


The Disruption of COVID-19 in Indonesia

The Disruption of COVID-19 in Indonesia

Edited by

Diah Kristina

**Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing**



The Disruption of COVID-19 in Indonesia

Edited by Diah Kristina

This book first published 2022

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2022 by Diah Kristina and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-5275-8656-1

ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-8656-7

This book is dedicated to all contributors involved in writing this book. In addition, this book is also presented to Universitas Sebelas Maret as a gift for the 46th anniversary of UNS. With the publication of this book, it certainly will boost UNS's reputation internationally. Hopefully this book is able to provide a clear picture of the developments and impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic from various scientific perspectives.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures.....	ix
List of Tables.....	x
Foreword	xi
Hywel Coleman	
Preface.....	xiii
Introduction	1
Diah Kristina	
Chapter 1	2
Government Policy-Making in Reaction to COVID-19	
Adi Sulistiyono, Fadhil Purnama Adi	
Chapter 2	19
Sea Transportation in Response to COVID-19	
Izza Mafruhah, Adenathera L. Dewa	
Chapter 3	31
COVID-19 and the Collapse of Small and Medium Enterprises	
Wisnu Untoro, Sarwoto	
Chapter 4	42
Changing Work Patterns brought about by COVID-19	
Hunik Sawitri, Sinto Sunaryo	
Chapter 5	54
Vulnerability to COVID-19	
Chatarina Muryani, Yasin Yusup, Sorja Koesuma	

Chapter 6	73
The Continuing Relevance of Heritage Concepts in the Context of COVID-19	
Diah Kristina, Ikke Dewi Pratama	
Chapter 7	83
New Ways of Shopping in the COVID-19 Era	
Winnie Astuti, Rufia Andisetyana Putri, Hakimatul Mukaromah, Lintang Suminar	
Chapter 8	94
Personal Hygiene in Response to COVID-19	
Adi Prayitno, Okid Parama Astirin	
Chapter 9	101
Changes in Students' Perceptions of Studying in the COVID-19 Era	
Slamet Subiyantoro	
Chapter 10	112
Digital Social Skills in the COVID-19 Era	
Sariyatun, Nur Fatah Abidin	
Chapter 11	124
Moral Decline and COVID-19	
Leo Agung S	
Chapter 12	135
The Environmental Impact of COVID-19	
Suranto Tjiptowibisono	
Chapter 13	151
Pranoto, Dwi Aries Himawanto, Nur Aziza Arifin	
References	167

LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 2-1 Maritime Industry and Connectivity (2) – Maritime Axis Implementation
- Figure 2-2 Four stages to overcoming covid19
- Figure 2-3. Global container ship over 8000 TEU in operation
- Figure 2-4. COVID-19 Timeline
- Figure 2-5. The map of influences and dependences between actors
- Figure 2-6. Convergences between actors
- Figure 4-1. Statistics of the number of confirmed cases, recovered patients, tests, and death toll due to the COVID-19
- Figure 4-2. The spread of COVID-19 in Indonesia
- Figure 5-1. Infographics of COVID-19 in Indonesia (Updated March 31, 2020)
- Figure 5-2. Infographics of COVID-19 in Indonesia (Updated March 8, 2021)
- Figure 5-3. The map of social vulnerability in Surakarta year 2021
- Figure 5-4. The map of economic vulnerability in Surakarta year 2021
- Figure 5-4. The map of economic vulnerability in Surakarta year 2021
- Figure 5-5. The map of physical vulnerability in Surakarta year 2021
- Chart 6-1: Relevant economic jargons
- Chart 6-2: Irrelevant economic jargons
- Chart. 6-3: Institutions to converse Javanese economic jargons
- Figure 7-1 Consumer preferences for jewelry shopping before (a) and during (b) the COVID-19 pandemic
- Figure 7-2. E-commerce and social-media as online jewelry shopping platform
- Graph 13- 1: Amount of waste collected at the last dumping site Putri Cempo.
- Graph 13-2: Waste production per day in ton in Surakarta.

LIST OF TABLES

- Table 3-1. Development of SMEs for the period 2007 - 2008
- Table 5-1. The highest number of COVID-19 cases in the world
- Table 5-2. Data of COVID-19 cases in each District in Surakarta
- Table 5-3. Parameters, weights, and social vulnerability scores
- Table 5-4. Parameters, weights, and economic vulnerability scores
- Table 5-5. Parameters, weights, and physical vulnerability score
- Table 5-6. Parameters, weights, and vulnerability classes of COVID-19
- Table 5-7. Calculation result of social vulnerability
- Table 5-8. The calculation result of economic vulnerability
- Table 5-9. The calculation result of physical vulnerability
- Table 5-10. Level of population vulnerability to pandemic of COVID-19
- Table 5- 11. COVID-19 confirmed cases and level of vulnerability in every sub-district in Surakarta
- Table 5-12. Correlation result between level of vulnerability and confirmed cases of COVID-19
- Table 6-1: Javanese forms of culture
- Table 7-1. Factors affecting preference for online jewelry shopping based on consumer perceptions
- Table 9-1. Data on perceptions of FKIP students towards online learning after 1 year of the pandemic
- Table 9-2. Factors that influence the process of change and adaptation in student perceptions
- Table 11-1. The character configuration in the context of the totality of psychological and socio-cultural processes
- Table 13-1: Waste volume at TPA "Putri Cempo Mojosongo" year 2012
- Table 2: Waste composition in year 2006 until 2009.

FOREWORD

HYWEL COLEMAN

HONORARY SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW,
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

Much has already been written about Covid and, no doubt, there is much more that will be written about it in the future. Indeed, despite deaths and disruption, the pandemic has given rise to a florescence of research in many different fields.

The central idea around which *The Disruption of COVID-19 in Indonesia* has been created is intriguing. Simply put, the book aims to reflect the diversity of Covid-related research and development activities which are taking place within a single institution, in this case Universitas Sebelas Maret (UNS) in Surakarta, Central Java, Indonesia. The disciplines represented here constitute just a sample of those taught in the university: UNS, as a large state university with 11 Faculties and a Graduate School, offers 66 Undergraduate programmes, 44 Masters programmes and 20 Doctoral programmes. The subjects explored in this volume range from sea transportation to digital social skills, from environmental impact to new ways of shopping, and from students' changing perceptions of what 'studying' means to the collapse of small and medium enterprises. Bringing these contributions together in one volume brings home to us, very vividly, the extent to which how life has changed for us all in the relatively short time since the pandemic first appeared, and how it is continuing to change.

The approach adopted here is original and truly multidisciplinary. As an independent observer of the development of the book over a period of approximately nine months, I have been impressed to see how the concept has been brought to fruition. Professor Diah Kristina, as editor, has encouraged the authors of individual chapters to discuss how their separate fields have been impacted by Covid and how they can contribute to tackling the problems created by the disease. The Editor has also brought the authors together from time to time to discuss broader issues relating to the creation of the book.

I congratulate the editor and all the members of her team for producing such an innovative contribution to the debates surrounding COVID-19, and for doing so in such a prompt and efficient manner.

Cinere, West Java
17 November 2021

PREFACE

This book is a multidisciplinary consideration of COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia consisting of Humanities, Social Sciences, Physical Sciences, Life Sciences, and Health Sciences. It offers varied perspectives on the positive and negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the human race and specifically on Indonesians.

This book provides insights into the social, cultural, political and economic impacts of COVID-19 written by a group of Indonesian academics who are experiencing the pandemic at first hand. They offer a counterbalance to the views of Western commentators.

The strength of this book lies in the empirical observations of Indonesian scholars who have been through learning experiences in both the East and the West. It is of interest to those working in many different fields, university students, the general public, and policy makers concerned with business and the economy, management, culture, and the provision of health services.

This book offers a range of responses to the COVID-19 pandemic from the perspectives of specialists across UNS. In thirteen chapters – preceded by a detailed editorial introduction - 13 researchers discuss aspects of the pandemic.

Sebelas Maret University – often referred to as UNS – is a major state university located in the city of Surakarta in the Indonesian province of Central Java. More than 40,000 students studying in 200 academic and vocational programmes, which are offered in 11 faculties and are taught by 1575 academic staff.

The city of Surakarta is one of the centres of Javanese culture and it is the home of two royal courts. It is also celebrated for the production of traditional handmade batik textiles, recognised by UNESCO as an example of the ‘intangible cultural heritage of humanity.’ The university is very conscious of its role as a centre of learning in this unique cultural context.

INTRODUCTION

DIAH KRISTINA

When the book is in your hand, I do hope that it provides you with another perspective on how disruptive COVID-19 has been to communities living in one of the biggest archipelago countries on earth, Indonesia. We are staggering and struggling to survive with very limited knowledge about the pandemic and ignorance of the people despite diverse efforts made by the government.

Contributions made by the book lie in the recommendations made by authors that include the need to get scientists involved in the government decision-making and a better selection of person in charge (PIC) in handling COVID-19 nationally. Empirically, revitalizing local wisdom such as creativity, innovation, and economic wisdom to improve social conditions due to the coronavirus seems to be beneficial to local communities.

In the context of education, maximizing aspects of self-directness on students reduces the cultural drawbacks of online learning activities that make students lose their responsibility of learning due to the absence of control and pressures from their teachers. Additionally, better synergy from all national and international stakeholders and promotion of hygienic behavior is a must. Limitations of this book may relate to the fact that it was written in the middle of COVID-19 outbreak and that more current phenomena might be not yet attended. Enjoy reading.

CHAPTER 1

GOVERNMENT POLICY-MAKING IN REACTION TO COVID-19

ADI SULISTIYONO¹, FADHIL PURNAMA ADI²

Universitas Sebelas Maret¹, Universitas Sebelas Maret²

People all over the world were talking about the Industry 4.0 era in early 2020, which has disrupted industries all over the world and influenced graduate demand for employment skills. While people were still discussing, planning, and anticipating the revolution, the Coronavirus, also known as COVID-19, emerged in the Chinese city of Wuhan [1] and spread throughout the world. This virus spreads through physical contact and affects the human respiratory tract fast. The virus had such a large impact that it only took three months [2] for it to transform from an epidemic to the COVID-19 [3] pandemic (WHO, 2020), infecting hundreds of countries both developed and developing. The unexplained nature of COVID-19 [4] and its unexpected spread [5] caused the number of confirmed and suspected instances of infection to skyrocket in just a few days. The virus spreads by physical contact and occasionally infects people without creating any symptoms that may be identified by the victim, causing even more panic. As a result, many towns were infected in large numbers, and many countries were obliged to enforce a lockdown [6] for more than a month to stop the virus from spreading. Due to social distancing rules, people were forced to carry out all of their tasks at home, including work, during these periods of lockdown. Social and religious activities were also halted. Many economic activities also came to a total halt for several months, causing even more paranoia [7].

COVID-19 has had a frightening effect on the world. The virus's effects were significantly more severe than the industry 4.0 Revolution's. It has had a significant psychological impact on many people, producing stress and panic and making them suspicious of one another. Many healthcare workers have died, economic problems have worsened, many hotel and restaurant

businesses have gone bankrupt, many workers have lost their jobs, many impoverished people have become even poorer, and economic growth has slowed dramatically. Despite the Indonesian government's efforts to anticipate the impact of COVID-19 early in the pandemic, such as declaring it a national disaster, implementing large-scale social distancing restrictions (PSBB) in some districts, and issuing several Government Regulations in Place of Law (Peraturan pemerintah pengganti undang-undang/ Perppu) on COVID-19, the number of cases continued to rise due to a lack of strict enforcement of these regulations and a lack of consistency on the part of the central government. The country's economic situation was in a crisis stage two months after large-scale social distancing restrictions were implemented, causing the central authorities to panic. As a result, the government enacted new 'New Normal' regulations. Unfortunately, these policies appeared to overlap without accomplishing any of their goals, resulting in widespread confusion that was aggravated by poor communication between government officials and the general people, leading to further dissatisfaction.

COVID-19 has had a frightening effect on the world. The virus's effects were significantly more severe than the industry 4.0 Revolution's. It has had a significant psychological impact on many people, producing stress and panic and making them suspicious of one another. Many healthcare workers have died, economic problems have worsened, many hotel and restaurant businesses have gone bankrupt, many workers have lost their jobs, many impoverished people have become even poorer, and economic growth has slowed dramatically. Despite the Indonesian government's efforts to anticipate the impact of COVID-19 early in the pandemic, such as declaring it a national disaster, implementing large-scale social distancing restrictions (PSBB) in some districts, and issuing several Government Regulations in Place of Law (Perppu) on COVID-19, the number of cases continued to rise due to a lack of strict enforcement of these regulations and a lack of consistency on the part of the central government. The country's economic situation was in a crisis stage two months after large-scale social distancing restrictions were implemented, causing the central authorities to panic. As a result, the government enacted new 'New Normal' regulations. Unfortunately, these policies appeared to overlap without accomplishing any of their goals, resulting in widespread confusion that was aggravated by poor communication between government officials and the general people, leading to further dissatisfaction.

These unanticipated turbulences were mostly caused by the nature of COVID-19, which makes transmission difficult to manage, as well as uncertainty about when the epidemic will stop and a plethora of confusing

laws. In such a case, the law must take a more prominent role in social engineering to reduce the risks associated with dealing with the community's disturbances produced by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Discussion

- **Disruption in the community due to the COVID-19 pandemic.**

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the world economy has been terrifying. One of the economic factors that have been affected is production, which is of course closely related to human beings. Coughing, shortness of breath, chest pain, and pneumonia are symptoms of COVID-19 infection. Due to the speed at which the virus spreads, many countries have implemented lockdowns to prevent it from spreading. People were told not to leave their houses and to avoid non-essential activity outside the home during these lockdowns. As a result, many manufacturers and businesses closed their doors or stayed open but with lower production.

This phenomenon created a huge problem for the global economy. In one report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) referred to it as the Great Lockdown. The impact of enforcing lockdown on the economy was evident from the poor economic growth in the first quarter of 2020, according to data released by several G20 countries. It is a fact that the economic output of G20 countries contributes more than 80% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the world therefore, the economic contraction that occurred in many of the G20 countries was a clear indication that the global economy was in trouble [8].

Several of Indonesia's commercial partners saw negative economic growth in the first quarter of 2020, with the following figures: Singapore -2.2, Hong Kong -8.9, European Union -2.7, and China -6.8. Meanwhile, some countries continued to see significant economic development, which was lower than the previous quarter. In the United States growth decreased from 2.3 to 0.3 percent, in South Korea from 2.3 to 1.3 percent, and in Vietnam from 6.8 to 3.8 percent. Indonesia's economy shrank significantly from 4.97 percent in the fourth quarter of 2019 to 2.97 percent in the first quarter of 2020. The significant contraction in the first quarter of 2020 was unexpected, bearing in mind that the physical distancing rules and large-scale social restrictions were not implemented until April 2020.

The World Economic Forum (WEF) saw that the spread of COVID-19 had started to affect the world economy. Many countries predicted that their

economy would experience a recession. Moreover, the economic growth of some countries would be negative. The Managing Director of the WEF, Saadia Zahidi, explained that several Middle Eastern countries were competing to issue an economic stimulus to prevent the impact of COVID-19 in the industrial sector. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that 170 countries would have negative per capita income growth in 2020, and developing countries would be three times more likely than developed countries to struggle with COVID-19 due to their lack of technology and healthcare infrastructure. Tackling COVID-19 is not only about focusing on domestic policies; it also requires international cooperation [9] (Liputan6.com, 2020b).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF and the World Bank predicted that Indonesia would be able to achieve positive economic development. Indonesia was thought to be one of three countries capable of surviving a pandemic produced by a deadly virus that originated in China. "The projection for Asia, including Indonesia, has come from two agencies, the World Bank and the IMF," Indonesian Finance Minister Sri Mulyani stated. Only three countries, they claim, can live beyond 0% or maintain positive territory. Indonesia, Tiongkok, and India are the countries in question. In the first and second quarters of this year, Indonesia's economy is predicted to rise by only 2.3 percent. Meanwhile, in the fourth quarter of 2020, growth will be stronger." [9,10]

During the global economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the areas most affected were logistic activities, trading activities, and tourism sectors, the latter being forced to close as a result of the foreign travel bans issued by several governments. The impact on the trade sector in particular affected export and import, raw materials, and capital materials. Meanwhile, the diminishing production, scarcity of goods, and high prices led to inflation. Rising prices accompanied by falling incomes are a fatal condition for purchasing power. China still supplied several raw materials to Indonesian industries, despite the ongoing restrictions caused by quarantines enforced in districts to limit the spread of COVID-19.

This phenomenon was closely linked to the role of communication technology. Due to the rapid spread of information, people's behavior changed greatly. The widespread panic created an imbalance between supply and demand. The global economic crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic caused the stock market index to collapse. The exchange rate of the Indonesian rupiah against the US dollar weakened after a large number

of foreign investors left the Indonesian financial market, causing the stock market to plummet and leaving a negative effect on the domestic economy.

After the onset of panic in the global market and the turmoil in the oil market, the value of the US dollar became stronger. It was thought likely that the rupiah would continue to weaken against the US dollar. The COVID-19 outbreak was not only affecting people's health but was also having a detrimental impact on the economy. It was due to the higher maintenance and production costs that had to be borne by the government when more workers became infected. Additionally, health risks increased and affected productivity from an economic standpoint. The high maintenance costs resulting from a large number of infected workers required serious handling, firm, well-targeted policies to resolve the economic crisis. The implementation of social distancing not only limited people's physical interaction but also disrupted their economic behavior. However, the decision to implement social distancing was considered better than the decision to enforce lockdown and the herd immunity policy. An enforced lockdown would make the economic growth rate even worse. In addition, the decreasing supply of food and other necessities caused prices to soar, and there were fears that this scarcity of goods would trigger social unrest. Therefore, the Indonesian government issued a three-part stimulus, namely fiscal, non-fiscal and economic, to encourage economic growth. These three stimuli were related to the needs of the people in the fields of business, taxes, and so on. The Indonesian Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani, coordinated with several institutions such as the Bank of Indonesia, the Financial Services Authority (OJK), the Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Financial System Stability Committee (KSSK).

President Joko Widodo announced various choices as a result of this coordination in a Presidential Decree. The three triggers listed above had an impact on many aspects of society and were intended to mitigate COVID-19's negative effects, as outlined below [11]:

1. Fiscal stimulus to encourage economic growth, including:

Temporary exemption from income tax or PPh article 21 for 6 months for manufacturing industries. It was intended to maintain the purchasing power of workers in the industry. This regulation ran from April to September 2020.

- A six-month delay in payment of import income tax or PPh article 22. This regulation ran from April to September 2020.

- Reduction of income tax or PPh article 25 by 60% for 6 months. It was hoped that this would provide a cash flow for industries with tax delays. This regulation ran from April to September 2020.
- Tax exemption for restaurants and hotels for 6 months. This regulation was applied to 10 tourist destinations and 33 cities and districts and ran from April to September 2020.
- Accelerated distribution of social assistance, subsidies for public housing, and introduction of a ‘worker’s card’ (*Kartu pekerja*).
- Discount on air tickets of up to 50% for every 25 seats for flights to 10 major tourist destinations.
- Insurance and compensation for healthcare workers treating patients infected by COVID-19.
- An accelerated period of 6 months was given for the relaxation of Value Added Tax or VAT refunds. The hope was that this would help with liquidating companies impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Relaxation of Value Added Tax or VAT refunds was accelerated for 6 months. It was hoped that this would help with the liquidity of companies impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

2. Non-Fiscal Stimulus related to export and import

The government issued several non-fiscal stimuli that it hoped would help export and import activities during the COVID-19 pandemic. These were:

- Acceleration of the export and import process for reputable businessmen.
- Acceleration of the export and import process by using a national logistic system.
- Simplification or reduction of limited prohibitions on export activities to facilitate export activities and increase export competitiveness.
- Simplification or reduction of limited import prohibitions for companies importing strategic food products, horticultural producers and commodities, medicine products, medicinal ingredients, and food products.

3. Stimulus for the Financial Sector

Several stimuli were issued to help the economic sector. These were:

- The Financial Services Authority (OJK) issued a relaxation or concession for issuers to carry out share buy-backs without going through the mechanism of a general meeting of shareholders.
- Relaxation of credit restructuring.
- Relaxation of payment of social security program contributions for workers in sectors affected by COVID-19.
- BI (Bank of Indonesia) provisions for underlying transactions for foreign investors were expanded to provide alternatives for protecting the rupiah exchange rate. Decrease in Indonesia's benchmark interest rate by 50 BPS and mandatory minimum demand deposits in Rupiah and foreign currencies.
- In a new Government Regulation in place of Law (Perppu), the government decided to increase the State Expenditure Budget for the year 2020 and the financial budget for handling COVID-19 by IDR 405.1 trillion. This budget was allocated to several different sectors, as follows: IDR 75 trillion for the healthcare sector; IDR 110 trillion for the social safety net; IDR 70.1 trillion for tax incentives and People's Business Credit (KUR) stimulus; IDR 150 trillion for financing the national economic recovery program, including credit restructuring and guarantees as well as financing for MSMEs and the business sector to strengthen economic resilience and recovery.

There were several criticisms of the government's allocation policy, as follows: 1) From the budget allocation policy issued by the government to manage the COVID-19 pandemic, it was evident that the government was prioritizing economic aspects rather than the healthcare sector [12]. 2) As a consequence of the stimulus policy, these extraordinary funds increased the budget deficit by 5.07%, which meant it had exceeded the deficit threshold stated in Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 17 of 2003 about State Finances. As explained in Article 12, the budget deficit is limited to a maximum of 3% of gross domestic product (GDP). However, the relaxation of this law was made possible with the new Regulation in place of Law (Perppu) about COVID-19 [13]. 3) The government was slow to decide on the budget reallocation for handling the COVID-19 pandemic, which was an indication that the government had failed to act quickly enough to deal with the threat of the outbreak [14]. 4) The economic stimulus provided by the government through Perppu Number 1 of 2020 should have been accompanied by adequate and appropriate fiscal and monetary policies to encourage faster and more realistic time efficiency and effectiveness of the policies. At the same time as the technical scheme and budget distribution flow for affected sectors such as healthcare, social, economic, and other

strategic sectors, there was also a need for the allocation of funds for people who had lost their livelihoods due to COVID-19, supported by valid and up-to-date data to ensure that the right people were targeted.

- **The Failure of Law to Act as a Tool of Social Engineering.**

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been horrifying and disrupted almost every aspect of social life. In this kind of situation, law plays an important role in mitigating the risks happening in society. According to Roscoe Pound, the law can be used as a tool of social engineering to influence the behavior of people who are experiencing social paranoia as a result of a downturn in the economy.

According to Roscoe Pound, hoping that the legal decisions handed down by judges will have the ability to change human behavior. The word “law” in this instance refers to the decisions made by judges in the Anglo-Saxon or Common Law legal system. The meaning of the word “tool” should not be interpreted literally as an “instrument”, but rather as a “medium” because the law is related to social contexts such as factors of belief, conviction, and culture. Roscoe Pound's theory is used in three main dimensions:

1. Law functions as a tool to regulate and manage society by
2. Balancing the fulfillment of the needs or interests of the community.
3. Providing supervision to maintain and continue human civilization [15].

Concerning this, Lyoid states that:

“According to Pound, the law should realize and protect six social interests: common security, social institutions (like family, religion and political rights), sense of morality, social goods, economic, cultural and political progress, and protection of an individual's life. The last of these 'social interests' Pound deems to be the most important. To realize those goals, a new sociological jurisprudence, Pound argues, must be developed”.

The term “social engineering” is used by Pound when explaining the function and role of law and lawyers. According to Pound, a lawyer should act like an engineer who plans to construct a building or a bridge. The engineer will first prepare and design a plan, then gather the necessary materials. Next, the engineer will make some adjustments between the materials gathered and the original plan to ensure that they suit the purpose. In this context, Pound makes an analogy between an engineer and a lawyer who plans to make a law. A lawyer needs to have a good plan and should

be able to make adjustments and find the right balance between various interests to create a legal construction (law) that is strong and functional [17].

Pound's theory was a response to a period when tremendous social change was taking place in America, while at the same time lawyers were stuck in a static mindset that positioned the law as a 'fixed star'. Pound states that by analogizing law to a tool of social change, lawyers and judges must abandon their rigid attitudes and make the law adaptable to and able to accommodate social change. In this way, lawyers and judges will be able to help people to achieve maximum satisfaction for their aspirations and needs by suppressing to a minimum any friction and conflict.

Based on the explanation above, Pound explains that the duty of judges, lawyers, and legislators is to carry out "social engineering". By identifying and protecting the needs of society, the law will guarantee the existence of social cohesion. According to Pound, interests are the demands and wishes that human beings seek to achieve individually and collectively. Interests are legalized by giving them status as legal rights. The main objective of the concept of social engineering is "to construct as efficient a structure of society as possible which requires the satisfaction of wants with the minimum of friction and waste of resources. Therefore, Law should work to achieve a balance between competing interests within society [18].

In Indonesia, Pound's theory was adopted by Mochtar Kusumaatmadja in the Theory of Law and Development, which was first discussed when he spoke at a national law seminar in 1973. This theory was also included in the legal material in Pelita I when he was Minister of Justice (1970-1975). There are two main ideas in this theory, about legal education and changes in society. The law and development theory puts forward the premise that change. As a consequence of a developing society, it should be carried out regularly. According to Mochtar, regular change can be obtained by laws and regulations, court decisions, or a combination of both. Irregular change through force must therefore be resisted [19]. In the practical application of the Indonesian government, the concept of law as a tool of social engineering was implemented by Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, by using Indonesian law not only as a tool but also as a vehicle of social reform [20].

From the time COVID-19 first appeared in Wuhan, the Indonesian government should have acted quickly and anticipated the threat so that not as many people would have been infected by the virus. At the beginning of February 2020 [21], COVID-19 had already caused the onset of a pandemic

that had spread to several countries. In early February, the Indonesian government should have complied with the mandate to announce the existence of this dangerous virus as stated in the Health Law: "The government periodically determines and announces the types and spread of diseases that have the potential to be contagious and/or will spread in a short time, as well as mentioning areas that can become the source of transmission." (Article 154 paragraph 1 of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 36 of 2009 concerning Health). The preamble in the fourth line of the 1945 Constitution states "... to protect the entire Indonesian nation and all the blood of Indonesia and to advance the general welfare. ...". Furthermore, Article 28H paragraph 1 states that: "Everyone has the right to live in physical and mental prosperity, to have a place to live, and to have a good and healthy living environment and the right to receive health services". On the other hand, the government ministers [22-23] and the President [24] failed to respond seriously to the threat of COVID-19. They ignored the mandate of the constitution and the law. It was not until March 2, 2020, that President Joko Widodo announced for the first time that two positive cases of COVID-19 had been identified in Indonesia [25]. as a Public Health Emergency.

The first of these regulations, Perppu No 1/2020 about handling the COVID-19 pandemic, did not receive a positive response; on the contrary, it sparked a tremendous deal of debate. This was because Article 27 paragraph (1) states that: the costs incurred by the Government and/or member institutions of the Financial System Stability Committee (KSSK) in the implementation of state revenue policies, including tax policies, expenditure policies, and including regional financial sector policies, financing policies, financial system stability policies, and the national economic recovery program, constitute part of the economic costs of saving the economy from crisis and are not state losses. Article 27 paragraph (2) states that members of the KSSK, the Secretary of the KSSK, members of the KSSK secretariat, officials or employees of the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Indonesia, the Financial Services Authority, and the Deposit Insurance Corporation, as well as other officials involved in the implementation of this regulation, cannot be prosecuted in either a civil or criminal trial if they performed their duties in good faith and under the proviso. Article 27 paragraph (3) specifies that any action taken in reliance on this rule, including decision-making, cannot be the subject of a lawsuit brought before the Administrative Court. Despite the controversy and the potential for corruption in the distribution of the COVID-19 stimulus, the majority of political parties have given their agreement at the DPR plenary session on May 12, 2020, for the ratification of Government Regulation in

place of Law (Perppu) No. 1/2020 to be officially enacted as law. From the point of view of the small factions, Perppu 1/2020 was approved by 8 factions, with only the faction of PKS (Partai Kesejahteraan Rakyat) rejecting it, the reason being that they considered it would not help the poor people. Hence, Perppu Number 1 of 2020 was authorized to become Law No. 2 of 2020, was issued and signed by President Joko Widodo on May 16, 2020, and became enforceable on May 18, 2020. Article 1 of Law No. 2 of 2020, states that "Government Regulation in place of Legislation Law Number 1 the Year 2020 ... has been authorized to become law and is attached as an inseparable part of this law.

Because all of the money spent could be labeled as economic costs, rather than state losses, enacting this Government Regulation in place of Law about the handling of COVID-19 as a fully ratified law increased the potential for it to be exploited to seize state funding without being subject to law enforcement. In addition, this law also prepared stimulus funds amounting to IDR 405.1 trillion, with IDR 75 trillion for the health sector, IDR 110 trillion for the social safety net, IDR 70.1 trillion for tax incentives and People's Business Credit (KUR) stimulus, and IDR 150 trillion for financing the national economic recovery program. In a situation where the law had allowed leniency in the management of these funds, without the possibility of being considered detrimental to state finances, this was the equivalent of handing over the distribution of IDR 405.1 trillion without any accountability. This would be extremely dangerous if the distribution was handled by people under the influence of government or party leaders who sought to achieve personal gain or to profit their party.

The Chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Firlil Bahuri, should be commended for his proactive actions in reminding all parties not to conduct illegal acts of corruption during the COVID-19 outbreak. During times of disaster, he added, perpetrators of corruption could face the death penalty, notably in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, goods and services were procured promptly and effectively, and everyone agreed that the people's safety was the most important consideration. Despite the fact that, under the new restrictions, any money spent was an economic expense rather than a state loss, the underlying foundation was a good intention [26].

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic gave rise to several overlapping legal products:1. The policy to establish the COVID-19 Task Force [27] overlapped with the existence of the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) [28] in handling the COVID-19 outbreak. Based on Presidential

Decree Number 7 of 2020, the President formed a Task Force for Accelerating the Handling of the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID 19). Its structure, duties, and functions had many similarities with BNPB. The head of the Task Force was the current Head of BNPB [29], and the secretariat of the Task Force was run by the BNPB secretariat. Article 4 of Presidential Decree No. 7/2020 stipulated that the structure of the Task Force consisted of a steering element and an implementing element, which was the same as the BNPB structure, referring to Article 11 concerning the Disaster Management Law. The steering element of BNPB was much bigger than the steering element of the Task Force. In Article 13 paragraph (2) of Presidential Decree Number 1 of 2019 concerning BNPB, the steering element is said to consist of 11 Government agencies; whereas in Article 8 of Presidential Decree Number 7 of 2020 the steering element only consists of 4 Government Agencies. The only difference was that the person directly in charge of the steering element in the Task Force was the Minister while the steering element in BNPB was managed by officials at the level of echelon I. A or I.B. This complicated matters further, since the Head of the Task. This level of national cooperation necessitated high-level political support. As a result, as stressed in Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, it was more suitable to delegate authority to the President. It should also be noted that the Task Force steering element's responsibilities, as outlined in Article 5 of Presidential Decree 7/2020, were identical to the BNPB steering element's responsibilities, as outlined in Article 11 of Presidential Decree 1/2019. Meanwhile, the Task Force's implementing elements' responsibilities, as outlined in Article 6 of Presidential Decree 7/2020, were consistent with the BNPB's implementing elements' responsibilities, as outlined in Articles 16 to 20 of Presidential Decree 1/2019. This complicated matters even more, because the Task Force's leader was also the head of the BNPB, and his position was equivalent to that of a Minister. The Task Force's leader should ideally be the President or Vice President, as they have the authority to issue directions on how to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, which had infected numerous government sectors and spread across the country by this point. Several policies were declared, starting with local governments' decisions to close schools, limit outside activities, restrict transportation, and restrict access, all of which necessitated cross-sectoral coordination and clear and strategic lines of command. Another similarity between the Task Force and BNPB was that they both had regional institutions formed by the local government. These similarities raised questions about the effectiveness of the Task Force because of its overlapping role with BNPB. There was a high probability that the existence of the Task Force would only be an extension of the

disaster management bureaucracy which had been previously regulated in the Disaster Management Law [30]. As a result, in its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the role of the Task Force was not optimal and its orientation was unclear, whether to choose physical distancing or PSBB or lockdown or herd immunity.

The large-scale social restrictions (PSBB) policy was too bureaucratic.

The Minister of Health officially ratified Minister of Health Regulation (Permenkes) Number 9 of 2020 concerning the Guidelines for Large-Scale Social Restrictions in Accelerating the Handling of COVID-19 on Friday, April 3, 2020. Instead of accelerating the handling of the pandemic, this regulation added more bureaucracy and even tended to abandon the mandate of Law Number 6 of 2018 concerning Regional Quarantine, thereby increasing the potential to slow down the government's handling of the COVID-19 outbreak. As stipulated in Article 4 of Minister of Health Regulation Number 9 of 2020, local governments were obligated to submit applications based on several data, including the increase in the number of cases by time, the distribution of cases by time, and reports of local transmission. On the other hand, Central Government had already collected and processed these data in every region in Indonesia based on the reports from all the COVID-19 test laboratories designated by the Ministry of Health. From these data, it should have been possible to determine which regions needed to implement the PSBB policy, in which case it would not have been necessary to wait for a request from the local government to enforce the PSBB policy (Article 6 paragraph (1) PP 21/2020 in conjunction with Article 3 paragraph (1) Permenkes 9/2020). The bureaucracy was stretched even longer with Article 7 Permenkes 9/2020, which stipulated that proposals or requests from the regional government would be reviewed by a team that had been formed by the Ministry of Health under the Decree of the Minister of Health of the Republic of Indonesia Number HK.01.07/MENKES/231/2020 concerning the Team for Determining Large-Scale Social Restrictions for Accelerating the Handling of COVID-19. This team consisted of 48 people from various agencies so the next challenge was to determine the technical details for coordinating the implementation and to make the decision whether or not the applications submitted by regional governments would be accepted.

The policy about supermarket operating hours was not synchronized with regional policies.

Minister of Trade Circular Number 317/M-DAG/SD/04/2020 concerning the Continuous Supply of Goods for the Public during the COVID-19 Pandemic allowed supermarkets to stay open later than 22.00. This circular was released on Friday, April 3, 2020. This concession applied mainly to retail outlets selling necessities, although in some areas closing times were no later than 20.00.

Many rules and policies were implemented without synchronization between all the different stakeholders.

A member of Commission V of the House Representatives (DPR) from the PKS faction, Syahrul Aidi Maazat, criticized the overlapping policies of the central government regarding its handling of COVID-19 [32]. The four stakeholders who were involved in dealing with the pandemic were the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Villages and Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration, and Ministry of Social Affairs. The consequence of this overlapping and the frequent changing of regulations in these four ministries was that local governments were confused in their work.

There were also conflicting policies concerning the prohibition of motorcycle taxis from carrying passengers.

Minister of Health Regulation (Permenkes) No.9 of 2020 concerning PSBB Guidelines in Handling COVID-19 prohibited motorcycle taxis from carrying passengers. However, Minister of Transportation Regulation No. 18 of 2020, on the contrary, allowed the carrying of passengers by motorcycle taxis. According to OMBUDSMAN Jakarta Raya, there were many other overlapping regulations related to the Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB). This meant that the PSBB policy was not optimal for handling the COVID-19 pandemic. Several policies were not only overlapping but also counter-productive. The policy prohibiting people from traveling to their hometowns to celebrate Eid al-Fitr changed several times, causing public confusion. On April 9, 2020, President Joko Widodo announced a strict travel ban [34] (kompas.com, 2020b) for all civil servants, including police and military personnel and BUMN employees, which prohibited them from traveling to their hometowns during the holiday period for Eid al-Fitr 1441 Hijriah or 2020. This policy aimed to minimize the mass movement of people from Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang,

Bekasi, or Jabodetabek areas, which were the epicenter of COVID-19, to other regions. On April 21, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, issued another official announcement, banning all travel during the Eid al-Fitr period [35]. To prevent a further spread of the COVID-19 outbreak, this Presidential Policy was followed up by Minister of Transportation Regulation Number 25 of 2020 concerning Transportation Control during the Eid Al-Fitr 1441 Hijriah Holiday Period to Prevent the Spread of COVID-19. The ban was imposed on April 24, 2021, and sanctions were imposed on May 7, 2021, for anyone who insisted on traveling during the Eid al-Fitr period. This conflicted with a previous announcement on April 2, 2020, by the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, who said that the government would not prohibit people from traveling home for Eid al-Fitr. However, he did ask for greater public awareness and encouraged people not to return to their hometowns to prevent the transmission of COVID-19 [36]. On May 6, 2020, the Minister of Transportation [37] restored the operating permits for all modes of transportation to carry passengers outside the region, revoking the previous prohibition on transportation operations that had been imposed to prevent widespread travel. On the same date, the Chairperson of the Task Force for Accelerating the Handling of COVID-19, Doni Monardo [38], emphasized that there were no changes to the regulations regarding the Eid al-Fitr travel restrictions which meant that all travel during the holiday period was still prohibited.

The policy prohibiting people from traveling to their hometowns was no different from the regional quarantine rules stipulated in Law Number 6 of 2018 concerning Health Quarantine.

However, the government was reluctant to implement such a regional quarantine policy and preferred instead to implement the PSBB policy and prohibit travel during the Eid al-Fitr holiday period. These steps taken by the government were an effort to avoid the responsibilities outlined in Law Number 6 of 2018 because if regional quarantine was implemented strictly, the government would face the obligation to fulfill people's basic needs. As stated in Article 55 Paragraph (1), during an area quarantine, the basic life necessities for people and food for livestock in the quarantine area are the responsibility of the central government. The government's decision not to implement regional quarantine, but instead to prohibit travel during the Eid al-Fitr holiday period was due to economic considerations because with the implementation of regional quarantine the government would have to provide food for the public. The government prioritized the prevention of