

The Role of Intelligence and State Policies in International Security

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Edited by

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PREFACE

The understanding of security has changed since the end of the Cold War. This understanding has also changed the characteristics of intelligence. States need to improve their securities and policies with new intelligence tactics. Moreover, the new security policies and intelligence tactics should also be harmonised with the new threats or risks, because risks and threats have been changing or evolving; for example, 20 years ago the international community talked about terrorism, but now the international community is talking about cyber risk/threats, hybrid warfare strategies etc. In addition, internal conflicts or wars caused the neighbouring or regional/global powers to turn to different intelligence activities. The new conflicts that have arisen have also caused new security problems for states and the international community.

Although intelligence activities have been used in the past, it has been considered as an academic discipline after the First World War. With the 1940s, intelligence began to be considered as a discipline and studies were carried out on it. The Strategic Intelligence book written by Sherman Kent can therefore be regarded as the first academic work in this field. Alp Cenk Arslan analyses the Intelligence Analysis in his article. In his study, Arslan states that intelligence analysis is important against strategic and tactical surprises that may arise in the future and that the analyses to be made can be effective on the security policies to be created.

Dr. Gamze Helvacıköylü and Ferdi Güçyetmez analyse the changing nature of security and intelligence in their article. Dr. Helvacıköylü and Güçyetmez claim that individuals have started to take more roles in the system with globalization. This situation has caused individuals to come to the fore more in terms of security. In addition, the authors state that today's security issues cannot be explained only by states' security, and therefore various security areas such as food security, water security, energy security and biological security have emerged today. Emerging new security problems can also affect the security of states, and therefore intelligence has an important position at this point. For this reason, Dr. Helvacıköylü and Güçyetmez talk about the importance of diversifying the intelligence activities of the states,

taking additional measures to address new problems, and cooperation at the same time.

The developments in Syria, especially in the last 10 years, have caused a large migration wave for the international community, while on the other hand, allowing terrorist organizations to organize more active attacks in this geography. The intervention of foreign states in the internal problems in Syria caused the problem to go from being regional to international. Asst. Prof. Dr. Fatma Anıl Öztop and Prof. Dr. Ertan Efeğil, in their study, analyse why foreign states are involved in conflicts within another country. The problem, which started as an internal conflict in 2011, has grown with the involvement of global powers and has not been resolved even today. Asst. Prof. Dr. Öztop and Prof. Dr. Efeğil indicate in their study that the involvement of foreign states in internal conflicts is mostly due to economic, political or military reasons. On the other hand, the authors also state that the involvement of global powers in internal conflicts in another state can weaken the other state in competition. In general, the involvement of the regional countries in the conflict, especially in Syria, along with the global powers, is within the framework of strategic interests and these interests are explained in detail by Asst. Prof. Dr. Öztop and Prof. Dr. Efeğil.

The wave of immigration affected the neighbouring states as well as the European Union, and the Union started to implement a new border security policy. On the other hand, by making an agreement with Turkey, it tried to keep the wave of migration away from its own lands. Beril Hakverir explains the details of the border security system of the European Union in her article. Hakverir states that the new border security system of the EU is to ensure the safety of citizens. This new policy put into practice by the European Union is criticized for humanitarian reasons and it is constantly stated that the agreement signed with Turkey is against human rights, which is its own value. The European Union, which gives importance to human values and therefore offers more immigrants the opportunity to live on its own lands, contradicts its own values with the policies it has implemented after the Syria crisis.

Another study on Syria was written by Dr. Ahmet Ateş. Dr. Ateş tried to analyse the effects of the Syrian civil war on Turkish intelligence in the historical process. In the study, it is claimed that Turkish Intelligence supported anti-Assad activities and various meetings were held for this purpose between 2011 and 2013. It is stated that especially after the terrorist attacks related to the Assad administration, Turkey started to act more actively against the Assad administration. On the other hand, although there

were opposing activities during the conflict process, it is also claimed that cooperation negotiations or meetings for the peaceful resolution of problems were held during this period. The developments that took place between 2014 and 2020 were mostly terrorist attacks, ISIS's active policy in the region, and the YPG, another branch of the PKK, operating in the region. The fact that the YPG terrorist organization's activity in Syria is a threat to Turkey's territorial integrity has caused the Turkish intelligence to work more actively in the region. Although the YPG is not recognized as a terrorist organization by some states, it is a terrorist organization because it is the Syrian branch of the PKK and attacks against Turkey. On the other hand, the presence of ISIS in the region and its attacks also caused Turkey to be active in Syria. Dr. Ateş evaluated the recent Turkish intelligence activities in Syria in the context of ISIS, YPG and Assad.

Muhammed Ali Baig and Hassan Tariq examined the economic and political effects of Covid-19 on China. Baig and Tariq claim that although China is a growing global economic power, the Covid-19 process has affected this situation. In particular, it is claimed in the study that the USA changed its view of China from China Threat to China Virus during this process has accelerated the competition between the two countries. Baig and Tariq also state that the economy needs time to recover globally, especially in China, due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Merve Suna Özel Özcan and Asst. Prof. Dr. Hatice Çelik examined the changing security nature of China-Russia relations in the post-Cold War period. In the study, it is claimed that there has been a change in the post-cold war relations between the two countries that acted in cooperation until the 1970s but their relation witnessed a change after the 1970s. Both countries come to the fore as the influential powers in the Asian geography. Although the actors showed similar stance against the USA camp during the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the bipolar world order came to an end and systemic change took place. With the new economic system it has put into practice, China has come to the fore as a rising power and has started to become a global power today. Although Russia tries to reach its former political and economic power with Putin, China has become a global market in any case and is trying to expand its sphere of influence by operating on the axis of soft power politically. Although it is stated in the study that it is difficult for the two countries to act together compared to in the past, it is discussed that there may be a mobilization in the long term depending on the changes in the priorities and interests of the two countries.

Another important work was written by Mariam Ariba. In her study, Ariba tried to analyse whether there is a relationship between the two by examining the balance of representation and culture of the other. She also applied Game Theory to media discourse and politics, examining how media representation is used to resolve conflict between violent and nonviolent aspects of civilizations. This study has an important quality due to the application of game theory to the field. In addition, different events were analysed within the framework of game theory, and Ariba has tried to reveal a new construction of media representation in global, regional and national discourse.

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CHAPTER ONE

WHY INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS MATTERS?¹

ALP CENK ARSLAN

1. Introduction

Intelligence analysis is a critical phase of the intelligence process. It has its own mechanism, models, and dynamics. The idiosyncratic structure of analysis makes it one of the most disputable topics of intelligence studies. As a matter of fact, not only the academic field of intelligence studies but also the intelligence community has been discussing the issue for a long time. Intelligence failures mostly create costs for the analytic units of the agencies, on other hand. This phenomenon is also a driver for the discussion upon the analytic process, for certain.

Analysis within the context of intelligence affairs is the specific evaluative stage of the process. It is the exploitation of cognitive methods to evaluate data and test hypotheses in a secret process (Johnston 2005, 4-5). It is the critical pillar of the process, requiring strategic decisions during the employment of its techniques (Lowenthal 2012).

However, even though these definitions seem clear, there is still a necessity to evaluate the dynamics of intelligence analysis. The related questions range from failures to suggested techniques and methodology. The working style of the analysts is also among the questions waiting to be responded to.

Yet, a significant question comes to the forefront especially in this chapter: why is intelligence analysis central for the intelligence process? As a first response, intelligence analysis is vital, because it prevents strategic and tactical surprises. As a second, analytic capabilities allow creating an

¹ For a structurally similar study conducted by the author, please see Arslan, A. C. (2020). *Intelligence Analysis: Reproduction of Information*, Ankara: Turkish National Police Academy.

influence over an entity for the security of a state. These two functions put the analytic process in the first place.

Responding to this question and the other main questions regarding intelligence analysis requires the evaluation of the literature of intelligence studies. I will try to answer several of these questions by surveying and critically engaging the researches within the literature. I primarily intend to evaluate the importance and restrictions of intelligence analysis, analyze the role of intelligence analysis while trying to prevent surprise attacks, and the significance of intelligence analysis in terms of creating an influence for the security of a state. Finally, I will present the main positions in the long-term discussion of the methodology of intelligence analysis.

2. Intelligence Analysis within the Theory of Intelligence

Despite the ambiguity and secrecy in the nature of intelligence affairs, a proper intelligence theory is difficult to form. This leads to several consequences in the sphere of intelligence studies. Yet, intelligence studies have updated itself to the highly-changing nature of world affairs since its foundations in the mid-20th century. It needs to have an appropriate theoretical context, in order to comprehend the entirety of this academic field. Intelligence analysis as a vital part of the intelligence production process, is among the most prominent discussion points of the field as well. Under a theoretical umbrella, one should focus on the discussions of the proper definition and place of intelligence analysis within the intelligence production process first.

Intelligence Analysis: the Whole Process or a Phase within the Cycle?

The literature of intelligence studies defines intelligence analysis in a dual way. By naming analysis, some refer to the whole intelligence production process, while the other accepts it as a phase within the intelligence cycle. The motivation behind the reference to the intelligence production process may come with the idea that all phases of the intelligence cycle are related to the analytic perspective to some extent. However, it is required to evaluate the analysis phase with its characteristics and functions. By doing so, I mean the analytic and evaluative phase of the intelligence production process, while I state the term “intelligence analysis” in this chapter.

The intelligence analysis phase within the intelligence cycle - that has the phases of planning/direction, collection, processing/exploitation, analysis, dissemination, and feedback – is the implementation of individual and collective cognitive methods to analyze data and knowledge and apply several hypothesis techniques in a secret process (Johnston 2005, 4-5). Intelligence analysis, on the other hand, refers to the process of separating the whole into pieces and the evaluation of their characteristics and functions (Mangio and Wilkinson 2008, 3). However, as Lowenthal states (2012, 120), the analysis could not be understood solely as the activity of sorting data, but it also needs major decisions to be given. Therefore, the analysis phase of the intelligence production process has a relative weight on the other stages.

The Functions of Intelligence Analysis

The prominent functions of intelligence analysis are mostly related to sorting relevant data with a perspective of providing strategic intelligence, meticulously selecting and framing the pieces of information, building analytic methods, and providing insight for the intelligence questions (McDowell 2008, 216).

Strategic intelligence, in its integrative perspective, requires a strong analytic effort. As the analytic culture has been born and grown up because of the failures in history, analysis has a function to assist with the other intelligence activities such as collection and processing of the collected information.

Certainly, the analytic process has its own methodology or set of methodologies. By exploiting these methods, facilitates the understanding of complex inputs and finding the connections among different pieces of data and information. Intelligence analysis should make a distinction between facts and opinions and should work on testing the hypotheses, as well. As Borek states, intelligence analysis transforms information that conflicts in itself into an appropriate understanding, in brief (2019, 816).

As a founding father of the analytic culture in the United States intelligence community, Kent accepts the analysis as a speculative side of the intelligence activity, while the other sides are descriptive and reportorial ones. His opinion is based on the idea that the analytic process has its power from the evaluation capability of the intelligence analyst. Therefore, the speculative-evaluative side of the intelligence activity has its core value within the context of strategic intelligence (Kent 1949, 39-40).

The Basic Requirements of Intelligence Analysis

One of the prominent requirements of intelligence analysis is to make a division among the collected data and information, then to make clear the process of the transformation of information to intelligence. As the whole intelligence production process is based upon the security requirements that come from the policy-makers, analytic products should be suitable to the criteria that are given by the policy-makers (Evans 2009, 42).

As mentioned above, the analysis process should feed and be fed with the other stages of the intelligence production process. However, it is a difficult requirement to succeed in reality. The analysis process should be in coordination especially with the collection phase which is called “the analytically driven collection”. This is based on the necessity that intelligence priorities should be met. Another requirement is to determine analytic priorities (Lowenthal 2012, 65).

In today’s world that has highly complex characteristics, intelligence analysis and the intelligence personnel face a problem of the urgency of the threats. It is both a challenge and a requirement for the intelligence community. Analysis reports could be both written and oral, short and long, urgent or long-term as a strategic document. However, during the crises, intelligence personnel should catch the policy-makers attention under his/her business and inform with a warning. Therefore, the structure of the analytic material should be flexible and suitable to the different situations (Johnson 1986, 10-11).

As mentioned, the major dichotomy of intelligence analysis is based on current and long-term intelligence. Current intelligence is related to the urgent security issues that require acute responses, while long-term intelligence is a more strategic concept. A basic requirement comes to the surface as acute security priorities need timely analysis which is an extremely difficult task for the analysts. The difficulty of such situations is laid on the fact that the analysis process should produce an insight that is closest to reality, while current crises may change the characteristics of the developments on the analyst’s desk. The balance of current and long-term analysis should be equally distributed (Lowenthal 2012, 64). Therefore, the proper intelligence production process may be fed with a strategic approach rather than solely coping with daily priorities.

Certainly, the most significant requirement that is related to intelligence analysis is on the shoulders of the analyst. The analysts have a burden to

have self-awareness in terms of their strengths and weaknesses. It would facilitate the determination of the methodology and techniques of the analysis processes that the analysts will exploit (McDowell 2008, 218).

Current Challenges of Intelligence Analysis

As a matter of fact, the analysis part of the intelligence production process has major challenges in a world with a high degree of chaos and complexity. The analysis phase is a challenge itself, at first. “Connecting the dots” - a well-known phrase upon the intelligence analysis – is both a crucial task and a challenge for the intelligence analysis today. Big data and the infinite amount of information are the driving forces of contemporary times. It makes intelligence analysis, which is busy with reaching the closest side of reality, a highly difficult occupation.

Digitalization could be evaluated as a sub-challenge under this point of the problem. Even technology and the digitalization of the sources has brought major benefits for the researchers and analysts within the intelligence community, there should be an effort to adapt to the rising complexity of information in the world (Gill and Pythian 2012, 110-111).

Today, a vital job of intelligence analysts is to make a division between irrelevant pieces of information and valuable knowledge. The noise problem of the analysis could be accepted as a high priority to cope with for the analysts (Johnson 2009, 44). Gill and Pythian raise awareness of the same problem. The example they present is a well-known intelligence failure in late history that is an assessment of the United States and the United Kingdom upon the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (2012, 108).

To understand today’s world that is in rising complexity, one solution could be the amendments in recruitment processes of intelligence agencies (Gill and Pythian 2012, 106). The agencies should diversify their analytic thinking capacity by hiring analysts from different cultural parts and age groups within the society (Ateş 2020, 190-191).

3. Why Intelligence Analysis Matters in terms of Preventing Surprises

There is a critical question for the researcher who studies intelligence analysis: why is intelligence analysis crucial not only for intelligence agencies but also for the security of a state? In this part, I try to explain the “reason for being” of the intelligence analysis by raising two arguments.

The first one is on a literal vital point of reason which is preventing strategic, operational, and tactical surprises. As intelligence failure happens when a surprise attack or development occurs, the primary responsibility of the intelligence analysis is to avoid these surprises by presenting a timely and effective insight that facilitates prediction (Wirtz 2017, 128).

The Necessity to Define the Theory of Surprise

Understanding the preventive angle of intelligence analysis, one should comprehend the surprise attacks. Surprise is a theoretical concept in war and security studies since Clausewitz's works on the war. However, a contemporary theorization of the concept still needs effort. Wirtz is one of the scholars who try to build a coordinated theory on surprise in intelligence studies. According to him, one of the prominent reasons behind the happening of a surprise is the limitation of human cognition. The hindrance to the prediction is rooted in the cognitive biases of the analysts. Other reasons for the surprise are organizational limitations and bureaucratic problems (Wirtz 2017, 9). These could be structural fragmentation and spoiled decentralization (Zegart 2007, 175-176; Zegart 2009).

The nature of surprises hinders the efforts to avoid them. They are inevitable, for the majority of the scholars. The literature on security and intelligence mostly mentions successful surprises rather than failed attacks. There is an answer to this situation that successful surprises are easier to find (Dahl 2013, 18-19; Wirtz 2017, 16).

Surprise attacks are the consequences of a successful deception activity, as the deception makes the atmosphere more ambiguous and uncertain for the enemy. It is clear that the surprise creates advancement in the attacker's side (Stein 1982, 94).

Another prominent reason why surprises are more visible in the literature is that it is easier to explain them. However, it is not valid for avoiding them. Thus, the theorization of the surprise attacks may help for defining the attackers and which actors could be the victim of them (Wirtz 2017, 20). Handel's understanding of the surprise is valuable to examine. He defines strategic surprises as force multipliers. The surprise helps the attacker to have a gain during the war at a lower cost (Handel 1984, 229-230). Even though surprises have such effects, they also create harm to the moral capabilities of the attacker (Wirtz 2017, 16).

Surprises are mostly effective at operational levels (Olsen and van Creveld 2011, 108). They help for the devastation of some functions of the enemy and allow the attacker to create a strategy for further attacks. They are also helpful for the creation of combat power, according to Votel (1991, 68). Despite the advantages of the surprises, they are not capable of the final victory of a war. There are many significant examples in history that combatting powers faced surprise attacks, however, they had a victory at the end of the war (Levite 1989, 349).

A significant classification of the surprise allows the researchers and analysts to comprehend the system of the concept. The classification includes levels of the concept of surprise. These levels are strategic, operational, and tactical levels. According to Ferris, the difference between strategy and tactics increased the fog and decreased the understanding and analysis within the planning efforts, during surprises (2005, 241). This point is vital in the levels of surprise. Strategic surprise is the highest level and needs strategic analysis to avoid (Schelling 1984, 370). Furthermore, the strategic warning which is related to strategic surprise and analysis is a change in the character of the threat (Turner 2005, 3).

The main difference between strategic and tactical surprises is easy to understand. Lowenthal states that strategic surprise happens when the defender does not have previous intelligence about the attack, as tactical surprise occurs when the defender has intelligence on a possible attack, however does not have detailed information about the timing or techniques of it (Lowenthal 2012, 3). Thus, the tactical surprise is the lowest level for the war. However, as the smaller units could have critical functions during a battle, the tactical surprise could create strong effects as a force multiplier (Meredith 1989, 3). According to US Department of the Army reports, the tactical level includes the employment of lethal and/or non-lethal tools (2011, 7).

The Role of Intelligence Analysis before Surprise

As surprises gain their power from the uncertainty, a possibility for them creates complexity for the responsibility of intelligence analysts (Handel 1984, 236). However, the major burden is on the shoulders of the analysts while preventing possible surprises. Analytic problems allow the happening of surprises. Intelligence agencies have a responsibility not only for stopping the surprise attacks but also for neutralizing them during their planning, in terms of a preventive function (Arad 2008, 44). For such

reasons, the analytic capabilities should be improved for unexpected attacks.

According to Handel's work, three prominent categories show up while discussing the role of analysis before surprises. They are methodological dilemmas and perception problems, the explanations on the level of acceptance, and the organizational and bureaucratic problems (Handel 1984, 235-236). As seen in this part, two of them are related to the analytical process. Betts also names the psychological reasons for the intelligence failure and surprise attacks (2009). Similarly, cognitive biases are among the first lines to be solved for avoiding surprise attacks (Wirtz 2017, 15). The modern international system plays an important role for the analysis and surprises, as it creates a complexity to understand what is offense or defense, on the other hand (Stein 1982, 95-96).

Another significant point on the uncertainty is about the nature of risks during security operations. The uncertainty and the risks affect intelligence analysis and assessments because of the decrease in the rationality in the analyst's mind (Handel 1984, 241-242). Capabilities and intentions are the major kinds of information during the analysis process. Collecting information about the capabilities of the actors is easier than collecting information on their intentions. The capabilities are two types, in Handel's understanding, as material and non-material ones. While material capabilities are more visible for intelligence collection and analysis, non-material ones are more discrete. It is an analytic failure to focus on solely material capabilities and disregard non-material assets (Handel 1984, 239).

Other problems regarding intelligence analysis and detecting possible surprises are the misperception of the assets, problems regarding mindsets of the analytic personnel (Arad 2008, 60). All approaches and analytic requirements are possible with a perspective of international cooperation and specialization.

4. Why Intelligence Analysis Matters in terms of Creating an Influence

Intelligence Analysis as a Process to Penetrate Foreign Entities

Warner defines intelligence as a secret activity to understand and/or influence foreign entities (2013, 9). By regarding this definition, it is clearly understood that influencing foreign entities is among the major objectives of intelligence activities. Intelligence analysis transforms data and knowledge

into an analytic product and creates an understanding of the given information and knowledge. The production of understanding by the analytic team of an intelligence agency should lead to a stage of influence.

According to Kent, there is a relationship between intelligence analysis and influencing. He states that “every intelligence analyst wishes to know everything, to be believed, and to influence policy for a good manner” (Kent 1968). Kent’s popular work “Estimates and Influence” explains the strong relationship among knowing, being believed, and influencing, and highlights that when influencing takes place with the other two wishes serendipity takes over (1968).

Influencing is a multi-dimensional concept. The aforementioned understanding is valid not only for influencing foreign states but also for penetrating non-state actors such as terrorist cells. This brings the counterterrorism paradigm into the equation (Schindler 2005, 712). Similarly, counterintelligence is another concept within the framework of influence, dealing with preventing penetration attempts. A significant note on counterintelligence is that not only state actors but also non-state actors are the subjects of this kind of activity. Economic actors are on the top of the list when analyzing the major instances (Herman 1996, 52).

Covert action is another concept that is related to the process of influence as intelligence operations which are related with influencing need covert operations in order to penetrate the entities. It should be noted that while covert actions are more proactive activities that aim at creating influence, counterintelligence, on the other hand, makes an effort to protect the defender from foreign attempts. Covert action is applied in unascrivable ways, according to Warner (2009, 7). It is the third option after unresponsiveness and employing military measures (Lowenthal 2012, 181). A significant characteristic of covert actions in terms of influence is that they are employed not only during war-time but also during peace periods (Stout and Warner 2018, 523). It should be reminded that perfect proactive intelligence is sustained by defensive information protection, regarding the concept of influence in intelligence affairs.

The Role of Analysis in Creating an Influence

As avoiding surprises requires several responsibilities for the intelligence analysis, seeking for influence has roles and burdens for analytic teams, similarly. It is a crucial role that intelligence analysis has for the successful influence operations on target entities. Barrett comprehensively tells the

benefits of the CIA assessments that allowed the United States to create an influence in Nasser's Egypt in late history, although the relationship tragically ends (2007, 43).

Intelligence analysts generally take and follow some measurement for the perception for influence (Prunckun 2010, 150);

- i) Deeply considering demographic and cultural factors,
- ii) Assessing patterns and indicators in the society's history,
- iii) Systematically comparing the reactions,
- iv) Regularly monitoring open-source media coverage of the society,

Intelligence analysis should focus on the success of the influence operations proactively. Thus, this action could be implemented with a special approach to the cases. Sitting in the office and being bound to the desk could not create a good analysis for influence operations (Schindler 2005, 696-697). Analytic intelligence products should include detailed estimates during influence actions. They should not be in the form of factual reporting but should be in-depth analyses. In this point, Grabo attracts attention to the problematic habits of policy-makers who prefer factual report products during crises (2010, 248). Aiming at creating influence requires trust in analysis.

Analytic projects should create support for influencing processes by mostly focusing on the decision-making mechanism of the target entity. It is clear that penetrating this mechanism would lead to a major achievement for intelligence activity as vital information comes to the desk of the analyst (Grabo 2010, 247). However, there must be a warning on the analysis process of foreign actors' decision-making mechanisms. States do not behave in the same way as individuals. They are not unitary actors and several decision-making processes may be more complex such as foreign policy decisions (Walsh 2011, 243).

Cognitive biases and mental shortcuts show themselves again on this point. Analysts should follow decision patterns, avoid oversimplification of the decision-making mechanisms (Grabo 2010, 251), and finally consider the intention of the actors as a core determinant.

5. Intuitive Approach and SATs in Intelligence Analysis

A highly discussed area of the world of intelligence studies and intelligence affairs, the analytic process has had its methodologies and methodologic

approaches since its foundation in the modern world. The discussion upon the intelligence analysis methodology has been created one of the biggest clashes of thoughts on a technical field. This has been a science or art dichotomy, in brief. One major point of view is the intuitive approach for the production of intelligence estimates, while the other one is based on scientific and structured techniques more. As the advocates of the intuitive approach focus on the discussion with a perspective of the master-apprentice relationship and the power of experience, the supporters of structured analytic techniques emphasize the need for a checking and testing mechanism to avoid analytic failures. In this part, I will present the positions of both camps and show the major dynamics within the discussion.

Conducting Intelligence Analysis by Intuitive Techniques

The intuitive approach promotes the power of personal intuitions for a successful analytic process. Intuition could be gained by experience and knowledge that comes from reasoning (Moore 2007, 87). Intelligence analysts could present a strong understanding based on their reasoning and experiences, according to the intuitive approach. Another significant root of analysis is expert support.

One should understand behaviors and behavioral dynamics to comprehend the intuitive approach better. Arkes and Kajdasz are among the scholars that systematically examine the intuitive approach. They evaluate the issue with a perspective of the behaviors and summarize several premises raised by intuitive theory (2011, 144-166). The premises of the intuitive approach are mostly behavioral, according to them. The assertions given by the advocates of the intuitive approach could be summarized as (Khalsa 2009, 80);

- i) Complex problems of intelligence analysis could not be solved by structured analytic techniques.
- ii) Scientific methods could not solve the irrational and unpredictable human mind.
- iii) Scientific / structured analytic techniques limit the contributions of the power of intuition.
- iv) Being aware of biases' existence is sufficient to overcome them.
- v) Exploiting the structured methodology takes a long time. Fast weapons and systems could not wait for the structured methodology of analysis.

It should be noted that intuitive thinking could also be structured. It is not a thought system that is solely based on uncontrolled assumptions (Moore 2007, 88).

Conducting Intelligence Analysis by SATs

Supporting a more structured analytic methodology falls into the “scientific” side of the debate. These techniques are called structured analytic techniques (SATs) and they are mechanisms for making problems and decisions visualized. The main assertion of the supporters of SATs is that the human mind is limited and the analytic process could not solely rely on it. Human thought is more reliable when a structured perspective is applied.

SATs are classified as diagnostic, contrarian, and imaginative thinking techniques in the works of the US Government (2009) and Heuer and Pherson (2011). Their name should be mentioned here, however, a detailed analysis of them is the subject of future work. Diagnostic techniques are key assumptions check, quality of information check, indicators or signpost change, and analysis of competing hypotheses. Contrarian techniques are the devil’s advocacy, team A/team B, high-impact/low probability analysis, and “what if?” analysis. Imaginative thinking techniques are brainstorming, outside-in thinking, red team analysis, and alternative futures analysis (US Government 2009).

However, there is still difficulty in the intelligence analysis community when applying SATs. Even in the 2000s, there were few examples of applied SATs (Treverton and Gabbard 2008, 35). Artner et al. state that the intelligence community started to employ SATs comprehensively, right after the intelligence failures on the case of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (2016, 4).

As a technique for eliminating analytic pitfalls, Analysis of Competing Hypotheses that was formed by Richards J. Heuer, Jr. became a response to the problem that analysts only focus on visible signals during the 1970s and 1980s. According to his understanding, the nature of deception does not include any signals before the surprise action happens. Thus, Analysis of Competing Hypotheses and other forms that are created from it are prominent SATs today (Coulthart 2016, 3). Intelligence failures, cognitive biases, the necessity for collaborative work, and policy-makers demands for more transparent processes have led to the development of SATs (Pherson 2013, 54).

A detailed structured analytic process should include the combination of the intuitive judgment of the analysts and expertise. A peer review as critical supervision should be implemented, at the same time (Heuer and Pherson 2011, 15). It is clear that intelligence analysis should include both intuitive power and SATs as a combination. The analytic process becomes more accurate with the employment of all cognitive and structured abilities (Heuer and Pherson 2011, 31-32).

On the other hand, solely relying on intuitive judgments is problematic and may create critical and risky outcomes. It is mostly because of the essence of intelligence subjects that are complex and changing day by day. Intelligence analysis personnel should consolidate their work with alternative outcomes rather than relying on the most reasonable one (Heuer and Pherson 2011, 118).

The real power of SATs is approaching the problems rather than responses, as responses could be misleading. Testing the alternative hypotheses and outcomes could provide an accurate analysis (Heuer and Pherson 2011, 21-22). Today, structured techniques are not only implemented by intelligence agencies but also conducted by non-state actors such as corporations. The use of big data and artificial intelligence technologies allows economic actors to employ these techniques. These actors range from multinational corporations to small information companies that have no more than a couple of employees. Even, the advancement in such technologies makes analytic techniques a must for the companies that wish to come to the forefront.

Analytic process is the job of a “master thinker” at the same time. It is a thought process and needs intellectual effort. Pherson writes on a significant point that is the primary habit of a “master thinker” while evaluating the analysis process. Focusing on alternative hypotheses, controlling for inconsistent data, and considering the context of the analysis are the main habits of an analyst (2013, 58).

To select the suitable SAT for a given question, intelligence analysis personnel should consider the main characteristics and dynamics of the intelligence problem. Deciding on the features of the time of the problem and the dynamics of relevant actions is vital (Garner and McGlynn 2019, 173). Therefore, an appropriate structured technique would be fruitful for solving an intelligence problem.

6. Conclusion

Since the late 1940s, intelligence studies have grown as an academic field. The field emerged and was raised in the Anglo-Saxon world then spread to the other intellectual spheres of the globe. Today, intelligence studies occupy the academic field of security strategies as a powerful research interest. Intelligence analysis and the academic discussions upon it make intelligence studies more relevant, structured, and scientific. This also allows significant techniques that come from intelligence management to be valid for other fields of the information society. As the world becomes more and more dependent on data and information management, the analytic process attracts the attention of a larger audience.

Even though the analytic field of intelligence process has caused several failures in late history, it still maintains its attractiveness. Its special methodology and techniques are still valid and adaptable to different sectors and situations whether they are related to security or the private economy.

Intelligence analysis, as a vital phase of the entire intelligence process, stands on the principle of the transformation of information and knowledge into a critical understanding. The analysis makes data, information, and knowledge – which are different elements – more valuable and relevant for intelligence requirements. The final phase of the analytic transformation of the collected information is creating an influence. It adds intelligence analysis into the context of the strategy and makes it a vital activity for sustaining an influential policy move.

Another crucial point, as mentioned in the chapter, is that analysis allows a state to avoid strategic, tactical, and operational surprises. If appropriately conducted, it protects the state by detecting surprise attacks and allows it to build a proactive policy against further attacks. A holistic methodology should be implemented to abstain from failures, for certain.

The methodology of intelligence analysis has been a subject of discussion for a long time. Two camps have come to the forefront as the advocates of the intuitive approach and the supporters of SATs. Both approaches have their advantages and limitations, strengths and weaknesses. Thus, a systematic approach combining both should be a good answer for more accurate results, as Khalsa argues (2009). It is clear that the legacy of intuition could not be neglected, however, structured techniques are critical for sustaining accuracy, at the same time.

I, again, will insist that intelligence analysis and its techniques are vital not only for intelligence agencies but also private actors in the globalized world of today. Corporations, high-technology entrepreneurs, and other actors dealing with information and the future of work should learn from the main techniques and pitfalls of intelligence analysis if they are eager to survive in a highly competitive world.

More academic work should be added to the literature and more workshops should be conducted for improving the capabilities of analytic personnel and for sustaining a comprehensive strategy. As a final note, small steps would come together and save decades by nurturing the grand strategy.

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CHAPTER TWO

AGAINST CHANGING GLOBAL THREATS SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP CHANGING SECURITY CONDITIONS

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Introduction

It was unacceptable that security and security systems remained limited in the changing system while new theories and policies emerged in international relations. Towards the end of the last century, remarkable progress has been made in the field of security studies and regional security research in this context. Especially in the last two decades, increasing security diversity with globalization has become even more important. Globalization has expanded the limits of individuals' understanding of providing security and safety. In addition, globalization has revealed a complex concept of security as a mechanism that carries the idea of political geography beyond. With the new security concept, we argue that the security understanding should be expanded to include a wider range of threats. Within this concept, many areas such as security, water security, food security, energy security, maritime security, climate security, nuclear security, biological security, geological security come to the fore. In this study, we will try to explain the changing dimension of security concepts in the field of international relations and the importance of integrating intelligence studies. In other words, in the global world order where new

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security concepts have emerged, we examine security and intelligence through interdependence and balance of power.

Changing Security Conditions

Post-Westphalian history in international relations covers a very intense period in terms of both conflict and war. The change in war tactics and the enlargement of the country borders have also caused new security needs. After the arms industry developed with the industrial revolution, the advanced dimension of the war has changed. After this point, the World Wars, which included the whole world, destroyed all techniques and left the defences of the countries completely helpless. After the World Wars, a period when international organizations came to the forefront was established and the hot conflict left its place to the Cold War. From this point on, the shape of the war has completely changed, and field combat has not been the case except in a few regions of the world. In addition to the conflicts that continue over terrorist organizations, countries have started to use new tactics with power hegemony in the international arena. At the end of the Cold War period, new security definitions and new world order emerged. At this point, a new era has begun with post-colonial security approaches.

Post-colonial security approaches have changed beyond the military issues after the Cold War to include other aspects such as human, environment and identity. There are many security theories that approach the elements of security from different perspectives, such as post-structuralism and constructivist security theories, post-colonial security approaches, the Copenhagen School, and the Paris School. These theories criticized the assumptions of realist and neo-realist theories on which security studies are based and drew attention to the fact that working only on the military dimension of security restricts security in other regions of the world. According to the changing security approaches, it is not enough to expand the security and consider other security elements of the state other than military security. It should also be noted that security is a derived concept. So, the question of what security means does not have a single answer that applies to all times and places. In addition, security perceptions are shaped differently according to the political views of individuals and societies. Post-colonial security approaches point to the necessity of questioning the concept of security.

On the other hand, defensive neo-realists like Waltz, who put the emphasis on security rather than power, argue that the primary goal of states is not to gain power but to preserve their existence.