Russia’s Turkey Policy during the Putin Era
Russia’s Turkey Policy during the Putin Era

By
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Russian-Turkish relations go back a long way. Although there have been occasional fluctuations in these relations, rapprochement and cooperation are inevitable, because they require mutual interests in the international arena.

While the Russian Federation wanted to maintain its gains following the dissolution of the USSR on one hand, it was trying to become westernized on the other. It continued its foreign policy within this framework. While the strategic locations of both Russia and Turkey made these countries rivals, they also forced them to cooperate.

As is known, the early 21st century has been very hectic for Turkish-Russian relations. Among the factors affecting bilateral relations are the conflicts of Chechnya and Syria, Libya/Ukraine, the Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Cyprus-Eastern Mediterranean issue, and so on. The above-mentioned regional conflicts also affect economic relations.

Prepared based on the principle of "To write history is as important as to make history. If the writer does not remain true to the maker, then the unchanging truth takes on a quality that will confuse the humanity", as quoted by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first chapter of this book deals with Turkish-Russian relations prior to 2000, in general terms. Subsequently, it touches upon the relations between Turkey and Bolshevik Russia, and the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation respectively. In the second chapter, relations between 2000 and 2015 are analyzed. The final chapter aims to explain the social, economic, and political relations that have been experienced, especially since the beginning of 2015, laying emphasis on important events. The developments taking place within the scope of the Syria issue, which is one of the main agenda items within these relations, are also discussed. Regarding the political solution of the Syrian issue, the opinions of the parties, the agreements concluded, and military and diplomatic issues, were also underlined. In this chapter, the events experienced between the shipment of the S-400 air defence system and the signing of the Sochi Accord regarding the north of Syria, are discussed.

Archive documents, and Turkish, Russian and English resources, benefited the study, and developments were followed through the official publications of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and Russia. TASS, Reuters, the İhlas News Agency, newspapers such as Pravda, and
Izvestia, and Turkish newspapers such as Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, and others, are analyzed comparatively.

The aim of this study is to evaluate the relations between Russia and Turkey within the scope of the political and economic priorities of these countries, and their perceptions of national security.

I would also like to point out that this work is a chronological study, based on events and published documents.

In fact, since relations between the two countries are very intense and active, it is not easy to keep up and follow the agenda. There is a new development almost every day. The leaders of the two countries hold frequent meetings. I decided to finish this work with the meeting between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin on March 5 2020.

I hope this book will be useful for those who will conduct more extensive studies related to Turkish-Russian relations.

I would like to thank Commissioning Editor, Adam Rummens, Proofreader Victoria Barry, Designers Sophie Edminson and Courtney Dixon, Typesetting Manager Amanda Millar, and the whole CSP family.

İzmir
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vefa KURBAN
November 18 2019
CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS BEFORE 2000

Introduction

Turkish-Russian relations have a very deep-rooted history. The first Ottoman-Russian war, which took place between the years of 1676 and 1681, involved different battles in different periods.\(^1\) After the Prut Campaign of 1711, history witnessed the continuous development of Russia and the simultaneous decline of the Ottoman state, followed by frequent losses of land. In the 18th century, Russia underwent a major change in economic, political, and cultural fields. The process of Westernization, or modernization, initiated by Peter the Great,\(^2\) and the decisions taken in this direction, provided a favorable basis for the Enlightenment Movement, coming from the West towards the end of the 18th century. Peter the Great paved the way for the development of the social and cultural values of Russia, by not only making certain modernization decisions covering all areas of life, but also adopting the principle of working as the basic philosophy of life.\(^3\)

Peter strengthened the Russian Tsarist.\(^4\) His most important work was

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\(^2\) Charles Seignobos, Rusya’nın Doğuşundan Çar II. Nikolay’a Rus Hükumeti (Russian Government from the Birth of Russia to Tsar Nikolai II), Prepared by: Vefa Kurban, Yeditepe Publishing, Istanbul, 2018, p34.


\(^4\) For detailed information on Peter the Great, see: Евгений Викторович Анисимов, Петр Великий: Личность и Реформы (Evgenii Viktorovich Anisimov, Peter the Great: Personality and Reforms).
the army, and the legal administration he granted to Russia. He disregarded
the old Russian tradition and adopted the West’s science, education, and
reform without change. He organized and assigned his army in the German
way, and accepted the German ranks as they were. Soldiers were dressed in
the European style, and the army was divided into infantry and cavalry, as
were those in Europe. The exception was the Kazakhs, who kept their
national clothes and military methods. He created a fleet in the style of the
European navy, and forcibly recruited the Russians, who were afraid of the
sea, as mariners.5

The 18th century is the first century of secular culture and innovation in
Russia. This is the period in which the philosophy of the Enlightenment was
adopted by all the civil institutions, including all civilian education
organizations, and by society. The Enlightenment period not only abolished
the religious crisis resulting from the division in the Russian Orthodox
Church, but also supported centralized power with the ideology of
rationalism. In this way, this new philosophy brought Russia closer to
European civilization, and formed the basis for mind-centered social
arrangements which replaced the religion-oriented social structure. Thanks
to all these developments, five centuries of forced cultural isolation caused
by the Tatar-Mongol invasion and Church repression ended, and Russia
began to take firm steps towards a cultural development unique to Europe.
Under the influence of the Enlightenment, the Russian way of thinking went
through a significant transformation, and European Culture became the
main cult of Russian society thereafter.6

As of the rule of the Peter the Great, Russia gained recognition as a big
state, and this status was confirmed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
Russia has constantly expanded its territory against its neighbors since the
mid-18th century.7

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5 Charles Seignobos, Rusya’nın Doğuşundan Çar II. Nikolay’a Rus Hükumeti
(Russian Government from the Birth of Russia to Tsar Nikolai II)”, Prepared by:

6 Zulfiya Şahin, “XVIII. YÜZYILIN İLK YARISINDA RUSYA’NIN KÜLTÜREL
GELİŞİMİ VE BATIYA UYUM ÇABALARI (CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF
RUSSIA AND ITS ATTEMPTS TO ADAPT TO THE WEST IN THE FIRST
HALF OF THE XVIII. CENTURY)”, Ankara University Journal of Social Sciences,
10 March 2020.

Turkish-Russian relations, on the other hand, have developed on a competitive basis, due to the overlap of their mandates throughout history. Periods of cooperation and alliances are very limited. The most important reason for this, is that Russia attacked the Ottoman territories for their own interests, and wanted to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman State, with the claim of defending the rights of the Orthodox nations. A large portion of the expansionist policy of the Tsarist Russia was directed towards Central Asia, the Caucuses, and the Balkans, where the Ottoman Empire and Turkish communities existed.\(^8\)

Russia won all the wars it had participated in during the Tsarist regime until the First World War, except for their defeat by the Japanese in 1905.\(^9\)

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The rich and wide lands gained as a result of these victories, and independent industrial power developed especially for the armed forces, gave rise to an increasing sense of self-confidence among the elites and contributed to the emergence of the awareness of, and the pride in, being Russian.\textsuperscript{10}

The awareness of being Russian was promoted within the education system based on the principles of orthodoxy, autocracy, and nation/nationality, as defined by Sergey Semenovich Uvarov,\textsuperscript{11} the Minister of Education, in 1833.\textsuperscript{12}

Although Russia gained an additional population that increased its power as a result of the conquests, the linguistic and religious relations of the peoples living in the territories newly annexed with Russia’s neighbors were considered as a weakness, and this fact played a specific role in the determination of Russia’s security policy. Russia made it a priority that its armed forces, which gave it ‘great state’ status, be based on Russia’s own resources, and have strong, state-of-the-art technology. It adopted the principle not to leave actions against Russia unanswered, but adjusted the timing accordingly. It pursued a foreign policy that aimed at benefiting from


\textsuperscript{11} Sergey Semionovich, Count Uvarov, was born in 1786 in Moscow, Russia. He served as a Russian statesman and administrator, and was the minister of education during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I. Uvarov undertook various missions: he served as a diplomat between the years of 1806 and 1810, as the head of the St. Petersburg educational district from 1811 to 1822, and as the deputy minister of education in 1832. Then in 1833, he was appointed as the minister of education. Uvarov thought that education was to be conducted “with faith in the principles of orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality”. Several periodicals and associations adopted Uvarov’s principles, which were rooted in loyalty to dynastic rule, traditional religious faith, and dignification of the Russian nation which were regarded as the articles of faith. However, in general, Uvarov’s educational policies may be described as reactionary, since he tried to limit access to education by non-noble people, and applied a firmer government control over the curricula of the universities and secondary-schools. While he was the minister of education, the Russian educational system, particularly technical and vocational education, expanded significantly. Uvarov served as the minister of education from 1833 to 1849, and the president of the Academy of Science from 1818 until his death in 1855. In 1846, he was granted the title of count. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sergey-Semyonovich-Graf-Uvarov, Retrieved on: 30.11.2019; “Уваров Сергей Семенович (Uvarov Sergey Semionovich)”, http://nlr.ru/nlr_history/persons/info.php?id=195, Retrieved on: 24.12.2019.

opportunities rather than a commitment to contractual obligations. Russia/the Soviet Union, which founded its own Autonomous Academy of Sciences in 1726, always paid special attention to education,\(^{13}\) and set its sights on reaching the development level of Western Europe and the United States. However, it may be pertinent to say that Russia was the most oriental of the West, and the most pertinent of the East.\(^{14}\)

**Developments After World War I - The 16 March 1921 Moscow Treaty**

During World War I, the October Revolution took place in Russia in 1917, after which the Bolshevik regime was overthrown, and the Bolsheviks came to power.\(^{15}\) It is right to list the objective causes of the Revolution in Russia as follows:

\(^{13}\) As other countries, Russia paid great attention to the development of fundamental and practical sciences in the 18\(^{th}\) century. In January of 1724, Peter I signed “The Definition of the Academy”, and in February of the same year, the Emperor approved the establishment of the Academy of Science and Arts. January 7 1726 is considered the official grand opening day of the Emperor’s Academy of Science, when the first grand academic session took place in the presence of members of the government, court and clergy. The academicians Ya. German and G.B. Bulfinger, speaking at the session, noted that the Academy of Science Foundation in Russia was the greatest event of the time. However, at that time, Russia did not have scholars prepared enough to take the position of academicians. For this reason, the staff, of junior scientific assistants and the first academicians, was mostly composed of foreigners, including eminent scholars, such as the famous mathematician Daniil Bernully, and one of the greatest mathematicians of the 18\(^{th}\) century, Leonard Ayler. However, it did not take much time for the scholars educated by the Academy of Science itself to take the leading positions. Some of them can be listed as follows: the first Russian junior scientific assistant V.E. Adodurov, the first Professor among the natives of Russia, G.V. Rihman, the first Russian Professor, M.V. Lomonosov, and a poet, V.K. Tredyakovskiy. After the 1850s, naturalists and travelers S.P. Krasheninnikov, I.I. Lepehin, N.Ya. Ozerezkovsky, and V.F. Zuev, mathematician S.K. Kotelnikov, astronomers N.I. Popov, S.Ya. Rumovsky, and P.B. Inohodtsev, chemist Ya.D. Zaharov, and mineralogist V.M. Severgin, worked their way up.


\(^{15}\) С. А. Ланцов, “ОКТЯБРЬСКАЯ РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ 1917 ГОДА: ЗАМЫСЛЫ И РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ”, ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА
- Financial challenges brought about by the First World War;
- Human loss caused by the First World War;
- Things not going well at the front;
- Inefficient management, both by the Tsar and the Bourgeois provisional government replacing it;
- The ‘peasant’ issue that could not be resolved (giving land to the peasantry);
- Challenging living conditions of workers;
- Almost the whole society was ignorant;
- Unfair national policy.16

On the other hand, the case was slightly different for the Ottoman State. The Ottoman Empire lost the war, suffered losses of great lands, and the empire collapsed. And it was not until 1921 that Turkey took back only a small portion of the territories which had been lost since the 18th century. On the other hand, financial and material help from the young socialists of Russia, under the Moscow Treaty dated March 16 1921, made a significant contribution to the victory of the Turkish National Struggle. This treaty made a big contribution to the development of bilateral relations between the two states. With the establishment of the Turkish and Soviet republics, the competitive relations between the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia, which had been destroyed by the end of the First World War, were replaced by relations based on solidarity and cooperation. During this period, which witnessed two world wars, both countries focused on their national development and tried to stay out of international struggles in the face of colonial Western imperialism. Rather than remaining in the middle of the conflict of interests, they tried to take over the reins by directing interests in international politics. In that struggle, both states tried to show the same effort, not necessarily out of sincerity, but because of necessity resulting from politics and interests which are as important as sincerity.17

Retrieved on: 16.07.2019
An archive document on the Trade and Navigation Treaty

18 Republic Archive of Prime Ministry 0300180102652008
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was established in 1922. The USSR was the first, and one of the largest, socialist states in history. The Union existed for nearly 70 years, from 1922 to 1991, and consisted of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and Turkmenistan, i.e. it was a union of 15 countries in total. The capital was Moscow, and the total area was 22,400 000 km². The total population of the Union in 1991 was 293 million.

The two countries, Russia and Turkey, had close cooperation between the years of 1921 and 1936, due to their common interests. They signed the Trade and Navigation Agreement on March 11 1927.19

**The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits and Turkish-Soviet Relations**

In later years, the Soviet Union attempted to maintain relations with Turkey, especially in the economic field, contributed to the establishment of the Turkish textile industry, and supported Turkey’s development in all fields. Turkish experts went to Russia and examined many industrial organizations, as well as organizing study visits to several commissioners of heavy and light industry. They visited the Krasnaia Agricultural Workshop, the Lenin Agricultural Academy, the Electrosila Factory, the Harkof Tractor and Manufacturing Factory, the Lomonosov Porcelain Factory, the Sugar Industry Research Institute, and the port of Odessa. During that period, the authorities decided to bring machinery from Russia, which was highly advanced in textiles especially for that branch of industry, to be established in Turkey.20

Furthermore, the Soviet Union supported Turkey in the finalization of the Montreux Convention, re-establishing Turkey's sovereignty on the Straits and including provisions in favor of the Black Sea littoral states. The

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Straits had always provided a strategic advantage to the Ottoman State, e.g. they brought an opportunity for the State to spread across three continents within a short time. However, it became a sore point in the period when the Ottoman Empire started to weaken, because, especially in the 18th century, the situation in Europe had greatly changed, and there was competition to achieve superiority. In order to achieve this goal, they aimed at capturing the Straits, or at least maintaining its control. This situation always portrayed the Straits, or the Ottoman State, as the target. However, the fact that Russia was getting stronger in the north, and put its historical plan to get closer to warm seas, made the situation even more critical.²¹

However, World War I brought the end of the emperors. The Ottoman Empire was destroyed, but the national struggle was successful, resulting in the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne. The term ‘Turkish Straits’ was mentioned for the first time in the Treaty of Lausanne.

The status of the Straits was re-determined with the signing of the Convention, in addition to the Lausanne Peace Treaty, on June 24, 1923. According to that rearrangement, passage through the Straits was free, and a Straits Commission, to be chaired by the Turkish representative, was established, to implement the status determined for this region. In this way, the control and management of the Straits gained an international status in which Turkey had a say. As a result, Turkey's rights and control on the Straits were largely limited.²²

Considering the international situation, the Turkish Government applied for the Amendment of the Straits Convention, and sent a note to the League of Nations which was accepted in Lausanne on 11 April 1936. In that note, Turkey outlined the evidence that made amendment necessary, and stated that Turkey was “ready to make negotiations for the conclusion of a new Straits regime which would ensure the necessary security conditions for the inviolability of Turkish territory, and continuous merchant shipping between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea taking place in the most liberal way.”²³

1- In terms of the new world balance, Europe’s situation in 1923 was very different from that in 1936. In 1923, Europe was moving towards disarmament, and the political organization of the continent was being built on the unchangeable principles mentioned under international guarantees. Turkey signed the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, because it relied on the guarantee provided by Article 18 as well as the assurance of the four great states to defend the Straits. However, the conditions changed completely, a new distrust started to rear its ugly head in the Mediterranean region again, and the only guarantee to cure the insecurity of the Straits was no more in hand. And the future was about to bring big dangers.

2- The guarantees set by the Convention were at a standstill. Turkey, of course, could never consent to the restriction of its sovereignty over a land whose security is essential for the safety of the whole territory. As those guarantees became impractical, the balance of the whole Convention degraded, to the detriment of not only Turkey, but also European peace. Back in the day, Turkey thought the guarantee assured by the four great powers was suitable for ensuring the territorial integrity of Turkey, and worth ignoring the burden that the Convention put on Turkey. However, these states’ approach towards the League of Nations also changed considerably over time.

3- The 1923 regime did not take into account the limited, or general, war threat. This was one of the deficiencies in the Lausanne regime. The system set forth only peace and war situations, and Turkey’s impartiality or belligerency in war. The deficiency of the system was that it had banned Turkey from practicing what was necessary for self-defence in case of a war threat.

4- Turkey stated that it was ready for negotiations for the amendment of the Treaty of Lausanne. The Republic of Turkey, even at the cost of heavy sacrifices, had always followed the policy of peace and agreement, since its foundation, and showed its tendency to compromise, its loyalty to his obligations, and its commitment to peace, at every opportunity. Turkey, in providing security to other countries, should be entitled to claim the same for itself.

Based on this evidence, the Turkish government called on the contracting parties, and invited them to determine the security conditions that would be deemed necessary for the inviolability of Turkish lands, and would establish

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a liberal status for the Straits which would enable the enhancement of maritime trade between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea.25

The conference in Montreux was convened to revise the Straits regime which had been determined in the Treaty of Lausanne, and update the regime according to the needs of the day. The essential aim of Turkey in that conference was to completely take the Straits under its control by rearranging the Straits regime, to solidify the Straits with its own military power by removing the military restrictions brought by the Treaty of Lausanne on the Straits, and to directly manage and protect the Straits in a war which was likely to begin soon in Europe. Turkey also demanded the right to make the decision to allow the passage of all vessels except warships through the Straits, to organize the passage from the Straits in case of a war in which Turkey was involved, and to restrict the ships passing through the Straits. Mustafa Kemal Pasha also thought that the current political situation in Europe was suitable for making these demands on the Straits, and gave approval for the negotiations.26

However, the Soviet Union requested that the Straits be closed to warships of all states that did not have a coast in the Black Sea, and that Soviet warships could use the Straits, regardless of conditions, to pass through to the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union believed that Turkey’s demand to limit warships passing through the Straits would weaken the Union’s naval power, and, therefore, criticized the Turkish side. Furthermore, the Soviet Union did not like the idea of asking permission from Turkey for passage through the Straits. Another demand of the Soviets was to defend the Straits together with Turkey. That request, which was completely contrary to Turkey’s wishes of sovereignty over the Straits, would be frequently repeated by the Soviets in the coming days.27

26 Barış ERTEM, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Srasında Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği ilişkileri ve Türkiye’ nin Amerika Birliği Devletleri ile Yaklaşması Etkileri (Turkey-Soviet Union Relations during Second World War and Effects On the Turkey Rapprochement with the USA)”, International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 8/7 Summer 2013 p161
27 Barış ERTEM, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Srasında Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği ilişkileri ve Türkiye’ nin Amerika Birliği Devletleri ile Yaklaşması Etkileri (Turkey-Soviet Union Relations during Second World War and Effects On the Turkey Rapprochement with the USA)”, International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 8/7 Summer 2013 p161
The Montreux Convention was signed on July 20 1936. In this contract, the terms that would undermine the sovereignty of Turkey over the Straits, such as the defence of the Straits in collaboration with the Russians, and organization of passage through the Straits by an international commission in various situations, were not accepted. However, arrangements were made in the Convention which overcame nearly all the concerns of the Soviets, many demands were accepted, and concessions were made. Although almost all the requests of the Soviet Union were accepted at the conference, the Union would continue to put strain on Turkey regarding the Straits, increasing the pressure day by day.

The Montreux Straits Convention, which was signed on 20 July 1936 and entered into force on 9 November 1936, has two important features. The first characteristic is that it filled a gap left open by the Treaty of Lausanne bringing security to the Republic of Turkey. On the other hand, the Convention is remarkable; a rare example in history showing that political agreements in international relations could be given a more appropriate identity by negotiation and peaceful means considering the conditions of the day. In the Convention, the freedom of passage through the Straits, and of transportation, was arranged by distinguishing between ships, warships, and aircraft carriers. The terms were also arranged by distinguishing different conditions: wartime when Turkey stayed impartial, wartime when Turkey became a belligerent party, and when Turkey believed that it was subject to a war threat.30

The archive document regarding the Montreux Convention on the Straits is given below.

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29 Барыш ERTEM, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Srasında Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği ilişkileri ve Türkiye’nin Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Yaklaşımına Etkileri (Turkey-Soviet Union Relations during Second World War and Effects On the Turkey Rapprochement with the USA)”; International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 8/7 Summer 2013, p161

Overview of Turkish-Russian Relations before 2000

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Chapter I
31 República Archives of the Prime Ministry 03010000063424233
The Soviet Thesis Regarding the Straits

Although the Soviet representative M. Litvinov thought that the closure of the Straits was important for the security of Turkey and all Black Sea states, he insisted on the closure formula, and announced that they were ready to negotiate the Turkish formula that deemed it appropriate to open the Straits to the warships of all countries, under “certain restrictions and certain targets”. Litvinov stated that there was no reason to prevent the warships belonging to the Black Sea states from crossing the Straits, and he tried to justify the claim by referring to the special situation of the Soviet Union, being surrounded by seas that had no connection in-between, and the obligation of the Navy to contact the ports and naval bases of the union. In other words, he demanded freedom of passage for the Black Sea states and restricted freedom for non-Black Sea states, supporting the Turkish view. Soviet researchers have reported that, “By gaining control over the Straits, Turkey would get closer to Russia, and the West was concerned about this situation”.

As a result, we can summarize the Montreux Convention briefly, as follows: This contract is a document that complements the lack of sovereignty in the area of the Republic of Turkey, and a solution that provides the balance required for peace in the delicate world geography in which Turkey is situated. The Montreux Convention guaranteed free passage through Istanbul and the Dardanelles Straits, leaving the control entirely to Turkey, and provided benefits to the Black Sea states by making a discrimination between Black Sea and non-Black Sea states regarding the use of the Straits.

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Overview of Turkish-Russian Relations before 2000

Events That Happened After World War II

The Soviet Union prevailed in the Second World War, and took back most of the land it had lost at the end of the First World War. By the end of World War II, the international political system underwent a considerable structural change. The main feature of the new international system was the formation of two rival blocs under the leadership of the two great powers that emerged at the end of the Second World War, and continuation of the relations between these blocs, known as the Cold War. The Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, which were held between the ‘three superpowers’ in 1945, symbolize the beginning of that system.

The Yalta Conference witnessed fierce debates over the issues which American and Eastern European statespeople and experts regarded as the ‘sale’ of Eastern Europe to communism. The Yalta Conference, in many aspects, was a detailed footnote to the Tehran Conference, where the future of Eastern Europe was roughly shaped.

As a result of the defeat of Hitler and fascism by the Soviet Union, and the coalition, critical changes occurred in the international arena. The borders of the Soviet Union expanded significantly, and East Prussia, called the Kaliningrad Region, south of Sakhalin Island, the Kuril Islands, and other regions, joined the country’s territory. As the state that defeated fascism, the authority of the USSR scaled up again, and started to be perceived as the big world state. The impact of the USSR was mostly felt in Eastern Europe and China. The communist regime was established in these countries in the second half of the 1940s. The adoption of the communist administration style was mostly due to the deployment of Soviet armies in

35 For information on World War II, see: Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna. 1941-1945: Voenno-Istoriceskie ocherki (Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945: Military Historical Essays), Moscow, 1998; A. N. Saharov, Istoriya Rossii, S Drevneyshih Vremen do Nashih Dnei (History of Russia, From Ancient Times to Our Days), Moscow, 2016; V. V. Kirillov, Istoriya Rossii (History of Russia), Moscow, 2012; A. S. Orlov, V. A. Georgiev, N. G. Georgieva, T. A. Sivoxina, Istoriya Rossii (History of Russia), Moscow, 2013.
37 Faruk Sönmezolu, II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy since World War II), Der Publishing, Istanbul, 2006, p15.
38 Catherine Evtuhov, Richard Stites, A History of Russia: Peoples, Legends, Events, Forces Since 1800 (Translated into Turkish by Ahmet Cevedet Aşkin), Istanbul, 2018, p455.
the territory of these countries, and the great financial support of the USSR.

After the war, the Soviet Union started to change its attitudes. One of the incidents that indicate these changes in attitude was the note the Soviet Union sent to Turkey on 19 March 1945. That note, which created enormous influence in Turkish foreign policy as soon as it was received, stated that the USSR was unilaterally withdrawing from the Turkish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact dated 17 December 1925, which would be terminated on 7 November 1945. The decision was explained by asserting that, due to the deep changes that had occurred especially during World War II, the Treaty did not cohere with the new situation and needed serious improvement.

It was stated in the note sent by the Ankara Government to the Soviet Union in response, on April 4 1945, that the Government approved the Soviet suggestions for making a new agreement, instead of the Turkish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact dated December 17 1925, which would involve serious changes that were more suitable for the interests of both sides, and that proposals regarding this issue would be examined with great care and good faith. While Forrestal, the American Secretary of the Navy, said that the note was one of the signs indicating the Soviet Union's purpose of enlargement, Stimson, the Secretary of War, emphasized that this attitude of the Soviets was due to the aims of freedom, democracy, and independence.

The relations between the former allies in World War II began to deteriorate over time. The parties began to distrust each other.

In this sense, Americans did not draw back. A memorandum was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of the US in the autumn of 1945.

The events developed in such a way that international politics would be largely about adapting to, and then partially rejecting, Soviet-American competition. The Cold War originally focused on the redrawing of borders in Europe. Therefore, it was related to the ‘issue of Germany’ in some underhand way, because the resolution of this issue would determine the level of authority that the victorious states of 1945 would have on Europe.

39 V. V. Kirillov, İstoriya Rossii (History of Russia), Moscow, 2012, p.546.
40 Haluk Ülman, İkinci Cihan Savaşı’nın Başından Truman Doktrini’ne Kadar Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri (Turkish-American Diplomatic Relations from the Beginning of the Second World War to the Truman Doctrine), Ankara, 1961, p51.
41 Haluk Ülman, İkinci Cihan Savaşı’nın Başından Truman Doktrini’ne Kadar Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri (Turkish-American Diplomatic Relations from the Beginning of the Second World War to the Truman Doctrine), Ankara, 1961, p52.
42 V. V. Kirillov, İstoriya Rossii (History of Russia), Moscow, 2012, p546.
There is no doubt that the Russians suffered from German aggression in the first half of the 20th century, more than all the other forces. For this reason, the Russians, gaining strength with Stalin's demand for security (which extended to paranoia), were determined not to allow the same thing to happen in the second half of the century. Supporting the World Communist revolution was a secondary, but related, thought. If Russia could create other states ruled by Marxian thought, and were waiting for Moscow to guide them, Russia's political and strategic position would be highly likely to strengthen. Such thoughts probably shaped Russian policy in the post-1945 world, much more than the desire to reach the warm seas/harbors, which went back centuries but still left the detailed solution to various questions open.43

On 5 January 1946, US President Harry S. Truman sent a letter to his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes: “We must show our iron fist to the Russians, and use strong language against them. In my opinion, we should not tolerate them in any way”.44

Churchill delivered a speech called the ‘Iron Curtain’ at Westminster College in Fulton, an American City, on March 5 1946. In that speech, Churchill called on western countries to “fight totalitarian communism”.45 In his speech, he declared “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie under Soviet sphere. Some of them are subject not only to Soviet influence, but to control and management from Moscow”.46

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44 V. V. Kirillov, Istoriya Rossii (History of Russia), Moscow, 2012, p547.
That speech was regarded as a political call in Moscow. Stalin responded to Churchill in the newspaper, Pravda, as follows: “Mr. Churchill now stands in the position of a firebrand of war”. In this process, the conflicts between the parties became even sharper and the Cold War, encompassing both sides, broke out.47,48

The Soviet Union sent another note to Turkey on August 7 1946, when Soviet-American relations went into a cold period. That Soviet note was about the Turkish Straits. The Soviet Union also sent the same note to the United States of America, and Britain. American authorities had two options to choose from:

- Just send a note, and leave Turkey alone with the Soviet Union;
- Exhibit a stable attitude and support Turkey regardless of its results.

47 The ‘Cold War’ was announced for the first time in Churchill’s speech in Fulton, USA in March 1946. Source: ACE Soviet Encyclopedia, Volume 8, Baku, 1984, p567.
48 V. V. Kirillov, İstoriya Rossii (History of Russia), Moscow, 2012, p548.
The US Secretariat of the Navy and the US State Department decided to support Turkey, no matter what results it would bring.\textsuperscript{49}

The US Acting Secretary, Acheson, argued during interviews about the Soviet note dated August 7, 1946 that this note had the intention of putting Turkey under the rule of the Soviet Union, rather than organizing the Straits regime.\textsuperscript{50}

The Soviet Union sent a new note to Turkey on September 24, 1946, repeating their request that the Straits regime had to be determined only by Turkey and the other Black Sea states, and that the Straits needed to be defended with the collaboration of Turkey and the Soviet Union. In response, the American government reaffirmed its support for Turkey by stating, in its note dated October 9, 1946, that the Montreux Convention could not be amended by the Black Sea states only, and that Turkey should be principally responsible for the defence of the Straits, repeating that the United Nations Security Council would be required to take action in case of an attack or threat on the Straits.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{49} Haluk Ülman, İkinci Cihan Savaşı’nın Başından Truman Doktrini’ne Kadar Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri (Turkish-American Diplomatic Relations from the Beginning of the Second World War to the Truman Doctrine), Ankara, 1961, pp77-79.

\textsuperscript{50} Haluk Ülman, İkinci Cihan Savaşı’nın Başından Truman Doktrini’ne Kadar Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri (Turkish-American Diplomatic Relations from the Beginning of the Second World War to the Truman Doctrine), Ankara, 1961, p79.

\textsuperscript{51} Haluk Ülman, İkinci Cihan Savaşı’nın Başından Truman Doktrini’ne Kadar Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri (Turkish-American Diplomatic Relations from the Beginning of the Second World War to the Truman Doctrine), Ankara, 1961, pp82-85.
In the next period, the US took the initiative to develop conflicts within the scope of the Cold War. The Soviet Union’s attempt to spread the ideology of communism, and the establishment of communist satellite states in Eastern Europe, caused great fear in America. For this reason, the fight against communism was the basis of American foreign policy, as of 1947. In February 1947, Truman proposed at the US Congress to carry out some

52 Republic Archive of Prime Ministry 03010002194769 Document on the tonnage of the Soviet navy in the Black Sea