

Political Reform in Taiwan and the International Human Rights Regime

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By

Mab Huang

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INTRODUCTION

For this collection of essays, I have selected a monograph and several papers I have published in the past forty-five years. The earliest piece of work is a monograph on *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, published by the University of Michigan Press in the year 1976, and the latest an enlarged version of a paper delivered in the National University of Chile, Santiago in December 2016. I choose to arrange my essays chronologically so that my readers will find it easier to understand the unfolding political situation in Taiwan and my thinking and reflection through the decades. Roughly speaking, when I wrote the intellectual ferment, politics in Taiwan had not attracted much attention from Western scholars, and I only briefly described and analyzed how the young intellectuals came together to agitate for political reform against the backgrounds of an international crisis. I was obviously concerned with what was going on in China as well for it was China's admission into the United Nations that provoked the crisis in Taiwan. Yet I did not say much about the revolution in China or the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. I hope to remedy this situation with the publication of a collection of essays on China in a year or two.

From a different angle, this book is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the efforts for political reform, and the response of the authoritarian government. The second part takes up the introduction of the international human rights regime into Taiwan beginning in the 1990s. Under this heading, three papers are grouped together which make up the agenda of living up to international human rights standards. They are the paper on the travail of setting up a national human rights commission, a second paper on inviting international experts to come to Taipei to review national reports on the implementation of the two international human rights covenants, and finally the third paper on transitional justice. And the third part ends with two essays on human rights education.

In preparing for this publication, many colleagues and students gave me much encouragement and help, without which it could not have been done. Dr. Edmund Ryden SJ was kind enough to go over many of the papers and not only correct my English grammar but help me understand and appreciate

the subtlety of the English language. Next two assistants of mine deserve my thanks. Ms. Heng-chun Liu serves as my preliminary editor, her forte being how to tackle footnotes and references. Mr. Justin Huang transcribed the monograph, which is a laborious task. And Ms. Merry Chang acts as my liaison with Cambridge Scholars Publishing and facilitates the process from the beginning to the end. As for those who have given me encouragement, there are too many to thank individually. I do, however, count my family members among them.

I would like to also thank the following publishers for their kind permission to reprint: The University of Michigan Press, Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd., the *Soochow Journal of Political Science*, and the *Taiwan Human Rights Journal*.

PART I

CHAPTER ONE

THE INTELLECTUAL FERMENT FOR POLITICAL REFORMS IN TAIWAN, 1971-1973

Preface

The early seventies marked a turning point in the fortunes of the ruling party and the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan. After two decades of firm control and security, the government began to sustain a series of diplomatic setbacks which threatened the survival of the Republic of China as an autonomous political entity. President Nixon's visit to Peking, the détente between Peking and Washington, and Japan's diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China inevitably led to the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan.

Against this background, the young intellectuals in Taiwan, particularly the young university professors and students, for the first time in twenty years took it upon themselves to agitate for basic political reforms. They called for an open and democratic society and demanded wide-ranging changes. They organized demonstrations, held forums, signed petitions, and made speeches. It was an exciting time. For a while it appeared that they might achieve what they had set out to do. This, however, did not come to pass. The ruling party and government responded with partial accommodations and selective reprisals. For all practical purposes, the ferment for political reforms had subsided by the summer of 1973.

This study is an attempt to reconstruct the intellectual ferment for political reforms in the years 1971-1973. In particular, it focuses on the description and analysis of the aspirations, hopes, and fears of the young university professors and students, the programs they proposed, the actions they took, their relations with the ruling party and government, and their impact and achievements. It is hoped that such an account will not only shed light on the politics of Taiwan, a subject generally neglected by Western scholars, but also contribute to our knowledge of intellectuals in times of crisis under

an authoritarian political system.

This study began to develop in the academic year 1971-1972 while I was on sabbatical leave and teaching at my alma mater, National Taiwan University. During my sojourn there, the ferment for political reforms was reaching its height. It was my good fortune that many university professors and students playing a crucial role in the agitation were either good friends or my students. I had the opportunity of participating in their meetings, observing them closely in action, and interviewing them at length. To a moderate degree, I also supported them in their efforts, as described in these pages.

I started work on this manuscript upon my return to the United States in August 1972. I was primarily motivated by the desire to clarify for myself what the intellectual ferment for political reforms was about; to a lesser degree, I desired to attest, as objectively as possible, to the efforts of the young intellectuals in Taiwan. I reviewed the literature on politics in Taiwan and carefully analyzed the publications of university professors and students in Taiwan during the years of political ferment. I also corresponded extensively with many participants, inquiring into a number of points that needed clarification. From December 1973 to January 1974, I again visited Taiwan and interviewed many people involved in the activities related in this study. Their encouragement and support contributed substantially to this work.

I would like to express my thanks to Professors A. Doak Barnett of the Brookings Institution, Robert Scalapino of the University of California, and Allen Whiting, Rhoads Murphey, and Michel Oksenberg of the University of Michigan for reading the draft of this manuscript and making helpful comments. I would also like to thank Mrs. Sharon Goss and my colleagues Paul Morman and Frederick Bartle at the New York State University College at Oswego for their editorial help in preparing this manuscript for publication.

Mab Huang
Oswego, New York
February 1976

Profile of Prominent Participants

Chang Ching-hang (also Chun-hung), a political scientist trained at National Taiwan University, was born in the late 1930s in Nantow, Taiwan, the son of a primary school teacher. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, he worked on the staff of the Secretariat General of the Nationalist Party in Taipei and was highly regarded as a promising young cadre. A leading member of the Ta-hsueh tsa-chi she, he was known for his keen mind and good writing style. His essay, "An Analysis of the Social Forces in Taiwan," coauthored with three young intellectuals and published in three installments in *Ta-hsueh tsa-chih* from July to September 1971, provoked a sensational response and established his reputation as a stringent critic of the government. In October 1971, he was chosen by the young intellectual group to draft a program for political reforms. In late 1972, he was invited by the State Department of the United States to visit this country. Upon his return he was implicated in the case of Professor Chen Ku-ying and others and was forced to resign from his party post. He ran for a seat on the City Council of Taipei in late 1973 and was defeated by a narrow margin.

Chen Ku-ying, a promising philosopher and favored disciple of the late Professor Yin Hai-kuang, was born in Fukien, China, in 1935. He taught for many years at National Taiwan University and was known for his studies of *Laotse and the Life of Jesus*, among other works. A young man of high intelligence, eloquence, and a poetic touch, he was adored by his students. During 1971-1972, he passionately championed human rights, particularly the right of students to speak their mind. In April 1972, his position on the student movement was severely attacked. In July-August 1972, he toured the United States and came into contact with intellectual groups of different political persuasions. When he returned to Taiwan, he actively participated in the debate on nationalism then going on and severely criticized Western liberalism. In March 1973, he was detained for twenty-four hours by the Taiwan Garrison Command on a charge of involvement in a pro-Communist "reading club." He was dismissed from the university after this incident.

Chen Shao-ting, born in Ping-tung, Taiwan, in the early 1930s, was a prominent political scientist educated at National Taiwan University. He has many scholarly works to his credit, including *On Totalitarianism*, *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century*, and *On Culture and Politics*. Possibly because a high school teacher of his had been convicted as a Communist spy, he was suspected by the authorities and in danger of being jailed. Due

to his political liability, he was not able to secure a position at National Taiwan University. For years, he lived in Tainan City and worked for Professor Morton Fried of Columbia University as a research associate. A leading member of the Ta-hsueh tsa-chih she, he was particularly well-known during 1971-1972 for demanding the “comprehensive re-election” of the three bodies of the people’s representatives at the national level.

Chu Hungdah, a well-known scholar in international law, was born in Fukien, China, in the late 1930s. Educated at National Taiwan University and Harvard University, he has been a research associate at Harvard Law School. In the academic year 1971-1972, he was a visiting professor at National Taiwan University. Given his cordial relationship with the Nationalist Party leadership, he played a significant role in the early phase of the ferment for political reforms.

Hu Fu, an expert in constitutional law and political parties, was born in Kiangsu, China, in the early 1930s into a wealthy family that had close ties with the Nationalist Party. Educated at National Taiwan University and Emory University in Georgia, he returned in the early 1960s to teach at the former while serving in an important administrative position at the Academia Sinica. A leading member of the Szu-yu yen she, he was accused of participating in a conspiracy to use that group to take over the Academia Sinica in the service of Professor John K. Fairbank and indirectly the Chinese Communists. His study of the Control Yuan, documented the predominant influence by the Nationalist Party as slander. In 1969, he spent a year in the United States as a visiting scholar at Yale University. In 1971-1972, he was known for his exposition of democracy and human rights.

Wang Shao-po, an instructor in philosophy at National Taiwan University and an eloquent champion of social justice in the early 1970s, was born in Fukien, China, in the late 1930s. His father was a military officer of the Nationalist army; his mother, convicted as a Communist spy, was executed by the authorities when he was a young child. Brought up by his grandmother, his childhood was exceptionally difficult. Highly regarded by his colleagues and students as a man of integrity and compassion, he spoke on behalf of the poor and the weak. He was very sympathetic to Chiang Ching-kuo’s efforts to make the government more accessible to the people and applauded his style. In 1973, he was implicated in the case of Professor Chen Ku-ying and others and was detained by the authorities for twenty-four hours. However, he kept his teaching position at National Taiwan

University until he was purged from the department in 1974.

Yang Kuo-shu, a pioneering scholar in studies of the Chinese national character and student attitudes, was educated at National Taiwan University and the University of Illinois. He was born in Shangtung, China, in the early 1930s. Known for his integrity, fairness, and ability to work with different groups, he played a crucial role in the ferment for political reforms. The success of the *Ta-hsueh tsa-chih* was to a substantial degree attributable to his talents, patience, and hard work.

I. Diplomatic Setbacks

The intellectual ferment for political reforms came unexpectedly to Taiwan in the years 1971-1973. During the 1960s, diverse groups of intellectuals had taken to arguing the need for knowledge and had discussed at great length the role and mission of the intellectual in a changing society; however, they had not entered the political arena with anything approaching a well-defined platform for political reforms. Among others, the *Wen-hsing tsaichi* [Literary Star], the *Szu-yu-yen* [Thought and Word], and the *Ta-hsueh tsa-chih* [The Intellectual] groups were cases in point.¹ With diplomatic setbacks at the United Nations and deteriorating relations with the United States and Japan sustained by the government in the early 1970s, the complexion of politics in Taiwan was dramatically altered. Young intellectuals moved into the political arena for the first time in two decades.

In a sense, it was paradoxical that young university professors and students took to agitation for political reforms when the Republic of China on Taiwan was fighting for survival as an autonomous political entity; yet, on closer examination, there was a logic to what took place in the years 1971-1973. It was precisely because diplomatic setbacks had weakened the authority of the ruling party and the government that the criticisms of the intellectuals had to be acknowledged and their ferment for political reforms accommodated. Given the serious challenges facing the nation as they saw it, the intellectuals summoned their courage to speak of the ills of society and play the role of instigators of political reforms.

For the preceding two decades, since Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party had withdrawn from the mainland, the ruling party and government governed Taiwan with a firm hand. With aid and support from the United States and the use of security police, particularly in the early 1950s, the Republic of China had survived both the threat that Peking would liberate

Taiwan by force and the challenge of the Taiwanese Independence Movement.² In Taiwan Chiang Kai-shek and his party ruled supreme. Politics were conducted in a highly autocratic style, with the ultimate power to make decisions on a wide range of issues reserved for the General Director of the ruling party.³

The only time Chiang Kai-shek's rule had been seriously challenged was when Lei Chen and his supporters moved to organize an opposition party in the late 1950s and early 1960s.⁴ Lei Chen, a former high-ranking official of the Nationalist Party and the publisher of the *Tzu-yu chung-kuo* [Free China Fortnightly] joined forces with a number of well-known intellectuals and prominent Taiwanese politicians and community leaders in a concerted effort to oppose the ruling party. Their protest against the abuse of power by the ruling party and government, against manipulation of elections and denial of political participation, apparently appealed to many sectors of the society. However, before long the ruling party decided to suppress the embryonic opposition party. In September 1960, Lei Chen was arrested and convicted by the military court for protecting an ex-Communist agent on the *Tzu-yu chung-kuo* staff and was sentenced to ten years in jail. The journal was closed down, and the opposition party did not see the light of day.

It can be taken as an indication of the tight control exercised by the ruling party and government that the crackdown on Lei Chen and his embryonic party did not provoke any substantial protest from the intellectual community or society in general. Hu Shih, the eminent philosopher, was reputed to have encouraged the formation of an opposition party and agreed to serve as its advisor; yet when the crisis came, he remained silent. A few newspapers and journals in Taiwan and Hong Kong did condemn the government. So did a journal published by a group of Chinese intellectuals in New York City.⁵ The protest, however, was as ineffective as it was muted. From the viewpoint of the ruling party, the crisis was handled effectively, if awkwardly.

During the sixties the intellectuals chafed under a straight-jacket. Any "heretical" opinions were not tolerated. Many a well-known professor and young intellectual paid a high price for criticizing the Nationalist Party and the government; they were harassed, kept under surveillance, and persecuted. Yin Hai-kwong, a philosophy professor at National Taiwan University and a close friend of Lei Chen and Hu Shih, was driven from the university and denied the right to give public lectures. His book, *Reappraisal of Cultural Change in Modern China* (in Chinese), was

proscribed. Until his premature death due to cancer, he held fast to liberalism and refused to compromise with the government, setting an example of integrity and courage.⁶ Po Yang, a popular anti-Communist journalist and literary writer, was accused of insulting the dignity of the head of state as well as of having been a Communist agent in 1949. He was arrested in March 1969 and sentenced by a military court to imprisonment.⁷ Li Ao, the young historian and counterculture youth here in Taiwan, was arrested and jailed in April 1971 after years of harassment.⁸ The journal *Wen-hsing tsa-chi*, with which Li Ao was closely linked, had been suppressed some six years earlier.

The *Szu-yu-yen* group was also treated as suspect. It was attacked by an intelligence officer-turned-journalist for allegedly working for Professor John K. Fairbank and indirectly for the Chinese Communists.⁹ The government kept the group under surveillance; security units from time to time would summon the executive secretary of the association for interviews.¹⁰ The list could be lengthened, but these incidents suffice to illustrate the plight of intellectuals in Taiwan.

From the perspective of the ruling party and government, the motivations for keeping the intellectuals under control are not difficult to ascertain. Both ideology and self-interest played a part. Chiang Kai-shek and many Nationalist leaders had never really been sympathetic to liberalism which, since the May Fourth Movement, had become a dormant yet potential political force in China.¹¹ They tended to equate liberalism with selfishness and lack of discipline, regarding it as an alien ideology not suitable for China. Worse still, they saw liberalism as a Trojan horse employed by the Chinese Communists for the destruction of traditional culture. To their discomfort, many of the intellectuals critical of the ruling party and government in Taiwan, such as Yin Hai-kwong and Li Ao, were profoundly influenced by the spirit of the May Fourth Movement. Furthermore, the Chinese intellectuals had always deemed themselves, as they still do, the conscience of society and the spokesmen of the people; and they were accepted as such. Though they did not have power, their authority could not be denied; thus, they were always a threat to the ruling elite. Tension between the ruling elite and the intellectuals, if subdued, was almost inevitable, awaiting the opportune time to erupt.

Despite this tight control, Taiwan enjoyed a degree of political stability and prosperity.¹² Yet beneath the economic prosperity and progress lurked many serious problems, as the young intellectuals would discover in the early

seventies.¹³ The entrepreneur class was satisfied, given the rapid development of capitalist enterprises and its support from the government. But the rank and file government functionaries, the military personnel, and in particular the peasantry and laboring class had not shared in the prosperity of the society to any equitable degree. Moreover, by the early seventies the villages were no longer prosperous, as they had been for a period of time after the Land Reform in the early fifties; nor were cities equal to the task of absorbing and caring for the young and unskilled laborers coming from the countryside.

Equally vital in the development of Taiwan, political stability was turning into political stagnation. Chiang Kai-shek and the party leadership, growing old and wedded to old ideas, held on to power. While there were indeed indications that Chiang Ching-kiap was prepared to take over the government, and that he and his close associates did not see eye to eye on many issues with elder party leaders, it was clear that Chiang Ching-kuo was determined to defer to his father in all crucial policy matters, patiently waiting for his turn. The problem of elite circulation was particularly serious. The National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan, all elected in 1947 when the Nationalist Party and government were still in control of the mainland, faced depletion and physical weakness in their membership. Of the 2,961 National Assembly members elected in 1947, only 1,393 were still serving in 1971; of the 759 members of the Legislative Yuan, 434 remained; while in the Control Yuan membership declined from 180 in 1949 to 69 in April 1971.¹⁴ Furthermore, due to old age and ill health, many of the people's representatives still serving simply could not perform their tasks. In 1971, the average age of the National Assembly's membership was 65, while that of the Control Yuan was over 70.¹⁵ Yet a solution proved to be extremely difficult. Concerned with the issue of legitimacy, i.e., its claim to be the only government of China, and desiring to retain the support of the people's representatives at the national level, the ruling party and government were not prepared to take any drastic measures.

After long deliberation and planning, a compromise was decided upon. The National Assembly in 1966 amended the Constitution to authorize President Chiang to hold a supplementary election of the three bodies. The election was duly held in December 1969 in Taipei City and Taiwan Province. Altogether, fifteen new members were elected to the National Assembly, eleven to the Legislative Yuan, and two to the Control Yuan. All the new members were native Taiwanese.¹⁶ The first supplementary election,

salutary as it might be in furthering political participation, did not create a broader power base. Given the size of the three organs and the control exercised by the ruling party, the newly elected people's representatives could not make much of a difference. In short, the supplementary election was a token measure.

As for the Executive Yuan, i.e., the administrative branch of the government, the trend was likewise worrisome. Since the fifties, the average age of the cabinet had been continuously on the rise. In the fifties, it was 50; in the sixties, it was over 60; and in 1970, it was 63 (ranging from 51 to 70).¹⁷ Though efforts had been made to recruit younger men into government posts, success was limited to the appointment of young technocrats, particularly in the fields of economic and financial affairs. Moreover, on the provincial level, the governor was appointed by the central government which for years had chosen a military man, thus limiting the opportunities of native Taiwanese civilian politicians. Tight control of local elections of Provincial Assembly members, city majors, city councilmen, hsien magistrates, and hsien councilmen by the ruling party, and recurring complaints of election fraud and manipulation also made for political tension.

During the early 1970s, the series of diplomatic setbacks noted earlier began to weaken the government's position. After decades of political stability, economic prosperity, and international recognition, the survival of the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan as an autonomous political entity was threatened. The first serious challenge facing the ruling party and government in Taiwan was the issue of the Tiao-yu-tai Islets,¹⁸ a cluster of rock girt islands and lonely reefs lying some 120 miles northeast of Taiwan and 570 miles southwest of Japan. Since the end of the Second World War, the islets had been occupied and administered by the United States as part of Okinawa. For centuries these islets served primarily as a refuge for Chinese fishermen, and until recently Chinese fishermen had still used them. However, with the discovery of oil deposits around the islets reported by the Economic Commission of Asia and the Far East in 1968-69, China, Taiwan, and Japan immediately became entangled in a jurisdictional dispute. On August 10, 1970, in a speech before the House of Councilors, the Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi unilaterally claimed the islets. A month later, Japan again reiterated its position, indicating that the Japanese government would decline to engage in any discussion on the issue of the islets' sovereignty.

These statements were followed by activity. On September 15, the police of Okinawa pulled down the national flag of the Republic of China on the islets. The next day, Chinese fishermen from Taiwan working near the islets were driven away by two Japanese naval vessels. And a few days later, it was reported that the Japanese government intended to allocate 300,000 *yen* to the government of Okinawa for the purpose of operating a weather bureau. Furthermore, the United States appeared to take a position favoring Japan. In a statement issued by the Department of State on September 10, 1970, the United States suggested that Okinawa would be restored to Japan in accord with the agreement between President Nixon and Premier Sato and that disposition of the Tiao-yu-tai Islets should be left to the negotiations of the nations concerned. Again on April 9, 1971, the U.S. Department of State made it clear that the islets would be returned to Japan in 1972 with the Okinawa Islands.

Peking, after having supported the Japanese claim to Okinawa since the late 1950s, issued a statement on December 4, 1970, claiming that the Tiao-yu-tai Islets were part of Taiwan and thus a part of China.

While the dispute over the islets began, the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan acted cautiously. On July 17, 1969, the government claimed the right to use natural resources beyond its territorial sea. In the same month, the Chinese Petroleum Company signed a contract with American companies for the exploration of oil deposits around the islets. In September 1971, the government reiterated its claim to the islets; it took the position that Japan was not a legitimate negotiator, citing the fact that both the Okinawa Islands and the Tiao-yu-tai Islets were still under the administrative control of the United States. However, it indicated that, as an ally, the government would not refuse to discuss informally with Japan the issues involved. Moreover, the government, through a private organization, the Committee for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Cooperation, had participated in a meeting held in November 1970 in Tokyo. As a result, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea agreed to exploit jointly the natural resources of the sea, and a Joint Committee for Ocean Development Research was set up. This move, however, was not disclosed to the public until March 1971; when reference was made to it, the spokesman insisted that none of the issues regarding the sovereignty of the islets were discussed at the meeting.¹⁹

If the government's reaction towards Japanese claims to the Tiao-yu-tai Islets had been modest, the society at large and the press were much more

agitated. On August 15, 1970, a number of members of the Control Yuan urged the government to take a firm position towards the islets and to protect the national interest. Mr. Sah Mong-wu, a well-known professor at National Taiwan University, also criticized the government for taking a low-key posture. So did newspapers and journals, along with the Fishermen Associations of Keelung and Suao whose livelihood was affected by the dispute.²⁰ The reaction was, not unexpectedly, most violent among intellectuals in Taiwan and abroad. The posture taken by the government toward Japan and, to a lesser degree, toward the United States was seen as a sign of weakness and betrayal of the national interest.

In late 1970, a group of young students in Hong Kong issued a statement condemning Japanese aggression and urged Chinese people throughout the world to unite and defend the islets. In the early part of November 1970, Chinese students at Princeton and the University of Wisconsin, led by Li Teh-yu, Hu Po-kai and others, began to hold meetings on how to handle the dispute. A pamphlet on Tiao-yu-tai affairs was issued. On December 19, Chinese students at Princeton University decided on a demonstration, heralding the Protect Tiao-yu-tai Movement in the United States and Taiwan. Soon students in the New York City area, Chicago, and Seattle joined in. "Protect Tiao-yu-tai Islets" groups were established in many American cities and universities; meetings were held, pamphlets were published, and a coordination network was set up. On January 29 and 30, 1971, Chinese intellectuals and university students demonstrated in six American cities: New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago, Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, with 2,000 to 3,000 persons taking part. In New York City alone, about 1,000 Chinese demonstrated at the United Nations plaza. They came from Boston, New Haven, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York and included Chinese students from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia as well as American-born Chinese. The demonstration was fairly orderly. Participants sang and distributed pamphlets as they moved along. It was a spontaneous patriotic movement, reminiscent of the May Fourth Movement some sixty years before, and not yet divided by the ideological cleavage that was soon to come. The Yi-ho-chuan (Boxers), the self-styled Maoist group in Chinatown, New York City, also participated in the demonstration, though their influence was rather limited. They attempted to distribute pamphlets of their own but were prevented from doing so. The only group that did not take part was the Formosan Independence Movement, probably because they were faced with a dilemma: given their tie with Japan, they could find it embarrassing to demonstrate against Japanese foreign policy.²¹

In April 10, 1971, in the wake of the American declaration of intent to turn over to Japan in 1972 administrative right to the Tiao-yu-tai Islets, about 2,500 Chinese intellectuals and students in the United States came to Washington, D.C., and staged a demonstration against the policy of the United States and Japan.²² While university students took to the streets, older Chinese intellectuals in the United States also contributed their share to the momentum. On March 19, 1971, some 500 well-known scholars in the United States wrote to President Chiang urging him to “stand firm on the issue of Tiao-yu-tai and resist the new aggression of Japan.” Three days later, the President replied that he would definitely do so and thanked them for their patriotism.²³

Faced with pressure from the Chinese intellectual community in the United States to take a firm position on the Tiao-yu-tai dispute, the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan responded defensively. Initially *Chung-yang jih-pao*, the organ of the Nationalist Party, reporting on the demonstrations in the United States, suggested that the Chinese students abroad supported the government’s position; yet beneath the surface there was a sense of nervousness. An editorial on February 5 asserted that Japan was not faced with the problem of militarism, and any attack on the revival of Japanese militarism would be seen as part of a Chinese Communist plot to divide the anti-Communist camp.²⁴ Though this editorial did not refer to the Tiao-yu-tai movement, Chinese students in the United States were enraged by the Chinese Communists. In addition, rumors circulated in the United States that the Embassy in Washington, D.C., and Consulate Generals in many American cities had done their best to discourage the demonstrations, to divide the Chinese groups, and in some cases, to threaten or rough up individual participants in the movement.

Apparently, the embassy and diplomats of the Republic of China in the United States were obsessed with fear that the Chinese Communists would exploit the situation to their advantage. To a degree, this fear was valid. Yet their defensive posture could only exasperate the students. When in the spring of 1971, Mr. Yao Hsin, director of international education and cultural affairs in the Ministry of Education, was sent to the United States to explain Taipei’s policy to the students, he was severely taken to task for weakness and indecisiveness on the part of the government. By September 1971, Taipei was warning openly that Chinese Communists were taking over the patriotic movement in the United States.²⁵ Eventually the movement was divided by ideological cleavage.²⁶ Those who supported Peking urged the unification of China under Communist rule; those who

supported the Nationalist Party organized themselves into the “Patriotic Anti-Communist Alliance”; and many Chinese professionals and students simply withdrew from any further participation.

In Taiwan, intellectuals and university students were also provoked by the dispute. As early as November 1970, a group of overseas Chinese students at National Taiwan University made plans to demonstrate in front of the Japanese Embassy; however, given the conciliatory position of the government, they were dissuaded by university authorities from doing so.²⁷ In April 1971, ninety-three university professors, students, and young men and women working in government and business issued a statement asserting that the Tiao-yu-tai Islets were part of China and professing support of the government in any measure it took to protect sovereignty.²⁸ Many of the signatories of this statement, including Professors Hungdah Chiu, Chen Ku-ying, Yang Kuo-shu, Mr. Chen Shao-ting, Mr. Chang Shao-wen, Mr. Chang Ching-hang and others, were later to play a crucial part in the ferment for political reforms.

Following the news on April 9, 1971, of the United States’ intent to turn over the islets to Japan and after demonstrations by Chinese intellectuals in America, the university students could no longer be controlled. On April 12 and 13, 1971, posters protesting Japanese aggression and American acquiescence began to appear *en masse* at the campus of National Taiwan University, National Chengchi University, and National Normal University, all in Taipei.²⁹ Meetings were held and Committees for the Protection of the Tiao-yu-tai Islets were set up. On April 15 and 16, wave after wave of demonstrations took place. On April 14, about 100 overseas Chinese students, primarily from National Taiwan University, demonstrated at the Embassy of Japan. About 1,000 overseas Chinese students from the three universities demonstrated in front of the United States Embassy on the 15th, delivering a letter of protest; on the 16th, ten delegates from National Taiwan University delivered a letter of protest signed by 2,500 students to the American Embassy and presented themselves at the Embassy of Japan.

At National Normal University, about 100 overseas students staged a sit-down strike on April 14; on the 17th, 4,000 students held a meeting in the stadium and staged a demonstration on the campus; and following that, about 2,000 students signed a protest with their blood. At National Chengchi University, against the wishes of the authorities; a demonstration was staged on the 13th; a delegation of twelve students also met with the American Ambassador to deliver their protest on the 14th and was received by a high-

ranking official in the Japanese Embassy.

Through these April days of protest and demonstration, the overseas Chinese students attending universities apparently took the lead. This was in part because, as students abroad, they were given more freedom of action by the government; their emotional response could be explained by the fact that, living abroad, particularly in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, they were more sensitive to humiliation and the issue of national sovereignty.

The government, it should be noted, was opposed to demonstrations. It made the utmost effort to dissuade the students from staging demonstrations, and when this was not possible, to control them so that they would not embarrass the government. The degree to which the press in Taiwan was strenuously controlled by the government was also clearly demonstrated through these days of demonstrations. Reports on student activities were few and clearly downplayed. Students at National Normal University were so angered by the news coverage that they urged a boycott of the newspapers, leading to a meeting between the students and the press on the 17th. Although the journalists did their best to explain why they did not play a more active role, they failed to convince the students.

In June 1971, angered by the “agreement” between the United States and Japan on the transfer of administration rights over the Tiao-yu-tai Islets, the students at National Taiwan University again staged a massive demonstration.³⁰ On June 14, posters appeared *en masse* on the campus. The next day the Committee for the Protection of the Tiao-yu-tai Islets called for demonstrations. The university authorities again attempted to dissuade the students, but the students refused to be placated. After seeking instruction from “above,” the university authorities agreed to student requests, providing the demonstration remained well disciplined and was kept to a minimum.

The students set to work. Mr. Wang Shao-po, a young instructor of the Department of Philosophy, was selected to draft “A Letter to Our Compatriots” as well as letters to the governments of the United States and Japan. The “Letter to Our Compatriots” was highly emotional and nationalistic. It referred to the anti-Japanese war, the occupation of Taiwan by Japan, and imperial encroachment on China in the past hundred years, and urged the Chinese to rise up in defense of national sovereignty. The letters to the government of the United States and Japan were equally passionate and the points were sharply made. In the former, the American

government was accused of committing in Asia an act akin to the Munich conspiracy; in the latter, Japan was warned against forcing the Chinese nation toward war again. The demonstration took place on January 17, with more than one thousand students participating. To maintain order, selected students and government security officials cordoned off the American Embassy before the group arrived. Though highly emotional, the demonstrators were fairly well-disciplined. Citizens in the streets applauded them when they arrived, the letter to the United States government was read aloud, and three slogans: “Protect the Tiao-yu-tai Islets”; “The Tiao-yu-tai Islets belong to us”; “Down with the Japanese and U.S. conspiracy.” The group then moved on to the Japanese Embassy. Many students shouted, “Japanese devils get out.” Again, Chang Tai-hsiang read aloud the letter of protest and went inside the embassy to deliver it. By noon the demonstration was over.

In this demonstration the Ta-hsueh tsa-chih journal began to play a more definite role. Its editorial formally protested the American and Japanese positions on the Tiao-yu-tai Islets; any agreement on Okinawa between Japan and the United States would be regarded as null and void. Furthermore, a new note was sounded. Urging a thorough self-examination regarding the plight of the nation, it insisted that only a thorough reform could save the nation.

What we refer to as political reforms are not only improvements in administrative efficiency; they are basic reforms of the political structure. We always hold the view that only if internal politics were healthy and modern could we establish a sound international position and provide a strong basis for success in diplomacy. Based on this belief, we with a heavy heart, urge the government authorities... to thoroughly wipe out any and all accumulated defects, use new men of talent, courage, and knowledge, as well as provide opportunity for fair competition for all so that we could together create modern institutions.³¹

When summer recess came and students left the universities, the “Protect Tiao-yu-tai Movement” subsided. Yet less than a month later, the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan was faced with a most serious challenge when President Nixon announced on July 16 that he would visit China to seek the normalization of relations. Even though he took pains to emphasize that the “action will not be at the expense of our old friends,” apparently referring to the government of Taiwan, the news inevitably produced a serious shock.³² To be sure, there had been signs that

the United States was moving towards a more conciliatory position towards Peking, but Nixon's decision was seen as a sudden move, heralding serious consequences. The Chinese Ambassador to the United States delivered a strong protest note to the U.S. Department of State denouncing the Nixon visit as a "shady deal"; Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-kun in Taipei summoned the American Ambassador to deliver a protest note; the Vice-President also made a statement, asserting that the deceit practiced by the Chinese Communists would be refuted by facts and the forces of truth and justice would ultimately triumph.³³

The Nationalist Party and governmental officials were dismayed; relations between the United States and Taiwan became more formal and cooler, if correct.³⁴ However, there was no sense of panic; for the party and government were assured that the United States would meet its treaty obligation. The posture of the government was that while the Republic of China had been wronged, it would persist in its course of truth and justice and, through self-reliance, survive the crisis and prosper. Taking a leaf from a speech given by President Chiang in June 1971,³⁵ the slogan of "Don't be disquieted in times of adverse change. Remain firm with dignity. Be self-reliant with vigor" was elevated into the highest guiding principle in this time of trial and was seen on posters and banners in cities and towns throughout the islands.³⁶

Closely following the shock of the announcement of Nixon's visit to Peking, Taipei was faced with the issue of maintaining its seat at the United Nations. For years the position of the Republic of China at the United Nations had been weakening, and the threat of expulsion was becoming very real. Nevertheless, through the support of the United States and Japan, as well as some African and Latin American nations, the government hoped that it could weather the crisis in 1971. Thus, the government did not prepare the people for what was to come to pass. Likewise, the newspapers stressed day after day the support that the Republic of China enjoyed in the world arena and professed the conviction that any move to expel it from the United Nations would be defeated. During this period, a new slogan appeared on posters and banners in the streets of Taipei. It read, "Resolutely resist the attempt of the Peking bandit regime to sneak in the U.N."³⁷

At the United Nations General Assembly, a complicated maneuver was going on. The United States adopted the position that expulsion of the delegate of the Republic of China should be treated as "an important issue," and the Japanese government was persuaded to co-sponsor an American

proposal to seat both Peking and Taipei. Yet in a sense, as pointed out by critics of American policy, the American support of Taipei was half-heartedly and clumsily executed. While the General Assembly was meeting, Kissinger was visiting Peking. This, many felt, gave the impression that the United States was not serious in its backing of the Republic of China.³⁸ After weeks of lobbying by the American delegate, the United States' proposal was defeated by a four-vote margin (55 to 59, with 15 abstentions). At that point Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai criticized the United Nations for "flagrant violation of the Charter" and withdrew from the General Assembly. Immediately after that, the General Assembly voted (76 to 35, with 17 abstentions) to "expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations."³⁹

In Taipei the government reacted rather calmly. President Chiang in his "Letter to Our Compatriots," denounced the vote of the General Assembly as unlawful and predicted the self-destruction of the United Nations.⁴⁰ This theme was echoed again and again by government officials. There was a sense of frustration, indignation, and apprehension in the air. University campuses, unexpectedly, were quiet. A demonstration outside the U.S. Embassy was peaceful and well-disciplined. During the evening news, many citizens interviewed on the Taiwan Television Network were angry and bitter, accusing Nixon of betrayal. University students interviewed by the network on different campuses, however, tended to react somewhat differently. They were more critical of the government and gave more thought to the future. Many of them expressed the belief that only through political reforms could Taiwan face the future with any sense of confidence.⁴¹ By this time, it needs to be noted that the intellectuals grouped around the *Ta-hsueh tsa-chih* had already published their statement, heralding the political reform movement.⁴²

From the fall of 1971 on, the position of the Republic of China in the international arena deteriorated rapidly. Amid signs that Peking was working diligently to isolate Taiwan, Nixon's visit in February 1972 was anxiously awaited by the government and people in Taiwan. However, while the United States was going through a new wave of enthusiasm about China and things Chinese at the time of President Nixon's visit, the news of his arrival and his discussions with Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai were played down in Taiwan. Reports from Peking by American newspapermen and television crews were entirely blacked out. It was rumored in Taipei that Vice-President C. K. Yen and Chiang Ching-kuo had made arrangements with the television network for a private view of

Nixon's visit; but the intellectual community in Taiwan could only rely on American journals such as *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News and World Report* for its information, while the masses depended on Chinese newspapers from Hong Kong. The thirst for information was such that for a few days a brisk market existed for those Hong Kong newspapers sympathetic to the government on Taiwan and permitted to circulate.⁴³ Nevertheless, the tone of reaction was set by Chiang Kai-shek. Significantly, in his opening speech to the National Assembly in Taipei, he did not refer to the Nixon visit. He asserted that the Chinese Communist regime had failed to maintain effective control over the mainland, citing the purges of Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao, and warned against the illusion that a balance of power scheme would be conducive to world peace.⁴⁴

On February 22, 1972, the National Assembly adopted a resolution denouncing Nixon's visit, asserting that the Chinese Communists were a "rebellion group" which could not represent the Chinese people and warning that it would consider null and void any agreement that emerged from the talks.⁴⁵ The Foreign Ministry also disapproved of the Nixon-Chou Communique; it issued a statement declaring a refusal to be bound by any agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China and reiterating the sacred mission of retaking the Chinese mainland.⁴⁶

In May 1972, before the transfer of the Tiao-yu-tai Islets to Japan, the Foreign Ministry again reasserted the sovereignty of the Republic of China over the islets and protested against the impending transfer.⁴⁷ University students, on the whole, were quiet. The Protect Tiao-yu-tai Movement had exhausted itself,⁴⁸ partly due to frustration and partly because students' attentions were focusing on agitation for basic political reforms. The only protest took place at National Taiwan University where Mr. Wang Hu-su, president of the Student Association and an active participant in the movement, led a few students on a hunger strike on May 15, the day the Tiao-yu-tai Islets were transferred to Japan. He and his friends chained themselves to the Fu Ssu-lien Bell Tower on campus. It was a stormy day and the downpour must have added a sense of drama. Reportedly, the government was prepared to send in plain-clothes police to arrest them. Fearing provocation, the university spent long hours in telephone consultations and maneuverings and finally succeeded in dissuading the government from action while they persuaded Mr. Wang and his friends to disperse.⁴⁹ Since university students on other campuses failed to join in, the gallant act of Mr. Wang and his friends at National Taiwan University was a mere symbol of defiance and frustration.

During the summer and fall of 1972, the position of the Republic of China in the world arena continued to worsen. Many countries either recognized Peking, compelling a severance of ties with Taipei, or moved towards establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The crucial issue, however, was whether Japan would move to recognize Peking. Since the Nixon visit to China, there were signs that Japan was reappraising its policy towards China, and pressures within Japan to change its course were mounting rapidly. The government on Taiwan could only hope to maintain its status quo.

The feelings towards Japan were extremely complicated. On the one hand, the ruling party and government hoped that, given the historical tie and President Chiang's generous treatment of Japan in the postwar years, Japanese politicians would be grateful and supportive of the government on Taiwan; on the other hand, they realized that Taiwan relied heavily on Japan both diplomatically and economically and could not risk a break with Japan. Within the intellectual community, opinion was divided. For many professors and university students, particularly those from mainland China, a residual sense of antagonism, if not hatred, toward Japan could still be discerned. In addition, Japanese influence on many aspects of life in Taiwan was adding insult to injury. Professor Kao Chun, an art historian, went so far as to argue that a voluntary army should be mobilized to occupy Tokyo, thus forcing Japan to give in.⁵⁰ Many scholars and professionals, however, tended to be more sober in their views and more tolerant of the Japanese position on Taiwan.

In contrast to reactions against the American rapprochement with Peking, reaction against a similar move by the Tanaka government of Japan was emotional and bitter. A sense of betrayal was shared by the government and society at large. When the Nixon-Tanaka Communique was issued, and it was clear that Premier Tanaka was planning to visit Peking, the government indicated intense disapproval. On September 3, the Foreign Ministry commented on the Communique and protested the move, arguing that the Tanaka visit would only produce greater tensions in Asia and the Pacific areas.⁵¹ The editorial of the *Chung-yang jih-pao* also pointed out that such a "conspiracy" between the Tanaka government and the Chinese Communists was an act of betrayal of trust and justice and would definitely impair the security of Asian nations.⁵² On September 12, through the initiative of the government, more than 8,000 university and college professors made public a statement protesting against Japanese policy, urging the Chinese people to rise up and accept the challenge.⁵³ Mr. Ku

Cheng-kang, chief delegate of the Republic of China to the Asian Parliamentary meeting in Japan, also took advantage of his meeting with Tanaka to warn him of the dire consequences of establishing diplomatic relations with mainland China. Premier Tanaka was noncommittal in his reply while indicating he still supported the Asian Parliamentary group.⁵⁴ But these open pressures and persuasions, as well as behind-the-scene maneuvers to influence the policy of the Japanese government, did not prevail. Japan rejected the formal protest from Taipei and asked instead for “Taiwan’s understanding for Japan’s new China policy.”⁵⁵

Before Premier Tanaka’s visit to China, Shiina was dispatched as a special envoy to Taipei to explain Japan’s position. Shiina was received coolly, and the negotiations failed to reconcile differences.⁵⁶ Significantly, he met with a mass demonstration.⁵⁷ The government on Taiwan had decided that no compromise was possible. During the time of Tanaka’s mission in Peking, the Foreign Ministry in Taipei declared that any agreement between Peking and Tokyo would be considered null and void.⁵⁸ On September 30, 1972, the day following the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, Taiwan announced the severance of relations with Japan, denouncing the accord as a “perfidious act.”⁵⁹ On September 25, heavy security was imposed in Taipei and the Japanese Embassy was cordoned off, though no demonstration was staged.⁶⁰ Chinese doctors and nurses in Keelung City burned about \$5,000 worth of Japanese medicine and declared a boycott against Japanese goods;⁶¹ the next day, photos of Tanaka were burned in protest by university students.⁶²

Japan’s new China policy also provoked a debate on nationalism among intellectuals.⁶³ Within the span of one week, on December 4 and again on December 11, 1972, the Tai-ta Lun-tan-she, a student organization at National Taiwan University, sponsored two forums on nationalism. Chen Yu-ching, newly appointed director of the Committee on Overseas Affairs of the ruling party, Professor Chen Ku-ying, Professor Wang Shao-po, and Professor Wang Wen-hsing, among others, spoke at the first forum. Briefly, Mr. Chen Yu-ching asserted that China must be unified; yet the crucial issue was how and for what. He argued forcefully that unification was meaningful only if China were unified as a free and democratic nation. Identity with Chinese culture, Chinese spirit, and Chinese ways of life, unification, and national independence, he stated, should be goals. “But we cannot identify with the Communist regime in mainland China; we should identify with the China that defends and promotes Chinese culture and spirit. And our government has already been making efforts in this direction”, he said.