The Mysterious and Obvious in American Diplomacy

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From Monroe to Trump

^{By} Insur Farkhutdinov

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ISBN (10): 1-5275-5437-6 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-5437-5 To my Mother and all the Mothers of the World, who survived the nightmare and hard times of World War II, as well as subsequent local wars, in the name of their countries and peoples.

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INTRODUCTION

"In the beginning was the word", the Bible says. These words were also said by the fifth President of the United States, John Quincy Adams, in his 1823 Address to the Nation and they fell on the fertile ground prepared by George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams Sr., whose son John Quincy Adams became a pivotal player in establishing the Monroe principles.

"She goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy": this aphorism by John Quincy Adams became the departure point for an entire strain of thought on American foreign policy. Adams' ideological opponents, such as Henry Clay, argued that the US, by distancing itself from revolutionary movements, missed an opportunity to move the world's political balance of forces in a progressive direction at a relatively low cost. Even today, it is interesting to follow the history of the dispute between John Quincy Adams and Henry Clav over the South American Revolutions. In contrast to Adams, Clay was a fierce supporter of the Latin American liberation movement and urged the US "to countenance, by all means short of actual war" the great cause of South American independence. This was largely because Americans' support of their southern brethren "would give additional tone, and hope, and confidence to the friends of Liberty throughout the world" at a time of great crisis for the "rights of mankind."1 John Quincy Adams explained that he intended to first and foremost argue against European-style colonialism.

For most of American history, an isolationist tendency prevailed in its foreign policy. In its early years, it was a reflection of the American national interest in fortifying the new nation's independence. With the European continent torn apart by the great powers' (France, Great Britain, Austria, Germany and Russia, to name a few) rivalry, the American nation could develop at its own pace, without any major external threat.

¹ John Quincy Adams, An Address Delivered at the Request of a Commission of Citizens of Washington; on the Occasion of Reading the Declaration of Independence, on the Fourth of July, 1821 (Washington, DC: Davis and Force, 1821), 29.

Introduction

In short, the Monroe Doctrine, which was created almost two centuries ago, politically isolated American states from the influence of the great European powers. It called for an American hemispheric alliance against the 'Holy Alliance' of European monarchies. Quincy Adams' address clearly warned America against going abroad in search of monstrous regimes to destroy, but this did not at all mean that monsters should be given an entirely free hand or that America should stay totally passive.

My acquaintance with America began in early childhood when I read *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn*, which was followed by Fenimore Cooper's stories about dominant American Indians. Years later, I was walking the streets of big cities and small towns of America with great interest. I also spent time visiting country farms and noting some of the features and colors from previous times. Then, I began to learn the real American history, which was full of heroism and drama.

I am ashamed to say that, back then, I was more aware of Marilyn Monroe's life than that of America's fifth president, James Monroe.

A few years ago, while staying in a small historical town in the Russian Urals, after a trip to India, I became enlightened. "From Monroe to Trump," I uttered. I could not help thinking about it. By that time, I had published many scholarly articles on American diplomacy, and my research pushed me toward the early history of the country. In my previous book, which was published in Moscow as The American Doctrine of Preventive Strikes from Monroe to Trump, I exposed my understanding of the apparent and hidden aspects of American diplomacy, which began with George Washington's 1796 "Farewell Address" and ended with the 45th US President, Donald Trump. This adventurous journey led me to the complicated history of the formation and development of US foreign policy. This was full of successes and failures, as well as the sometimes proud, and sometimes unpleasant, episodes of interference in other countries' affairs. The unreasonable politics of the leading countries during the Cold War had almost brought the world to the edge of a third World War.

Do Americans want such a war? Do Russians want it? No, they do not and nor does any other nation on Earth.

Finally, I am pleased to proceed to the most important part, which involves saying a few words about my colleagues and friends. The book was written in complicated circumstances. It is impossible to express the extent

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of my gratitude to all my friends and colleagues. I would first like to mention Stanislav Shuvanov and Galina Samokhvalova, who, as children, survived a Stalingrad that had been torn apart by Hitler's troops, and who were also the first exacting readers of my Russian-language articles and my book. Stanislav Shuvanov, a veteran of Russian Diplomacy Service and Professor of the Russian Academy of Geopolitical Problems, supported my research by sharing his deep thoughts on the destiny of the Latin American countries, even though there were some political disagreements between us. I would also like to mention my dear, long-term friend Rashid Batkhiev, who earned his PhD in Criminal Law at Moscow State University in the 1970s, and who is also an honorably retired Judge of the Russian Federation, who never left me in the most difficult periods of my life.

Professor Dmitriy Nechevin was born in wartime and taken out of Leningrad by the Red Army, as the Nazis had blocked the city; this made him a son of the regiment. He survived the Nazis at the front. He believes in justice and the idea that peace will eventually triumph in the world. His kind advice and fundamental knowledge of international relations, especially on the League of Nations, still fascinate me.

I would also like to thank Doctor Andrei Ragulnin and his wife, Professor Indira, as well as my loyal friends from Bashkiria, which is where we were all born. Andrei, a friend of mine, and I set up the monthly *Eurasian Law Journal*, which is now in its eleventh year.

I am also grateful to an MGIMO Masters of Law student, Tiran Parsamyan, for his practical advice during my work on this book. My friend Professor Sergei Burianov, who reviewed my previous book, also shared his knowledge with me. Without Oleg Rzhevskiy, some of the pages of this book would be missing.

This book would not be finished on time without the intellectual support of my nephew, Linar Farkhutdinov, who has a PhD in Philosophy and who has been loyal to the revolutionary ideas of Che Guevara since childhood. Guevara fought for the liberation of the Latin American peoples, which is also one of the topics of my book.

My beloved granddaughters Arina, Maria, Sofia, and grandson, Ruslan, who is purposeful, like the young "Virginian Trio" (Monroe, Adams, and Clay), in his dream of becoming the new Ronaldo in football, all patiently waited, together with their parents—my best daughter Oksana and her

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husband Ruslan— for their grandfather to finally finish his book. And my younger son Rivaz is no exception, as he provided the inspiration for this book when we stayed in India.

Finally, this book has been written for the honorable press, Cambridge Scholars Publishing. I only ask the respected reader to think kindly on some of controversial thoughts they might find in this book, because they do not make up its essence.

PART I.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AS THE CORNERSTONE OF PAX AMERICANA

"The Monroe Doctrine is respected as long as we can support it, and this does not depend on law, but on politics and power." —State Secretary Knox

CHAPTER ONE

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE MILITARY STRIKES: METHODOLOGICAL RATIONALE

1.1. Ecumene: hemispheric imaginings in international law

Gretchen Murphy used the term "hemispheric imaginings" to highlight the often-overlooked interconnection between geography and culture or, more widely, space and historically-determined human consciousness. The point is that our understanding of the world's structure is not based entirely on facts, but more on values. Maps are a good example, because, historically, they usually failed to give a neutral, "scientific" image of the world, but implicitly contained an ideological perspective, which was determined by the cultural heritage of their author. The distinction between the map and the area that it tries to depict may be interpreted widely or, perhaps more accurately, epistemologically. We never truly reach a neutral "landscape" or "space" in itself, due to the limitations of our knowledge, but always operate within the framework of a model, which we both construct and reconstruct. This is in no way to advocate for agnosticism, or even solipsism, but to point out the dialectical nature of our knowledge, as it is a constant, dynamic process and never a static fact. We have no other way than that of building and rebuilding, writing and rewriting our "maps", whether they are philosophical, political or geographical. In this way, each map is a narrative. The Monroe Doctrine is one of the narratives that attempt to bring the "divergent national trajectories"² of anti-imperialism and imperialism together. It also ties the political distinction between tyranny and democracy to the geographical differences between the Old

² Gretchen Murphy, *Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire.* (Durham: Duke University Press. 2005), 2.

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and New World, thereby forming a "spatial construct that divides the globe into two hemispheres."³

The prerequisites for international law started to be formed in the 16th century. Big national states with strong central power appeared that were able to establish order within their borders. At the same time, constant wars caused chaos with the Thirty Years' War at its peak. The Peace of Westphalia was signed on October 24, 1648; this established the borders of the European states and was the basic document for all consequent treaties leading up to the end of the 18th century. In Paris, in 1625, during the first all-European war, Hugo Grotius published his tract, "On the law of war and peace", which laid the foundation for international law. As a result, the idea of international law was developed, which limited the previous lawlessness. Balance of powers became a key concept in international relations, although it was violated in the beginning of the 19th century but restored at the Vienna Congress. Europe was stable until the end of the 19th century. Norms of international law were formed on the basis of Roman law, and the monarch was seen as an actor of legal relations. International law was based on the equality of states, in the same way that Roman law was based on the equality of physical persons. By the beginning of the 20th century, humanity had reached a high level of development in practically all areas, except for international politics. Nationalism dominated international life, leading to World War I, which took the lives of 10 million people. This caused a counter reaction. resulting in the creation of the League of Nations.

Carl Schmitt wrote that, when Columbus discovered America in 1492 and the New World appeared, it caused a revolutionary change in the selfperception of the European nations. Europe automatically became an "Old World". Although it still considered itself a center of civilization that developed universally applicable concepts, within that center, significant changes occurred due to the discovery of the New World. According to Schmitt, this was because the new land was free for occupation and expansion, which caused rivalry among the European Powers. The division of the New World caused a re-division of the Old World, thus giving impetus to the development of international law. A line was established, which ran "along the equator or the Tropic of Cancer in the South, along a degree of longitude drawn in the Atlantic Ocean through

³ Ibid., 5.

Chapter One

the Canary Islands or the Azores in the West, or a combination of both."⁴ Schmitt writes that Europe ended and the New World started on this line. At any rate, European law (i.e., European public law) ended here. Consequently, war was placed within traditional European international law, which meant that the struggle for land-appropriations knew no bounds. Beyond the line was an "overseas" zone in which, due to the lack of a legal limit on war, only "the law of the stronger applied."⁵ Schmitt further notes that as long as

"...everything that "occurred beyond the line" remained outside the legal, moral, and political values recognized on this side of the line. This was a tremendous exoneration of the internal European problematic. The significance in international law of the famous and notorious expression "beyond the line" lies precisely in this exoneration."⁶

The global line of the Western Hemisphere is drawn by the New World in contrast to traditional Eurocentric international law. The practical consequences of this line became apparent in the 19th century and, even more so, in the 20th. This line connected the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean: "Instead of thinking of our continent as a body of land surrounded by water, we are coming to think of the Atlantic [and the Pacific] as bodies of water surrounded by land, of which our shores are a part."⁷

The Atlantic Community

"...came to define a transatlantic space including basically North American and Western European countries, which supposedly shared political and economic principles and institutions (liberal democracy, individual rights and the rule of law, free market and free trade), cultural traditions (Christianity and, more generally, "Western civilization") and, consequently, national interests."⁸

Following the Russian Revolution and the formation of the Communist Bloc, the community became strengthened in military-political terms, thereby giving birth to NATO on April 4, 1949.

⁴ Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the international law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum* (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2006), 93.

⁵ Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*, 93.

⁶ Ibid., 94.

⁷ Marco Mariano, "Is Italy an 'Atlantic' Country?" The Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in America, 11–19.

⁸ Ibid.

1.2. The Monroe Doctrine: from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana

The Monroe Doctrine and the doctrine of preventive military strikes, at first sight, appear to be unconnected. Speaking generally, these two international legal categories do not really have a direct relationship. Viewed chronologically, the Monroe Doctrine refers to the first quarter of the 19th century, whereas the US President George W. Bush officially announced the doctrine of preventive military strikes in 2001. Many researchers consider James Monroe to be the founder of the preventive military strike; he became the first President in the history of America to use it in 1817 when, under the Monroe decree, an American warship attacked the island of Amelia, which was, at that time, part of the Spanish Empire.

Despite the time gap of almost two centuries, both doctrines were associated with the US's ever-growing desire for world domination. In today's world, Donald Trump has recently announced a new protectionist policy, which creates serious trade barriers for European products. Trump showed the whole world the 'real character' of America: the newly elected US president called some European allies "free-riders" and said that NATO may have become "obsolete". He argued the following:

> "I think NATO is obsolete. NATO was done at a time you had the Soviet Union, which was obviously larger—much larger than Russia is today. I'm not saying Russia is not a threat. But we have other threats. We have the threat of terrorism. And NATO doesn't discuss terrorism. NATO's not meant for terrorism. NATO doesn't have the right countries in it for terrorism."⁹

The US clearly formulated both its position and claims at the beginning of the 19th century, via the Monroe Doctrine. President James Monroe put this doctrine forward in his annual message to US Congress on December 2, 1823. It actually contained a call from the US to the European powers to divide the world between them. The Monroe Doctrine contained three basic provisions, which were put forth as the principles of US foreign policy: non-interference of American states in the internal affairs of Europe; non-interference of European states in the internal affairs of

⁹ Tim Hains, "Trump: NATO Is Obsolete And Expensive, 'Doesn't Have The Right Countries In It For Terrorism," Real Clear Politics, March 27, 2016 https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/03/27/trump_europe_is_not_safe_lot s of the free world has become weak.html

American states: and the prevention of European states from encroaching. in any way, on the independence of a country through the act of colonization. After its proclamation, the Monroe Doctrine forced the US to take into account its own weakness and reckon with the power of Great Britain. The US had to then consider the inaccessibility of Great Britain's colonies and territorial acquisitions, as well as the fact that this provided them with favorable conditions for expansion on the American continent. which was far removed from the European powers. Therefore, until the end of the 19th century, the US was mainly engaged in the creation of a colonial empire in the Americas and demanded only one thing from the European powers: non-interference in the affairs of America and the recognition of a US monopoly. Due to unconnected circumstances, they were compelled to refrain from claims to territorial acquisitions in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US viewed the Monroe Doctrine as a means of "legalizing" its interference in the internal affairs of the rest of the Americas. Therefore, the beginning of a new stage in the development of American foreign policy thinking and the ideological foundations of American behavior in the world was due to the emergence of the Monroe Doctrine, which was the first official US expansionist concept. It was formulated on the basis of President J. Monroe and Secretary of State, J. O. Adams's (later also the President of the US) ideas and it was proclaimed in 1823 in the form of a presidential address to Congress. It aimed to limit the ambitions of European powers, primarily those of the British Empire.

American diplomacy developed its violent activity throughout the final years of the 19th century, when it aimed to tear away some of Spain's colonies, namely Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. It is significant that the opinions, and especially the aspirations, of the populations in these territories were not taken into consideration at all: i.e., the policy was carried out from the standpoint of the US's own unilateral interests.

"The Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism epitomize different aspects of the complex history of US-Latin American relations. The Monroe Doctrine has traditionally symbolized the US's long-standing attachment to unilateralism and a nostalgic desire for isolation from global geopolitics, coupled with paternalism in the Americas. Although, after 1889 Pan-Americanism was a US-led policy, it conveyed a commitment to a set of values that were consistent with continental cooperation, and which consequently held considerable appeal for Latin American states from the turn of the century until the late 1930s. However, this is to state the case far too severely. In the 1890s, when Pan-Americanism was originally formulated, the Monroe Doctrine was revived and even reinvented. In other words, it was Pan-Americanized." $^{\!\!\!10}$

Carl Schmitt notes the Monroe Doctrine's change of the meaning in the 19th century, when the US started to use it as a cover for their colonial policy. True, compared to the uncovered colonialism of the European powers, US colonialism remained relative because it was carried out as a "distribution of democratic values": i.e., in the eyes of the US population, it was considered to be a sort of civilizing and emancipating activity. Schmitt thought that, although the initial content was changed, this was only minor because the US's priority within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine may be interpreted quite widely.

American imperialism is considered to be the successor of British imperialism. This was the so-called Pax Britannica: a period of dominance by the British Empire at sea and in international relations beginning with Waterloo (1815) and ending with World War I (1914–1918). The peak of British power was in the Victorian age (1837–1901). It was characterized by the free trade doctrine, which was developed by the Manchester school, the control of strategic naval routes, the abolition of slavery, the propagation of the English language, parliamentarism, technologies, laws, and so on.

In the second half of the 19th century, when the British Empire was at the peak of its power, and when Benjamin Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain, and Cecil Rhodes were important figures, the myth of the "white man's burden" was formed. This was a sort of moral justification of imperialist rule, as most memorably expressed by Rudyard Kipling. However, they knew perfectly well that moral justifications were used to cover up the very pragmatic economic fact that Britain wanted stability. Cecil Rhodes expressed this idea very clearly in 1895:

"I was in the East End of London (a working-class quarter) yesterday and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for 'bread! bread!' and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism. [...] My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the

¹⁰ "In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898–1933," by Juan Pablo Scarfi, *Diplomatic History* 40, No. 2 (2016): 189–218.

Chapter One

United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists."¹¹

Thanks to Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, the Monroe Doctrine was remodelled into a universalist-imperialist world doctrine: "the Monroe Doctrine turned into the Doctrine of Roosevelt, which was not just a simple corollary or amendment to the Monroe Doctrine. The Roosevelt's doctrine is the foundations of the US's power policy in the world, although for propaganda purposes and mystification the USA still refer to the Monroe Doctrine".¹²

After the end of World War II, Britain was involved in a series of conflicts at the borders of its vast colonial empire. It could not be saved as times had changed; the Americans also actively helped to destroy the British Empire. At this point, the British Commonwealth, which was created in 1931, became useful. Initially, this organization was intended to regulate the relations between the United Kingdom and its dominions, including Australia, Canada, and New Zeeland. However, after the war, former colonies were also accepted. The head of the Commonwealth is Queen Elizabeth II. The US's role as a hegemon of the Western world was mostly explained by the fact that it was not damaged in World War II and could easily spread its influence in Western countries. In many respects, the US's role after 1945 was even greater than after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In order to understand the goals and tasks of American geopolitics, one has to look deeper and remember the Council of Foreign Relations' 1939 memorandum, which was widely discussed in Washington's political circles and was welcomed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his administration. In short, its essence is reducible to the fact that the war in Europe was inevitable. As a consequence of the coming war, the US had to take the place of the British Empire as the world's sovereign. Edwin Guy, one of the editors of the *Foreign Affairs Journal*, which is published

¹¹ Vladimir Lenin, *Collected Works*, Volume 22 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 256–57.

¹² Walter La Feber, "The Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine from Monroe to Reagan," in *Redefining the Past: essays in diplomatic history in honor of William Appleman Williams*, ed. Lloyd C. Gardner (Corvallis, Or.: Oregon State University Press, 1986).

by the Council of Foreign Affairs, wrote: "When I think of the British Empire as our inheritance I think simply of the natural right of succession. That ultimate succession is inevitable."¹³

In 1939, there was a series of meetings between the US State Department and the Council of Foreign Relations where a detailed plan was formed for the US to succeed the former British Empire as the world's sovereign. Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod argue in their book, *To Win a Nuclear War*,¹⁴ that this plan was later embodied in the NSC 20/1 and NSC 68 documents. In contrast to Great Britain and old Pax Britannica, whose axiom was a relative advantage in the context of the world's balance of power, the coming Pax Americana was supposed to be based on the absolute advantage of US power. This principle was not just incompatible with, but rejected, the old concept of balance of powers. Later, in 1940– 1941—especially after the Atlantic Charter was signed in 1941 and a conference of Allied countries in Casablanca in 1943—Great Britain and the US developed the US's main strategic concept, which was known as the establishment of the critical superiority of US power in the post-war world—the so-called Roosevelt Doctrine.

In the period after the end of World War II, the US was not only Great Britain's successor, but also filled the power vacuum left by Germany. The US became the most powerful enemy of the Soviet Union, whose destruction was now becoming a categorical imperative of US policy as a way of continuing war by peaceful means. The US's Leviathan (an Atlantic sea-power) was preparing for a final battle with the Soviet Union's Behemoth (a leading Eurasian power).

Did the British Empire really sink into oblivion?

It is generally considered that after World War II, in accordance with the Atlantic Charter, which had been signed by Britain and the US, the British Empire, "on which the sun never sets," disintegrated. However, this was not really the case, because 'disintegration' assumes something chaotic and unmanageable, just like the situation in Russia and Austro-Hungary, or manageable by outside powers, as in the case of Yugoslavia. In

¹³ Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, *The Imperial Brain Trust: The Council* on Foreign Relations & United States Foreign Policy, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 19.

¹⁴ Michio Kaku & Daniel Axelrod, *To Win a Nuclear War. The Pentagon's Secret War Plans*, (London: Zed Press, 1987).

contrast, the disintegration of the British Empire was directed and prolonged. The English really seem to be masters not only of colonization. but of decolonization as well. The English started to prepare for the future long before it arrived at the end of the 19th century. At that time, the rules of colonization changed. The name "colony" started to be avoided, as it became an offensive term. Instead, terms such as 'dominions' and 'protectorates' were used, depending on their level of development, and they were given some formal features of independence. By that time, the British Empire was so large that it was impossible to take proper care of it. It was, in time, renamed the British Commonwealth of Nations, before later becoming simply the Commonwealth of Nations. These days, this organization unites 2,418,964,000 people, and 20% of world's land territory from former British colonies, apart from some territories in the Middle East. The transformation of the Empire into the Commonwealth was beneficial for both the colonizers and the inhabitants of the former colonies. The British authorities reduced their huge costs in order to support their own infrastructure and army. The British learned their lesson from losing 13 North American colonies in the 18th century, and so they no longer abused their powers openly. As a result, the Monroe Doctrine has remained in force up to the present day. Furthermore, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, John Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan all referred to it during various political crises. The doctrine was anti-colonial since it set limits on European imperialism and intervention in the Western Hemisphere. It was imperial in the sense that it was applied, especially by President James Polk in the 1840s, as an expansionist policy throughout the Americas and was associated with the "manifest destiny" of the US. As soon as European colonialism and interventions in the Americas were no longer perceived as a threat in the context of the First World War, the doctrine progressively became a matter of debate in the Western Hemisphere, rather than acting as a limit to European colonialism.

In 1895, Grover Cleveland attempted to invoke the Monroe Doctrine to compel the British to accept arbitration in a border dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. He went as far as to threaten to create a commission for this purpose if the British would not agree. Eventually, the arbitration took place by mutual consent, but the British, through their foreign secretary Lord Salisbury, made it clear that they rejected the idea that the Monroe Doctrine was a legitimate part of international law. Using the Monroe Doctrine, which became the basis for US expansion in the Western Hemisphere, the US opposed the expansion of European powers over the new independent states of Latin America. Back then, the process of gaining independence in Latin America was still, in fact, under British control, but the US position could not be ignored. In 1862, for the first time, the principle of the fifth US president was publicly called the Monroe Doctrine when French forces invaded and conquered Mexico.

We can distinguish four stages in the history of establishing the US's world hegemony using the Monroe Doctrine. The first was after the end of World War I, which was when it was used and developed by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. Thanks to the latter's efforts in 1919, the Monroe Doctrine was fixed in the Covenant of the League of Nations (Article 21) in 1920: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."¹⁵

The Truman Doctrine (1945–1953) on preventive nuclear strikes became a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine. Additionally, the Eisenhower Doctrine asserted a number of principles regarding the use of the atomic weapons, equating this weapon to usual methods of warfare. President Lyndon Johnson, for whom the Monroe Doctrine was a kind of a reference book, was the first to launch a preemptive strike against another state by beginning the war in Vietnam. The Guam Doctrine (also known as the Nixon Doctrine) also had something in common with the fifth President's doctrine, as did the Carter Doctrine of massive retaliation, which also left an indelible mark on the history of American diplomacy. During a new acute confrontation with the Soviet Union, the Reagan Doctrine created the preventive nuclear strike, called "decapitation." The next era lasted from the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s to the end of Barack Obama's administration. George Bush Sr.'s Doctrine (the Bush Doctrine) allowed the use of a brilliant preventive strike (Desert Storm) in order to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation in early 1991 in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution. This was perhaps the only correct application of the preventive strike doctrine.

The key idea underlying the National Security Strategy of President George W. Bush, which was published on September 20, 2002, is the concept of anticipation, which is defined as preventive and preemptive actions. Part III of the Strategy stated: "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we

¹⁵ The Covenant of the League of Nations, available from

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art21

will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of selfdefense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country".¹⁶ Part V of the Strategy declared:

"The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."¹⁷

On the basis of this new strategy, in 2003, the US started a so-called preventive war against Iraq, which grossly violated the basic principles of international law under a contrived pretext. Much later, in an interview with CNN, the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair acknowledged that one of the causes of Islamic State's formation was the invasion of Iraq by NATO countries in 2003. Tony Blair actually apologized for the chaos that swept the country after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.¹⁸ Iraq has now become an academy of global terrorism, which allows skillful terrorists to seep into Europe.

International law recognizes the right of each country to act in selfdefense. The right of states to undertake proactive actions for the purposes of self-defense in various forms is permissible within the framework of the UN Charter. A preventive attack can be justified, if it is conducted according to Art. 51 of the UN Charter, which allows self-defense only in when there is an armed attack on the member state:

> "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lm9-Bp8B-h0

¹⁶ National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 17, 2002, available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf

¹⁷ National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 17, 2002, available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf

¹⁸ Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair on ISIS and Iraq, YouTube video, 02:07, posted by "FactPointVideo," October 26, 2015,

any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."¹⁹

Bill Clinton's doctrine on preventive interference is akin to the constant interference of President Monroe in neighboring countries' affairs.

The fourth stage of establishing the US's world hegemony using the Monroe Doctrine began in 2017 with the formation of Donald Trump's foreign policy. Trump is strenuously forcing the world to accept the inevitability of preventive military strikes against countries that are perceived negatively by the US.

Britain became a global empire following the Vienna Congress of 1815, which lasted until the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations was created. The British Empire was too large and too concerned with global problems to fit into just a European framework. The collapse of the empire and subsequent rise of the US as the most prominent country in the West forced the British to descend to Europe's level and start building their new role as a middle-range power with trans-regional ambitions. From 1950 to 1960, Britain was dominated by the opinion that, in order to compensate for the loss of its empire, it needed to become the special partner of its transatlantic neighbor. During the Cold War years, which united Britain and the US against a common enemy, their relations were complementary.

At the beginning of the 21st century, especially after the war in Iraq, a significant part of Britain's intellectual and business elite desperately felt the instability of the country's position, which stands with one leg in the US and with the other in Europe. The Europeanization of Britain is opposed by the right wing elements of the ruling circles and parts of the military establishment.

The end of the Cold War did not only mean the collapse of the Soviet Union through the victory of the "free world" over the "Empire of Evil", but it also led to the elimination of a rival who had challenged America's claims to establish *Pax Americana*. Now, the only superpower left with its messianic ideology appears to be triumphing over the world. In the process, the final establishment of Pax Americana is presented as a necessity in terms of both American national interests and the demands of

¹⁹ Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945), available from http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html

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the world community. In essence, it indicates that an orderly existence is impossible beyond Pax Americana's borders. However, in fact, it is the perpetuation of Pax Americana ideology that leads to both marginalization and the progressive impoverishment of many countries throughout the world:

"In this regard, the perspective of the progressive marginalization of countries, regions and people seems to be very real. They will be forcibly cut off from the process of the world development. But they are being cut-off under conditions that are not the result of their own choice. The most obvious example of this is Sub-Saharan Africa [...] Being beat dead as a result of capitalist "development", the largest part of Africa now may be left on its own. Such a fate threatens other countries and peoples as well."²⁰

Also, it should not be forgotten that marginalized countries and peoples from the non-Western parts of the world might unleash a war (nuclear, bacteriological, etc.) against the West and destroy it.

Let us once again return to the fate of the British Empire and highlight the rationale for this work. History does repeat itself, in essence if not in details. The fate of the British Empire is the closest example of the current stage of American imperialism's development. As previously noted, the US is a direct successor to the British Empire. Has something changed to make the British example no longer relevant? The answer is clearly 'no', because nothing has changed and all the changes that took place in the past century only confirm and strengthen the opinion that the American Empire will share the same fate. This is due to the core of the capitalist mode of production, which is now facing the same problems as it did at the beginning of the 20th century. There were no free sales markets left, before World War I occurred. It created sales markets and the US benefited from this by increasing their exports fourfold during the war. The US was no longer in Europe's debt and, instead, became its creditor. Then there was the Great Depression, which was followed by World War II. The US benefited again from a global conflict, and this was followed by a golden age of unprecedented prosperity driven by reconstruction and the illusion of a welfare state, which exhausted itself by the 1970s. In the absence of new sales markets, Reagan began to promote domestic consumption by turning the US into a society of consumers, which meant a decrease in

²⁰ Andre Frank, "Smeschenie mirovih tsentrov c Vostoka na Zapad" [Shift of World Centers from East to West], Latinskaya America [Latin America], no. 2 (1993): 11.