Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of ‘Becoming-Revolutionary’
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By
Raniel S.M. Reyes
For Gino, Nhie,
and all the victims of the COVID-19 pandemic
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The Latin noun revolutio, from which the term “revolution” came from, entails the act of “turning back” or “rolling back.” A revolution presupposes temporality, for a revolution is a “course,” that is, a “movement” through time. To be more precise, as a movement, a revolution implies the complete turning around of something—for instance, the earth’s movement around the sun upon which we measure a year. Understanding the temporality of revolution allows us to also shed light on another relative term, “event.” The term also comes from Latin, specifically evinere (ex + venire) meaning “to result from” or “to come out from.” Therefore, an event is an “outcome” and can only occur through the course of time. So, both revolution and event presuppose time as movement. While we usually regard a revolution as a “big event” because it radically alters a given social or political landscape, it is something that, nevertheless, happens only after a series of smaller historical moments have come to pass. An event, in this context, is the moment when a revolution comes full circle; however, it only occurs after the fact.

But while a revolution as event presupposes the temporal, and I say dialectical, aggregation of smaller historical moments, we should not unwittingly construe it as a finished product or a final telos. The political notion points to another telos—freedom. I believe that this is the universal motivation for any philosophy of revolution. In order to understand freedom as the telos of revolution, which is at the same time its normative basis, it will benefit us if we expatiate on it from the point of view of “small politics,” rather than “big politics.” It is important that we understand the amorphous character of the idea of freedom, and so while it is the normative basis for a theory of revolution, freedom itself averts any grand narrative of political theory. I believe that Raniel S.M. Reyes’ Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of ‘Becoming-Revolutionary’ points us towards that direction.

Reyes offers a timely treatise on the philosophical idea of revolution. By patiently presenting a nuanced reconstruction of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s ontology, Reyes narrates to us the possibility of understanding revolution from the point of view of small politics, that is, micropolitics. Through micropolitics, the temporality of revolution as political praxis is underscored. Presented as a political ontology, the optics
of micropolitics shifts from mainstream (macro) social and political spheres to the singularity of subterranean and unlikely locations as potent spaces for political praxis. In this sense, the possibility of a revolution, normatively based on a vague notion of freedom, is brought about by temporal, albeit non-sequential, moments. This means that the “micro” moments of micropolitics come from different directions and in various degrees of intensity and commitment—in other words, they come together rhizomically. These micro spheres are spaces where we could imagine our utopias, our vague ideas of a good life, in the sense of Ernst Bloch. “Becoming-revolutionary,” Reyes adumbrates, “involves the schizophrenization of oedipalized desire in the individual, familial, societal, and cyber spectrums.” From these spaces of “desire” we begin to build a sense of hope for something better, the obverse of which is described by Reyes as capitalism. It is in this sense that the revolution is still to come.

Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of ‘Becoming-Revolutionary’ is one but also many or many singularities in one: an assemblage of moments. It is a thorough introduction to the main philosophical ideas of Deleuze and Guattari, a necessary moment in Reyes’ attempt to articulate a micropolitics. Arguably, one could read his interpretation of “schizoanalysis” as a critical theory based on the aforementioned vague notion of freedom. For after all, any critical theory is normatively grounded in the abolition of social injustice. As Reyes puts it, “becoming-revolutionary advocates the cultivation of new subjectivities and relations irreducible to the repressive, protean, and gaseous frontiers of Empire.”

Ultimately, Reyes’ book is an original reading of Deleuzo-Guattarian political theory, for this type of political theory is often accused of a lack of political or ethical commitment. Reyes attempts to remedy this seeming deficit in interpretation by presenting micropolitics as a critical theory. Thanks to Reyes, the emancipative potential of Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy is placed at the center stage. Reyes’ interpretation radicalizes the notion of revolution, as the concept of “becoming-revolutionary” presents revolution not as a telos but an image of thought, in the Deleuzian/Nietzschean sense, that counters ideology and sustains our continuous (for after all a revolution is a rolling back) imagination of freedom.

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# List of Abbreviations

**Gilles Deleuze** (cited by page number)  
**PS**  *Proust and Signs*  
**NT**  “Nomad Thought”  
**NP**  *Nietzsche and Philosophy*  
**S**  *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*  
**B**  *Bergsonism*  
**C1**  *Cinema 1: Movement-Image*  
**C2**  *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*  
**ES**  *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature*  
**EP**  *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*  
**LS**  *The Logic of Sense*  
**DR**  *Difference and Repetition*  
**N**  *Negotiations*  
**OLM**  “One Less Manifesto”  
**ECC**  *Essays Critical and Clinical*  
**PI**  *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*  
**FB**  *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*  
**TRM**  *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*  
**WG**  *What is Grounding?*

**Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari** (cited by page number)  
**AO**  *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*  
**K**  *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*  
**ATP**  *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*  
**WP**  *What is Philosophy?*

**Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet** (cited by page number)  
**D**  *Dialogues II*
Revolution is a perennial companion of life’s immanent dynamism and humanity’s capacity to transform the world. It has been appropriated and misappropriated by people for political, economic, religious, and scientific reasons, and it has been actualized in different epistemic planes such as geography, aesthetics, and mass media. From a conventional political stance, revolution aspires to overthrow a tyrannical system, a dominating party, and a rogue country. Furthermore, past revolutions were more ideological and class-based, launched by certain colonized, oppressed, and marginalized subjectivities against cruelty and hegemony.

Notwithstanding a large number of social factors and nuances, the overarching telos of most revolutionary actions is freedom. Its fervent desire to undermine obsolete traditions and abolish unjust structures is guided by an earnest attempt to listen to people’s voices—a gesture that contributes to consensus-building and reform. To achieve these liberating ends, individuals of varying principles, especially in the past, resorted to vehement upheavals after exhausting all deliberative options. From the perspective of Marxist intellectuals, for instance, the annihilation of capitalist exploitation calls for radical action. The communist leader, Mao Tse Tung, aptly summarizes this point: “A revolution … cannot be so refined … and magnanimous. A revolution is … an act of violence by which one class overthrows another” (Tse Tung 1927). However, we are witnesses to the so-called miscarriage of Marxism. The failure of Marxism is engendered by the failure of the so-called followers of Marx to put into fruition the original vision of Marx, that is, the achievement of social justice via the ultimate abolition of societal classes. Instead, the once radical praxis has converted into a degenerated political conservatism, which resulted not in social transformation, but rather in the stagnation of history. This form of political conservatism is a dangerous ideology because it exists in the name of Marx; but in reality, it is the ultimate bastardization of Marx’s original concern for the plight of the oppressed. In connection to this, Hannah Arendt argues in On Revolution that, “Only where this pathos of novelty … is connected with the idea of freedom are we entitled to speak of revolution. But violence is no more adequate to describe … revolution than change … in the sense of a new beginning … of a new body politics, where
the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution” (Arendt 1965, 27–28).

This debate between violent and reformist kinds of struggle is also characteristic of history and politics. As such, the concept of revolution is integrally intertwined with the telos of nationhood. In the context of Philippine political history, for example, it is profoundly informed by an ardent opposition to a colonial ‘other’ such as Spain and the United States of America. In this vein, revolution has become a great and persistent concern for Filipino consciousness. But the passionate quest for nationalism was desecrated by recurrent contradictions inherent in Philippine history itself. In the 1896 revolution, a huge 38th parallel existed between those revolutionaries privileging radical action and those endorsing peaceful reforms. This difference in approach was aggravated by the social participants’ paucity in military resources and intelligence, personal tensions between revolutionaries, and connivance with the oppressors.

At this juncture, a caveat must be mentioned. It is beyond the scope of this book to argue which is the better procedure for a revolution. In fact, past radical actions are still captives of political representation and teleology. From a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, however, revolution is a praxis that would not force a classless society or the reemergence of previous revolutions, if the materialities of the immanent field of life are still plagued by descending life-typologies, fascist principles, and arborescent relations.

Despite the promise of past successful revolutions, a repetition of their identities is already impossible. This is the reason why this unenlightened practice engenders us to misrecognize new struggles’ distinctive attributes and potentials for novel terrains of thinking. Similarly, the mediocre clamor for the repetition of the old paves the way for oligarchs and opportunists, to name a few, to strengthen their fortresses and manipulate people’s historical consciousness. If ever we would desire the repetition of any past struggle, it should be a yearning to repeat the power of difference (DR 41) that produced it and an aspiration for incessant self-critique.

At present, revolution has drastically transfigured its rhetoric, intensities, and scope by virtue of the dialectics of history and the world, as well as the contingencies of the human condition. In the light of globalization, revolution transcends the traditional boundaries of nation, society, and state. As the world is miniaturized by such enormous technological breakthroughs such as the World Wide Web, people who were divided by language, race, and culture are now enunciating more fluid relations with the rest. In this vein, any form of regional or local resistance
inevitably bears a global dimension. Of course, the pragmatics fostered by these developments is similarly matched by threats such as terrorism and environmental catastrophes.

In the realm of contemporary social movements, past local uprisings against an exploitative state, imperialistic policies, and neoliberalism, to name a few, currently assume worldwide constellations. Today’s revolution is constitutive of a hybridity of voices, affects, and subjectivities. Similar to the Occupy Movement, revolutionary resistance now is rhizomic, nonteleological, and is characterized by different initiatives across the globe. Additionally, it is prosecuted by an assemblage of subjectivities, which is performed in various geographies and fueled by variegated causes. However, the radical attributes and possibilities offered by these movements are always hunted by life-denying possibilities that include the reactive return to debased practices, the voluntary submission to exploitation, and the fortification of the very nemesis these activities seek to subvert. One of the most notable contributions of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in the fields of Continental philosophy in general, and French Critical Theory in particular, is the critical analysis of contemporary forms of societal predicaments and antagonism through the lens of schizoanalysis and the principle of becoming-minoritarian, to name a few.

A. The Contemporary French Micropolitical Tradition

The aftermath of World War II and France’s Liberation had a profound effect on the thoughts of Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Felix Guattari. The 1960s marked a point in France’s history when the socio-political climate of the time was ripe and provided a concrete condition for the development of ideas of young philosophers. These young thinkers made waves by relating their critique of metaphysics, science, and history to the socio-political climate—which resulted in philosophical currents such as postmodernism and poststructuralism. In the sphere of politics, any political theory that aims for the unitary justification of political governance, performance of societal diagnosis, and critical opposition was cast to doubt. Theorists therefore were inclined to alternative conceptions of political resistance.

Against the grain of politics as a normative theory, Foucault casts his attention to the “specificity of the mechanisms of power.” In his major works, especially *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, he demonstrates how institutions such as prisons, schools, and hospitals convert into disciplinary devices of control and subjugation. Foucault and Deleuze are kindred spirits principally in relation to their socio-political
struggles and critical approaches to modern life. Paul Patton claims that most of Deleuze’s political-activist engagements involve common causes with Foucault in the 1970s, such as his participation in the Prisoner’s Information Group formed by Foucault, Daniel Defert, and other intellectuals in the early parts of 1971, including Deleuze’s integral role in the campaign later that year expressing support for immigrant workers and against racism.8

For Foucault, the possibility of the existence of a societal Leviathan is arbitrary because power in the contemporary condition is no longer in closed spaces but is dispersed in the body politic.9 As such, the state’s invincible grip on people is enfeebled because the configurations of power are not anymore derived from an overarching concept. For this reason, power now originates from the periphery, and it is exercised in innumerable nodes.10 He claims that power already operates in pockets and is “employed and exercised through a net-like organization … individuals circulate between its threads” (Foucault 1980a, 98). As the singular expression of sovereignty turns problematic, the dispersion of power in various coordinates causes amplified and more pluralistic atomizations. This novel kind of technology of power renders control and domination more subtly yet progressively detrimental and generalized in the entire society.11

Foucault believes that the lack of a nerve center of monarchial power in the contemporary epoch causes power-relations to be transmitted and deployed in web-like manner perpetually. This novel social configuration likewise allows power to surmount the restraining boundaries of philosophical anthropocentrism because it puts a premium on the instruments of its scattered expressions and practices of positioning in the body politic.12 In his view, power relations are derived from the support that forces relation, which includes both human and nonhuman materialities (Foucault 1980b, 92). This eventuality is engendered by what he calls the swarming of different disciplinary mechanisms transfigured from the local exercise of forces within the confines of a particular institution into extensive constellations of power. This social fluidity is also present in the conceptualization of ‘assemblage’—a dynamic principle evasive to the governance of any transcendental eidos. It comprises the collection of matter-flows such as affects and bodies regulated by web-like processes of historical configuration (ATP 406). A corollary principle to assemblage is the Deleuzo-Guattarian theorization of micropolitics or the minoritarian logic of production. As opposed to macropolitics, micropolitics is based on heterogeneous investments and local connections. Whereas the former functions in rhizomic fashion, the latter operates in hierarchical relations.
Foucault’s micropolitics is directed to the local expressions of power and subjugation in our everyday lives. In this political template, the individual is portrayed as an agent of subversion and transformation, and not simply as an after-effect of the configuration of forces or as objects of power and exploitation in society. The individual’s role is likewise not only to subvert values encompassing domination, but also to reconstruct the epistemological underpinnings governing relations of power. This brand of genealogical critique against essentialist knowledge-formations and principles that fossilize truth and power is likewise one of the fundamental pillars of Deleuze’s *Nietzsche and Philosophy*.

Deleuze’s reconstruction of Nietzsche is an experimentation and radicalization of our thinking and language. It promotes a minoritarian reading of the text, that is, without reference to any preconceived essence. As a result, everything becomes fragmentary, dynamic, and relational. Furthermore, the Deleuzian typological reading of nihilism is rooted from Nietzsche’s principle of genealogy. This new philosophy is a critique of the value of values. Specifically, it assesses whether values differentially originated from noble and base or ascending and descending typologies. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze writes:

> Genealogy means both the value of origin and the origin of values. Genealogy is opposed to absolute values as it is to relative or utilitarian ones. Genealogy signifies the differential element of values from which their value itself derives. Genealogy thus means origin or birth, but also difference … in the origin. Genealogy means nobility and baseness, nobility and vulgarity, nobility and decadence in the origin.

Genealogical critique is a form of evaluation and an active expression of a mode of existence or creation. In other words, in genealogy’s aptitude of evaluation lies its ability to create. Genealogy’s endorsement of the invention of new concepts and possibilities of life serves as a philosophical blueprint of Deleuze’s (in collaboration with Guattari) genealogical critique of capitalism and Oedipus. In *Anti-Oedipus*, they explicate that these oppressive phenomena are products of socio-historical configurations and contingencies; that is why, they can be critically diagnosed and undermined.

Further, Derrida joins Foucault in what is called a ‘generation.’ Deleuze and Derrida’s contribution to the French Postwar scholarship weights upon their efforts to revive Nietzsche’s philosophy of difference. Their philosophies seek to invert Platonic metaphysics and revaluate the
Hegelian dialectical philosophy because of their nihilistic and teleological underpinnings. Furthermore, Derrida conceives that the goal of his philosophy of difference or what is famously known as ‘deconstruction,’ is no longer the achievement of absolute truth. Rather, it is the deconstruction of dogmatic structures plaguing the present so as to open up the passage to the ‘other’ (Derrida 1992, 341). In the Deleuzo-Guattarian parlance, the trajectory toward the other entails a philosophy of the future or a virtual philosophy—a term borrowed from Bergson. In *Specters of Marx*, Derrida delineates that his deconstructive appraisal aspires to assume niftily the form of a Marxist critique to radicalize the present in pursuit of a “movement of an experience open to the absolute future of what is coming,” (Derrida 1994, 16) which, in the Deleuzo-Guattarian terrain, refers to a future philosophy capable of inventing untimely concepts and revolutionizing people’s reactive thoughts and practices.

Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction assumes the role of a democracy-to-come in diagnosing the contemporary society. Essentially, this form of democracy does not provide universal guides that will engender the achievement of an ideal democratic society. Rather, it critically diagnoses traditional democracy based on the concepts of absolute sovereignty and the androcentric tradition. This reformulated brand of democracy maintains a close affinity with Deleuze and Guattari’s principle of becoming-democracy in the sense that it analyzes the tensions immanent in our understanding and practices of democracy, justice, governance, and the like toward an absolute future of pure becoming.

Becoming-democracy maintains a critical stance on conventional democratic practices and popular opinions, as well as its violence to the human condition. Ultimately, it exemplifies the principle of becoming-revolutionary via its critical diagnosis of different capitalist and democratic codifications in society. Such mode of resistance fuels philosophy’s political vocation—the creation of concepts capable of radicalizing the grain toward a people- and world-to-come.

Foucault and Deleuze are contemporary fellow-questors by virtue of their respective formulations of immanent critique, micropolitics, sympathy to nonhuman materialities or mechanisms, and repudiation of any macrorevolutionary transformation. However, what I think remains unexplored is the micropolitical analysis of the dynamics of psychic and social oppression from the perspective not of power, but of desire (desiring-production). Deleuze’s philosophy attempts to diagnose and subvert all kinds of exploitations or fascism in social classes, institutions, and organizations of political government at the subterranean domains of
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sensibility, affect, and allegiance. In Derrida’s case, despite his philosophy’s radical critique of identity and projection to the horizon of the other, it is bankrupt of any elaborate explanation about the mapping of a subjectivity of the future and a world open to nonhuman materialities. The critical study of oppression (social and individual) using desiring-production, the analysis of society through micropolitics, and the receptivity to the nonhuman, are the important themes Deleuze investigated and problematized in collaboration with Guattari.

B. The Deleuzo-Guattarian Connection

From Foucault’s micropolitics and Derrida’s differential philosophy, let us now turn to the historico-philosophical encounter between Deleuze and Guattari—against the backdrop of the May 1968 event and the succeeding predicaments that occurred in the French society. Prior to Deleuze and Guattari’s encounter in the summer of 1969, their lives and careers were divergent from each other. The former just completed his Doctorat D’Etat, whose major thesis serves as the content of *Difference and Repetition*. Meanwhile, the latter, is an organic individual educated by his immersion into the life outside the university walls. He is neither an academic nor a philosophico-literary scholar. Whereas the former was a famous academician known for authoring phenomenal books such as *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, the latter was a recognized radical psychoanalyst and activist. Negri profoundly describes his experience with the opposite personalities of Deleuze and Guattari in *Negri on Negri*:

“We talked about many things, but I couldn’t tell him that I was depressed, that I was tired, that I had problems…. It was difficult to explain to him what was happening in Italy. With Felix I could. Very soon we began to come up with ideas together—and not only from the theoretical point of view” (Negri 2004, 46). As a footnote to Negri’s divergent experience with Deleuze and Guattari, scholars claim that Deleuze and Guattari’s relationship is comparable to that of a wasp and an orchid. In fact, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari explain this form of relation and becoming:

> Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. It could be said that the orchid imitates the wasp, reproducing its image in a signifying fashion (mimesis, mimicry, lure, etc.). But this is true only on the level of the strata—a parallelism between two strata such that a plant organization on one imitates an animal organization on the other. At the same time, something else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a
capture of code, surplus-value of code, an increase in valence, a
veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a
becoming-orchid of the wasp (ATP 10).

Their encounter, which initially lacked any historical necessity, was made
possible by Jean-Pierre Muyard, a psychoanalyst practitioner at the La
Borde Clinic—whose goal is to formulate and provide radically novel
brands of care capable of differentializing various institutions.29

What Deleuze lacks is relatively what is excessive in Guattari—his
creative capacity to organize people and collective action, as well as his
experience with the socially and psychologically deranged individuals. In
fact, in 1969, Muyard wanted to moderate Guattari’s enthusiasm and
militancy in and outside the clinic. Muyard thought that teaching Guattari
how to write would mitigate his radical fervor. This plan only materialized
upon Guattari’s meeting with Deleuze. In their first meeting, their pathways
immediately converged in variegated ways. Whereas philosophy was
radically criticized by structuralism and Lacanian psychoanalysis, Guattari
was marginalized by Lacan himself as his interlocutor.30 Deleuze’s
encounter with Guattari then provided an avenue for the former to articulate
his response against these critics. Meanwhile, the latter’s perennial plan to
critically engage with Lacan’s Oedipal triangulation and the reductionism-
of-signifier thesis strengthened upon meeting Deleuze. Guattari’s critique
of Oedipal triangulation or psychoanalytic familialism was affirmed by
Deleuze.

Deleuze and Guattari’s first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
Anti-Oedipus attests to the creativity that stays in-between their
collaboration. Their first experimental book granted what Deleuze really
wanted to do aside from Difference and Repetition. According to him, “The
time is coming when it will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy
the way it has been done for so long…. This search for a new means of
philosophical expression begun by Nietzsche must be pursued today with
respect to the renewal of certain other arts” (DR xxii).

Deleuze and Guattari’s creative experimentation with language
has transformed the writer ‘Kafka’ into a paramount figure of becoming-
minoritarian, the biological concept ‘rhizome’ into a political principle, and
the geographic term ‘cartography’ into a revolutionary activity, to name
few. Inspired by Nietzschean philosophy, among others, Deleuze and
Guattari’s project was fueled by the goal to abolish the frontiers of the ‘old
image of thought’ toward the ‘new image of thought’ (NP 91).

Furthermore, various scholars claim that the philosophical
encounter of Deleuze and Guattari during the revolutionary ferment of the
1970s was a significant turning point in both thinkers’ career. On the one
Deleuze and Guattari’s antipsychiatric thinking was deepened by his encounter with an alternative philosophical tradition consisting of maverick philosophers, namely Hume, Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Bergson. On the other, Deleuze’s philosophy of difference was contextualized and harnessed upon its immersion with the theoretico-institutional struggles in French psychoanalysis and psychiatry, as well as with the political turmoil surrounding students’ and workers’ movements in France (and in the entire Europe). The creative conjunction of their ideas and experiences transfigures their project into an assemblage of philosophy, politics, and psychiatry. The concepts ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘paranoia,’ for instance, are then comprehended as products of historico-political materialities. In this manner, these forms of psychic repression are perceived as by-products of social oppression. Moreover, their collaborative scholarship expands the Deleuzian critical diagnosis of philosophy to a critique of the social and political aspects of discourse, subjectivity, and organizations. As such, they view the May 1968 phenomenon not merely as a commonplace political protest, but a “becoming breaking through history” (N 153). It is because this event ardently challenges the standard concepts of conventional psychoanalysis, party politics, social movements, and intellectual scholarship, whose configurations all revolve around the identitarian notion of the rational human subject.

The basic foundation of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is incomplete without the conjunction of the May 1968 event with their critical diagnosis of structuralism, psychoanalysis, and Marxism. All these historico-philosophical components are conceived based on a history of struggles where disturbances or fissures are evaluated to craft new perspectives of life and reality, which is neither unifying nor totalizing (ATP 292). Influenced by Marx, Deleuze and Guattari incorporate into psychoanalysis the socio-historical materialities of Marxism in shaping behavior of individuals. In turn, Marxism is likewise reconfigured through its dialectical relation to Freudian psychoanalysis (including Lacanian psychoanalysis). They bridge the gap between political economy (Marxism) and libidinal economy (psychoanalysis) through the problematic of desire. Specifically, they transform the pathologization of desire into both a psychiatric and a socio-historical question through the conceptualization of desiring-production.

The radical historicization of psychoanalysis is paramount in contextualizing psychoanalysis and capitalism. The creative effort of capitalism to separate libido from labor-power is strengthened by psychoanalysis. In other words, the attempt to harmonize psychoanalysis and libidinal economy actualizes as a device to undermine the former’s
fortification of capitalism. The seemingly infallible frontier and surreptitious operation of capitalism is one of the principal objects that their project, popularly known as schizoanalysis, seeks to confront by disclosing its paralogisms, systemic oppression, and socio-historical orientation. More importantly, Deleuze and Guattari’s merging of psychoanalysis (libido) and Marxism (labor-power) envisions to search for the ‘unconscious libidinal investment’ capable of deterritorializing the exploitative citadel of advanced capitalism while maximizing its immanent revolutionary potentiality.

Despite the belligerency of Anti-Oedipus, the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, A Thousand Plateaus, received a higher acclaim. Whereas the former is characterized by sophisticated arguments against Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, traditional Marxism, and fascism, the latter is constitutive of abstemious discussions on a wide range of topics understood as plateaus. The apparent restrained language of the second book is a moderation of the radical fervor of the first, which is more historical than intentional. It is historical because the 1975 oil crisis in France abolished the people’s hope for a grand societal reconfiguration. Likewise, the concerns of A Thousand Plateaus are not limited to the predicaments of the French society or Europe; the book also tackles primitive societies, geology, music, nomadology, and the like.

Inspired by Nietzsche, one of the tacit goals of A Thousand Plateaus is the undermining of all metaphysical codifications and arboreal structures in the history of thought (not only of philosophy) through the principle of the rhizome. Such a concept substitutes desire as the new image of thought. Guattari’s noble appreciation of Kafka’s scholarship provided an excellent supplementary resource to Deleuze and Guattari’s dynamic and creative collaboration. Eventually, they wrote a new book espousing a micropolitics of literature: Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature.

Before the publication of Deleuze and Guattari’s last collaborative work, What is Philosophy?, a hiatus occurred between their philosophical engagement. This temporary distance was necessary for them to rethink everything they learned from their transversal encounter. The former came up with his book on cinema, while the latter returned to his previous comfort zone—activism. However, this brief break did more harm to Guattari than to Deleuze. The former, as Dosse describes, “once again suffered from a sense of absence, of void, of isolation and solitude” (Dosse 2010, 14).

Indeed, the encounter between Deleuze and Guattari, which fundamentally fuses the horizons of philosophy and materialist psychiatry, has also spawned the intersections of politics, arts, cultural studies, and the like. This is the why the claim that Deleuze’s philosophy is apolitical is
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Deleuze’s philosophico-political imagination was shaped by “the enthusiasm and naïveté of the Liberation” (PS 15). As a university professor in 1968, he joined the fuming crowd known as the 1968 French Student Revolt. Henceforth, this radical demonstration, among other factors, magnified the politico-revolutionary import of the overall endeavor, which he shared with Guattari. Nevertheless, this idea was not wholeheartedly accepted by some contemporary thinkers such as Slavoj Žižek. In Organs Without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences, Žižek considers Deleuze to be more of an avant garde than a political writer. Žižek writes, “It is crucial to note that not a single one of Deleuze’s own texts is in any way directly political: Deleuze ‘in himself’ is a highly elitist author, indifferent towards politics.” Žižek views the 1968 revolution as the principal cause of the decay of morals, authority, and class consciousness in the French society (Adolphs and Karakayali 2007). For him, an emancipatory pedagogy and politics cannot be derived from this molecular struggle through the loss of universal values; for this reason, a universal nihilism necessitates the construction of a total emancipatory project. However, a universal thrust to overcome nihilism, fascism, or capitalism overlooks the micropolitical existence of these problems. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari assert that “those who evaluated things in macropolitical terms understood nothing of the event, because something unaccountable was escaping” (ATP 238).

Furthermore, other scholars argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of the political vocation of philosophy as the perpetual creation of novel concepts is an inchoate, if not insufficient, basis for a political philosophy. This allegation only makes sense from the perspective of traditional or normative politics. Under such a political template, a macropolitical theory of a state and revolution, which is present in the works of Plato, Rousseau, and Machiavelli, is being championed. However, Deleuze and Guattari’s entire scholarship was conceptualized and developed as a form of micropolitics. As a critical counterpart of micropolitics, micropolitics focuses on the molecularization of desiring-production, as well as the heterogeneous and local relations. It is in this respect that I agree with Patton’s claim about the possibility of a Deleuzo-Guattarian political philosophy. In Deleuze and the Political, he opines that the aforementioned political philosophy diverges from the traditional political framework in the sense that political concerns such as the best form of government and the nature of democracy, are absent from their project. Patton maintains, “Deleuze and Guattari discuss society and politics in terms of machinic assemblages, becomings ... forms of capture and processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization” (Patton 2000, 1).
Inspired by Deleuze-Guattarian political philosophy, the Occupy Movement presents one of the best concretizations of micropolitical resistance at present. The movement epitomizes an unrelenting struggle geared to radically confront the dehumanizing effects of global capitalism and political representation. Different from past revolutionary activities, it does not adhere to traditional political principles and praxes. The alternatives posed by demonstrators are unorthodox in nature to elude the totalizing hands of politicians and capitalists.

In terms of historical influence, the Occupy Movement owes its existence to the Alter-Globalization Movement principally because of the latter’s proposal for horizontal relationships, direct democratic practices, and multifronted struggle—famously organized by the Zapatistas of Brazil. Beneath the movement’s theoretical indebtedness to the Anti-Globalization struggle is a deeper foundation derivable from Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy in general, and revolutionary philosophy in particular.

Of course, a critique of the capitalist system is incomplete without reference to the works of Karl Marx. When Deleuze was interviewed two years before he passed away in 1995 about his affinity with the Communist Party, he stated that he only became a Marxist after coming across Marx’s literature in the 1960s (N 169). However, notwithstanding the action-theoretic relevance of Marx’s philosophy in Deleuze, as well as in Guattari’s scholarship, Deleuze and Guattari’s critical distance with Marxism did not vanish. In *Anti-Oedipus*, for example, they critically reconstructed Marx’s theory of political economy in conjunction with Freud and Lacan’s psychoanalysis.

In the contemporary period, capital has survived the collapse of grand narratives in Western philosophy and has reconstructed its relation of production into an immanent system and force capable of configuring its own territory, limit, and overcoming. Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari undermine the underlying Hegelian-Marxist belief that history is a form of an organism capable of fashioning its own self-destruction and healing, and a picture of a universal history and emancipation. They repudiate the codifications of history-as-organism toward the formulation of a history of nomadic movements and becomings (*ATP* 30).

C. Overview of the Book

This book seeks to reconstruct Deleuze and Guattari’s micropolitics toward a philosophy of becoming-revolutionary. Of course, this is not the first book on Deleuze and Guattari’s politics. My work is indispensably influenced
and inspired by previous literatures on Deleuze and Guattari’s socio-political philosophy such as Paul Patton’s *Deleuze and the Political* and Eugene Holland’s *Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: An Introduction to Schizoanalysis*. My research project primarily investigates the relationship between the principles of micropolitics and becoming-revolutionary. It begins with the typical discussion of the fundamental principles in the Deleuzo-Guattarian politics, with a particular thrust on the revolutionary possibilities latent in these concepts. More importantly, I demonstrate how these conceptual apparatuses exemplify the philosophy of becoming-revolutionary, in conjunction with the politico-revolutionary imports derivable from geophilosophy and the analysis of the societies of control. This book establishes its niche by engaging with Chantal Mouffe’s theorization of radical democracy, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s diagnosis of Empire, Franco Berardi’s analysis of semiocapitalism, the ASEAN Integration Project, as well as the principles of geobiosociality and populism, to name a few. Concurrent with these discussions, it navigates various present-day mode of resistance that carry with them the radical potentials of a revolution-to-come. Ultimately, these initiatives aim to expand, examine, and challenge Deleuzo-Guattarian political philosophy against the backdrop of contemporary predicaments, theories, and practices.

The first three chapters discuss the rudimentary themes of micropolitics and its various articulations through the principles of schizoanalysis, becoming-minoritarian, and nomadology. I present in Chapter One the basic features of the Deleuzian philosophy of difference. I start with an elucidation of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, succeeded by an effort to elicit a politics of difference from it. The philosophy of difference crafts relations that antagonize all attempts to transcendentalize thinking and reduce the possibilities of life into quantifiable and marginalized variables such as Platonism and Hegelianism. Deleuze circumvents his engagement with Hegelian philosophy through his reconstruction of Nietzschean philosophy. Through Nietzsche, Deleuze is able to undermine the logic of identity or philosophy of representation plaguing Hegelian philosophy. Deleuze’s diagnosis of Platonism, as well as Hegelianism, is, of course, only one aspect of his overall critique of transcendental philosophy. The other implicit themes of his philosophy of difference include his theories of immanence, subjectivity, multiplicity, and difference-in-itself, which are greatly influenced by his critical engagements with the philosophy not only of Nietzsche but also of Hume, Bergson, and Spinoza.

From the discussion of fundamental concepts in the Deleuzian differential philosophy, I reconstruct Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of
schizoanalysis in Chapter Two. As a theory of desire and critique, schizoanalysis is indispensably informed by the aftermath of the May 1968 struggle. First, I explain desire’s pathologization in the history of Western philosophy, and how this marginalization obscured its social investments and revolutionary potentialities. Second, I elucidate Deleuze and Guattari’s internal and external critique of Oedipus. I elaborate the former through a disquisition of different syntheses and paralogisms of desiring-production. With regard to the latter, I explicate the genealogy of social production that further subjects Oedipus to historicization. It is through this holistic form of critique that schizoanalysis’ goal of achieving freedom from all kinds of oedipalization and capitalist exploitation becomes possible.

Meanwhile in Chapter Three, I explicate the importance of the principle of rhizome or rhizomatics in minoritarian literature and politics, as well as in the concept of nomadology. The unifying principle that connect all these concepts is the philosophy of becoming-minoritarian. It is a principle of prudence and transformation that stays between all majoritarian and minoritarian codifications in society, which further subject these principles to perpetual variations. Furthermore, in last section of this chapter, I differentiate the nomad and the State apparatus to further backbone Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of history.

From the fundamental features of schizoanalysis elucidated in Chapter Two, I explain in Chapter Four how schizoanalytic revolution operates as a principle of becoming-revolutionary, or as a philosophy of therapeutic and revolutionary transformation. From the goal of undermining Oedipal repression within the nuclear family, Deleuze and Guattari also extend schizoanalysis to the larger societal milieu where asceticism, oedipality, and capitalism interweave through the manifold networks of molar investments. Schizoanalysis likewise labors for the subordination of molar principles and organizations to molecular investments, which further cultivates schizophrenia. Moreover, the schizophrenic process of permanent revolution subordinates capitalist social production to desiring-production, toward a new socius characterized by an unconscious libidinal investment and prosecuted by the subject-groups.

In the subsequent chapter (Chapter Five), I explicate Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of the principle of becoming-minoritarian as a middle principle of becoming-revolutionary. To begin with, I explain the nomad’s alliance with the principle of becoming-minoritarian because it appeals to a revolution-to-come against the State apparatus or any principle that totalizes life. Moreover, I elaborate the theory of becoming-democracy as one of the timeliest concretizations of becoming-minoritarian/revolutionary through its antithetical relation with traditional or capitalist-configured democracy. To
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further expand and examine becoming-democracy’s relevance to the present time, I engage with some contemporary theorists of democracy such as Chantal Mouffe. Likewise, I provide some concrete examples from the Philippine society in order to demonstrate that some lines of creativity (or opportunities) crafted through becoming-minoritarian/democracy also author lines of destruction or debasement.

In Chapter Six, I explore the principle of geophilosophy as another expression of the philosophy of becoming-revolutionary. In the first part, I discuss concepts such as complexity politics, contingency, and fabulation to transform geophilosophy into a philosophy of becoming-revolutionary. In addition, I explain the socio-political relevance of complexity theory in conjunction with the principle of geology of morals or geobiosociality. It is followed by a discussion on the art of fabulation and the people-to-come, in conjunction with the theory of refrain and politics. Speaking of politics, I engage with geophilosophy through a problematization of the contemporary political phenomenon that plagues both the Left and the Right political spectrums—‘populism.’ Lastly, I elucidate geophilosophy in relation to revolutionary becoming and utopia. In this vein, geophilosophy is transfigured into a philosophy of becoming-revolutionary whose underlying principle is the creation of a world- and people-to-come.

From the discussion and critical diagnosis of the repressive features and axiomatic logic of capitalism through Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis, micropolitics, and geophilosophy, in Chapter 7, I provide a full-blown disquisition and analysis of capitalism in its most advanced form—the ‘societies of control.’ I reconstruct the control society phenomenon by interfacing it with Hardt and Negri’s theorization of Empire, and Berardi’s formulation of semiocapitalism, for increased historical concretization and relevance. Subsequently, I elucidate another concept parallel with the control society phenomenon—neoliberal capitalism. Specifically, I trace the development of neoliberal capitalism and its infiltration into the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Integration Project in general, and the K to 12 Educational Reform in particular. Lastly, I explicate and analyze the revolutionary potentials immanent in all spaces and zones where the control society operates, reigns, and mutates, such as Negri’s theorization of the multitude, and the insurgent initiatives of Edward Snowden and the Occupy Movement. In the Conclusion, I summarize and highlight all the indispensable characteristics of the philosophy of becoming-revolutionary.

This humble opus is an unfinished project. If ever some discussions and engagements with other philosophers appear as abridged and insufficient, I hope that these inadequacies serve as invitations to further
travel with Deleuze and Guattari, and with other contemporary theorists ruthlessly critical of advanced capitalism and all expressions of ethical fascism. More importantly, I hope that this book provokes action-theoretic revolutionary possibilities, as well as challenges us to wake up from our oedipalized, Statist, and fascists slumbers.

Notes

1 Orthodox Marxism’s dogmatic utilization of scientific or objectivist methodologies incapacitates its very mechanism to become receptive to the contingencies and nuances of societal and individual conditions. Its reductive appropriation of social reality disheartens any conceptualization of a theory of subjectivity or philosophical anthropology. As a result, it lacks conceptual apparatuses to analyze the miscarriage of the proletariats’ revolutionary consciousness, as well as to cultivate opportunities and spaces for the cultivation of this radical impulse.

2 Even historians are divided into those thinking that Jose Rizal is counter-revolutionary like Renato Constantino and those who adhere to the view that there is a revolutionary Rizal foremost of which are Gregorio Zaide and Floro Quibuyen. See (Quibuyen 1997).

3 See (Ileto 1998).


5 See (Patton and Protevi 2003).

6 Jean Francois Lyotard defines postmodernism’s primary attitude as the ‘incredulity towards meta-narratives.’ See (Lyotard 1984).

7 See (Foucault 1980a, 145).

8 See (Patton 2010a, 84). Patton’s comprehensive essay provides the readers with a rigorous and nuanced analysis of the different convergences and divergences between the philosophies of Deleuze and Foucault, ranging from their theorizations of power and history, and the mapping of the ‘new.’

9 See (Patton 2010a, 188).

10 See (Foucault 1980b, 94).

11 The critical theorist Herbert Marcuse formulates the concept of false needs as a capitalist aesthetic device for ever-increasing and systemic subjugation. See (Marcuse 1964, 5).

12 See (Rouse 1994, 106).

13 Ulrich Beck’s theory of ‘subpolitics’ is shaped by the theory of reflexive modernity. Subpolitics is informed by the erosion of the coherent power emanating from the nation-state. Its existence is grounded on the pluralistic voices and localized centers of people’s everyday endeavors, including the novel deployment of collective struggles operating outside the State apparatus. Consequently, self-help cooperatives and grassroots societal organizations are formed to address the local needs of the community akin to their security, human rights, and housing. See (Beck 1994).