

Democracy,
Federalism, the
European Revolution,
and Global Governance

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By

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INTRODUCTION

One of the central questions of our time is the crisis of traditional ideologies, such as liberalism, socialism and democracy, in relation both to their capability to continue to constitute certain points of reference for the understanding of the historical course – their descriptive capability to interpret historical-social facts – and their effectiveness in guiding and motivating political action with the formation of specific political behaviours, that is to say in relation to their prescriptive capacity. This crisis is related to the fact that their categories of analysis of the historical-social process have proved inadequate for interpreting the contemporary age in a unitary and non-contradictory way, manifesting a contradiction between the values enunciated and the historical results achieved.¹

¹ The term ideology means a political theory capable of offering a unitary and non-contradictory interpretative criterion of the historical course, and of the principles of political action, that is to say of ideas which concern both the facts – the being – and the values – the having to be. Without a thought of the future it is not possible to understand the meaning of the present time, and to express choices capable of orienting it according to rationality. However, an ideology has the capacity to fully grasp the contradictions of the existing political order when it is waning. For an analysis of the theoretical definition of the concept of ideology, see: Sinisa Malesevic and Iain MacKenzie eds., *Ideology after Poststructuralism* (London: Pluto Press, 1990); Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger, *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Michael Freedon, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (London: Routledge, 2002); David Hawkes, *Ideology (The New Critical Idiom)* (London: Routledge, 2004); Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (London: Verso, 2007); John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay and Hulda Thorisdottir, *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Raymond Boudon, *The Analysis of Ideology* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013); Terry Eagleton, *Ideology* (London: Routledge, 2014). About the prescriptive value of ideologies, see Trygve Tholfsen, *Ideology and Revolution in Modern Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Rafal Soborski, *Ideology and the Future of Progressive Social Movements* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018).

Therefore, the theory of the end of an era – characterized by the primacy of ideologies in motivating political action and directing the course of history towards an end – has appeared. As an expression of the Enlightenment, the traditional ideologies seem to have exhausted that prophetic and propulsive power that, starting from the French and American revolutions, has strongly marked the two most dense centuries of events in the history of humanity. Their death has even been announced, and with it the end of history. Yet, ideologies continue to represent in the collective imagination an ideal horizon that allows us to think about the future. They continue to offer to politically organized minorities both the values for which to struggle and the categories with which to interpret the course of history, namely the ability to think about the future on the basis of a unitary and non-contradictory conception of the past.²

The crisis of liberalism coincided with the crisis of the liberal state, and the consequent short but devastating success of fascism in Europe and authoritarianism in the rest of the world, and was manifested with the collapse of liberal parties even in those states – for example, in the United Kingdom in the time between the two world wars – which remained immune from fascist contagion. The crisis of socialism manifested itself with the alliance, on the eve of the Second World War, between the Soviet Union and nationalist-socialist Germany, and ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet state, and with it the drastic downsizing and gradual disappearance of all the communist parties of Western Europe.³

² Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin, 2012). For an analysis on the end of ideologies, see David Walsh, *After Ideology: Recovering the Spiritual Foundations of Freedom* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995); Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). About the common intellectual origin of traditional ideologies, see Robert Wuthnow, *Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European Socialism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

³ For an analysis of liberalism as an ideology, see Ben Jackson and Marc Stear, *Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freedon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). About the crisis of liberalism as an ideology see: Rachel S. Turner, *Neo-Liberal Ideology: History, Concepts and Policies* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); John Hallowell, *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology* (Oxford: Andesite Press, 2013). For an analysis of the crisis of liberalism in the United Kingdom, see Alan Sykes, *The Rise and Fall of British Liberalism: 1776-1988* (London: Routledge, 2014).

The crisis of democracy is a phenomenon of our time and has manifested itself in the very moment of its apparent triumph, when, with the events of 1989, it appeared as a panacea to all ills, extensible to all peoples of the earth and able to bring liberalism and socialism out of the dead end they seemed to be in. It is no mere coincidence that the crisis of democracy manifested itself in the 1990s, precisely at the time of its apparent triumph. Democracy today is a universally recognized value and parameter for measuring the degree of political and social development of a people. Behind its apparent ideological triumph, and the fulfilment of Tocqueville's prediction of its unstoppable march, it nevertheless appears to be profoundly depleted of its original meaning, reduced, according to Carl Schmitt's criticism, to a mere pretence, disguising the power of certain politically organized elites.⁴

The crisis of democracy openly manifested itself as soon as the contradiction between its success at the national level and its negation at the international level emerged. It seems to be legitimate to identify this crisis first of all in the international failure of democracy, that is to say in the absence of democratic decision-making processes where the destinies of mankind are substantially at stake. This is the fundamental cause of the loss of its contents and reduction to electoral procedures on the one hand, and to the ever more marked and universal sharing of power – or its simulacrum – between majority and opposition on the other.

In Europe, the crisis of democratic institutions is accelerated by the current political and identity crisis of the European Union, suspended midway between a drastic reduction of the traditional powers of the states, which

⁴ Carl Schmitt, *Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). On Schmitt see John P. McCormick, *Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Chantal Mouffe ed., *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt* (London: Verso, 1999); Jeffrey Seitzer, *Comparative History and Legal Theory: Carl Schmitt in the First German Democracy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Jan-Werner Müller, *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); Kam Shapiro, *Carl Schmitt and the Intensification of Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); Johan Tralau, *Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt: The Politics of Order and Myth* (London: Routledge, 2013); Montserrat Herrero, *The Political Discourse of Carl Schmitt: A Mystic of Order* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). About the apparent triumph of democracy, see: Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Simon Reid-Henry, *Empire of Democracy: The Remaking of the West Since the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019).

are the foundation of the principle of sovereignty, and their partial and in many ways autocratic transfer to institutions not yet fully democratically controlled.

The growing consensus within the member states for the various populist and generally Eurosceptic movements is a testament to the present Continental dimensions of the issue. If the welding that has recently occurred in Italy between populist and nationalist forces should extend to the other member states of the European Union, it would inevitably lead, if not successfully fought, to the dissolution of the Union itself. In fact, the European Union is – as Mario Albertini, political and moral guide of European federalists, and an author who will be widely referenced in this study, observed – “an embryonic form of state and nothing is as difficult as creating a new state on an area already covered by many states”. At any moment, until the end, the undertaking can fail.⁵

If fascism – which in Italy found the historical ground for its first appearance – represented the extreme (and vain) attempt to restore, after the devastating consequences of WWI, the absolute sovereignty of the nation state, the past yellow-green Italian government represented an attempt – to which Italy continues to offer a historical experimental seat – to prevent the process of European unification from exceeding the point of no return with the creation of a European federal state. However, the explosive mixture of nationalism and populism – being the ideological substance of fascism – cannot produce in Europe the demonic effects of

⁵ Mario Albertini, *Nazionalismo e federalismo* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999), 286. About the concept of sovereignty, see Paul W. Kahn, *Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). As regards to Euro-scepticism and the rise of sovereigntist movements in Europe, see: Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, *Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005); Paul Taylor, *The End of European Integration: Anti-Europeanism Examined* (London: Routledge, 2007); Cécile Leconte, *Understanding Euroscepticism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); L. Topaloff, *Political Parties and Euroscepticism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Nathalie Brack and Olivier Costa, eds., *Euroscepticism within the EU Institutions: Diverging Views of Europe* (London: Routledge, 2014); Alina Polyakova, *The Dark Side of European Integration: Social Foundations and Cultural Determinants of the Rise of Radical Right Movements in Contemporary Europe* (New York: ibidem Press, 2015); Catherine E. De Vries, *Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

fascism because the fundamental seat of power is at present not within the national state, but a Euro-Atlantic political system.⁶

In the United States, this crisis suddenly appeared with all its destabilizing implications – particularly for the role of leadership of democracies that America took up for half a century – in the question of the dubious legitimacy of the first election of George W. Bush to the White House, and is now manifesting itself in a *de facto* primacy of the executive over the other powers of the federal state. In the United States there is a strong tradition of the independence and autonomy of public opinion from the economic and political powers, and through the press and the media it has always exercised, especially with regards to the executive, a function of control. Moreover, it is the same mechanism as the federal state – based on a fundamental pact, the Constitution, and the effective primacy of the judiciary over the other organs of the state in institutional matters – which prevents this hegemony from progressing beyond defined limits and becoming irreversible. The election of Donald Trump to the head of the federal government could however produce a constitutional revision in the

⁶ Italy constituted the historical grounds on which, in the crisis of the liberal state – as Ferruccio Parri, referring to the lesson of Gaetano Salvemini, very lucidly observed in opposition to Benedetto Croce, in a famous debate within the Constitutional Assembly – the international crisis of liberalism was manifested for the first time, and in fascism there emerged a new model of state and society which was exported all over the world. A war was needed to eradicate it, one fought not only between states but especially within states, and between opposing and therefore irreconcilable visions of the historical course. The work that best highlights the Italian political structure and its crisis is that of Pietro Scoppola, *La repubblica dei partiti. Evoluzione e crisi di un sistema politico. 1945-1996* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997). On the radical populist right in Western Europe, see: Franco Ferraresi, *Threats to Democracy* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1996); Tomislav Sunic, *Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right* (Budapest: Arktos Media, 2011); Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni, eds., *Understanding Populist Party Organisation: The Radical Right in Western Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Cas Mudde, *On Extremism and Democracy in Europe* (London: Routledge, 2017); Andrea Conti, *The Populist Radical Right in Western Europe: Ideology and Agenda Impact on International Issues* (Online University Press, 2018); Barry Eichengreen, *The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). For a study of neo-nationalism, see Andre Gingrich and Marcus Banks, eds., *Neo-nationalism in Europe and Beyond: Perspectives from Social Anthropology* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006).

authoritarian sense, as a response to the crisis of American leadership within the Atlantic System.⁷

On the global level, this crisis is even more evident where we observe within the multinationals a progressive centralization of decisions in ever-narrower areas that are beyond the control of the shareholders, and their progressive interference with the economic and political affairs of the states, particularly the weaker ones.⁸

Secondly we witness, particularly in what are called mature democracies, a progressive separation between the state and civil society, in which the state and its representatives become more and more self-referential, with an ever more marked identification between the state and politicians of profession, and civil society increasingly atomized, divided into a series of small groups separated from each other, tending to organize themselves as real corporations.

Thirdly, now manifest is the crisis of the social state, which played a historical role in allowing the progressive inclusion of citizens in the area of social guarantees. Within the so-called mature democracies, an inexorable process of privatization of services is taking place which, besides not

⁷ On the crisis of American democracy, see: Charles L. Zelden, *Bush V. Gore: Exposing the Hidden Crisis in American Democracy: Abridged and Updated* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010); A. Kolin, *State Power and Democracy: Before and During the Presidency of George W. Bush* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Pippa Norris, Sarah Cameron and Thomas Wynter, eds., *Electoral Integrity in America: Securing Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Jon R. Bond and Kevin B. Smith, *Analyzing American Democracy: Politics and Political Science* (London: Routledge, 2019).

⁸ For a debate see: Joshua Kurlantzick, *Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the Worldwide Decline of Representative Government* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014); Todd Huizinga, *The New Totalitarian Temptation: Global Governance and the Crisis of Democracy in Europe* (New York: Encounter Books, 2016); A. C. Grayling, *Democracy and Its Crisis* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2017); Roland Rich, *Democracy in Crisis: Why, Where, How to Respond* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2017); Alan Nasser, *Override Economy: American Capitalism and the Crisis of Democracy* (London: Pluto Press, 2018); Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson and Mark Tushnet, *Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Manuel Castells, *Rupture, The Crisis of Liberal Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2018). About the multinationals' challenge to parliamentary democracy, see Naomi R. Lamoreaux and William J. Novak, eds., *Corporations and American Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).

producing the announced beneficial effects, tends to widen the economic gap between the social classes, expanding the range of social exclusion and re-proposing, in unprecedented forms, the question of social conflict that was thought to be definitively overcome.

In order to grasp the significance that the democratic principle occupies in our age of globalization and define the relationship it has with the historical-social course as a whole, it seems very useful to apply to democracy the theoretical categories that Albertini applied to federalism in an attempt to elaborate a general theory of ideologies. We can thus observe that the current crisis of democracy it is not just of one country, or a group of countries (that is, a specific geographic area), but rather of a general nature, since it has ceased to have a 'specific' relationship with the historical course, simply assuming a 'generic' one.⁹

According to Albertini, an ideology has a specific relationship with the historical course when it corresponds to a turning point in history. The recognition of this implies the historical knowledge "of the existence of a crossroads, of a conflict between mutually exclusive values," and the theoretical knowledge "of what must be destroyed and of what must be created."¹⁰

This manifests itself in a revolutionary historical phase. The turning points of history are in fact realized "when the eternal story of the new, of the

⁹ Albertini's contribution to the elaboration of a general theory of ideologies cannot be identified in a single publication, but has developed throughout his entire philosophical work, recently brought together in *Tutti gli scritti* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996-2014). For the debate on a general theory of ideologies, see: Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Vernon Van Dyke, *Ideology and Political Choice: The Search for Freedom, Justice, and Virtue* (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 1995); Goran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1999); Jan Rehmann, *Theories of Ideology: The Powers of Alienation and Subjection* (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2014).

¹⁰ Mario Albertini, *Il federalismo. Antologia e definizione* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998), 256. The ideology allows a political organization to maintain a certain degree of cohesion within it and coherence in action to achieve a specific result. For an analysis of the relationship of ideologies with the historical course, see: John Brewer, *Party, Ideology and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Leon P. Baradat, *Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2008); Manfred B. Steger, *The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution to the Global War on Terror* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

transition from non-existence to existence” – which implies that something old must be taken out of the way to make room for the new – “assumes such an importance that the whole process of human emancipation stagnates until the knot is dissolved.” In these moments history, “alongside its incessant evolutionary complexity” there emerges a factor “of extreme simplicity, that in which either there is the old or the new, and an absolute ‘no’ must therefore be pronounced.” In this regard, Albertini observes that:

This happened to liberalism towards absolutism, to democracy towards the class political privilege (restricted suffrage), to socialism towards the economic privilege of the class (bourgeois monopoly of economic power) and it seems that it is going to happen to federalism for the national monopoly of political and economic power, which employs the brute force of armies to maintain the hierarchy among nations, which became incompatible, due to the growing interdependence between national and international processes, with the development of freedom, justice and equality.¹¹

An ideology has a generic relationship with historical-social reality when “it has already won the battle for its existence and no longer corresponds to a turning point in history but to an acquired and stable factor in the historical process.” In a situation of this kind, ideologies establish a relationship between the present and the past, reflecting “theoretically in thought the acquired factors of social life,” that is to say the turning point that has expressed their historical affirmation and come to mobilize energies on the values already recognized.¹²

The phase in which democracy has had a specific relationship with the historical course coincided with the age of universal suffrage and the welfare state, when only with democracy could one relate the present to the future, the reality with its overcoming, and being with having to be, and only with the call to democracy was it possible to mobilize new energies on the front where there was an obstacle that had to be removed

¹¹ Albertini, *Il federalismo*, 255. For an analysis of the ideologies as instruments of political change, see Andrew Vincent, *Modern Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); Alex Roberto Hybe, *The Power of Ideology: From the Roman Empire to Al-Qaeda* (London: Routledge, 2012); Raphael Samuel and Gareth Stedman Jones eds., *Culture, Ideology and Politics: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm* (London: Routledge, 2016).

¹² Albertini, *Il federalismo*, 256, 255, 254. According to Jonathan Schell, “the present is the fulcrum on which the future and the past are balanced; and if the future is lost, the past also falls,” Jonathan Schell, *Il destino della terra* (Milan: Mondadori, 1982), 223.

in order to continue the process of human emancipation. *Vice versa*, the phase in which democracy has a generic relationship with the historical course is ours, when by referring to democracy one “theoretically reflects the acquired factors of social life in thought,” and energies are mobilized on the front of universally shared values which have already won the battle for their recognition.¹³

The passage from the phase of the historical affirmation of traditional ideologies to that of their legal development, that is to say their consolidation within the national state, is marked by the shift from the offensive to the defensive. If their historical affirmation was obtained thanks to the victory of a class, this was possible on condition of accepting the only political formation then allowed by the international situation of power – the national state. Once in power, the winning class has gone from the offensive to the defensive. Liberals, democrats, and socialists “did not defend only individual, political and social freedom, but also a class and a form of state.” Democracy was then necessary to widen the sphere of liberal liberty, and socialism to widen the sphere of democratic freedom.¹⁴

According to Albertini, the effects of a revolution have two meanings: the practical, immediate, and verifiable in material transformations that it achieves – in new institutions and political and social behaviours – and a historical one, verifiable only in culture – if culture means what profoundly motivates the formation of human thought and action – in the importance of the message that it gives to humanity, and in the perspectives it opens.

If, for example, the concrete result of the French Revolution was very modest – that is to say, the creation of the centralized and bureaucratic Jacobin State – the historical one was universal in scope, affirming in the culture of mankind the democratic principle which, despite its partial realization and all the shortcomings of democracy, is strongly rooted in the heart of man and has since never been removed. Fascism, which represented its open denial, was swept away. The socialist states with only

¹³ Albertini, *Il federalismo*, 256. For an analysis, see George Reid Andrews and Herrick Chapman, *The Social Construction of Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Alice Kessler-Harris and Maurizio Vaudagna, eds., *Democracy and the Welfare State: The Two Wests in the Age of Austerity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).

¹⁴ Mario Albertini, *Nazionalismo e Federalismo* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999), 171-2.

one ruling party, which in fact denied it, could not deny it in the theory and ceremonies of political life, and eventually collapsed.¹⁵

About the October Revolution, Albertini in 1973 affirmed that the gap between revolutionary aspirations and the Soviet state was so broad that it became clear to everyone that it had not “realized communism but a rigid state capitalism.” Because of the Revolution, however, “private ownership of the social means of production” no longer appeared legitimate, despite being “the true social property of the means of production,” still “far from being a true democracy.” As absolutism died forever, Albertini pointed out, “in the hearts of men, so it also happened for the principle that legitimizes the private ownership of the social means of production.”¹⁶

Applying the theoretical categories of historical materialism, Albertini observed how, during the first phases of the industrial revolution, the growth of the interdependence of human action developed mainly in depth, within the national states. With the liberal and democratic struggle of bourgeoisie against aristocracy, and the socialist struggle of the proletariat against the same bourgeoisie, this tendency intensified, thus overcoming the class divisions that have always existed within evolved societies. However, this tendency towards class integration has also strengthened the division of humanity into separate groups, the bureaucratic states, which are idealized, in their ideological representation, as consanguinity, as nations.¹⁷

The nation is, according to Albertini, “an ideological fact” that produces, “in the minds of individuals who do not try to escape from the national psychological state of mind, by breaking their ties with national political power, the belief that their national condition is natural and unchangeable.” This entails a self-mystification, that is to say, “to regard natural, or necessary, or universal, and in any case absolutely good, what is simply historical and contingent.” The national feeling “is the ideological reflection of the bonds of the citizen with its own national state,” which becomes “all the stronger and more exclusive the more these links increase in extent (the number of citizens actually involved) and depth (the amount of human activities connected with the state).”¹⁸

¹⁵ Mario Albertini, Giuseppe Petrilli and Andrea Chiti-Batelli, *Storia del federalismo europeo*, Edmondo Paolini ed., (Torino: SEI, 1973), 77-8.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 78.

¹⁷ Albertini, Petrilli and Chiti-Batelli, *Storia del federalismo*, 75-6.

¹⁸ Albertini, *Nazionalismo e*, 19-20, 23.

In the nation, Albertini has identified the ideological basis of the centralized and bureaucratic state. The child of the French Revolution, this new form of state imposed the unity of language, culture, and traditions throughout the territory of the state, producing a systematic destruction of all pre-existing relationships between local communities at various levels. The fusion of state and nation allowed the Jacobins to demand from the citizens an exclusive loyalty to protect the revolution from both the internal forces that opposed it and external threats. Such national mysticism has therefore transformed citizens into servants of the state and its power politics. “Born as a revolutionary idea,” Levi observed in this regard, the nation has today “turned into a factor of conservation.”¹⁹

It has never been as evident as today that the nation state is “dust without substance,” as Luigi Einaudi clearly observed in 1954. The fact of living in a geocentric world of nation states leads us to consider one’s own nation as “the centre of our political universe,” as Emery Reves lucidly points out: “the fixed point around which we imagine that all other nations, all the problems and the events that are outside of our nation, rotate.” While living in a Copernican world, our political and social representations have remained Ptolemaic:

There is not the slightest hope that we can solve any of the vital problems of our generation until we rise above the nation-centric dogmatic conceptions and we realize that in order to understand the political, economic and social problems of this high degree complementary and industrialized world we must move our point of observation and see all the nations and all the national issues in motion, in their correlative functions rotating according to the same laws, without any fixed point created by our imagination for our comfort.²⁰

¹⁹ Lucio Levi, Guido Montani and Francesco Rossolillo, *Tre introduzioni al federalismo* (Napoli: Guida, 2005), 126-7. For a discussion of the ideological valence of power politics, see: P. Cassels, *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World* (London: Routledge, 1996); Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, *Indoctrinability, Ideology and Warfare: Evolutionary Perspectives* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998); Mark L. Haas, *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

²⁰ Luigi Einaudi, *Lo scrittorio del Presidente (1948-1955)* (Turin: Einaudi, 1956), 89; Emery Reves, *Anatomia della pace* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990), 43-6. For an analysis of the historical reconstruction from the national point of view, see: S. Carvalho and F. Gemenne, eds., *Nations and their Histories: Constructions and Representations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Christopher L. Hill, *National History and the World of Nations: Capital, State, and the Rhetoric of*

Our states continue to exist to meet the needs of daily life by force of inertia. Since 1945, the European nations have ceased to be the reference framework for the evolution of international relations and the process of the formation of the public will. During the Cold War, the framework of world power – represented by the Soviet and American hegemonic spheres – no longer coincided with the contest of national political struggle, and this produced, according to Luigi Vittorio Majocchi:

a split in the conscience of the political actors who, on the one hand suffered from the ideological conditioning produced by the real distribution of power on the world level and, on the other, from the nature of the political struggle that had remained national.²¹

With the collapse of the so-called ‘Soviet-American condominium’ of the world, the fundamental material condition that enabled democracy to effectively play its stabilizing role in the national framework suddenly disappeared. As long as the great questions of the world were resolved through the instruments of Soviet-American diplomacy, the nation states that gravitated in their respective zones of influence were protected from the devastating and destabilizing effects of national sovereignty. The conditions that made possible the apparent good functioning of democratic institutions in Western Europe, and the same success of the EEC, were identified by Albertini in a “*de facto* eclipse of national sovereignty,” and the economic-strategic hegemony of the United States on a global level.²²

In an authoritarian situation, the inalienable tasks of the state – the guarantee of security and economic growth – were entrusted, on this side of the Iron Curtain, to the American power. “Where there is a hegemony,” Majocchi observes, “popular sovereignty is a lie, that is, democracy is a lie.” The ideological conscience, “fomented by all the symbols of national

History in Japan, France, and the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009); Veronique Beni, *Manufacturing Citizenship: Education and Nationalism in Europe, South Asia and China* (London: Routledge, 2012).

²¹ Luigi Vittorio Majocchi, *La difficile costruzione dell’unità europea* (Milan: Jaca, 1996), 117.

²² Albertini observed in *Quattro banalità e una conclusione sul vertice europeo* that “European unity is ... a sort of anarchy based on the actual eclipse of national sovereignties, on American protection and, ultimately, on the atomic bomb, which prevents Russia letting its power overflow into the political vacuum of Western Europe,” *Il Federalista*, 3, 2, (1961), 65.

sovereignty, can hide from men ... this elementary truth; but the 'king is naked,' as in the famous tale, even though everyone sees him dressed.'²³

Mankind is now running in the direction of the universalization of the relations of production, exchange, and consumption, but believes that it is still going in the direction of its own nation. The fundamental contradiction of our time is no longer in class or power conflicts within nations, as Albertini remarked, but in the political division of mankind into national and sovereign states, which perpetuates the unequal distribution of power and wealth among peoples, and prevents a rational government of the world.²⁴

The new world that is taking shape beyond nations can be organized politically with the method of democracy, which is an indispensable premise for the reaffirmation and progress of freedom, justice and equality, only if, according to Albertini, the historical vision and the tools of federalism are added to the perspectives and instruments of liberalism, socialism, and democracy. It is precisely the growth of the interdependence of relations between states and their economies that are destined to overcome the division of humanity into national states. Federalism is not linked, like traditional ideologies, to the redemption of a class, but the liberation of the citizen from the totalitarianism of the national state, which, despite being dead in deeds, continues to live as an ideological reflection. The inequality among nations is more marked than the inequality that exists today among the classes within the industrialized nations. The aspiration to equality among nations is the great novelty of our time, and it can become a revolutionary force if it becomes the expression of a worldwide movement for the progressive democratic control of international relations.²⁵

The central problem of our time no longer seems then to be connected only to the question of achieving a higher degree of freedom, equality or

²³ Majocchi, *La difficile costruzione*, 117. As regards the process of Americanization of the world, see Sean Stone and Richard Grove, *New World Order: A Strategy of Imperialism* (Waltermville, OR: Trine Day, 2016); G. Doug Davis and Michael O. Slobodchikoff, *Cultural Imperialism and the Decline of the Liberal Order: Russian and Western Soft Power in Eastern Europe* (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 2018).

²⁴ Albertini, *Il federalismo* 297. Marx bases the revolutionary struggle on the theory of permanent contradictions between infrastructure and superstructure. Historical materialism is based on the postulate that society, in order to exist, must first provide for its own self-reproduction through the production of goods and services.

²⁵ Albertini, *Il Federalismo*, 253-4, 257.

social justice, but to that of organizing peaceful and constitutional relations between nations. If we therefore accept the point of view that the historical novelty of our time coincides with the question of the political integration of mankind, then it seems plausible to maintain that this novelty is reflected in federalism, which would thus acquire a specific relationship with the historical course. The federal government is, in fact, the only possible international democratic instrument capable of creating the reign of the law among nations, since it broadens the sphere of democratic government from the ambit of the state to that of a group of states, up to and including potentially the whole of mankind.²⁶

Democracy can come out of the crisis in which it has stumbled, recognizing the fact that it has already won the battle for its existence – like other traditional ideologies, such as liberalism and socialism – and coming to establish a specific relationship with federalism, which, despite being a filiation of the democratic idea, has assumed its own conceptual autonomy and seems to be the political principle in which the historical novelty of our time is reflected.²⁷

The definition of a theoretical relationship between the world federation – which would establish the universal realm of law – and the last (and therefore not yet realized) phase of the development of traditional ideologies would allow us to verify on the empirical level what relationship would be established between federalism, liberalism, democracy, and socialism. Linking the value of peace with freedom, equality, and social justice also means defining the phases of the development of these ideologies and identifying in the current crisis of traditional ideologies the manifestation

²⁶ For an discussion, see Preston King, *Federalism and Federation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Mikhail Filippov and Peter C. Ordeshook, *Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); George Anderson, *Federalism: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Kyle Scott, *Federalism: A Normative Theory and its Practical Relevance* (New York: Continuum, 2011); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., *Federalism* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2017).

²⁷ For an analysis, see Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick, *The Age of Federalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); P. Chemerinsky, *Enhancing Government: Federalism for the 21st Century* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); John Kincaid, *Federalism* (Newcastle upon Tyne: SAGE, 2011); Alain Gagnon and Soeren Keil, *Understanding Federalism and Federation* (London: Routledge, 2015); Giampiero Bordino, Antonio Mosconi and Lucio Levi, *Federalism: A Political Theory for Our Time* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016).

of a contingent difficulty, relative to the current phase of development, and not permanent and definitive.²⁸

This crisis is therefore due, not to an intrinsic weakness, but an incomplete realization of liberalism, democracy, and socialism, because they have not yet entered the last phase of their development. The historical affirmation of traditional ideologies has in fact manifested itself in the age of nationalisms, characterized by war as a means of resolving, in the last instance, the conflicts between sovereign states. The partial accomplishments by traditional ideologies are therefore to be related to the fact that, in order to realize their values historically, they have had to sink into a situation of power in which the world is divided into national and sovereign states and their relations are characterized by violence. Only with the transition from a world of war to one of peace will ideologies be able to enter the final and complete phase of their development.²⁹

According to Albertini, “the time of the maximum affirmation (cultural and political) of an ideology comes before that of the complete realization of the value that distinguishes it.” Having thus become fully established on the terrain of culture and politics, and corresponding to “permanent traits of the historical course rather than to novelties, or to turning points in history,” today they can establish a complementary relationship in order to achieve the full realization of their respective ideals on the terrain of

²⁸ Those who identified, with the crisis of ideologies, the beginning of a new historical epoch – characterized, on a theoretical level, by absolute relativism, and on the empirical by the so called “liquid society” – made a double mystification. They denied the presence of reason (as the manifestation of subjectivity) in historical development, and exchanged a value judgment for an assertion of fact. For an analysis of the crisis of ideologies, see: Roy C. Macridis and Mark Hulliung, *Contemporary Political Ideologies* (London: Pearson, 1997); Ian Adams, *Political Ideology Today* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Lyman Tower Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Comparative Analysis* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2008); Lewis S. Feuer, *Ideology and the Ideologists* (London: Routledge, 2010); Leon P. Baradat, *Political Ideologies* (London: Pearson, 2011); Slavoj Žižek, ed., *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso, 2012); Vincent Geoghegan and Rick Wilford, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2014); Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Leon P. Barada, *Political Ideologies* (London: Routledge, 2016); Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (London: Red Globe Press, 2017).

²⁹ Albertini, *Nazionalismo e*, 171.

history. According to this perspective, the thesis that democracy is necessary to bring about the achievements of liberalism, just as socialism is necessary to bring about the achievements of democracy, appears to be well-founded.³⁰

Taking as an example socialism, Albertini notes how it still needs to make great progress in order to fully realize the value that distinguishes it. Full social justice is today “far from being acquired,” but the fact that “the project of an ideology is not yet fully realized is not enough to establish its relationship with the historical process.” In this regard, Majocchi observes that values such as freedom, equality, and social justice are largely disregarded, and there is therefore ample space for the continuation of the great battles which in their name have been fought on this strip of land. However, the fact remains that, “in this part of the world, there is no one who does not know that these values have become the heritage of all,” being “enrolled in the course of history.” They have won the battle for their recognition. On the contrary, there is a value that has not yet been affirmed: peace. The value of peace is today placed at the top of the scale of values, whereas in traditional ideologies it had a subordinate position, and its realization was considered as a consequence of the realization of their own values. The federalist therefore makes peace “the supreme goal of political struggle.”³¹

Liberalism, democracy, and socialism are nevertheless the prerequisites for peace, in the sense that “war becomes once again a priority objective whenever the values of freedom, justice and equality are trampled on.” This, however, holds in the negative sense. That is to say, they have become such a universal heritage of humanity – i.e. they have won in a specific phase of their development, once and for all, the battle for their recognition – that their lack or limitation can cause war.³²

This, however, does not hold in a positive sense. That is to say, it is wrong to think that they are also the means to build peace. “The opposite is quite true,” notes Albertini:

³⁰ Albertini, *Il federalismo*, 254-5. For an analysis of the relationship of democracy with other traditional ideologies, see P. J. Rhodes, *Ancient Democracy and Modern Ideology* (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 2003); Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal* (London: Pearson, 2010).

³¹ Albertini, *Il federalismo*, 255-4; Majocchi, *La difficile costruzione*, 44.

³² Albertini, *Nazionalismo e*, 171.

While the historical affirmation of each of these ideologies constitutes one of the premises for peace, peace, in turn (as world government), constitutes the necessary premise of their complete realization ... We cannot build peace by simply strengthening these ideologies.

On the contrary, when we tried to elaborate “unilateral pseudo-theories of peace,” that is, to make the advent of peace coincide with their own affirmation on a universal scale, they produced “an ideological reflection: the masking of war.”³³

“Having obtained the liberation of the classes,” Albertini concludes, only with the ideology of peace “we can advance ... on the ground of the liberation of individuals.” It is the ground of the struggle for peace that allows for “the expansion of the sphere of individual, political and social freedom through the full freedom of man as such.” This requires, observes Albertini:

on the part of the liberals, the democrats and the socialists the overcoming of their ideological limits; and on the part of everyone, the development of a positive theory of peace and a strategy that makes peace ... the ultimate goal of political struggle.³⁴

This would have three consequences.

First of all, the conflict among traditional ideologies that has negatively – and sometimes dramatically – characterized the history of the twentieth century would cease, and a new balance would be established between them, for the full realization of the values that distinguish them. Values are defined historically – that is to say, they are inscribed throughout history, which makes them progressively thinkable and concretely achievable from time to time. If one denies history a meaning, reducing it to pure materiality or fortuity, one ends up relativizing and isolating the exercise of freedom, reducing it to subjective arbitrariness, and denying the manifestation of rationality, which exists *in itself* and *for itself*, in history. To deny the immanence of reason in history means attributing the link between events to chance or fortune.³⁵

If one is not able to think of history as a meaningful process, it is not possible to give political action a meaning that goes beyond the present.

³³ *Ibidem*, 171.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, 172.

³⁵ For an analysis of the meaning of historical course, see Francesco Rossolillo, *Senso della storia e azione politica* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2009).

Only by accepting the idea of the historical course – of a beginning, a development, and an end – does subjectivity find its own task within it, the role of the continuator of a process where subjectivity and objectivity merge, and which has continuity of meaning. Conceived as a process in which man becomes, in Hegelian terms, what he is, history makes sense only if the event carries with it the sign of its own insufficiency, as an incomplete manifestation of reason in its materialization. From this perspective, the historical process is seen in a dialectic relationship between the polarity of essence and existence, between the rational and the real, towards their progressive fusion.³⁶

It was Kant who made the sphere of individual morality coincide with that of the course of history as the result of a design of nature, which, using the “sociable un-sociability” of individuals, establishes a dialectic relationship between subjectivity – the ideas of reason, the sphere of morality, of the ends – and objectivity, that is to say, the course of history. The awareness of one’s own freedom – act in a way to treat humanity, both in your person and in that of everyone else, always as an end and never only as a means – it does not happen in the abstract, on a purely formal level, but is enrolled in a specific process, and therefore in the possibilities of the historical realization of freedom. In Kant, the categorical imperative is in fact lacking specific contents, and identifies itself in subjective freedom: “act in such a way that the maxim of your own moral values [will] always be valid also as a principle of universal legislation.”³⁷

Also for Max Weber, subjectivity and objectivity are two spheres that tend to coincide. Making a distinction between the ethics of intention – that is,

³⁶ *Ibidem*, 56-64. Existentialism denies that history has a meaning, considering the historical meaning as immanent in the event, fragile in itself, appearing as “a genesis of reason.” Essence and existence, signifier and signification, “are identified in freedom, meant not as a leavening of existence produced by the attraction exerted on it by existence, but as a pure and simple suppression of the essence, as vertigo of the conscience in front to the abyss of absolute arbitrariness” (*Ibidem*, 59, 120).

³⁷ *Ibidem*, 124. For Kant, the autonomy of morality is based on the fact that the categorical imperative, as an *a priori* form, derives directly from reason: “What I immediately recognize as law for me, I recognize with respect: and this is nothing else than the awareness of the subordination of my will to a law, without any mediation of sensitiveness.” Immanuel Kant, *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi* (Milan: Rusconi, 1994), 75. Structuralism, historicism, and the sociology of culture reduce history to an object and place the subject outside of history. Also for Fichte there is a connection between the sphere of morality and a progressive course in history.

obedience to the command of consciousness in itself and for itself, regardless of its practical consequences – and the ethics of responsibility – the action aimed at achieving an end – Weber isolated, in the sphere of morality, two specific fields for the application of freedom: the field of pure witness and the field of politics. It is the separation between the doing (an action in itself) and the being able to do (using a situation of power) that makes political action the specific field of the ethics of responsibility. “In politics,” Weber observes, “the art of conquering power is not the art of taking decisions that bring the realization of the public good nearer, but that of transforming both the virtues and the vices of real men into consensus.”³⁸

Referring to the Hegelian phenomenological figures, Francesco Rossolillo, as disciple of Albertini, develops a dialectical conception of the historical course, which appears as a progressive approach and reconciliation between natural necessity – the determinations of human nature – and moral necessity, namely the exercise of freedom towards overcoming them. History thus appears as the product of the dialectical relationship between determination – the facts – and freedom – the values – in a succession of equilibriums that are resolved into one another through revolutionary leaps. Having determined and therefore limited and contradictory goals, the political struggle manifests itself as a conflict for the overcoming of a specific determination by the creation of another determination which is nevertheless at a higher stage. The exercise of morality is thus expressed as the progressive manifestation of the truth of man who, being limited in their determinations, affirms in the political struggle the yearning for freedom from all determinations. The revolutionary is the one who makes a personal question of the contradiction between facts and values.³⁹

The revolution manifests itself with a denial of negation. A simple negation denies the social reality of one’s own time – expression of the permanent contradiction between facts and values – without, however, inserting the negation into an historical perspective. Hegel wrote about it:

³⁸ Rossolillo, *Senso della storia*, 129.

³⁹ Albertini, *Nazionalismo e*, 76-7, 91, 99-100. The Hegelian figures of phenomenology resolve themselves in each other, but are always connected to a matrix that was at the beginning and will be at the end. This is an idea that manifests itself historically. According to Rossolillo, the dialectic of necessity and freedom is ironclad: “those who want to eliminate the pole of freedom from reality cannot escape the need to make it flow entirely on itself.” (Rossolillo, *Senso della storia*, 122).

To refute, to which the bards of global protest are very wrongly referring to, is easier than to justify, that is, to recognize and highlight something affirmative ... Nothing is easier than showing ... the negative. One has the satisfaction of becoming aware of being higher than what one judges if the negative is recognized in it. This flatters vanity. If you refute something, it means that you are beyond it. But if one is beyond a thing, this means that one has not entered into it. On the contrary, finding the affirmative implies being penetrated into the object, having justified it, and this is far more difficult than to refute it.⁴⁰

This is possible because, in situations of revolutionary crisis, the political system enters into a contradiction with itself. In Hegelian terms, every quantitative change is transformed, in a certain phase of historical development, into a qualitative change. It is the moment in which the political formula, “the code of the meanings of social life,” is transformed, as Rossolillo observes, through which values are formulated and represented, and on which “history is interpreted and taken as a basis for action.” Therefore, in the revolutionary transformation there is an element of both continuity and discontinuity. By sanctioning a change that has already occurred, the revolution does not change anything, but introduces a system that adjusts the situation of political power to the existing state of social power.⁴¹

In revolutions, Rossolillo observes, “the language in which social life is expressed” is suddenly transformed. The revolution:

changes the names. It is the discovery of the code, or of the paradigm ... that explains the changes that have occurred and gives them a name ... All that is normally believed to have been created by the revolution existed before, but it was illegal. The revolution, by introducing another political formula, makes legal with a single act everything which was previously illegal ... The revolutionary, while fighting the existing mechanism of the struggle for power, as the latter actually denies the values that should justify it, presents itself as a defender of legality in its deepest sense. And in this respect he is opposed to the normal politician who, on the contrary, defending the existing mechanism of the struggle for power, denies the values with which it has entered into contradiction.⁴²

Applying Kuhn’s thesis – according to which scientific research is based on paradigms, that is to say a set of theoretical interpretative norms universally accepted by the scientific community – to the field of politics,

⁴⁰ Quoted in *Ibidem*, 455.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, 460-1.

⁴² *Ibidem*, 457-8, 462.

Rossolillo notes that all political activity is based on a universally accepted paradigm, a specific mechanism that regulates the struggle for power and its ideological justification. Political paradigms enter in crisis when within society there are created forms of coexistence increasingly in contrast with the form in which the struggle for power is organized. “Like scientists,” Rossolillo observes, “politicians are impervious to the idea of changing paradigm, because the paradigm is not part of the object on which they usually reflect and act.” The revolutionary alternative remains marginal and strongly minoritarian until the crisis of the paradigm is manifested in all its amplitude, and threatens to seriously disrupt the political framework.⁴³

The French Revolution itself was, as observed by de Tocqueville, accomplished in deeds before it was realized, coming to sanction a change in the relations of power within the society that had already happened. The state was already centralized, the local autonomies already suppressed, and the nobility had already lost all political privileges. With the revolution the representation of power relations within the society changed – the bourgeois, from being a subject, becomes a citizen.⁴⁴

The second consequence of the development of a positive theory of peace and a strategy that makes peace the supreme goal of political struggle would be to inaugurate a new phase in human history, the definitive exit from prehistory, to use a Kantian term – a phase of human development in which international relations are governed by the law of nature, which is the law of the strongest – and entry into actual history; that is, a situation in which international conflicts would be resolved by peaceful and constitutional means and a society founded on values of freedom, equality, and social justice would become feasible not just for the privileged part of

⁴³ *Ibidem*, 449-50. The paradigm goes into crisis when it is no longer able to interpret the new facts that emerged from the research, unless it is to formulate a number of exceptions and too-elaborate theoretical constructions. The change in the paradigm corresponds to the phase in which a scientific revolution has matured and the community has gradually become aware of it. A new paradigm does not impose itself on the community of scientists with the evidence of a scientific proposition, but as a reversal of the perspective of a more fideistic than rational nature. The community of scientists therefore tends to continue to use the old paradigm, without however being able to remedy the increasingly frequent and obvious contradictions within it. According to Rossolillo, the revolutionary minority is often seen “as conservative, as socialists were considered conservatives at the beginning of their struggle ... and federalists are often considered as conservatives in today’s Europe.” (*Ibidem*, 446-50).

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, 461-2.

humanity. According to Albertini, the construction of a political system capable of replacing peace with truce as the basis for relations between states would end “history driven by the contradictions of inequality and discord, in which men, dominated by the violent component of human nature, cannot freely dispose of themselves.” Only when framed exclusively by law would the behaviour of men thus depend “on the truly human side of their nature, on the autonomy of reason and on the moral law.”⁴⁵

The construction of a universal society of free people begins when reason is able to build a society in which “nobody is treated as a means but all as ends”; that is to say, reason definitely emerges from an environment which is not rational and, by establishing “the equality of all reasonable beings,” is able to recognize itself in the historical course. In this perspective, peace is not an end in itself but a pre-condition for the full realization of the characterizing values of liberalism, democracy, and socialism. As long as the state of nature in international relations remains – “the state of nature,” Kant observed, “is rather a state of war, in the sense that, even if there are no declared hostilities, there is a continuing threat to them” – values like freedom, equality, and justice can be affirmed, as history has shown up to now, only in privileged geographical areas of the world and, within them, in very partial and precarious forms.⁴⁶

The fundamental cause of the international failure of liberalism, socialism, and democracy lies in the division of humanity into sovereign states. To take note of this and recognize that without world federation any political and social achievement is circumscribed geographically and intrinsically precarious – because it is constantly threatened by a situation of international relations in which the criterion of the need to put the question of security before any other moral question is applied – it also means recognizing that the time has come to deeply modify certain traditional theoretical categories.⁴⁷

Thirdly, the recognition, by traditional ideologies, of peace as a pre-condition to the crowning of their respective ideal horizons, and of federalism as the political-cultural novelty of our time, with a specific vision of values, of the historical course and of society, would produce a

⁴⁵ Albertini, *Nazionalismo e*, 29. According to Albertini the universal reign of law would allow men to “fully realize their rational nature”, *Ibidem*, 110.

⁴⁶ Albertini, *Il federalismo*, 30.

⁴⁷ For an analysis, see John Rawls, *Il diritto dei popoli*, Sebastiano Maffettone ed., (Turin: Edizioni di Comunità, 2001); id., *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

complete reversal of perspective – a real revolution – within them. It would then create a new relationship of the traditional ideologies among themselves, based, as noted, on a new basis of competitive cooperation, compared to the old one of pure competition, also degenerated in frontal opposition; and between them and federalism, with the recognition of federalism in its own conceptual autonomy, its specific relationship with the historical course, and its function in the redefinition of their ideal reference framework.

History has shown how illusory the claim of traditional ideologies – and also of religions like Christianity – is to making peace at the international level coincide with their own universal affirmation, that there will be peace when all people are liberals, or democrats, or socialists, or Christians. History has also shown how self-contradictory and harbingers of disasters had been the claim of making the beginning of the historical process towards the universal affirmation of a specific ideology coincide with the construction of a specific form of state or government in one country or in a group of countries.⁴⁸

It is wrong to make the apparent triumph of democracy on a world scale correspond to the beginning of an era of peace. The overcoming of the causes of conflicts does not lie in a specific form of government, but in overcoming national sovereignty. It is true that democracies are less warlike than dictatorships, but as long as the division of humanity in sovereign states persists, the need for defence represents a serious limitation or threat to the full exercise of popular sovereignty. “The means of defence against an external danger,” James Madison warned, “have always been the tools of tyranny at home.” For Kant, the existence of a democratic order is certainly necessary for the internal stability of a state, but only the federation would be able to bring out individual states from the state of nature, making them enter the rule of law.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ On the utopian aspects of democratic Catholicism, see: John W. de Gruchy, *Christianity and Democracy: A Theology for a Just World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Robert P. Kraynak, *Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God and Politics in the Fallen World* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001); Amy Kittelstrom, *The Religion of Democracy: Seven Liberals and the American Moral Tradition* (London: Penguin Books, 2015); Jon Wittrock and Michael Marder, *Contemporary Democracy and the Sacred: Rights, Religion and Ideology* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018).

⁴⁹ From a speech by Madison on 29 June 1787, quoted in Levi, Montani and Rossolillo, *Tre introduzioni*, 15. On the alleged peaceful nature of democracy and

Despite the result of the Peloponnesian War, democracies proved to be more effective than dictatorships in winning wars, thus making real the prophecy of Alexis de Tocqueville, first of all because democracies only start wars that they know they can win. The leaders of democracies are indeed well aware of the internal political consequences of the eventuality of a defeat. Secondly, the primacy of individualism over collectivism, characteristic of democratic societies, invariably produced the effect of motivating the actions of their soldiers in defending both individual and collective rights. Being based on public consensus, democratic societies are then led to adopt foreign policies and collective security that are more effective than dictatorships.⁵⁰

The federalist revolution would represent the crowning and completion of the democratic revolution. By suppressing the duty of exclusive loyalty to the nation, which is already dead in deeds, and thus restoring to man “the clear conscience of his belonging to humanity, of which nationalism, produced by the national state, had deprived it,” the federalist revolution operates a global rethinking of the system of categories through which the world and the human condition were thought of. If it is therefore true that, in Hegelian terms, history is the process through which man becomes what he is, the revolutionary comes to play, in relation to society, the Socratic maieutic function, which consists in making mankind come to an awareness of its own destiny.⁵¹

the creation of a universal democratic peace see M. W. Doyle and B. M. Farrand *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). For a discussion, see Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch and Nicolas Bouchet, eds., *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama* (London: Routledge, 2013).

⁵⁰ For a debate, see Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2002).

⁵¹ Rossolillo, *Senso della storia*, 459, 463-4. For an examination of nationalism from a theoretical point of view, see: Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945); Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (Teaneck, NJ: Holmes & Meier, 1983); Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993); Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Ronald Beiner ed., *Theorizing Nationalism* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998); Philip Spencer, *Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Newcastle upon Tyne: SAGE, 2002); Graham Day, *Theorizing Nationalism* (London: Palgrave, 2005); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Erika Harris, *Nationalism: Theories and Cases* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009); Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010); Umut Ozkirimli, *Theories of*