

Hegel's System of Logic

Hegel's System of Logic:

*The Absolute Idea
as Form of Forms*

By

Stephen Theron

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This book is dedicated to the memory of Fernando Inciarte, former Director of the *Philosophisches Seminar* at the University of Muenster (the Latin title of whose book, *Forma Formarum*, I have transposed to my English title) and of Professor Joseph Pieper, former Associate Professor there and internationally well-known philosophical author (e.g. of *Happiness and Contemplation*), both of them sources of inspiration and my kind patrons, *in memoriam*. It is also for Fergus Kerr, editor of *New Blackfriars*, Oxford, as of the collection *Contemplating Aquinas* (inspiration, in turn, for much here), SCM, London, 2003, and for the former Dom Dunstan O'Keefe as also for Dom Charles Lombard Fitzgerald, both former editors of *The Downside Review*, for their constant help and encouragement. In a special way, though, I dedicate it to my wife Regina, without whose unwavering support in all senses through these last fifty years this book and much else would surely not have come to be.

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PREFACE

There is a connection of causality between analogy and “supposition” in the sense of the Aristotelian theory of reference (*suppositio*: “standing for”), or, rather, between analogy and related varieties of such supposition diagnosed for the same term in different uses. In other words there is an analogy between the concepts of analogy itself and *suppositio*, inasmuch as any identification of the latter has to be made against a background of partly equivocal possibilities of reference (a more limited term than *suppositio*). As Aristotle had it (*De soph. el. c, 1, 165a 7-16*), there are more things and entities in general than there are words. The possibility of using the same word with more than one reference is therefore very much needed if language is to cater adequately to the universal, let us rather say to the infinite, scope of intellect. Now the condition for this possibility, of course, is that there exist likenesses between individual entities, relations permitting an ordered system of verbal and indeed conceptual association.

The most obvious case of this is the likeness between individuals of the same species, permitting the same word to be used for more than one individual. This description is valid, whether or not the first occasion for uttering a certain sound as a word was upon familiarity with (or first sighting of) an individual only, or after a realisation that there existed a species or family of similar individuals (forming one species or several closely related species). It is valid because we are reasoning from experiences of appearance, not from developed knowledge and observation of the conditions for and limitations upon reproductive possibilities. Again, the fact, if it is a fact, that words name concepts, i.e. that we naturally “abstract” (or act as if abstracting) common “dematerialised” natures, is a power or limitation from within the subject only. It cannot be imposed upon the world observed without further ado.

All we can say is that a world with “sets” of beings resembling one another (or reminding the observer the one of the other) results in a use of analogous meanings (and references) of words corresponding to observed likenesses (with individual differences) in reality. This is why, to anticipate, we will want to say there is an analogy between subject and predicate as such (as the same term can have material or formal *suppositio* in traditional logical theory), or even between being and essence, on the general principle that contraries depend upon a common nature.

But before going further into the ramifications of analogy, so essential for any hope of *saying the world's truth*, we will here attempt to clarify further the range of those instruments of our reason, logic and language, though we speak improperly here, given that the three instruments proper (*organa*) of reason, Aristotle finds, are concept, judgment and argument. Thus logic, the science of these three, is only an instrument as *logica utens* or, rather, it is there reason itself and hence no instrument. Any instrument is finite and hence subject to evaluation. Reason, however, as evaluating all else without further recourse, can only be infinite if there is to be any science at all. Nor, therefore, does the situation change where reason thinks itself (it does not merely reflect upon itself) as what is then, in the old terminology, *logica docens*, indistinguishable from as in vital *rapport* with metaphysics. If logic is thought then language is the latter's prime mode, should it indeed have one. Language can be thought to reduce to one Word, which is the world. Hence, and only hence, can it be the case that "the limits of my language are the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein) and conversely. As rational beings, however, we can only aspire to have not a world but *the* world, which is, again, one word, thought's one *exitus*. "World" thus used is distinguished from "Earth" as proper name for a finite place.

The notion, the tradition, of *suppositio* as just mentioned, is based upon something quite lost in the idea of *reference*. Reference says nothing about the referring instrument or *word* referring as carrying back to or "standing for" our concepts in every case, while at this level we have nothing to do with empiricism, this nothing being of the essence of logic. The analysts, however, do not think of going beyond language as their frame, again, of reference, as we do here in referring to mind. Just therefore they do not consider *the nature of* this universal *means* of reference but only how what I *mean* to say is or may be intended by what I *do* say.

Suppositio explains specifically the existence and function of the word as *substituting* for things, something Wittgenstein might seem, but only seem, rather to mock at the start of his *Investigations*, as part of establishing the truth that "a language is a form of life". One has words, however, only because "one cannot manipulate the things themselves in discourse about them", as Aristotle puts it, again (*De soph. el.* I, 165a 7-16). One may feel a need to apologise a little for the term "things" here. Yet this, in fact, is the spirituality of discourse. One needs to discourse on things (which just might by extension be called "manipulation". Hence in some areas one might literally manipulate instead, e.g. to communicate that A is, or is to be placed, i.e. by order, to the left of B) as effect of one's understanding things, knowing how they are. This bringing of them to attention, for its part, is a bringing that leaves them unchanged, called "intentional", the peculiarity of

knowing, when finite at least. For *discourse*, specifically, is about “things”, but about them by means of indeed manipulating substitute counters, i.e. material words, paralleled in thinking by concepts, the *verba interiora* which not only “stand for” things but are (formal) signs of them (*signa formalia*) in, say, the theory of Jean Poinsoot “of St. Thomas”, Descartes’ contemporary, signs, rather, of their specific or generic natures (there is no science of the abstractly conceived or imagined individual) and nothing else. They are thus, perhaps, no more, these concepts, than the *relation* between thinker and thing thought, ultimately one of identity, or even that thing thought as itself ideal as, insofar as they are finite, in Hegel. This has to mean, though, that in thus apparently being manipulated the things manipulate themselves, i.e. that the world, as object become subject, thus *manipulates itself*. There is thus no place for an individual active subject and therefore none for such an object either. This Hegel calls “the ideality of the finite”. These two notions, of subject and object, become thus absorbed in what Hegel calls the Idea itself, seen as absolute or as his account of what in religion is pictured as God, thus, again, to be seen as absorbing the world as object rather than as, in classical pantheism, being absorbed into it. It is the Idea rather, as he says at the end of the greater *Science of Logic*: “The method is the pure Concept which only relates to itself as such (*nur zu sich selbst verhaelt*); it is therefore the simple relation to self which is Being, now concrete (*erfuelltes*) being as ‘thought thinking itself’... as the simple intensive totality” (*Wissenschaft der Logik* II, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt: *Werke*, vol. 6 p. 572, my translation). The freedom of thought, that is, is ultimate being, the Aristotelian *nous* in its self-comprehension, again, wherein all finds its or their fulfilment, absolute knowing as one is known, one might say, in “simple intensive totality” (Hegel’s phrase again). This Hermetic side to Hegel’s system, congenial or not, cannot be ignored.

So there is a parallel, or analogical likeness rather, between word and thought, words as used signifying the latter. It will be seen though, as Aristotle continues, in the text of his cited above (165a 7-16), that this relation between names will not be the same as the relations between things. Nor will that between concepts be the same, since those names bear directly upon abstracted entities, pairings or groupings of which often, or always so in the case of predication (S *is* P), form a unity in “objective” (in Hegel’s sense of this term) reality. Thus a conceptual identity is declared between the referents of two different subject and predicate names (as having the same *suppositio*, though each in its own proper manner), i.e. that is what predication is, Fx, always, whether I say “Cicero is Cicero” or “Cicero is Tully” (Compare our “Subject and Predicate Logic”, final section: *The*

Modern Schoolman LXVI, January 1989). Since this itself is the uniquely logical relation it cannot be affected logically by any general theory of extra-mental or extra-logical relations, e.g. the Russellian one, without great mental confusion.

*

St. Bonaventura wrote of the univocity of plural usages of “the same” term, as the likeness merely of two or more such usages to one another, *similitudo univocationis*, as if in fact the same term, as itself a usage, were not the same (cf. *I Sent.* 48) or as if, more generally, the same were, necessarily, the different, mere likeness enfolding both univocity and analogy. The latter, however, has been defined as itself a species of equivocation. *This is the same thesis as Hegel’s, that the same and the different are the same in their very difference.* All this relates to “our” use of words, applying them to a world supposed, again, different (from thought, as Kant in his way explored). As the term is itself a usage the same term, again, used of two or on two occasions, is not the same. Wittgenstein said, accordingly, that the meaning is the use (and therefore not the meaning), without however fully bringing out this consequent impasse or, it must seem, unresolved clash, developed as it had been, however, in the Preface to Hegel’s *The Phenomenology of Mind*, called accordingly spirit, *Geist*. It is the genius of quite ordinary German speech to identify mind and spirit thus, in clear contrast to English, for example, as Anglo-Saxon developed after the Norman or Franco-Latin conquest. Our concern here, however, must completely transcend the vagaries or individual character of any particular language, since its aim is precisely to transcend, to get behind, language itself as phenomenon merely.

We have, then, either analogy or equivocation between analogy and equivocation themselves! This is because analogy is itself irreducible to univocity, as is at first unthinkingly demanded or supposed. The relation of *suppositio* in fact, which we have been discussing above, holds between words and non-words or things, though indeed this second *relatandum*, “thing”, might itself be another word, then or in consequence “materially” considered (the term is significant as negatively de-fining mind as *immaterial*). This has been fundamentally forgotten in modern philosophy’s central trend, Wittgenstein making a virtue, or so he was interpreted, of such forgetting, e.g. by those putting together his unfinished *Philosophical Investigations* (for thus they had interpreted his earlier *Tractatus*). This relation, however, is a matter of things processing through the mind, of the world’s thus becoming conscious of itself to itself. This equivalence,

however, is one with Absolute Idealism's suspension of all notions of realism, its identification of idealism with realism, namely, the Idea being "the true being", as Hegel declares at the end of his first or "greater" *Science of Logic*.

It is, again, because the supply of words is limited that we have analogy, in the "exemplary" form of analogous uses or significations of the same term. Note here that if there can be analogous uses then there can be analogous things and ultimately analogous beings generally, this eventually implying a prime analogate, as something which anything and everything resembles in this way and which must underlie any use of "the same as", as when we find Hegel saying, at the same time as he disclaims it, since then, he says, good is just not good nor evil evil, that "good is the same as evil".

Putting it thus, however, can seem to confirm the theory that analogy is "only" a logical doctrine within some larger theatre. This immediate impression, though, is false to the universality of logic as the very "form of the world" (Hegel). Analogy is inexplicable unless there are likenesses between *things*, even though, or because, "each thing is itself and not another thing". The truth is that each "thing" (this term itself names a category in Hegel's *Science of Logic*), just as being itself, becomes every other thing. There is an absolute fluidity, itself determined as such by this primary resistance to or indeed negation of it in the first or "abstracting" positing of a definite term, the interchangeability, namely, of the discrete and the continuous. So where two things are analogous, as by this analogy of being they have to be, we have two analogous uses of one term, as in "dinner table" and "the table of the virtues". The logical doctrine here is not to be confused with metaphor as a restrictedly linguistic phenomenon evidencing it. The thinking process here issues finally, in Hegel in particular, in the one "word", the Concept, as all in all. Every particular, thereby, named or imagined, is a (logical) moment of the Concept, even, Hegel will claim to demonstrate, Nature as a whole or the Idea's free going forth (cf. *Enc.* 244). This "passing" quality of the logical moment in its finitude is reflected, namely, in our notions and experience of Time. Meanwhile, therefore, logic itself, the Concept, God in Aquinas or related theology, has no real relation to us corresponding to "our", the creation's "real" relation (in a moderate realist and hence dualist philosophy) to the former. God "shall be all in all" - the at first sight temporal quality of "shall" retains, also in everyday speech, a certain normative quality.

Not only therefore is the identity relation *the* logical relation but, as fundament of this actuality, there is a circularity of relations between moments, whether conceptual or personal or both, each of which is an absolute end and the same end. Although this relation is Trinitarian in form

(here we touch upon Hegel's theology, the aspect under which his system *is* theology philosophically, i.e. the Aristotelian sense of *nous*) there is no definite *number* of its moments (Hegel says: "It is useless to count" as lying "outside the Concept"), ever arising and departing as they do, but only to return without end, which are called, whether as one or many in the particular cases, persons or, as Hegel at times has it, spirits, "stainless forms and shapes of heaven" (cf. *Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. Baillie, V, B, c: "Reason as Test of Laws"). A further issue of this, as we noted above, is that the term "analogous" is itself irreducibly analogous, on pain of not being analogous at all, i.e. if there were some univocal fundament to which all reduced. This Trinity or *triunity* is the only rational conception of God therefore, Hegel variously affirms.

*

So we have truth and being. Falsehood is the mind contradicting being or, that is to say, itself, since the mind, the Idea, *is* finally being, Hegel declares at the end of the greater *Science of Logic*, again. In itself, however, this, i.e. falsity, is a stage in the recognition, the revelation, of truth, to itself or to mind indifferently. The finite mind as a "power of the soul", or as life, is not mind or spirit. Death, Hegel says, is, accordingly, "the entry into spirit", itself, spirit, *Geist*, mind, called "life" in a figure (of speech), though pluriform speech itself, we have seen, is nothing but figure. Mind, therefore, its idea, that is to say, is violated in word or deed indifferently, whereas, it follows already, it is in itself *inviolable*. Thus, just as there is no language but in figure, so there are (this is the inviolability) no events but in figure, again, neither this nor any other. "Practical truth" is simply truth as the ultimate *act*. Conversely, the action to and/or *in* which the practical syllogism concludes is itself represented thought, itself thus transcending the presentation, before it is anything else. Action is contemplation, entailing no turning away, as, conversely, *theoria* is the highest *praxis*, as Aristotle had declared. Thought is itself already the "far better thing" that I do without need. Re-flection, thus "bending back", is itself act. The theological notion of *sin*, deriving from ritual but itself imagined or represented as past, is here dissolved. There cannot be an infinite offence, in the way generally "represented", and regarding this attribution (of infinity) as quite distinct from its supposed effect, of being "mortal" in an intended sense best caught in English by "death-ing" or killing, just inasmuch as it can be turned away from, whatever it is, since offence is itself a passing or finite moment, logically speaking, of the infinite itself, to be, in a figure, forgotten since as such unknowable. The invitation to judgment,

that is, is illusory, depending on a makeshift or faulty picture of the true state of affairs, whereby the last shall be first, the first last, the scarlet turning into, or including, the “white as snow” while, *ipso facto*, the converse of this (the “elder brother” syndrome) will also hold. One or another, we are the same. Religion attempts to express this when it says, for example: “There, but for the grace of God, go I”. This, all the same, is all too easily a judgment on the ungraced nature of the other part, inevitable so long as we continue to form material images of “sin”, that original ritual fault. For here too we should worship “neither on this mountain nor on that”. This is shown in religion itself, however, when it is said that the “spotless” mediator was (is) “made sin for us” or even, figure within figure, that he “nails it (sin) to the Cross” and so on. Hence death too, Hegel affirms, is the opposite of what we imagine, is without “sting”, not life vanquished but life’s *meaning*, as to be found in logic itself, Hegel claims, life as itself being “only the Idea immediate”. This, though, is said within a discourse in which mediation itself is sublated or “put by” while, furthermore, neither Life nor Existence as logical categories are to be confused with any empirical or material species or representation of the same. Hegel has chosen to transpose the ordinary names of things in this way for his exposition of “the true reason-world”, asking us only to keep this in mind. The alternative would be to have a purely algebraic scheme where each item could be looked up (under what letter?) in, or learned by heart from, an appended index, or, why not, put in brackets beside, which shows the futility of this demand. Besides this, Hegel’s further claim, I would hazard, is to show that these concepts themselves as we manipulate them in common life are in fact open to as *logically* requiring the refinement his *method* universally exhibits, especially as this refers to our concept of ourselves, of Self, showing us thereby that we do not after all inhabit a free-standing objectively finite world, are not thereby even our true selves as *in it* but are, rather, the individuals transcending themselves “as individual”.

The distinction, then, of self-consciousness from the essential nature (*Wesen*) is completely transparent. Because of this the distinctions found within that nature itself are not accidental characteristics. On the contrary, because of the unity of the essence with self-consciousness (from which alone discordance, incongruity might have come), they are articulated groups (*Massen*) of the unity permeated by its own life, unsundered spirits transparent to themselves, stainless forms and shapes of heaven, that preserve amidst their differences the untarnished innocence and concord of their essential nature. (cited partially above already, with the reference, from Hegel’s *The Phenomenology of Mind*).

This analysis or one similar, I would claim, is implicit in the evangelical declaration that “your sins are forgiven”, removing sin to the one sin of that “against the spirit”, as Hegel in one place condemns “certainty against the spirit” (1830 third Preface to the *Encyclopaedia*). In this sense God, “who but” as the Pharisees indignantly asked, forgives sins, i.e. sublates their notion as a finite picture of finitude. Thus forgiveness, by God or of one another, plays a key-role, even that of lynch-pin, in the argument constituting *The Phenomenology of Mind* (VI Cc3). The thesis here is equivalent to the Dostoyevskian “We are all responsible for all” as finally involved in the meaning of **Substance** and hence of personality, to which action is assimilated, as analysed (cf. *Enc.* 151 with the important *Zusatz* on the development from Spinoza to Leibniz).

*

Talk of a legislating God, then, is sociomorphic transference. Human rights equally are but analogously forensic in their notion, a fiction, as it is said nowadays, stuff for the street. Love does not transcend or absorb them, but is rather itself alone the realisation of eternal truth. It is not that love makes us respect a *pre-existing* right merely. With love, rather, life in the spirit, which is yet more or other than life, is first or in logical priority as underlying all birth, all who are born. Or, the last, i.e. the human right or rights, both as passive entitlement(s) and as active obligation(s), is, was ever and shall be first, as *in* love, and hence not rights specifically. They are fictions, again. Else love would be nothing as conferring nothing, would not be at all. Being, however, is necessity, in the immutable freedom of the Idea as being Idea of itself exclusively as, precisely, all-inclusive, hence of love too. Yet is not love, rather, the actualising energy of being itself in the first place, i.e. even in the very first place and not just in human or maybe other finite generation, as it appears? Some utterances by Jakob Boehme, a thinker regarded highly by Hegel, concerning an aboriginal will, touch upon this point, which would also imply that no one has a *right* to be loved. Hence it cannot, strictly, be earned either. There is just this chance, not, in the nature of the case, to be gambled upon, however, that if you have it you might get it or, equally, its opposite, however. This is that dark cause which we, or Scripture itself, prefer, to some extent forgivingly or compassionately, to call being hated “without a cause”. These categories as such, however, let us make no mistake, “lie outside the Concept”, are “empty thoughts” (an expression of Hegel’s) yet useful, as here, for communication. The philosophy of love, he makes quite clear, is in fact swallowed up in that of Being, of, that is, the Absolute Idea (cp. *Enc.* 159).

Such an account, of love principally, McTaggart has forcefully argued, is, so to say, the soul and spirit of immortality, called in religion, again, resurrection or, finally, ascension, the “going up” to the Holy City. Such iconography, like this philosophy, is the stuff of human achievement, to use now that figure. Nothing is achieved where “everything is accomplished”, as Hegel says when commenting on teleology, on its notion. He there gives a version, as it were, of Kant’s notion of the person, any person, as an end (in itself) though without any of the wistfulness of the Kantian “ought”, the “as if” of attitude or recommended mind-set.

All religions, it thus turns out, but *via* the essential mediation, historically, of a self-begetting or emergent logic within religion’s eventual self-expression, within religion itself as concrete, hatch out as philosophy, serving only itself in perfect worship. It is this that the recent notion of “globalisation” figures forth, the whole processing through mind without distinction as to beginning or terminus. This, though, is based necessarily upon a particular and even individual foundation, as the very shape of history cannot but picture and as is now pictured also, in its own individual way, in “natural history” or evolution, but without prejudice to necessity. Thus we learn from David Attenborough and others that there has been a plurality of developments of sight-organs as a vital response to light, even though just one, the eye, may have survived. The thrust towards sight, we may therefore hazard, is a necessity of nature, more general even than any supposed thrust of a given species towards some sort of collective “survival” of those species or individuals, it seems not to matter which, judged thereafter to have been, not surprisingly, most fit to survive. It is thus, as what is fit, that “the factual is normative” (Hegel).

*

Thus analogy as we have been discussing it covers, takes in, both language and things, since language is itself but one “thing”. This of course is the opposite speech to that in which it is said that “purity of heart is to will one thing” (Kierkegaard). Without such analogy, however, this last, where “thing” names the analogy which all things have to one another, since they are otherwise not plurified, the opposed univocity itself could not occur. What it says, all the same, is that will defines itself as willing the good categorically, as the “good will”, therefore, with **Volition** as furthest form of **Cognition** itself, the *former* being placed, we should note, immediately anterior in the *Logic*, and hence posterior to Cognition, i.e. as an *advance* (239), to the **Speculative** or **Absolute Idea** (see the relevant chapters on this theme concluding this book). This is real or actually existent in a manner

sublating both these finite terms, volition and goodness namely, along with cognition itself as crowned in volition, terms taken from now sublated or superseded finite categories in thought's, the Idea's, all the same ever-returning course, going out in order to return, as truth in itself, Hegel claims, can only be result.

Ideas, if not less ideal, are yet, as in the Platonist perspective, more concrete and abiding than things. Spirit is, so to say, super-matter. Hence arises our theme, as to what is real, what actually exists. Things thus proceeding in the mind are no longer things but ideas. The external thing is itself an idea. Thought cannot conceptually restrict itself in the way generally or immediately assumed, just as one cannot abstract praxis from *theoria*. Everything is thought. The practical syllogism is truly a syllogism, with the concluding action (activity as a whole then) intrinsic to it. It is the ultimate syllogism, as volition succeeds upon cognition, the good upon the true. Thus, as Fernando Inciarte well showed (e.g. in his *Substance and Action*, George Ohms, Hildesheim, 2002), the soul or mind turns out to be the man as agent. The composite of soul and body (Aquinas) is a representation. Resurrection is the picture of man's own reality as a living spirit, upon which the whole of biology hangs or is hung, in mere objectification of self-consciousness itself, of mind universalising such self-consciousness to a zero-point as regards its individuality while enhancing its personal quality as *concrete* universal, thus yielding science, Hegel claims.

This is about the relation of created to creator as pure spirit. To vary the insight: we see small ants running on the cloth and think it improbable, or perhaps, like Hegel's village schoolmaster in LPR, wonderful that God bothers to know each individual ant and all its movements at all times. The insight into the object, however, is God's knowing the object and *thus* making it be or, rather, be-ing it, actively. God runs on the cloth, if you like, or God is not God. There are not two things, the ant and God's knowledge of it. God's knowledge *ants* (but since it includes the ant's motion it is not itself moved), a Fregean might say in form of a verb, applying this in fact to predication generally, such that the true logical form of "This is a fish" is, rather, "This *fishises" (the asterisk signifying an improper formation), Fx, standing for predicate as an incomplete function generally. So there is indeed a certain esoteric knowledge involved in such logical theory. Whatever we predicate thereby becomes something else, a form or act. For Aquinas a predicate signifies only *quasi*-formally, which seems better as excluding the absurd view that only certain types of formal things can be predicates or, more importantly, predicated, and not "just anything or everything" (Henry Veatch: "St. Thomas's Doctrine of Subject and Predicate" in *St. Thomas Aquinas (1274-1974)*, Vol. II, Toronto 1974). Yet

it is because we are ourselves thoughts (of God, of Mind), i.e. we *are* that, that we see what are other thoughts, see the persons, as at a (non-momentary) level of their own and not at that of the thinker whose world, whose mind it is, or, rather, not at the one without being at the other, each being both subject and object and hence neither but rather, in each case, the other of self. The Idea is thus the true self, uniquely. As Hegel puts it, untouched however by negative or abstract Unitarianism, "God is the absolute person" (151, *Zus.*).

We speak of God's knowledge of "possibles". This only means that everything is possible. God does not have as it were to "imagine" things, sea-battles etc., before making them or before eventuation. The possible is thus more than the possibly actual and we do not get over this "everything" by mentally actualising abstractly "possible worlds". It, the possible, *is* the actual. Nothing, no class of elements, can, so to say, be ahead of as other than God, the Idea, which he might, so to say, consult. Hence they cannot be in him either under this sobriquet. As being God his thought of them, his thought of anything, has to be the thing, even of course if he should think of a thought, for example his own. God never knows what he cannot or will not do since his doing of anything is itself the knowing as nothing else is. In this sense too, supremely even, "Everything", the Good as cognate with Being, with the Idea in freedom, "is accomplished". That is what it means to be God. There is no abstract class of possibles, such as we often imagine with our invitations to "suppose", and this might indeed be what Hegel says "induced Kant to make possibility a modality", i.e. something merely abstract, like a woman giving birth to kittens, say. So no, we won't thus suppose. Really possibility is actuality and conversely and with a grasp of this our thought shall find its freedom and strength. When God conceives a higher mountain-top than Everest on this earth then there will *be* one, it is the same idea, or if there has been one then that was and is his conception, as Christ "saw Satan (under whatever mode) falling from heaven" (under whatever mode) or "saw" and knew Nathaniel under the fig-tree, to the latter's amazement (*John* 1, 48: the historical "correctness" or otherwise of this account is not at issue here). So when we say that God as God must know all possibles we have then to determine whether an abstract or unrealised possibility, in contradistinction from actuality, is itself a possible as, in the final analysis, by Hegelian logic, it is not and this, rather, is what God knows. He does not say to himself, as it were, I could rather have done this or that, simply because it is his *own* being as Idea that determines the formalities of actuality and possibility, the latter being identified with the former in the dialectical Advance, in the first place. Such, anyhow, is

Hegel's decided view, which is thus the truth of the "butterfly's wing" view of things.

The Notion is the principle of freedom, the power of substance self-realised. It is a systematic whole, in which each of its constituent functions is the very total which the notion is, and is put as indissolubly one with it. Thus in its self-identity it has original and complete determinateness. (160)

Nor, of course, does God work by or with propositions anyhow. That is why, the main reason why, a propositionalist ethic is defective as being a "rationalist" ethic, why reasoning generally is one with action, in which the premises themselves are completed. Such action, as act, is "thought thinking itself" (cf. Aristotle's Greek text from *Metaphysics* XI 7 stating this, as cited by Hegel as concluding the whole *Encyclopaedia*, but unreasonably omitted, as is even a translation thereof, from the English text on the Internet from the University of Idaho). So howcome God? Well, God is reason, *nous*, within which alone all questions and our own being as questioner are founded, while even "nothing", the **Negative**, is thus a rational notion.

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Besides *The Analogy of God and the World* (Hampus Lyttkens' title for his doctoral thesis: Uppsala, c.1950, lent to me in MS form by Peter Geach at Leeds in 1979) there is the analogy of things, again, with one another. **Thing**, I repeat, is a passing category in Hegel's *Logic*. The analogy holds between all that exists, in a common likeness forming the basis for a common love or community of being, bound together in the reciprocal causality not precisely of system but of universal intelligibility.

We have explored analogy far enough to uncover an analogy (of being) between **Being** and **Essence**, to which Being accordingly yields, *via* the mediation of the Substrate as within **Measure**. It is Hegel's merit to have shown that analogy *of Being specifically* holds also between the logical categories, i.e. those of thought, which are accordingly, although analogously again, **One**, and of which **Analogy** itself is one category (EL 190), i.e. analogy, again, is itself analogical as between Logic and Being or as, again, the very being of the Idea, its essential freedom as first necessity. There is thus an analogy between analogy and *materia prima* as the necessary potentiality conditioning Nature, necessary just as the substantial Subject or, for Aquinas, individual human soul is necessary. Confer here the essay on natural necessity in Thomas Aquinas by Patterson Brown in Anthony Kenny's collection of essays, *Aquinas* (Macmillan Paperback, London 1970). It is necessary in the freedom of the divine Idea, thus named

as expressing the unity or singularity of absolute thought. Natural necessity, the necessity which is nature, is absorbed in logical necessity.

Thus in his demonstration itself of God by "the third way" Thomas Aquinas "admits the possibility of a *plurality* of necessary beings" (Patterson Brown), some of them caused, giving as examples "the heavenly bodies", as believed "incorruptible", the human soul, (intellectual principle), prime matter and angels, the common characteristic being incorruptibility.

The equation of natural with logical necessity, the former being thus absorbed in the latter, however, is the conception behind Leibniz's theorem of the "best of all possible worlds", seemingly bypassing Nature's tangible self-alienation, but rather absorbing it, again, as a mere moment of the Idea finally, everything resulting necessary in view of the absolute idealism Leibniz was at least, after Berkeley, approaching towards, thus landing himself, according to Hegel, it seems with some admiration, in a "philosophy of perfect contradiction".

All this is the same as to say that there must be an analogy between any pair of contraries in so far as they must be grounded in a common nature in order to be contraries in the first place. Thus it is "the character of thought" that "the moments as much *are* as they *are not*" (Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Baillie, 1967 edition, p. 777). Analogy, unnamed, is the controlling reality in Hegel's thinking, I venture to affirm.

The moments are, that is, unlike within a likeness, which is just the definition of analogy as, it turns out, the condition for the disparateness of concepts relative to one another as, logically viewed, just one class (of all classes, viz. *the* Concept, as in Hegel). This is in fact Hegel's version of Aristotle's on the face of it univocal statement that there is no univocal universal of the "things which are", or that "being is *said* in many ways". Being, rather, is an "analogical set" comprehensive enough to include, of logical necessity, non-being. "The moments as much are as they are not." So, parallel to **Existence** and **Essence** as a logical pair we have, as a pair, reference and sense or meaning, *Bedeutung* and *Sinn* in Frege's development of this. Thus, the morning star is, analogously (i.e. it is not), the evening star. In Fregean logic, indeed (for which I hold no especial brief), these correspond, in a particularly defined way, to Subject and Predicate as being, if we return to Hegel, Object and Concept. Even in Aquinas, accordingly, the predicate signifies *as if* formally, we have noted, the subject *as if* materially (*quasi*), whereas in Frege the subject really is the matter, the predicate the form, i.e. they are for him, it can seem, irreducibly different entities and not merely separated by their respective quality of being posited, *quasi* materially or *quasi* formally. So they cannot be the same, there cannot be an identity. Just therefore a special "*is* of identity" has

to be posited, “Socrates is Socrates” differing *toto caeli* from “Socrates is a man” (cf. our “Subject and Predicate Logic”, *The Modern Schoolman*, January 1989, pp. 129-139, esp. section IV). Even if x “fishises” yet x, in Frege, whatever it is, i.e. any x, is not the “fishising” but separate substantially while accidentally or essentially “fishising”. The difference is, then, that for Aquinas or Aristotle as cited above *both* subject and predicate refer, *supponunt pro*, and to the same thing or *ens*. As Aquinas expresses it (in *De ente et essentia*), “only wholes are predicated of wholes” (cf. the article by Veatch cited above). The Idea, in its actual *naming*, by “supposition” or reference, is not abstract (cf. Aquinas’s *De ente et essentia*). It *is* the Idea. Thus thought knows itself.

An identity of reference, therefore, can ground an analogy between subject and predicate and hence between reference and sense themselves as logical operations. The two *different* ways of referring (the predicate “connotes”) to the same thing give analogy, or a situation midway between identity and disparity, so-called intentional identity. There is not, therefore, a dualistic chasm between sense and reference, between the world of meaning, of “intellectual formalities”, and the real world, each of which can therefore be assimilated to the other indifferently. This, seen as giving an opening to pantheism, is really its refutation, opening rather, as Hegel clearly suggests, towards Trinitarianism as “the only rational” theology. Awareness of this is the possibility of knowledge as seen by Aristotelians and *a fortiori* Platonists, among whom Hegelians should accordingly be counted, for whom the form in the knower *is* the form of the thing known, which therefore, as Hegel works it out, is what alone knows itself. That the intelligible form is found *alio modo* in “the external world” (we cannot say “in nature”, *qua* moment of the Idea, still less “in things”, the thing being also a passing “methodical” category finally, for thought, absorbed in the Idea) is ultimately another way of affirming the nothingness of this “external world” (*Enc.* 50). Subject, as becoming thus absolute, vanishes *qua* subject specifically or as contradistinguished against object, just as, one-sidedly, does the object in, say, Berkeleyan idealism. Yet for both “of course God is the object” (Hegel) just in being found to be absolute subject, all-inclusive as having nothing “appearing beside” as Aristotelian *paremphenomenon*, as indeed Aristotle uses this term in proving the immateriality of thought, *nous*, of mind, *res cogitans*, as knowing, in its essential freedom, being or existence as absorbed in essence, as itself *qua* mind necessary for the possibility of this identity with eventually all that would be otherwise other, i.e. for knowledge or science. The principle of non-contradiction, again, is thus the first or controlling instance of reference

specifically, even when referring, as does Hegel, even or especially, to the contradictions constituting “reality”.

In this way reference, *suppositio*, is contained within the ambit of meaning (*significatio*), intentional “objects” being the things known themselves, this, the *id quid*, “that which”, being the final sense of the *id quo*, “that by which”, in the famous passage from Aquinas at *Summa theol.* I, 85, 2, where, in confirmation of this, the *id quo* is itself known, necessarily posited, as an *id quid*, if there is not to be infinite regress. Interpreting concepts as “formal signs” does not alter this since even the unknowable, as even relations, has and have to be known as precisely such. By this route, in fact, concepts tend to become mere relations between knower and known, as Andre de Muralt points out in his *L'enjeu de la philosophie medievale* (Brill, Leyden 1991). In fact the fight against the falsification which is abstraction needs to be acknowledged as properly fought out within reason itself, as bearing upon ideas “knowable in themselves” rather than upon things as “more knowable to us”, the very divide Aristotle, one with Hegel in this, declares his intention to bridge at the beginning of his *Metaphysics*, thus acknowledging empiricism in the discounting of it. This also is the key to P.T. Geach's polemic against abstractionism, as not represented, he claims, even by Aquinas:

In accepting the comparison whereby the *intellectus agens*, the mind's concept-forming power, is likened to a light that enables the mind's eye to see the intelligible features of things, as the bodily eye sees colours, Aquinas is careful to add that this comparison goes on all fours only if we suppose that colours are generated by kindling the light - that the light is not just revealing colours that already existed in the dark (*Summa theol.* Ia q. 79 art. 3 ad 2um). Furthermore he says that when we form a judgment expressed in words, our use of concepts is to be compared, not to seeing something, but rather to forming a visual image of something we are not now seeing, or even never have seen (*Ibid.* q. 85 art. 2 ad 3um). So he expresses anti-abstractionist views both on the formation and on the exercise of concepts. (Peter Geach: *Mental Acts*, RKP London 1957, p.139. The 1971 edition of this now classic work included a new and important Preface).

That the mind makes concepts is explained by Hegel with his thesis that Mind is itself the self-knowing and final, actually self-producing Concept. This is his account of logical form, whereby form constitutes the world or, as the scholastic tag had it, *forma dat esse*, form gives being and hence, as the Idea, *is* being ultimately, as Hegel spells out, again, at the end of his “Greater Logic”. Aquinas's position that the mind (as abstractly human or finite, i.e. as soul) can know being without itself being or becoming it was always, even self-confessedly or in his own case, necessarily midway or

provisional. Human souls, like angels, prime matter and “the celestial” bodies are, in his realist system, created or caused (by God) necessary beings, as such or “*per se* incorruptible”, it is claimed at *Summa contra Gentiles* II, 30, “How Absolute Necessity can exist in created things”, a passage cited in full by Patterson Brown in his article referred to above here. Brown contrasts this with what Kant writes in the *Critique of Pure Reason* at A606-607, B634/635 as, *qua* refutation, “completely off the mark”. The error of nineteenth century Neo-Scholasticism, first proposed as a corrective to, *inter alia*, the Hegelian *method*, was, by contrast, to attempt to absolutise that provisional position. This claim as to Hegelian method, as if it might be considered in parallel with the Scholastic method it conceptually transcends (see below in our text here *passim*), shows more than anything else the incomprehension of those promoting Thomist revival, however excellent a project, as I consider it, in itself, but not, indeed, as instrumental for something else, given the claim to revive Thomist *philosophy*. Hegel’s philosophical method, in other words, is itself deep theology. There is no place for “handmaids”, *ancillae*, here. The *unreadiness*, this philosophical incomprehension, which this movement of reaction embodied, its enforced triumph in clerical and related circles, left the way open for the parallel Marxist materialisation of the Hegelian Concept and “method”, for the wars, revolutions and worse enormities of the immediate future. This was a repeat, at one level higher, one might well think, of the 1607 refusal of the papacy (*Congregatio de auxiliis*) to confirm the *Thomist* position that God *qua* God, as the light enabling all our knowledge, necessarily determines the human free act as free, is never passive to it as “leaving it alone” (“liberty of indifference”), a refusal which played its part, one might well think, again, in opening the way for the modern atheist movement or for the relative triumph, in Europe, of the Kantian anti-philosophy, an absolutisation of mere phenomenalism as Hegel denominated it. But perhaps the Pope judged this practical refusal, i.e. not one of thought, as the lesser of two evils, the other being incomprehension on the part of the larger body of “the faithful”. Such a consideration, however well meant or “correct” in its sphere rather than true (*Enc.* 172), lies, like numbers, “outside the Concept”, while as mere or abstract practice, e.g. “in” a university or when conferring generally, even philosophy itself is of course just “phenomenal”. The “mistake”, as it would be at least if intending a purely philosophical stance, which it is doubtful that it did, was again repeated c. 1860 when “the Holy Office” condemned five propositions, there would be more layer, of the nascent movement of Hegelian “ontologism” as “not safe for teaching”, a curious phrase.

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There is, though, we have mentioned, a further point (i.e. apart from that of the identity of being and essence) at which meaning is itself the purest instance of reference. This is expressed by the principle of non-contradiction, which of course Hegel is not, contradictorily, attempting to deny in his critique of “the soulless word *is*”. He uses it, rather, as do all who argue anything, to establish contradictory moments in or of existence as itself a finitely self-contradictory or, as abstract, false category. In and by this principle as constitutive the understanding apprehends reality in its very formalities. It is not then merely a rule for speaking among humans specifically, being itself rather the *possibility of reference* as even the latter's primal *act* or form, as already referred to being. This successful reference, the affirmative identification of (any) being with itself, with the denial of its negation, is the first achievement of sense, of meaning. As Aristotle puts it (*Metaphysics* IV, 40), one cannot know what this principle means without believing it true, though not at all in virtue of a reduction of truth to correct speaking merely. This would be to confound the theoretical with the abstractly pragmatic, where the useful is no longer useful (for anything). Thus the animals strive to survive merely in virtue of being alive, life, like suicide, its contrary, having no specific meaning for them collectively taken. Each, as finite, like a passing or finite category in the logic, is purely phenomenal, false even, except insofar as it might have and hence *be* Mind, the Idea, which determines even how Nature as a whole is to be viewed as a moment, though alienated or “petrified” (Schelling), of the Concept, individual insects, to use an example of Hegel's, lying “outside of” this. This, in fact, is why he calls the evolutionary hypothesis, taken in abstract isolation at least, an “empty thought”. “Life”, “the initial particularisation”, as “in point of its immediacy this individual living thing” (216), “no more than the idea immediate” (221), “runs away” (221, *Zus.*), as he also puts it. In “the process of Kind”, “the highest point of its vitality”, “the immediate living being mediates itself with itself”, a difficult notion at first blush. The “real result” of this process of Kind, the dominant notion in evolution as we typically view natural life today, viewing now this very process “notionally” (i.e. this result is not a *temporal* event), however, “is to merge and overcome that immediacy with which the *idea in the shape of life*, is still beset” (stress added). It is as this *idea*, namely, that Life is treated in the Logic, as merging into the following category of **Kind**, the individual conceptually *becoming*, i.e. of itself, the universal as Nature is merged, absorbed into Mind in its very Idea, again. Each is called, we might say, to become not *all*, as it were distributively, but the universal, the Kantian

“Kingdom of ends” merging here into the logical circle having its centre, or its being whole, i.e. wholly, at every point. However, as Hegel, seeming to show exact prescience of the future Marxist deformation of his system, wryly comments:

Human nature, not much to its credit, is more ready to believe that a system denies God, than that it denies the world. A denial of the God seems so much more intelligible than a denial of the world. (50)

The reference to a readiness to believe mirrors exactly a passage of the *Summa contra gentes* of Thomas Aquinas mentioning “sins against faith”, as a virtue, he means. This can be either by excess or defect, i.e. wilful refusal, in his view, or, as here, excess in a too great readiness to believe what should still be tried and tested, the world and its ways, namely. Here in Hegel, such unconditional faith in the world, so to say, is a matter of “just missing the notion”.

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So a general scepticism, or consistent denial rather, is expressed here in our sources concerning time and, consequently events or “happenings” as time-bound. These, and associated phenomena, including even the world or our entire if transient life, do not “belong to the notion” or Concept. This, as bearing upon time, events and the world, as objects of belief declared here, by our reading, to be objectively nothing, is thus a *formal* causality prior to its positing as “efficient” cause. It, the Concept, God, is the *form* of the world as disclosed to the subject (which it itself nonetheless is, in this unity of self and other necessarily proper to infinity), constituting it in being as intellect, spirit. Hence spirit, here as mind (*Geist*) or soul (*anima*), is *quodammodo omnia* or, for Heidegger, just *omnia*. The *quodammodo*, however, though ignored by Heidegger, is the noting of an analogy between spirit and world, ultimately, as at the opening, the becoming, of Hegel’s logic, between being and nothing, the negativity of absolute freedom, as also, or correspondingly rather, between macrocosm and microcosm, as developed in Cusanus or Leibniz and further by Hegelian monism, where whole and part are interchangeable in mutual cancellation. What was developed was thus the further reaches of analogy, of likeness, finally of identity *in* difference, where the many as such are one but *in* their remaining many, as they do not in that *oneness* (of the blackness of cows at night, in Hegel’s words) that they would have, Aquinas observes, if there were no analogy. This identity, that is, is the analogy *of being* specifically, just as set or found (and not merely “posited” *in* being). Why is there such an analogy,

to which “creation” or the procession of likenesses corresponds, unless as deriving logically from the Absolute Idea, *viz.* that there should be a plurality in unity of such beings, on the Trinitarian analogy in fact, Hegel would add, while wishing, like Aquinas, to downplay or eliminate any numerical aspect in just this naming of “three”, which he therefore in a measure cannot but deprecate or otherwise modify? *Numeri non ponuntur in divinis* (Aquinas), i.e. numbers play, can play, no part in theology. “It is useless to count” (Hegel). By such logic these or “God’s good pleasure” and similar expressions are but figures, though in incarnating or expressing logic they are as necessary, these “picture ideas”, as is incarnation itself, individual and only thus actual, as Hegel expounds this theology and its necessity. It thus would appear that the familiar exclamation of naïve or realist thinking that God “could have acted differently” is objectively impious, goodness and indeed freedom being more surely based in or, more especially, *as* necessity, with “no shadow of turning”. God did not “repent himself” but then neither did he specifically “send” the Flood, for example. It, along with such sending, is absorbed, sublated, as moment in or of the whole. Here too, as in that later “betrayal”, “is the son of man glorified”, man, again, being a, or, as always, *the* divine moment. So God indeed wills himself to be and that freely, so that this his self-constitutive act, *is* being, his being is freedom. It is his being, in its necessity, that is chosen or willed, while if it were not there would be no will or being thus not to will. The necessity, that is, is entirely immanent to what we call necessary being.

So there has to be analogy between mind, spirit, and God, who thus *is* spirit. Univocity is itself mere phenomenon, therefore. “Turn but a stone and you touch a wing” and not just a butterfly’s, though an absolute unity, beyond the very possibility of event, is finally implied, nullifying the show of “groaning and travailing”. This is the rational seal of peace upon every conflict, as upon conflict as such.

As pointed out earlier on, however, in the analogy of God and the world, of which the analogy between finite beings is itself an analogy – i.e. analogy is itself an analogous concept - , the primary analogate is, as the whole potential, the one which simply *is* without qualification. It is, as the prime *matter* (speaking now of God as *analogandum*), pure potentiality or potency indifferently, and, *as such*, necessary, a being that is only such by analogy with our normal or unthinking usage. That is, we speak of the *absolute* in negative analogy with Being taken normally, so to say. Analogy is the web of discourse, of thought even, itself. This, anyhow, is the analogy *of* being as this is analogous to the analogy *between* beings, in their very capacity as beings. In the primal analogy between Being and Nothing, consequently, neither is *prime* analogate as enabling the other. Negative theology is thus

wholly and unmixedly positive. This is what *underpins* Aquinas's dictum, which may be taken equally as about knowledge itself, as Hegel will expound it, that "we know most about God when we know that we know nothing about him", about the cause in as identical in absolute difference with and from the effect as a whole even. "This *also* is thou, neither is this thou". This is what Hegel further develops in his final *Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God*, which are *equally* in their subject/matter about the nature of the contingent.

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Subject and predicate both refer to, intend, the identical *suppositum*. This, however, insofar as they are "bits of language", is only possible by way of the *idea* (cf. J. Deely: "How Language Refers", in *Studi Internazionali di Filosofia*, 1972). That is to say, the idea, the thought, *is* the *suppositum*, is what they stand for. Words name ideas, concepts. This only implies a so-called three-level semantics if empiricist realism has been assumed. It is not only words that are pictures in general, however. Rather, this category also includes any significant phrase, such as "things in themselves". This is a picture, as of course is "picture", the word, itself, taken in fact from painting originally (Latin: *pingo, pictum*). So when we explain our world's constitutive freezing of the finite moments (and "freeze" of course is yet another picture) by language, "verbalisation", we are linguistically explaining language itself or explaining linguistic explanation. The concept of explanation, therefore, is not that of final or absolute knowledge, which, very properly, Hegel does not therefore properly explain. He rather shows, as he elsewhere states, that we must go beyond the mirage that is explanation, where one set of terms is simply substituted for another without addressing at all the problem of reference, which we are saying here are equally those of meaning, i.e. the terms both mean and refer to the same reality. So "this dog", subject, and "a dog" predicate, both refer to or stand for the same *whole*. By the same reasoning they both ultimately name or *think* the Concept as it results from speculative logic in Hegel's system of the same. There is no *individuum vagum*. Thus if I say "a dog" simply then nothing is thereby asserted or even merely proposed, while "Dog!" without the article, spoken by a child, is likely to be a disguised if indefinite statement, assertion or command.

This gives to subject and predicate an analogical function *with regard to each other*. They both refer but after their respective manner. This corrective to Fregean dualism only goes halfway, however, as Hegel shows. The judgment in fact, as reversible, destroys equally both of its terms. Language

as such does indeed “bewitch intelligence”, in Wittgenstein’s phrase. Thus God and being, Hegel’s example, must be thought *at once*, as one, neither delimiting the other. Or, if you can say God *is* anything then you can no longer talk of God. The same, however, applies to being. If being is anything other than itself, for example if it is nothing, then being is not being. This leads to the situation Hegel calls Becoming, here not at all implying, however, that anything ever becomes. If that were meant then we would not have the correct, so to say transcendent category here. For Hegel, in the last analysis, only the Idea itself becomes, and that constitutively. Failure to see this led Hans Kueng absurdly to suggest that “historical”, like “being” (or “is”), “one”, “true” and “good”, but as part of his interpretation of Hegel, was a “transcendental predicate” in the Thomist or associated sense (see his *The Incarnation of God*, London 1970), Logical becoming is not historical, history, like time, having no place in the logic. The “Bacchanalian whirl” (of concepts or even as such), that is, is a superior form of standing still, hence a “whirl”. This, one may note, is perhaps the first insight needed for a worthy philosophy of the dance, as for music itself, miscalled “music of time” as if there were some other music. Music, rather, is time de-figured. As such it is absorbed into or fulfilled in thought, contemplation, as thought thinking itself in that necessity where nothing, least of all the contingent, is omitted. I am thinking of course of the music often miscalled “abstract”. As art it is absolute, rather, but as always attaining the universal in individual form.

So the analogy here is between subject and predicate as referring instruments and not, therefore, between *supposita* as referred by these, since of these there is just one finally, namely the Idea (or concept, originally, in his *On Interpretation*, Aristotle’s first and hence prime act of the understanding) or equivalently (as Hegel finally concludes to it as *der sich begreifende Begriff*) Being, Greek *to on*, as analogy itself, as between good and evil, positive and negative, or, this is the point, any two elements whatever, for the simple reason that duality itself is sublated. Being, that is, is not said “in many ways” (Aristotle) merely, but in every possible way. “Why do you call me good? There is none good but God”. The Scripture here supports Hegel’s stance. In so far as we condescend to speech, however, he adds, we must strenuously deny such identifications, of good and evil for example. Speech, as the aboriginal “letter”, is in fact false and kills. “Things”, as spiritual (this is both conclusion and presupposition to philosophy), are only comprehensible spiritually, *geistlich*.

The analogy then lies in a qualified identity of reference, such as is even carried over into actual identity statements such as “Cicero is Cicero”, inasmuch as this might be intending anything, or as when we say “God is

God". It is from this identity, in fact, that this analogy of conceptual subject and predicate is deduced, every judgment thus being of the form "A is A". The second A, as in "A is B(A)", is a mere picture of the first form, of the truth. In other words, "A is B", the expression, is analogous to "A is A", whatever we might want to "mean" thereby and the whole situation is thus analogous to Hegel's treatment of the one-word utterance "I" at *Enc.* 20. This situation is generalised in the universal or popular commendation of the supposedly self-destroying judgment (which actually destroys the world, rather), universally applicable, viz. "This also is thou, neither is this thou". The meaning, as Hegel says, is that all judgments are false; they kill, as does the science of anatomy absolutely taken. As McTaggart put it, we make no judgments "in heaven" or where all is *perceived*, rather. Berkeley had said that *esse* IS *percipi* (in exquisite speculative self-contradiction, whatever limitation Hegel may have found in his thought generally).

So it is not that analogy bridges a chasm but that there is no chasm, but rather a sameness of form, *as in knower and known*. Knowing, we may therefore say, initially establishes being, a statement holding just as much as the converse, since they are (this is the only explanation) actually the same. Being then is self-knowing, the Idea. The analogy between Subject and Predicate, then, is the overcoming of their difference before, logically before, any judgment is made. Thus, as it were anteriorly, "all things are a judgment" just as, Hegel will also say, "Everything is a syllogism". Our logic simply retraces this in abstract detail but with a view to putting it together again. We live in between the beginning and the end, which are, however, the same, which means that our living, life, is "only the Idea immediate", i.e. is not the Idea, being "but a melon" or "but a melancholy flower" indifferently, as the popular round suggests. It must "cessate", therefore, with death, Hegel notes. This is the same as to say it must cease continually, as in reality, this ceasing, the daily dying of Scripture, is "the entry into spirit" (i.e. mind) where we anyhow *are* "all the time", as we revealingly say. Whenever we think we take distance from life immediate. This too is why Hegel dismisses the posited objects of sense-perception, from which "we" nonetheless have to start, as possible object of knowledge (*Phenomenology of Mind*, "Introduction" and first sections of the main text).

Thus the judgment, any judgment, identifies not Subject and Predicate as such, again, but what both "stand for", though differently, *quasi* materially or *quasi* formally respectively, as one account, we have noted, has it, at the same time as it states that "only wholes are predicated of wholes" (Aquinas: *On Being and Essence*; cf. Henry Veatch: "St. Thomas's Doctrine of Subject and Predicate" in *St. Thomas Aquinas (1274-1974), Commemorative Studies*, Vol. II, Toronto 1974). This so to say independently existing pre-confirmation