The Pragmatics of Cogent Argumentation in British and American Political Debates

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FOREWORD

In this analytical work, the author pragmatically tackles the communicative interactional process of cogent argumentation in British prime ministerial and American presidential political debates.

The book considers and evaluates prime ministerial and presidential political debates with regard to pragma (logical, dialectical, and rhetorical) means that constitute the components of cogent arguments within the process of cogent argumentation. These means are achieved through pragma logical (data, warrant, claim, backing, rebuttal, and qualifier), pragma dialectical (speech acts), pragma rhetorical (argumentative appeals, politeness, and figures of speech) strategies. Cogent argumentation is a process that involves two candidates exchanging cogent arguments where it ends with one candidate's arguments more cogent than the other one.

The study examines the pragmatic criteria that are met when the above pragmatic strategies are used in arguments in the context of argumentation. Thus, they render one's arguments more cogent than another's. Attention has been given to a qualitative analysis as well as a quantitative one.

It is noticed that Cameron and Obama's arguments are more cogent than their opponents' in the process of argumentation. They have employed pragma (logical, dialectical, and rhetorical) strategies. Besides, it has been observed that these pragmatic strategies have met pragma (logical, dialectical, and rhetorical) criteria. The employment of these pragmatic strategies and the presence of the pragmatic criteria render their arguments more cogent in the process of argumentation than their opponents. Accordingly, the whole process, i.e. argumentation is more cogent to their benefit.

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INTRODUCTION

The book has chosen the language of British prime ministerial (as the governmental system in Britain is royal) and American presidential (as the governmental system in America is presidential) political debates due to its importance and strength. Such debates provide voters with information about the candidates ability to tackle issues that are important to people.

The corpus involves two prime ministerial (see Web Sources II and III; see Appendix I for the analysis of the remaining situations) and two presidential (see Web Sources IV and V; see Appendix II for the analysis of the remaining situations) political debates. The former context involves three candidates (Cameron, Brown, and Clegg) and the latter includes two candidates (Obama and Romney)¹.

To begin with, argumentation is an aspect of real life communicative situations. It is an influential phenomenon that is involved in nearly all fields of human life.

In political debate encounters, candidates engage in presenting their arguments to each other. The difference is not measured in terms of power or title but in terms of one's arguments as parts in a larger context that is argumentation. Put another way, one participant tries to provide an effective way of resolving the disharmony which is caused by dissimilitude with his opponent. It is stated that arguments are considered as fundamental in a process of argumentation; their purpose is to alter the

¹ The equality of candidates' number does not play a significant role, here, because each cogent argumentative situation is held between two candidates only. Besides, it is not a debilitating issue since: the time allocated to the three candidates in the British context is the same to the time allocated for the two candidates in the American one; what concerns this study is whose arguments are more cogent in each context separately; and what is compared between the two contexts is whether or not debaters' arguments, in both contexts, are characterized by the presence of the same pragmatic criteria and whether or not proponents resort to the same cogent pragmatic strategies to render their arguments as cogent or more cogent than their opponents in the context of argumentation, in both contexts as well. Thus, the comparison of these two contexts is possible and not deluding.

audience through reinforcing one's beliefs, attitudes, intentions, values, feelings or behaviours (Hample 2013: 370).

Political debates have a considerable impact on our life. They could change policy. They make people choose their powerful leader. Abraham Lincoln says "our government rests in public opinion. Whoever can change public opinion can change the government (Zarefsky 2014: 114)." Moreover, Andra Gillespie, a political scientist at Emory University, says "how people perform in debates is important because they can influence elites' behaviour" (Joseph 2015: 1). As such, the process of choosing a president or a prime minster is important to the US, UK, and the world. To persuade and convince voters, it is not that candidates in such political debates dodge and parry but it is that candidates must argue cogently and it is the one who argues cogently wins. They wisely marshal their arguments and facts and then send them into battle. However, this does not mean that they attempt to convince naïve audience. In this context, they take advantage of every possible strategy that helps them achieve their intended goal.

Most researchers argue that something is missing concerning the cogency of argument in the context of argumentation. For example, it is proposed that cogent arguments are sealed inside the walls of argumentation where participants argue cogently and rely on nothing but the force of better arguments. Arguments, Berrill (1996: 77) posits, are not used to ignore, avoid, or disguise difference in belief and opinion. They are "intended to set out a cogent case" for or against "beliefs, to bring the audience around to those beliefs, and thereby- by virtue of cogent argumentation- to eliminate the disagreement (ibid.)." Responding to disagreement through the use of reasons and evidence, among other things, is regarded as a reasonable change of mind.

Consequently, this book aims at identifying the pragmatic criteria which decide that argument in the British prime ministerial and American presidential political debates is cogent, highlighting the pragmatic structure of cogent argumentation where arguments are exchanged in the context of these political debates, and divulging the cogent pragma-logical kinds of reasoning used by candidates along the three stages² of cogent argumentation in the political debates under discussion. As such, the study explains the differences between candidates, concerning the aims discussed

 $^{^2}$ Cogent argumentation is a pragmatic process which involves three stages (see Figure 31).

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above, in each context (British or American) independently. Furthermore, it distinguishes the differences between British prime ministerial and American presidential political debates with respect to these aims.

The analysis of the data is based on an eclectic model that this study develops (see Figure 31). The eclectic model is based on the theoretical background surveyed, as well as, what I have reached based on observations.

The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter One introduces a theoretical background of what has been written on 'cogent argument' including definitions, types, structures, and functions and how this literature incorporates to reach an operational definition of 'cogent argumentation'. Chapter Two discusses the presence of cogent pragmatic criteria and the utilization of cogent pragmatic strategies in the prime ministerial and presidential political debates under investigation. Chapter Three develops an eclectic model of 'cogent argumentation' which is based on reviewing previous theoretical information, models, and observations made by this study. Chapter Four is concerned with the application of the model developed to the political debates under scrutiny. Chapter Five discusses findings, sums up conclusions, and introduces recommendations and implications for further research work.

CHAPTER ONE

COGENT ARGUMENTATION

A man who makes an assertion puts forward a claim – a claim on our attention and to our belief. ... a man who asserts something intends his statement to be taken seriously: and, if his statement is understood ... Just how seriously it will be taken depends, of course, on many circumstances. —Toulmin

1.1 A theoretical background

This chapter addresses itself to the task of endeavouring a detailed theoretical account of what has been written in relation to *cogent argument*. However, this study examines the arguments that cogently prevail in the context of argumentation. As such, the whole process, i.e. *argumentation* is more cogent to the one whose arguments are more cogent. The word 'argument' is dealt with as different from the word 'argumentation' in the sense that the former refers to a verbal act whereas the latter to a verbal activity. Accordingly, argumentation is understood, in this study, as an exchange of reasons in the context of disagreement where arguments wrap these reasons. As such, the chapter presently begins with introducing the term 'cogent argument' and ends with an operational definition of *cogent argumentation* where arguments are regarded as parts of a larger context, i.e. argumentation so as to go in line with the aims of this study and verify or reject its hypotheses (see P. 43).

1.2 Cogent argument as part of argumentation

With argumentation dealt with as a verbal activity, arguments (as a verbal act) are exchanged to reach a certain conclusion in front of the audience. Johnson (2000: 168) states that there is a need to differentiate between argument and argumentation and he revises a definition of argument as "the distillate of the practice of argumentation." At its most basic, most recent pragmatic theories place arguments in the context of argumentation

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with the aim of approaching argumentation as 'a mode of actions' (Goodwin and Innocenti cited in Mohammed and Lewinski 2016: 449).

As far as cogent³ arguments are concerned, according to a definition which is offered by *The American Heritage Dictionary* 1981 (cited in Rehg 2009: 297), they are those which are not easily resisted. Another definition is provided by Martinich (2016: 31) who demonstrates that a cogent argument is recognized to be so with respect to the presentation of its structure and content. As far as this study is concerned, cogent argument is dealt with as part of a larger context, i.e. argumentation where the three perspectives: pragma-logic, pragma-dialectics, and pragma-rhetoric are involved (see P. 43).

To begin with, only when an argument is logically valid, does its conclusion follow from its premises. For, arguments based on logical sequences play a role in convincing the audience by means of leading them to certain inferences. Then, dialectic focuses on procedures regulating discussion through a comprehensive exchange of arguments and counter arguments. This provides norms which if are followed, they will produce cogent argument leading to reasonable conclusions. However, as arguments represent ways of communicating in relation to other moves in the context of argumentation, rhetoric embroiders argumentation, powered by persuasiveness through the adaptation of skillful language to a given audience.

Traditionally, Aristotle provides a relevant and an updated systematization of the ideas on argumentation in the Western world. He focuses on persuasion, i.e. winning over the audience to a certain view and tries to persuade them to change their minds about some issues (Lawrie 2006: 16). His achievement is logically, dialectically, and rhetorically interpreted, in argumentation, in terms of the definition of deduction which is an inference where premises lead to a conclusion. Syllogism correlates with enthymeme as particular deductive forms of reasoning [schemes] (see Freeley and Steinberg 2014: 51). For Aristotle, then, dialectic implies resources and rules for verifying claims through a contentious argumentative discussion where the questioner brings the answerer to a contradiction, thus showing his position to be unsustainable. Finally, rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic. It aims at persuading the audience by adjusting all the available means of persuasion they can marshal to the occasion at

³ Argumentative theorists tend to use the term 'cogency' as a broad synonym for argument strength and/or persuasiveness (Rehg 2009: 7).

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hand. Hence, there are three basic means of persuasion present: ethos, pathos, and logos (see 3.2.2.4.3.2 below). One crucial means of persuasion via logos is the enthymeme, a rhetorical version of the syllogism where one of the premises is implicit and left to be filled by the audience. However, though enthymeme is introduced by Aristotle, he provides little or no explanation for it.

Toulmin (2003[1958]), on his part, as a prominent voice, convoys the domination of formal logic⁴. He provides as elements of arguments: data, warrant, backing, qualifier, rebuttal, and claim (see 1.2.1.1.2). Logic, the author (2003: 8) reveals, "lost touch with its application." He makes known a layout of argument which introduces different elements recruited in the course of an argument and its functions. Put in other words, different steps constitute arguing in defense of a claim. Toulmin's (ibid.) model of argument, though is reprehended on a number of accounts, remains influential on account of the fact that it has contributed insights instrumental in developing the field of informal logic.

Other voices that accompany formal logic begin to accumulate, not necessarily to defeat, but to fill the gaps and thus collide with new complementary disciplines, informal logic among others, to give emphasis to a discipline at the expense of another, transferring the domination of one to another, or to disable one over another. In contrast to too much research works within communication, argumentation theory combines a descriptive study of how we argue with normative inquiry as standards of good argumentation. In this sense, it has a long interdisciplinary tradition that starts with ancient rhetoric, dialectic, and logic and continues today. However, they have not been brought together. The three perspectives need to be integrated into one comprehensive theory.

According to Brown and Yule (1983: 33), to arrive at an interpretation for utterances or for the connection between utterances, when accessing a speakers' intended meaning, one has to rely on the process of inference. To them (ibid.), inferences make one be capable of deriving a specific conclusion depending on specific premises whether deductively, inductively, and so on. As such, an inference is a pragmatic concept simply since it is closely tied to the context and a speaker's intended meaning (Brown and Yule 1983: 35). Walton (1989: 6), on his part,

⁴ Formal-informal distinction of arguments refers to those effects which are so not due to their structural appearance (e.g. syntax) but due to the content (e.g. tropes) (Al-Juwaid and Deygan 2016: 40).

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presents inferences as rules or obligations of persuasion in a critical discussion framework. In other words, although a participant in a discussion wants to prove his claim, he has to present it in a cooperative way.

Lewinski and Mohammed (2016: 83), on their part, reach the consensus that arguments are conveyed through "informal schemes of inference" rhetorically in a rational way controlled by dialectical critical standards.

To mirror that, when one contemplates on Figure 1 below,

Schemes and structure of inferences \longrightarrow originating in logic Shape and role of argumentative discussions \longrightarrow originating in dialectic Contexts of arguments \longrightarrow originating in rhetoric

Figure 1: A Comprehensive Theory of Logic, Dialectics, and Rhetoric

he finds that logic can be portrayed as the product (argument) that is part of the process (argumentation). As such, it voices something central, indispensable in the context of presidential debates⁵. It is so on the principal ground that a necessary condition of acceptability of a standpoint is that the argument underlying the justification be reconstructible is logically valid argument where the audience are given the opportunity to evaluate and judge the performance of candidates' arguments in terms of the structure of inferences and reasoning included.

Earlier, Walton (1989: 1-3) offers a promising endeavor where he differentiates classical logic from logical pragmatics. The difference between classical logic and logical pragmatics is presented in Table 1 below:

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⁵ Presidential debates represent a context where those desiring to be leaders stand before the public and argue why they should be granted one of the greatest expressions of power that is having their citizens' votes (Trent et al. 2016).

	Classical Logic		Logical Pragmatics
1.	It emphasizes semantic relationships between sets of propositions.	1.	1. It has to do with the use of those propositions by an arguer to carry out a goal. In reasoning with a second participant in the dialogue
2.	It is just a set of propositions, nothing more or less. All that matters is the truth or		one common goal is to convince or persuade another arguer.
	falsehood of those propositions. The wider context is not taken into account.	2.	An argument, here, is a claim that according to appropriate procedures of reasonableness, should be relevant to providing or establishing the arguer's
3.	It is concerned with propositions that make up an argument.	3.	conclusion at issue. It is concerned with the reasoned
4.	It is, and as its words imply, concerned with a theory. No reference is made to context, or to any practical issues. All what matters is a set of propositions.		use of those propositions in dialogue to carry out a goal, for example, to build or refute a case to support one's side of a contentious issue in a context of a dialogue.
5.	It may be referred to formal logic.	4.	It is a practical discipline, an applied art that is concerned with what is done with those propositions and what use is made of them.
		5.	It may be referred to informal logic.

Table 1: Differences between Classical Logic and Logical Pragmatics

According to Table 1 above, Walton (ibid.) states that logical pragmatics has a role in deciding which side presents the better argument in a context of a debate. Put in other words, its role lies in clearing up or clarifying what the argument is (ibid.: 3).

It is worth mentioning that logical pragmatics has been dealt with in terms of other almost similar terminologies such as, as Walton (1995: 6) calls it,

dialogue logic and, as Benthem (2009: 22) calls it, logical dynamics. I argue that it is promising to merge, say, logical dynamics into concrete models of a larger context, i.e. argumentation. Similarly, Ribeiro (2012: 10) has given a contributory role to 'dialogical logic' in analyzing and evaluating arguments within the context of argumentation as real-life argumentative practice.

Finally, it is very important to refer to what Wenzel 1980 (cited in Eemeren et al. 1986: 102) has stated that though each perspective (logic, dialectics, or rhetoric) yields its own unique mode of understanding, one needs to bring the three perspectives together towards constituting a full theory of *cogent* argumentation (Italics mine). Johnson (1987: 155) highlights that, in a wider context, i.e. argumentation, to lodge against [one's] position, a dialectical tier must be addressed in addition to an illative core. Freeman (1991: 22), on his part, posits that arguments- as developing through a challenger/ response exchange- incorporate to the cogency of arguments and as such the whole process of argumentation. Johnson (cited in Freeman 2003: 1) posits that the cogency of an argument is understood when dealt with as a product of a dialectical procedure where a proponent puts forward a claim supported by reasoning and this claim is challenged by an opponent. How well an arguer reasons concerning alternative positions and objections constitutes part of the evaluative criteria for arguments in argumentation. Rehg (2009: 7) states that cogency, based on what has been surveyed by Eemeren et al. (1996). is a broad term which covers: logic, dialectics, and rhetoric. Eemeren (2015: 680) argues that it is better and indispensable to maintain the three perspectives: logic, dialectics, and rhetoric to bring forth a full-fledged argumentation theory. Similarly, Lewinski and Mohammed (2016: 83) and Boardman et al. (2018: 7-8) ensure that there is a need to combine the three perspectives if one wants to constitute a successful argument.

The present study uses 'pragma-logic' as an alternative term to 'logical pragmatics'. Besides, it makes use of pragma-dialectics as well as pragma-rhetoric. The three perspectives are brought together as a full-fledged cogent argumentation approach.

The following sections are devoted to tracing back literature on what has been theorized about cogent arguments so as to approach an operational definition for *cogent argumentation* and pave the way to the practical part of this study. Formal, informal, and modern approaches in relation to arguments cogency are introduced, and put within the context of cogent argumentation, presently in the next sections of this chapter.

1.2.1 Cogent arguments: types, structures and functions

Cogent arguments are dealt with as part of the process of argumentation in this study. Consequently, the following sections and subsections deal with types, structures and functions of cogent arguments as they are presented by theorists with some modifications and additions made by the researcher wherever necessary so as to accord with the aims and hypotheses of this study.

How arguments are constructed helps arguers conceive their audience by virtue of leading them to reach certain inferences. Accordingly, it is important to streamline kinds of reasoning which is the endeavor of the next section.

1.2.1.1 Types and structures of cogent arguments

Since the time of Aristotle, logicians, dialecticians, and rhetoricians, among others, have devoted their time and exerted their efforts to find out what signifies the goodness of arguments. Different types and structures have emerged. They are discussed chronologically below.

1.2.1.1.1 Cogent logical structure of arguments

Logic has been regarded as a normative tool guarantying the goodness of arguments⁶ depending on simple rules. It is how one reasons correctly. A conclusion is true if it follows from true premises. As such, logic, here, is valid because it is prescriptive rather than descriptive. However, though such types of reasoning seem to be as simple, they are not. The following sub-sections are devoted to shed light on kinds of reasoning that are indispensable with reference to the data under scrutiny.

1. Deductive reasoning

Cogent arguments first include only logically valid deductions, those that preserve the truth (Rehg 2009: 7). The words 'soundness', 'validity', 'cogency', and 'strength', are exploited interchangeably (see Toulmin 2003; Eemeren et al. 2014: 205).

According to Freeley and Steinberg (2014: 174-5), deductive reasoning is considered as the first degree on a continuum of cogency followed by

⁶ An argument here is regarded as composed of a series of premises and one following or preceding conclusion (see Smith 2003: 1; among many others).

inductive (which establishes a lesser degree of cogency) and other kinds of reasoning (see Figure 5 below).

The deductive scheme⁷ can be represented in Figure 2 below:



Figure 2: Cogent Valid Deductive Arguments

To fly in the face of a palpable case of such scheme, in the following example,

1. Premise 1: Oranges are either fruits or musical instruments.

Premise 2: Oranges are not fruits.

Conclusion: Oranges are musical instruments. (Magnus 2014: 8),

one notices that to structure a deductive argument, it is impossible that true premises lead to false conclusion (Hurley 2000: 33). Though the conclusion, here, follows in a valid way from the premises, it is questionable. Accordingly, this argument certainly makes one understand what cogent valid deductive arguments are.

Traditionally, Shaw (1922: 75) states that deduction is an argument which houses a general truth and a particular one. To illustrate, he provides the following example,

2. Socrates was mortal; for

A. All men are mortal; and

- B. Socrates was a man (Shaw, ibid.).

Here, in this example, the argument proceeds a general truth that *all men are mortal* (a general premise) to a particular truth that *Socrates was a*

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⁷ This scheme represents the first degree in the cogency continuum (see Figure 5 below).

man (a particular premise) to reach the conclusion that Socrates was mortal.

According to Shaw (ibid.: 76), deductive reasoning is classified into formal (syllogistic) where all its elements are present (its premises and its conclusion) and informal (enthymemic) where not all of its elements (its premises) are present.

According to Eemeren and Henkemans (2017: 83), valid reasoning (deductive reasoning) is not enough, thus kinds of other schemes, which are presented in the next sections, are more informative than 'If...then...' logical argument forms known as *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* as explained below:

modus ponens:

If P then Q
P
Then Q

For example,

3. If someone is smoking then he/she is doing something wrong

- Ula is smoking (there is P)

- Therefore, she is doing something wrong (then there is Q).

Or modus tollens:

- If P then Q
- Not X
- Then not Q

For example,

4. If someone is smoking then he/she is doing something wrong

- Ula is not doing something wrong (there is no Q)

- Therefore, she is not smoking (there is no P).

The following kinds of reasoning go a step further in explaining, by means of schemes, how the reason advanced and the standpoint being defended are linked together in a specific way (Eemeren and Henkemans 2017: 83).

2. Inductive reasoning

Another scheme⁸ is represented by induction where the conclusion probably follows from the premises (Rehg 2009: 7). Rehg (ibid.) expounds that being related to persuasiveness, cogent arguments are not only deductively valid but also inductively they are with sufficient probability to persuade. Here, the strength of cogency in such arguments is dependent on generalization. Figure 3 below illustrates such a kind of cogent arguments:



Figure 3: Cogent Strong Inductive Arguments

Trading on the possibility of such scheme, consider the following example,

5. **Premise 1:** In January 1997, it rained in San Diego.

Premise 2: In January 1998, it rained in San Diego.

Premise 3: In January 1999, it rained in San Diego.

Conclusion: It rains every January in San Diego (Magnus 2014: 9),

⁸ This kind of scheme represents the second type on the cogency continuum (see Figure 5 below). This suggests that arguments can be strongly cogent in relation to counter arguments according to the kind of reasoning used, as Rehg (2009: 7) states.

where it is enough to say that the conclusion depends on generalization. Thus, it is probably cogent. Or to put it in another way, it is improbable that the conclusion is false and the premises are true (Hurley 2000: 33).

With reference to deductive and inductive arguments, a cogent argument is the one which deserves to convince us of its conclusion. If one maintains that cogent arguments can be "deductively valid or inductively strong, one has to determine which standard to use in appraising an argument (Hitchcock 2017: 19)." However, Hitchcock (ibid.) argues six lines later that such a view is too rigid and narrow. In practice, this means that we should fill out elliptical arguments with premises which stand the chance of being justified and which make the argument deductively valid or inductively strong. Such an approach, which impoverishes or augments cogency, depends on interpretation.

3. Disjunctive reasoning

This scheme derives its name from the fact that one of its premises comprises a disjunctive proposition. Walton (2008: 306-9) explicates that this kind of reasoning can be schematized as below:

- Either A or B
- Not A
- Then B.

For example,

6. We have a choice between giving in to student demand and teaching what students want, or standing firm and teaching what needs to be taught.

- Giving in to students' demand and teaching what students want is not an acceptable course of action.

- Therefore, we should stand firm and teach what needs to be taught (ibid.: 308).

4. Causal reasoning

A connection is made causally between the claim and the standpoints according to this kind of reasoning (Eemeren and Henkemans 2017: 87).

This kind of reasoning can be portrayed as below:

- Y is true of X,
- Because Z is true of X,
- And Z leads to Y (ibid.: 88).

Consider the following example,

- 7. Ronald's headache will go away now
- He just took two aspirins
- Aspirins make headaches go away (ibid.: 83).

Causal reasoning is signaled by any of the following expressions: 'because', 'has the inevitable result that', 'leads to', 'you always', 'can't help but make you' (Eemeren and Henkemans 2017: 90). It is also characterized by the following words: 'then', 'otherwise', 'because of that', 'that leads to'. There are also other clues that denote this kind of reasoning: 'create', 'make', 'arise from', 'catch', etc. (ibid.: 91).

5. Symptomatic reasoning

According to Eemeren and Henkemans (ibid.: 85), symptomatic reasoning is to cite in the argument that a certain standpoint is a characteristic (a sign or a distinguishable mark) of the claim.

This kind of reasoning can be characterized as follows:

- Y is true of X
- Because Z is true of X
- And Z symptomatic of Y (ibid.).

For example,

- 8. Herman is a real man
- Herman is strong
- Being strong is characteristic of real man (ibid. 2017: 83).

The following expressions are signs of symptomatic reasoning: 'typical of', 'natural for', 'Z is Y', 'the way Y is the way Z' (ibid.: 89). The following words also refer to such kind: 'real', 'born', 'typical', 'a prime example of' when qualify nouns as predicate, e.g.

9. This is not a *real* report, because it doesn't even have a bibliography (ibid.: 90).

6. Reasoning from analogy

According to Eemeren and Henkemans (2017: 86), this kind of reasoning can be presented in the form of the following:

- Y is true of X,
- Because Y is true of Z,
- And Z is comparable to X.

For example,

10. A Lottery for entrance to the university is absurd

- A lottery is not used to determine who gets to participate in the Olympic Games either

- At universities the same standards apply as in sports (ibid.: 83).

Analogy may occur in a figurative way to be more effective. Traditionally, Shaw (1922: 95) divides this kind of reasoning into two kinds: literal and figurative. To illustrate the distinction, consider the following two examples:

11. Emperor William's plan of world-conquest was doomed to failure; because

- A. Napoleon failed in a similar undertaking.

This is an example of literal analogy.

12. You shouldn't change generals in the middle of a campaign; because

- You shouldn't swap horses in the middle of a steam (ibid.: 96).

This is an example of figurative analogy (for further examples, see *Persuasion through Striking Analogies* ibid.: 299-303).

Analogy can be signaled by the following expressions: 'like', 'comparable', 'similar', 'correspond', 'related to reminiscent' (Eemeren and Henkemans 2017: 90). The following words can also refer to such kind of reasoning: 'also', 'either', 'the same', 'just like' (ibid.: 91).

7. Conductive (or explanatory) reasoning

Another scheme represents a way where the connection between the premises and the claim is in terms of the former separately giving support for and/or against the latter. Consequently, a decision is arrived at through more than one separate reason. Traditionally, Shaw (1922: 91) refers to two kinds of reasoning: perfect and imperfect where the former enumerates all possible instances, only partial instances does the latter number.

According to Govier (2014: 90), this kind of reasoning occurs when separately relevant conditions support a conclusion convergently. Such reasoning is cogent in the sense that if one condition is countered, the other conditions are still effective (ibid.).

The reasons that are used to support a certain claim are separate. For example, consider the following:

- 13. She never takes her eyes off him in a crowd,
- She is continually restless when he is out of town
- At any opportunity, she will introduce his name in a conversation