

The Theory of Phenomenological Structuralism

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By

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*Paul Camy Mocombe,
January 27, 2019*

INTRODUCTION

This work explores phenomenological structuralism as an essay in the phenomenological traditions of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean-Paul Sartre; Haitian epistemology; and structurationist sociology to resolve the structure/agency problematic of the social sciences. Through the synthesis of Haitian metaphysical ontology and epistemology (Haitian/Vilokan idealism), structuration theory, phenomenology, Althusserian structural-Marxism, quantum mechanics, ORCH-OR theory, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of language games, Paul C. Mocombe offers an alternative reading of the structure/agency problematic of the social sciences, which holds on to the notions of structure, duality, dualism, and the individual's rational ability to choose to account for the constitution of individual human consciousness and society in and as the material resource framework of the earth. The work goes on to highlight the theoretical and methodological tenets, which constitute Mocombe's theory of phenomenological structuralism.

In the academic literature, consciousness refers to subjective awareness of phenomenal experiences (ideology, language, self, feelings, choice, control of voluntary behavior, thoughts, etc.) of internal and external worlds. The academic literature "describes three possibilities regarding the origin and place of consciousness in the universe: (A) as an emergent property of complex brain neuronal computation, (B) as spiritual quality of the universe, distinct from purely physical actions, and (C) as composed of discrete 'proto-conscious' events acting in accordance with physical laws not yet fully understood" (Hameroff and Penrose, 2014, pg. 70). The latter position, (C), represents the ORCH-OR ("orchestrated objective reduction") theory of Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (2014), which includes aspects of (A) and (B), and posits that "consciousness consists of discrete moments, each an 'orchestrated' quantum-computational process terminated by... an action [,objective reduction or OR,] rooted in quantum aspects of the fine structure of space—time geometry, this being coupled to brain neuronal processes via microtubules" (pg. 70). In this view, the understanding is that a proto-conscious experience existed in the universe, and as a result of emergent structures of the brain it (proto-conscious experience) became embodied and evolved as a result of quantum neuronal computations of "brains."

Paul C. Mocombe's (2016, 2017, 2018) structurationist sociology, phenomenological structuralism, which attempts to resolve the structure/agency problematic of the social sciences, builds on the ORCH-OR theory of Hameroff and Penrose, while abductively holding on to the multiverse hypothesis of quantum mechanics and Haitian ontology/epistemology, which the authors reject because it is not "a more down-to-earth viewpoint" (Hameroff and Penrose, 2014, pg. 51). For Mocombe (2016, 2018), quantum superposition, entanglement, and evidence in Haitian Vodou of spirit possession, which represent ancestors from a parallel world, Vilokan, of the earth's of which we ought to pattern our behaviors and structures, are grounding proofs for the abductive acceptance of the multiple worlds hypothesis of quantum mechanics. Within the latter hypothesis, the understanding is that "each possibility in a superposition evolves to form its own universe, resulting in an infinite multitude of coexisting 'parallel' worlds. The stream of consciousness of the observer is supposed somehow to 'split', so that there is one in each of the worlds—at least in those worlds for which the observer remains alive and conscious. Each instance of the observer's consciousness experiences a separate independent world, and is not directly aware of any of the other worlds" (Hameroff and Penrose, 2014, pg. 50). It is within this multiple worlds hypothesis as synthesized with M-theory that Mocombe, abductively, constructs the nature and origins of consciousness in the universe according to his theory of phenomenological structuralism. For Mocombe, consciousness is a fifth force of nature, a quantum material substance/energy, psychion, the phenomenal property of which is recycled/entangled/superimposed throughout the multiverse and becomes embodied via the microtubules of brains existing in interconnecting material resource frameworks of multiverses. In other words, consciousness is manifested in simultaneous, entangled, superimposed, and interconnecting material resource frameworks as embodied praxis or practical consciousness tied to social relations of production, the content of which in-turn becomes the phenomenal properties of material (subatomic particle energy, psychion) consciousness that is recycled/entangled/superimposed throughout the multiverses. It is within this theoretical language of consciousness constitution that Mocombe attempts, through his theory of phenomenological structuralism, to resolve the structural-agency problematic of the social sciences

Background of the Problem

The structural-functional and structural Marxist turn in the mid-to-late 1960s and early 70s in explaining ethnic/racial identity or for that matter identity in general, privileged socially constructed relations within and via language and symbolic representation, as opposed to biology (i.e., race, genetics, structure of the mind, etc.), as the determining factor in identity or consciousness formation. This move, however, encountered a peculiar problem: to what extent should identity or consciousness formation be attributed to internal (individual subjective responses), as opposed to external and expressed processes (the social relations)? In other words, as Teresa Brennan (1997) so eloquently phrases the problem, “[f]or if everything is socially constructed, how do novel ideas emerge? How does originality, or genius in the extreme case, come into being?” (Brennan, 1997, pg. 89). She continues, “this problem is equivalent to the old conundrum of [(structural)] functionalism. How do we know, do or write anything at odds with a received view? How do we explain those moments, or movements, which escape from the compound of socially constructed identifications?” (Brennan, 1997, pg. 89). Paul C. Mocombe’s (2016, 2017, 2018) theory of Phenomenological structuralism attempts to resolve these three dilemmas through a phenomenological ontology of identity, consciousness, and societal constitution and development, which accounts for individual agency or social action in the world and structures of signification amidst structural reproduction and differentiation.

Within the theory and methodology of phenomenological structuralism, I argue that the “moments, or movements, which escape from the compound of socially constructed identifications” are the product of an individual actors’ (mental) stance/analytics (Heidegger’s term) vis-à-vis three types of structures of signification amidst societal structural reproduction and differentiation, 1) the (chemical, biological, and physiological) drives (forms of sensibility and understanding) of the body and brain, 2) impulses or phenomenal properties of residual past/present/future consciousnesses or recycled/entangled/superimposed subatomic/chemical particles, psychion, encapsulated in the neuronal structures (microtubules) of the brain, 3) and actions resulting from the deferment of meaning in ego-centered linguistic and symbolic communicative discourse.

Generally speaking, consciousnesses, actions, learning, and development within my phenomenological structural ontology are the product of the embodiment of the phenomenal properties of recycled/entangled/superimposed subatomic neuronal energies/chemicals

of the multiverse, psychion, objectified in the space-time of entangled and superimposed multiverses via aggregated bodies and the brains. Once objectified and embodied the phenomenal properties of the neuronal energies/chemicals encounter the space-time of physical worlds via a transcendental subject of consciousnesses and the drives and sensibilities of the aggregated body and brain in reified structures of signification, language, ideology, ideological apparatuses, and communicative discourse defined and determined by other beings that control the resources (economics), and modes of distributing and consuming them, of the material world required for physical survival in space-time. The Heideggerian (mental) stances/analytcs, ready-to-hand, unready-to-hand, and present-at-hand, of the embodied transcendental ego vis-à-vis, 1) the sensibilities and (chemical, biological, and physiological) drives of the body and brain, 2) drives of embodied residual memories or phenomenal properties of past/present/future recycled/entangled/superimposed subatomic/chemical particles, 3) the actions produced via the body in relation to the indeterminacy/deferment of meaning of linguistic and symbolic signifiers as they appear to individuated consciousnesses in ego-centered communicative discourse, 4) and the dialectical and differentiating effects, i.e., structural reproduction and differentiation, of the structures of signification, social class language game, of those who control the economic materials (and their distribution, i.e., mode of production) of a world are the origins of praxis and or practical consciousnesses. All four types of actions, the drives and sensibilities of the body and brain, drives or phenomenal properties of embodied recycled/entangled/superimposed past/present/future consciousnesses, structural reproduction/differentiation stemming from the mode of production, and deferential actions arising from the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse via the present-at-hand stance/analytic, exist in the material world with the social class language game, i.e., the physical, mental, emotional, ideological, etc. 5) powers of those who control the material resource framework as the causative agent for individual behaviors. In other words, our (mental) stances in consciousness vis-à-vis the drives and sensibilities of the body and brain, (societal) structural reproduction and differentiation, drives of embodied past/present/future consciousnesses of recycled/entangled/superimposed subatomic/chemical particles, and deferential actions arising as a result of the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse determines the practical consciousness we want to recursively reorganize and reproduce in the material world. The power and power positions of those who control (via the mode of production, language, ideology,

ideological apparatuses, and communicative discourse) the resources (and their distribution, i.e., mode of production) of a material resource framework, and the threat it poses to the ontological security of an actor, in the end determines what actions and identities of consciousness are allowed to organize and reproduce in the material world without the individual actor/agent facing marginalization or death.

The Structure/Agency Debate

The linguistic turn in meaning and identity constitution, whether in linguistics or the social sciences, presupposes that meaning and the nature of human identity or consciousness are nothing more than the relationships which pertain within a given linguistic system, structure, culture, or social structure. Thus, such questions as those pertaining to matters of human agency, individual or shared interests, community, etc., have generally been ignored by so-called “structuralists” (Edgar and Sedgwick, 1999, pg. 383). This in turn makes most structural approaches synchronic; that is, most structuralists approach a phenomenon at a single moment in history, or as something existing outside history, which is unchanging.

It is well known that Ferdinand de Saussure in linguistics, to Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, and Talcott Parsons and Louis Althusser in sociology postulate this synchronic world ordered into an interconnected semiotic system. In Saussurean structuralism, which serves as the model for the social sciences, language “is viewed as a purely arbitrary system of signs in which *parole* or speech is subsidiary to *langue*, the formal dimension of language. *Parole* is the world’s messiness that the semiotic order [or formal dimension] shuns” (Obeyesekere, 1997, pg. 18), subjecting social actors to its binary rules that gives them their conceptual framework, rather than the other way around (Levi-Strauss, 1963; Marshall, 1998; Saussure, 1972 [1916]).

In anthropology, Lévi-Strauss extends this idea to culture, and culture too becomes a system of external signs, which reflect the structure or categories of the mind, exercised in social relations to order experience (Lévi-Strauss, 1963, pg. 279). Just the same, in sociology Talcott Parsons employs the notion of structure or system to refer to modern capitalist society as an “organic” whole or totality consisting of interrelated parts (i.e., structurally differentiated) that perform specific functions in relation to each other and contribute to the maintenance of the whole, i.e., structural functionalism (Parsons, 1951, pg. 5-6). The structural Marxism of Louis Althusser, and many others, replaces both Parsons’s conservative holism and Levi-Strauss’s mental categories by positions in modes of

production and relations to the means of production for the structure or system that governs meaning and gives social actors their conceptual framework and praxis (Althusser, 2001[1971]).

The logical consequence of the adoption of the Saussurean position by Lévi-Strauss, Parsons, and Althusser in philosophy and the social sciences, however, is the implication that human action, or consciousness, lies in the reproduction of the relational (binary rules for inclusion and exclusion) objective models of society as either structured by our minds, or the external interrelated structures of signification as internalized by social actors. Therefore, to understand human social agency, one only needs to understand either how the mind structures reality (transcendental idealism), or the differentiating (structural reproduction and differentiation) rules of a culture, social structure, or social system. Both positions, however, are problematic. In the psychologism of the former case, social structure reflecting the structure of the mind, social practice or action and its variability are inconceivable in that there is no analytical means to explain how the internal “binary” processes of the mind give rise to the external empirical phenomena of social structures, practices, and their variabilities. In the latter case, structure or social structure as a reflection of the internalization of external functional structures of signification, i.e., part/whole relationship, the possibility for, and the origins of, the variability of practices, which have ontological status in the world, amongst irreducibly situated subjects are inconceivable, as human subjects or social actors are only reproducing in their actions the relational meaning and representation of the external objective social world (society), without any alternative practices, deviations, or improvisations outside of the structural reproduction and differentiation of the social structure.

Moreover, since the 1960’s with the advent of postmodern and post-structural theories into the theoretical discourses of social science academics a new struggle regarding the origins and nature of identity and consciousness vis-à-vis the aforementioned problematics has dominated social science and philosophical theories. The issue centers on several factors raised by postmodern and post-structural thinkers in the likes of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Jacques Lacan against the structuralism of the sciences, 1) they question the validity regarding the Cartesian rational individual, which Foucault and Derrida deny in favor of their attempt to dissolve the subject altogether; 2) they question the interdependency of the constitution of a stable structure and a distinct subject with agency, in denying the latter they undermine the former; 3) they question the status of science; 4) finally, they question the possibility of the objectivity of any language of description or analysis. Although

these factors raised in the writings of Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault are theoretically legitimate and have posed tremendous problems for the social sciences and their constitution as a science based on the notion of a stable structure constituted by stable subjects with agency. These problems have not adequately been addressed by Marxist social theorists in the likes of Louis Althusser, Pierre Bourdieu, Jürgen Habermas, Anthony Giddens, and Marshall Sahlins working to resolve these issues by attempting to synthesize the rationality of the individual with the phenomenological discourses of the former theorists, and Marxist and structural Marxist philosophy.

Hence the structure/agency debate in the social sciences emphasize the rational origins of the reproduced and transformed social actions of social actors that constitute a social structure: are social actors determined and driven by internal invariable structures of the mind (Lévi-Strauss, 1963; Bell, 1985 [1982]), or are social actors automata determined and driven by external relational structures of signification (Parsons, 1951; Althusser, 2001 [1971])? Thus, in the social scientific form of the debate, biological determinism, i.e., innate senses of anything, as well as the Lévi-Straussian sense, i.e., innate structure of the mind, were out rightly rejected. Also, the idea that social actors are irreducibly situated subjects who act and react based on rational calculations as they respond to particular external social processes (social structure) or stimuli was for the most part dismissed. Total rationality was viewed as an impossibility given the inability of social actors to either know all the choices available to them in the present or know the complete future outcomes of those choices. This made rationality necessarily relative to a frame of reference or structure of signification, which rejects the indeterminacy of meaning and decentered subject of postmodern/post-structural theorizing.

Hence, the focus in the study of action and interaction in the social sciences was thus not a matter of denying or minimizing the rational potential of social actors, but expressed rather an urgent need to understand where ‘the system’ or structure that limits their knowledge and stabilizes society “comes from—how it is produced and reproduced, and how it may have changed in the past or be changed in the future” (Ortner, 1984, pg. 146). In other words, thinkers plagued by this debate, sought “to explain the relationship(s) that obtain between human action, on the one hand, and some global entity which we may call the system, [or social structure, structure, or culture] on the other” (Ortner, 1984, pg. 148), when the latter (i.e., the system) is not a necessary reflection of neither biology, nor the structure of the mind, but an external force of rules of conduct, i.e., categorical boundaries, tied to the social relations of production that

stabilizes society and thereby constitute the identity of social actors as argued by Talcott Parsons and Louis Althusser.

From roughly 1975 to the present, an enormous strand of critical writings, expounding a great many strands of theoretical schools of thought, combined to challenge this post-World War II structuralist matrix which denied alternative agencies, outside the relational logic of a structure, system, or culture to social actors. Some were advanced by rationalist thinkers seeking to preserve the idea of individuals as solitary thinkers who act in a purposive rational way, while others were offered by theorists dedicated to preserving the tenets of structural-functionalism and structural-Marxism while explicating the functional role of difference or the variability of practices amongst social actors within social structure not as an invariable by-product of the mind but as an external unified structure of signification or system. Considering this action-oriented response to account for the different provinces of meaning within systems or structures of signification, the term praxis or structurationist theorists will serve as the dominant label for the arguments expounded in opposition to Parsonian structural-functionalism and variants of structural Marxism by prominent theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu, Marshall Sahlins, Anthony Giddens, and Jürgen Habermas (Crothers, 2003; Ortner, 1984). These arguments are complex, and to examine them together is necessarily to do violence to the purity of notions advanced separately by various authors. The exercise is nevertheless useful at least for revealing their main and common objective, i.e., to resolve the structure/agency debate of the social sciences.

The Structurationist Response and its Problems

Structural-functionalists and Structural-Marxists in attempting to understand social action (i.e., praxis) within social structures of signification privilege social relations, reproduction, and differentiation via linguistic and symbolic representation over biological determining elements (i.e., race, sex, etc.), for meaning, human action, and consciousness constructions. In doing so, however, they fail to account for the origins and nature of the different provinces of meaning, human action, and consciousness existing within, but at the same time, outside the relational or dialectical prescribed logic of the social structure (structural reproduction and differentiation). Neo-structuralists or structurationists in the likes of Pierre Bourdieu (1990 [1980], 1984) with his theory of practice (habitus or constructivist structuralism), Marshall Sahlins (1976, 1995 [1981]) through mythopraxis, Anthony Giddens (1984) through his theory of structuration, and Jürgen

Habermas (1987 [1981], 1984 [1981]) with his theory of “communicative action,” however, attempt to do just that, “explain the relationship(s) that obtain between human action, on the one hand, and some global entity which we may call the system, [or social structure, structure, or culture] on the other” in order to capture the nature of social action, reproduction, transformation, and differentiation within structures of signification. They attempt to do so, for the most part, through “the central notion of the ‘duality of structure’ which refers to ‘the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices’” (Archer, 1985, pg. 60). That is, structures are not only external to social actors, but are internal rules and resources (“form of consciousness”) produced and reproduced by actors “unconsciously” (intuitively) in their practices.¹ From this perspective, accordingly, structure, i.e., culture or, sociological speaking, social structure, “may set conditions to the historical process, but it is dissolved and reformulated in material practice, so that history becomes the realization, in the form of society, of the actual [(embodied rules)] resources people put into play” (Sahlins, 1995 [1981], pg. 7). In this understanding, the structure is not an epiphenomenon of the structure of the mind, but is a result of the internalization by social actors of external (social structural) rules of conduct which are sanctioned, recursively (re) organized, reproduced, and differentiated in material practice. Thus, social structure, human action, meaning, and consciousness are mutually constituted and united together as “practical consciousness,” i.e., a duality.

Ostensibly, like structuralism, structural functionalism, and structural Marxism, the structurationist response to account for the nature of human action within structures of signification, however, is also problematic. That is, the central notion of the duality of structure prevents praxis theorists from accounting for the origins and relational nature of the variability of praxis or “practical consciousnesses” within a particular structure of signification. That is to say, the part/whole dialectic of the “duality” concept cannot account for the origins and relations of alternative “practical consciousnesses” that arise as a result of 1) the (chemical, biological, and physiological) drives and sensibilities of the body and brain, 2) the drives and impulses, phenomenal properties, of embodied

¹ Aside from considerably lexical differences, the other major difference underlining the three structurationists rests on the driving nature of agency. For Bourdieu and Sahlins, action is a result of purely structural forces, which are internalized and recursively reproduced; Giddens on the contrary, emphasizes more the choice of the rational individual in reproducing the structural terms and its agential moments.

recycled/entangled/superimposed subatomic particles, and 3) the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse during the internalization process as suggested by postmodern and post-structural theory. In essence, structurationists are only able to account for the dialectic of 4) structural reproduction and differentiation stemming from the means and mode of production of a society. They are unable to account for the actions and relations of the former three phenomena outlined above to structural differentiation and reproduction.

Pierre Bourdieu

The central notion of the duality of structure in Pierre Bourdieu (1990 [1980]) is described as a “dialectic of objective structures and incorporated structures (*habitus*) which operates in every practical action” (Bourdieu, 1990, pg. 41; insert added). Action, therefore, is a result of the *habitus* of individuals, an “embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history . . .” (56); a “system of structured, structuring dispositions” (52) that are “deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action [.]” (54) derived from “the conditionings [(fields)] associated with a particular class of [material] conditions of existence . . .” (53). In short, in his application of this theory to capitalist society in his work *Distinctions* (1984) cultural, economic, political, and social capital become the system of structured, structuring dispositions that are deposited in social actors in their form of schemes of perception, thought, and action that differentiates them and their conditioning fields from each other in the society. More concretely speaking, the bourgeois class of capitalist society possesses the capital forms, i.e., linguistic, social, economic, cultural, and political capitals, which constitute the social structure of modern societies and gets distributed throughout the society and differentiates the aesthetic tastes of middle and working classes from the upper-class of owners and high-level executives based upon the amount of capital they possess in their material conditions. Albeit, all classes in the society seek to possess the capital of the bourgeois upper-classes whose institutions or ideological apparatuses transmit these structuring dispositions to them.

Although Bourdieu’s materialization of social structure by synthesizing the objectivity of the latter with the subjectivity of action is able to capture the actual nature of human social action and societal reproduction, the movement of the body as a result of the embodiment of a “system of structured, structuring dispositions” within “fields” associated with a particular class of material conditions, his theory is only able to capture

the origins and nature of structural reproduction and differentiation produced by the relational logic of the “[capitalist] system of structured, structuring dispositions” and not the origins and role of difference arrived at through the deferment of meaning in the incorporation process and the other two processes I have highlighted above. In other words, Bourdieu’s praxis response is unable to capture the relation and role of the different means (practical consciousnesses) of organizing a “field,” which arises because of the deferment of meaning in the internalization “of schemes of perception, thought and action derived from the conditionings” within a dominant structure of signification. That is, the central notion of the duality of structure prevents Bourdieu from accounting for the origins and relational nature of the variability of praxis or “practical consciousnesses” within a particular structure of signification. The part/whole dialectic of the “duality” concept cannot account for alternative “practical consciousnesses” that arises as a result of not structural differentiation, but the (chemical, biological, and physiological) drives of the body, phenomenal properties of embodied subatomic particles, and the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse during the internalization process of signifiers (Habermas, 1987 [1981], 1984 [1981]; Mocombe, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018). In a word, he is unable to account for Jacques Derrida’s notion of *différance*, alternative structures of signification and actions that are outside the structuring structure of capitalist structural differentiation, on the one hand; and Mocombe’s (2016, 2017, 2018) *drives/impulses*, phenomenal properties, vis-à-vis the body and embodied subatomic particles, on the other.

Marshall Sahlins

In Marshall Sahlins’s (1976, 1995 [1981]) cultural structuralist history, the interrelationship is also between structures of significance and social action. That is, structure and action, “structure of the conjuncture,” emerges from the dialectic between culture (structure) and the cultural schemes in the individual, prefigured myths (mythopraxis) in his application of his theory to the ancient Hawaiians or prefigured “interests” in the case of contemporary “man,” which are actually symbols and categories constituting a received system that gives persons, events, and objects their historical effect (1995 [1981]). So that, situations are ordered by culture (structure), and history, or agency, is the product of structures of significance: the recursively organized and reproduced cultural schemes (*habitus* in Bourdieu’s approach) of the individual or social actor “dissolved or reformulated” in the material world (7).

Like Bourdieu, Sahlins is able to demonstrate the material nature of social action derived from the internalization of external structures of signification. However, also like Bourdieu, he is unable to account for the relation of the analytics of an individual actor vis-à-vis the different provinces of meaning within the structure of signification, which arises as a result of the drives of the body, phenomenal properties of embodied subatomic particles, and the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse. In other words, as in the case of the ancient Hawaiians, who Sahlins argue assumed Captain Cook to be a god because their internalization of the mythical structures of signification which structured their social action or gave them their historical effect at the time, “structure-of-the-conjuncture,” of Cook’s arrival to their islands posited such a being, he is unable to account for the nature and relation of those Polynesians who upon internalizing this “mythical reality” rejected it for another interpretation, i.e., he was a “thug” seeking to steal their land, women, children, and resources. Sahlins’ conflating of action and structures mutual constitution prevents such a materialized happening or conclusion. The part/whole dialectic by which Hawaiian consciousness is constituted via the structure of the conjuncture of their mythopraxis in Sahlins’ theorizing cannot account for how the Polynesians could reach any other conclusions outside that which is determined by their dialectic totality, mythopraxis, “which are actually symbols and categories constituting a received system that gives persons, events, and objects their historical effect.”

Anthony Giddens

Just the same, Anthony Giddens (1984), like Bourdieu and Sahlins, also highlights this “*duality* of structure.” His theory of structuration, which has no obvious single statement of explanation, is a social ontology describing what it means to be an individual invested with “practical consciousness”—a structure’s or culture’s rules and resources. Thus, “one of the main propositions of structuration theory is that the rules and resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action are at the same time the means of system reproduction (duality of structure)” (19). Action in this understanding is a result of the structural properties of social systems consciously and unconsciously manifesting themselves in the practices that individuals, in order to maintain their ontological security, recursively organize and reproduce (25).

Whereas Giddens, unlike Bourdieu and Sahlins, posits difference through the notion of structural differentiation as a result of the threat to a

social actor's ontological security, he is still unable to account for the origins, nature, and relation, within the dominant structure of signification, of those who upon internalizing a structure's rule of conduct which are sanctioned reject them for ontological insecure ways of reproducing (acting in) their material resource framework. In other words, Giddens, through his notion of "ontological security," is able to demonstrate how and why social actors choose to reproduce the external structural properties of social systems, which after a while simply become a second nature forgotten as history. What he is unable to demonstrate, however, given his notion of the "duality" of structure, is how alternative practices may emerge, and the relation and functioning of these practices to the dominant social system.

Jürgen Habermas

Jürgen Habermas's (1987 [1981]) ought to be "organic" conclusion regarding the constitution of present modern conditions, unlike Giddens, account for the constitution of alternative practices through the distinction he draws between system and lifeworld. Habermas's evolutionary social ontology, "communicative action," is based on the Weberian understanding of the rationalization process in modernity. That is to say, for Habermas the rationalization process in modern communicative discourse has historically developed into a differentiated lifeworld of varying cultural traditions, networks of solidarity groups, and institutions of socialization, "enframed" by, but differentiated from, the rational formation of the secular systems of economy and politics derived from linguistically arrived at "mutual understanding" amongst these varying groups and institutions. This Durkheimian "organic solidarity" which emphasizes mutual cooperation, takes *différance*, or the variability of alternative practices derived through the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse, to be the basis for the constitution of modern society. For the rational system of economy and politics in the Habermasian sense is distinguished from the lifeworld of a myriad of meaningful subjective pragmatic positions or categorical boundaries, which it "organically" stabilizes and governs. This, according to Habermas, like Emile Durkheim, differentiates modern societies from primitive ones, which "mechanically" marginalized all differences and *différance* for the underlying "sacred rules" governing meaning that is the social structure.

Like the traditional structural structurationism of Bourdieu, Sahlins, and Giddens, which views the (post) modern social structure or system as

a reified symbolic order in which its representations, practices, and meanings are fixed and must be internalized or embodied by social actors as their practical consciousness, part/whole relation, my attempt to understand the constitution of modern society as difference and *différance* assumes that the distinction between the lifeworld and its manifestation as a system (organized around the mode of production), is more enduring just as in primitive societies. Habermas, who refers to this notion as “the colonization of the lifeworld,” sees it as a “crisis” in the constitution of modern society; I see it as the more valid means or framework to understanding the nature of systems and social integration up till this point in the human archaeological record.

To put it simply, whereas Habermas, building on the works of George Herbert Mead, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber, sees the “linguisticification of the sacred, as an unfettering of the rationality potential of action oriented to mutual understanding” (Habermas, 1987 [1981], pg. 288), i.e., “communicative action” between subjective positions of the lifeworld within the rational agreed upon boundaries of the economic and political system, which distinguishes modernity from “primitive societies.” I, building on the structural duality outlined by the more traditional structuralists, view Habermas’s liberal position and the constitution of modern society in terms of a *re-sacrilization* of society based on the substantive and purposive rationality of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. That is, (post) modern society is no different from primitive ones. It is an enchantment of the world via the Protestant Ethic and the spirit of capitalism. As such, so-called modern society is a Durkheimian “mechanical solidarity” *re-sacrilized* through the universal claims embedded in a substantive and purposive-rationality, which is an avatar of a sacred linguistic worldview, i.e., the cultural or social structural conditions of Protestantism and its discursive practice the spirit of capitalism and its modes of production reified via language, ideology, ideological apparatuses, and communicative discourse.

This mechanical constitution of modern society via actions of bodies (practical consciousnesses), language, ideology, ideological apparatuses, and communicative discourse structuralizing the class division and social relations of production of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism worldview on the earth, captures the constitution of modern society in our universe, galaxy, and the earth, through the Habermasian rejected notion of “the colonization of the lifeworld.” Habermas fails to realize that the lifeworld he speaks of is structuralized and differentiated within the systemic dialectic, class division and social relations of production, of the Protestant Ethic and the spirit of (postindustrial) capitalism, which

juxtaposes his embourgeoisied position within the system against the differentiated lifeworld of the underclass masses, he is theorizing about. That is to say, the lifeworld is not magically protected from the systemicity of the Protestant Ethic and the spirit of capitalism by which modern society is constituted. It is also structured and differentiated within the systemicity, class division and social relations of production, of the Protestant Ethic and the spirit of capitalism via actions of bodies, language, ideology, ideological apparatuses (media, education, family, etc.), communicative discourse, and the mode of production of the upper-class of owners and high-level executives. It is within this (their enchantment) mechanical constitutive framework that the origins and relations of alternative practices arrived at as a result of an individual actor's stance/analytics vis-à-vis the (chemical, biological, and physiological) drives and sensibilities of the body, drives/impulses (phenomenal properties) of residual past/present/future consciousnesses of recycled/entangled/superimposed subatomic particles, and through the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse must be understood. It is not that these alternative practices arrived-at, ready-to-hand, unready-to-hand and present-at-hand, vis-à-vis the drives and sensibilities of the body and brain, residual past/present/future consciousnesses of recycled/entangled/superimposed subatomic particles, and through the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse are given free rein to reproduce their practices within the social system, which is grounded in the reproduction and differentiation of the social relations of production. On the contrary, their practices are relationally constrained within the structure and differentiation of the system or social structure as determined by class division and the social relations of production through, contemporarily, bourgeois/underclass bodies, mode of production, language, ideologies, ideological apparatuses, and communicative discourse, dialectically, seeking equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution for these once discriminated against alternative practices within the social class language game of the postindustrial bourgeois state. In essence, by accounting for both structural reproduction and differentiation and social practices arriving through the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse, Habermas is highlighting the power dynamics or mechanical solidarity of postindustrial capitalist society, which marginalizes against previous discriminatory practices, i.e., sexism, patriarchy, racism, and homophobia, for its post-racial, post-sexual, etc. constitution where the bourgeoisies of once-discriminated against subjective positions marginalize and discriminate against the underclasses of their communities. In a word, Habermas overlooks, by labeling the

phenomenon “a crisis,” the power relations by which postindustrial (Protestant/Capitalist) society, even Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity, is constituted in favor of the bourgeoisies, which have internalized the practical consciousness of the social structure, of once discriminated against subjective positions.

A Phenomenological Understanding of Structure and Action: Phenomenological Structuralism

These similar attempts, incorporation or internalization of structural rules or the “duality” (part/whole) of structure differentiated in material practice by social relations of production, to retrofit structuralism in the social sciences for agency by liberating it of the subject/object distinction, fall short of providing a *complete* account of the phenomenon, however. Structurationists are able to explain the nature of social action and differentiation in social structure, the manifestation of internalized external structures of signification as “practical consciousness” differentiated by the binary relational logic or rules of a reified structure or social system in material practice. They fail, with the exception of Habermas, however, given the intimacy of structure and actions mutual constitution (Archer, 1985, pg. 60), part/whole relationship, to account, analytically and ontologically, for the origins and relationship to the dominant social structure of those individuals and groups who, upon linguistically internalizing a structure’s terms (i.e., norms, values, prescriptions and proscriptions), reflectively, present-at-hand, reject its signified rules and resources for other institutionalized/structuralized forms of Being- (and organizing resources)-in-the-world-time. These alternative forms or consciousnesses are derived, not from the relational meaning/differentiation and representation of the social structure, i.e., structural action and differentiation related to the social relations of production, but from their (mental) analytics vis-à-vis the (chemical, biological, and physiological) drives and sensibilities of the body and brain, drives or impulses of residual past/present/future consciousnesses of recycled/entangled/superimposed subatomic particles, and the indeterminacy/deferment of meaning of the symbolic and linguistic signifiers of the linguistic worldview as suggested by Jacques Derrida’s *différance*, the “practical consciousnesses” yielded by the deferment of meaning in the internalization of arbitrary symbolic signs through ego-centered “communicative action,” which become structuralize within the logic of those in power positions (Habermas, 1987 [1981]).

Unlike, Bourdieu, Sahlins, and Giddens, Habermas is able to account for the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse. However, he fails to realize that his communicative discourse is taking place within the dialectic of structural reproduction and differentiation of the aforementioned structurationists. In other words, his lifeworld is simply the product and differentiation of the system of postindustrial (Protestant) capitalist society seeking to integrate alternative meanings arising from communicative discourse within the class reproduction and differentiation of the Protestant Ethic and the spirit of capitalism. As such, “the colonization of the lifeworld” is not an aberration, but the ontological and epistemological nature of societal constitution in the current “structure of the conjuncture” (postindustrialism) of the Protestant Ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Moreover, he also does not account for the other two, drives (phenomenal properties) of the body and subatomic particles, origins of action and their relation to the dominant social structure. From my perspective, as with Habermas’s epistemology, in order to grasp these alternative forms and their relation within, and to, a dominant social structure, there is a necessary distinction, as Margaret Archer (1985) points out, that needs to be made between structural or cultural identity as reified, present-at-hand, as a social structure or representation of what it means to be in the material resource framework of the world via actions of bodies, language, ideologies, ideological apparatuses, communicative discourse, and mode (relations) of production, on the one hand. And the phenomenological, mediating, process, analytics (Heidegger’s unready-to-hand; ready-to-hand; and present-at-hand), by which identity or being-in-the-world is constructed in and as consciousness in order to give rise to practical consciousness revealed or manifested within the world through the actions of the body, language, ideology, ideological apparatuses, communicative discourse, and mode of production, on the other. In other words, a distinction between the articulatory referents (i.e., differentially related sociocultural political elements—institutions and ideological apparatuses—stemming from the mode of production, which power prescribes) social actors encounter and must recursively (re) organize and reproduce for their ontological security or the survival of the structural relations that constitutes a societal boundary, structuralism, and the actual phenomenological process or method, i.e., mental states, ready-to-hand, unready-to-hand, and present-at-hand, by which individual social actors encounter and interpret these articulatory referents in consciousness in order to construct their identity or practical consciousness. This makes Being, as in Martin Heidegger’s (1927) phenomenological ontology, phenomenologically structural and hermeneutic or split, as in Jürgen

Habermas's conclusions, between system and lifeworld. That is, split between human beings preontological nature or mode of being-in-the-world-with-others-in-time and the ontological value-predicates of the world of others, which presuppose our historicity, which we initially encounter and use to be in in the world via our bodies, consciousness, language, ideology, ideological apparatuses, communicative discourse, and mode of production. My intent here is to understand or outline the necessary constitutive (power) relationships which emerge out of this interaction between the preontological nature of being-in-the-world-with-others-in-spacetime and the ontological mode, which I call phenomenological structuralism, i.e., the descriptive method, ontology, and epistemology for understanding and experiencing the phenomenology of Being's being-in-the-world-with-others-in-spacetime.

To this end, I am suggesting that only two necessary understanding of the constitution of society or being-in-the-world-with-others-in-time can emerge in my understanding of the phenomenology of Being-as-such's-being-in-the-world-with-others-in-space-time, either Jürgen Habermas's harmonious interaction between various forms of embodied being-in-the-world that are the result of the experiences of the body, recycled/entangled/superimposed unconscious drives, phenomenal properties, of subatomic particles, language, and the deferment of meaning in ego-centered communicative discourse, or Karl Marx's economic power model wherein one embodied linguistic community attempts to determine meaning and understanding via their control of the economic conditions, social relations of production, and institutions for being-in-the-world of a particular material resource framework. Up till this point of the human archaeological record the understanding is that the latter has been the norm. In fact, I want to suggest that the Habermasian (organic) position is a product of the latter position, contemporarily, and is not the democratic end-goal of human rational interaction. Human constitution in and as society is *always* a result of power and power relations stemming from control of the actions of bodies, language, ideology, ideological apparatuses, and communicative discourse stemming from the mode (relations) of production, and not the nature of Being-as-such. Society is organized, constituted, and revealed via the social class language game of those who control the economic conditions of a material resource framework via the actions of their bodies, mode of production, language, ideology, ideological apparatuses, and communicative discourse. So in both cases, society is a product of economic power relations and can only be constituted as such.