

Great Transformation in Eurasia

Great Transformation in Eurasia

By

Filiz Katman

Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing



Great Transformation in Eurasia

By Filiz Katman

This book first published 2018

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2018 by Filiz Katman

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-5275-0633-9

ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0633-6

To my family

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures.....	ix
Preface	xi
Introduction	xiii
Chapter One.....	1
“Great Transformation”: A Road Map for Eurasia “Great Transformation”	
Chapter Two	9
Eurasia as a Security Complex What is Security? / Theories on Security / Security Complex Theory: Securitisation & Security Complex / Eurasia as a Security Complex	
Chapter Three	27
Great Transformation in Eurasia Transformation and Eurasia / New Great Game / NATO as a Tool in “Great Transformation” / Pipeline Politics: Energy Leverage in Power Game	
Chapter Four.....	59
Contemporary Challenges in the Heartland Eurasia as the Grand Chessboard / New Silk Road: Back to Old School in Eurasia / International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC): A Multimodal Transportation System / Towards an Integrated Region: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) / Challenges in the Periphery: South China Sea, China vs USA-Battle on the Sea, Myanmar, and the Missile Tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) / What is Next in Eurasia?	
Conclusion.....	105
Great Transformation in Eurasia: Battleground for Powers	

LIST OF FIGURES

- Figure 4-1 Asia's Growth Paths
- Figure 4-2 Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road
- Figure 4-3 Silk Road Economic Belt
- Figure 4-4 Share in World Total (%)
- Figure 4-5 New Silk Roads
- Figure 4-6 Regions and Provinces
- Figure 4-7 North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC)
- Figure 4-8 INSTC
- Figure 4-9 EAEU-General Indicators
- Figure 4-10 EAEU-Sectors
- Figure 4-11 South China Sea Islands
- Figure 4-12 Disputed Zones in South China Sea
- Figure 4-13 Proven and Probable Reserves Gas and Oil in South China Sea
- Figure 4-14 South China Sea Liquefied Natural Gas Flows
- Figure 4-15 Territorial Waters and Exclusive Economic Zone
- Figure 4-16 Trade Flows in South China Sea
- Figure 4-17 Corridor of Power
- Figure 4-18 China's trans-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines
- Figure 4-19 Trans-Burma Oil Corridor and Gas Pipelines
- Figure 4-20 China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipeline
- Figure 4-21 The North Korean Arsenal
- Figure 4-22 Reliability of Old vs New Missiles
- Figure 4-23 Kim Family Missile Tests
- Figure 4-24 Better Connectivity

PREFACE

FILIZ KATMAN¹

This book intends to provide information on the transformation in the Eurasian region. Since it is called a “heartland,” ongoing developments in the region put it at the centre of the world politics. Such a tendency is strengthened by the projections on population, growth, and capacity, which together make the region the rising star in the world. Moreover, energy capacity and game changing initiatives such as One Belt, One Road highlight the region’s potential in terms of opportunities, while Myanmar, the conflict over the South China Sea, and North Korea make the region critical in terms of challenges. Thus, a thorough analysis of such opportunities and challenges is necessary for a better understanding of the ongoing developments and projections for the future in the world politics.

The book is composed of a theoretical background on the “Great Transformation,” the security complex characteristics of Eurasia, the roles of New Great Game, NATO involvement in the transformation, the One Belt One Road Initiative, the South China Sea, and contemporary challenges in the region. Some chapters are based on research in the author’s M.A. thesis, entitled *NATO Policies in South Caucasus*.

It is intended to have a look at the changes beyond the dissolution of the Soviet Union, independence, energy versus security parameters in the Eurasian region, contemporary challenges in the region such as the One Belt, One Road initiative, Russian policy, and rising tensions in the South China Sea.

¹ Assistant Professor, President, Energy Politics and Markets Research Centre, Faculty Member, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences, Istanbul Aydin University, TURKEY, filizkatman@aydin.edu.tr

INTRODUCTION

GREAT TRANSFORMATION AND EURASIA

The geography of Eurasia has been a vast geographical area for most ancient civilisations from Southern and Eastern Asia, the Central, Middle, and Western Asia, and Southern Europe with radical transformations. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his famous book *Grand Chessboard* (1998), defines Eurasia as the centre of global power and formulates a Eurasian geostrategy for the United States, much of it concerned with geostrategy in Central Asia with a focus on the exercise of power in Eurasia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The argument is based on the Heartland Theory presented in the article entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History” (1904) by Halford J. Mackinder, one of the founding fathers of geopolitics and geostrategy. In short, the theory argues that “who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island controls the world” (Mackinder: 1996: 106). In particular, he writes, it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger should emerge capable of dominating Eurasia, and thus also capable of challenging America’s global pre-eminence.

Eurasia, having such characteristics and problems, is in the scope of regional and external powers. This study aims at analysing the background for the desecuritisation and integration of the region by sorting out the geographical, economic, and socio-political characteristics of the region, and also involvement of the regional and external powers in order to explain North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) involvement based on the Great Transformation approach within the analytical framework. The major argument of this study is that Eurasia reflects the characteristics of a security complex with its historical, geographic, economic, and socio-political characteristics, energy resources and transportation routes of energy resources, and unresolved conflicts, and is subject to the Great Transformation process. According to the security complex theory, first of all, it must be desecuritized, then stabilized, and finally integrated it into the world. In this framework, NATO plays the organizational role in the process by assisting in stabilising the region and integrating into the world system. Moreover, countries in the region are already part of the process because of their political will for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. The Great

Transformation approach developed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the multisectoral security approach -called the Copenhagen School- and classical security complex theory will be used in explaining the arguments.

CHAPTER ONE

“GREAT TRANSFORMATION”: A ROAD MAP FOR EURASIA*

1. Introduction

“Nothing can stop the change.” This sentence explains the world order in the Post-Cold War period exactly. Great changes have brought great differences in international politics. Countries have tried to orient themselves to new situations. The course of international relations has also been reshaped by these challenges. International world perception and threat and security perceptions have also been redefined by new realities and new situations. Eurasia, with its historical, geographic, economic, and socio-political characteristics, its energy resources and transportation routes, and its unresolved conflicts, is a security complex that has undergone dramatic change.

It has been previously mentioned in the Introduction that Eurasia, from Southern and Eastern Asia, Central, Middle, and Western Asia, and Southern Europe, has been a vast geographical area for most ancient civilisations. It has experienced radical transformations. As Zbigniew Brzezinski (1998) mentions in his famous book *Grand Chessboard*, it has been subject to significant transformations. He argues that Eurasia is the centre of global power, and he defines a Eurasian geostrategy for the United States of America. It is concerned with geostrategy in Central Asia, focusing on the exercise of power in Eurasia after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He uses the Heartland Theory presented in the article entitled “The Geographical Pivot of the History” by Halford J. Mackinder (1904), a leading scholar of geopolitics and geostrategy. The theory mentions that “who rules East Europe commands

* This chapter is based on research in the author’s M.A. thesis *NATO Policies in South Caucasus*.

the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island controls the world” (Mackinder, 1996: 106). Moreover, according to the theory, it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger should emerge who is capable of dominating Eurasia, and thus also capable of challenging America’s global pre-eminence.

As David Lynch (2003: 8) points out, Eurasia is a region of blockades, conflicts, and trade restrictions; a blockade of Azerbaijan and Turkey over Armenia, and, since the early 1990s, a blockade of important rail links from Armenia through Georgia to Russia; a strict Russian border regime which disrupts oil/trade flows, the status of the Caspian Sea and conflicts prevent this area from becoming a region that can provide the forums at which parties can gather to discuss solutions. Lynch criticises the so-called “transition paradigm” since countries live in conditions of corruption, poorly institutionalised political forms, poor economic conditions, low levels of economic integration with international markets, and all within a political climate of growing disenchantment and a deepening gap between the rulers and the ruled (Lynch, 2003: 8).

The countries of Eurasia gained their independence in the 1990s, and have not yet established democratic or political and economic stability.¹ It has also been claimed that colour revolutions such as those that occurred twice in the Ukraine and once in Georgia represent a form of irregular warfare against Eurasia (for instance, the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003)², and these were supported by the west. Other issues of concern in the region are undemocratic elections, problems with candidate selection, and corruption in the state bureaucracy.

On the other hand, the security perception is different in each country, and this is a critical factor in maintaining the security and stability of the region. Armenia takes Russia as its partner, and perceives a threat from Azerbaijan and Turkey. Azerbaijan takes Turkey and the west as its partners, while perceiving threats from Armenia, Iran, and, decreasingly, from Russia. Georgia has American support and close relations with Turkey, and it perceives threats from (and has domestic problems in

¹ For an insight into civil society in the Caucasus, see B. Babajanian, S. Freizer, and D. Stevens, “Introduction: Civil Society in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” *Central Asian Survey*, September 2005, 24(3), pp. 209-224.

² For information on the situation after the revolution and democracy in Georgia, see Laurence Broers, “After the ‘revolution’: civil society and the challenges of consolidating democracy in Georgia,” *Central Asian Survey*, September 2005, 24(3), pp. 333-350.

connection with) Russia. Attempts to resolve regional conflicts have not yet yielded successful solutions. The United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have a role to play, but while the OSCE has made more of an attempt to resolve these conflicts, it has contributed neither to their solution nor to the security of the region.³

The picture above clearly shows that there is no dominant power or organisation in terms of the security of the region in general. Again, there are two perspectives, the Euro-Atlantic and Russian perspectives. The first of these aims for security and economic prosperity is through the establishment of strong state institutions, democratic values, the rule of law, and transparency. The second is based on dominance, maintaining the status quo, and control over the region through political, economic, and military means.

An unstable, unsecured, undemocratic region is a threat in every direction, north, south, east, and west. The situation described above proves how important it is to transform the region into a stable, secure, and democratic region, and to resolve conflicts between its countries through political bargaining instead of through clashes. The transformation into market economies and domestic countries also serves the purposes of Euro-Atlantic security (Yavuzalp, 2003: 69).

As illustrated by the Former Secretary General Lord Robertson, in his visits to Georgia in September 2000 and Armenia and Azerbaijan in January 2001, European security is “inseparably linked to that of other countries.” In Tbilisi, he told a conference on Regional Cooperation and Partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) “the more secure our neighbours are the more secure we are. ... European security first of all depends on how well our neighbours are protected” (DeTemple, 2001: 15; Robertson, 2000).

The previously mentioned conflicts are also important in the era of the wars against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organised crime. The South Caucasus is in the Eastern Arc (a region of instability between Germany and Russia from Northern Europe down through Turkey, the Caucasus, and Middle Asia) of the “Arc of Crisis” (The Southern Arc is composed of North Africa, the Mediterranean, the

³ For an analysis of the regional security system in the Caucasus, see Bruno Coppleters, “A Regional Security System for the Caucasus” [Electronic Version], *Caucasian Regional Studies*, 2000, 5(1-2). http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/crs/crs-2000/crs00_cob01.html [accessed 3 March 2006].

Middle East, and Southeast Asia) (Asmus, Kugler, and Larabee, 1993: 9-14). Svante Cornell (2004: 130) uses this point, in his article “NATO’s Role in South Caucasus Regional Security,” in order to explain how this region fits into Euro-Atlantic security interests and contributes to our desecuritisation concept:

Any destabilising and unsecured areas located around the area, especially in such geographically and strategically important regions, should be under control at some point, then desecuritized, then, as the ultimate goal, be transformed into an integrated region and be transformed from being a net security consumer to a net security provider.

In this study, major argument is that Eurasia reflects the characteristics of a security complex with its history, geography, economy, and politics, energy reserves with their transportation routes, and unresolved conflicts, and is subject to the “Great Transformation” process. The security complex theory argues that such security complex is subject to desecuritisation, stabilisation, and finally integration into the world. It is also argued in this framework that NATO plays the organisational role in the process by assisting in stabilising the region and integrating it into the world system. Besides, countries in the region are already part of the process, because of their political will for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. Three approaches will be used to explain the arguments presented here: the “Great Transformation” approach of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a multisector security approach called the Copenhagen School, and classical security complex theory.

2. “Great Transformation”

Zbigniew Brzezinski’s⁴ article entitled “Great Transformation,” which was published in the Fall 1993 issue of *The National Interest*, supports the argument presented above concerning the developments in the region, “the

⁴ For detailed information on his theory from the original text, see Z. Brzezinski, “The Great Transformation,” *The National Interest*, Fall 1993 <http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=92CC3CD2669245CFBCA1759C597E9A1E&nm=Articles+and+Archives&type=Publishing&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle&mid=1ABA92EFC8348688A4EBEB3D69D33EF&tier=2&did=966C1453AB994C2CB95389C9C60F52DF&dtxt=Fall+1993> or Z. Brzezinski, “Büyük Transformasyon,” *Avrasya Etüdüleri*, İlkbahar 1, 1994, pp. 41-55.

processes of post-communist political and economic transformation.” Brzezinski analyses “initiatives to create politically and economically successful democracies on the ruins of [the] communist system” in order to learn from their lessons. He analyses western policies meant to aid and promote this transformation, and he criticises the west for not being actively prepared to transform old Soviet-type systems.

He also focuses on “the results expected to flow in the foreseeable future—over the next decade or so—from the ongoing efforts at the transformation,” and more specifically, he concludes with “things that the United States should then be doing in that context.” He defines the phases of post-communist transformation and describes the means of concluding each phase:

φ **Phase 1:** 1-5 Years

Political Goal: Transformation

Economic Goal: Stability

To Do List:

Political: Basic Democracy, Free Press, Terminating One-Party State and Police System, Pre-Democratic Coalition for Change

Legal-Regulatory: Removing State Controls

Economic: Terminating Price Controls and Subventions, Terminating Collectivisation, Privatisations

Western Aid: Monetary Stability, Emergency Credit and Aids

φ **Phase 2:** 3-10 Years

Political Goal: From Transformation to Stability

Economic Goal: From Stability to Transformation

To Do List:

Political: New Constitution and Election Law, Elections, Decentralised Regional Self-Government, Stable Democratic Coalition = New Political Elite

Legal-Regulatory: Legal Regulatory Framework for Ownership and Trade

Economic: Banking System, Small and Medium Scale Privatisation, De-Monopolisation, Appearance of New Economic Class

Western Aid: Infrastructure Credits, Technical and Management Aids, Trade Privileges and Entrance to Markets, First Foreign Capital Investments

ϕ **Phase 3:** 5-10+ Years

Political Goal: Consolidation

Economic Goal: Continuous “Take-off”

To Do List:

Political: Forming Stable Democratic Parties, Developing Democratic Political Culture

Legal-Regulatory: Appearance of Independent Legislation and Law Culture

Economic: Big Scale Privatisation, Investor Lobbies, and Appearance of Entrepreneurship Culture. Western Aid: Big Foreign Capital Investments, Membership to Key Western Organisations (EC-today’s EU, NATO etc.)

Brzezinski also mentions NATO membership as a means of transforming and integrating the old communist countries. In his article, he emphasises “new security arrangements” in the early 1990s, and forecasts the formation of a wide Euro-Atlantic security system including Moscow and Kiev, the NATO membership of ex-communist countries, and individual partnerships: all of this actually happened.

The interests of the US in the Caucasus were enunciated as follows: to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the regional states; to keep Iran in check until it applies more pro-western policies; to defuse the violent and anti-western potential of Islamic fundamentalism through economic growth and to shore up civil society throughout the region; to ensure access to energy resources throughout the entire region. The US and Turkey cooperate in the South Caucasus, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline has the strong support of the US. It is noted that this area is called the “strategic fulcrum of the future” or the “strategic high ground” by US analysts, due to its energy resources (Blank, 1998: 11). US policies are defined as closely tied to NATO enlargement; moreover, it is argued that “to maintain regional security, NATO must not only integrate the whole region into the western economy and foster the development of pluralistic institutions, it must grasp military mettle.”

American policy towards the region is encapsulated in the following sentence from the foreword of a report published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States (US) Army War College: “A U.S. goal of irrevocably integrating these states (Transcaucasian and Central Asian states) into the western state system economically, politically, and militarily can make them an intensifying focus of international rivalry” (Blank, 2000: iii).

3. Conclusion

Eurasia, with its geographic location, energy resources, and conflicts, bears the characteristics of a security complex, and is undergoing a great transformation process. The objectives of the process include fostering regional security and stability through peacetime military engagement, ensuring access to Caspian Basin energy resources, combating threats such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and containing Russia’s resurgence.

NATO is also alarmed by the increased militarisation on the southern borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the rapidly growing energy relations of the region with Russia. Furthermore, the west is concerned by the rapidly developing security relationship between Moscow and Tehran. Iran is already Russia’s third largest customer for weapons and military training after China and India. The Russian-Iranian initiative is clearly intended to block NATO influence in the area and to monopolise energy corridors from the Caspian region to Europe.

Critical issues for the world, such as energy security and the diversification of the energy supply, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, and drug and human trafficking, are also the issues of the region that characterise it as security complex to be desecuritized. NATO policies in this region serve this mission, and the New Great Game is a crucial factor in the Eurasian Great Transformation. Rivalry among western powers versus Russia and China in the region intensifies the power struggle.

References

- Asmus, R. D., R. L. Kugler, and F. S. Larrabee. (1993). Building a New NATO [Electronic Version]. **Foreign Affairs**, September/October 1993.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19930901faessay8561/ronald-d-asmus-richard-l-kugler-f-stephen-larrabee/building-a-new-nato.html> [16 April 2006].
- Blank, S. (1998), "Kafkasya Güvenliğinde Yeni Eğilimler," **Avrasya Etüdüleri**, İlkbahar 1998, Sayı 13, pp. 2-17.
- Blank, Stephen J. (1998). "The Future of Transcaspien Security," The Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (2002),
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB111.pdf>
- . (2002). "The Future of Transcaspien Security". The Strategic Studies Institute.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB111.pdf> [27 April 2006]
- Brzezinski, Z. (1998). **Grand Chessboard**, Basic Books.
- Cornell, S. (2004). "NATO's Role in South Caucasus Regional Security," **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, 3(2), pp. 123-134.
- DeTemple, J. E. (2001). Military Engagement in the South Caucasus-NATO [Electronic Version]. **Joint Force Quarterly**, Autumn-Winter 2001.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_2001_Autumn-Winter/ai_87779059 [24 April 2006].
- Lynch, D. (2003). **A Regional Insecurity Dynamic. The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU** [Electronic Version]. Chaillot Papers. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, European Union.
- Mackinder, H. J. (1904). "The Geographical Pivot of History," **The Geographical Journal**, April 1904, pp. 421-437.
- . (1996). **Democratic Ideals and Reality**, National Defense University Press.
- Yavuzalp, O. (2003). "NATO's Future After the War in Iraq," **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, 2(2), pp. 65-73.

CHAPTER TWO

EURASIA AS A SECURITY COMPLEX*

1. Introduction

Security is a subjective term facing continuous transformation throughout history. However, mainly, it is about survival. Security is about perceiving a threat and taking precautions against it. Eurasia, located in the “heartland” of the world island, is critical in terms of security. Eurasia, with its historical, geographic, economic, and socio-political characteristics, with its resources and transportation routes, and with its unresolved conflicts, is a security complex undergoing dramatic change. Ongoing developments in the region reflect its critical position in world politics. Several initiatives, projects, and plans have been initiated by local, regional, and international powers.

The focal point for the prospects of the region is whether the interests of such diverse powers will collide or contradict, their capacity to realise such interests and whether they will seek cooperation or clash in realising them. The centre of gravity moves towards Eurasia due to such activity in the vast geography of the world island, and to Asia-Pacific. It is even argued that it may lead to a war in the Asian side of the Pacific Ocean. Considering the characteristics of the region, such an armed clash would be hard to contain in the region.

2. What is Security?

Since the first human beings on earth, security has been a determinant in the organising of our daily life. In order to protect themselves from threats stemming from natural conditions (e.g., wild animals), human beings have

* This chapter is based on research in the author’s M.A. thesis *NATO Policies in South Caucasus*.

tried to provide for their own security. According to Maslow's¹ hierarchy of needs, security is second only to physiological needs; security is about survival but, today, is also a physiological need. Etymologically, the word "secure" comes from *se + cura*, meaning "careless" or "freedom from concern" (McSweeney, 1999: 16). It derives from "sure" in English and "*sûr*" in French. The *Larousse* Modern Dictionary notes the French usage: "Do not confuse *securite*, the feeling of having nothing to fear, and *surete*, the state of having sense of 'certitude' carried by the term 'sure'." The Oxford English Dictionary expresses it as "having or affording ground for confidence; safe; (objectively) certain" (McSweeney, 1999: 6; Oxford English Dictionary Volume ix, 370). Over the centuries, the meaning and usage of the word has changed, and its meaning has evolved from a positive to a negative one. The notion of security also has different levels, such as the individual, the group, and the international community.

Security is a subjective feeling; we perceive a threat to our security. Singer explains threat perception in quasi-mathematical form (Carey, 2000: 55; Singer, 1967):

$$\text{Threat Perception} = \text{Capability} \times \text{Intent}$$

As noted above, a capability (and the intention of the source of threat to endanger our security) is observed. It is not only survival conditions that are under threat, but also peace, economic, political, social, and humanitarian conditions. A person can feel secure but cannot touch that feeling; so, he or she uses various means to reach that feeling. In order to provide it, an instrument is needed, such as a weapon, an alarm, a bar, money, the police, the army, the government, or shares. When such instruments are obtained, the person feels secure in social, economic, and political terms.

When we feel insecure, we are frightened, worried and constrained, so there must be a threat that causes us to feel insecure. To protect ourselves, we take precautions in order to provide security: this is defence. In order to defend ourselves, we try to provide means and power. When the shoe is on the other foot, others may take this as a threat to their security or as a preparation to attack. In international relations theory, this is called a security dilemma. It is claimed to be dangerous because it may lead to an

¹ For further information about Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, see <http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/maslow.html>

arms race. The notion of a security dilemma was first clearly explained in the 1950s by John Herz (Baylis and Smith, 1998: 197; Herz, 1950: 157) as follows:

A structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening.

Security is a subjective term. Arnold Wolfers (McSweeney, 1999: 14; Wolfers, 1962: 153), a soft-realist, defines it as follows: “security after all is nothing but the absence of the evil of insecurity, a negative value so to speak.” In her article entitled “What is Security?” Emma Rothschild (Rothschild, 1995: 61) defines security as a relationship: “Its most consistent sense—and the sense that is most suggestive for modern international politics was indeed of a condition, or an objective that constituted a relationship between individuals and states or societies.” The term “security” involves the individual, the nation and the international community, and there is disagreement about which of these should constitute the main focus. According to the Copenhagen School’s definition of security (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998), there is a threat, an object referred to, a securitising actor, and an emergency action against the threat. As Waever points out, issues are taken out of their normal mode in the process of securitisation: they are securitised. So, it is better to aim for a desecuritisation of those issues.

3. Theories on Security

In international relations, the character of security is different. Each theory² adopts a different perspective, and considers different methods of providing and sustaining security. On the ground, everybody agrees that security is about survival. The traditional “neo-realist” perspective, liberal institutionalism, democratic peace theory, collective security theory, constructivist critical theory, post-modernist views, and global views, all take different approaches. The main debate is between the realist and

² For further information on the security perceptions of international relations theories, see O. F. Tanrısever (2005), **Devlet ve Ötesi. Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar**. Atilla Eralp (ed.), E. F. Keyman, M. F. Tayfur, F. Yalvaç, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 107-123.

idealist schools. While the realists and neo-realists argue that states are in search of greater security and thus of greater power, the transnationalists/idealists argue that international life is founded on the search for peace.³

The traditional “neo-realist” approach to security involves a military dimension (Fischer, 1993: 5). In an anarchic self-help system, with its lack of trust, the state must have the military capability to defend itself in order to retain independence and sovereignty: thus, security is primary for governments. Hobbes, Machiavelli, Rousseau, E. H. Carr and Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer all represent this approach, and are pessimistic about cooperation between states. Contingent realists, such as Charles Glasser, argue that, in some circumstances, security can be achieved through cooperation, such that security is contingent on the prevailing circumstances. Contingent realists are more optimistic about cooperation. This approach has been criticised for being culturally oriented and too narrowly defined.

In *People, States and Fear*, Barry Buzan (1991: 214-242) argues that states must overcome “excessively self-referenced security policies” and think instead about the security interests of their neighbours. Most recently, in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde analyse security according to sectors: the military sector, the environmental sector, the economic sector, the societal sector, and the political sector. This approach is called the Copenhagen School. The traditional approach rejects the role of international institutions in achieving world peace and security. Liberal institutionalists like Robert Keohane and Martin accept some of the assumptions of realism, such as the importance of military power, but they consider international institutions to be important tools for international security. In the 1980s, the democratic peace theory of Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett proposed that the spread of democracy (with some basic assumptions like republican democratic representation, an ideological commitment to human rights, and transnational interdependence) would lead to greater international security.

³ For further information on theories of international relations, see S. Guzzini (1998), **Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy**, London and New York: Routledge. See also J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.) (1998), **The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations**, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

The collective security theorists Charles and Clifford Kupchan move beyond the self-help world of realism. They argue that, when necessary, states should come together to stop aggression, and collective security institutions should contribute to a more benign international system. Constructivist thinkers like Alexander Wendt accept many neo-realist assumptions, but stress the importance of social structure, i.e., shared knowledge and practices. According to post-modernists like Richard Ashley, realism is one of the key problems of international insecurity and should be replaced with a “communitarian discourse.” The global society school of thought argues that while at the end of the twentieth century globalisation had accelerated towards a global society, this brought new risks for nation states in crisis associated with the environment, poverty, and weapons of mass destruction. The globalist approach to security is based on what Anthony Giddens calls utopian realism. According to this view, a radical transformation of international politics is taking place (Baylis and Smith, 1998: 207; Giddens, 1990: 154-158).

Fischer (1993: 9-10) uses the definition of security adopted through consensus by the representatives of the 150 participating states of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, convened by the United Nations General Assembly in New York and that took place from 24 August to 11 September 1987:

14. Security is an overriding priority for all nations. It is also fundamental for both disarmament and development. Security consists of not only military, but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights and ecological aspects. Enhanced security can, on the one hand, create conditions conducive to disarmament and, on the other, provide the environment and confidence for the successful pursuit of development. The development process, by overcoming non-military threats to security and contributing to a more stable and sustainable international system, can enhance security and thereby promote arms reduction and disarmament. Disarmament would enhance security both directly and indirectly. A process of disarmament that provides for undiminished security at progressively lower levels of armaments could allow additional resources to be devoted to addressing non-military challenges to security, and thus result in enhanced overall security. ...

18. Recently, non-military threats to security have moved to the forefront of global concern. Underdevelopment and declining prospects for development, as well as mismanagement and waste of resources, constitute challenges to security. The degradation of the environment presents a threat to sustainable development. The world can hardly be regarded as secure so long as there is polarisation of wealth and poverty at the national and international levels. Gross and systematic violations of human rights retard genuine socio-economic development and create tensions that

contribute to instability. Mass poverty, illiteracy, disease, squalor and malnutrition afflicting a large proportion of the world's population often become the cause of social strain, tension and strife.

In the same book, Fischer (1993: 9-10) proposes a comprehensive definition of security, described at the meeting of a group of experts on non-military aspects of security, in Tashkent, in May 1990:

Security is a condition in which states consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress.

The security of individuals and communities of which states are constituted is ensured by the guarantee and effective exercise of individual freedom, political, social and economic rights, as well as by the preservation or restoration of a liveable environment for present and future generations.

Security also implies that essential human needs, notably in the field of nutrition, education, housing and public health are ensured on a permanent basis.

An adequate protection against dangers to security should be also maintained. The ways and means to attain security may be defined in national, intergovernmental, non-governmental or global terms.

One of the central arguments about security concerns the choice between guns and/or butter and investment. Paul Kennedy (1988: 691-692) describes this dilemma in his famous book, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*. Due to the scarcity of resources, the share of military expenditure and economic investment is always questioned. In a situation of globalised world money, blood and power are not enough to protect borders, and thus not enough to protect our security. Cooperation is a way of solving this problem. Although a conflict may not neighbour your country, you are still under threat in a globalised world, and instability and/or insecurity in one part of the world involves and affects your security. In order to establish cooperation, international institutions gather states around common objectives. It is not realistic to think about a world of pure peace, without conflicts, clashes etc. It is inevitable that we must face these possibilities in securitising items. On the other hand, it is possible to maintain good relations with states and to meet on democratic grounds in order to solve problems through compromise rather than through violence, if the parties involved believe this and show the necessary political will. The changing nature of threats proves how cooperation is useful in preventing threats and fighting against them.

A. The Changing Nature of Threat

As mentioned earlier, threat perception is a determinant of security. Thus, the answer to what constitutes a threat is important. In some cases, issues can be introduced as threats, although they are not. These may be shown successfully by the authorities as threats. Threat and security are also categorised as hard and soft. Hard security and hard threat include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and ethnic conflicts. Soft security, on the other hand, involves climate change, drug trafficking, human trafficking, cyber threats, illegal migration, and so on. At some point, groups may use a soft threat as a hard threat, for instance using money from illegal migration and/or drug trafficking to finance terrorist activities. As can be seen in this example, soft and hard threats and security are interlinked. Once a threat is defined, it is securitised. The military and executive branches of the state define threats and security issues. Security deals with the prevention or containment of these threats. Since economic prosperity is what states want to achieve, maintaining security and stability is a *sine qua non* for sustainable development. So, they are interlinked (Ziyal, 2004: 33).

Securitisation can reach points where there are imaginary situations. Desecuritisation, on the other hand, is the process of transforming an issue from a perceived threat into a normal issue. Threat perception has changed over the centuries. The Cold War was a period of suspicion about which weapons other countries possessed, and over their plans for other countries, where national integrity and sovereignty were the purposes of security, and the arms race between the superpowers reached a very dangerous level. The German and Soviet threats were common threats for their neighbours in Europe and America. Imperialism, the nuclear capability of the Soviets, and communism, threatened the world. In the bipolar Cold War period, deterrence rather than execution was applied as a security policy.

NATO was formed under these circumstances, in order to enable collective action in the case of an attack on a treaty member. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union desecuritised these issues. The world was transformed, and a new situation emerged. In the Cold War period, the sources and features of threat and the methods by which to overcome them were obvious. In the post-Cold War period, threats were transformed into unknown, unidentifiable, borderless, and difficult to overcome threats, called asymmetric threats. Classical war has been replaced with asymmetric war, which is defined as criminal action to make people accept your ideology or your group, using both military and

non-military methods, and new strategies and tactics against enemies that may or may not have greater technological and military strength, by abusing sensibilities as well as avoiding the stronger characteristics of the enemy. In this situation, security is ever more difficult to attain and sustain.

In 1999, NATO revised its Strategic Concept to include the following: ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states that could lead to local and even regional instability and which, in turn, could affect Euro-Atlantic stability (NATO's Strategic Concept, Article 20). Due to the characteristics of the threat, cooperation is of the utmost importance. Each piece of information is very important in defining the threat, finding the source of the threat, and overcoming the threat. Thus, cooperative security is the "corresponding principle" (Nolan, 1994: 9) for international security in the post-Cold War era.

As noted above, terrorism has not been taken as a primary concern, despite Turkey's insistence that it should be; instead, it has been treated as a domestic issue. In 2001, the world watched the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and saw how these invisible threats had become visible, dangerous, fearless, and shocking; the need for cooperation became urgent, in order to take precautions and to be prepared. This was the face of global terrorism.

Terrorism is defined as unpredictable and irregular, as an act of organised crime, with groups ready to strike at any time or anywhere in order to have a person, an idea, or a group accepted. Over 100 different definitions of terrorism exist. In his speech titled "Global Terrorism: Present and Future Challenges" at School on Terrorism in 2006 at Bahcesehir University, Professor Stephen Sloan (2006) defines the essential elements of terrorism as follows: it relies on threat or the use of force (though ultimately, threat is not enough); it is at least outwardly political in nature; it is psychologically "'aimed' at the people watching" (Brian Jenkins); it is often protracted in nature: "Death by a thousand cuts"; it is primarily asymmetric as regards organisation and generations; it is small in size, and its targets are larger in scale. There is no universal agreement on the definition of terrorism, and this presents problems in formulating counterterrorist policies. It can more or less be defined as "a purposeful human activity directed toward the creation of a general climate of fear designed to influence in ways desired by the protagonists other human beings and through them some course of events" (Sloan, 2006). If these terrorist groups acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, the results would be far worse than anyone could imagine.