Colonial Transformation and Asian Religions in Modern History

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Edited by

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project (*Colonial Transformation and Asian Religions in Modern History*) was originally motivated through casual conversations with Asian religion and society scholars at the School of Culture, History, and Language at the Australian National University. The idea was carried on by hosting an international conference on Asian Religion from 7-9th April 2016. There were over one hundred scholars at the conference. As it was so successful, a second conference will be organised in 2018. As a result of the conference, this volume, in a pioneering perspective, introduces the various phenomena of religious transformation in a multi-cultural community to enhance the social concept of religion in the history of religions. The study draws from studies of the religious culture of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia as well as the ideological subjects of animal baiting, Sanskrit mythologies, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), religious philosophy (within Hinduism), the *Mahābhārata*, the Bhagavad Gita, women, Champa Buddhist art, Pentecostalism, religious volunteerism, Tenrikyo, the Nagasaki Catholic community, and Tibetan Buddhism.

PREFACE

It is an honour and a great pleasure for me, an anthropologist of Asian globalised religions, to preface David Kim's *Colonial Transformation and Asian Religions in Modern History*. This volume indeed engages and reopens a crucial debate in Asian Studies and in Religious Studies: the issue of "colonialism" and the many ways the term (and what it means empirically and epistemologically speaking) has impacted both practices and knowledge. Indeed, in the last two decades Social Sciences and Humanities have undertaken a vast movement of redefinition of the nature and context of the production of knowledge, taking more and more seriously the issue of colonialism, not only as a way to understand the reframing of the world, but also the reorganisation of the semantic categories and the frameworks of meaning through which the world makes sense. Foucault's reflections on *power and knowledge* and the growing interest in the *poetics and politics* of social action and of cultural representation have infused Social Sciences and Humanities, and range nowadays at the forefront of the new agendas of research. If we live in Postcolonial times, as goes the common wisdom, academic circles also work alongside postmodern and postcolonial epistemologies (of deconstruction, critical archaeology of knowledge, issues in power) and even with "post-postcolonial" views, since the process of critical deconstruction has now bypassed the "postcolonial" step. Theories of social and cultural change, and furthermore *religious* change needed to leave room enough for the factors explicitly associated, directly or less directly, to colonial projects or forces.

Knowledge on societies and cultures has been deeply impacted by the issue of colonialism and the *postcolonial turn*, but religion has long been indisposed to engage in the critical deconstruction of the structures of power in the world. Voices from the *Asian* South have had a particular (sound) echo in Social Sciences and Humanities, especially in the context of Indian *Cultural* and *Subaltern Studies* whose discussion on the concept of "culture," the contestation of the models of knowledge and the historical narratives exported from the North exemplified the emergence of a new ideological consciousness and a more multi-polar and balanced intelligibility of social processes and cultural dynamics. Yet, the topic of religion has only recently surfaced in these debates, for understandable

reasons but not always explicitly explained (religion was synonymous with historical stability, or with resistance to change, for instance).

In the United States, but on the basis of the Western Path of monotheistic religious institutions, Talal Asad ranges among the first scholars to locate issues in power regarding religion, not only in history and society, but regarding the definition of religion itself. It is worthy to note that Asad was himself born in *Muslim* Asia (Saudi Arabia) and the critics he addressed to the definition of religion were framed after Clifford Geertz's works, who had himself studied Asian religions (but as well, Islam in North Africa). Asian religions nevertheless only came late in the agenda of the "colonial-postcolonial" debates and retrospectively, it is clear now for many that the fabric of Asian societies in the Western mind as "spiritual nations" takes on a *deshistoricisation* of Asia (Van der Veer, 2009), and that the reinjection of history and politics in the background studies on Asian religions unveiled unexpected dynamics of complex reinventions—Asian cultural and religious traditions, such as Buddhism and Hinduism, are engaged in the dialectics of Westernisation of the East and Easternisation of the West—following Campbell (1999).

Postcolonial thinking and critics have otherwise been nourished by the pioneering works of Edward Said, Stuart Hall or Franz Fanon, and their influence grew in Humanities and Social Sciences, and finally reached Asian and Religious Studies, especially Tibetan Studies where considerations on identity, resistance, imagination, challenges of authority, ethnicity and the instrumental construction of culture/religion have nowadays a large theoretical surface and legitimacy (see the works of Peter Bishop, Donald Lopez Jr. or Frank Korom, as examples). But colonial and postcolonial issues do not *only* matter for regions of Asia where political history is marked by such critical turbulences: they have also filtered into many other countries and cultural areas, even those where "colonialism" was until recently not a meaningful concept, and under the influence of modern transnational social sciences (in Nepal, see Prasad, 2000). Under the flag of "colonial" or "postcolonial," both moulding the relationships between religious dynamics and ideological or political forces, religions can be either considered as altered and weakened, on the one side, or revitalised and invigorated by this colonial environment, on the other side.

Further, issues in power imbalance, and the political domination of groups over others have mainly been considered under the umbrella of "colonial Asia" (colonial India, Burma, Vietnam, and so on) and focused on the *external* forms and forces of colonialism—cultural, political and religious influences coming from the Modern and Imperialistic West, affecting local traditions, remained more or less unaltered. According to

this model, long-lasting and immutable "traditions" have been quickly and deeply impacted by exported models of modernities, but fortunately revised for a much more complex portrayal of the interplay between local and global, urban and rural, elite and popular, Western and Eastern, etc., ideas and practices, on the grounds of empowerment or resistance, and the reinvention of the forms, functions, effects, and even the semantic category of "religion" (Van der Veer 2002). Recent literature has demonstrated that the reinvention of so-called "traditional religions" in Asia, in the colonial and postcolonial context, is a multifaceted process of "religionisation of politics and politicisation of religion" to quote Roland Robertson (1992), depending on the specific local situation: the colonial and political history of India, of Southeast Asia or of Tibet (three edifying examples) are all concerned, in different manners and with different aspects and effects, with the issue of colonialism. Scholars in Religious and Asian Studies accurately recognise this diversity and avoid the essentialist generalisations on "religion-in-colonial-Asia" for more detailed historically and ethnographically informed local situations in which *a specific* form of colonial domination generates *a particular* agency for *unique* religious systems and actors. Adding the colonial issue, another crucial dimension of the debate regarding colonialism is regarding the forces of collective imaginations, and the *moral geographies* they draw. As such, the "Orient" is both the terriorialised imagination of the eastern Other (in the Western mind) and the geographic site where the Asian religions are reworked and repackaged alongside the new faces of transnational politics and global cultural forces.

It is a well-known fact that orientalism did play a role in the emergence of colonial and postcolonial thinking. Edward Said's masterpiece, *Orientalism* (1978), emphasised the ways that the category of "the Orient" has nourished the fantasies and imagination of the West towards a stereotyped East. As a response, Eastern societies have secreted the reverse imaginary force, *Occidentalism*, as a political and cultural imagination of the West in the "Eastern mind," in a strange and paradoxical mimesis and counter-mimesis process. Egalitarianism, and other claims relating to decolonisation in the realm of politics and culture in Asia (at large) seem to take on a *Kulturkampf* between emerging ideological and cultural forces in Asia and a more and more "provincialised" West (according to Chakrabarty), risking the essentialisation of culture and religion. Moreover, it is very important to consider the diversity of the moral geographies of the East, and the distinction between territorial imaginations on the "Near East" and "Far East," where religions have rather differently faced the challenges of modernisation and globalisation, even if identity reinvention through

religious resistance and empowerment is a common dynamic observed here and there. It remains that colonialism and postcolonialism as *perspectives* to understand the rapid and massive transformations of Asian cultures and religions are still a rather new section in Asian Studies, to be nourished by empirically informed researches. David Kim has successfully gathered here a series of instructive and illustrative case studies revealing the continuing logics of colonial forces in the modern history of Asia. We hope and do not doubt that this volume will contribute significantly to this topical yet essential key debate in the context of Asia.

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INTRODUCTION

The localisation of a region, group, culture, or nation was a common social phenomenon in the pre-modern era of Asia, but global colonialism began to affect the lifestyle of local people. In particular, western authorities introduced more advanced skills such as technology, navigation, medicine and education into Asia, but whether they always cooperated with regional people is a curious issue. What was the cultural condition of their relationship between locals and newcomers? The influence of imperialism has been criticised in various ways, but the role of colonial power over the religious communities and the emergence of new religions in Asian cultures have not received significant attention among scholars, even though the Asian continent is home to many religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Islam, Shintoism, and Shamanism. It is also an undeniable fact that Asian society and culture were formed based on such a religious environment. *Colonial Transformation and Asian Religions in Modern History* will unveil multi-angle perspectives of the socio-religious transition of Asian society. This book uses the cultural religiosity of Asian people as a lens through which readers can re-examine the concepts of imperialism, religious syncretism and modernisation. In addition, the book's contributors interpret the growth of new religions as another perspective of anti-colonialism. This new approach offers a significant insight to comprehending the practical agony and sorrow of the regional people of Asia in the context of modern history.

The subject of this (edited) book is eighteenth- to twentieth-century Asian history related to colonial transformation and Asian religions. The manuscript is composed of selected articles (from a total of sixty-two articles) from the Asian Religion Conference, held on 7-9th April, 2016, at the Australian National University. Although there are already many introductory sources on the colonial societies of modern Asia (*Plantation Society and the Colonial Order in Southeast Asia* (1989), *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia* (1997), and *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy* (2001)), this book uniquely demonstrates the impact of religious and philosophical culture on social development. The scope of the book covers the identity, culture, and teachings of religious communities in modern Asian society. The socio-political influence of Asian religions on local people will be the primary focus, with less

attention given to economic perspectives. Attention to Asian history, ethnology, and traditional religions will help to apprehend the theme of this project. Further, this new book offers a new view of the socio-religious phenomena of Asian countries through examining the structure and unique teaching of the old and new religions. The inquiry of religious persecution and social apprehension under imperial influence will underline the new cultural landscape of Asia.

Colonial Transformation and Asian Religions in Modern History has three sections (twelve chapters): South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Section One (six chapters) will describe the religious landscape of South Asia where the religious communities are evaluated from a colonial perspective. The topics of "animal baiting and holy shrines in Pakistan," "the Peshwa and the Brahmin community in Maharashtra," and "Kāmākhyā and Nīlācala in Kāmarūpa," will be reviewed in a socio-religious context. The *Mahābhārata* will be explored by three papers in which Indian literature is seen from the perspective of political text, of the Bhagavad Gita, and of the female reformer. Section Two (two chapters) approaches the region of Southeast Asia. Here, the characteristic of medieval Buddhist Art is analysed for the origin of the state religion in Champa (Vietnam), while the religious community of Pentecostals is considered in the context of democratic politics in the modern Philippines. Section Three (four chapters) demonstrates the colonial conflicts or harmony of the religious movements in the region of East Asia. Many nations belong to the region of East Asia, including Mongolia, but this part explores the colonial transformation of China, South Korea and Japan, focusing on the manifestations of "Australian Presbyterian volunteerism during the Korean War," "the Japanese new religion of Tenrikyo," and "the interpretation of Nagasaki Catholics on the atomic bombing," and the cultural image of "Tibetan Buddhism in China."

In detail, Chapter One, in the South Asia section, discusses the politics of organising animal baiting activities and Muslim religious festivals (*urs* or *meely*) adjacent to 10 rural shrines of South Punjab, Pakistan. Taking a short detour into Indian colonial history, Muhammad Kavesh examines the strategies of current South Punjabi politicians for perpetuating power. He raises multiple questions: how did contemporary South Punjabi politicians use colonial manoeuvres for wielding authority? How and why has animal baiting been seen as an expression of masculinity since colonial times? How does the mechanism of corruption work in favour of the district bureaucrats and rural politicians? Kavesh then argues that the colonial laws that provided pathways to the British such as controlling the pilgrims' gatherings, to minimising the risks of

affrays, riots, and public epidemics, or organising/banning animal baiting activities, are still utilised by the district authorities and local politicians of South Punjab to strengthen and perpetuate power in the area. Chapter Two explains the cross-cultural negotiation which took place at Nīlācala, through the analysis of Sanskrit mythologies connected to the sacred hill as well as the study of ritual praxis linked to the temple of Kāmākhyā. Paolo E. Rosati here demonstrates that in Kāmarūpa (Assam, north-eastern India) after the Hindu cultural penetration, mirrored by the mytho-historical invasion headed by Naraka, the *Paurāṇikas* to legitimise the *yoni* (vulva) tribal symbol within the Brahmanic ideology manipulated the mythology of Dakṣa's sacrifice. Therefore, only the North-eastern *purāṇas* narrate the origin of the *śākta-pīṭhas* (seats of the goddess) from the limbs of Satī, after her body's dismemberment; her *yoni* landed on Nīlācala in Kāmarūpa, where Kāmadeva (Desire) regained his shape after he had been incinerated by Śiva. Thence, the tribal *yoni* was transformed in the "*yoni* of Satī" and Nīlācala became the *yoni-pīṭha*. The Kāmarūpa is connected either with sexual or death imagery, and both are inherited from tribal traditions. Yet, the local goddess Kāmākhyā was absorbed into the Hindu pantheon, though her tribal roots survived within the mythologies of desire, death, and rebirth which linked Kāmadeva and Satī to the temple of Kāmākhyā on Nīlācala, as well as in her aniconic cult and in its related ritual praxis.

Chapter Three shows how religion has had prime importance in the debates on colonialism in India and how religion became a contested category to reach modernity. In the process "dharma" that became the new signifier, operated through the institutional apparatuses, in social reform initiatives, in public ceremonies and ritualistic practices. Alok Oak argues that the dharmic basis for social, ethical, and political mobilisation against British colonialism in the late 19th century assumed different modes of engagement. Raising objections to the decades-old perception of the role of religion in the colonialism-modernity binary as either a form of revivalism or as a form of "derivative" discourse, this paper substantiates dharma (religion) as a universal politico-ethical category. Taking a cue from western liberal tradition as well as the medieval saint poetry of Maharashtra, M. G. Ranade (1842-1901) became the biggest exponent of such dharmic rationality in the 19th century. This paper argues that Ranade was attempting a distinct exposition of liberalism co-habiting the spaces opened up by his interpretations of the western discourse and the dualist philosophy within Hinduism. Meanwhile, Chapter Four explores the use of the epic text, the *Mahābhārata,* in political discourse over the past twelve years, specifically since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) lost power

centrally in 2004 and regained it again in 2014. It suggests that the appropriation of this text by politicians and the media, and the adoption of some of its central characters as political role models have been a deliberate strategy and a significant influence in propelling the BJP to power. This stands in contrast to the media's exaltation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's charisma and supposed good economic management in Gujarat. Greg Bailey extends this appropriation of the epic by making some comments about the well-publicised attempt by figures such as Yellapragada Sudershan Rao, chairman of the Indian Council of Historical Research, to lay the groundwork for both epics to be regarded as definitive, almost mirror image, sources of early Indian history and of leaving a marked heritage to the present day. By an analysis of contemporary media articles from Indian newspapers, the paper argues that both politicians and journalists are employing these to frame political activity in terms of a civilisational narrative that, though being over two thousand years old, still has a very vibrant reality in the present day.

Taritwat Chaihemwong, in Chapter Five, approaches the Bhagavad Gita which is one of the sacred texts of Hinduism. The Bhagavad Gita is esteemed to be the jewel of Hindu literature and a container of the Upanishad, which is based upon experience, thought, and action as important aspects of human life, and advocates the values to humanity. *Karma Yoga* in the Bhagavad Gita is seen as the performance of actions without caring for their fruits; this is reflected as the essence of the Bhagavad Gita's teaching which provides the basis of practical humanism with a spiritual bent of mind. Chaihemwong sees that no action can be without a result, but one should not aspire for any results of his/her action because aspiration brings selfhood and increases the *ego* in man. The Bhagavad Gita is reflected to teach how to solve human problems in practical life as the opening section of the Bhagavad Gita raises the question of human action. This paper argues that followers must discharge their worldly duties selflessly and sincerely, but while doing so, they should always keep the thought in their mind from the shades of selfishness. Thus, the paper includes the concept that *Karma Yoga* in the Bhagavad Gita is the important way for attaining light to perfect oneself, to eradicate evils from the earth, and to establish eternal peace for humankind.

Chapter Six regards the empowerment of women in the form of the socio-religious reformation of society in the age of the epic Mahabharata (400 BC-400 AD) and in the society of British Colonial Calcutta in the 19th century. With respect to the society of the Mahabharata, Supriya Banik Pal explores the socio-cultural experiences and obstacles that were

faced by the average Brahmin housewife, and contrasts them with patriarchal religious ideals. Rani Rashmoni, born to a lower-caste poor family and the wife of a Zamindar, is considered to be one of the eminent social reformers of the Bengal Renaissance. Her strong personality, humanity, political wisdom, religious virtue, social welfare, and resistance against the British are of great importance. The paper shows that she built the Dakshineswar-Kali-temple which has been the centre for spiritual awakening since the 19th century. But how were Brahmani and Rashmoni being represented in the era of the Mahabharata and in Colonial Bengal respectively? Was there any difference? This article not only investigates these issues with a post-modern outlook but also evaluates the propagation of the social structures and customs that emphasised specific and distinct gender roles within society.

Chapter Seven, in the Southeast Asia section, explores 9th-century Champa Buddhist art. According to Ann R. Proctor, during the ninth century CE a monumental Buddhist monastery and temple were built by a Cham king at Đồng Dương near present-day Đà Nẵng, Vietnam. Consecrated in 875 CE, it was one of the largest Buddhist establishments ever built in Southeast Asia. The once vast complex was built in the city of Indrapura, described as "The city covered with splendour, as is the city of Indra, sparkling with white lotuses." However, the splendid city of Indrapura was deserted by the year 1000. Through examining architectural remains and sculpture, this paper sustains that Cham linkages with India through Southeast Asia and China are evident in historical records, and the form of religion appears to be a version of esoteric Buddhism with particular emphasis on the compassionate saviour, Avalokiteshvara. Proctor also addresses the fact that the unique style of Đồng Dương sculptures attests to the syncretic form of religion followed by the Cham elite at this time. Chapter Eight examines Filipino Pentecostals as a community of believers as to whether they are democratically participative, locally acting, and translating the Gospel of Christ in all its fullness in the strengthening of civil society and democratic politics in the Philippines. Joel A. Tejedo selected two groups of Pentecostal believers as respondents to probe whether there is a significant difference between the political engagement of Ilocano and Cordilleran Pentecostals. Using the measurement tools designed by the Judkins Institute of Leadership and the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey of the Sanguaro Seminar of Harvard University, Tejedo utilises a statistical formula to test the data as to whether these differences and commonalities indicate cohesive political engagement in the political world. The results of the study show that there is no crucial difference between the perception of Ilocano and Cordilleran

Pentecostals. However, the findings reveal the significant observations that Pentecostal believers, both Ilocano and Cordilleran, have a high level of political participation, demonstrated in their civic and political participation in the local communities. This paper suggests that Filipino Pentecostals are beginning to translate the meaning of the gospel into the creation of just politics in the public sphere.

Chapter Nine, in the East Asia section, delivers a case study of the Australian NGO movement during the Korean War (1950-1953), through which the religious vulnerary activities affected the socio-cultural situation of Korea in the process of its modernisation. Here, the Korean peninsula, like Taiwan (1895-1945), was seen as one of the colonies of Japan in the first half of the twentieth century (1910-1945). The end of World War II brought an opportunity to be independent, but the different ideologies of the Capitalist Bloc and the Soviet Bloc caused the Cold War. The Korean War was the initial result of the political conflict. Australia did not have diplomatic relations with the unsteady nation until 1963, but this paper not only explores the social activities of the Australian NGO group (the Presbyterian Church of Australia (PCA), together with the Presbyterian Women's Missionary Union (PWMU)), but also argues that the religious volunteerism of humanitarian aid, medical work, religious mission, and education was a significant refugee project in Pusan (temporary capital) and Kyungnam province.

According to Chapter Ten, Tenrikyo was established in 1838. The time was towards the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate (Edo era, 1603~1868) and on the threshold of a new phase of the Meiji era (1868~1912). The new religion was referred to as "the religion in transitional" Japan. Midori Horiuchi sees that it was a time marked by the end of the closed-door policy in Japan. Previous to that time the Edo government's policy towards religions was the *danka*-system. Namely, Buddhist temples wrote *terauke* ("registration") certificates for all their affiliated households, while households had the duty to become *danka* of the closest Buddhist temple. There was no freedom of belief for individuals. Under those circumstances what impact did the divinely revealed religion of Tenrikyo provide to the people? This paper considers some characteristics of the "new religion" Tenrikyo through the responses of the community and people of that transitional period of Japanese history. Chapter Eleven discusses how Nagai Takashi's interpretation of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki as *hansai* or a burnt offering has been negotiated by the modern Catholic *hibakusha* community. This analysis is part of an oral history project interviewing Catholic survivors of the bombing and other community members about community memory

including faith perspectives and perceptions of the bombing. In view of the presence of 12000 Catholics close to ground zero of whom 8500 are said to have been killed, Nagai's interpretation proved to be significant for the community. After his death in 1951, Nagai's interpretation was increasingly criticised, not only by outsiders but also by the surviving Catholic community. How did the Papal visit in 1981 shift the Catholic interpretation of the bomb? Gwyn McClelland sustains that the Pope's description of the bombing as inflicted by humanity shifted the discourse significantly. Moving beyond the *hansai* interpretation has been necessary for the surviving community, who have relinquished some of Nagai's terms. How then do modern Catholic survivors remember the bombing? The political theology of Johann Baptist Metz and Renè Girard's "scapegoat" mechanism may subvert the suggestion that smaller violence halts larger violence, just as the survivors' reinterpretation of religious vocabulary demonstrates agency and resistance beyond victimhood.

The last chapter (Twelve) demonstrates the cultural transformation of Eastern Tibet in contemporary China. Since Tibet's abrupt meeting in the 1980s with the modernising forces of capitalism, science and the Chinese Communist Party's policies on religion, Buddhism in Eastern Tibet has been shifting towards a valuing of scholastic knowledge over yogic, experiential knowledge. This is seen as evident in Tibetan dialogues heard in monasteries, public debates, and publications in which practitioners who do not marry their meditation and yogic practices with in-depth textual study are criticised. Elizabeth McDougal maintains that the shift is particularly apparent in Nangchen, a former kingdom in Eastern Tibet, where oral lineages that engaged in tantric sādhanās and yogas without much dialectical study used to fill the region's many hermitages. This research takes Gebchak nunnery in Nangchen as an example of Eastern Tibet's earlier contemplative culture, and juxtaposes the Nunnery's determination to preserve their original practice traditions with the shift towards scholasticism taking place elsewhere in the region.

Ultimately, each article of this volume (*Colonial Transformation and Asian Religions in Modern History*) reflects the historical perspective of modern Asia; the colonial time for religions was the socio-cultural transformation moment in which local communities or religious groups, in order to survive, had to be either negotiated or altered by the external environment or its influences. Chapters One, Two, Eight, Ten, Twelve, and Thirteen were based on field research in the contexts of cultural anthropology, arts, history, politics, and culture. Chapter Nine was the result of a survey on the Pentecostal evangelisation of the politics of the Phillippines, while chapters Three to Seven and Eleven were about the

issues of society, rebellion, scripture, women, and new religions. Such approaches of Asian religions in modern history are enough to indicate the conclusion that religious traditions can be maintained in the process of historical transformation, but they need to accept cultural challenge or political compromise.

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PART ONE:

SOUTH ASIA

CHAPTER ONE

FROM COLONY TO POST-COLONY: ANIMAL BAITING AND RELIGIOUS FESTIVALS IN SOUTH PUNJAB, PAKISTAN

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Despite their illegal status, baiting activities have been widely practised in many countries throughout the world. Some are presumed to have existed in Rome's Coliseum,[1] where dogs were baited against other animals to appreciate the dog's fierceness and aggression.[2] From the 12th century, baiting activities became popular in medieval England,[3] where dogs were pitted against bears, bulls, badgers, and even rats.[4] Brownstein noted that from Roman times, England was famous for the large and ferocious English mastiff, which was "used for hunting, but primarily he was bred and trained to be a man killer as watch-dog or war-dog."[5] As such, the mastiff for Britons was an emblem of strength, courage, aggression and other characteristics that were symbols of English masculine prowess.[6] Baiting activities flourished as a popular pastime in Britain and reached

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[1] Hanna Gibson, *Dog Fighting: Detailed Discussion* (Michigan Staff University, College of Law: Animal Legal & Historical Center, 2005), 4.

[2] Linda Kalof and Carl Taylor, "The Discourse of Dog Fighting," *Humanity & Society* 31, 4 (2007): 321-22.

[3] Phyllis G. Coleman, "Note to Athletes, NFL, and NBA: Dog Fighting is a Crime, not a Sport," *Journal of Animal Law & Ethics* 3, 1 (2009): 88.

[4] Rhonda D. Evans and Craig J. Forsyth, "Entertainment to Outrage: A Social Historical View of Dog Fighting," *International Review of Modern Sociology* 27, 2 (1997): 61.

[5] Oscar Brownstein, "The Popularity of Baiting in England Before 1600: A Study in Social and Theatrical History," *Educational Theatre Journal* 21, 3 (1969): 243.

[6] Kalof and Taylor, "The Discourse of Dog Fighting," 322.

their peak in the 16th century.[7] At that time, it was an amusement of royalty, appreciated by monarchs, aristocrats, nobility, and the gentry; and was taken with utmost earnestness by the people of all classes.[8] Scholars observed that King Henry VIII and Queen Elizabeth I enjoyed baiting activities, and presented dogs (mostly English mastiffs) as royal gifts to other heads of state.[9] Such gifts are revealing in politically astute exchange, as the courageous dog embodied the traits of its presenter—the courageous and powerful monarch, and functioned in developing/maintaining hierarchies.[10]

In the 16th century, bull baiting and bear baiting in England were popular, even more so than the drama of that period.[11] The baiting activities at that time not only displayed the dog's qualities against bears, bulls and rats, but they also served some utilitarian functions.[12] The bull was selected for baiting so that before slaughter, the frenzied exercise would tenderise the bull's meat.[13] The bear was chosen because of its similarity to humans in form and shape and the dog's win over the bear depicted its ascendancy over a more powerful creature.[14] In addition, ratting was performed to reduce the population of rats in the cities at the time when the sewer system was not fully developed.[15] However, from serving utilitarian functions, the baiting activities soon became

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[7] Mike Homan, *A Complete History of Fighting Dogs* (Gloucestershire: Ringpress Books, 1999). Dieter Fleig, *History of Fighting Dogs* (Neptune City: THF Publications, 1996).

[8] Evans and Forsyth, "Entertainment to Outrage: A Social Historical View of Dog Fighting," 61.

[9] Brownstein, "The Popularity of Baiting in England Before 1600: A Study in Social and Theatrical History," 243.

[10] Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*, trans. Ian Gunnison (New York and London: The Norton Library, 1954), 72.

[11] Brownstein, "The Popularity of Baiting in England Before 1600: A Study in Social and Theatrical History," 237.

[12] Rhonda Evans, DeAnn K. Gauthier, and Craig J. Forsyth, "Dog Fighting: Symbolic Expression and Validation of Masculinity," *Sex Roles* 39, 11-12 (1998): 827.

[13] Kalof and Taylor, "The Discourse of Dog Fighting," 322.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Evans and Forsyth, "Entertainment to Outrage: A Social Historical View of Dog Fighting," 61.

entertainment.[16] In all these baiting activities, the audience praised the mastiff's ferocity, and was eager to see it as a winner.[17]

In the 18th century, a new form of entertainment was introduced in addition to bull baiting and bear baiting. The activity of dog fighting (two dogs fighting against each other) appeared as another popular choice.[18] The major reason for its introduction was that dog fighting appeared as more sporting and competitive than bull baiting or bear baiting. In dog fighting, the canines were not attacking a tethered victim (bear or bull) but fighting against each other on equal grounds.[19] Dog fighting and other baiting activities remained legal for almost a century with the support of members of the upper class, who at that time were commercial breeders of the baiting animals and had control of the market.[20] Any change in the law was strongly opposed, for instance when in 1800, the House of Commons presented a bill for abolishing bull-baiting in the British Parliament, it was defeated on the grounds that the amusement inspired courage and produced an elevation of mind.[21]

In India, the British colonialists introduced bear baiting in the 18th century. Until the present day, the outcrosses of the English bull terrier are the most employed breeds in bear baiting and dog fighting. The perpetuation of animal baiting in India has been seen by some as the British strategy to initiate relations with local landlords, who in exchange took up these activities "to develop relations with the British rulers and establish their important status within the rural community."[22] For many years, animal baiting remained a symbol of conspicuous leisure and martial masculinity for the British. During the early colonial time, the British not only transmitted the activities to Indian landlords, they also

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[16] Evans, Gauthier, and Forsyth, "Dog Fighting: Symbolic Expression and Validation of Masculinity," 827.
[17] Brownstein, "The Popularity of Baiting in England Before 1600: A Study in Social and Theatrical History," 243.
[18] Evans and Forsyth, "Entertainment to Outrage: A Social Historical View of Dog Fighting," 62.
[19] Kalof and Taylor, "The Discourse of Dog Fighting," 323.
[20] Evans and Forsyth, "Entertainment to Outrage: A Social Historical View of Dog Fighting," 62.
[21] Harriet Ritvo, "Animals in Nineteenth-century Britain: Complicated Attitudes and Competing Categories," in *Animals and Human Society: Changing Perspectives*, eds. Aubrey Manning and James Serpell (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 106.
[22] John Joseph, "Bear-baiting in Pakistan," in *World Society for the Protection of Animal's Liberty Campaign* (World Society for the Protection of Animals, 1997), 4.

transferred the meanings they carried (such as to depict the dog's masculine courage and strength over other animals). Bulls held a religious and utilitarian (farming) significance for both Hindus and Muslims, so they were not baited against dogs. However, bear baiting and dog fighting were practised to appreciate the martial masculine skills of dogs (courage, bravery, aggression, and strength, to name a few).

Slowly, the animal activities received opposition in England from the moral philosophers. In the 18th century, many religious and moral philosophical schools debated the use and abuse of non-human animals. These debates were the precursor to the animal welfare movement. The core of these debates was the demand for more humane treatment and the prevention of cruelty to all animals. These 18th century moral philosophers not only discouraged beating or baiting animals but also insisted on the complete care and protection of animals. Among them, English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was a central advocate for raising concerns on animal suffering: "The question is not, Can [animals] *reason*? nor, Can they *talk*? but, Can they *suffer*?" he argued.[23] Bentham and many others criticised the inhumane treatment of non-human animals during that time.

In the 19th century, baiting activities started to lose their elite patronage and were banned in England with the Humane Act of 1835.[24] The reasons for banning animal baiting in England were much more than the pressure from moral philosophers. For instance, its opposition stemmed from the Church of England: most of the animal baiting was being practised on Sundays, and significantly reduced the audience of the church.[25] Secondly, the increasing impact of Victorian sensibilities, such as morality, sympathy, suffering, and self-righteousness underpinned the ban on such activities. However, because of Victorian moral principles animal baiting slowly lost its elite patronage, whereas other "blood sports" such as game-hunting, fox-hunting, and tiger-hunting in India (as elite activities) continued as gentlemen's recreation.[26] And lastly, as Dunning

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[23] Jonathan Benthall, "Animal Liberation and Rights," *Anthropology Today* 23, 2 (2007): 2.
[24] Coleman, "Note to Athletes, NFL, and NBA: Dog Fighting is a Crime, not a Sport," 88.
[25] Evans and Forsyth, "Entertainment to Outrage: A Social Historical View of Dog Fighting," 63.
[26] Anand S. Pandian, "Predatory Care: The Imperial Hunt in Mughal and British India," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 14, 1 (2001). Shafqat Hussain, "Sports-hunting, Fairness and Colonial Identity: Collaboration and Subversion in the Northwestern Frontier Region of the British Indian," *Conservation and Society* 8, 2

has noted, in the "age of revolution" baiting activities were attracting large crowds, and were considered a threat for propagating riots and affrays.[27]

As the Indian natives adopted bear baiting and dog fighting, the British elites turned their attention away, and adopted tiger killing and game hunting in the Himalayas as an expression of their masculine prowess and conspicuous leisure. Veblen has noted that leisure is worthy, honourable and noble if it involves the element of exploitation, and those employments that do not contain exploitation are seen as unworthy, debasing, and ignoble.[28] By exploiting the wildlife and killing the "man-eating tiger," the British not only engaged in an "honourable" form of leisure, they also justified their role as worthy rulers and masters of the wild.[29]

In 1824, "The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" was established in England. Soon after, the society received royal patronage and changed to "The *Royal* Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" under the aegis of Queen Victoria.[30] At the end of the 19th century, dog fighting along with all other types of baiting were declared illegal by the British Government of India through the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1890 as an effort to extend the boundary of the Victorian humane doctrine to include the colony.

After independence in 1947, both the newly established Indian and Pakistani Governments adopted the laws developed by the British. Although the Indian Government made amendments to the Prevention to Cruelty Act in 1960,[31] in Pakistan the 1890 version of the Act is still intact with very minor changes. According to section 6-C of the Act, if any person incites or baits any animal to fight, the person will be punished with a fine of up to fifty rupees (about a half-dollar in the present day). In

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(2010): 32-36. William K. Storey, "Big Cats and Imperialism: Lion and Tiger Hunting in Kenya and Northern India, 1898-1930," *Journal of World History* 2, 2 (1991): 154-161.

[27] Tom Dunning, "Animal Baiting," in *Encyclopedia of World Sport: From Ancient Times to the Present*, eds. David Levinson and Karen Christensen (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1996), 30.

[28] Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912), 15.

[29] Pandian, "Predatory Care: The Imperial Hunt in Mughal and British India," 84.

[30] Ritvo, "Animals in Nineteenth-century Britain: Complicated Attitudes and Competing Categories," 108.

[31] Krithika Srinivasan, "The Biopolitics of Animal Being and Welfare: Dog Control and Care in the UK and India," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 38, 1 (2013): 108.

section 3(a), there is mention of a three-month term of imprisonment for the person who treats animals with cruelty.[32] The penalty for inciting animals to fight was a deterrent in 1890, when 50 rupees was a huge sum. In the present day, the value of the fine is nominal, and has resulted in minimal police action as regard to animal baiting.

The activity of bear baiting has been recently outlawed in Sindh province through a bear protection law, and the Bio-Resource Research Centre (BRC)[33] in coordination with the Wildlife department of Pakistan is taking steps to ban the activity in the whole of Pakistan. Bear baiting as an activity was a popular feature of festivals in parts of rural Punjab and Sindh where two or more dogs were unleashed to attack a tethered bear. The canine (and sometimes incisor) teeth, and nails of the bear were removed before the fight to give the dogs a clear advantage over the bear.[34] The popularity of bear baiting as a rural entertainment remained at its peak until the mid-1990s, but a decrease in wild bears, most importantly Asiatic black bears,[35] raised some concerns from international animal rights groups [such as the World Society for the Protection of Animals]. This resulted in formidable opposition to bear baiting from the Wildlife department in Pakistan which supported the BRC to eradicate the practice of bear baiting in the country: "we started this project in 1994 as a species conservation drive. At the start there were 1200 bear baiting cases in one year, but in 2014 there were only eight events," commented the director of the BRC.

The chief strategy of the BRC was to convince Imams (the persons who lead prayers in a mosque) from different Islamic sects to speak against bear baiting. Imams are men of great stature whose designation as religious authorities and community leaders means that they can speak against such deleterious activities during their weekly sermon of Friday noon prayer in the mosque. In February 2015, bear baiting was officially declared illegal in Sindh province. In addition, keeping and using bears for

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[32] The Government of India, "The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act," The Government of India (1890).

[33] Bio-resource Research Centre (BRC), "Bearbaiting," Bio-resource Research Centre (BRC), http://www. pbrc.edu.pk/bearbaiting.htm, accessed on 10/11/2015.

[34] The practice of making the bear more vulnerable by tethering it with a chain was adopted from the British, see Kalof and Taylor, 2007, 323.

[35] Asiatic Black Bear or Himalayan Black Bear has been listed as "vulnerable" to extinction by the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (see The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 2015).

dancing,[36] begging or in the circus were also declared illegal, and the penalties for these acts were fines up to 100,000 rupees (about $1000) and/or imprisonment for two years.[37] The pronouncement of religious authorities in declaring bear baiting as un-Islamic, along with legal actions and severe penalties enforced by the state with the pressure of international animal welfare organisations, has put an end to this practice.

Mela in South Punjab

In present-day rural South Punjab (and rural Pakistan at large), animal baiting (other than bear baiting) is not thwarted by the police or other law enforcing authorities. Most of the animal baiting activities are organised by rural politicians as part of rural cultural festivals (*melas*). When a police SHO (Session House Officer) was asked for his opinion about the legality of animal baiting, he shrugged and stated "festival organisers (the politicians) obtain permission beforehand from higher district authorities such as DPOs (District Police Officer) and DCOs (District Coordination Officer), so how are we (low-ranked officers) supposed to raid the event?" In the early colonial period, animal baiting activities helped the British in their dominance over the Indian subcontinent. Now these activities are assisting rural politicians to further their political ambitions.

A *mela* (the term originated from the Sanskrit word *mel*) usually refers to a religious fair where thousands of people come together and celebrate the death anniversary of a Sufi saint or martyr engraved in the shrine. However, it is important to note that the *melas* taking place in South Punjab should not be considered similar to the *urs*[38] festivals being

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[36] In rural Pakistan, beggars train monkeys and bears to perform certain tricks (referred to as bear-dance), and display the performance to rural audiences in village streets to get some money in reward.

[37] Sameer Mandhro, "Sindh Bans Bear-baiting," *The Express Tribune*, 19 February 2015. World Animal Protection, "New Law a Major Step Forward in Protecting Bears in Pakistan," World Animal Protection, http://www.worldanimalprotection.org/news/new-law-major-step-forward-protecting-bears-pakistan, accessed on 22/03/2016.

[38] The word *urs,* literally meaning "marriage" in Arabic, symbolises the mystical union of the soul with God. In popular culture, the term is used for the death anniversary of a saint that is celebrated at his shrine to honour his efforts and services to humanity. Some famous *urs* of popular Sufi shrines (such as the *urs* of Lal Shahbaz Qalander in Sindh, the *urs* of Data Ganj Bakhsh in Lahore, and the *urs* of Baha-ud-Din Zakriya in Multan) even congregate hundreds of thousands of people on the occasion.