

Metaphorical Imagination

Metaphorical Imagination:

*Towards a Methodology
for Implicit Evidence*

By

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A truer [marital] relationship is more than
the physical metaphor—the vocal, carnal,
and contractual; it is essentially [clothed]
within a body-soul embodiment

To Khadija—my *soulmate*

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PROLOGUE

Living by Neil Diamond's lyrical metaphor [The Story of My Life, 1986], this book tells *the story of my* [academic] *life*. It starts with the struggle of my PhD days, and may end [only] on the day I leave this world. Certainly, it is the *story of our times*: tragic times of fallacious evidence and partial truths—a *never letting go*; that I hope people will find *plain to read*.

This book interconnects the domains of critical theory, embodiment philosophy, cognitive linguistics, and qualitative research; and I do not privilege myself to essential specialism, academic training, or resourcefulness, in these domains. I am also unprivileged in academic contacts and peer support for help in reviews and technical comments. I consider myself privileged only as a sensitive observer and life-long learner, trying to follow an instinctive sense for assigning values to my first-hand experiences. Metaphor is my gifted storyteller, and only in metaphor could one safely assert that *the story's still the truth*—a claim I make in this book.

The story follows 25 years of my rewarding *fellowship* with metaphor, which would influence my observation and [life-long] learning. In February 2000, over a seminar lecture at Lancaster University, Prof. Maggie Mort, would smilingly introduce me as: “Tanweer, from mathematics to metaphor!” This seemed to have hinted at two amusing facts: my first degree in mathematics and over a year's (1991) struggle for [intellectual] survival in the most celebrated but *hardcore* Operational Research department at Lancaster's management school where I completed a research masters. In my PhD proposal I had opted for *soft* analytical models. I was quite convinced that even if I wanted to assign mathematical and

statistical efficacy to *human group behavioural complexity*, it would not actually be as simple as it appeared. So, rather than making the usual change in the proposal, I decided to change department and moved to Applied Social Science. Prof. Alan Beattie, my academic supervisor from 1992 to 1994, and I were inspired by Gareth Morgan's *Images of Organization* [1986] and mutually decided that I expand the "images" to an *inter-organisational* domain and study the challenging norms of interagency collaboration. Unfortunately, in the middle of my research data analysis and write-up, my scholarship came to an end, reducing my status to a non-resident student and resulting in an unwanted break of four years (1994-1998). However, this break allowed for a helpful *drilling down* of the metaphors under my study, and testing their staying power in refining and finishing my PhD (1999-2000) with the generous support of Prof. Roger Clough. This break also put to the test my love for metaphor.

Beyond the PhD, I held on to my strong belief in a utility of metaphorical modeling in organisation analysis and social research. This conviction, *vis-à-vis* my experience of the flaws of scientific positivism, is reflected in the first chapter, and carried on to serve as an inquiry-in-writing format since then, in 2006-2007 in particular, when I drafted three chapters of this book at the School of Education at the University of Leeds. Over the years, I have shared this conviction through conference papers, publications, and even some preliminary schemata [Abdullah, 2000a; 2000b; 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2006; 2008a; 2008b; 2010; 2014; 2015]. I kept pointing to the *never letting go* of the challenges of social research practice, alongside a growing need for parallel sensemaking options to review complexity and deception in contemporary evidence—*the story of our times*. Certainly, I maintained my confidence in metaphor in order to take on this challenge.

A saying associated with psychologist Abraham Maslow is that *if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail*. This seems true in our choice of social research methods. More noticeably since the 21st century, the positivist protocols of our methodology toolkit have failed us in terms of their sophistication and penetrative power to study complex settings. But why is it that, this book asks, we would be “hushed up” by these complexities? By overviewing the 21st century evidence, this book allows us to *revisit* the epistemology and ontology of evidence. This revisit makes little claim to bringing about an academic revolution, but does emphasise a cognitive [*r*]evolution—an indispensable sense of *methodological* direction, marking and flagging up posts for researchers who take evidence seriously.

It is over this *revisit* that I introduce metaphor as a schema that allows researchers to *re*interpret evidential complexities around them. The normative position I take is to prepare the grounds—both theoretical and moral—for the utilisation of metaphor as a cognitive methodology that I call Metaphorical Imagination (MI). Over the entire history of our empirical knowledge, we only *discover*, *uncover*, and/or *recover* what has already existed: the physical laws of gravity and motion, the chemical formulae, and a range of diseases. In the same way, all evidence of mainstream complexity exists *out there*. MI lets us unfold and interpret this evidence. Such a capacity for discovery is not possible in the positivist tradition; still MI does not undervalue empiricism that must hold *phenomenal* and *realist* influence over our intellect. MI allows embodied cognition of empiricism and intuitivism—the *body* and *soul* of evidence. As such, the normative scope of MI may appear helpfully thinner than critical social theory and sociological traditions such as Symbolic Interactionism, but thicker and more inclusive as compared to Researching and Applying

Metaphor (RaAM) which studies an exclusive metaphorical discourse inside specific contexts.

MI is nothing new at all. It is ever-present in mainstream poetry, whether romantic or mystic, embodying the body and the soul, letting both implicitly speak for each other. It is only in a “disciplined” capacity that MI offers a *renewed* sphere of intellectual influence that cuts across all levels: a respondent’s setting (individual, societal, or universal) *vis-à-vis* his or her responses, and the categories of academic disciplines to study these responses. Building on critical social research and clear gaps in social theory, MI takes us to a postdisciplinary world of Implicit Evidence (IE), whereupon we involuntarily unlock ourselves from our *specialist* identity genres that we assumed we were tied to. This presents a challenging debate, but one worth engaging in. For empiricism to end up [only] in relativism (which I assert is the case), has been embarrassing for our sensemaking capacities. In our intellectual journeys, most of us would keep tracing *circles* in search of our truths, consuming *times* but staying fixed to our *spaces*. MI may not take us to [all] the truths that we must seek, but it fills up the knowledge gaps in a direction of the truth[s]. MI offers us *tangential* hope!

MI produces the scope for our methodological survival. Intuitivism in MI is not beyond or against the empiricist “here and now” but rather, paradoxically *within* mutuality of these **spaces** and **times**; allowing us to see the forest for the trees the same way as the trees for the forest. MI gives shape to an intuitive image of *a dense forest* that we do not miss in a thick account of the empiricist data *trees*. Specifically, MI allows methodological sustenance within inconsistent settings:

- *Where* and *when* the quality and credibility of empirical evidence are likely to be questioned;

- *Where* and *when* the evidential settings are likely to be complex, uncertain, and deceptive;
- *Where* and *when* the evidential settings are figurative and likely to be insufficient to rationalise an empirical and literal sense;
- *Where* and *when* evidential settings are likely to reveal hidden meanings across experiential-*intersubjective* and interpretative-*intertextual* analyses; and
- *Where* and *when*, in terms of serendipitous, heuristic, and reflexive sensemaking of implicit contexts, the tacit influence is likely to become cognitively viable.

I hope students of social research theory, critical social and organisational inquiry, and *soft* evaluation methodologies may find this book helpful. It can serve as an academic reference for researchers and practitioners in areas such as investigative journalism, organisational development and social reforms, and propaganda and conspiracy analysis; as well as subjects within applied social science, such as social and community work, race and inter-faith relations, and psychiatric health. It may also help develop indigenous approaches for inquiry into, and prevention of, hate crime, domestic violence, and child- and elderly abuse. Nonetheless, as the evidence shaped up in MI is essentially postdisciplinary, I do not withdraw from, or draw in, any boundaries of social inquiry and practice. Rather, by bringing metaphorical thinking and social research closer, MI invites us to take a break from the usual [*here and now*] fixation, and appreciate the paradoxical wonders of implicit evidence around us. This break can put to the test cognitive-methodological capacities of MI across multiple contextual-experiential explanations.

I divide this book into three parts, each of three chapters. The first part outlines the rationale, scope, and inevitability of intuitive evidence in social research that we customarily call

personal, and whose tacit sensemaking is often [under]treated as unsolicited. Here, I challenge the customary conceptions of [hard] evidence, and make a strong case for intuitive evidence in the metaphor and embodied cognition *vis-à-vis* failings of empiricism in negotiating mainstream complexity in social research theory and practice. The second part presents MI as a cognitive methodology and discusses its key theoretical and operational utility in social science research. In this context, I explain how social [*science*] research is actually an embodied form of cognition of empirical-intuitive evidence that can negotiate mainstream paradoxes. Here, I introduce a cognitive schema that characterises a unique mutuality in shaping the divergence and convergence of research evidence. Further, with “crystallisation” as a case in point, I illustrate how MI could induce a **cognitive restructuring**—from dualism to embodiment. In part three, I discuss the key implications of MI and briefly *revisit* and *reenact* the [dualist] epistemology and ontology of evidence, and subsequently claim all truths to be **only** emergent paradoxical values in metaphor. Here, I discuss the body and soul, and the life and death of the data; losing and winning wars of truths and untruths, knowing and unknowing the purpose of life, and the enlightened and gloomy worlds inside and outside of us. I also assert how the scope of the most sought after ethical responsibility is actually hidden in the metaphor that we enact by *researching*, and how *within* a cognitive unconscious sense of intuitive evidence, metaphor unfolds the rhetoric of truths not only in our [titular] *research*, but in our lives. I also claim all truth-values in social research to be embodied, paradoxical, and postdisciplinary.

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I am indebted to my mother for always helping lift me to a high morale. Her insight and imaginative reasoning into social life is very penetrating, and her strong genetic influence is noticeable in my academic interests. Coincidentally, during the past three years, her Lewy body dementia developed from bad to worse—nearly in parallel with my finalising this book. Initially, her disease would not hold her back from taking the steps to visit me regularly in the early hours of the morning to ask: “Are you still working!” often adding, with a gentle kiss on my shoulder: “When will you finish the book?” And I would reply: “Looks like never!” Though, in recent months, I only hear her calling for me in her several hours of extreme restlessness. When I would leave the work to attend to her, and to hold her closely, she would still fondly kiss my hands, conveying implicitly countless blessings.

I must appreciate my dearest mother- and father-in-law for their continued morale-boosting and benevolence. With his

academic background and interest in philosophy and English literature, my father-in-law has always been there for me for a discussion, and continues to be a most wonderful intellectual inspiration. For my wife Khadija, the book dedication says it all. Her unending moral and academic support approaches co-author status. I am most indebted to my precious sister Fariha for always shouldering my responsibilities, and especially, for not just *standing by* me, but *standing up* for me, when I need someone the most. Her presence in my life is so very special that I find it tough to imagine a life without her.

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I must mention our family pet, Lilly, a Turkish Angora cat: my regular company over the final writing up. She would lie fondly near the keyboard next to my right hand; maybe for an instinctive [proximal] interest in the *mouse* that we shared.

PART I

CHAPTER ONE

SOCIAL RESEARCH: REFLECTIONS ON EVIDENCE

Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul; written words are the signs of words spoken...But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects of which, those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies. [Aristotle, De Interpretatione 1, 16a:3-9; trans. Modrak, DKW, 2001; emphasis added]

1.1. “What is evidence?” Personal anxieties

“You are pulling *the* rug from under your own feet!”

“You must let *the* data speak!”

These were the strongly worded cautions with which two of my PhD supervisors at Lancaster *outmentored* me. They wanted to ensure that I follow *the* prescribed methodology for my fieldwork and adhered to *the* duly approved protocols for data collection, analysis, and interpretation. In opposition to this, I would find myself questioning the fieldwork setting, without focusing too much on a [procedural] projection of the data. I was certain that richer data existed outside of approved methodology and the bounded methods. Nevertheless, I could make sense of this data only in the form of personal *insights* reflecting and evolving out of my experiential interactions with the fieldwork setting. These insights kept defining and redefining the patterns of my conceptions and assumptions of the *goings on* over the progress of the fieldwork.

Interestingly, these insights had emerged in parallel with my methods, and well ahead of the findings typically acquired towards the end. I could follow the emergence of insights through the entire course of fieldwork data collection and even beyond—all the way to data interpretation and the [final] write up. Contrary to my research schedule stages too, this sensemaking of emergence was concurrent, not sequential! I wondered whether that emergence was a parallel sense of infusion, a fusion of my methods with insights, or simply confusion. Owing to the prescribed research focus, i.e. *the rug under my own feet*, I could not endorse the emergence of my insights, and equally was unable to *let the data speak* through the norms of data citation, because a fluidity in such emergent insights could hardly be held together and reported as valid evidence *in the data*.

I was not the only one to have experienced such anxieties. Later, I noticed several social researchers having reported the influence of evolving insights through the course of research and writing up [among others, Holloway and Jefferson, 2000; Wolcott, 2001; Flyrbjerg, 2001; Garratt, 2003; Richardson and Lockeridge, 2004; Richardson and St. Pierre, 2005]. In prescribing the value of heuristic research in the social sciences, Moustakas [1990] claims that such insights actually created a consistency between field realities and the researcher's "reflective thought, feeling, and awareness" (p. 12). In complex research settings such as the one I was studying, Wolcott [2001] would recommend a comprehension of emergent insights even through the "sixth sense". Their reporting, however, would remain an issue.

My PhD fieldwork was mostly qualitative. I had used a *triangulation* of the interview, observation, and questionnaire methods to examine the challenges of collaborative planning faced by agencies working for primary health care in Pakistan [Abdullah, 2000a]. As all the agencies operated in turbulent,

impermanent, and inconsistent political-economic and social-cultural milieus, the fieldwork turned out to be demanding. In that situation, the rationalist and positivist admonitions of my supervisors were indeed well-placed. Their message was clear: to recognise the limiting factors of the setting, but stick to the task. “The best PhD is the finished PhD”, I was warned. Still, I was not convinced I should give up my naïve ambition of making better contextual sense.

In hindsight, I find a social researcher’s usual frustration *against method*—the scientific standards [Feyerabend, 1975, and others], to be natural and understandable. For our PhDs, whether as idealists, pragmatists, or realists, we all struggle with the *approved* normative limits of collecting, processing, and interpreting our data. However, our purpose must be *to find evidence in data and not data in evidence*, and be able to discover any [critical] underlying relationships between the data and evidence. In my case, I was unsure whether such relationships were coincidental, consequential, or transcendental. All I did was to follow a parallel sense of curiosity to unfold evidence in the data that was embedded deeply or existed outside the approved data sources. I strongly felt that our methodological incapacity to register personal insights must not subvert the presence or importance of these insights as a credible source of evidence.

The anxiety about reporting intuitive influences is common to all scholarly traditions of the physical and social sciences. Among others, the mid-20th century philosophies of Michael Polanyi and Hans-Georg Gadamer point to the flaws of empiricism *vis-à-vis* the need to recognise the intuitive, emotive, and imaginative reflections that we all experience in parallel with our prescribed methods of social inquiry. In *Personal Knowledge* [1958] and *The Tacit Dimension* [1967], Polanyi claims that social researchers actually produce [tacit] *personal* knowledge that is unreportable as credible evidence.

Symbolic Interactionism in qualitative research—developed by Blumer [1969], Denzin [1992] and other Chicago School sociologists—acknowledges the social researcher’s role in respect of the setting and all meanings that enact mainstream social realities, while recognising them as instinctually interactive and experiential. A value of contextual sensitivity of the field data with regard to theory emergence is self-explanatory in the notion of the Grounded Theory [Glaser and Strauss, 1967]. Again, the questions of how we rationalise, validate, and report intuitive categorisation remain open to debate [Kelle, 2005].

Hence, I was in a position to realise that tacit insights in social research served only as the researcher’s experiential *means* [Wolcott, 2001; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Brown, 2003; Greenwood and Levin, 2005, among others] but not the methodological *ends*, and subsequently, as a source of evidence. In *Beyond Method* [Morgan, 1983], a mix of social and organisational research suggests that tacit influences persist, but only at the back of the researcher’s mind. This assortment of options certainly offers a function in terms of *methods*, but little support as insistent *methodologies* in sustaining and validating tacit insights as sources of evidence.

1.2. Physical vs. implicit evidence

Through the course of my PhD fieldwork, I developed several personal insights that were, in a way, *beyond method*. These insights evolved across a wide [spatiotemporal] range of fieldwork data sources and perspectives, from hearsay to academic: ideational-ideological, historical, social-linguistic, political-economic, and cultural-institutional, such as: “in relying too much on international donors, the government of Pakistan agencies developed a *dependency syndrome*”.

No systematically collected data could have projected this insight enough for the robustness needed to ideate and explain

“dependency” (financial, technical, intellectual...) *vis-à-vis* some sensemaking of coherence essential to conceptualise the level(s) of incidence of a syndrome (individual, institutional, cultural...). Again, the challenge I faced was two-fold: first, to be able to qualify a *dependency syndrome* as my intuitively evolved critical insight, and second, to validate it as credible evidence. For this purpose, I needed a single methodology, i.e. *the rug under my feet* that could help comprehend the contextual complexity in concurrence with a single implicit sense which could *speak for the data*; thereby, claiming validity [within the same] as credible intuitive evidence.

Here, metaphor came to my rescue. Challenged with making sense of data complexity, metaphor proved robust and offered coherence. Metaphor not only validated a random emergence of personal insights, but more importantly, it helped in recognising how and why the quality of evidence **in** the data has traditionally been perceived as physical and visible. Conceivably, the majority of social researchers who follow empirical norms are, in a way, cognitively conditioned towards this tendency. Let us see how evidence as a Source Domain of cognitive metaphor [stereotypically] translates into the Target Domain as *physical* and *visible*:

Evidence has a *weight*;
 Evidence has a *body*, or *perfect body*;
 Evidence is *hard* or *soft*; *weak* or *strong*;
 Evidence is *prima facie* and *corpus delicti*

The Latin origin of evidence: “e”–*out*, and “videre”–*to see*, reveals the main reason behind mainstream researchers’ instinctive attraction to the physical profile of the data: *features*, *figures*, and *curves*, that let the data speak through personal interviews, *trendy* and stylistic *visual* displays, and *iconic pictograms*. In public inquiries or crime investigations,

we are likely to perceive [valid] evidence through detectable *grounds, tracks, and footprints* that we *trace*, and even *sniff*. All of which are physical senses or capacities. We also keep on record, display, and retrieve evidence in visual *exhibits, tokens, and seals*. We frequently scan evidential credibility across solid physical-measurable *indicators* and *indexes* (the *index* finger, in some cases!). When finalised, the “body” of evidence is *hard-coated*, as in academic dissertations, and *filed* away in glossy *jackets* that we typically notice in inquiry reports and consultation projects.

Based on the Metalude database [Goatly, 2005], I notice how in order to qualify evidence as credible¹, our cognitive constructs tend to favour the *open, uncovered, clear, and visible*, against the *hidden, covered, unclear, and invisible*:

Unknown is COVERED
 Unknown and ignored is INVISIBLE
 To make known is to SHOW and DRAW
 Known is UNCOVERED and OPEN
 Obvious is CLEAR
 Seriousness and Importance is WEIGHT

Some “body” of evidence was also visible in my PhD data—indented interview quotations, boxed observations, pie charts, and the database index. A projection of physical *configuration* was meant to ensure mechanistic sanctity—to the satisfaction of my supervisors; but, I continued to contest its worth. A physical-visual presentation was elegant but superficial, and inadequate in conveying an implicit sense through emergent insights such as “a *dependency syndrome*”.

¹ For more details on physical vs. visible evidence, readers may study databases that provide root analogies of a set of target domains and source domains of relevant cognitive metaphors.

At that point, an image appeared in my mind, representing a possibility: if evidence is cognitively conditioned to have a *physical body*, could we not correspondingly *uncondition* or *recondition* evidence in an *implicit soul*? Further, only if social researchers *reinterpreted* and *reframed* their cognitions, could the soul reveal implicit evidence. This shift in reasoning led to more questions:

Are Aristotle's *mental affections* (as quoted initially) the signs or impressions of the soul that we unconsciously display in our choice of metaphor?

Could metaphor unfold implicit evidence *within* the soul whilst interpreting *a* personal and intuitive sense in data?

Could the soul reveal to us the implicit evidence of complexity inside institutional intrigues, the human cultural psyche, and symbolism of individual, group, and organisational power?

How could we ever disregard the value and utility of the *soul* in social research? It is certain that we miss the deeply embedded factors of individual and organisational behaviour because Aristotle's *mental affections*—the impressions of the soul—the metaphor, could not be taken into account by the empiricist norms and protocols and serve as a credible source of evidence. Hence, it became clear, that, only because the soul was not physical and visible, the exclusively positivist norms would disregard its potential utility. To investigate how and why this is the case, we need to realise how [highly] the soul has been valued in early philosophical tradition, and take advice from the sages of antiquity.

Socrates believes that philosophers are innately attracted to the soul and not the body. For the soul's transformational

utility in a philosophical discourse, he would call himself *the midwife of the soul*, i.e. someone who assisted in bringing to life a newly-born self—a newer understanding, and possibly a *truer* self. Plato recognises a philosopher’s true value as the ability to *win the soul* through discourse. And for Aristotle, the soul is the “essence” of human intellect and its elusive, but most insightful, cognitive source. Hence, without expanding further on the influence of the soul through the history of philosophy, one may recognise how the metaphor, as the carrier of Aristotle’s *mental affections* that the soul creates, is simply the basis of all philosophical reasoning—instinctively “the same for the whole of mankind”!

Assertions made in the philosophy of antiquity invite us back to the basics of human cognition. And this return must refresh the epistemology and ontology of evidence through the philosophical discourse that takes intuitive sensemaking seriously. Thereupon, we could always *review* the possibility and methodological sustenance of *truths* in implicit evidence in light of its hardly claimed relationship with the soul.

1.3. Implicit *contextual* sense in metaphor

I refer to some PhD fieldwork data to demonstrate how metaphor rendered coherent the complex study setting, and made sense of it in a robust manner [Abdullah, 2000a]. Among other methods, I had employed 50 open-ended questionnaires and 50 semi-structured personal interviews, in order to collect data from representatives of healthcare agencies of the governmental and non-governmental sector in Pakistan, as well as international bilateral donor agencies that provided financial and technical support. Several figurative phrases by respondents helped in gleaning a deeper sense of the respondents’ mindsets. Among literal answers to question of why inter-agency collaboration was challenging for them, some responses were metaphorical, such as: “...because of

the *turf, money and ego*”! As a set of primary metaphors, this phrase seemed ordinary at that moment. Later, over meta-analysis and data syntheses, its implicit meaning unfolded both in relating to, and in creating, several secondary metaphors. Interestingly, this phrase also (re)interpreted the literal and quantitative data, allowing unique conceptual coherence with regard to methodological utility.

I outline some of these data below. The figurative content is italicized while the data context is indicated in brackets:

- “It has become a joke for some [donor] colleagues that we [government agencies] are motivated by *travel allowances* and *daily allowances* and not by the purpose of our work responsibilities”.
- “*Strings* are attached to funding...donor agencies have their own *marketing* reasons behind aid...funds go back into their own *pockets*”.
- “We would not involve them [government agencies]... maybe for *good reason*”.
- “Inter-agency conflicts are *territorial* and [expressed in terms of] *territoriality*”.
- “*Ad hocism* and *patchwork*...the government agencies have no choice but to make *ad hoc* decisions”.
- “Better if we [government agencies] do not have any aid, *people would be cut down to size*”.
- “The health sector is a *market*...they [donor agencies] want consultants and equipment to be *bought* from their own country...no agency is ready to *lose* its *market* [in a shared domain of collaboration]”.
- “They [government agencies] *buy* a lot of frustration and *heart-burn* for themselves too”.
- “[How’s collaboration possible] in government agencies [where] *in-fighting* is a national sport”.

- “He [a government agency counterpart] would come and even *lick my shoes* to get his job done”.
- “When there is more money [i.e. funding for inter-agency collaboration]...there is *room* for corruption”.
- “Donor agencies want a clearly-defined *area* of operation”.
- “[For us, the donors] collaboration is only possible with *like-minded* non-governmental agencies”.
- “When there is no urgency [to collaborate], all agencies become *egocentric*”.
- “[Donor] agencies *guard* their individual *identity*”.

“**Turf, money, and ego**” helped in [steadily] connecting to the respondents’ mindset and unfolding the complexity of my fieldwork setting. The literal phrases and quantitative data would not comprehend complexity in a manner that was robust and coherent. Even more importantly, this particular phrase appeared to take form through emergent cognitive configurations that could roughly be described as clumps, pivots, and synergy.

- (i) First, all the above and other fieldwork data could be assembled in the phrase *turf, money and ego* in terms of three **cognitive clumps**. These clumps created a unique *paradox*, allowing ubiquitous inclusivity *vis-à-vis* exclusivity and distinguishability along inseparability in the phrase, shaping a viable conceptual plane.
- (ii) Second, the cognitive clumps in *turf, money and ego* appeared to have become [loosely] connected through randomly emergent **cognitive pivots**. A viability and flexibility in thought trials and subsequent metaphorical extensions across the emergent pivots created, within transference, the scope for an *intuitive embodiment*. The pivots shaped and enacted a cognitive convergence *vis-*

à-vis divergence, and aligned the core of the conceptual plane in this phrase.

- (iii) Third, the phrase *turf*, *money* and *ego* is bound to lose its cognitive-linguistic sustenance if the symbolism in “turf”, “money” and “ego” were taken separately, as three mutually exclusive challenges. I describe this as **cognitive synergy** created through the clumps and pivots. This synergy helped the transference of multi-disciplinary views on complexity in the phrase, but also creating the scope of [a] *postdisciplinarity* in implicit evidence. It dispersed each clump across the conceptual plane and produced contextually deeper, still universal, and experiential, yet intuitively rich (re)interpretations.

My conception of the clumps, pivots, and synergy is closer to cognitive science accounts of conceptual blending and conceptual integration [Turner, 1998; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002], “image schemata” [Johnson, 1987], and a “cognitive schema” [Lakoff, 1987; Hampe, 2005]. My study of *turf*, *money*, and *ego* could also be expanded within philosophical norms of “alethic hermeneutics” [Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000] in terms of experiential-intuitive (re)interpretations. I discuss a cognitive interplay of clumps, pivots, and synergy.

First, *turf* normally suggests a bounded *area* or a field. Other than its “physical” sense, it also extends to ideological, cultural, and institutional domains. Its literal sense is limited, but its implicit cognitive metaphorical extension is not. For instance, cultures have turfs that conservative agencies *guard* from invasion. Institutional ideologies are *territories* and not allowed to be trespassed upon. Ideas can be *bought* and *sold* in terms of money. Besides, *room* for *corruption* extends further both the “turf” and the “money” identities.

Second, we conceive of *money* as a resource holding direct monetary value. It mainly symbolises financial and material