Cognitive Explorations into the Category Schema of 'For'

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ABSTRACT

The existing literature concerning prepositions shows disparities in the approach to the issue of category, both in terms of definition and classification. Prepositions are defined relative to other grammatical categories, e.g. a noun, rather than as independent linguistic items. Also the question of whether prepositions should be considered lexemes or merely function as grammatical words is still unresolved. Though there is abundant linguistic literature concerning English prepositions and containing thorough analyses of many of them relatively little attention is devoted to the description of *for*, though it belongs to the group of words with the highest frequency of occurrence in the language.
Traditionally, *for* is classified as a preposition and a conjunction. As a preposition, *for* codes, according to various dictionaries, up to thirty different meanings, while as a conjunction, it is usually considered a synonym of *because*.

The purpose of the analyses conducted in this work is to fill the gap that exists in the systematic study on the English prepositions. Carried out from the cognitive perspective and with the aid of Langacker's Cognitive Grammar methodology, the analyses aim to provide evidence in support of the thesis that *for* constitutes a category in itself, characterized by a complex semantic structure that comprises a variety of schemas sanctioning the uses of *for* in the language.

The hypothesis put forward in this work is that the most abstract schema that determines the structure of the whole category *for* is the schema "preposition", while other uses of *for* where it has been traditionally categorized otherwise, e.g. as a conjunction, are sanctioned by the sub-schemas of the schema "preposition". My intention is also to identify and describe the meaning schemas whose activation motivates the whole range of meanings coded by the predicate *for*.

The cognitive view on a preposition allows for defining it as an atemporal relational predication whose characteristic feature is a nominal landmark. The analysis of the structures that elaborate the landmark of *for* confirms the hypothesis of the prepositional character of *for*. They all have a nominal profile resulting from their immediate conceptualization as things (specified by nouns) or gaining the nominal characteristics in the course of nominalization, that is, semantic integration with a

nominalizing morpheme (*-er, -ing, to*) and/or rearranging their semantic content, the consequence of which is shifting the profile from the relation/process to a thing (a relation/process participant or the area containing the relation/ process phases).

According to the cognitive definition, the trajector of the atemporal relation (preposition) can be elaborated by a structure of any profile (nominal, processual or atemporal relational). The analysis of the structures elaborating the trajector of *for* allowed for the observation that the profile of the trajector-elaborating entity determines the role in which the prepositional phrase (the structure resulting from the elaboration of the landmark of *for* at the lower level of semantic integration) occurs within the composite structure. Each role that the prepositional phrase with the elaborated trajector plays in the composite structure evokes a different sub-schema of the general schema "preposition". Elaborating the trajector by a thing gives rise to a noun phrase where the prepositional phrase specifies the noun, i.e. specifies the thing elaborating its trajector, evoking the sub-schema "adjective". Elaborating the trajector by an atemporal relation gives rise to adjectival, adverbial or prepositional phrases where the *for*-prepositional phrase specifies the landmark of the relation, evoking the sub-schema "adverb". Elaborating the trajector by a process gives rise to a verb phrase where the *for*-prepositional phrase specifies the landmark of the process, evoking the sub-schema "adverb". When the trajector-elaborating process is a grounded predication (a finite clause), the prepositional phrase provides specifications to the process as a whole, evoking the schema of a subordinated conjunction, still within the sub-schema "adverb". The rearrangement of the conceptual material of the composite structures in terms of profile/base alignment can result in downgrading the relation and foregrounding either the region it is contained in, or some nominal entity in its base, which results in conceptual reification of the relation and evoking the sub-schema "noun". Implementing analytic tools of Cognitive Grammar with respect to traditional categories allows to view the relational predication *for* as the category of a considerably complex structure, instantiating the most abstract schema "preposition" and the schemas for "adjective", "adverb" and "conjunction" functioning as its sub-schemas.

Langacker's "billiard-ball model of causation", according to which the "cause-effect" relation is viewed as the energy transfer between the objects, is crucial for the analysis of the structure of the category. The profile of the trajector of *for* determines the way it is conceptualized relative to the energy transfer theory. The nominal profile of the trajector allows for its conceptualization as an object capable of transferring the

energy supplied by some external source (e.g. the process in which the trajector participates at a higher level of semantic integration). Relational (processual in particular) profile of the trajector allows for conceptualizing it as an independent source of energy. The energy is transferred from the trajector to the landmark which is conceptualized as a thing, that is, as an entity capable of absorbing the transferred energy. In this context, the "path-goal" schema (already postulated in the subject literature) contained in the conceptual base of *for* allows its trajector to locate its landmark (conceptualized as a goal), and makes the landmark conceptually accessible for verification in terms of being capable of absorbing the energy emitted/transferred by the trajector.

The analysis of the predicate *for*, which allows the identification of the meaning schemas that organize the semantic content of *for*, and sanction the various senses that it codes, is complementary to the analyses conducted. The meaning schemas of *for* are located in various domains: space, time as well as other abstract ones but they all share the path schema along which the energy transfer from the trajector to the landmark occurs. The differences between the schemas result from different ways of conceptualizing the landmark as the element of the path. *For* as a semantic category is a network of meaning schemas, some of which function within the category as metaphorical extensions. The main schema is the path schema along which the energy transfer from the trajector to the landmark occurs, and the main metaphor organizing the semantic content of the predicate *for* is INFLUENCE IS TRANSMITTABLE ENERGY.

The analysis of the schema of the category *for* shows the effectiveness of cognitive methodologies in linguistic research, and the results of the analysis conducted in his work can fill the gap that so far has existed in the systematic study of English prepositions.

INTRODUCTION

Linguistics abounds in literature devoted to the description of the grammatical category "preposition". The issue has so far been discussed either within the framework of more comprehensive works on grammar (e.g. Huddleston (1984), Quirk et al. (1985), Declerck (1990), Greenbaum (1996), Biber et al. (1999), (2002), Brinton (2000), Eastwood (2001), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), Halliday (2004), Carter and McCarthy (2006), Aarts (2011)), or as the works focused solely on the analysis of this particular category (e.g. Bolinger (1971), Fraser (1976), Jackendoff ((1973), (1977)), Dixon (1982), Janda (1984), Emonds (1985), Chomsky (1986), Rauh (1993), Baker (1995), (2003), Gries (1997), Lindstromberg (1998), Fang (2000), Perez-Quintero (2004), Littlefield (2006), Elenbaas (2007), Keizer (2008), Bordet and Jamet (2010)).

The survey of the published literature exhibits still remaining disparities and inconsistencies in the approach to the category "preposition". Linguists point to the problem with its classification and definition. Non-cognitive grammar defines and describes the preposition only through its relationship to other grammatical categories, failing to provide the ultimate definition of what it is itself. The question of whether prepositions constitute a class of lexical or non-lexical words still remains unresolved. Jackendoff (1977) demands that all the prepositions be considered lexical words, Rauh (1993) makes a distinction between lexical and non-lexical prepositions providing methods of testing them in this respect. Baker's (2003) standpoint, in turn, is that prepositions do not constitute a lexical category.

Little attention by linguists has so far been attached to the analysis of the lexical item *for* despite a profuse published literature on prepositions in general as well as on particular representatives of this category (e.g. Brugman (1981): *over*, Lindner (1981): *up*, *out*, Cuyckens (1984): *at*, (1999): *to*, *for*, Hawkins (1984): spatial prepositions, Ekberg (1997): *up*, *out*, *above*, *behind*, Evans and Tyler (2004): *to*, *through*, Turewicz (2005): *in,* Hampe (2005): *down*, *up*). The literature on the subject still has not provided a clear and definitive description of *for,* despite its frequent occurrence in the English language (*for* is the thirteenth most frequently

used word[1] and the third most frequently occurring preposition[2]). The purpose of the analyses conducted in this work is thus to fill the gap that exists in the systematic study on English prepositions. Carried out from the cognitive perspective and with the aid of Langacker's Cognitive Grammar methodology, the analyses aim to provide evidence in support of the thesis that *for* constitutes a category itself, characterized by a complex semantic structure that comprises a variety of schemas sanctioning the uses of *for* in the language.

The claim regarding the relationship between the semantic and phonological poles of a symbolic unit is central to Cognitive Grammar[3], such that one element on the phonological pole always associates with one element on the semantic pole, and *vice-versa*. Therefore, for apparently various concepts coded by a linguistic expression, there should exist one concept of a considerable degree of schematicity which is shared by all the other concepts and sanctions all the possible uses of the linguistic expression. The hypothesis put forward in this work is that the most abstract schema that determines the structure of the whole category *for* is the schema "preposition", while other uses of *for,* whereby it has been traditionally categorized otherwise, e.g. as a conjunction, are sanctioned by the sub-schemas of the schema "preposition". The researcher's intention is also to identify and describe the meaning schemas whose activation motivates the whole range of meanings coded by the predicate *for.*

The title of the work *Cognitive explorations into the category schema of for* draws the reader's attention to the notions that cognitive linguistics places among the key issues for analyses, that is *categorization*, *category* and *schema*.

Rosch's (1978) discovery of basic level categories, followed by her formulation of the theory of prototype, revolutionized the linguists' approach to category and categorization, so far based on the Aristotelian model of necessary and sufficient conditions, commonly accepted, though never, in fact, verified empirically. Rosch's findings provided empirical evidence in support of the new approach, which makes the prototype—i.e.

[1] According to The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), 1990–2015, 520 million words.

[2] According to Fang (2000).

[3] A symbolic unit is defined in Cognitive Grammar as "a cognitive structure mastered by a speaker to the point that it can be employed in largely automatic fashion, without requiring attention to its individual parts or their arrangement" (Langacker (1987:494)).

the best exemplar, central for a category, and the category membership—the issue of greater or weaker similarity to the prototype exhibited by the categorized element. Lakoff (1987) views *categorization* as the primary way that people understand experience. The factors that determine understanding are the bodily experience, and the way the language user applies imaginative mechanisms, such as metaphor, metonymy or imagery, to create categories which help the user order the world and make sense of experience. Since a vast majority of words and concepts designate categories rather than individual entities in the world, the notion of a category is central to the process of categorization, specified in cognitive linguistics as a conceptual category, or due to its actualization in language, a linguistic category (cf. Langacker (1987), Lakoff (1987), Taylor (1989), (1995), (2001)).

Linguistic categories are complex entities, therefore the necessary-and-sufficient condition model in most cases[4] proves an insufficient tool for categorization. As Langacker states it:

> Complex categories are capable of combining and treating as equivalent a multitude of distinct elements that might escape a uniform characterization enabling the language user a precise distinction between the category members and non-members. Thus, the category membership is considered a matter of degree, depending on the linguistic convention and perspective taken by the language user (Langacker (1987: 370)).

As the alternative to the necessary-and-sufficient condition model, cognitive linguistics proposes two models of categorization, each supported by empirical evidence. These are the categorization based on the relationship to the prototype and the categorization based on schematicity, both providing a complete description of a natural language despite the differences that exist between them (cf. Langacker (1987), Taylor (1995), (2001), Kleiber (1990), (2003)). In Langacker's (1987) view,

> A prototype is a typical instance of a category, and other elements are assimilated to the category on the basis of their perceived resemblance to the prototype; there are degrees of membership based on degrees of similarity. A schema, by contrast, is an abstract characterization that is fully compatible with all the members of the category it defines (…); it is an integrated structure that embodies the commonality of its members, which are conceptions of greater specificity and detail that elaborate the schema in contrasting ways. Categorization based on schematicity provides full

[4] The necessary-and-sufficient condition model of categorization proves effective for the superordinate level categories (cf. Löbner (2002)).

> sanction, which corresponds to the linguistic notion of well-formedness. By contrast, categorization based on extension provides only partial sanction and figures in assessments of deviance (Langacker (1987: 371)).

Langacker (1987) notifies that lexical items of frequent occurrence exhibit a wide variety of interrelated senses and usages sanctioned by linguistic conventions, which emerge as a set of conventionally established values. This set constitutes what Langacker considers a complex category, best conceived and described as a schematic network. Referring to Lindner's (1981) usage-based conception, Langacker (1987) proposes a unified account of categories, which incorporates both the prototype and the schema model of categorization. Both models are considered as special cases of a unified phenomenon, and related in an integral way to the network conception of complex categories. Langacker's conception involves, in the first place, the listing of all the established values of a lexical item, which provide empirical data. The analysis of how the different values are related to one another allows for identifying the structure of the category. As Langacker points out, the senses can be related via elaboration (i.e. the relationship between a schema and its instantiations) and extension (i.e. the relationship between prototypical and peripheral senses). Various senses of a lexical item are united in a network of schemas that reflect the generalizations extracted from specific instances as well as the variety of categorizing judgments concerning the complex category. In Langacker's conception, the assimilation of a given concept to the category defined by a particular prototype can proceed in two ways. If the concept matches the specifications of the prototype, it is recognized as a central or prototypical instance of the category, and the prototype is considered schematic with respect to this concept. The concept can differ from the prototype in some respects, which do not necessarily exclude it from the category. The concept is accepted as the category member as long as the conceptualizer is capable of observing the resemblances and ignoring the differences between the prototype and the concept categorized. By downgrading certain specifications of the prototype and foregrounding others, the conceptualizer arrives at a schematic construal that is compatible with both the prototype and the concept. Hence, Langacker points to three cognitive factors involved in categorization, that is, the prototype, the categorized concept, and a schema which represents the resemblance between the prototype and the concept, and which can be elaborated by the prototype and the concept in different ways.

From the perspective described, the lexical item *for*, which is the

subject of the analysis carried out in this work, is a complex category whose structure can be represented as a network of interrelated schemas. The purpose of this work is thus to explore the structure of the category *for* with a view to discovering the schema that provides full sanction for the usages of *for*. The term *cognitive,* characterizing the explorations conducted, pertains to the methodology applied in the research, which is Langacker's usage-based model as well as to the principles of cognitive analysis explicated in his Foundations of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker (1987), (1991)). The cognitive methods applied in the research allow for precise defining and categorizing *for,* as well as exploring its semantic structure in search of the schemas that sanction the uses of *for* in the English language. Identifying the schemas of *for* aims at finding the highest schema of the whole category compatible with all the other schemas functioning within the category as its sub-schemas. The hypothesis formulated in this work is that the category *for*, which comprises all the uses and senses coded by *for* identified in English, that is, *for* as the preposition, conjunction, noun, prefix, as well as the predicate incorporating a multitude of senses, can be best conceived of and described as a schematic network, whereby the schema "preposition" holds the position of the highest category schema with other schemas functioning as its sub-schemas.

The linguistic material used for the analyses was collected mainly from The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), a powerful Internet database containing over 520 million linguistic items saved in the context of written and spoken records of various registers, collected from 1990–2015, and continuously expanded and updated. The motivation for the corpus data selection was the diversity of structures it offers and the authenticity of the material which also contained the structures conventionally considered ungrammatical, yet by virtue of their occurrence in the corpus, deserving a detailed analysis. The COCA turned out to be a valuable source of information concerning the frequency of occurrence of the structures examined as well as their collocation range. For the analyses whereby the structural complexity of the sample material could have posed the risk to the clarity of interpretation, the structurally simpler examples were gathered from the dictionaries such as *The Oxford English Dictionary*, *The Macmillan Dictionary*, *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, *The Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, etc. The dictionary examples, by virtue of their structural simplicity, proved especially useful with the analysis of the predicate, facilitating precise descriptions.

The work consists of five chapters. In Chapter One, I focus on the

grammatical category "preposition" as described in the published literature from both pre-cognitive and cognitive perspectives. The purpose of the chapter is not only to juxtapose the two modes of linguistic description, but also to search for the points in common which could provide arguments originating in non-cognitive descriptions in favour of cognitive interpretations. The chapter also provides the basis for further analyses introducing and describing some key concepts and definitions applied in cognitive grammar, as well as specifying the criterion for identifying the category "preposition" and for categorizing the relational predication *for* in this way.

Chapter Two includes a survey of the published literature in terms of already existing analyses and descriptions of which *for* is the subject. Here I present traditional as well as recent views with regard to the meanings conveyed by *for* and the ways it functions in the structure of the English language. I devote special attention to the roles that *for* plays in various syntactic constructions with a view to further analyses aimed at identifying the schemas that contribute to the category structure of *for*. In addition, the range of senses coded by *for* is provided as the basis for further analyses conducted in search of the meaning schemas of *for*.

In Chapter Three, I take a closer look at the structures that elaborate the trajector of *for* viewed as a relational predication. Here I make an attempt to identify the factors that determine the specific schemas evoked with particular uses of *for*, sanctioning its occurrence in a variety of constructions and its traditionally "prepositional" and "non-prepositional" characterization in the language.

Chapter Four contains the analysis of the structures that elaborate the landmark of *for*. Applying the cognitive methods of linguistic research, I provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that, by virtue of having an invariably nominal landmark, *for* represents the category "preposition" in each case of its use.

As a complement to the analysis, I conduct the examination of *for* as a predicate, that is, the entity coding a variety of senses. In Chapter Five, I explore the semantic structure of *for* in search of the meaning schemas that give rise to various meanings of *for*. Inspired by the approach presented by Lakoff (1987), but still in the vein of Langacker's methodology, I identify a number of interrelated meaning schemas as well as the most abstract schema which, I argue, is central to the semantic structure of the category *for*.

The results of the research are presented in the Conclusions. The analysis conducted within the framework of Cognitive Grammar methodology can offer a new perspective on and provide deeper insight

into the category "preposition", and the category *for* in particular. The findings can contribute to a more comprehensive and holistic description of English prepositions.

CHAPTER ONE

FACETS TO THE CATEGORY "PREPOSITION"

Introduction

Despite their growing popularity as research material, prepositions appear a highly problematic group of words, both in terms of their definition and classification. The problem cannot be marginalized, considering the frequency and variety of structural contexts of prepositions that occur in a language. It has long been disputed how prepositions should be defined, whether they should be included in the class of lexical words and treated on a par with nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, or just the opposite—that their role should be rendered purely functional and grammatical, owing to the lack of full semantic content; but maybe the issue is a matter of degree.

Another problem concerns the relationship between prepositions and other word classes as a result of the multitude of contexts in which prepositions occur. The question arises whether the words, otherwise considered prepositions, which occur in the same syntactic contexts as adverbs, adjectives and conjunctions, etc., should, by virtue of specific properties they exhibit, be shifted to the corresponding classes of words, or just the opposite, despite their occurrence in the contexts suitable for adverbs, adjectives, conjunctions, etc., should all these words remain within the category "preposition"? In this part of the work, I present various views on the category "preposition", both non-cognitive and cognitive, arguing that cognitive perspective allows for a more comprehensive description of the category, providing answers to the questions that remain open or unanswered for non-cognitive linguistics.

1.1. Non-cognitive perspective

In traditional, that is to say, non-cognitive grammar, prepositions are most frequently defined in terms of their role in syntactic constructions and relative to the structures they combine with, rather than in terms of what

kind of entities they are. Although the literature provides rich and exhaustive descriptions of prepositions in terms of typology, functions and semantic content, it sheds little light on such basic issues as what exactly is a preposition, what makes it capable of coding so many senses and occurring in so numerous syntactic contexts. Within the framework of non-cognitive linguistics, there exist two very popular approaches to the grammatical category "preposition". One approach, represented by Bolinger (1971), Fraser (1976), Quirk et al. (1985), Broughton (1990), Radford (1997), Biber et al. (1999), Littlefield (2006) and Thatcher (2010) makes distinctions between prepositions and other categories like particles, adverbs or conjunctions on the one hand, but on the other considers possible the cases where prepositions can function as particles, adverbs, nouns or conjunctions. According to the opposite standpoint, represented by Jackendoff (1973) or Huddleston and Pullum (2002) the category "preposition" can contain the items traditionally classified as particles, adverbs or conjunctions. Within the framework of these two approaches to prepositions, the scholars also individually modify their standpoints, focusing in each case on a different dimension of the category discussed, contributing, on the one hand to a more comprehensive description of the category, but escaping a more unified, ordered view on the other, which results in a multitude of definitions and descriptions, very often contradictory to one another. The following section aims at presenting existing views on prepositions with reference to the aforementioned issues. Contemporary grammarians make numerous attempts to define prepositions. Most frequently, prepositions are defined as

(i) Words expressing a relationship between two entities, one represented by the prepositional complement (typically a noun phrase, a nominal *wh*-clause, or a nominal -*ing*-clause), the other being another part of the sentence (Quirk et al. (1985));
(ii) A minor word-class, in that their function in a sentence, i.e. showing relationships, is often more important than their actual meaning—structural words, as opposed to content or lexical words (Broughton (1990));
(iii) Invariable words (e.g. *at*, *in, on, under, by, with, from, against*) generally used to express location or manner, etc., whose characteristic property (though there are exceptions) is that they can be pre-modified by the adverbs *straight* and *right* (Radford (1997));
(iv) A group of function words, or links, which introduce prepositional phrases (Biber et al. (1999));

(v) A relatively closed, grammatically distinct class of words whose most central members characteristically express spatial relations or serve to mark various syntactic functions and semantic roles (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)); and
(vi) Part of speech which connects or relates one part of a sentence, usually a noun, a pronoun, a verb form ending in *-ing* or some equivalent complement which the preposition is said to govern, to another part of the sentence or to the sentence as a whole (Thatcher (2010)).

It can be inferred from the definitions, especially that of Huddleston and Pullum's, that the category "preposition" is not homogeneous, that is to say, not all its members are equal in terms of their status. This inequality can be exhibited in various ways. Quirk et al. (1985) identify a group of central and marginal prepositions, and propose a set of criteria for the classification of the central prepositions. The criteria are established as a set of constraints on the prepositional complement. According to them, central prepositions cannot be followed by *that*-clauses (see 1.1.1) or infinitives (see 1.1.2), despite possible nominal functions of infinitives and *that*-clauses in other structures:

(1.1.1) *[5]*He was surprised at (that) she noticed him*
(Quirk et al. (1985)).
(1.1.2) **He was surprised at to see her* (Quirk et al. (1985)).

Another constraint is that central prepositions cannot take as their complement a personal pronoun in a subjective case form, as illustrated in (1.1.3):

(1.1.3) **He was surprised at she* (Quirk et al. (1985)).

On the other hand, marginal prepositions can fail to satisfy the criteria, e.g. *instead of*, which allows for the infinitive clause as well as the finite *as*-clause complements, as shown in (1.1.4) and (1.1.5):

(1.1.4) *It must be so frightful to have to put things on in order to look better, instead of to strip things off* (Quirk et al. (1985)).

[5] I use the asterisk to mark the structures considered as ungrammatical. The symbol is used throughout the chapter.

(1.1.5) *He pictures people as he sees them instead of as they are* (Quirk et al. (1985)).

Additionally, as Huddleston and Pullum (2002) point out, central prepositions code the sense of spatial relations, unlike less central prepositions, which code other senses. Radford (1997), in turn, points to the capacity of central prepositions for taking adverbial pre-modifiers *right* and *straight*, which less central prepositions typically lack.
As yet another syntactic criterion for diversifying prepositions within the category, Radford (1997) postulates the property of transitivity. Where a preposition is followed by a nominal or pronominal complement, it is said to be transitive, whereas lack of complement makes it intransitive, as illustrated in (1.1.6) and (1.1.7), respectively:

(1.1.6) *There was nobody inside the house* (Radford (1997)).
(1.1.7) *There was nobody inside* (Radford (1997)).

Biber et al. (1999) postulate a different sub-categorization of prepositions, based on both semantic and syntactic criteria. They make a distinction between free and bound prepositions, which lies in their semantic and syntactic independence. In their view, free prepositions have an independent meaning and their choice in the syntactic context is independent of any other word, while bound prepositions code little independent meaning, their choice in the syntactic context being dependent on the other word, usually the preceding verb, as illustrated in (1.1.8) and (1.1.9), respectively:

(1.1.8) *But the only other thing perhaps, he'll go with one of the kids, that's a possibility* (Biber et al. (1999)).
(1.1.9) *They've got to be willing to part with that bit of money* (Biber et al. (1999).

The descriptions presented so far allow me to view central prepositions as words on the semantic level expressing spatial location, while on the level of grammar—being transitive and adverbially pre-modified by *right* and *straight*. The same preposition, however, can function as free or bound, transitive or intransitive, which may imply that these characteristics are also a matter of degree.

As follows from the definitions presented at the beginning of the section, prepositions function relative to other structures, the most characteristic being the prepositional complement. According to Quirk et

al. (1985) and Biber et al. (1999), the most typical structures functioning as prepositional complements are noun phrases (1.1.10), nominal *wh*-clauses (1.1.11), and nominal *-ing*-clauses (1.1.12), though Biber et al. notify the occurrence of infinitival clause complements after certain prepositions, as shown in (1.1.13). In addition, Biber et al. (1999) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002) include in the group of prepositional complements prepositional phrases (1.1.14) and adverb phrases (1.1.15), but Huddleston and Pullum also include adjective phrases (1.1.16) and clauses (1.1.17), pointing out that each type of the complementing phrases or clauses can parallel a noun phrase, so is nominal in nature:

(1.1.10) *in the morning* (Biber et al (1999));
(1.1.11) *Component drawings carry instructions on where they are used (...)* (Biber et al (1999));
(1.1.12) *(...) they talked little among themselves till they surfaced three days after leaving Darwin* (Biber et al. (1999));
(1.1.13) *I have nothing new to say, except to say that when I do have something to say I will say it* (Biber et al. (1999));
(1.1.14) *The magician emerged from behind the curtain* (Huddleston and Pullum (2002));
(1.1.15) *I didn't know about it until recently* (Huddleston and Pullum (2002));
(1.1.16) *They took me for dead* (Huddleston and Pullum (2002));
(1.1.17) *We can't agree on whether we should call the police* (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)).

An interesting perspective is provided by Huddleston and Pullum (2002), who suggest viewing prepositions as the heads of phrases. As the evidence in support of their claim, the authors point to the properties of prepositions which they share with other phrase heads, such as their capacity for taking modifiers like verb phrases (1.1.18, cf. Quirk et al. (1985)), being embedded, like noun phrases, inside larger prepositional phrases (1.1.19), selecting, like verbs, adjectives or nouns, particular types of the complement while excluding others (1.1.20), or exhibiting within their structures the distinction between objects and predicative complements (1.1.21):

(1.1.18) *It happened just inside the penalty area* (Huddleston and Pullum (2002));
(1.1.19) [*from* [*behind the curtain*]] (Huddleston and Pullum (2002));

(1.1.20) *until recently* (AdvP) vs. * *until recent* (AdjP) (Huddleston and Pullum (2002));
(1.1.21) *She bought it* [*for a friend*] (object) vs. *She took him* [*for a friend*] (predicative complement) (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)).

Together with their complements, prepositions form prepositional phrases, which syntactically function as post-modifiers in noun phrases (1.1.22) or verb and adjective complements (1.1.23–24). Quirk et al. (1985) point to a closer relationship that obtains between the preposition and the preceding verb or adjective, which determine the choice of the preposition, than between the preposition and its own complement in the noun phrase post-modification. Additionally, Biber et al. (1999) point to a pre-modifying function of prepositional phrases in noun phrases (1.1.25):

(1.1.22) *the people on the bus* (Quirk et al. (1985));
(1.1.23) *We were looking at his awful paintings* (Quirk et al. (1985));
(1.1.24) *I'm sorry for his parents* (Quirk et al. (1985));
(1.1.25) *It probably fell out of the sky after an in-flight explosion* (Biber et al. (1999)).

Prepositional phrases also function syntactically as various types of adverbials, i.e. adjuncts (1.1.26), subjuncts (1.1.27), disjuncts (1.1.28) and conjuncts (1.1.29):

(1.1.26) *People were singing on the bus* (Quirk et al. (1985));
(1.1.27) *From a personal point of view, I find this a good solution to the problem* (Quirk et al. (1985));
(1.1.28) *In all fairness, she did try to phone the police* (Quirk et al. (1985));
(1.1.29) *On the other hand, he made no attempt to help her* (Quirk et al. (1985)).

Prepositions are considered a problematic category owing to their similarity to other word classes. Some grammarians claim prepositions to have the potential to become adverbs or conjunctions (Eastwood (2001)), occasionally even verbs and adjectives (Biber et al. (1999), Thatcher (2010)). However, as Biber et al. claim, it is difficult to draw a clear borderline between the category "preposition" and other word classes. Littlefield (2006), pointing to a non-homogeneous structure of the category, claims that at the heart of the category "preposition" are, traditionally considered prototypical, the transitive prepositions such as *in,*

on, under, to and *with,* while at the edges of the category are elements such as particles and adverbs which, on the one hand, seem inherently related to prepositions, but on the other hand, exhibit noticeable differences in their syntactic distribution. There exists an alternative view, though, represented by Jackendoff (1973), Emonds (1985) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002), which favours considering the words in question a single category.

The issue of similarities and disparities between categories and category members was discussed by Quirk et al. (1985) in terms of unclear borders between the word classes. The authors, however, focused mainly on recognizing the features that help differentiate the classes. In their view, the distinguishing criterion between the class of prepositions and the class of conjunctions is that prepositions introduce nominal or nominalized complements, whereas the corresponding conjunctions introduce subordinate clauses. The property that makes some prepositions (e.g. *after, as, before, until, since*) similar to conjunctions is their capacity for playing a double role, i.e. conjunctive, by virtue of combining with a clause, and typically prepositional, by virtue of combining with a noun phrase, as shown in (1.1.30):

(1.1.30) *The day before she arrived* vs. *The day before her arrival* (Quirk et al. (1985)).

Conversely, Huddleston and Pullum (2002), noting the analogy with the verbs that take noun phrases or declarative content clauses as their complements and still remain within the same category verb (1.1.31), claim it is unfounded to approach the prepositions occurring in the same syntactic context in a different way (1.1.32):

(1.1.31) cf. *I remember* <u>*the accident*</u> and *I remember* <u>*you promised to help*</u> (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)).
(1.1.32) cf. *He left after* <u>*the accident*</u> and *He left after* <u>*you promised to help*</u> (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)).

Huddleston and Pullum therefore include in the category "preposition" all of the subordinating conjunctions, with the three exceptions of, so called, markers of subordination, i.e. *whether*, *if* (as the equivalent of *whether*) and *that* (introducing a subordinate clause).

Another class of words that seem to overlap with the category "preposition" is the adverb. Some authors make an additional distinction between the adverb and the adverbial particle, pointing to a particular semantic bond between the particle and the preceding verb (Broughton

(1990), Biber et al. (1999), Littlefield (2006)). On the other hand, some linguists categorize the same words as adverbs and adverbial particles interchangeably (Jackendoff (1973), Emonds (1985), Quirk et al. (1985)). Biber et al. (1999) argue that adverbial particles differ from adverbs in terms of length and complexity, being shorter and less complex (1.1.33):

(1.1.33) cf. *It swallowed up the two men* and **It swallowed completely the two men* (Biber et al. (1999)).

According to Quirk et al. (1985) the criteria allowing for further differentiation between prepositions and adverbs are the absence of a word stress in the preposition and its presence in the adverb, and the mobility feature, which demarcates more syntactically mobile adverbs from less mobile prepositions, as shown in (1.1.34). On the borderline there is the group of prepositional adverbs (e.g. *across*) which can exhibit varying degrees of syntactic mobility:

(1.1.34) *She looked the word up* vs. **She looked the hill up* (Quirk et al. (1985)).

Broughton (1990) provides the examples showing contextual correspondence between prepositions and other word classes, as well as the meaning differences caused by their changed roles, as shown in (1.1.35), where *to* is a preposition, and (1.1.36), where *to* is an adverbial particle:

(1.1.35) *Paul's mother came to tea* (she visited and had tea) (Broughton (1990)).
(1.1.36) *Paul's mother came to* (she regained consciousness) (Broughton (1990)).

In the alternative view represented by Jackendoff (1973) and Edmonds (1985), the same words categorized as prepositions, particles and adverbs should be considered a single category, the claim made on the observation that there is a high degree of overlap between these categories in three respects:

(i) Phonological, i.e. the words have the same phonological form regardless of their being a preposition, an adverbial particle or an adverb;
(ii) Semantic, i.e. prepositions, particles and adverbs that share a

phonological form also share the core meaning; and

(iii) Syntactic, i.e. there is a similarity in the distribution of the types of structures which these elements are part of, the specific examples being: locative inversion, directional *with* sentences, and *straight*/*right* modification.

All three constructions are considered unique to prepositions, and, as they can also occur with adverbs and particles, they provide strong evidence in support of a single category for the prepositions, adverbs and adverbial particles.

Jackendoff (1973) advocates a single category for prepositions and adverbial particles, pointing to transitivity feature that distinguishes them in the same way as it distinguishes transitive and intransitive verbs within the single category "verb". Emonds (1985), in addition, points to the sameness of meaning of the words categorized as prepositions and adverbs regardless of the presence or absence of an object. Huddleston and Pullum's (2002) conception of prepositions as the heads of phrases allows for their occurrence both with and without a complement (1.1.37):

(1.1.37) cf. *I haven't seen her since* <u>*the war*</u> and *I haven't seen her since* (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)).

By analogy with verbs, nouns and adjectives which can occur with or without complements and still be classified as verbs, nouns and adjectives, Huddleston and Pullum, sharing the view of Jackendoff and Emonds, opt for classifying the prepositions in the same way regardless of the presence or absence of their complements, as illustrated in (1.1.38–40):

(1.1.38) cf. *She was eating an apple* and *She was eating* (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)).
(1.1.39) cf. *She is the director of the company* and *She is the director* (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)).
(1.1.40) cf. *I'm certain it's genuine* and *I'm certain* (Huddleston and Pullum (2002)).

The issue that still remains unresolved is whether prepositions constitute a class of lexical or function words. The definitions provided at the beginning of this section show a greater tendency to value grammatical functions of prepositions over their semantic role. More recently, the linguists (Mackenzie ((1992b), (2001)), Bakker and Siewierska (2002), Perez-Quintero (2004), Keizer (2008), Bordet and Jamet (2010)) have