Henry A. Wallace’s Criticism of America’s Atomic Monopoly, 1945-1948
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By
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Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing
For

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Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace was an earnest supporter of the Stimson Proposal, a disarmament proposal submitted to the Truman administration by then Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson immediately after World War II. This plan suggested direct communication with the Soviets over control of a newly-released atomic energy used against Japan. Vice President Henry Wallace, who had developed a rich scientific knowledge base during his early life, was trusted during the war years by not only President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) but also scientific administrator Vannevar Bush. Wallace’s postwar vision shared many points with those of atomic scientists. These scientists believed that basic scientific knowledge, particularly in theoretical physics, could not be contained because science had no national boundaries. For this reason, Wallace opposed a new version of the Stimson plan headed by Bernard Baruch, which, on one hand, was skillfully modified to maintain the US atomic monopoly through a strict inspection system while, on the other, invited Soviet partnership in a U.S. scheme. Wallace’s postwar atomic vision that incorporated a joint partnership with the Soviet Union failed to resonate with President Truman, State Secretary James F. Byrnes, and the American public. The belief was that U.S. atomic secrets were a national asset. Subsequently, policy makers in the Truman administration, whose fundamental position was to make no concessions of any kind to the Kremlin, gave little consideration to any additional alternative suggested desperately by Wallace. As a result, Wallace was marginalized and eventually ousted from Truman’s Cabinet.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply grateful to Professors of Osaka University, Shin Okada, Shuichi Shindo, and Toshitaka Takeuchi for their valuable advice. Each freely contributed necessary subject matter knowledge and academic wisdom to this project. Above all else, I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Yoneyuki Sugita, my primary adviser at Osaka University, who refined my scholarship at the doctorate course and inspired me to persevere through the challenging times. Without his painstaking critiques and encouragement, my study would not have been completed. Two former professors, Takeshi Matsuda and Yuzo Murayama, also provided large amounts of their time from the start of my master’s course at Osaka University of Foreign Studies.

Other professors beyond Osaka University also offered crucial advice. Professor Tatsuro Nomura, then Professor of Aichi Gakuin University and former President of the Japanese Association for American Studies, shared invaluable books and other literature related to Henry A. Wallace. These materials are now a cherished possession. Professor Hiroshi Fujimoto of Nanzan University has long shown an interest in my research and freely offered helpful insight. Finally, Professor Natsuki Aruga, a past Professor of Saitama University, helped me gain access to important scholarly sources related to Wallace.

Also not to be forgotten, several archivists and researchers greatly aided my research. Regarding Henry L. Stimson’s documents, Ms. Hiroko Takahashi, a former researcher at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, helped me locate the Bush–Conant files and Harrison–Bundy files, most of which were originally uncatalogued at that time. Another institution housing valuable materials about Stimson included the Hitotsubashi University Library. Furthermore, the International Institute of American Studies at Doshisha University and the Kyoto University Library provided valuable access to Bush-Conant microfilms. The National Diet Library also allowed access to a trove of Stimson documents.

For instrumental content on Wallace, the Ritsumeikan University Library, a depository for Wallace’s diaries and oral history in Japan, allowed me to view all the vital microfilms. The Center for Pacific and American Studies Library of the University of Tokyo also permitted me to read other useful Wallace papers.
In the United Kingdom, I was able to study Niels Bohr’s documents and correspondence, most notably the M.A.U.D. report and its related material at the National Archives at Kew in London. Furthermore, I owe thanks to the Royal Society in London, whose archivist continued sending me documents on British atomic policy after I returned to Japan. Meanwhile, the Bodleian Library of Oxford University was equally helpful in locating documents related to atomic energy issues. The British Library of Political and Economic Science, a holder of vast volumes of many kinds, allowed me free access, thanks to Professor Shigeru Akita of Osaka University, who happened to be teaching at the London School of Economics at this time.

In the United States, I am indebted to Mr. Sam Rushay at the Harry S. Truman Library, who assisted me unstintingly during every visit. At the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Dr. Kennon Moody helped me locate key documents on FDR and Eleanor Roosevelt. The most valuable documents were Alexander Sachs’ papers, now unavailable to the public. The McKeldin Library of Maryland University at College Park, which holds documents concerning governmental hearings, allowed microfilm access and the National Archives II, and provided governmental documents to which my study owes a great deal.

Special thanks are also reserved for Mr. Kevin Leonard, a researcher who helped me at the Library of Congress in Washington D.C.; Ms. Maria Sakrejda-Leavitt, an archivist at the Archives and Special Collections of Amherst College Library; Ms. Lisette Matano (M.L.S.), an archivist at Georgetown University Library; and Mr. John Delooper, an archivist with the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University Library. Mr. James Cross, a manuscript archivist, also spent weeks finding materials concerning James F. Byrnes at Clemson University Library. Without the assistance of these archivists, this project would have been substantially more difficult.

Lastly, I am deeply indebted to my colleagues for their technical assistance as well as moral support: Yukari Sakamoto has always been helpful in documenting chronology, Kelly Doell has tirelessly assisted the editing of this document, and Atsuko Shigesawa has always been willing to offer me advice when needed.
INTRODUCTION

This study addresses the following crucial question: why were the views of Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, an earnest supporter of the Stimson Proposal and a critic of the foolish attempt to withhold atomic secrets, so thoroughly disregarded, not only by President Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, but also by most American people? A thorough examination of Wallace’s atomic policy has illustrated that atomic scientists, whose minds were disinterested in the idea of national boundaries, much less national sovereignty over scientific knowledge, failed to participate in the decision-making process related to U.S. atomic policy. This investigation has shown that Wallace, whose vision of postwar world peace was shared by atomic scientists, found himself alienated from Truman’s Cabinet, and was ultimately ousted from the Truman administration.

A proposal produced by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, aimed at controlling atomic energy immediately after the end of World War II, was submitted to the Truman Cabinet on September 12, 1945. Stimson’s proposal recommended the opening of a direct dialogue with the Soviet Union to share knowledge related to atomic technology. This dialogue would serve to control the use of atomic energy and to prevent an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The proposal engendered huge divisions within Truman’s Cabinet, mainly because of its collective lack of scientific understanding. Similarly, the American people were torn over whether American atomic secrets should be disclosed or protected as a national asset.

Six months later, the Acheson–Lilienthal Report, the Truman Administration’s so-called roadmap for an atomic control plan, was completed. It called for the inclusion of the Soviet Union in an atomic partnership and put control of atomic materials in the hands of an international agency. However, the final version of the American program, the Baruch Plan, actually submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations (UNAEC) greatly strengthened the inspection system by mandating swift penalties. The Baruch Plan still advocated atomic disarmament, but it decidedly maintained that the US keep sole retention of its atomic know-how as long as possible. Unsurprisingly, it failed
because of the Soviet veto in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), thereby precipitating the Cold War arms race.

The Soviet Union vetoed atomic controls in the United Nations and produced an atomic bomb in 1949. As a result, America’s atomic monopoly collapsed, and an arms race ensued. Stimson and Wallace had warned of this eventuality. Through an examination of certain key actions taken by successive U.S. administrations, this study illustrates why Wallace’s reasonable approach to preventing this arms race failed to win over President Truman and his advisers.

Lastly, as a recurring motif in this paper, the objective of international control of atomic energy demands clarification. Broadly stated, it refers to a realization on the part of statesmen, scientists, and laymen that the power of the atom, already spread worldwide, was unique but extremely dangerous. As a result, its development should be overseen collectively by an international agency.

In Chapter One, the manner in which Wallace’s scientific knowledge was nurtured in his early life is explored. His scientific experiences played a decisive role leading to his successful political career as Secretary of Agriculture in the Administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). An examination of the latter part of Wallace’s life, mostly serving as Vice President and Secretary of Commerce, reveals facets of Wallace’s atomic views and policy that very few historians have analyzed.

In Chapter Two, the process by which FDR initiated an atomic program for fear of German acquisition of atomic technology is charted. Wallace, then Vice President in the FDR administration, commenced his involvement in the atomic program that began secretly before the outbreak of World War II. This study also shows how Wallace strengthened atomic knowledge and acted as an adviser for the atomic scientists.

In Chapter Three, the contentious Stimson Proposal for international controls of atomic energy aimed at preventing a postwar arms race with the Soviet Union is examined. At this time, American public opinion was divided over whether America alone or some international agency should exercise control over atomic energy technology. Wallace’s understanding of atomic power led him to adopt the view of atomic scientists and incorporate this view into his independent perspective of the postwar world order.

In Chapter Four, details are presented about how Wallace developed his vision of atomic power in light of U.S. public and political confusion. The debate focused on whether America should invite the Soviet Union to join the atomic partnership. However, Wallace admitted that his vision of
a postwar atomic age had gradually diverged from those of Truman’s
advisers, and from those of the American public.

Finally, in Chapter Five, Wallace’s desperate attempt to restore the
deteriorating Soviet trusteeship is explored. Wallace made this attempt,
even as the public at large overwhelmingly supported America’s atomic
monopoly, and Truman and his closest advisers were determined to adhere
to a “get-tough” policy in relations with the Soviet Union. This study will
also show that, eventually, Wallace abandoned his political career and left
office as the administration’s lone dissenter.
CHAPTER ONE
EARLIER STUDIES AND POSITIONS
OF THIS PAPER

This chapter reviews the upbringing and career of Henry Wallace, former Secretary of Agriculture of the United States and Vice President to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). In particular, this chapter recounts Wallace’s time as the Secretary of Commerce for the Truman Administration when he performed an integral role in stewarding America’s atomic policy and in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The following analysis of the literature on Wallace will show that his atomic policy toward the Soviet Union has received little attention to date.

A. The Life of Henry A. Wallace

Born on a small family farm in Iowa on October 7, 1888, Henry Agard Wallace became the sole member of the Wallace family to carry on the name “Henry.” His grandfather, “Uncle Henry,” a former Presbyterian minister, was the editor of Iowa Homestead, a journal about farming and rural life. Meanwhile, young Henry’s father, Henry Cantwell Wallace, graduated from Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts, eventually securing a professorship in dairying in 1893. Wallace’s father ultimately succeeded Edwin Meredith as Secretary of Agriculture in President Warren G. Harding’s administration.

Influenced by “Uncle Henry’s” agricultural interests and Henry C.’s penchant for academia, Wallace started his first experiments on corn at the age of 15, leading him to the important discovery that corn yield and the aesthetic quality of the ear were independent of one another. Wallace’s scientific interests flourished during these formative years, leading him to pursue his education at Iowa College. Soon after his graduation in 1910, Wallace left academia to pursue his research interests on his own, focusing on genetics, economics, and mathematics among others. Most of his important discoveries about agriculture emerged from his work in
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Statistics. A series of Wallace’s lectures on statistics to Iowa State faculty ultimately introduced the field of agriculture to econometrics. In 1923, Wallace, at 35, achieved his most important scientific accomplishment—the first commercially viable strain of hybrid corn. To exploit his discovery, he founded the Hi-Bred Corn Company (now Pioneer Hi-Bred Co.) three years later in 1926.

During his entrepreneurial exploits, Wallace regularly contributed to the family journal, now called Wallaces Farmer, which championed agricultural econometrics. His experience with the “less corn, more clover, more money” policy in the early 1920s motivated him to acknowledge the impracticality of purely voluntary plans. Instead of relying on such schemes, he urged the government to intervene in support of farmers by reducing surpluses. Wallace had a chance to apply his expertise in 1932 when FDR asked him to be his Secretary of Agriculture.

The United States’ agricultural industry had been struggling when Wallace took office in March of 1933. Quick action was needed to alleviate the effects a banking crisis was having on farming communities across the country. Alongside Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Rexford Tugwell, Wallace successfully proposed the first major piece of New Deal agricultural legislation—the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA). Thereafter, his nuanced understanding of the goals and philosophies of the New Deal made him known as one of the most influential thinkers in progressive politics (see Russell Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa, 1947).

In 1940, seeking a third term, FDR sought to replace Vice President John Nance Gamer (1868–1967) who, in the first two terms, strongly opposed the New Deal. Meanwhile, the war in Europe received growing attention of the Administration. FDR knew his replacement needed not only to have an administrative savvy to handle the pressures of a world war, but an ability to publically guide the nation through such a tumultuous period. A host of capable candidates vied for the vice presidency, but FDR strongly favored Wallace as a running mate. The Schapsmeier brothers, Wallace biographers, explain that FDR coveted Wallace for his loyalty during his first eight years in office and for his excellent administrative ability. However, most of all, FDR appreciated the alignment of their political philosophy. Boldly, Roosevelt wrote a letter to his party stating that he would refuse any other nomination should they reject Wallace. On January 20, in 1941, Wallace was officially sworn in.

During his Vice Presidency, Wallace actively participated in the work of the executive branch, eventually becoming the prototype of a modern Vice President. He showed little patience with the job’s traditional role in
legislative debate. Instead, Wallace focused on the activities of the executive branch.

His speech “The Price of Free World Victory” on May 8, 1942, laid out his vision of the postwar world; the Allies were not simply fighting against fascists; they were fighting for a just peace. Unusually, Wallace avoided denigrations of the German and Japanese people, which were standard in wartime propaganda. Instead, Wallace depicted the war not just as an effort to return to the status quo, but as a chance to make the world a better place, where only a just peace would make the immense sacrifices worthwhile. Explicitly, he rejected the notion of an “American Century” as a war aim, declaring that the century which we were entering could be and had to be the “Century of the Common Man.” This latter notion proposed that “the world can live in a free democracy with dignity of the individual.”

In 1943, Wallace made a goodwill trip to Latin America, where he listened to his hosts, spoke with them in Spanish, and met with men and women in the street. Wallace’s concern for Latin America extended far beyond the typical American politician’s concern. In fact, he instructed the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) to institute “Labor Clauses” in all production contracts with Latin America, which caused conflict with Jesse Jones, the Secretary of Commerce and chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) over labor clauses.

FDR was dismayed at this lack of unity within his own cabinet, the likely result of his insistence for including conservatives and liberals in his administration. Despite FDR’s efforts, the conflict flared up in the press. Consequently, FDR removed Wallace from his chairmanship of the BEW.

In 1944, just prior to the Democratic National Convention, FDR sent Wallace to China and the Soviet Union (see Edward L. Schapsmeier and G. Frederick Schapsmeier, Prophets in Politics, 1970 and Graham White and John Maze, Henry A. Wallace, 1995). Wallace returned to discover that, despite the support of 65% of registered Democrats, his renomination for Vice President was in danger. A group of conservatives in the Democratic Party, led by Democratic National Committee (DNC) Treasurer Edwin W. Pauley, joined in the call for Wallace’s ousting. Ultimately, FDR endorsed Harry S. Truman, dooming Wallace’s candidacy.

Although Wallace won the first ballot with 429.5 votes to Truman’s 319.5, his victory was insufficient to secure the nomination. In the third

ballot, Truman swept into the vice presidency. Southern conservative Democrats’ hostility toward Wallace’s radical liberalism and the emergence of anti-FDR sentiment fueled Wallace’s removal from his campaign.

Consequently, Wallace lost his position as Vice President in 1944. Despite this outcome, he continued to diligently campaign for the Roosevelt–Truman ticket, emphasizing the importance of civil rights, full employment, growth, and peace. After the Democratic victory, the re-elected FDR offered Wallace his choice of positions within the cabinet. Wallace selected Secretary of Commerce (see Tsugio Ando, *Amerika Jiyushugi to New Deal* [*America’s Liberalism and New Deal*, 1990]).

**B. Studies of Henry A. Wallace**

Many studies on atomic weaponry tend to painstakingly examine why atomic bombs were detonated on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 or whether this event was justifiable. In light of this trend, the current study will instead focus on other pertinent U.S. diplomatic activities associated with this event. This requires an in-depth account and analysis of Henry Wallace’s political life.

Indeed, some historians have analyzed Henry Wallace in post-1960, partly because of the intensification of the Cold War and how Cold War warriors targeted Wallace during this period. In general, past examinations of Wallace’s atomic policy have been invariably linked to analyses of relations with the Soviet Union. Based on the above Cold War concepts, three schools of thought have guided these interpretations. Orthodoxy, wherein, at the height of tensions between the United States and U.S.S.R., frames Wallace as an unrealistic, wooly dreamer, that offered every reason to be targeted by the Cold War warriors. The second perspective offered by revisionists between 1965 and the late 1970s depicts Wallace as a victim of red-baiting. Finally, after 1990, the pro-revisionist group took a multilateral approach to understanding Wallace.

Subsequently, the sections that follow are segmented six ways. First, section describes a history of the proceedings on Atomic International Controls during the Cold War. Second section introduces literature on Wallace in general. Third sections analyzes Orthodoxy authors. Fourth section explains Revisionists’ interpretation on Wallace. Fifth section introduces Post-Revisionists. Finally Atomic International Controls after 1990s are described. An explanation of Wallace’s early days follows.

The issue of international controls of atomic energy, a recurring motif of this paper, demands explanation because international atomic control is a controversial topic within the academic literature on Wallace. Surprisingly, few books on international control exist, perhaps because, as historian Akira Iriye claims, historians feel compelled to examine the origin of the Cold War more than to question the necessity of atomic controls. This section documents how the literature on atomic control has been informative to scholars interested in atomic international control.

Among this literature is the Smyth Report, published six days after the first use of the atomic bomb. Dr. Henry D. Smyth chronicled the administrative and technical history of this secret enterprise. Despite Smyth’s call for public discussion, the actual issues posed by the exploitation of atomic energy failed to reach the American people during the successive decade.

The official, comprehensive record of all aspects of the early years of atomic international control is chronicled in Atomic Energy Development, published in 1947–1948 by the United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) and The International Control of Atomic Energy: Policy at the Crossroads. A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: The New World, 1939/1946 published by the USAEC Historical Advisory Committee also describes the possible routes to the bomb and includes a well-balanced narrative of the research enterprise of WWII. This book
strongly influenced the development of the present study. Furthermore, archivist Gowing wrote *Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945* [1964]7 and *Independence and Deterrence*, [1974]8, an official account of British atomic development. Notably, the Maud Report on the British atomic program also shares Gowing’s informative descriptions on the matter.

Robert Joel Bresler, one of the few academic writers on international atomic control, proposed four hypotheses in his doctoral dissertation, “*Atomic Policy toward International Control of Atomic Energy 1945–1946*.”9 Advocates of international control, such as Henry Stimson in his Stimson Proposal and many atomic scientists, asked policymakers to accept intangible factors (an atmosphere of trust) over tangible factors (an atomic monopoly) and untested factors (a system of controls and safeguards) over factors that had already been given (a system of atomic deterrence) as a basis for policy. Stimson and the scientists concludes that mutual trust, the willingness to seek atomic weapons reduction, the urgency attached to the development of policy, and the fear of the efficacy of nuclear deterrence were not incorporated into the process of policy development. In fact, in 1965, Bresler concluded that history would ultimately hold the final judgment of the policy. Bresler’s conclusion came at a time when the Cold War was extremely intense. As a result, the present study takes the stance that Wallace’s position, which adopted the opinions of Stimson and the scientists, was also rejected. However, the facts of history eventually validated his opposition to America’s atomic monopoly.

Ten years later in 1975, Martin J. Sherwin, author of *A World Destroyed*, describes the history of the making of the atomic bomb, elucidating the uncertain Anglo–American partnership and the corresponding debate between scientists and political leaders.10 In response to the discussions between Stimson and the scientists, Sherwin also proposed that international controls had to be established, but that Soviet exclusion of Truman’s administration discouraged it. Although Sherwin did not discuss how to deal with the bomb after the war, his interpretation of the work of

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scientists like Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, plus several British scientists is instrumental to the present study.

Also in 1975, in the article, “Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941–1946,” 11 Barton J. Bernstein thoughtfully concluded that FDR’s decision to exclude Soviets from the atomic project, Truman’s decision to use the bomb in combat without explicitly informing the Soviet Union, and Truman’s choice not invite the Soviets to join in dialogue on postwar control of atomic energy undoubtedly contributed to the Cold War. Yet, in light of the fragility of wartime Soviet–American relations, Bernstein states that historians should not regard America’s wartime policy related to the bomb as the cause, but only as one of many causes of the Cold War. Furthermore, the wartime policy related to atomic energy represented one of a number of missed opportunities at achieving limited agreements. Consequently, Bernstein, during a time of détente, offers a critical discussion for other choices missing in the early Cold War period. Bernstein’s in-depth thought provided an opportunity for rethinking Wallace’s challenges.

In 1977, Daniel Yergin asserts in his book, Shattered Peace, that America initiated the Cold War, exaggerating the Soviet threat, thereby founding an anti-communist safeguard against them. Although sympathetic to Wallace, Yergin pointed out his three defects. First, Wallace was obsessed with an idea that those who took greatest alarm at the Soviet Union were fellow-travellers of fascism. Second, although as an apologist of the Soviet Union, Wallace always questions why the Soviets feared the United States, rather than asking why U.S. leaders might be disturbed by Soviet behavior. Finally, as anti-British, Wallace believed that the United Kingdom, by no means sharing national interests with the Soviet Union, obstinately opposed the U.S. position. Yergin’s analysis helps objectively frame Wallace’s stance on relations with the Soviet Union. However, Yergin falls short of explaining why Wallace needed the Soviet joint partnership for international atomic controls.

In 1986, Richard Rhodes introduced in his book, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, which described the birth of the Manhattan Project and the difficult but necessary relations with atomic scientists. 12 Rhodes’ scientific explanations of the process fleshed out the story of atomic development with detailed evidence. However, few references to policy-making is presented.

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In 1987, in his book, *By the Bomb’s Early Light*, Paul Boyer depicts an overall image of how atomic bombs have influenced American thought and culture. Closing the story of post-Hiroshima spiritual awareness of the horror of the atomic bomb, Boyer argues that cultural attention to the bomb diminished and an uneasy acquiescence of atomic superiority prevailed after Hiroshima. Despite Boyer’s detailed introduction of the movement of atomic scientists, Boyer fails to mention why international controls were badly needed.13

In 1981, Gregg Herken’s *Winning Weapon* presented several analyses of the militant and political consequences of the atomic bombings up to 1950.14 Explaining the prolonged role of atomic bombs that Truman and his advisers had envisioned, Herken describes the legacy of these ultimate weapons. Herken established that Wallace’s atomic view, although quite novel compared to that of the Cold War warriors, resonated with few people.

In contrast, hard-liners, such as Truman and his advisers, were so obsessed with absolute advantage of negotiation with the Soviets that they clung to the delusion of what Herken called *Pax Atomica*, a policy of American nuclear hegemony. Even the United Nations could not surpass the US atomic power. In his narrative, Herken was sympathetic to Wallace, shaping his image as a tragic hero while detailing the debate about the Baruch Plan in the United Nations. Furthermore, the Baruch–Wallace conflict showcased Wallace as overwhelmed by the winning weapons. Herken positions Wallace as a victim of *Pax Atomica*, lasting to 1955. Although Herken’s approach to Wallace is informative, it lacks an analysis of why Wallace sought Soviet joint partnership, and instead, focuses on how Truman and his policy-makers created an illusion of America’s decisive advantage either in peace or war.

In 1988, in his book *Danger and Survival*, McGeorge Bundy suggested that, even though FDR had survived, the failure of international atomic controls would have been unavoidable.15 Bundy, a co-author of Stimson’s *On Active Service*, successfully detailed the decision-making procedures discussed between atomic scientists and political leaders. In this context,

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Bundy positioned Wallace as a great man who understood Henry Stimson, further justifying Wallace’s advocates in the Baruch–Wallace conflicts on the international controls issue. In view of the literature above, which is mostly related to international controls and US atomic policy, steps to give thought to missing opportunities and choices were suggested. Still very few researchers have yet thought of Wallace as an advocate for another world order including the Soviet Union. The following section reviews the extant literature on Wallace to date.

2. Literature about Wallace

Wallace’s biography intrigues many historians because of his popularity within the FDR administration as a New Dealer. But few scholars have placed him as an integral figure in the postwar US science policy debate. As described above, Wallace’s scientific knowledge, nurtured throughout his childhood, prompted him to introduce econometrics to the field of agriculture before he took office in 1933. Chapter Two further details Wallace’s technical skills that lead him to be a scientific adviser to FDR and Bush in their efforts to develop atomic research. Thomas C. Lassman describes Wallace’s attempts to revitalize the Bureau of Standards in the article, Government Science in Postwar America: Henry A. Wallace, Edward U. Condon, and the Transformation of the National Bureau of Standards, 1945–1951. Lassman outlines Wallace’s efforts to maintain physical standards in the Bureau of Standards, the subcommittee of the Commerce Department, and to choose a theoretical physicist, Condon, as Director. Lassman claims that Wallace’s biographers created a distorted portrait of their subject because most historians have focused on elements of Wallace’s career that had little or nothing to do with his abiding interest in science and technology.

In Chapter Two, this study explains that, after the war, Wallace relished his opportunity at the Bureau of Standards because he was privy to an important report produced by Alexander Sachs that credited Wallace with spurring FDR to start atomic research. Wallace became heavily involved with this program. Lassman’s interpretation of Wallace is highly valuable to this study on Wallace because it introduced detailed accounts of his interest in science and technology that—other historians had previously overlooked.

In 1947, another biographer and journalist, Russell Lord, introduced the Wallace family and his early political career in his biographical essay, *The Wallaces of Iowa*. This publication describes how three generations of Wallaces nurtured scientific consciousness in agriculture and its business.\(^{18}\) However, there is no mention of his atomic policy in Lord’s account, partly because this essay was written one year before Wallace’s defeat in the Presidential campaign of 1948. In 1960, after 13 years’ absence, Karl M. Schmidt draws a vivid picture of the tragic campaign of the Progressive Party movement in his book *Henry A. Wallace: Quixotic Crusade 1948*. Schmidt depicts Wallace as having fought for peace as a presidential candidate.\(^{19}\) As a political scientist, Schmidt perceived Wallace’s failure in the presidential election as a result of a split amongst liberals. Strangely, Schmidt does not introduce any of Wallace’s activity in American–Soviet relations, much less his atomic policy involvement.

Soon after, J. Joseph Huthmacher responded favorably to Schmidt in a review of *Henry A. Wallace: Quixotic Crusader*.\(^{20}\) Huthmacher agrees with Schmidt that the defeats at the hands of the Progressive Party were the result of a liberal split. Huthmacher adds that Truman’s democratic liberals (Cold War liberals) abandoned the FDR legacy with no apparent discussion about other choices while, at the same time, promoting Soviet containment policy. Also, Huthmacher shares Schmidt’s understanding that Russia’s growing “intransigence” during 1948, exemplified by the Berlin blockade, strengthened the feeling that conciliation was not possible. In short, Huthmacher’s contention was that Russian intransigence did not begin in earnest until 1948 and that there was no legitimate reason to be concerned over it until then. Huthmacher eventually raises a question: if any documents showed the Soviet’s cooperative behavior in 1946–1947, then Wallace’s criticism of Truman’s “tough policy” in 1946-1947 was correct and the American people indeed missed the chance to create a peaceful world in collaboration with Russia. If this assumption failed to yield any supporting evidence, Truman would have been right. Huthmacher’s question throws an important light on the Cold War historians because it was a time when the Cold War tension was intense. Some of the Soviet documents released after the Cold War, show that, even in 1947–1948, the Soviet people were too exhausted from the


war even to consider undertaking such an attack. Given this, Huthmacher’s question has validated Wallace’s statement entitled “Significance of Atomic Age,” (October 15, 1945) and his letter “A New Approach to Russia” (March 14, 1946) to Truman.

3. Orthodox scholars

An example of an orthodox school of thought is represented by Herbert Feis’ work, *Japan Subdued.* In it, Feis takes an orthodox position on the use of the bomb, emphasizing the justification of America’s use of the bombs. As a government official and economist, Feis had access to the unpublished documents available in 1961. His official account traces the discussions of the possible steps to put an end to the war as quick as possible, and of the fate of Japan’s Emperor. His position, however, became the target of revisionists, including Gar Alperovitz in 1965.

In 1949, the year of Wallace’s defeat in the presidential campaign, Kazuko Tsurumi, a leading Japanese philosopher, writes about Wallace in her paper “Wallace’s Reconstruction.” Tsurumi informed Japanese readers of Wallace, who had a completely different concept of the Cold War from those called Cold War warriors in the Truman Cabinet. Given the political landscape of 1949, her paper would have been surprising and revealing to Japanese readers. It is no wonder that Tsurumi suggested to Tsugio Ando (later discussed) to study Wallace. In 1970, at a time when the “Cold War consensus” was dominant, Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, both Wallace biographers and critics of


22 For “The Significance of the Atomic Age,” See Appendix G.


25 Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 140. Leffler defines the “Cold War Consensus” as general agreement in the United States that the Kremlin was an ideological enemy with no legitimate fears or grievances.
Wallace, referred to him as an unrealistic wooly dreamer. The Schapsmeiers’ interpretation of Wallace described how his agrarian years (as Secretary of Agriculture) alone represented the finest hour of his presence upon the stage of history, but the remainder of his political career was disastrous. Yet the Schapsmeier brothers still concluded that if Wallace had been re-elected as Vice President instead of Truman, he would have fulfilled the Roosevelt legacy and the Cold War would have been avoided.

To sum up, this orthodox school of thought, devoid of alternatives to the Cold War thinking, considered Wallace as an unrealistic dreamer. At the same time, Wallace is depicted as a crusader for peace, and an outlier to the dominant cold war consensus. As a whole, the description of Wallace as a wooly dreamer was dominant in this genre.

4. Revisionists

The revisionists are represented by Gar Alperovitz, who wrote Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. Alperovitz contends that the bomb was used as a diplomatic lever, deployed to thwart Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe and Asia. This theory prompted an insurgence of revisionist perspectives proclaiming US responsibility for the origins of the Cold War. Among those revisionists’ was Norman Markowitz who, in 1970, completed a doctoral dissertation on the matter entitled “The Rise and Fall of the People’s Century.” He lamented that “Wallace had thrown away his career and reputation in a wrong-headed and futile crusade against American foreign policy.” Three years later, Markowitz focused on Wallace’s career in the 1940s, challenging those who saw him as either a Communist dupe or a visionary crack-pot. Markowitz describes Wallace’s wartime liberal program for a world New Deal and his idea for the creation of an American social service state (the idea of the Century of the common Man) in great depth. He concludes that Wallace should have been depicted as more sophisticated, more courageous, and less foolish.

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than he had been to date. Despite this insight, Markowitz offered little mention of Wallace’s position on Atomic policy or how Wallace urged that America–Soviet tensions be allayed to encourage Soviet friendship.29

In his review of Markowitz, Ellis Hawley evaluates and supports his accounts of Wallace, characterizing it as a good effort.30 Additionally, Hawley emphasizes that Markowitz had accurately portrayed Wallace’s performance (as a democratic socialist) in the conflict with Jessie Jones (vice presidential candidate in the FDR administration), which ultimately results in his failure to become Vice President in 1944. Eventually, Hawley agreed with Markowitz that Wallace was by no means a wooly dreamer, a communist dupe, or an open-door imperialist, as the New Left was often regarded,31 but a courageous man with broad foresight.

A strong supporter of Wallace, Richard Walton, in Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War, attempts to compare the Wallace campaign of 1948 with the détente diplomacy initiated by the Nixon and Ford administrations.32 Walton advocated that the Progressive Party campaign became the very policy of détente practiced by Nixon a quarter century later. Similarly, Walton supported Wallace’s atomic policy for its opposition to Truman Doctrine, the development of hydrogen bomb, and the Marshall Plan. However, Walton is insufficiently persuasive because he lacked explanation of how Wallace came in touch with the atomic scientists, or why he believed atomic secrets should be shared with the Soviets.

Conversely, in 1977, Ralph Levering contends that Walton was too robust in his assertions. Levering believes that Wallace and his supporters were absolutely right about American foreign policy, while Truman and liberals in Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) who supported anti-Soviet policies were wrong.33 Levering ultimately shares Walton’s

conclusion, although he disagrees with Walton’s open appreciation of Wallace.

In 1974, J. Samuel Walker thoroughly scrutinized Wallace’s foreign policy in his dissertation.\(^{34}\) Two years later, he introduced Wallace’s idea of “The Century of Common Man” in his book.\(^ {35} \) Walker explains that America, as a postwar leader among nations, should have helped raise the living standard of developing countries by supplying them modern technology, instead of executing military and economic imperialism over those countries. In turn, a universal (including Eastern Europe) “open door” economy, based on democratic-economic policy, was absolutely necessary. Walker further explains that the ongoing Marshall Plan program, an initiative of Secretary of State George C. Marshall, reminded of an “open door policy” of “Dollar Policy” days. Regarding Wallace’s atomic policy, Walker eloquently describes how the debate on international controls had been explored among Bernard Baruch and Secretary of State James Byrnes. However, Walker does not discuss how Wallace became involved with atomic scientists and what his view on atomic policy was.

In general, revisionists tend to interpret Wallace favorably, formulating an image of him as a reformer for a new world order. However, such interpretations lack any considerable attention to his role in atomic policy. One exception is Walker, who details Wallace’s atomic policy, attributing Wallace’s failure to his illusion of mystic and religious thought. Even so, Walker concludes that Wallace was not a political naïf but a thoughtful and visionary politician, partly because Walker values Wallace’s political skills more than his infamous religious activity.

5. Post-Revisionists

Since the work of Schapsmeier and Markowitz in 1970, and Walton and Walker in 1976, very few writers have devoted any attention to Wallace until the 1990s, likely because, as Walker explains, inconsistent information related to Wallace’s complex character or his diversified political career caused difficulty for historians to establish uniformity in his biography.\(^ {36} \) As a result, after less than twenty years’ absence, at a time

\(^{34}\) John Samuel Walker, “Henry A. Wallace and American Foreign Policy,” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 1974).


when the Cold War ended, a third group of historians emerged: post-
revisionists. This group adopted a multilateral approach involving
international relations, social science, historical cultures, and religion. In
general, revisionist arguments frame Wallace as a positive figure and also
identify him as overly religious, complex, and mystic.

In 1995, although White and Maze shared the view presented by
Walton, they offered a new perspective in *Henry A. Wallace: His Search
for a New World Order*,37 which analyzes Wallace’s enigmatic, i.e.,
mystic, quixotic, and indiscreet behavior, and concludes that it might
play a role in the defeat of the Progressive Party in the presidential
campaign of 1948. White and Maze also examine Wallace’s relations with
his mentor, artist Nicholas Roerich in the 1930s, Wallace sent him as a
special envoy to Asia. Roerich’s poor performance led to a political
scandal, the “guru affair” in 1943, to which FDR devoted little attention.
Despite Wallace’s political slip, White and Maze portrayed him positively,
calling him a courageous man whose vision was sufficiently practical
enough to satisfy needy nations with materials to support their future
affluence.

In response, Edward L. Schapsmeier state that there was no reason to
endorse the White and Maze conclusion of the Cold War being shortened
by forty years had Wallace been elected Vice President, and add that
Wallace’s enigma had nothing to do with his policy.38 Charles J. Errico
echoes the view of Schapsmeier in his review,39 and suggests that Walker
needed to add more explanations related to Wallace’s New World Order.40
Meanwhile, Markowitz had concurred with Errico and Walker.41 David
Hendrickson highlighted ambiguity in the New World Order that White
and Maze described.42 Of note, the authors’ interpretation of Wallace
atomic policy identified that Wallace never abandoned the idea of Soviet
trusteeship even after the defeat in the Presidential campaign of 1948.

37 Graham White and John Maze. *Henry A. Wallace: His Search for a New World
38 Edward L. Schapsmeier, review of *Henry Wallace: His Search for a New World
Order*, by Graham White and John Maze, *The American Historical Review* 102(1)
(1997): 211.
40 Ibid.
41 Norman D. Markowitz, review of *Henry Wallace: His Search for a New World