A World Beyond Global Disorder

A World Beyond Global Disorder:

The Courage to Hope

Edited by

Fred Dallmayr and
Edward Demenchonok

Cambridge Scholars Publishing



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God is not the God of disorder but of peace.
(1 Cor. 14:33)

It is not Paris we should pray for.
It is the world. It is a world in which Beirut,
reeling from bombings two days before Paris,
is not covered in the press.
A world in which a bomb goes off
at a funeral in Baghdad
and not one person's status update says "Baghdad,"
because not one white person died in that fire.
Pray for the world
that blames a refugee crisis for a terrorist attack.
That does not pause to differentiate between the attacker
and the person running from the very same thing you are.
Pray for a world
where people walking across countries for months,
their only belongings upon their backs
are told they have no place to go.
Say a prayer for Paris by all means,
but pray more,
for the world that does not have a prayer
for those who no longer have a home to defend.
For a world that is falling apart in all corners,
and not simply in the towers and cafes we find so familiar.
(Anonymous)

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PREFACE

The motto of the Enlightenment was Horace's "*Sapere Aude*!"—"Dare to Know!" Or, as Kant translates it: "have courage to make use of your *own* understanding!"[1] It encouraged individuals to make use of their minds to work their way from dependence to independence, to become enlightened and active citizens, to realize their rights in a law-governed civil state and thus to be the masters of their own destiny. The public use of reason must always be free and it is concerned with what is true for all. It should not advance the interests of a particular individual, party, or nation. This implies a non-deterministic view of history as open, containing many potential alternatives, and it implies the moral responsibility of the people as subjects of historical-cultural creativity. These ideas in their contemporary developed form remain relevant as a source of inspiration in our twenty-first century, when individual freedom is threatened in many ways, along with escalating social and global problems.

On the eve of the twenty-first century, many hoped that humanity would at last embrace new opportunities for peaceful international relations and cooperation as the best approach to solving social and global problems. However, their hopes were dashed by the continuation of the status quo; traditional policies of exploitation of human and natural resources; and hegemonic politics seeking global control in a unipolar world.

Research publications, trying to assess the current situation in the world, provide a catalog of failures and dysfunctions in the areas of economy, security, and environment, and a gridlock in global governance—the breakdown of global cooperation at a time when we need it most. All these are symptoms of global disorder or, in a broader sense, of civilizational failure, already detected in critiques of Western civilization by philosophers since the late nineteenth century.

In the neoconservative and some neoliberal ideologies, the current situation is frequently described deterministically as the process emanating from globalization, presented either as the rosy picture of Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," the grim view of Samuel P. Huntington's "clash of civilizations," or John G. Ikenberry's "liberal Leviathan."[2] All these in one way or the other underscore the defects of the status quo. It

ignores the role of peoples and other political actors in the transformation of society. In any case, at first blush, it would seem that we have no choice but to submit ourselves to the flow of events, relying on the "invisible hand" of the neoliberal economy or on the mercy of the "benevolent hegemon" as the world's ruler.

But any such conclusion is fallacious; in truth, the emperor has no clothes. Researchers of American policy show a glaring discrepancy between declared ends and the forcible means used to achieve them. Traditional policies have not removed the root causes of the problems, but have made them even worse while also generating new problems. Such a pessimistic picture, however, should not obscure opportunities for a better future. Thus, new approaches and policies are both needed and possible.

Philosophy, as a tool by which to engage in critical thinking, can help us to shatter the ideological myths surrounding a policy of global hegemony, to see the root cause of the problems and their possible solutions. Visions of a new world order invoke a different philosophy, at the center of which is human freedom and the vital interests of humanity. This philosophy asserts that the transcendental task for the survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy over any particular interests of nations or social groups. It promotes an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility. It is based on exploring the realities of today's world, which is not unipolar, but multicentric and socio-culturally diverse, having a variety of political forces and actors in play, with different tendencies and vectors of development, and which is open to various potential scenarios ranging from the best to the worst possible.

The realization of one or the other possible scenarios ultimately depends on the people. It is high time for social transformation, and the realization of existing opportunities for the amelioration of society requires people to think, to be enlightened in order to make informed choices, and to be active as citizens of their states as well as citizens of the world. This also requires more dialogical and collaborative relationships among individuals, social groups, and nations to join efforts for the solution to prevailing social, economic, environmental and other global problems.

In reflecting on the cultural diversity of the interrelated humanity, philosophers pay special attention to the relationships among the different elements of the socially and culturally diverse world. Such relationships can be intolerant and violent (as self-fulfilled prophecies of "culture wars" or "clashes of civilizations" predict) or mutually respectful and oriented toward dialogue and collaboration.

Philosophy contributes to the grounding of the universal character of dialogue and the normative status of dialogism. Dialogic philosophy, championed by Mikhail Bakhtin and Martin Buber among others,[3] and its contemporary development, provide us with a vision of human beings and society based on the principles of dialogue and communication on all levels—individual, intersubjective, social, cultural, international, and inter-civilizational. The implementation of these principles aims to transform the traditional world into the world of the "dialogue of civilizations" or a "dialogic civilization."

A search for an alternative to the existing state of affairs can be conceived in terms of the contrast between the one-dimensional monologic world of stereotypes and authoritarian edicts versus the pluralistic dialogic world of creative thinking, recognition of others as equals, personal moral responsibility and shared co-existence, and an openness toward the cultural-historical creativity of individuals.

An obvious contrast to dialogue is monologic thinking, related to domination and authoritarian power. In the same vein are various forms of nationalism, supremacist exceptionalism, fundamentalism, and other forms of extremism, which are intolerant of differences and the other. Less evident, while also damaging, is the abuse of universalistic notions, such as dialogue, once they are downgraded to mere clichés in political demagogy or pseudo-philosophical sophistry.[4]

In a conflicted world, for those striving for the progressive transformation of the world, organizations that serve as forums for promoting genuine dialogue in theory and practice are particularly important. Among these, the World Public Forum "Dialogue of Civilizations" (WPF) stands out. The WPF was established in 2002 by the initiative of representatives of civil society and members of non-governmental organizations from several countries as a practical realization of the United Nations General Assembly resolution, "Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations."[5] Its founding President is Vladimir I. Yakunin. WPF held its fourteen annual sessions in Rhodes, Greece, attracting many participants from over 70 countries. Recently it has been transformed into Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute (www.doc-research.org). It brings together many independent intellectuals, philosophers, political scientists, economists, and prominent public and religious figures from around the world to discuss the most pressing world problems that concern all human beings.

The contributors, from different countries, are united in search for the answer to the key interrelated questions: What are the underlying causes of the present world disorder? How can we overcome it? What are the

alternative visions and designs for a more peaceful, just and sustainable world order? These questions are at the crux of contemporary concerns and discussions among philosophers, political scientists, and the reasoning public in today's world about the present situation and the future of humanity. Featuring articles by noted international scholars, this book sheds new light on these questions by expanding them beyond the traditional, Eurocentric and West-centric theoretical canon into a creative global dialogue about the future of humanity.

The book offers not only an analytical picture of the current global disorder. Every so often, and sometimes unexpectedly, glimmers of hope break through the dark clouds hovering over our lives. What is important to note at this point is that these rays must not only be passively received or enjoyed, but must generate hopeful dispositions which, in turn, translate into practical conduct designed to promote peace and justice and thus to honor the "better angels" of humanity. Such conduct demands the cultivation of a courage which, without turning away from present calamities, marshals as remedies the resources of civic virtue and public responsibility crucially demanded in our time. The book's Introduction invokes the reflections of the great theologian Paul Tillich who, in some famous texts, celebrated the importance of the "courage to be" and also the corollary disposition of the "courage to hope."

Despite all the challenges posed by our current global disorder, we persist in believing that genuine global dialogue in the world through international forums and publications will help people to develop a global consciousness, and strengthen the courage to think, hope, and act in order to make our world a better place to live. We trust that this book will help the reader see that meaningful choices remain, for all of us, as peoples, nations, and individuals.

Edward Demenchonok

Notes

1. Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question, 'What is Enlightenment?'" in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, 11-22 (1784; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); John G. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

3. See Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992); Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970); first published in 1937 as *Ich and du*.
4. An example of this is idle talk about "universal dialogue" as feigned by a parochial group controlling the notorious "International Society for Universal Dialogue" (ISUD). Their pretentious sophistry is conceptually flawed, lacking any clarification of the meaning of "universalism" and in which sense it is used, and it confuses those who may think that this may have theological connotations. Its members were disappointed that ISUD is neither international nor dialogical, but rather has degenerated into a pocket club of the dominating group from one country, which uses some members from the other countries merely for show, is interested in power and money, and is authoritarian and intolerant to others. Disappointed members demanded that the discredited organization be dissolved because it is misleading, unworthy of its name, and unable to carry out its purpose. Such a simulacrum disgraces the idea of dialogue.
5. UNGA Resolution 56/6 of 9 November 2001.

INTRODUCTION

THE COURAGE TO HOPE

FRED DALLMAYR

In hope he believed against hope.
(Romans 4:18)

A title of this volume is a variation on the title of a book published by Paul Tillich in 1952, *The Courage to Be*. The variation is meant as a tribute to Tillich who, throughout his life, struggled with the issue of "hope," and with the difficulty of maintaining the "courage to hope" in the midst of our violent, conflicted, and seemingly "hopeless" world. The difficulty reached a peak in the post-war era and the ensuing Cold War. As theologian Mark Taylor observes, at the time when Martin Luther King Jr. "struggled to the rhythms of 'We shall overcome', Tillich barely dared hope."[1] According to his personal secretary at Harvard University, Grace Cali, Tillich during the early 1960s tried to inspire students to join movements against racism in South Africa and the United States, but he himself remained "despondent" about America's capacity to counter the main threats of the time: "the racial trouble" and "the nuclear arms development" that together made up what he called the nation's "awful sickness." He said he could "feel this sickness" in all his speaking engagements throughout the country.[2]

His secretary recalls one particular exchange that she and some of his students had with him in 1961. Here is her account:

> Student asking: 'Is there any way of stopping it?'
>
> He sighed heavily. 'I hope and pray so. But I am afraid not. Today the self-destructive urges in man are so strong—individually and on the group level—that I doubt if they can be overcome.'
>
> 'Isn't there anything any of us can be doing to help reverse the trends?' asked Victor intently.
>
> His face filled with a deep sadness. 'It is already too late. I feel it may be too far gone—especially the racial trouble.'

> 'But Paulus!' I protested. 'Is there no hope?'
> He sensed our plea. 'There is only one way. Everywhere, in every way possible, we as individuals must fight against the forces of destruction. First, in ourselves, then on a group level. We must work for anything that will bring people together—but in encounters where love and justice become creatively one.'[3]

The present volume reflects this dilemma: while acknowledging the difficulty of hoping, it strongly affirms the "courage to hope." But first some more words about the nature of hope. In March of 1965, shortly before his death, Tillich delivered a sermon at the Memorial Church of Harvard University; its title: "The Right to Hope." In his sermon, the theologian stressed the human need for hope as a bulwark against despair; but he also distinguished carefully between genuine, well-grounded hope and foolish flights of fancy. "Nobody," he said, "can live without hope, even if it were only for the smallest things which give some satisfaction even under the worst of conditions, in poverty, sickness, and social failure." Without this bulwark we would sink into dark despair or deadly indifference. But the questions are: "Do we have a right to hope?" Do we have the right kind of hope? "Is there a justified hope for each of us, for nations and movements, for mankind and perhaps for all life, for the whole universe?"

The sermon cites episodes from biblical history where genuine hope is exemplified. There is the story of Abraham who—"hoping against hope"—trusted in the promise of becoming the father of a large nation. This faith was continued in Christianity where believers trust in the coming of "the new heaven and the new earth." But in both cases, hope was severely tested and sometimes shattered by disappointment. In the Hebrew Bible, the book of Job laments about God's power to "destroy the hope of man" (Job 14:19). In the Christian gospel, there is the dismay of the two disciples on the way to Galilee: "We had hoped that he was the one to redeem Israel" (Luke 24:21). This dismay has spread far and wide in modern times, and especially in the contemporary age when perhaps the majority of people are tormented by anxiety, hopelessness and despair. Here Tillich introduces his distinction: "Hope is easy for the fool but hard for the wise one. How then can we distinguish genuine from foolish hope?"[4]

The question raised by Tillich touches on some of the deepest and most complicated issues not only in theology but in philosophy and the human sciences: it is the issue of time and of the meaning of human life and history. For Tillich, hope is not a matter of scientific prediction or "futurology"; nor is it the result of human fabrication or artifice. In those cases, hope would be replaced by knowledge or will power. The question

is whether there is a ground—perhaps a grounding "unground"—which is not empirically verifiable or falsifiable; nor is it an empty daydream. Theologically speaking, the grounding has the character of a "promise" granted by a source which is trustworthy and reliable. In philosophical language, the grounding testifies to the primacy of potentiality over actuality, or at least of a certain excess of the former over the latter. In still different (postmodern) terminology, one can speak here of the interlinking of absence and presence, or else of an absent presence. In Tillich's words:

> Where there is genuine hope, there that for which we hope already has some presence. In some way, the hoped for is at the same time here and not here. . . . Thus, there is a beginning here and now; and this beginning drives toward an end.

This absent presence makes all the difference: "Where such a beginning of what is hoped for is lacking, hope is foolishness." On a metaphorical level, he adds, we are all familiar with genuine hope. Thus, "in the seed of a tree, stem and leaves are already present, and this gives us the right to sow the seed in hope for the fruit." A similar situation prevails in the case of children and our hope of seeing them reach maturity and adulthood. This leads to a religious-spiritual parallel. It may be that, in the heart of human beings, some seeds have been planted which eventually will lead humanity toward the land of promise, "in the fullness of time."[5]

Given the recalcitrance of promise to prediction and manipulation, the question arises regarding human practice and its limits. In line with sage religious and philosophical teachings, Tillich stresses the need for waiting, for lying in wait or expectation. "Hoping," he states, "often implies waiting"—and waiting "demands patience" which in turn demands "stillness in one's self." But there are two kinds of waiting: "the passive waiting in laziness, and the receptive waiting in openness." Those who wait passively in laziness "prevent the coming of what they are waiting for"; while those waiting openly and receptively "work for its coming." As he continues: "Waiting in inner stillness, with poised tension and openness toward what we can only receive . . . is highest activity; it is the driving force which leads us toward the growth of something new in us."[6] Such patience or active waiting is difficult for individuals and for societies or peoples. Small wonder there is often a tendency to "hurry things up" and to manipulate developments to reach outcomes quickly. The tendency is evident in the modern (Western) ideology of "progress," the trust in the accelerated, humanly manufactured fulfillment of social goals. In a still more detrimental form, hopeful waiting is foiled when societal fulfillment is linked with the striving for national glory, power and domination. This

derailment can happen even in countries where a higher promise has been implanted. As Tillich observes in a striking passage:

> There was and is in Israel, as in every nation, much foolish hope: national arrogance, will to power, ignorance about other nations, hate and fear of them, the use of God and his promises for the nation's own glory. Such hopes, present also in our own [American] nation, are foolish hopes. They do not come out of what we truly are and cannot, therefore, become reality in history, but they are illusions about our own goodness and distortions of the image of others.[7]

Although acknowledging the fact of horrible derailments and destructive foolishness, Tillich never abandoned genuine hope, both for individuals and for societies and people. Just as individuals, through hope, may "*become*" what they truly "*are*", so there is also the "fulfillment of historical hopes" of humanity, however limited or fragmentary it may be. Tillich in this context refers to the spreading of democracy or the "democratic form of life" which is actually the fulfillment of "old ideas about the equal dignity of human beings before God and under law." The ideas matured over time because there were social groups concretely inhabited by democratic hopes. In a similar manner, the social or "socialist" principle is a partial fulfillment of the age-old dreams of the poor that they may participate in the good life (and the goods of life). In the period of decolonization and globalization, the ancient belief in the "original unity" of humanity is also being resuscitated, inspiring a "genuine hope for reunion" in previously marginalized populations. The most enduring and profound hope, however, is the longing not just for unity, but for reunion in justice and peace. In the language of both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, this is the longing for "the coming of the Kingdom of God." For Tillich, this Kingdom does not come "in one dramatic event." Rather, it is arriving "here and now in every act of love, in every manifestation of truth, in every experience of the holy." The hope sustaining this belief is justified (and not foolish), because there is already "a presence and a beginning" of what is hoped for.[8]

As previously indicated, the present volume is located at the cusp of hopelessness and hope. All the assembled papers are fully aware of the grimness of our global situation, of the enormous danger of wholesale destruction, of the fact that things may have already gone "too far." Yet, all of them are inhabited by certain stubbornness: a stubborn refusal to accept things as they are (the present "global disorder"); a determination to hope and work for a better condition of the world. This determination, we are convinced, is not a "foolish" hope, not the result of empty daydreams.

Rather, it is anchored in concrete reality—more specifically, in concrete everyday human experience. In every breath we take, we affirm the value and goodness of life; we affirm a belief or hope in the future, and ultimately the prevalence of life over death and destruction. Thus, every breath is a testimony to the genuine (not foolish) character of our expectation. Thus also, the deeper promise we affirm is anchored in every breathing moment—in Tillich's language, "in every act of love, in every manifestation of truth, in every experience of the holy." This experience may not completely shield us from doubt and despair; but it enables us ever so often to recover the "courage to hope."

The first Part of the volume focuses on the reigning "global disorder," evident in unipolar hegemony together with some challenges to this disorder. The opening chapter is by Richard Falk, the renowned expert on international politics and law. Titled "A New Geopolitical Realm for the Twenty-first Century," the essay contrasts an older geopolitical order (or disorder)—still largely dominant today—with a newer paradigm hopefully emerging in our time. According to Falk, the older system was based entirely on "hard power," on the ability of states to wage war for the protection of their security. The system arose after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) which enshrined the primacy of territorial states as the sole basis of membership in international society. In ensuing centuries, the system extended its reach from Europe to the rest of the world through colonization. The paradigm was challenged after World War I and World War II by the establishment of international bodies, the success of anti-colonial movements, and the spreading motto of the self-determination of peoples. These developments gave rise embryonically to a new geopolitical framework whose main features are outlined in Falk's paper. The problem is that the old system is still deeply entrenched and shows no willingness to surrender its privileges to newer horizons. Falk in this situation calls for a "concrete utopia," a hope for a future which is neither empirically predictable nor readily defeated by cynicism and despair.

The tension present in hope is tightened into conflict in the second chapter by the distinguished philosopher Akeel Bilgrami. Titled "World Order, Islam, and the West," the chapter presents the geopolitical system born in the modern West as a constellation of territorial states wedded purely to the pursuit of political power and with little or no interest in cultural or civilizational issues. To this extent, the phrase "world order" is actually an oxymoron or euphemism hiding "global disorder," namely the reality of domination and subjection. Together with Falk, Bilgrami sees the modern Western paradigm as the engine fueling the West's global ascendance, that is, the extension of its system through colonialism or

imperialism to the "second and third worlds" (where the second also includes socialist countries). Given the location of most of the "developing" societies in the global South, the modern system translates into a North-South confrontation, with the North basically vying for the natural (not cultural) resources of the South. With regard to the relation between Islam and the West, this scenario means that "world order" does not stand opposed to Islam (or any other religion) as such, but only to Muslim countries unwilling to settle for subjection. For Bilgrami, the main issue today is possible "resistance" to global (dis)order. In his view, such resistance cannot simply rely on good intentions or dialogue alone; because "one cannot have a dialogue with a master." Nor is violence the answer, because the latter—apart from being "intrinsically immoral"—usually brings just "further domination." Hence, the need today is for goodwill backed up by principled action or praxis, pretty much along the lines of Gandhian "truth or justice-force" (*satyagraha*)."

The theme of tension and conflict is continued in the chapter by global studies professor Walter Mignolo. Like Falk and Bilgrami, Mignolo views Western modernity as a paradigmatic system composed of interlocking structures and layers. A crucial feature of this system is what he calls its "coloniality of power" consolidated in a "colonial matrix of power" (CMP) stretching into all areas of social life: political, economic, religious, ethnic-racial, and cultural. Importantly, coloniality in his view is not only a brute engine of domination but a cognitive-epistemic (knowledge-power) framework constructed on the premise of a distinct form of "subjectivity" or subjective agency: not so much the Cartesian *ego cogito* but the instrumental *ego conquiro* (as will to power). In the process of the ongoing globalization, the Western system is expanded into an increasingly pervasive global coloniality endowed with the possibility of near-total surveillance and control. Alarmingly, this expansion transforms even aspects of international law (seen in the sense of Carl Schmitt's "second *nomos*"). What is required in our situation, for Mignolo, is not only a partial or piecemeal decolonization, but a change of paradigm, what he calls "decoloniality" connected with "dewesternization." This shift can draw inspiration from earlier liberation theology and "dependency theory," but has to be more comprehensive relying on new forms of knowledge, discourse, and conversation. With this shift, the old "colonial matrix" would give way to multiple possibilities and "pluriversal horizons" of global life.

A major example of global disorder today is the nearly random, extra-judicial killing of people throughout the world through the use of drones. Conducted without warning, such killings cut through all territorial

boundaries, obliterating traditional sovereignty and the distinction in international law between war and peace. Italian international politics expert Daniele Archibugi examines the recent proliferation of the practice and its impact on the "community of nations." The author sees three major problems in drone killings. The first concerns the status and rights of the target: is s/he an enemy combatant, a non-combatant, a defendant? If a combatant, a soldier in war has the right to surrender. If a non-combatant: the target should have the right to a fair trial, with due process, legal counsel and defense. The second problem is the authority for the killings. Although drone killings in foreign countries are acts of war, decisions to kill are usually made by intelligence agencies or secret bureaucratic bodies far removed from public scrutiny and accountability. The third problem has to do with "collateral damage" whose high percentage defeats the vaunted claims of drone precision. For Archibugi, drone killings are clearly war crimes fueled by sheer will to power (motto: "we kill because we can"); they also represent the triumph of technology over humanity. His counter-proposals are again three: first, to launch an information campaign exposing drone killings as criminal acts; next, to promote greater judicial intervention to combat extra-judicial methods; and finally to institute Public Opinion Tribunals seeking to expose those guilty of war crimes, leading to the eventual banning of drone killings in the world.

In his study on Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger once noted that modern Western culture was increasingly giving pride of place to the *brutalitas* of human *animalitas*. Drawing on a broad range of experiences, the chapter by Indian psychological theorist Ashis Nandy offers a grim picture of the ongoing "brutalization" of human and social life in our time. Without denying the important achievements of modern science, Nandy notes that, in its triumphalist mode, modernity has also engendered such brutalized phenomena as "dispassionate, scientized, assembly-line violence," "new concepts of disposable humans and infra-humans," finding expression in genocide, ethnic cleansing, and total warfare. As an expert psychologist, Nandy taps into the psychic undercurrents of disorder, such as "drug-dependent escapism" and "manic violence" nurtured by totalized ideologies. He draws attention to the twisted "psychological pleasures" of carpet bombing and to the present orgy of media violence: "the meaningless, random violence without any genuine depth of feeling backing it"—what Orwell had called "surplus violence." For Nandy, all these phenomena signal a dreadful plunge into "de-civilization" and de-humanization. Despite this grim portrayal, however, his paper is not entirely devoid of hope. As an antidote to the dominant malignancy, Nandy points to "new global heroes," all "votaries of non-violence" and

heirs of the Mahatma Gandhi: Nelson Mandela, the Dalai Lama, Aung Sang Su Kyi, and others. Importantly, these heroes (in his view) are not just isolated dreamers but are backed up by grassroots movements still wedded to the hope of re-humanization.

The second Part of the volume turns to efforts or strategies designed to correct or mitigate the disorder prevailing in the present global system. In his chapter "Reflections on Multipolarity, Regionalism, and Peace," distinguished international-relations scholar Fabio Petito invokes the idea of the "dialogue of civilizations" to challenge (once again) Samuel Huntington's work—this time not directly his thesis of a looming "clash" of civilizations but his proposal for a "multipolar system" organized along civilizational lines as a corrective to the clash. While accepting the value of multipolarity in general, Petito finds that Huntington's model of self-enclosed civilizational blocs still follows the logic of clash, at least in the absence of a cross-cultural dialogue and interaction oriented toward the *telos* of peace. As he acknowledges, some proposals for softening the conflict between competing blocs have been advanced by Huntington himself and also by "neo-regionalist" scholars like Chantal Mouffe and Daniel Zolo. However, in Huntington's case, the proposal does not go beyond a "minimalist ethics" of non-interference, while regionalist scholars seem satisfied with encouraging a purely pragmatic balance of power. For Petito, without a genuine dialogue of civilizations as an overarching framework, there is a risk that a multipolar and multi-civilizational world order still leaves us with "a worrying system of forces," and a structure of "macro-regional great powers" (*Grossraum Politik*) ready for macro-collisions. His own preference is for "multiculturally and dialogically constituted processes of regional integration" within the horizon of a global peace agenda. Thus his "alternative model" accepts multipolarity as a spatial/geopolitical reality but rejects "culturalist enclosure" as a refusal of dialogue.

A similar agenda of global-regional equilibrium can be found in the "Bandung Spirit" originating in the alliance of non-aligned African and Asian countries established at the Bandung Conference in 1955, at the height of the Cold War. Brazilian social theorist Beatriz Bissio invokes this legacy in her chapter titled "The 'Bandung Spirit' as an Alternative to the Present Chaos." Taking her point of departure from the ills of the present system, Bissio recounts the string of political disasters in our century, from September 11 to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to the intervention in Libya in 2011 to the ongoing mayhem in Syria and to the present-day flood of refugees from the Middle East to Europe and the rest of the world. As she observes, this

unfolding tragedy—the direct or indirect result of the interventions—makes a farce of the notion "world order" (unless the phrase is used satirically). She also quotes CIA veteran Paul Pillar to the effect that "political change cannot be imposed by an outside power, much less by means of gunfire." These observations lead Bissio directly to the recollection of the "Bandung Spirit" and the tradition of the "non-aligned movement." In this context, she remembers the basic "Ten Principles" articulated in Bandung, especially the principles of respect for territorial integrity and of "non-intervention and non-interference" in the internal affairs of other countries and regions. To be sure, the geopolitical situation has changed dramatically since the Cold War and so have the meaning and reach of "world order"; accordingly, possibilities of resistance have to be reformatted and readjusted. In our time, one such readjustment is evident in the role of BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in the world. As Bissio notes hopefully, today "BRICS can move forward with the gradual substitution of the Bretton Woods framework, due to their own weight in the world economy."

Another possible alternative to global disorder is emerging today in Asia in the form of the "Silk Road" projects. Chinese philosopher and public intellectual Peinim Ni discusses some of these projects in his essay titled "'Silk Road World Order': Underlying Philosophy and Impact." As Ni points out, in its intent the Chinese initiative of "One Belt and One Road" presents a blueprint for a future geopolitical scenario. The chapter digs first into some of the historical background undergirding the Chinese initiative, while also sketching the vast dimensions of the Silk Road projects. Ni immediately raises a crucial question: is the projected new scenario just a variation of the old, Western-style "world order"? "Will it be just a changing of the guard or will it be new or different in substance?" Ni opts for the latter alternative, citing Yuri Tavrosky to the effect that the emerging scenario will be "not vertical, but horizontal" in terms of geopolitical organization and power. In support of this option, he cites some recent political and economic policies enacted by China. More important, however, is the different ethical and philosophical spirit permeating the projects. The chapter here points to the great tradition of Confucian ethics and the still older legacy of "all under heaven" (*tianxia*), a legacy rephrased by philosopher Tu Weiming as an "anthropocosmic vision." As Ni realizes, a beneficial outcome cannot be predicted with certainty. However, "we can take as basis of our hope" exhortations by the Chinese leadership "to work together to forge a new partnership of win-win cooperation and create a community of shared future for humankind."

The praxis of resisting global disorder is only in part a matter of restructuring the global geopolitical scenario; in large measure, it involves the effort to change human perceptions, orientations and dispositions, that is, to uplift the ethical fiber of people. This later effort is at the heart of the work of political activist and public intellectual Cynthia McKinney as captured in her chapter "*Ubuntu*: Beyond Domestic and Global Disorder." The chapter starts by remembering a speech President Kennedy delivered in 1963 at the American University where he urged America to be a peaceful nation living justly with other countries in a global commonwealth: "Not a *Pax Americana* enforced on the world by American weapons of war; nor the peace of the grave or the security of the slave," but "a genuine peace." Having spent some years in the US Congress, McKinney learned through hard experience that Kennedy's vision was for all practical purposes extinguished with his assassination. Her paper recounts her difficult struggles as a Congress-woman when she fought against domestic racial divisions while also resisting the powerful bent of many national leaders to wage incessant war abroad. As she writes: "Drastic corrective action is urgently needed." The ideals which should guide such action, she notes, are egalitarianism, anti-racism, and "post-capitalism" (at least in the sense of an opposition to "vulture capitalism" and support for a "sharing economy"). She also finds inspiration in the ideas and practices of many "second and third world" countries, especially the practice of *ujamaa* or *ubuntu*, meaning brotherhood and social solidarity among all people.

In the concluding chapter of Part II, Russian philosopher Marietta Stepanyants draws attention to the urgent need for educational changes, especially on the primary and secondary levels in our globalizing world. As she points out, one of the extremely disturbing features of the reigning "global disorder" is the widespread involvement of children in violent conflicts and wars, as a spin-off of the hatreds and animosities among adults. Her chapter gives the example of the Russian Federation where, due to the multicultural and multi-ethnic character of society and its reflection in school systems, tensions and conflicts can easily arise among school children and in classrooms. The main issue in such conflicts is usually the precarious and contested "identity" of the competing ethnic and religious groups. Conflicts and animosities about identity usually operate on a subliminal and purely emotional level, without any real understanding of existing differences and their reasons. Moreover, in a democratic setting, there is the problem of somehow reconciling group identities with a shared national identity. To tackle these issues, Marietta Stepanyants argues strongly in favor of the introduction of intercultural education for young people, both in Russia and elsewhere. Such education,

in her view, serves two crucial purposes: to reduce violence among school children, and to prepare young people for the task of cross-cultural dialogue on the global level. Stepanyants herself has been a pioneer in this field: under the auspices partly of UNESCO and the World Public Forum, she has designed a model curriculum which can serve as an exemplar of global intercultural education.

The third Part of the volume invokes religious, spiritual and ethical resources for global renewal. Much inspiration for resisting disorder can be derived from the great world religions and also from prominent philosophical and wisdom traditions around the world. In his chapter, "Herald of Glad Tidings: Pope Francis as Teacher of Global Politics," Fred Dallmayr shows how genuine Christian faith can serve as a bulwark against global chaos and as a beacon of hope for the future. The chapter starts by recalling some of the pontiff's statements at the War Memorial in Redipuglia, Italy, in 2014 where he denounced war as utter "madness" and also pointed to some of the motivating causes or origins of devastation: "Greed, intolerance, the lust for power . . . these motives underlie the decision to go to war." These motives, he added, powerfully persist in our present time, unleashing new wars "fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, wanton destruction." In some of his writings and speeches of the last two years (especially *The Joy of the Gospel* and *The Church of Mercy*), Francis strongly attacked a whole host of the crises and "diseases" in today's world: the growing intolerance between countries, races, and creeds; the massive political and economic inequality between rich and poor, powerful and powerless; the rise of a new idolatry of the "God of money"; the spreading "culture" of consumption and waste; and above all the glorification of violence turning the whole world into a battle field. In the face of this battery of derailments, miseries, and dangers, the pontiff urges his readers and listeners to step back from the brink of the abyss and undergo a radical turning or "*metanoia*": "I ask each of you, indeed all of you, to have a conversion of heart." Only such a turning, he stresses, can lead to genuine social and political renewal—which in turn, is a precondition and corollary of the proclamation of "glad tidings": the approach of the promised "Kingdom of God."

Given this strong papal exhortation, the question arises whether religion can be a sufficient or plausible antidote to violence and destruction. As is well known, in the eyes of many agnostics or non-believers, religion of any kind is part of the problem, not part of the solution. In her chapter, "Finding Peace in Authentic Religion," philosopher Paola Bernardini candidly tackles this issue by introducing the distinction between genuine or authentic and debased or inauthentic religious faith; only the latter, she

argues, serves as a seedbed for violence and destruction. To test or validate this distinction, Bernardini relies on four main criteria: philosophical, etymological, ethical, and hermeneutical. On the strictly philosophical level, a religious faith can be called authentic in as much as it makes sense of questions regarding the ultimate meaning of life. This test was used by Pope Benedict when he explained the conversion of the ancient tribes to monotheism as an attempt to make rational sense of the cosmic order. A similar argument was used by philosopher Hermann Cohen to show the coincidence of rational order and faith. The practical implication is that rational order is conducive to peace (not violence or war). In terms of etymology, one can show that "*religio*" authentically means to bind or reconnect (not to sever or divide). The closeness of the Arabic terms "Islam" (submission) and *al-salam* (peace) has often been noted; and according to some Jewish authorities "*torah*" basically signifies a shared way or shared practices of life. On the ethical level, God and "goodness" are virtually interchangeable, especially as religious conduct means following the Golden Rule. Finally, hermeneutics is crucial because scriptural passages seemingly departing from the Golden Rule must be interpreted narrowly in a given context. All of these arguments combined support Bernardini's claim that "authentic" religion promotes justice and peace.

In her paper, Bernardini points to Mahatma Gandhi as an authentic Hindu believer; she also holds up the example of the Muslim follower of Gandhi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, as a genuine representative of his faith (and a counterfoil to extremist *jihadism*). To validate further her conception of authenticity, the next chapter turns to the prominent Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush, widely known for his effort to connect (or re-connect) Islamic faith and rational insight. In his chapter "High Time for a Change of Mind," Soroush offers five main points designed to reorient current debates. His first point takes up the sensitive issue of freedom of speech, especially the claimed "right" to insult Islam and the Prophet. Without denying the "right," he finds the exercise deficient on two grounds: it does not increase cognitive understanding and violates basic standards of ethical conduct. "What goodness is there in causing heartache and senseless torment?" While thus shielding "authentic" faith, Soroush in his second point freely admits the practice of rational criticism and debate, arguing that in all religions there is a "rational imperative of analytical, ethical and historical critique" in order to keep faith free from perversions. In his third point, he admonishes Muslims everywhere to stay on the "high ground," by not participating in ongoing geopolitical struggles for power, in arms sales, and competition for nuclear weapons. On the positive side,

this means cultivating ethical standards and practicing the norms of genuine faith. The fourth point counsels strongly against shortcuts or derailments which are unfortunately too widespread today: especially reactionary modes of anti-Westernism and celebrations of a primeval "purism" upholding a spurious Islamic "identity" neglectful of rational faith. In his fifth and last point, Soroush offers sage advice to fellow-Muslims: they

> should heal believers and direct their passions upward, use their knowledge to interpret the principles of religion, temper law with ethics, separate what is essential to religion from what is accidental, and expand the reach of economic and political justice.

The issue of the relation between faith and ethical standards of conduct is further examined by Islamic scholar Ebrahim Moosa in his chapter "Muslim Ethics in an Era of Globalism: Reconciliation in an Age of Empire." By comparison with Abdolkarim Soroush's more irenic text, Ebrahim Moosa pays more attention to the violent derailments of religious loyalties. As he acknowledges, the notion of a "Muslim ethics" is placed under siege today from two sides: on the one hand, the actions of violent, fanatical movements like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram; and on the other, the operation of a "post-modern" imperialism, that is, the spreading of complex transnational political and economic networks seemingly without central purpose (sometimes called "cellular globalization"). The two factors are nor unrelated: Western imperial ventures have entailed "a bitter harvest and an unstoppable afterlife of violence in regions they attempted to reshape by force." For Mousa, a crucial remedy for the prevailing disorder is global justice, especially the "equitable sharing of the world's resources in a peaceful and non-hegemonic manner." Spelling out more clearly the requisites of global peace and reconciliation, he lists these major needs (all parts of a genuine Muslim ethics): fostering an ethics of "accountability and responsibility" beginning with self-critique; transcending nation-state structures by nurturing "an ethos of cosmopolitan citizenship based on people-to-people relations"; and promoting an "inclusive ethical content" in the global order that goes beyond "liberal ethics." In the end, at least in the context of the Abrahamic religions, global peace cannot just be contractual but has to reflect a new "covenant" - involving a "re-covenanting" of beliefs and practices that will "turn reconciliation into meaningful life forms."

From the Middle Eastern and West Asian contexts the volume turns to East Asia and its spiritual-philosophical traditions, chiefly the legacy of Confucianism. In his chapter "Spiritual Humanism: An Emerging Global

Discourse," renowned Chinese scholar Tu Weiming explores the relevance of the Confucian tradition for the task of overcoming global disorder in our time. In his view, the main contribution resides in the fostering of a "spiritual humanism" combining and renewing the best ethical teachings of the past on a cross-cultural level. Such a humanism, he notes, stands opposed to a one-sided "Enlightenment mentality" stressing rationalism, materialism, and utilitarianism; more specifically, it offers an antidote to some of the negative consequences of modernity, such as aggressive anthropocentrism, imperialism, possessive individualism, and secular nationalism. In line with older Chinese teachings, spiritual humanism for Tu Weiming upholds the "unity of heaven and humanity" and just peace for "All under Heaven." Central ingredients of this outlook are reverence for the divine or sublime; cultivation of the "human" (*ren*); the nurturing of nature; and the practice of reciprocity or the Golden Rule in its various forms. Although cosmopolitan in its implications, spiritual humanism does not aim at global uniformity or synthetic sameness; rather, in its opposition to imperial hegemony, it cherishes the plurality of cultures and religions—although not a "clashing" plurality but one of harmonious cross-fertilization. Tu Weiming concludes: "The emergence of an ecumenical and cosmopolitan spirit is the precondition for us to envision a truly authentic global culture of peace."

In his concluding chapter titled "World in Transition: From a Hegemonic Disorder toward a Cosmopolitan Order," Edward Demenchonok reviews the ongoing changes and transformations of the global scenario, particularly the decline of the older Westphalian system of competing sovereignties, the flirtation with a unipolar hegemonic order (or rather disorder), and the ongoing emergence of a new multilateral paradigm held together by global norms, intercultural dialogue, and ecumenical and cosmopolitan interaction or symbiosis. As Demenchonok makes clear, the world is presently hovering on the cusp between hope and hopelessness, between optimism and despair, between a decaying world disorder, and a precariously emerging cosmopolitan horizon. Since we cannot be neutral in this struggle, our task is to be soberly and courageously engaged in hope for the future of our world.

Notes

1. Mark Lewis Taylor, "Tillich's Ethics: Between Politics and Ontology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Tillich*, ed. Russell R. Manning (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 190.