

The Rhetoric of Emperor Hirohito

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*Continuity and Rupture in
Japan's Dramas of Modernity*

By

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CHAPTER ONE

EMPEROR HIROHITO AND HIS WARTIME ROLE: APPROACHING HISTORY FROM THE RHETORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The obligations of order hang over us, even if we would revolt against order. Out of such predicaments, ingenious fellows rise up and sing; thus promptly have all our liabilities been by symbol-using converted into assets.

—Kenneth Burke, “Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education”

The relationship between utopia and the existing order turns out to be a “dialectical” one.

—Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*

Emperor Hirohito is the most charismatic leader in the modern history of Japan. As a public figure, he also inspired much controversy. The Emperor played a vital role in key episodes in Japan’s dramas of modernity. Before and during World War II, he was “constructed” as the authority representing *kokutai*, the “imperial line unbroken for the age eternal,” to justify the introduction of imperialism into East Asian nations based upon Shinto, or Japan’s indigenous religion. In fact, the part that the Emperor played in wartime Japan has been a matter of controversy.¹ But the controversy over the wartime role of the Emperor remains unresolved even for the people of Japan. The dramatic transformation of his status from the pre- and wartime *manifest deity* to the post-war symbol of Japan has hindered all public discussion about the so-called “Emperor System.”² In his book *Nihonjinron: Meiji kara konnichi made (Japanology: From the Meiji to the present)*, sociologist Hiroshi Minami explains that

when it comes to an analysis of the national character of the Japanese people, their consciousness toward the Emperor is *the* most crucial point. Although the Emperor lost his divinity and “became a human being” as a

result of losing the war, we are not allowed to discuss the Emperor System freely even at present. On the occasion of the death of Emperor Showa [Hirohito], discussions over the state of the Emperor System have been conducted once more, but they were far from satisfactory. (*Nihonjinron* [Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994], 384; my translation)

Hence, the Emperor has often been stigmatized as a mysterious person by the wartime fascist regime or excluded as a subject from the post-war historical discussion by the Japanese people.

Beyond doubt, nationalism in the Showa era (1926-1989),³ especially the 1930's, was an important force in Japan, and the position of the Emperor was key to it.⁴ Stephen S. Large writes that during the Showa era, "Japan experienced great upheaval and change wrought by the Depression, a series of wars culminating in the devastation of the country and the destruction of empire, an unprecedented foreign occupation, recovery from the ruins of war, and the country's rapid development as an economic superpower."⁵ Thus, to study the Showa era is to study Japan's most dramatic experience of war and peace.

When we look at past history books on the Emperor and Japan's wartime periods, four classes can be identified. The first sort of books are studies upon public controversy over the post-war status of the Emperor. They are invaluable sources in the sense that they are both analytical and argumentative. Such books include the pros and cons about the wartime role as well as the post-war utility of the Emperor. For instance, Kiyoko Takeda's *Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor* explains the ambiguous status of the Emperor: one image is of a mythological and absolutist Emperor based upon a divinity in the enduring lineage of the imperial family, and the other is a rational and democratic interpretation as expressed in the Charter Oath of 1868 which promised a deliberative assembly and government acting in accordance with the public will. Takeda provides an intensive analysis of the American, British, Canadian, and Chinese views of the Emperor toward the end of the war.⁶ Masanori Nakamura's *Japanese Monarchy* is equally useful but unique in that he focuses upon the wartime activities of former U.S. ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew. Nakamura depicts how Grew, the then biggest pro-Japan figure in the United States State Department, presented political themes concerned with a bias of future policy toward Japan, issues regarding the imperial institution in particular.⁷

The second group of books are biographies of Emperor Hirohito. They often focus upon the wartime role of the Emperor; some are primarily historical, ranging from his birth in 1901 to his death in 1989, and others are rather political covering his personal influence as well as his connections with the decision-making process in Japan. For example,

Leonard Mosley's *Hirohito, Emperor of Japan* is representative of historical biographies about the story of events, environment and influences which led the Emperor to a climactic and unexpected moment in history. As Mosley writes, "It is the story of a gentle introvert, scholarly and civilized man of peace who found himself Emperor of a nation bent on war and conquest. It is the story of how he found the courage and the resource, in spite of military fanatics and palace conspiracies, to outwit the plotters and end the war."⁸ Stephen S. Large's *Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan*, on the other hand, is an example of political biography about how much the Emperor was responsible for the war, why he emerged as a contested "symbolic Emperor" in post-war Japan, and his legacy today.⁹ Although these books center upon the Emperor as a key person, the common weakness is that little emphasis is placed upon the Emperor as a "symbolic" authority representing the social identity of the Japanese people. Hence, the relationship between the rhetoric of the Emperor and social formation is not fully explored or discussed.

The third group of books are those upon the wartime history of Japan. The books belonging to this genre do not explore directly the role played by the Emperor in the Pacific War, but they do provide essential information about the war's historical content. For instance, W. G. Beasley's *Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945* presents a systematic analysis of the development, expansion and eventful destruction of Japanese imperialism since its chapters are chronologically ordered from the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 through to its collapse in 1945. Beasley contends that Japan is the only Asian country in modern times to have built a successful industrial economy and an empire, and that these two phenomena are closely related.¹⁰ By contrast, leading Japanese scholar Saburo Ienaga's *Pacific War 1931-1945* writes of Japan's role in World War II from a critical perspective.¹¹ Finally, Robert J. C. Butow's *Japan's Decision to Surrender*, is useful for studying how Japan struggled to end the war causing the least damage although it contains a larger variety of themes than the wartime role of the Emperor, such as "The Role of [Premier] Suzuki and the Concept of Haragei," "Peace Feelers Through the Dulles Organization," and "Japanese Overtures to the Kremlin."¹²

The last field of study includes books on Japan's wartime discourse. Although there is a scarcity of this sort of resource, such works can be invaluable sources for rhetorical analysis in that these authors recognize the importance of ideology and rhetoric. For instance, Joyce C. Lebra's *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity in World War II* is an extraordinary collection of Japan's wartime rhetoric and official government documents. Although she does not conduct critical analysis, Lebra provides an inexhaustible resource for analyzing Japan's wartime

ideological discourse from “The Ideal Conceptualized,” through “Government Plans,” to “Policy Implementation in the Field: The Reality.”¹³ Japanese scholar of media history Akiko Takeyama’s *Gyokuonhoso*, or Imperial Broadcast, is another unique book in that it exclusively deals with the Emperor’s single speech, “Imperial Rescript Ending the War” of August 15, 1945. The first chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of how the rescript was drafted, delivered and received by the people concerned. The second chapter explains the contemporary media system that broadcast the rescript. The third and final chapter is important since it includes a full citation of the original text and follow-up announcements by Japanese radio stations. Although Takeyama does not undertake rhetorical criticism, her analysis of audience perception is useful for describing the enormous social influence of the imperial broadcast.¹⁴

Given the past research on Emperor Hirohito, there are two premises that inform this book of the Showa period. First, twentieth century Japan has undergone several transformations which demand intensive analyses. The changes brought about by the Pacific War are key to understanding these national transformations experienced by Japan. The other premise is that there were major episodes in the transformations in which statements (or a lack of them) by the Emperor played a key role, as he responded (or not) to major moments brought about by shifting fortunes in war and peace. These shifting fortunes were part of what might be viewed as an extended argument between the Emperor System itself and the Allied Powers.

Specifically, there remain important unanswered historical questions about the wartime role of the Emperor: Why did Japanese society want the Emperor to perform the role of a *manifest deity* before the war? How could he operate so effectively as the *manifest deity* during the war? Why was his status transformed into the symbol of Japan after the war? In short, how was the authority and legitimacy of the Emperor embodied and sustained before, during and after World War II? I explore these key questions about the wartime role of the Emperor and his social influence upon the Japanese people from the rhetorical perspective.

Rhetorical reading of history

This book approaches Japan’s wartime nationalism and the Emperor System primarily from a rhetorical perspective, a point of view that reads texts as they are situated in a rhetorical situation calling for public utterance. When an exigency exists, rhetoric fulfills a vital role as “an art preoccupied with the formation of public discourse; as defining practical

questions for prudential reason and conduct; and as the counterpart of dialectic, the reflective critique of reason in politics and ethics.”¹⁵ Hence, the rhetorical reading of history requires the critic to focus upon interpretation of important artifacts. Michael Leff contends that

textual criticism sustains a narrower focus than other types of criticism, but it does so in order to concentrate on the fundamental operations of rhetorical language. If the focus becomes too narrow, the theory of reading loses contact not only with other critical endeavors but also with the social world where practice occurs. On the other hand, if its focus is extended too broadly, it loses the discipline required to engage texts with precision and to comprehend the fundamentals of practice. If it achieves the proper balance, textual criticism can offer a theoretically sound and practically useful base for the one activity shared in common by all other interpretative projects—the rhetorical reading of text. (“Things Made by Words: Reflections on Textual Criticism,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 78, no. 2 [1992]: 230)

A unique “way of thinking,” therefore, can be enacted by the rhetorical reading of texts since the critic puts an emphasis upon the textual performance and interaction with audiences.¹⁶ Although I do not mean to argue that rhetorical analysis is superior to historical analysis, in one way or another, historians and critics clearly put different emphases upon the examination of historical events, thereby supplementing one another.¹⁷ Historical and rhetorical analyses are not mutually exclusive but complement one another in reaching for a deeper understanding of how Japanese cultural, social and state history has been, and is being created, maintained and subverted.

Importance of studying Japanese rhetoric

There are two reasons why we need to deploy a rhetorical approach to the wartime history of Japan in this book. First, since its publication in 1972 John L. Morrison’s *Western Speech* article claiming that “Japanese culture before World War II evidenced no rhetorical tradition”¹⁸ has invoked a number of responses from Japanese rhetoricians. Nevertheless, it is ironic that Morrison’s article has provided Japanese scholars of rhetoric with a strong incentive to study “Japanese rhetoric.” Some argue that Morrison is simply inaccurate since there have been a number of rhetorical traditions in Japan. Others publish case studies on rhetoric in the public realm of Japanese society.

The former group of scholars aim at indicating the existence of rhetorical practice as “exceptions” to Morrison’s argument. Among the first group of scholars, Roichi Okabe, for instance, points out that in the

Meiji period Western rhetorical training, including speech and debate, *did* exist in Japan as a result of enlightenment education developed by Yukichi Fukuzawa, founder of Keio University.¹⁹ Satoshi Ishii also demonstrates that Japan *does* preserve a tradition of Buddhist preaching introduced from China in the sixth century.²⁰ On the other hand, the latter group primarily attacks Morrison's characterization of Japan as a "rhetorical vacuum."²¹ Among them, Satoru Aonuma, for example, finds that during World War II the fascist government employed folk narrative as a means of disseminating information or forming consensus among the Japanese public.²² Also, Yoshihisa Itaba analyzed the socio-historical controversy over opening the ports of Japan to Western intercourse during the end of the Tokugawa period.²³

In my opinion, however, there lies a serious weakness in the previous Japanese rhetorical studies. That is, they did not carefully analyze Morrison's speculation that one reason for the lack of a viable rhetorical tradition in Japan is "the psychological domination the Emperor has exerted over Japanese traditional life and thought."²⁴ Morrison observes:

The unquestioned, unchallenged, and untouched Son of the Rising Sun has piloted Japan's every institution, formally or informally. Within this tightly knit authoritarian ship [*sic*] of state any argumentation or debate about the cultural status quo would have merely rocked the boat, a boat kept steady by a ballast of authoritarian psychology buried in its every institution, made watertight from keel to pilothouse by conforming and condescending minds, and kept on even keel by a tradition that allowed no deviation from the plotted course of Japan's glorious and inevitable destiny. ("The Absence of a Rhetorical Tradition in Japanese Culture," 102)

Contrary to Morrison, I view the Emperor's authority as nothing but a rhetorical construction, not tightly sealed, but constantly reinvented, as the Emperor System was linguistically re-situated to meet rhetorical exigencies.²⁵ Rhetorical analysis of the Emperor's rescripts should enable examination of how the imperial institution affected Japanese society. This contrasts with early analyses of the Emperor that have focused either upon his life history or wartime guilt.

Second, this book presents an insightful case study of cross-cultural rhetoric. Specifically, I see an obvious problem in Morrison's definition of rhetoric in that he quite narrowly defines a rhetorical tradition. He states that

in [his] study the term "rhetoric," and its various appellations, should be understood to mean, more or less, two things: (1) an articulated, formalized, historically understood tradition of public speech, wherein the

canons explicate manner, style, etc., and (2) even more importantly, a functional use of public argumentation and debate, whereby viable issues are contested. (p. 90)

Thus, Morrison equates oratory and forensic education with “rhetoric.” But Morrison sounds self-contradictory when he adds that “rhetoric means something more than *mere communication*, without which no culture could even exist.”²⁶ I suspect that Morrison could hardly exclude such “public communication” as ideology, propaganda, and myth, from his own definition of rhetoric.

For instance, Roichi Okabe contends that “the main fallacy in Morrison’s contention and in similar views entertained by others seems to have stemmed from their failure to make a clear-cut distinction between *rhetoric as a discipline* and *rhetoric as an approach to resolving human problems*.”²⁷ By rhetoric as a discipline, he means an established field of study whose concern is with the art of informative and sensory discourse. Such a concept can be applied to any time, any culture, and any people because of its universality.

Okabe goes on to argue that Morrison is wrong with both definitions of rhetoric. On the one hand, even if rhetoric is to be defined as a discipline whose nature is universal, it has received different treatments in the East and in the West. Robert T. Oliver explains that

in the West rhetoric has been considered to be so important that it has had to be explored and delineated separately, as a special knowledge about human relations. In the East rhetoric has been considered so important that it could not be separated from the remainder of human knowledge. (*Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China* [Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1971], 10)

Therefore, although Morrison believes that there was a lack of rhetorical discipline in Japanese society, he cannot automatically assume that there was no rhetorical tradition in Japan.

On the other hand, if we are to take rhetoric to mean an approach to resolving human problems confronting us daily, it is often the case that each culture has its own way of looking at things and resolving differences.²⁸ For instance, Kanzo Uchimura, one of the influential Japanese intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century, argues as follows:

Occidentals emphasize differences; Orientals agreements. Occidentals are analysts; Orientals, synthesists. Occidentals are eager to ask the question: Why do you not believe just as we do? Orientals refrain from asking such a question knowing that all true men [*sic*] fundamentally believe the same

thing. So, naturally, Occidentals appear to be very rude to Orientals, seeing that the former treat the delicate questions of souls as they treat all other questions. This is the main reason, I think, why it is so very difficult for Occidental missionaries to reach Oriental souls. Psychologically, as far as the East is from the West, so far are Orientals removed from Occidentals. (*Alone with God and Me*, The Complete Works of Kanzo Uchimura, vol. 3, new ed. [Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1924; Tokyo: Kyobunkwan, 1972], 34. The citation refers to the Kyobunkwan edition)

Thus, whereas Occidentals tend to seek for the truth through the process of critical inquiry, Orientals tend to avoid unnecessary conflicts of opinion in the spirit of mutual respect. As rhetoric is created, developed, and preserved in each culture, it is highly culture bound, and takes a unique form in each culture. Okabe argues that

this misconception about the East and Eastern rhetoric held by Western scholars may have stemmed in part from their inclination to approach Eastern rhetoric with a vain hope of discovering some aspects similar to those of Western rhetoric. When they fail to do so, [Western scholars] tend to come to the hasty conclusion that rhetoric is non-existent in the East. The attitude is analogous, to quote Oliver, “to trying to measure the salinity of water with a ruler.” This misconception may in turn accelerate their tendency to use rhetoric in the singular, or in the Western sense of the word, and not in the plural, or in the universalistic sense of the term. They regard their own Western rhetoric as the sole criterion from which to judge all others. This is what Vernon Jensen calls the “ethnocentric myopia” inherent in Western scholars. (“Researching Japanese Rhetorical Theory and Practice,” 3)

As a result, as Okabe contends, “If they happen to find any rhetorical remnant in the East at all, Western scholars are then likely to relegate it to a second-class status and dismiss it as unimportant, irrelevant, or at least different from the one they have long been accustomed to in the West.”²⁹

It is, therefore, imperative that the critic analyze rhetorical texts from the perspectives of both indigenous and endogenous cultures. Without such a concerted effort, it is impossible to translate each culture’s unique aspects for people of different cultures. Andrew R. Smith warns that “following Peirce, a transcultural critical analysis that is speculative begins with the realization that the translatability of signs from one domain to another is eminently fallible, since we are putting together for the first time what we never dreamed of putting together before.”³⁰

Such a risk, however, is worth taking. We cannot emphasize too much the importance of remaining open to new possibilities regarding the critical analysis of cross-cultural rhetoric “if we hope to breach rigid cultural, national, or political boundaries and contribute to mutual

acknowledgement and understanding in any endeavor.”³¹ Smith concludes that

daring to see new differences and combinations that depart from some previously fixated system of belief presupposes an ethical choice where an authoritative or *a priori* position is embodied and imaginatively challenged. This new association of possibilities, based both on the rules of an existing system and the sudden appearance of a new case, is motivated by an abductive logic that is the experiential basis for discovery and the experimental basis for invention. Discovery and invention are not possible unless we acknowledge some fallibility in what we believe to be true, ethical, real, imaginary, or symbolic. In critically analyzing discourse that is radically different, what may appear as outrageous, spurious, insane, ordinary, or pretentious, from a relativistic or formalistic point of view, may be a significant manifestation of cultural practices or epiphany of personal history. (“Mishima’s *Seppuku* Speech: A Critical-Cultural Analysis,” 1)

Thus, a solution to the current problem is not that the East and the West are blaming each other. Rather, they should agree to disagree and develop mutual respect for each other’s rhetorical tradition. Such an attempt can provide us with a great challenge to establish several different theories of rhetoric.³² Although a large variety of indigenous rhetorical traditions exist in Japan, it is relatively new for Japanese scholars to analyze and publish studies in this area.³³ When there is a lack of a critical community (as was the case in Japan), we have no choice but to start with a speculative critical analysis. But when a large number of critical analyses of indigenous rhetoric have been conducted, community members are able to develop intersubjective understanding about indigenous rhetorical theory and practice.

Finally, this work marks the first comprehensive attempt to analyze Japan’s wartime discourse as rhetoric. Although the United States has a long tradition of study of rhetorical history, or what has been known as “public address,” Japan lacks a tradition which invites scholars to look at situations as problems of persuasion and to examine choices people made in responding to them through the use of language as symbolic action. In Japan, little has been written about relationships between historical artifacts and persuasion.

Consequently, most Japanese historians, when writing historical accounts, depend extensively upon official documents or personal diaries, citing passages from textual artifacts merely for support or elaboration. Although historians recognize the importance of political speeches or statements, they usually focus upon background information rather than reading the context forming messages across texts. Instead of looking at

“who is carrying what intent to whom, why, how, and in what situation,” most studies have taken a positivist approach at the risk of having a *presentist bias*. They often look at the event from the perspective of “what nowadays we understand.” Some even make ethical judgments about wartime ideology based upon current findings. Although such an approach may be justifiable as an authentic reading of history, it begs the questions of *why* and *how* so many Japanese were persuaded to obey orders rendered by the fascist regime. It is necessary to scrutinize what appeals were thought to be persuasive, what the Japanese prized, what they simply assumed, and how the Emperor enacted symbolic inducements to transform Japan.

Dramatistic analysis of historical episodes

As a method of rhetorical reading of the text, I employ dramatism. Dramatism offers a definition of rhetoric that is greater than the traditional persuasion model rooted by and large in neo-Aristotelian assumptions. Dramatism, a method of rhetorical criticism developed by Kenneth Burke, is based on assumptions quite similar to the social construction of reality advanced by Berger and Luckmann.³⁴ This book emplots Emperor Hirohito’s discourse in controversies that highlight the significance of his address and permit explanation of the successes and limits of his rhetorical strategies. Kenneth Burke writes that dramatism is “a method of analysis and a corresponding critique of terminology designed to show that the most direct route to the study of human relations and human motives is via a methodological inquiry into cycles or clusters of terms and their functions.”³⁵ The use of language motivates people to form attitudes, and all attitudes are preparatory to action. This is why act is a terministic center from which many related considerations radiate.

For neo-Aristotelians, language is an important consideration as well. Correct use of language is governed by the intention to persuade, and the strength of a message is determined by how well words are used as tools and weapons which build up or attack positions. From the dramatist point of view, however, words are not mere instruments of persuasion. They are also expressions of commitment to a particular view of reality, and the words a speaker uses identify him or her as grounded in and speaking from a point of view in which the world is constructed in a certain way. Since people have the capacity to wage conflict, that is to choose other words enacting other perspectives, any community (no matter how large or small) is engaged in a constant drama. Some people name circumstances in such a way as to command greater sacrifices for the old order. Others create new names for novel circumstances in preparing

audiences to make the shift between the old situation and the new. Key to every social drama of this kind is the question of what and how to make use of or assuage the guilt that occurs when groups who invest in the old reality do not get what they have been promised or have promised themselves.³⁶

Social order is upheld in some, if not all, societies in terms of a relationship between superior and subordinate. The rhetoric of courtship invites the superior and the subordinate to influence each other. The rhetoric of courtship requires the superior to demonstrate all the virtues of leadership in society: wisdom, courage, foresight and direction toward successful goals. The followers, in turn, swears allegiance, loyalty, sacrifice and their best efforts to follow orders. So long as things work well and each can keep their promise, persuasion operates in an untroubled fashion. Conflict and controversy arise when the promise of perfection fails.

The dramatic perspective sees disagreement as inherent in social structure. "Superiors, inferiors, and equals must expect disobedience, indifference, and disloyalty" in any social system, Hugh Duncan writes.³⁷ When this occurs, the office of persuasion expands in an effort to renew the order. Guilt arises as bonds and relationships are transformed when both sides speak the language of sacrifice, a language that names the imperfection and promises greater self-dedication (mortification) or elimination of the causes of disharmony (victimage). Burke summarizes as follows:

. . . , a dramatic analysis shows how the negativistic principle of guilt implicit in the nature of order combines with the principles of thoroughness (or "perfection") and substitution that are characteristic of symbol systems in such a way that the sacrificial principle of victimage (the "scapegoat") is intrinsic to human congregation. The intricate line of expression might be summed up thus: If order, then guilt; if guilt, then need for redemption; but any such "payment" is victimage. Or: If action, then drama; if drama, then conflict; if conflict, then victimage. ("Dramatism," 7:450)

Thus, a dramatic analysis would have the critic analyze those episodes in which issues of guilt arise and examine episodes in which social imperfections are named and have to be dealt with.

Dramatic analysis is particularly appropriate for times of social crisis. Then, the social reality constructed by leaders and followers is pushed to its limits. From a rhetorical perspective, a social crisis may be defined as a historical episode in which an order of terms becomes tested and transformed. A society's leadership, for example, makes promises and

commands loyalty based upon a definition of a nation and its history and destiny. If these promises cannot be kept, then the question of fault arises. Sometimes the rhetoric of national leaders draws upon definitions of the meaning and purpose of social institutions—the religious, educational, and cultural systems—in order to gain support and mobilize politics that affect masses of people. When such policies go wrong and take a disastrous turn, a crisis arises. Rhetoric is used to address the question: how can a social order be reconfirmed or reconstituted?

Wartime is one of those moments that invite social crisis. Wartime furnishes an age-old social drama. There is a moment of initiation, a crisis or conclusion to the war, and then a time of reconciliation. Sometimes a nation or whole region of the globe can go through cycles of war or extended conflict. Modern war for reasons of state, however, takes on an episodic quality. For Japan in the Showa era, the time of “Enlightened Peace,” one encounters the drama of modern war. Japan caused the Manchurian Incident in 1931. In 1941, it declared war on the United States and Great Britain. The war was concluded in 1945 with the surrender and an official occupation which began in the same year. However, although this modern war was composed of a succession of episodes, the social drama that engaged Japan was far from a continuous story of a defeated nation. Rather, each episode analyzed in this book offers something different than the smooth continuous working out of the arc of history. Rather, it will be shown that wartime episodes disrupted the old social reality. The uniqueness of Japan’s institutions, its role in history, its melding of the hierarchies of state and religion, and—above all else—the social reality of the Emperor were challenged by wartime events. The ability of the Emperor to transform himself and the throne while maintaining continuity among times of stress and change is the key dramatic element that holds the plot lines of initial moments of a contemporary Japanese rhetorical tradition together.

Ideological argumentation and wartime rhetoric

Over the past centuries, scholars of rhetorical communication have been grappling with the fundamental nature of argumentation that continues to shape and reshape social, political and religious structures of human society. The literature suggests that whereas most acknowledge its critical or sometime subversive effects, some have paid considerable attention to *enemies* of sound argumentation such as ideology, myth, and propaganda. For instance, Marxists are concerned with ideology as the ruling ideas of the epoch in an attempt to investigate what might be termed as the internal life of the ideological realm, and to provide detailed and

sophisticated accounts of how society's ruling ideas are produced. Religious scholars have argued that myth, a sacred tale concerned with the origins of the natural or supernatural, or cultural phenomena, serves various roles available within the articulated social cosmos for community members to achieve a position of influence within the social hierarchies, or to find ways of operating meaningfully as contributing members. Finally, the scholars of media studies have explored the tension between the principles of democracy and the process of propaganda since the notion of a rational person, capable of thinking and living according to scientific patterns, of choosing freely between good and evil seems opposed to sacred influences or appeals to the irrational.

One manifestation of argumentation (however one describes the phenomena at large) is in critical discussions where people genuinely strive cooperatively to achieve critical decisions. Hence, argumentation can be recognized as "the process of advancing, supporting, modifying, and criticizing claims so that appropriate decision makers may grant or deny adherence."³⁸ This audience-centered definition contains the assumption that the participants must willingly engage in public debate and discussion, and their arguments must function to open a critical space and keep it open. From this perspective, the aim of argumentation is, as Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca have noted, to gain the adherence of others. Argumentation should be viewed as an interactive process between arguer and audience to determine the appropriateness of an advocated claim based upon data presented within the reasoning given. Only the argument that exceeds a threshold for audience acceptance will survive or prevail, and others will disappear or fade away. This way, argumentation plays a chief role in the critical decision-making process.³⁹

For instance, in his essay "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," Wayne Brockriede maintains that "argument" means the process whereby a person reasons his/her way from one side to the choice of another idea, and further argues that this concept of argument implies five general characteristics: "(1) an inferential leap from existing beliefs to the adoption of a new belief or the reinforcement of an old one; (2) a perceived rationale to justify that leap; (3) choice among two or more competing claims; (4) a regulation of uncertainty in relation to the second claim—since someone has made an inferential leap, certainty can be neither zero or total; and (5) a willingness to risk a confrontation of that claim with one's peers."⁴⁰ Thus, Brockriede's definition assumes the arguer's willingness to risk engaging in critical evaluation of claim selected, data presented, and reasoning provided. As he himself notes, the "last characteristic is especially important. By inviting confrontation, the critic-arguer tried to establish some degree of intersubjective reliability in

his [/her] judgment and in his [/her] reasons for the judgment.”⁴¹ Thus, the establishment of intersubjectivity is one of the primary aims of engaging in argumentative discourse.

The arguer is necessarily required to cultivate his/her “argumentativeness,” or willingness to argue for what he/she believes, by treating disagreements as objectively as possible, reaffirming the other’s position, and allowing the other person to save face.⁴² As a consequence, the arguer is forced to engage in critical/rational discourse, running the risk of being defeated by his/her opponents. When quoted by Jürgen Habermas, H. Neuendorff states,

Anyone participating in argument shows his [/her] rationality or lack of it by the manner in which he [/she] handles and responds to the offering of reasons for or against claims. If he [/she] is “open to argument,” he [/she] is “deaf to argument,” by contrast, he [/she] may either ignore contrary reasons or reply to them with dogmatic assertions, and either way he [/she] fails to deal with the issues “rationally.” (quoted in Habermas, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, 18⁴³)

Then, Habermas goes on to argue that “corresponding to the openness of rational expressions to being explained, there is, on the side of persons who behave rationally, to participate properly in argumentation.”⁴⁴ With that recognition, the intersubjective reasoning procedure has been developed since Ancient times. Aristotle argues that the strongest reasoning can be attained through enthymeme, or a joint effort between the speaker and the audience. Shigeru Matsumoto and Takeshi Suzuki suggest a use of the “initiator and examiner” model, instead of the affirmative and negative sides, in educational debate.⁴⁵ Clearly, the best-developed current theory of that kind is the pragma-dialectic theory by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst.⁴⁶ Thus, as a method of critical decision-making, argumentation must establish intersubjectivity, and save rationality in the act of speech. In this sense, argumentation can be viewed as a cooperative activity between the proponent and the opponent, intended to reach the best possible conclusion through engagement in critical/rational discourse. When rhetoric or argumentation violates any or all of the above mentioned normative standards, it should be considered problematic and undesirable. As such, ideological argument is designed to oppress free and critical discussion and promote controlled and uncritical thinking.

Ideology often tends to present itself as political philosophy, or “as arguments in support of a more or less coherent view of the political world.”⁴⁷ Ideological arguments, for many critics and theorists, are a kind of argument “employed to support the legitimacy of a particular political

system, to justify a particular configuration of power relations in society.”⁴⁸ Michael Weiler further explains that

ideology is a form of discourse designed to deal with the anxieties that the loss of the old world created and to accommodate people to the requirements of the new. What about ideology qualifies it for this role?

The answer is that ideology presents itself in the form of rational, philosophical argument. It supports these reasons not with divine revelation or royal pronouncement but with scientific, empirical evidence. (“Ideology, Rhetoric and Argument,” 25; emphasis added)

Thus, ideological argument presents itself in the form of a rational, philosophical one. On the other hand, ideological pronouncement presents itself in the form of fascist, anti-realist rhetoric. It is a logic in search of absolutes and likely to proliferate in periods of fascist ideology, especially wartime. While ideological arguments are still grounded in rational, empirical assumptions, ideological pronouncements are grounded in fascist, anti-realist assumptions. Hence, ideological pronouncement is concerned more profoundly with religious and/or royal aspects of a community.

Regarding commonalities shared by both ideological arguments and pronouncement, there are three essential characteristics. The first one is “anti-realism” in the sense that “ideological argumentation characteristically avoids difficult entanglement in the specifics of its subject matter, seeking rather to settle problems by establishing or amplifying the ‘common’ morality of the community.”⁴⁹ These often function as the process through which a grand narrative is rationalized logically by social agents depending on mythos, or people’s appreciation of their cultural heritage or membership in society. For instance, the characters of Japan’s wartime rhetoric were represented by *the respect for authority, order, hierarchy, filial piety, and harmony*.

The second essential constituent for ideological argument and pronouncement is “a lack of critical space.” Rather than promoting a space for critical thinking and reflection, both of them function to undermine and limit the possibility of critical discussion among target audiences. McGee and Martin argue that, “to give the appearance of empirical relevance,” ideological argumentation characteristically “constructs social and political problems to make action more likely for even the most vacuous term can be materialized by people who behave as if it were real and true.”⁵⁰ In actuality, ideology often provides the community with a paradigm, or “a general system of belief and understanding which guides thinking, theory formation, problem definition, and associated reassert activity, and which determines the value and worth of a specific

undertaking.”⁵¹ Once an ideology is accepted by people, everything is explained and interpreted within the frame of reference of the ideology. Richard L. Wright and Hailu F. Hailu explain that

ideology functions much like a paradigm in that it provides an implicit or explicit system of value/knowledge which guides feelings, perceptions, understandings, and action. Conceptualized in this way, ideology frames the way that the socially constituted individual activity lives his or her life within the social totality; ideology, therefore, participates formatively in the social construction of the individual to the degree that one is constrained to think, feel, and act in an ideologically consistent manner. (“Conceptualizing Language as Ideology,” 175)

As such, ideological pronouncement declares the framing story, which leads to social practices and agreement through the normal process of social existence, interpretation, and discourse. For that purpose, the key term is indoctrination, or “the teaching of what is believed true in such a way as to preclude critical inquiry on the part of learner.”⁵² Actually, the *Cardinal Principles* is said to serve such a role. In the eighteenth century, Japan suffered from social tensions caused by the impact of Westernization after the Meiji Restoration and later the Great Depression, and felt an acute need to unify the Japanese people under a nationalist ideal. As a result, from 1868 until 1945 the Japanese people were obliged to observe Shinto as the state religion.

The third and final characteristic of ideological argument and ideological pronouncement is “one-sided communication,” or a sort of imperfect communication designed to ask the audience to stop thinking and to blindly accept the imposed cultural norm or social more. Ideology, in general, presents partial and partisan ideas as if they were the natural order. When such an idea is presented not as argument, but as pronouncement, no criticism or even questioning is called for, but just obedience and loyalty are required by the ruling class. Dennis Mumby argues that

the process of cultural formation and deformation is at least partially a product of the power structures that characterize the relationships of domination that exist between different social groups in a culture. Meaning is therefore contingent not only on intersubjective understanding within a community, but also on the process by which certain dominant groups are able to frame the interests of competing groups within their own particular worldview. It is in this context that ideology plays a key role in constituting the meaning formations that are built on and around the relations of domination that characterize a particular culture or institution. (“Ideology and the Social Construction of Meaning: A

Communication Perspective,” *Communication Quarterly* 37, no. 4 [1989]: 293)

Thus, meaning formations help the ruling class to establish one-sided communication. Practically, only socializers are allowed to speak, and socializees are only allowed to listen but not required to comprehend. Such communication is necessarily imperfect, since the ideal communication should be based upon a free exchange of ideas and opinions.⁵³ With the above defining characteristics in mind, let me conduct an analysis of the *Cardinal Principles* in the next chapter in order to show what key ideological pronouncements are employed by serving as fascist, anti-realist discourse, in lieu of critical, rational discourse.

Rhetorical analysis of controversy

Each of the three subsequent chapters constitutes a reading of the imperial rescripts. There are many ways to read the meaning and significance of these discourses. Most readings would probably agree on the basic circumstances surrounding the addresses. History does play an important role in framing what is possible, and the book will note historical constraints that appeared urgent at those times thereby influencing the burdens taken up in each rescript. However, the dramatic reading undertaken by the book will work to open up the importance of the Emperor’s words by situating each within a particular controversy that was important at the time.

Aligning a text within a controversy is an important way to animate the dramatic significance and meaning of a discourse. A controversy is an ongoing disagreement where differences are expressed. Controversies are composed of engaged arguments that put in question issues of authority, legitimacy and meaning for institutions. Controversies can occur over the meaning or implications of events in relation to the responsibility of persons. A controversy raises issues of duty or obligation in relation to the appropriateness of continuing with previous assumptions and ways of doing things or changing to new ones. A controversy also provides a point of entry for discussion and evaluation. Controversies are rarely finished discourses. The arguments that can be found in the past, if recovered, can refresh insights into the current discussions and debates of the present.

This book examines three major rhetorical events, episodes where the Emperor directly or indirectly played a crucial role in terms of mass persuasion in the Pacific War. The first rhetorical episode is the dramatic announcement of war, made by the Emperor, against the United States and Great Britain. There are three crucial moments within the first episode.

This first moment is the creation of the Emperor System itself as a structure of authority. An indigenous religion is a particularly important source of symbols and appeals to authority in any culture. In Japan, Shinto was very important precisely because the religion played a crucial role in defining a common cultural identity. To understand the war, it is necessary to discover how this religion was mobilized to support state fascism. This symbolic construction exploited the Emperor's divine position, and used the power of religious and state affiliation to foster a number of myths designed to influence the self-understanding and loyalty of Japanese citizens.

Especially, a "terrain of the divine" is analyzed as the sphere of influence upon which national identity was constructed. When used as a means of legitimating authority, the terrain mediates the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.⁵⁴ The terrain is the medium through which most of the relationships among participants of nationalism are indoctrinated. Their relationships are constrained by patterns that they themselves have established over time. By examining the *Kokutai no hongei: Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan*,⁵⁵ I indicate what sorts of relationships were established between the Emperor and his "good and loyal subjects."

The second moment examines the form of the Emperor's discourse in declaring war. In a way, the form of these addresses itself announces a commitment and affirms the ideological formation discussed above. On the other hand, the announcement deepens the complexities of rhetorical address by putting Japan at odds with its own participation in modernity. For the West, the conduct of war had depended upon the "Just War Doctrine."⁵⁶ In the twentieth century, this doctrine has been expanded to a concept of total war. Whereas the former limited the conduct of war to the pursuit of justice and acknowledged constraints upon the length and costs of combat, the latter calls for total effort in overcoming the opposition. The declaration of war rescript is a document that follows the genre of the Just War Doctrine even as it advances total war aims. It does so while trying to distinguish the pure and different motives of the East from those of the West. This contradiction between announced intent and formal constraint leaves the Emperor himself in an ambiguous position from which to speak. These tensions that are set in place in this address will be analyzed in later discourses.

The third moment at the outset of the war is the Japanese intellectuals' reception of the declaration of war address. For them, the question of East and West is cast into the mold of the old order and the new, or modernity and postmodernity. This part of the analysis examines the principle of perfection implicit in rhetoric of order. It will show how rhetoric

sometimes functions as an “epiphany,” that is a sudden seeing of things whole and clear. This book will examine the role played by the imperial rescript in generating a rhetorical vision in which Japan gains its uniqueness at the price of fighting wars without end in order to overcome the modern influence of Western ideologies.

So the first episode of the declaration of war is approached from these three angles. The first permits us to see how the social construction of reality was formed by the weaving together of individual elements of Japanese identity, history and social institutions into a program of indoctrination certified by the authority of the Emperor. The second permits us to see how the Emperor’s name was interwoven into a declaration of war that announced an ambitious new nationalism even while it imported tensions within the rhetoric of Japanese war goals. The final angle introduces a rhetoric that takes the meaning of war to an ultimate or philosophical view. Each set of motives complements one another, and the fulfillment of the dreams of Japan’s destiny were unfolded by the rhetoric of Empire. The rhetoric did not contemplate the meaning of the war or the actions of the Emperor should the Japanese military fail. Within this episode, such a situation was unthinkable.

The second rhetorical episode is “Ending the War,” which involves an alternation of reality brought about by the Emperor’s speaking directly to the Japanese people as a person with a *divine* persona. The construction of social reality involved a moment of constant reinterpretation, and sometimes termination, of the finality of old realities. Japan’s modernist interpretation of itself as a leader of a separate Asian sphere was thrown into doubt by its inability to achieve victory and its vulnerability at home. What would be the ending phase of World War II? Would an invasion bring about death and destruction or the capitulation of Japan’s own historical self-understanding? The atomic bomb created an *aporia* that allowed the Emperor to end the war with a speech that pivoted past and future in such a way as to permit continuity of the nation while it ended one rhetorical line for interpreting Japan’s modern history.

The second episode to be examined concerns a controversy surrounding the end of the war. During wars, the motives for fighting change. The reasons for settling the peace are rarely the same as for starting the war and seldom altogether clear. Rhetoric at these times produces and brings into focus decisions about how to deal with those responsible for fighting and how to move to post-war relationships. I choose to examine the close of the Pacific War as a fracture point, a moment so strained that old realities became terminated and new ones opened. There are two moments in this drama of alternation that this book sets forth and explains.

The first moment involves a debate within the United States. At the end of the war, two forces emerged whose opinions differed about what the United States should do in light of its impending victory over Japan. In reconstructing this debate, let me get at a source of ambivalence over U.S.-Japan relations that persists in different forms even to this day. This issue was simple and specific enough. One side wished to see the Emperor go. Defeat in war means that the very heart of the Emperor System should be taken out. The other side wished to see the Emperor stay, if not in his current capacity at least as a constitutional monarch. Underlying this issue are two different temporal orientations that split the United States. One was a past-looking direction that saw the war as incomplete until retribution had been finished and all threats of a right wing renewal eliminated. The other side was a future-looking, pragmatic view that wished to use the Emperor as status and a symbolic power to legitimate social change in Japan. The fracture persisted throughout the period of the end of the war. Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca notion of “dissociation” examines how rhetoric is used to create differences.⁵⁷ It will be used to analyze the controversy over the post-war status of the Emperor.

A second fracture in reality involved the country moving toward defeat. It was a double-break with reality, in a way. Japan was losing the war, a possibility not anticipated by the ideological formations previously discussed. It also had been made the target of novel weapons, atomic bombs with frightening power. This section explains the difficult task of the Emperor’s address insofar as he had to find a way to stop the war, a difficulty created by the fact that in his own name soldiers had been convinced to fight to the death. Additionally, although the Emperor had been admired and praised everywhere, he had not spoken in public. Even if he were not the focus of blame for the war, finding a way to bring things to a conclusion was difficult.

This book explores the “Rescript Ending the War” as the Emperor assumed a public voice. A public voice is a feature of rhetoric that identifies one as a secular actor in a world of policy. The study explores the way the speech enacted a public voice and in its very enactment—more than any particular lines of argument—became a memorable moment that permitted the Japanese to alter wartime realities and to ready themselves in diverse ways for a post-war world. It is argued that the address contained several important symbolic strategies, including piety, identification, and transcendence. Perhaps key to the address, however, was the creation of a sublime moment—moving beyond argument—that symbolized and signaled a finished past and the necessity of a move toward an impossible, hence peculiarly open future.

So, the alternation of an old social reality is viewed from two angles. From the United States, one finds a split in attitude toward this country's future relationship with Japan depending upon the dividing of time. While feelings brought about by the war range more widely, the debate over the Emperor serves as a central focus of differences and debate over U.S.-Japan policy. From the perspective of Japan, wartime reality was altered or terminated in a moment that was never expected. In that moment, the Emperor transformed himself by becoming a voiced public figure that spoke both an end of time and a beginning. The voice provided continuity even within the announcement of radical change for Japan and for the Emperor himself. For many of the wartime generation, this moment was a defining time in Japanese history. Thus, they (and to some extent we) are still being asked to "endure the unendurable and suffer what is insufferable."

The third rhetorical episode is "Beginning the Peace." The final major intervention by the Emperor is a construction of social reality of Japan into a modern democratic state. This was a double-moment where the reality between the Allies and Japan was brought as much into a unified basis as could be expected. The (re)construction work began with a division about the role played by the Emperor and what to do with that institution after the war. Here, I find a divided reality, a split between past and future where one side saw the Emperor as guilty and oriented its judgment toward the future, but one without the dangers of militarism. He was asked to give up his divinity and agreed to do so, but in a way that maintained continuity with Japan's older traditions. In essence, I trace out these three episodes of cultural transition in Japan's life as a modern state before, during, and after World War II.

The third episode concerns the transformation of social reality. In the first episode, reality was constructed by the uniting of Japanese institutions under a single identity, a family nation dedicated to the pursuit of a war in the name of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." In the second episode old social reality was altered. In the United States, time was fractured into those who would not be satisfied until the war was completed and those who wished the work of transformation to be pursued continually. In Japan, the reality of myths of national superiority and uniqueness were confronted with war's end brought about by a startling, newly revealed dimension of the Emperor—a secular voice. In the third episode, this project takes up a construction of new social reality, events that created a strange partnership between Japan and the United States.

Rhetoric played yet another role in this dramatic episode. As was noted earlier, a community through rhetoric can only settle questions of responsibility. It takes arguments of praise and blame to decide whether a

person, party or entire group of people are guilty of some actions and should be held accountable. Dramatism holds that there are two prominent frames within which such rhetoric works itself out and allows an audience to take meaningful action that encompasses a situation. These symbolic frames of acceptance are the comic and tragic frames.

The comic and tragic frames differ from each other based upon their depiction of time, human action and agency. There are two major way of “distinguishing between comedy and tragedy,” Burke contends. The first is to note that “tragic characters are said to be ‘better’ than ordinary people, comic characters ‘worse.’”⁵⁸ So, the mistakes made by tragic characters are larger than life. Because they are heroic, their downfall carries a sad lesson about the limits to human ambition. The mistakes of comic characters are due to stupidity, a human fragility. This leads to the second distinguishing characteristic, emplotment. “Comedy has a plot that builds toward a ‘happy’ ending,” Burke says, “tragedy towards an ‘unhappy’ ending.”⁵⁹ He argues thus:

The heroic [efforts in a tragedy] promotes acceptance by *magnification*, making the hero’s character as great as the situation he confronts, and fortifying the non-heroic individual vicariously, by identification with the hero, but humor reverses the process: it takes up the slack between the momentousness of the situation and the febleness or those in the situation by dwarfing the situation. (*Attitudes Toward History* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984], 43; emphasis in the original)

Constructing a new social reality, after it has been broken up, seems to require that room enough be made for interpreting dramatic plots from different points of view, sometimes comic and at others tragic. A transformed social reality creates a symbolic unity that is ambiguous enough to allow room for co-operation. Former foes create symbols of affirmation to a new social order, but often the symbols are ambiguous enough to be appreciated from quite different motivational perspectives.

The first moment of the last historical episode takes up a discussion of the Emperor’s war guilt. Part of the ritual of war rhetoric is to conclude the peace by rounding up those who are held accountable for a war or for wartime crimes against human civilization. In the post-war order, social hierarchy is turned upside down for the losing side. Those in power are cast out, and those opposed to the old order find new support. This is a tragic rhetoric because guilt is invested in those who were supposed to be good leaders and their fall is held up as an example for future leaders who would choose to pursue their path to power through aggression.

For those who fought a war, transformation of reality requires acknowledgment of tragedy, too. Their hopes and dreams, sacrifices and

complicities become part of a past that they carry with them. It was not clear at the end of World War II what blame, if any, the Emperor should shoulder. This chapter shows that some in this controversy employed the very ambiguity of his relationship to the Emperor System to provide him with a defense against responsibility for wartime crimes. While this strategy of forensic argument was useful in constructing a defense, this chapter explores two other moments that allowed space for ambiguity and the construction of a comic frame of acceptance.

The initial comic moment involves the publishing of a photograph, which pictured the Emperor with General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Occupation Force in Japan. Just as the war-ending rescript gave the Emperor a voice, this photo gave him a public appearance or visibility—and a visibility aligned with the American wartime leader. This chapter examines how the apparently accidental lines of sight developed in this widely published photo contribute to humanizing the Emperor, thereby permitting him to be seen in a new way. This was a comic moment that both impaired and transformed the Emperor's public dignity.

The subsequent comic moment involves differing interpretations that were placed on the Emperor's address renouncing his divinity, called the "Declaration of Humanity." This speech has been overlooked because many scholars thought it to be propaganda—which indeed it was. The speech was requested by MacArthur himself, even though it was distributed in the Emperor's name. Moreover, the address itself has been mistakenly named, for nowhere in the rescript did the Emperor explicitly declare himself to be a human being. Nevertheless, the book shows how the announcement created enough strategic ambiguity so as to allow both Americans and Japanese to be satisfied with the transformation of the symbolic standing of the Emperor as a constitutional monarch.

The third episode of the wartime drama explores the rhetorical transformation of reality by analyzing enactments of the tragic frame of identification and the disruptions brought about by the comic transformation of the status of the Emperor. While it can be said that each of these episodes met with some success in transforming social reality in difficult and contentious moments of national history, I believe that this success was not achieved without a cost. In a way, the divided relationship between Japan and the United States was never completely resolved by these rhetorical episodes while the way in which the war was figured, ended, and the subsequent occupation handed, raises questions unanswered to this day.

Notes

¹ For instance, W. G. Beasley notes, “On the one hand there are those, both in Japan and elsewhere in the world, who have attributed to [Emperor Hirohito] a measure of war guilt as great as that which attached to the members of prewar and wartime cabinets. As a theoretically absolute monarch, it is argued, he was responsible for what was done in his name: the decision to prosecute the war in the first place, as well as the actions, including the atrocities, that were carried out during it. Others maintain, equally vociferously, that because he lacked the means effectively to intervene, and was even precluded by his constitutional position from trying to do so, that charge cannot be sustained” (W. G. Beasley, introduction to *Emperor Hirohito and His Times: A Japanese Perspective*, by Toshiaki Kawahara [Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1990], viii).

² Although the phrase “Emperor System” was originally coined as a pejorative, it is widely used by the public at present. As *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan* explains, “At the heart of the debate over the emperor’s role in the state from 1868 to 1945 was the so-called emperor system. Coined as a pejorative term by the Japan Communist Party in the 1920s, ‘emperor system’ meant for Marxists, and even some postwar liberals, that Japan under the Meiji Constitution was an absolutist state ruled by an absolute monarch who governed by means of an extensive and oppressive bureaucracy, a standing army, and a police force. Modern Japan, according to this interpretation, was neither a capitalist nor a feudal state but an admixture of both. Consequently, an all-but-autonomous ‘bureaucratic-military-police state’ could emerge by manipulating the feudal and capitalist classes against each other. And at the center of this absolutist state was the emperor, around whom an ethic of absolute loyalty had been devised, an ethic diametrically opposed to democracy, human rights, and freedom. *Although the ‘emperor system’ theory formed the intellectual basis for urging the abolition of the imperial institution, the term itself, ironically, became so widely used by the public that even conservatives and advocates of imperial rule adopted it*” (Kodansha, *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan* [Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983], s.v. “emperor”; emphasis added).

³ “Showa” is the third *nenjo*, or era name, after abolition of the so-called “Samurai Government” system. According to *Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia*, “Before the Meiji period (1868-1912), *nenjo* might be changed upon the accession of a new emperor, the occurrence of auspicious or malign events, or at certain points in the traditional 60-year calendar cycle. . . . With the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the present system of using one era name for each imperial reign (*issei ichigen*) was adopted; since that times era names have changed only on the death of an emperor and the accession of his heir to the throne. As before, passages in the Chinese classics have been selected for use as an era name: Meiji (1868-1912; ‘Enlightened Rule’), Taisho (1912-26; ‘Great Righteousness’), Showa (1926-89; ‘Enlightened Peace’), and Heisei (1989-present; ‘Attaining Peace’). Emperors are referred to posthumously by the era name of their reign (e.g., Emperor Hirohito now known as Emperor Showa)” (Kodansha, *Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia* [Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993], s.v. “nengō”).