Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem
Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem

Edited by
Jonathan Warner, David W. Lovell
and Michalis Kontos
# Table of Contents

Preface ............................................................................................................................. vii

Chapter One ..................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction
David W. Lovell, Michalis Kontos, Matteo Nicolini and Jonathan Warner

**Part 1: Identity and Perceptions**

Chapter Two .................................................................................................................. 18
Settling Protracted Social Conflicts: Trust, Identity, and the Resolution
of the “Cyprus Issue”
David W. Lovell

Chapter Three ................................................................................................................. 36
Foreign Interventions and Greek Cypriot Perceptions
Michalis Kontos

**Part 2: Politics: Contemporary Issues in the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot Communities**

Chapter Four ................................................................................................................ 58
Offshore Gas: An Anticatalyst in Efforts to Reunify Cyprus
Ayla Gürel

Chapter Five .................................................................................................................. 90
Cyprus Problem–Cyprus Hydrocarbons–Regional Co-Operation:
Pieces of a Knotty Puzzle
Melanie Antoniou

Chapter Six ..................................................................................................................... 112
Erdoğan’s Cyprus: Another Aspect of the Turkish Model
Nikos Moudouros
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>Turkey: From the “Motherland” to the “IMF of Northern Cyprus”?</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Umut Bozkurt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight</td>
<td>Keeping the Peace: UNFICYP and its Electronic Eyes on the Green Line</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Walter Dorn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td><strong>Comparisons</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nine</td>
<td>Cyprus and Belize: The Role of Neighbours in their Stories</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jonathan Warner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten</td>
<td>Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict: Comparing Cyprus and Sri Lanka</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zenonas Tziaras</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td><strong>Going Forward: New Approaches to Resolving the Cyprus Problem</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleven</td>
<td>A “New” Legal Geography for the “Old” Cyprus Question:</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Demarcation, Power-Sharing, and Divided Societies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matteo Nicolini</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve</td>
<td>Civil Society Active Dialogue Networks in Cyprus: Peace-ing it Together at the Grassroots</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bülent Kanol and İlke Dağlı</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The idea for this book arose after a happy accident when we editors found ourselves brought together in a merged workshop at the 2012 conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas in Cyprus. Encouraged by the insights brought to the Cyprus problem from different perspectives, and by the productive engagement on all sides on what is a difficult and protracted set of issues, and mindful that there had been no major scholarly work on the problem for some time, we met after the workshop to begin planning in earnest. Although we were previously unknown to each other, and our intellectual journeys and disciplinary foundations were somewhat different (and our key method of communication for nearly four years has been email), we nevertheless found a rapport and, more importantly, substantial common ground. As more and more contributors were recruited to the project, and as we read their various drafts, our common ground changed very little. Our sensibilities—especially to matters such as the importance of a non-partisan presentation of the Cyprus issue, and to methodological issues—were heightened.

This book is written in a spirit of hope. The long division of the population of Cyprus is, at its core, a human tragedy that we believe can be ended. Politics, and the various top-down mechanisms that have been used to address the division, have tended rather to accentuate than to resolve the Cyprus problem. Indeed, they have developed a life of their own, and vested interests benefit from their continuation. Even the discovery of oil and gas reserves under the seabed off the coast of Cyprus, with the promise of economic wealth, has become grist to this self-interested mill. Furthermore, the continued meddling of foreigners in the affairs of Cyprus has intensified the problem and done little to assist a resolution. One of the key messages from this book is that people-to-people initiatives must supplement the plans (and posturing) of politicians in order to make progress towards an ultimate resolution of the Cyprus problem. What that resolution might look like, in institutional terms, we cannot be certain and nor do we want to prescribe. Human ingenuity is able to find a widely accepted and workable formula for a Cyprus that combines unity and diversity, acknowledges the worth of its different constituent communities, and addresses—or begins to move beyond—historical animosities and injustices. Nationalism, as Ernest Renan
perceptively explained in the nineteenth century is not just a “daily plebiscite,” but also involves selective “forgetting.”

As editors, we owe a debt to the contributors whose chapters are here assembled, and who accepted our initial invitations, and then responded cheerfully to our subsequent advice and corrections to their chapters. We thank the editorial staff of Cambridge Scholars Publishing for their equanimity in the face of a couple of missed deadlines while we, in our different time zones, coped with the heavy demands of teaching and travelling for our universities. We owe a particular debt to our partners and families, who understood our more-than-occasional distractions from everyday life while we grappled with another editorial task. And we would all like to thank Jonathan's wife, Lynda, who copy-edited the entire typescript in its penultimate version: we are deeply indebted to you, as is the dear reader!

—The Editors
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

DAVID W. LOVELL, MICHALIS KONTOS, MATTEO NICOLINI AND JONATHAN WARNER

The Cyprus Problem in a World of Conflicts

Conflict has been an enduring feature of human societies in general, and of the body politic in particular. Attempts to avoid conflict might indeed have been the cause of the establishment of the body politic, emerging as it was imagined by the seventeenth century thinkers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke from, respectively, the fearsome, or simply inconvenient, “state of nature.” Conflicts might have caused the renovation of the body politic on compactual grounds, at least in England during the seventeenth century. Indeed, the rule of the fundamental law of the land was established on the basis of the constitutional principle of mixed government upon a contractual basis. From that time onwards, English political power has had its root in the consent of the people. This was a shift from the “unwritten constraints of the ancient constitution, the immemorial suprema lex or common law, whose jurisdiction is unchallengeable and whose judges are the ultimate arbiters of juridical disputes” (Raffield, 2010: 85) to “mixed regime arguments [which] sprang from the constitutional dilemma raised by competing claims for royal prerogative and the extensions of parliamentary power” (Ward, 2004: 60). To sum up, modern ideas of identity exhibit a high degree of adaptation to the English legal tradition, since it “emphasized the need to balance and calibrate the distinct elements in the English polity, rather than appealing primarily to its antiquity” (Ward, 2004: 59). In international relations, conflicts can lead to the creation of new world orders and to the formulation of new politics.
While nowadays we tend to reduce the causes of conflict to a struggle for advantage in situations of scarcity (arguably our existential situation), conflict also takes place for broadly societal, ideological, sectarian and vainglorious reasons in their own right. Indeed, the latter can engender even more cruelty and malevolence than conflicts over scarcity, which might, in any case, be susceptible to some form of transnational agreement (as exemplified by the European Coal and Steel Community: see Cameron, 2004: 211 ff).

More than 2,000 years ago Thucydides (1972: 80) recognized the breadth of the fundamental causes of conflict when he identified them as fear, honour and interest. How we manage a conflict, whatever its cause, is a test of human wisdom and skills (which is perhaps why, in most states, there is no right of citizens to bear arms). In important respects the long-standing institutions of government, law, diplomacy and the market are creative ways of channelling and managing conflict to beneficial ends. Wars happen when those institutions fail, when conflicting demands cannot be conciliated, when the limits of exchange are reached, or when compromise is regarded as anathema. From a political realist point of view wars also happen when a belligerent’s interests are supported by a suitable international structure; that is, when the aggressor believes that the power distribution is such that the expected benefits of the use of military violence exceed the expected costs. As Thucydides would argue, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” A more accurate term for wars between unequal belligerents is “foreign intervention.” There is little doubt that foreign intervention has decisively stimulated ethnic conflict in Cyprus.

Wars “succeed”—if that is an appropriate term—when they create a new equilibrium or approach in which the issues in dispute may be peacefully addressed (Schmitt, 2006; Ortino, 2002). As Thomas Hobbes (1991: 71) put it in the seventeenth century, there is no better “hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.” Some conflicts, however, give rise to “unsuccessful” wars, where despite a military victory the issues are not resolved, continue to smoulder and are readily re-ignited, and some conflicts remain in a stalemate condition of “neither war nor peace,” where skirmishing continues and insecurity pervades everyday life. These sorts of conflicts are often described as “protracted” or “intractable.” The complexities they involve and the difficulties that their continuation creates are the subjects of this volume as they relate to the case of Cyprus, and the focus of this chapter insofar as they help us understand how solutions to the “Cyprus problem” (for want of a neutral terminology) might be approached.
Introduction: New Perspectives on the Cyprus Problem

In the contemporary world, such “protracted conflicts” can be seen in both inter- and intra-state relations. The so-called “Cold War” can be considered one such interstate conflict, now ended by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but possibly reappearing as a result of increased tensions between NATO and Russia in the twenty-first century, especially after the 2014 events in Ukraine. But the types of conflict of which Cyprus forms an example, that of disputes in divided societies can be seen, *mutatis mutandis*, in the Arab-Israeli conflict since at least 1947; in Lebanon since independence in 1943, but especially since the civil war (1975-1990) (Raad 1988); in Sri Lanka since 1983 (perhaps closer to resolution after a decisive but bloody military defeat of the “Tamil Tigers” in 2009), in Northern Ireland, Kashmir and elsewhere (Lijphart 2002). Ethnic and religious divisions combined with a clumsy colonial disengagement are evident in most of these conflicts. Moreover, their very length has created a depth of feeling and a realignment of material circumstances and behavioural norms which lead to an intractability that is dispiriting for those caught in its web and exasperating for outsiders of good will to observe, and for which the term “protracted social conflict” is sometimes deployed. This term proposes to capture the depth of the issues at stake and to insist that the tools of social psychology, just as much as those of international relations and jurisprudence, are necessary in building solutions.

**Background to the Cyprus Problem**

When did the Cyprus Problem start? A number of chapters in this volume revisit and reinterpret the history of the island, often taking different starting points. Leaving aside the conflicts within and without the Byzantine Empire (palace coups and intrigues; Arab invasions) and the later conflicts between European powers (the Latin period from Richard the Lionheart’s conquest in 1189 to the capture of Venetian-ruled Famagusta in 1571), some would argue that the modern conflict has its roots in the arrival of immigrants from Anatolia after the Ottoman conquest in the 16th century (see Gazioglu [1990] for an account of Turkish rule of Cyprus). If there had been no emigration to Cyprus from what is now Turkey, there would be no Turkish Cypriots, and Cyprus would today most likely be part of Greece. Turkish rule lasted until 1878, when Britain and the Ottoman Empire reached an agreement that the former would lease and administer the island. The incoming British administration was met by an appeal from the Archbishop expressing the hope that, just as Gladstone had gifted the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864,
Chapter One

Cyprus could expect the same. And, indeed, Britain did offer the island to Greece in 1915, in return for Greece’s joining the war against Germany and her allies, an offer that was refused, partly because the king, Constantine, thought that neutrality was in Greece’s best interests, and partly because of the close family relationship between the king and the German Kaiser (who was his brother-in-law).

Britain formally annexed the island when the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the German side. In general the British administration of its colony was peaceful. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots served with the British forces in World War II, even though there was no obligation for them to do so. But the rise of anti-colonialism with the advent of the United Nations (established in 1945) led to increased agitation for the self-determination of the island, which would inevitably lead to enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece). The Cypriot Greek Orthodox Church conducted a referendum in 1950, which resulted in a large number of signatures demanding enosis. When the British Colonial Secretary, Henry Hopkinson, announced that some territories, like Cyprus, could never be fully independent, Greek Cypriot indignation boiled over into violence. The campaign by EOKA, launched in 1955, saw bombings of British military installations and roadside IED’s that killed civilians; characterizing EOKA as a terrorist organization, the British responded by sending in more troops, and by trying to hunt down those seen as responsible for the attacks. This proved to be more difficult than expected: a guerrilla army with support from the local population was almost impossible to root out. Battles with holed-up irregulars or executions of those captured alive served only to create martyrs and stiffen the resolve of EOKA. The exiling of Archbishop Makarios, the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, did nothing to stem the bloodshed. The Turkish Cypriot community was drawn into the conflict, as the British recruited Turkish Cypriots to fill vacancies in the civilian police force left by Greek Cypriot resignations and sackings. A diplomatic proposal that the island should become a Turkish/Greek condominium was rejected by the Greek Cypriot population, but it did serve to awaken Turkey’s interest in the former Ottoman province. Turkey argued that, if Britain were minded to abandon its colony, then ownership should revert to Turkey, as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Cypriot leaders proposed taksim—the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. A peace deal produced a truce between EOKA and Britain, and a proposal of independence, guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and Britain. A constitution for the new state was drafted by Greek, Turkish and British civil servants, with no input from the Cypriots. Faced with an ultimatum that it was this
or nothing, Dr Fazıl Küçük, the Turkish Cypriot leader, and Archbishop Makarios signed, and the Republic of Cyprus was born in August 1960.

In its original form, it lasted little more than three years; the bicommmunal nature of the Republic collapsed in violence during the winter of 1963-4. The Turkish Cypriot population gathered into defensible areas, protected by their own militia. A United Nations peacekeeping force arrived to try to ensure an end to violence. A further bloodletting in 1967 (the Kophinou incident) led to attempts to resolve the problem; things were more peaceable, until the events of 1974. In July of that year, the Greek junta (which had been ruling Greece since 1967) organized a coup against Makarios’ government. Five days later Turkey invaded, arguing that Article Four of the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) gave it the right to do so. Although the coupist government swiftly collapsed, a truce followed by peace talks broke down, and the Turkish army swept through northern Cyprus, stopping only at the cease-fire line observed today. 200,000 Greek Cypriots were displaced from their homes in the north; for their own protection, almost all of the Turkish Cypriots living south of the ceasefire line found their way to the Turkish-controlled area, creating two ethnically distinct areas in Cyprus.

Peace talks have been held intermittently since 1977; the outline agreed then still forms the basis of the type of solution sought today. The talks oscillate between aiming for a comprehensive settlement (what became the Annan Plan, that was put to separate referenda in 2004), and confidence building measures, that aim to work towards a settlement one step at a time.

**Recent developments: why this book?**

“Of the making many books there is no end, and much study wearies the body,” the author of the Biblical book of Ecclesiastes advises his readers (12:12b). Much ink has already been spilt on analyses of the Cyprus Problem, and so it is apposite to ask why another one is needed.

Over time, conflicts evolve and change. The restoration of democracy in Greece in the aftermath of the failure of the 1974 coup in Cyprus was one early and positive change. A military coup in Turkey in 1980 and the constrained democracy which followed it was less helpful, as was the Turkish Cypriot declaration of UDI in 1983. More recently, the decline of the power of the military in Turkey and the rise of political Islam there, along with Cyprus’ EU entry changed the parameters of the problem. The financial crisis affecting Greece and Cyprus since 2010, plus the changing leadership on the island have shaped the development of the issues
involved in the Cyprus Problem. Since the 2004 referenda, the major changes on the ground have been the opening of more crossing points along the 1974 ceasefire line, more contact between members of the two communities, and the completion of a long-planned water pipeline between Turkey and north Cyprus (which should alleviate the acute water shortage on the island and the massive depletion of groundwater resources in the north). The discovery of offshore natural gas has added a new element to the mix. These developments, while not in themselves game-changers, open up both new opportunities for, and new threats to, the peace process. It is the implications of these changes that this book seeks to explore.

Contested histories make for interesting reading, perhaps; significantly, their effects are still felt today. New ways of understanding the conflict, and being able to appreciate the viewpoint of the “other” open possible pathways towards resolution of conflict. Although conflicts are all unique to some extent, there are perhaps things that can be learned from them that can help with understanding conflict and conflict resolution elsewhere.

Much of the discussion in the book concerns the difficulty of producing viable constitutional and civic arrangements in an ethnically-divided polity. It is clear that this issue dominates almost all discussion of the Cyprus Problem, from the drawing of borders, the conceptualization of identity of oneself and of the “other,” and the management of the natural resources with which the island is endowed. Other cleavages in civil society, such as gender inequality, then seem less salient. For example, politics continues to be male-dominated: the leaders of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities since independence have always been men. Women are more underrepresented in the Republic of Cyprus’ institutions than in any other EU country: only seven out of 56 members of the Republic’s House of Representatives are women; and only four out of 50 of the Turkish Cypriot assembly. Few women have held high office in the government or judiciary, and, at present, only one of Cyprus’ six representatives in the European Parliament is a woman. Progress towards gender equality is proceeding, but the issue, while important, is not seen as a top priority.

This book contains contributions from both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as well as outside scholars. Many of the authors draw on the history of the Cyprus Problem. While rehashing the events of the pre-referendum period won’t help solve the Problem, understanding the significance of the history to current thinking, and the intersection (or lack thereof) between the differing stories is very important. Why do Cypriots
not perceive that they have interests in common? Are they confused about what their real interests might be?

One vexed issue in writing about Cyprus is the way in which to refer to the north of the island, the area taken by Turkish forces in 1974. For Turkey and most people who live there, this area of land is now the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, with its own President, Parliament and civic institutions. For all other countries in the world, it is the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus, and all its governmental institutions are illegitimate, merely masquerading as the genuine article. Most Greek Cypriot writers refer to north Cyprus, following United Nations resolutions, as an illegal pseudo-state and place its institutions within inverted commas. Careful writers distinguish between those institutions which are the successors of those within the competence of the Turkish Communal Chamber (which are therefore legitimate under Part V the 1960 Cyprus Constitution), and those that are in violation of the Constitution. Thus primary and secondary schools in the north are really schools, but the “universities” are not (as the power to grant University charters rests with the Government, whereas pre-university education was a matter for the communal chamber – Article 20 of the Constitution). Similarly, Mustafa Akinci is recognized as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community, but only as “President” of the “TRNC” or pseudo-state. While, with good will and effort, it is possible to get an agreed vocabulary, in this volume we have striven to achieve linguistic neutrality only in this introductory chapter. Elsewhere, we have chosen to allow each author to use the language of his or her choice. Readers should not infer from this that the editors necessarily endorse the formulations used.

The Structure of the Book

In the opening chapter of the first section, David W. Lovell contextualizes the Cyprus Problem within the broader issues of trust and identity. In today’s world the issue of Cyprus is special for all the wrong reasons: because of the duration of the division of Cyprus; because of the involvement of the two mother countries, Greece and Turkey, which can use the two Cypriot communities as proxies for their ongoing feud; and because of the repeated failure of the United Nations’ attempts at resolution of the conflict. Even trying to outline the history of the last fifty years is fraught with difficulty, as each side sees events in partisan terms. As a result, it is with suspicion that all attempts at reconciliation continue to be viewed. The chapter provides an overview of the Cyprus problem as a background against which a discussion of the role of identity can take
place. A necessary condition for resolving the Cyprus problem, he argues, is the creation of a Cypriot identity and then a national interest that can replace the existing loyalties to the motherlands and their cultures and traditions.

In his chapter, “Foreign interventions and Greek Cypriot perceptions,” Michalis Kontos broadens the question of identity to include a consideration of the way that outsiders are viewed. Cyprus has suffered from a long history of foreign rule, interventions, and interference, and this history has shaped the nature of both the Cyprus Problem and Cypriot identities. The chapter uses a model of cognitive consistency as described by Robert Jervis (1976) and links this to the literature on foreign intervention originating from the perspective of international relations, with the aim of critically examining some of the solidified perceptions of the Cyprus problem, especially those of the Greek Cypriot political elites and public opinion. These perceptions mainly concern the role of the great powers and Cyprus’ guarantors. The Cyprus problem is a field of intensive domestic political debate in the Republic of Cyprus (which has de facto been run by the Greek Cypriot community since 1964). It has been the leading issue in all election campaigns since 1974. Non-Cypriot actors implicated one way or another in the Cyprus problem, namely the three guarantor powers (the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey) and the United States, have critically affected the form and the content of the problem. There are, however, various domestic perceptions and misperceptions relating to the “foreigners” and their role regarding the Cyprus problem which define—to a large degree—the way the Cyprus problem affects the Greek Cypriot domestic political agenda, and, therefore, the Greek Cypriot official stance in the negotiations on the Cyprus problem.

The second section of the book concentrates on the contemporary political scene within the two communities, covering salient issues in their political discourse, and the issues that drive “domestic” concerns. Ayla Gürel discusses how the current politics of offshore gas complicate a settlement in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus (RoC) began preparing the ground for offshore hydrocarbons exploration in the early 2000s, and in 2008, the US-based company Noble Energy was awarded a three-year licence in one of the 13 blocks in the offshore exploration area demarcated by the RoC. Since September 2011, Noble Energy has completed two test wells. In September 2013, the preliminary results of the second well showed that there was an estimated reserve of five trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the block—quite a significant resource. With the prospect of further hydrocarbon finds in this and other
blocks licensed in early 2013, gas potentially carries a promise of unprecedented prosperity for the whole island. But the unresolved Cyprus problem stands in the way of this promise being realized. Although the RoC government maintains that in its pursuit to develop the island’s offshore natural resources it is exercising its sovereign rights as recognized by the international community, both the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the government of Turkey have voiced strong objection to these offshore initiatives. Exclusion of Turkish Cypriots from this process is inconsistent, they maintain, with the international accords that established the original RoC in 1960. The chapter analyses the reasons behind this tension over the development of Cyprus’ offshore hydrocarbons based on the parties’ expressed positions and actions. The hydrocarbons controversy stems directly from the parties’ fundamental differences about the nature of the Cyprus problem, and therefore what is politically at stake in Cyprus. As things stand, the issue of hydrocarbons appears to be deepening the chasm between the parties to the Cyprus problem and thus reducing the likelihood of a political settlement.

Melanie Antoniou also looks at the effects of the discovery of hydrocarbons in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but from the perspective of the Greek Cypriot side. The RoC has developed two strategic goals as a result of the gas discovery: the monetization of the energy fields as soon as possible, and the transformation of Cyprus into a regional energy hub. However, both of these goals are in conflict with the stated vital interests of Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey wants to reserve for itself the position of regional energy hub as part of a strategy of taking on a leadership role in the region. In addition, Turkey aims at a bigger share of maritime zone and offshore hydrocarbons in the eastern Mediterranean Sea via the expansion of her EEZ. This chapter analyses how Turkey’s pursuit of her strategic goals, in conjunction with Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ failure to recognize their real common interest in development of the gas resources could put into peril the prospects for their further development and negate the potential for Cyprus to become a bridge for the construction of a new form of regional co-operation, including between Israel and the Arab states. It suggests that inter-state co-operation could be constructed and achieved by the introduction of appropriate law enforcement agencies in international political life. These agencies would constitute a constraint on the exercise of power, leading to a reduction in violence (and the threat of violence) and movement towards a more consensual political life. Such agencies could, for instance, take the form of a regulatory system that functions as a subsystem of the Energy Charter and in harmony with the EU legal and regulatory framework.
Although the discovery of gas also affects the relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot statelet, there are other elements to the way in which that relationship is changing. The effects of the 2010 financial crisis on the economy of the RoC are well-known; less well documented are the changes in economic structure that are altering the nature of the economy, politics and society in the north. The next two chapters seek to address this omission.

Nikos Moudouros focuses on the way the relationship with Turkey has changed over the past decade as the “Turkish (economic) Model” has become increasingly an undisguised neoliberalism. How this model has affected the Turkish Cypriots, and has played out in north Cyprus, forms an appropriate basis for analysing the Turkish model and Turkey’s use of soft power. The chapter argues that the dominant perception of Turkey’s national security needs in relation to Cyprus is changing contextually, resulting in modifications to Turkey’s ambition to export its modernization programme to the Turkish Cypriot community. In turn, this development in Cyprus has resulted in the discontinuity from the socio-economic system that prevailed in the Turkish Cypriot community in the immediate aftermath of 1974. The way in which the Turkish government has exported its model of transformation is through a succession of three-year financial protocols. In theory these made economic aid more contingent on results; in practice they have produced a new social dynamic within the Turkish Cypriot community, which perhaps makes an agreement with the RoC more attractive.

Umut Bozkurt presents a different view of the same issue: could Turkey’s neoliberal “therapies” in north Cyprus perhaps instead lead the island further along the path of division? It was in the aftermath of the failure of the Annan Plan that Turkey assumed the de facto role of the “IMF of northern Cyprus,” aiming to effect a deeper transformation in the economy and politics of the Turkish Cypriot community. As well as insisting on austerity measures and the privatization of state owned enterprises in order to tame the “cumbersome” state in the north of Cyprus, the Turkish government opted for a strategy that defined northern Cyprus as a special investment area. As a result of this, inflows of Turkish capital have significantly increased, both through the purchase of privatized state enterprises and the privatization of infrastructure, education, and the construction and tourism sectors. The chapter seeks to locate this neoliberal restructuring of north Cyprus in a global context and not solely as a peculiarity of state formation and the local dynamics of the Turkish Cypriot community. But within that dynamic, the fear is that Turkey and north Cyprus will enter an ever-closer union, as increased dependency
forces north Cyprus to rely ever more heavily on not only Turkish political institutions, but on Turkish businessmen as well.

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been on the island since 1974. UNFICYP is invisible to most Cypriots—those impacted by its presence are limited to people living in or near the Green line or buffer zone (but this does include a large proportion of Nicosia, the only remaining divided capital in Europe). Any changes in the nature of the Cyprus Problem have the potential to change the role of UNFICYP and its monitoring and peacekeeping role. Walter Dorn explores the way in which monitoring the Green Line has changed over the past 25 years: the increasing availability of electronic surveillance has the potential to make monitoring easier, and so make it possible to head off trouble before it happens. In itself, this increased ability to be proactive can help reduce tension, as the two sides come to understand that any hostile intent by the other side will be rapidly defused, and that communicating peaceful intent (by, for example, reducing forces in sensitive areas) is facilitated. The 1974 war divided the island into two parts with a narrow demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the opposing Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces. The volatility and violence in this buffer zone, either side of the “Green Line” that marked the ceasefire positions, necessitated a constant UN peacekeeping presence. This was achieved mainly with manned observation posts (OPs), about 150 of which were established by 1975 to maintain stability and prevent flare-ups, including any lethal exchanges between the two sides. By the early 1990s, many of the countries contributing peacekeepers to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus had become tired of the stalemate and the lack of progress in negotiations, so they withdrew their troops from the force. This necessitated a reduction in the number of constantly manned OPs from 51 in 1992 to 21 in mid-1993. Further downsizing of UNFICYP by the UN Security Council in 2004 gave rise to a new approach to monitor the DMZ and produce actionable intelligence on violations. Cameras were installed in hot-spots in the Nicosia DMZ and more mobile responsive patrols were introduced as part of the new ‘concentration with mobility’ concept. This was the first time a UN peace operation used unattended cameras to monitor a demilitarized zone. The chapter examines the UN’s difficulties and successes using the remote cameras, especially during important peace-threatening incidents. Other technologies that aided UNFICYP are also reviewed for lessons that might assist an under-equipped United Nations in its watch-keeping function.

The third section of the book reverses the direction of one of Walter Dorn’s questions. Peacekeeping elsewhere has learned from UNFICYP’s
experiences; but can Cyprus, and those working to resolve the issue, learn from the history of other places? Many states have experienced British colonization and have differing ethnic groups; in some cases, independence has led, sooner or later, to violent conflict; in others, a long-lasting commitment to a politics that somehow transcends ethnicity has developed. First, the success story. In his contribution, Jonathan Warner explores the histories of Cyprus and Belize, the way that their neighbours are perceived, and how this affects each nation’s self-understanding and the effects of this understanding on political culture. Each state, of course, comprises people who have a multiplicity of individual stories, but national cohesion will exist when the stories cohere well together. In Belize, this is largely the case; in Cyprus, there are at least two competing narratives. It is the ability of Belizeans to fit their stories within a common story of Belizean identity that has allowed for peaceful coexistence—it is the inability of Cypriots to do this that led to violence and separation. The challenge for putting Cyprus back together again, then, is to seek a common Cypriot identity by finding ways to develop stories of commonality between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots.

Less peaceful has been the history of Sri Lanka, where, like Cyprus, ethnicity has been a major feature of the conflict between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority. Following a discussion about the concepts and methods used, Zenonas Tziarras explores the conflicts in Cyprus and Sri Lanka, and then proceeds to a comparative analysis of the two cases. Each case study examines the prominence (or lack thereof) of ethnicity in the (ethnic) conflict in question. Comparisons in terms of history, colonization, the post-independence experience, the period of conflict and the post-conflict era are made, to allow the identification of similarities and differences between them. The chapter argues that the prominence and significance of ethnicity changes over time in both conflicts, and that the similar historical circumstances of the two conflicts play an important part in determining their nature. Although the role of ethnicity does change or evolve during the course of an ethnic conflict, it comes to characterize the nature of the conflict, rather than being its root cause (Carment, 2007: 63). The chapter therefore explores other possible root causes, such as political and economic factors, horizontal inequalities, the role of education, the exploitation of ethnic identity by elites, the colonial history, and nationalism. It makes a distinction between the root causes of each conflict and the actors and other factors as the underlying reasons that trigger or exacerbate a conflict. These often differ from the perceptions between the groups that intensify and prolong the conflict. It is important then, that conflict resolution strategies should be developed that identify the root
causes and address these, rather than concentrating on the symptom of overemphasis on ethnicity.

The final section of the book looks at two different ways that the conflict might be resolved, and the island reunited. Matteo Nicolini’s chapter introduces a new way of conceptualizing the Cyprus Problem, that of Legal Geography. He is interested in two major institutional mechanisms through which multinational federations enhance consociational participation and geographical cohesion in deeply divided societies, that is, appropriate demarcation of sub-state regions and power sharing. Ethnic-based units and consociational participation aim at fulfilling the rationale of multinational federations: they preserve territorial and political integrity, and maintain diversity by including different ethnic groups in a single federal structure. But the chapter’s main concern is the applicability of this framework to Cyprus: what might a sustainable accommodation of difference look like? Part of the answer, it argues, is to use the tools of a comparative legal analysis, thus providing experiences, proposals and arrangements useful to establishing a new constitutional design of a unified Cyprus. The chapter thus aims to reassess the use of federal arrangements, in general, and of asymmetrical federalism, in particular, when accommodating divided societies. It considers the constitutional implications of regional demarcation and power-sharing between what are now two separate ethnic-oriented polities. Socio-economic factors present a significant challenge to an ethnic-construed territorial identity, and add additional layers of complexity to the problem of governance of divided societies such as Cyprus. But this complexity also presents an opportunity to reassess the criteria for demarcation of the federal territory and the ethnically-defined units, and to create a unique common territorial identity for both ethnicities.

By contrast, Bülent Kanol and İlke Dağlı are concerned with the situation “the day after” a solution is agreed: what groundwork needs to be done in order to ensure that there is grassroots support for the agreement that the leaders have initialled. This is especially important given the disappointment of the 2004 referendum results: if the average Cypriot does not see how the solution will benefit him or her, it is unlikely to gain support, or, if it is implemented, is unlikely to be sustainable. The chapter emphasizes the importance of civil society, explaining how Active Dialogue Networks (ADNs), a form of participatory democracy, might help build bridges now between the communities. It describes one project where this grassroots approach is paying off and overcoming recent pessimism about the prospects of a solution. Thematic ADNs endeavour to bring together both the “key people and more people” in order to generate
innovative solutions and recommendations to issues identified through public deliberation. The ADN discussed in this chapter was designed to deliberate upon prospective confidence building measures and subsequently to prioritize recommendations for action ranked according to their urgency, impact and practicality, using a democratic, participatory and inclusive process. Findings show that the majority of the ADN participants are of the opinion that the main form of conflict resolution strategy in Cyprus (negotiations between the leaders of the communities and their political elites) is of only limited value, and other kinds of activities are needed to complement this Track One diplomacy in order to overcome the current deadlock. These findings are in line with recent peace-building literature which focuses on the importance of civil society in building sustainable peace among different groups. While the innovative ADN methodology adds legitimacy to peace-building efforts, the chapter also draws on the literature on ontological security to explain why sustainable peace is unlikely to be built without the support of the institutions of civil society and without reconfiguring the way in which identities of “friend” and “enemy” are perceived.

Towards a solution?

The chapters presented in the book in general express a cautious optimism that the Cyprus Problem is capable of being solved, but that there will need to be considerable effort put in to ensure that any solution survives in the long term. The opportunities afforded by the gas discoveries have to be balanced by the complications they create in deciding how the benefits of this bonanza should be shared out. The neoliberal policies imposed on the north by Turkey may well make the Turkish Cypriots think that an agreement with their Greek compatriots is an attractive option; but fears of changing one overload for another urges proceeding slowly. Building of trust does not happen instantaneously; the happy outcome of opening crossing points, that people visit the other side to shop or enjoy the beaches and mountains, is a move in the right direction, but in itself is insufficient. Shopping in someone’s shop or sitting on the beach in another’s village does not necessarily mean you want to live next door to them.

Negotiations between the leaders of the two communities were broken off in late 2014, because of the dispute over Turkish exploration for natural gas in waters where the RoC enjoys exclusive exploitation rights. However, the election of Mustafa Akinci as Turkish Cypriot leader in April 2015 has engendered a new hope that there will be progress towards
a solution. Lellos Demetriades, the long-time mayor of Nicosia (serving from 1971 until 2001) found a kindred spirit in Akıncı, who headed the administration of the Turkish sector from 1976 to 1990. During this time they co-operated on many projects – including developing a Masterplan for the city should the division end. Akıncı’s decisive victory over the incumbent Derviş Eroğlu (Rauf Denktaş’s protégé) suggests that the Turkish Cypriots have put behind them the disappointment at the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots in the 2004 referendum. Initial signs of progress are promising – commitments by both Akıncı and President Nicos Anastasiades to work together to seek a solution; a relaxation of visa requirements; the discussion and implementation of confidence building measures; and the possibility of an overall settlement within months. Turkey seems to have forgiven Akıncı his initial faux pas; indeed, according to Sabah newspaper (2015; Cyprus Mail, 2015), Turkey’s minister for EU affairs, Volkan Bozkir, blamed Rauf Denktaş for the lack of a solution, a comment almost without precedent. Although, after the disappointments of the past, it is premature to announce that a settlement will shortly be reached, there does seem to be an air of optimism on the island today. The symbolism of the two leaders visiting coffee shops together on both sides of the divide is promising, and the initial commitment to working quickly towards a solution encouraging, but we’ve been here before. And, of course, reaching a sustainable solution needs more than just a political agreement between leaders. Amongst the many issues that need to be addressed which cannot be incorporated into a written agreement is that of ensuring that bridges are built between the institutions of civil society across the Green Line. Those who harbour anti-Federalist sentiments need to be included in the process, and their reservations addressed. In addition, changing the perceptions each side has of the other, and enhancing a common Cypriot identity that would respect the communities’ ethnic origins but contribute to increasing mutual trust are hard tasks that need to be accomplished to prevent yet another disappointment.

References


Cyprus Mail (2015) Rauf Denktash to blame for non-solution May 18 http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/05/18/rauf-denktash-to-blame-for-non-solution/.


PART I

IDENTITY AND PERCEPTIONS
Protracted social conflicts are those modern, long-term conflicts—always simmering, but sometimes boiling over into organized violence—in which the settlements that generally put an end to violent conflicts are elusive because the issues that initiated them remain unresolved. Such issues are frankly very difficult to resolve because they tend to involve matters of identity, so crucial in the contemporary age of nationalism and its corollary, the nation state. Where one party refuses to acknowledge the legitimate identity and experience of the other the conflict becomes essentially existential; the depth of feeling which attends it is matched by a realignment of material circumstances and behavioural norms over decades and generations. The conflict itself, and all that surrounds it—the skirmishing, the resettlements, the myths, the political structures, and the continuing sense of loss and injustice—becomes the new “normal” for both parties. Socialization of the next generation is centred on the struggle; children imbibe it with their mothers’ milk. The prevailing sentiments, on both sides, are mistrust and fear. The term “protracted social conflict” seeks to capture the depth of the issues at stake in these lamentable cases, while insisting that the tools of social psychology, just as much as those of international relations, are necessary in building solutions.

We are familiar with such protracted conflicts in the Middle East, with the Arab-Israeli divide since at least 1947; in Lebanon since independence in 1943, but especially since the civil war (1975-1990) (Raad 1988); in Sri Lanka since 1983 (perhaps closer to resolution after a decisive but bloody
The “Cyprus issue,” however, has a regrettably special place in the history of protracted conflicts: because of the duration of the divisions in Cyprus itself between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (formalized since 1983 by a disputed international border across the island); because of the involvement of two foreign countries, Greece and Turkey, for which the “hyphenated” Cypriot communities form proxy (and for the most part, willing) battalions in their ongoing feud; and because of the failure of the United Nations’ longstanding efforts to resolve the conflict. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was deployed in the buffer zone between the two Cypriot communities in 1964, and remains in place: one of the longest continuous deployments of peacekeepers in the UN’s history. Such is the depth of feeling among many Cypriots that simply trying to describe the last fifty years of Cyprus’ history is a minefield for the unwary, each side seeing the progression of events in highly partisan terms. (There are, nevertheless, some creditable recent accounts, including those by Michael (2011) and Heracleides (2011).) Likewise, suspicion and stereotype are the bifocals through which every attempt at reconciliation continues to be viewed. These are unsurprising characteristics of protracted social conflicts more generally.

This chapter will begin by providing a brief overview of the “Cyprus issue” against which to discuss the role of identity in the creation of a relatively harmonious community that forms the ballast of a robust modern state. Drawing on the perspectives of the “protracted social conflict” model developed by Azar (1990), and of “interactive conflict resolution” of which it forms a part (Fisher 1997), I argue that the key to the causes of the division of Cyprus and to their resolution lies in acknowledging basic human needs and recognizing that identity and security are at issue. These causes are discussed, and then the importance of identity and trust are stressed.

The necessary condition for a resolution to the “Cyprus issue,” I argue, is the creation of a Cypriot identity and thus a national interest that can supersede existing loyalties to external states, cultures and traditions. Many analysts are sceptical, or dismissive, of the very possibility of creating a Cypriot identity (Joseph 1985: 241-42); some are not (Yılmaz 2008: 428). My view is that a Cypriot identity need not—in fact, is quite unlikely to—be a homogeneous entity, though it does need to be distinctive from “mainland” identities and to be respectful of the historical and ethnic contribution and diversity of the communities that comprise “Cyprus.” Movement in such a direction will understandably be gradual as
communities build trust with each other (and defeat or at least neutralize “spoilers”); some of the mechanisms for advancing this agenda will be discussed in the penultimate section of the chapter. One thing is clear: there is no “big-bang” solution to the “Cyprus issue,” and certainly no military solution. Likewise, the notion that a solution lies in negotiations between external parties, specifically Athens and Ankara (Camp 2001), posits Cypriots—wrongly, in my view—as merely pawns. In the face of the modern history of this beautiful but unhappy island, one can only hope that the methodical work of building trust is patiently advanced among the communities of Cyprus itself.

II

As an island in the eastern Mediterranean, and a welcome port of call for sea-borne trade (not to mention convenient destination for conquerors and settlers), Cyprus has been subject to diverse cultural influences for thousands of years. In 1489, to mention only more recent times, it was captured by the Republic of Venice; in 1570, the Ottomans invaded; and in 1878, the island was transferred by the Ottomans to the control of the United Kingdom. After a period of rising clashes with the British in the postcolonial era after the Second World War, Cyprus became independent in 1960. Despite the machinations of the island’s communities during the struggle for independence, including a failed proposal for unification with Greece, it is essentially from the time of independence that the “Cyprus issue” emerged onto the international agenda. It was grounded in fears that an appropriate political recognition and role for the substantial, but minority, Turkish Cypriot community could not be guaranteed in the new state (and, indeed, while formal recognition of the minority community was guaranteed in the 1960 Constitution, the problems to which that gave rise led to President Makarios’ 1963 reform proposals—“The Thirteen Amendments”—and a deepening of inter-communal mistrust), and it was aggravated by outside parties with their own agendas. Violence between the Turkish-oriented and Greek-oriented communities soon broke out, and led ultimately to the deployment of UNFICYP in 1964. Ten years later, just days after an attempt by the Greek military junta to unite the island with Greece, including a coup that ousted and almost killed President Makarios, Turkish troops invaded on 20 July 1974 (on the grounds of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community) and divided the island; in 1983 this division was formalized by the declaration of independence by the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. Tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots were displaced southwards by the invasion, and tens of thousands
of Turkish Cypriots fled to the north; thousands of poor, mainland Turks were subsequently resettled in northern Cyprus. The international community does not recognize this northern “Republic,” but is constrained in acting against it; the displaced populations and their descendants continue to feel aggrieved at their loss; and the passage of time conspires to normalize the territorial status quo and entrench the hostility.

The “Cyprus issue” has been aggravated, if not fundamentally created, by the interference of colonial and other external powers. Indeed, it is the burden of Christopher Hitchens’ passionate but incisive analysis that

Only four years after they had painfully achieved independence [in 1960], the Cypriots became the victims of a superpower design for partition. This partition reflected only the strategic requirements of outside powers, and did not conform to any local needs … The imposition of partition [from 1974] necessitated the setting of Greek against Turk, and Greek against Greek. (Hitchens 1997, 11-12)

In Hitchens’ view, Cyprus reached its current impasse by a series of external manoeuvres, by Greece, Turkey and Britain, often with willing Cypriot accomplices, but exploiting and fanning ancient rivalries. The two most important things to know about Cyprus in the last couple of centuries are first how it fitted into grand power strategy and second, that the people of Cyprus have rarely if ever been consulted about their fate. Hitchens insisted:

that before 1955 there was no history of internal viciousness in Cyprus … In his book Years of Upheaval … Dr Henry Kissinger … speaks of “primeval hatred of Greeks and Turks,” “atavistic bitternesses” and “a lethal cocktail” … In doing so, he perpetuates a fairly widespread and commonplace view of the island’s troubles; a fatalistic view of the incompatibility of the communities that insults both of them. (Hitchens 1997: 47)

While this may be true, fifty years of division and acceptance of the narrative of historical hostility have reinforced each community’s mistrust of the other, passed on as it is to children and grand-children. Fortunately, there has been almost no violence between the communities in more than a decade, but an aggrieved stalemate continues.

Meanwhile the UN’s efforts—both at keeping the parties from taking up arms once again, and at a long-term settlement of the division—continue. In the literature on conflict resolution, the peacekeeping success of the UN in Cyprus has been rightly noted. Quite simply: there has been no open warfare since 1974. Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 81-82) point
out that UN peacekeeping “has acquired an important reputation for impartiality and professionalism … In Cyprus, UNFICYP has prevented the re-ignition of open warfare between the Greek and Turkish communities.” But while this is important, it is not sufficient: the UN’s many efforts at settlement have thus far signally failed. The efforts by the UN Secretary-General’s recent Special Adviser (2008-14), former Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer, have not broken this dismal mediation record. While it might be easy to blame Downer himself for incautious comments, as the Greek Cypriot side has sometimes done (AP 2012), criticism of his mission reflects rather the extent of the continuing distance between the two sides. The apparent readiness of the parties to the dispute to misinterpret Downer’s statements must have had him bemused and perplexed. However that may be, the decision by Mr. Downer in early 2014 to accept an Australian government diplomatic posting, and to resign as Special Adviser, raises the prospect that a new Adviser and a fresh approach may yield results. Downer’s failure is not simply from personal shortcomings. As a long-time observer of Cyprus summed it up:

[Downer] faulted in comprehending the potency of the internal political front within each side – what is known in the conflict resolution parlour as the “negotiator’s dilemma”: meaning that the intra-communal process is as significant as the actual inter-communal negotiations in successfully reaching a mediated settlement. But to be fair to Downer that is something that all negotiators and third party mediators have failed to apprehend (Michael 2014).

Yet the UN’s failure more generally suggests—odd as it may, at first, seem—that the United Nations may not be the appropriate third party to mediate in the task of building trust between the sides.

The story of public mediation in Cyprus can be told in terms of recurring cycles of hopes raised and then dashed. The most recent cycle can be charted in a series of reports by the International Crisis Group (ICG). In June 2008, the ICG declared the “Best Chance Yet” for the reunification of Cyprus on the basis of the election of Demetris Christofias to the Greek Cypriot presidency. By September 2009, it described the state of play as “Reunification or Partition?” if the opportunity for a settlement was not reached by April 2010 (the date of the then-forthcoming Turkish Cypriot elections). By February 2011, the ICG was urging “Six Steps towards a Settlement,” premised on the notion that “the Cyprus reunification negotiations under way since 2008 [are] at an impasse.” The stalemate continues, as does the impression that a new approach (and not