

For God and Country

For God and Country:

Butler's 1944 Education Act

By

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To Dr. James E. Hayes, professor of education and grandfather

CONTENTS

Preface	ix
Introduction	1
Chapter One.....	13
A Backdrop to the 1944 Act	
Chapter Two	29
The 1944 Act as History	
Chapter Three	43
Christian-Civic Humanists	
R. A. Butler	
Fred Clarke	
Karl Mannheim	
Chapter Four.....	57
Reconstructing Education	
Chapter Five	73
For God and Country	
Chapter Six	87
Religious Education for All	
Chapter Seven.....	101
Further Education for All?	
Glossary.....	117
People	
Terms	
Selected References.....	127
Index	153

PREFACE

This study, by a twenty-first century American of left-wing and atheist beliefs, attempts to continue to help rescue interwar and 1940s-era English Christian intellectuals and Conservative politicians from a “condescension” of history [of education]. As a historical study, it attempts to understand how and why educational philosophies were formed, and how and why education policies were enacted, without trying to judge the educational or pedagogical values or results of education policies and philosophies. As a historian rather than an educationalist, I wrote this book as an intellectual history, rather than a history of education. That said, having been raised by an extended family of left-wing American educators, I came to this work with a firm belief in the benefits of a liberal education and with criticisms of my own country’s systems and policy decisions.

I began my work pouring over the pages of Brian Simon’s important studies on English education. My research and subsequent analysis, however, forced me to make a fundamental shift in thinking. A consequent tight focus on Minister of Education R. A. Butler and his intellectual colleagues, particularly Conservative and Christian activists, dashed my Generation X and (naïve) liberal assumptions that these men and women were little more than die-hard Tories and antecedents of Thatcherism or the Christian-Right. Rather, Butler and his educationalist peers emerged as deeply complex men and women who weighed and measured social *and* cultural concerns and tradition *and* progress to create policy they believed could restore a viable Christian-civic humanism to England. I was—ironically—fortunate that I began this study after 9/11 and 7/7 when scholarly ideas about religion in England (and the United States) changed quickly to embrace interpretations of postsecularism. Perhaps this, and my identity as a Gen X American, led to my initial astonishment to find that Religious Education had been *mandated* by the 1944 Education Act in England.¹ This seemed incongruous in what was supposed to have been a secularizing century. I came to agree with other thinkers that the history of Religious Education, particularly after this mandate, had not just been—in

¹ Although formally “an Act to reform the law relating to education in England and Wales” this study’s focus is on England.

many cases—under-analyzed, but in some cases almost systematically ignored.

My continued research and analysis led me to agree with other scholars that radical protagonists of the left, as well as those on the right, had contributed to the on-going partisan debates in English educational politics by misrepresenting, or at least misunderstanding, aspects of past policy decisions. A continued lack of self-awareness and introspection by both sides of the political spectrum contributed to the on-going confusion that stymied England's educational philosophies after 1944. Both the left and the right tried, in vain, to continue to reform English education. These controversies contained, paradoxically, bipartisan elitist attitudes toward education, vocation, and society that plagued late-twentieth century England. Yet I believed there must have been attempts to systematically bridge the divides and to create a national education system for all. I found this in my study of the making of the 1944 Act.

A 1984 sociological explanation of “educational policy and ideology” by Open University instructors argues that postwar educational policy was based on two widely accepted “axioms:” “(A) That universal education provided by the state could bring about peaceful social change and ameliorate at least some of the harsher injustices created by a class-divided society [and] (B) that an educated workforce was a prerequisite for economic growth” (section 2.2). In my reading, these goals clearly reflected proposals made by Butler and his intellectual colleagues for Religious Education and secondary and further education embedded in the Act. Why then, did partisan conflicts continue after the landmark 1944 Act? Parts of the answer are that some interpretations of the 1944 Act neglected to fully examine schemes for Religious Education, alternate forms of secondary education outside comprehensives, and further education—as well as non-governmental documents and discussions that are now seen as influencing the Act's legislation and spirit. Historians in the twentieth-century had left out parts of the story of the 1944 Act. This is natural as historiographical trends change and, fortunately, left room for new scholars to enter the historical discussions.

Scholars had noted that the rise of the professional classes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries included an almost complete absorption of educational and intellectual status into a form of property. Harold Perkin, among others, traces the rise of the professional classes and the socio-cultural splintering that occurred between middle-class industrialists and middle-class intellectuals who rose up in society by dint of accumulation of material or intellectual capital. Working-class life, both in terms of careers and cultures, remained marginalized and degraded. The

English middle classes held to an ideal of freedom to work but only middle-class careers were considered independent. Professional vocations held by formally-educated men (and later women) that involved expensive or accredited education and training were regarded as having increased social or cultural value. Work that involved practical education and material production outside of formal higher education remained largely denigrated. The continued development and integration of mass culture and mass education contributed to a culture where educational credentials and financial compensation meant more than intellectualism and social welfare. Katharyne Mitchell calls this movement a form of “strategic cosmopolitanism” for privileged professional classes (2003). Perkin describes it as “self-destructive greed and corruption among professional elites” “who control the flow of income [and power] to steer more and more of it to themselves” (1996, abstract, xiv). In the late twentieth century both the left and the right continued construction on this educational-industrial complex of higher education which in turn shaped secondary education’s structures and goals—often for the worse.

English education became focused on a battle for rights to formal further—higher—education. Politicians and educationalists thus lost focus on creating a viable educational philosophy for all that could benefit state welfare and the commonweal. Labour *and* Conservatives submerged ideas that education *and* training were necessary and vital parts of every citizen’s life. These battles for formal education continue, and current educational policy reports suggest that no side has won but that English educational philosophies continue to suffer.

A theme of the 1944 Act, in my interpretation, was the maintenance of and renewed respect for spheres of society outside the ranks of professional society, where men, women, and children had a way forward that was not based on increased professionalization and material wealth, but on a philosophy of life-long learning and a sense of education as related to Christian-civic humanism. This was a program to open, not limit, the paths all citizens—regardless of birth—could chose, constrained only by a consideration of the commonweal and the individual’s own interests and abilities. In order to do so, as Butler and his colleagues argued, educational philosophy must look toward diverse educational schemes tempered by social cohesion. Social cohesion, it was believed, could exist while educating citizens for the wide variety of occupations necessary in an industrialized society. A national faith—Christianity—would propagate mutual respect and commonweal spirit. Although I personally do not believe in the need for a *Christian*-based Religious Education in the national school system, philosophies of education for the

welfare of the general public, rather than wedded to elitist ideals of a liberal education as the only way forward, still seem like a good idea—on both sides of the Atlantic.²

This preface would not be complete without some acknowledgements. Thanks to my family, friends, and students. You know who you are and how you helped. Thank you to my mentors and colleagues at the University of California, Davis, University of Washington, Tacoma and elsewhere. This book would not have been possible without you. Joanne Clarke Dillman, thank you, especially, for your encouragement and friendship. Special thanks to the School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at the University of Washington, Tacoma for awarding me a Research & Teaching Fund Award to support revision of an earlier draft of this work and to hire Jennifer Joyner—history B.A., MAIS candidate, writer, and friend—to proofread and make clever editing suggestions for the manuscript. Thanks Jen!

Finally, a few notes on the text: written by an American this book uses American English spelling in the main text but British English spelling in quotations and elsewhere as appropriate. A brief glossary of people and terms that may not be familiar to American or lay audiences is provided. I also made the decision to use an author-date system of notes and references for this book. This style is one with growing—but not full—acceptance by historians. The author-date style, to my mind, is less cumbersome for the reader and allows for a slimmer volume—both are important trends in our current age. I have strived, however, to provide readers with a clear guide to sources and materials used as well as limited footnotes for explanatory comments outside the main text. Any errors that remain in the text are my own.

² As a historian, I do believe we should teach for understanding of human spirituality in all its forms and practices.

INTRODUCTION

The first duty that every generation owes to its children is to make its country and theirs safe and solvent. That is the precondition of all social reform.

—R. A. Butler, “The 1944 Act Seen against the Pattern of the Times,” 1952

Since its inception in England, scholars have provided clear interpretations for the 1944 Education Act’s socio-educational legacy. From a historical point of view, however, the 1944 Act’s Conservative and Christian cultural and intellectual backgrounds have been less clear. This book attempts to fill some of these gaps by analyzing the political, socio-cultural, and intellectual ideas the 1944 Act’s architects, specifically Richard Austen (R. A.) Butler, President of the Board of Education, educationalist Fred Clarke, and sociologist Karl Mannheim, applied in crafting educational literature and legislation during the interwar and World War II periods. This focus on ideology, as well as a periodization that examines the 1944 Act’s intellectual background and its legislation, reveals a philosophy, identified in this book as Christian-civic humanism, which borrowed from English intellectual and cultural history, but crafted a specific response to trends and problems in twentieth-century England.

In his memoirs Butler recalled,

[Prime Minister] Churchill’s [1941] Minute [forbidding initiation of education reform] was quite definite . . . [but] having viewed the milk and honey from the top of Pisgah, I was damned if I was going to die in the land of Moab . . . I decided to disregard what he said and go straight ahead [with education reform] . . . I intended to have an Education Bill, and three years [later] I placed such a Bill on the Statute Book” (1971, 95).

Three interpretations are drawn from this statement. First, Butler profoundly believed he could and *would* create legislation, despite any political barriers. Second and third, Butler had a plan for the 1944 Act before official reform efforts began and that scheme was envisioned as a spiritual crusade. This analysis suggests re-reading intellectual proposals, legislative policy, and supporting literature of the 1944 Act through postsecular lenses is necessary. As the Office for Standards in Education, UK (Ofsted) report “Making Sense of Religion” suggested in 2007,

“debates about the relationship between religion and British identity have given a new impetus and urgency to the subject [of Religious Education in schools].” The postsecular analysis in this study reveals that Butler and his colleagues’ visions for new educational legislation included not only the hot button issues of secondary and further education reforms but synchronized them with plans for a Religious Education that would bolster civic and spiritual development for English culture. The relationships between secondary and further education and Religious Education formed the basis for Butler’s 1944 Act and his visions for British identity.

Although this study focuses on aspects of Butler’s, Clarke’s, and Mannheim’s specific contributions to the intellectual and educational proposals of the 1944 Act, it also reaffirms a web of formal and informal collaborations by Christian intellectuals, educationalists, and Conservative social reformers who contributed to Christian-civic thought for educational reform in the 1930s and 1940s. These groups, with ties to Butler, Clarke and Mannheim, included the Moot, the All-Souls Group, the Conservative Committee on Postwar Problems, and the *Christian New-Letter*. Christian values and a transcendence of class and vocational conflicts through secondary and further education were widely regarded as symbiotic responses to international and domestic trends that threatened English society. Butler’s practical efforts to [re]-build infrastructure, industry, and the English national economy and to re-stimulate Anglo-Christian values were embedded in two sections of the 1944 Act: “Religious Education in County and Voluntary Schools,” (sections 25-30)—the historic mandate of religious instruction—and “Further Education,” (sections 41-47). Special attention will be given to these sections of the 1944 Act in this study.

While there is little contention among scholars that the making of the 1944 Act was an important venture and its legislation a fundamental event in English educational history, its Christian-civic elements were submerged in the historical record after its passage. In part, this was a postwar reaction to its synthesis of patriotism through spirituality, commonweal, and education seen as reactionary, and thus inconsequential, to postwar narratives. It was also a natural result in the shift in principles and power from the wartime coalition government to the 1945 Labour government—although while after 1945 Butler remained a prominent Conservative politician, he no longer served in Education and while his 1944 Act stood, his influence and interpretations did not.

To some extent, the political change-over re-focused the meanings and implementation of the 1944 Act in post-World War II on a secular (and Labour) platform for secondary education for all. While this study does not provide a counterfactual, it does suggest that what Butler’s 1944 Act

proposed was not entirely what politicians and educationalists implemented. Although scores of historians—from renowned historian of education Brian Simon (1991) to renowned intellectual historian Jose Harris (2003)—have contributed to analysis of the 1944 Act, the paradigm shift of postsecular thought continues to encourage historical interpretation of the 1944 Act with an increased focus on its historic mandate of Religious Education. A postsecular approach not only helps unbury the Christian-civic humanism imbued in the 1944 Act but removes Butler's contributions from the dustbin of so-called Tory reactions to one of third-way and middle-opinion progressive legislation. British novelist Zadie Smith's *On Beauty* unwittingly helped me shift my liberal and secular historical lens to this view during my research: "Liberals never believe that conservatives are motivated by moral convictions as profoundly held as those . . . liberals profess . . . to hold. [They] . . . choose to believe that conservatives are motivated by a deep self-hatred, by some form of . . . psychological flaw. But . . . that's the most comforting fairy tale of them all!" (2005, 369).

After 9/11 and 7/7 a wider interest in postsecular historical analysis developed—a clear example is Callum Brown's *Religion and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain* (2006), offered in part as a revision to his *The Death of Christian Britain* (2001). In *Religion and Society* Brown revises his earlier claim for "the death of Christian Britain" rooted in the 1960s, and argues that since 9/11 "religion is back on the agenda" (xv). Although the scope of his work is much broader than a focus on Religious Education, he notes the anticipation of Christian social reformers and clergy such as Archbishop William Temple for gaining a foothold for Religious Education in England through the 1944 religious mandate. Again, Ofsted's 2007 report encouraged closer scrutiny of the history of Religious Education and collective worship arguing, "The notions, common until recently, that religion was quietly declining and Religious Education had little relevance to modern life now look naïve."

Examples of this work exist. Charmian Cannon's 1964 article, "The Influence of Religion on Educational Policy, 1902-1944," analyzes the cultural pressures surrounding Religious Education and its legislation as well as the religious convictions of the architects of the 1944 Act. Marjorie Reeves, ed., *Christian Thinking and Social Order: Conviction Politics from the 1930s to the Present Day* (1999) argues that important Christian intellectual voices of the 1930s must be carefully reconsidered because they were a key part of that historical record, regardless of the marginalization they have since suffered in intellectual, political, and educational history. Harris examines parts of this progressive intellectual

thought—she mentions Butler, specifically—and its links to state welfare reform in the 1940s (1991, 1992, and 2003). Gregory Dochuk argues that Religious Education was linked to ideals for communal and corporate feelings in school and society (2006). Religious Education, Dochuk suggests, thus became a win-win policy for spreading religious culture, rather than a church-state political conspiracy. Matthew Grimley's work examines Christian intellectuals whose work was crucial to a Christian-civic humanist educational philosophy (2003 and 2007).

These are excellent studies to begin to understand why English politicians *mandated* (for the first time ever) Religious Education in 1944. Gaps in the scholarship, however, remain. To cite two examples: Brown's wide-ranging work notes a resurgence of British Christian culture in the 1940s and 1950s but does not offer a deeper discussion of how and why state-mandated Religious Education developed and was put into law. Furthermore, while Brown's claim for the "death of Christian Britain" in the 1960s is vital in English religious historiography, Religious Education and collective worship in schools remained mandatory post-1960—as Ofsted suggests, the time is ripe to continue investigations of how Religious Education influenced (and influences) students and English culture as a whole.

Logical historiographical reasons exist for the noticeable lack of attention to Religious Educational history and culture. Some scholarship focuses on the important dual control or church-state readings of the partnerships between the state and the church to maintain dual control in education (Cruikshank 1963). This work examines disputes and consensus among Christian denominations in terms of the content of Religious Education, yet these institutional and political analyses outnumber cultural analyses, with notable exceptions. In addition, mandatory Religious Education was not regarded as historically significant because it was interpreted as a short-lived reaction in the immediate postwar years and by the 1960s its specific Anglo-Christian characteristics were interpreted as beginning to give way to multiculturalism, interests in religious global politics, and increased secularism.

Interpretations of the 1944 Act have also tended to focus on the key concerns and debates over secondary education for all in English education. This emphasis was crucial in the 1944 Act's historical and historiographical context. Gary McCulloch and Liz Sobell, however, point out that the history of secondary education, like the history of Religious Education, is also incomplete (1994). They specifically suggest more work on the social history of secondary modern schools to explain why they emerged as part of the secondary educational reforms of the 1940s.

McCulloch and Sobell note that by the early 1960s almost 4,000 secondary moderns served over one and a half million children in England and Wales, but “the social and political significance of these schools, no less than their long-term historical importance, has still to be examined in any depth” (1994, 275). Fuller study of secondary modern schools reveals that secondary moderns were envisioned as a viable secondary school choice for the vast majority of students who would not attend university-prep grammar schools or specialized science and technology technical schools. This interpretation fits into my argument as well: Part of Butler's third-way thinking was in development of these types of institutions and that this work, married to the 1944 Act's mandate of Religious Education, was another piece of his third-way Christian-civic philosophy for educational reform. The calls for more research by Ofsted, McCulloch and Sobell, and others make clear the need for continued work on the history of education in England.

Again, this work has begun. In their extremely concise yet powerful analysis of the 1988 Educational Reform Act, with its necessary references to the legislation of the 1944 Act, Josephine M. Cairns and Edwin Cox note wasted chances in education following the legislation of the 1944 Act (1989). Cairns, for example, argues that post-1944, interpretations of the 1944 Act's educational proposals were constricted, in part by legislators who misjudged the realities of day-to-day school life. These limited views also contributed to historical interpretations of the 1944 Act which glossed over its Christian culture and state welfare ethics imbued within its rhetoric. With the benefit of twenty-first century historiographical shifts recharged focus on the making of the 1944 Act by Conservative and Christian thinkers and their collaborators is fruitful. This inquiry necessitates an introduction to Christian-civic humanism.

As a tradition, civic humanism is a difficult concept to pin down. As J. G. A. Pocock argues, early modern English republicans did not work from a republican paradigm, *per se*, but rather from accessible language and ideas (1975). Thus, Pocock's linguistic approach to political concepts is useful to analyze the flexible philosophies that Butler, Clark, and Mannheim promoted, which included not only republican and Christian ideals, but invoked third-way thinking that transcended partisan politics and generational divides. While Pocock applied his arguments of an “Atlantic republican tradition” to the upheaval of the English Revolution, his theoretical framework allows for broader interpretation and application, especially in regard to a broad definition of republicanism in interwar England: “civic humanism.” This builds on a standard definition of civic humanism,

[An] active, participatory, patriotic citizenship as well as the ethos and [the] educational ideal that goes with it . . . [It may include an] upsurge of patriotic [sentiment] as a response to foreign aggression and despotism, informed by the revival of classical [or traditional] models. This movement is also taken as a decisive turning point away from [old-fashioned] ways and towards liberating modernity. . . . Civic humanism is linked in principle to a[n] . . . educational program that goes beyond the formative capacity of participatory citizenship itself and involves the conscious revival of . . . [traditional] ideals. Republican candor, simplicity of manner, opposition to ostentation, luxury and lucre, are common Some theorists also dwell on the millenarian aspirations associated with republican ideals responding to the fragility of the republic and the need to provide against its corruption and decay with the passage of time (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2008).

Pocock's analysis of this tradition suggests civic humanism as a concept was accessible to modern political reformers facing challenging, yet potential politically opportune, events in their national milieu.

The idioms of civic humanism fit Butler's and his colleagues' educational proposals. These were socio-political reactions to the threats against the British commonweal catalyzed by what Pocock might call the *occasione* of the interwar years: the political tyrannies, social and cultural decay, and ostentation brought on by modernist cultures and radical politics between the World Wars. Politicians and educationalists feared these events and reactions threatened the English nation's heart and soul: Anglo-Christian and civic traditions of liberty, justice, and truth.

Although in the twentieth century radical forms of English republicanism were often considered relics, republican language and ideals did not simply die out. They evolved and shifted with the times. By the twentieth century differences between democratic and republican systems were confused and confusing as the terms slipped and slid together in many political traditions: these concepts were not rigid agendas but fluid ideals. The British commonweal was based on classical ideals of Roman republicanism that balanced individual rights and civic responsibilities. The British Commonwealth, seen as a direct descendant of the Roman Empire, tried to balance its imperial rule with civic responsibility (Pocock 1975). The differences between republican and democratic ideals were sometimes just subtle emphases on the ultimate form of sovereignty: the rules of civic society or the equality of the citizens.

A use of civic humanist language or philosophy did not mean that Butler and his colleagues were attempting to create or re-create a viable political republic. It simply suggests that they were in tune with aspects of broadly-conceived republican ideals. Theirs was a wartime social reform

project that sought to strengthen the existing political order through civic-mindedness rather than a political crusade to radically change the British government. Butler was not interested, for example, in overthrowing the monarchy, or dissolving parliamentary democracy for a direct democracy, but he was interested in strengthening and revitalizing the British political system through a synthesis of ideals taken from both democratic and republican traditions.

Butler, Clarke, and Mannheim's republican ideals were often couched in the language of democracy and socio-political enfranchisement. At the same time, Christian values and progressive ideas related to increasing civic and political participation within a democratic tradition were seen as integral to that socio-political tradition. Mannheim explained this choice succinctly: "As the emergence of Capitalism and the corresponding social revolutions occurred at a very early stage in England, when religion was still alive and permeated society as a whole, both the conservative and the progressive forces developed their philosophies within the set framework of religion" (1943, 110). Butler and Clarke were intimately familiar with republican, Christian, and commonweal ideals, traditions, programs, and language rooted in ancient Greco-Roman and Christian traditions as well as the radical republican tradition in English history. Both men alluded to them in their work with references to Plato, Milton, and other classical republican and Christian thinkers. Mannheim specialized in political sociology and democratic social planning and represented sociological expertise on these issues and proposals. An educational element was critical to this notion of Christian-civic humanism because Butler, Clarke, and Mannheim all believed that citizens must possess knowledge in order to function as responsible citizens.

At the same time their philosophy suggested an understanding that a republic can also refer to a system of restricted democracy. These restrictions included traditional forms of authority and cultural cohesion which for Butler and his colleagues included Christianity as a key form of moral and civilizing authority. In the English language these republican ideals were coded in the phrases commonweal, commonwealth or the British Commonwealth. Because, however, republic is often confusing given the events of the English Revolution, and commonwealth is complicated with the politics of the British Empire, the phrases Christian-civic humanism and commonweal, meaning "the public good," are used in this study to portray this ideology in opposition to the often misunderstood and slippery terms republicanism or commonwealth. The Christian-civic educational philosophy developed in the interwar era continued to be discussed and developed as the specters of Fascism and Communism

threatened England physically and culturally in World War II. English politicians prepared themselves and the nation for an uncertain place in a new world order.

Domestic, as well as international issues, made Butler and his colleagues extremely anxious about the state of England. Trends of demographic decline suggested that British politicians must anticipate smaller future populations, making efficient planning of man [and woman] power a necessary and practical reality (Thane 1990). Thus anxieties about issues such as demographic decline in terms of Britain's economic and political role fundamentally shaped the 1944 Act. These trends and anxieties forced intellectuals and politicians to explore consensus-building and progressive reform that would not create further domestic havoc in the tumultuous years surrounding World War II. These trends suggested plans for state welfare using third-way politics.

A primary focus of Butler's plans for educational reform was the restoration of English socio-cultural and economic power through compromises among tradition, reform, and political reality. Mannheim described this kind of socio-political planning as "Planning for Freedom" a Third Way between a *laissez-faire* society and total regimentation" (Mannheim 1951, xvii). Butler's movement reflects assessments of values of English third-way politics: "A belief in the value of community;" work as a "source of dignity and worth;" adherence to a "strong moral vein;" and the necessity of both individuals and public bodies to practice responsibility and accountability (Dickson 1999). Butler, Clarke, and Mannheim envisioned a "militant democracy" that insisted on a synthesis of traditional *laissez-faire* and modernist statist social and political policies. In addition, their brand of third-way ideology, Christian-civic humanism, encompassed a compromise between the growing divide between traditional and modernist cultural trends. This divide remained under the surface even during an era of consensus politics surrounding the Second World War. Mannheim argued, "The new militant democracy will . . . develop a new attitude to values. It will differ from the relativist *laissez-faire* of the previous age, as it will have the courage to agree on some basic values" (1943, 10). For Butler, Clarke, and Mannheim these basic values for England would be defined by the tenets of Christianity as a foundation of English culture. The "militant democracy" would mandate moral and spiritual education, encourage "planning for democracy," but hold an important distinction from statism: a "distinction between planning for uniformity and planning for freedom and variety" (Mannheim 1943, 10).

Community spirit would be developed through “political education” that encouraged active citizenship and social values that embraced all kinds of citizens (Butler 1939). Secondary and further education would be used to establish these social values and foster individuality by allowing student’s aptitudes, interests, and abilities to guide them into intellectual, professional, industrial, agricultural, and service-industry fields necessary for the nation’s commonweal. All forms of work that served the nation were valuable. As Dochuk reveals, Religious Education was meant to promote a strong moral vein, and communal worship would also help promote community solidarity (2006). Taken together, these elements would help promote state welfare.

The intellectual and structural components integral to the welfare of the state are apparent in the actual construction of the 1944 Act, including its moral and spiritual concerns, inclusive but varied educational tracks with a focus on youth services and further education, and its emphases on education as a lifelong, not just school-based, process. These elements formed the basis of the Christian-civic humanist educational philosophy. The relationship between Christian-civic humanism and ideas of commonweal, however, require an analysis of the differences between the Welfare State and a more broadly-conceived intellectual and political movement for state welfare.

An interesting question arises about what the Welfare State means as a concept versus other concepts of state welfare. Asa Briggs argues, “The phrase ‘welfare state’ is of recent origin. It was first used to describe Labour Britain after 1945” (1961, 2). Harris, however, suggests the intellectual and political thought that led to Brigg’s interpretation of the Labour Welfare State—including the 1944 Act as a Welfare State policy—had a much longer reach in what she calls “social welfare history” and focuses in part on what she calls “the Welfare State policies of the 1940s” (1992, 233 and 1991, 135). The history of the Welfare State Harris examines suggests scrutiny of different readings of welfare state in addition to the interpretation provided by Briggs. Kathleen Woodroffe, for example, argues,

The label ‘Welfare State’ is of recent origin. It was first used by Sir Alfred Zimmern during the 1930’s [*sic*] to epitomize the contrast between warfare and welfare—the “guns or butter” of the Nazis—and later, by the Archbishop of Canterbury [William Temple] who, in 1941, published his *Citizen and Churchman* in which he developed the notion of a “welfare state” of the democracies as opposed to the “power state” of the dictators. The notion held, he argued, only if the state in the democracies fulfilled its moral and spiritual functions in promoting human welfare. The term was

soon given a new connotation by the Beveridge Report in 1942 and the legislation of the Labour government which followed it, when the whole concept of welfare was widened from the pre-war concept of a set of social services for the care of people unable to care for themselves . . . (1968, 303-4).

Butler's ideas for education reform fit within the latter analyses of state welfare much more closely than an idea of a Labour Welfare State cradle to grave social system. Not coincidentally, both Zimmern and Temple were intimately connected with intellectual, political, and educationalist movements shaping Butler's 1944 Act.

In relation to the making of the 1944 Act, Butler, Clarke, and Mannheim developed proposals for state welfare issues, such as education during the interwar years, long before the passage of historic Labour Welfare State legislation. Another key, then, to understanding the 1944 Act's intellectual history is examining it as piece of interwar state welfare politics through third-way Christian-civic policies. After 1945, politicians, educationalists, and historians interpreted the 1944 Act differently as socio-political aims changed from promoting state welfare to promoting the Labour Welfare State. Whatever differences, however, exist between concepts of state welfare and the Welfare State, Butler did attempt to create compromises between the two in his plans for state-sanctioned Religious Education and "secondary education for all" in the 1944 Act. Nonetheless, his main goal was a state welfare educational policy within the rubric of Zimmern and Temple's understanding of state welfare as a democratic state fulfilling "its moral and spiritual functions in promoting human welfare," (Woodroffe 1968, 304) and practical theories of a guns *and* butter social welfare. Butler and his colleagues meant to serve the nation in "the battle of Education" and the "battle of the Young" (Butler 1942). For Butler, this was "a venture as important as [World War II] itself" (1942, 6). Thus, between 1941 and 1944, Butler's pledge: "having viewed the milk and honey from the top of Pisgah . . . I decided to disregard [Churchill's order and] go straight ahead [with education reform]." The result: the crystallization of Christian-civic educational thought codified in the 1944 Act.

Chapter 1 gives a general overview of the history of education in England through the early years of World War II. The chapter examines the historical context of English education in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to explain why and how secular and religious educational reforms were seen as necessary for social progress. Chapter 2 more deeply explores historiography surrounding the 1944 Act as mentioned in this introduction and includes reminders of noted scholars

and works. Chapter 3 focuses on the history of educational philosophy in the interwar years, with special attention devoted to Butler, Clarke, and Mannheim as key members of an intellectual coalition that developed and synthesized the main tenets of the Christian-civic educational philosophy. Chapters 4 and 5 move into World War II when Butler became President of the Board of Education and transformed the intellectual ferment of interwar educational philosophies into underlying tenets of his 1944 Act. These chapters also explore political discussions surrounding the passage of the 1944 Act. Chapters 6 and 7 take a closer look at the two main pillars of Christian-civic humanism—Religious Education and secondary/further education—as embodied in educational discussions and the language of the 1944 Act. These chapters also examine their respective topics in terms of legislation and its interpretation, educational literature, and post-1944 legacies. This includes suggestions as to why historians, politicians, and the public often misinterpreted Butler and his colleagues' work in the postwar years.

CHAPTER ONE

A BACKDROP TO THE 1944 ACT

For in the night outside I see
Great storms preparing, from whose grips
I think shall come triumphantly
Only the noblest ships
—Quoted by R. A. Butler from Lord Dunsany, “Looking Seaward,” 1935,
in conclusion to “The future of political education: an address,” 1939

Two cornerstones of traditional English education are Religious Education and educational liberty. Although formal education was originally available to only select groups of students, typically from the upper classes, these tenets set important precedents for English pedagogy and curriculum. In the nineteenth century, the middle-classes argued for a popular expansion of education so that all citizens could be educated to better understand and engage in the responsibilities of civic and cultural life. Another interpretation of this era, however, argues that middle-class citizens believed that education was necessary for controlling and shaping the working classes. A fascinating theory, “the ideological roots of intelligence testing,” argues that English educationalists equated abstract thinking and learning as crucial markers of the intellectual path to God and true spiritual illumination (White 2006). Both interpretations reveal the kind of Victorian values that shaped the expansion of formal English education in the nineteenth century.

Twentieth-century debates among educationalists also revolved around these issues. Some third-way thinkers looked for a synthesis between religious culture and secular politics as answers. In order to understand how and why these issues occupied their minds, the history of Religious Education, educational liberty, and their evolution into concepts of a specifically English definition of “secondary education for all” provide a historical backdrop. Because English national identity has been tied to a unique and public English-Protestant culture regardless of individual citizen’s private beliefs and practices, Englishness remained tied to Christian ethics.

Indeed, historical and postsecular theories argue that contemporary society remains tied to traditional Protestant ethics. Religion was embedded in the fabric of English society through its traditional role in the service of education. Because the churches and educational services were traditional partners, Religious Education in English schools remained less controversial than in other countries. Religious Education disputes over denominational teaching in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did, however, exist. These disputes were largely between and among Protestant sects over how to teach Christianity rather than between oppositional belief systems or demands for wholly secular state educational systems.

In England, shifts toward more representative governments had not created a secular state per se but rather a secular government with leaders who were still tied to the Church of England. The churches were responsible in large part for the formation of formal schooling in England—an education with obvious religious themes and curriculum. The state had made its first formal overture toward a national system of education in 1833 following the First Reform Act. The government offered a subsidy of 20,000 pounds toward building schools associated with the Nonconformist British and Foreign School Society and the Anglican National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor. This subsidy tied the churches and the state together in a co-dependent relationship for providing education. Once established, this formal relationship bound the English government and the English churches into the dual system—church and state—of education that continues to this day.

By 1870 England passed the first of a series of Education Acts that strove to meet the nation's needs as a center of rising middle-class and professional power. The 1870 Education Act was done “[in] the typical English expedient of compromise by retaining the old system and grafting on it a new” (Cruickshank 1963, 37). The government planned to maintain efficiency and economy by allowing existing Anglican and Nonconformist schools to remain in place. The creation of the dual system in English education allowed the government simply to “fill up the gaps” left by religious bodies (Cruickshank 1963, 17). An expanded educational system served the needs of newly enfranchised middle-class populations and the state to keep British industry competitive in the second wave of industrialization. The government arranged to incorporate church schools into a national system by exchanging minimal government supervision (and responsibility) in return for state financial aid to help maintain infrastructure.

To settle religious difficulties which still divided Anglicans and Nonconformists, the state allowed schools that were voluntary, or run by a particular sect, to continue denominational education. Nevertheless, the 1870 Act's Cowper-Temple clause mandated that state-run schools be non-denominational. This did not mean state schools did not incorporate Religious Education. Rather, Cowper-Temple mandated no denominationally distinctive catechism or forms would be allowed in the curriculum or services. This was generally interpreted to refer to religious denominations within Christianity, although in some cases it extended to Judaism. Cowper-Temple was primarily designed, however, to dispel quarrels among English Protestant sects and assumed Religious Education had a place in the national educational system.

This legislation virtually ensured that Religious Education in some form would continue to be a part of English educational curriculums. Its removal would require major national reform that would offend powerful religious organizations. The Cowper-Temple clause also more or less guaranteed the permanence of the dual system because Anglicans, Nonconformists, and other religious or special-interest groups in England could only give specialized denominational instruction outside the confines of the state schools. Cowper-Temple, thus, led to disputes over what constituted non-denominational morals and ethics in England and a proliferation of voluntary schools and extra-curricular denominational Religious Education.

By 1900 the state organized a national Board of Education to provide a central educational authority. The Board's first major task was to put the 1902 Education Act into effect. The 1902 Act maintained both the dual system and the Cowper-Temple clause. Proposals were made to formally mandate Religious Education, but were dropped because the issue proved too controversial. There were thus few changes in provisions for Religious Education but the government integrated church schools more deeply into the national system by offering them financial assistance through rates. The state, however, took responsibility for the maintenance and salaries of teaching staff and for all secular education within state and voluntary schools. This move was in response to the failing efforts of voluntary schools to maintain educational infrastructure and to reform outdated curriculums.

In addition to the developments surrounding Religious Education in the 1902 Act, the state took also took a significant step in educational administration by disbanding school boards in favor of local educational authorities (LEAs). The local educational authorities had power over local elementary education and secular aspects of state-aided voluntary schools

including some secondary and technical education. Educational liberty at the local level allowed each region to decide what kind of services to provide based on local populations and local concerns. Because local educational authorities had political and economic significance their liberty quickly became a factor in local political rights. Local authority remained an important tradition even as domestic and international trends for nationalized education began to evolve.

Political and educational officials realized, however, that the 1902 Act had not done enough to reform the system given educational and technological advances abroad. Educationalists argued for extending students' education by increasing the minimum age at which children could leave school. This transition was tied to proposals for the development of a broader secondary system to serve a more diverse student body, including more working-class children. Industrial and technological advances abroad, as well as the dispiriting Boer Wars, fueled fears that England was losing its industrial and military prowess. Voluntary schools continued to suffer from economic difficulties, which put the improvement of their curriculum into question and also suggested the necessity for increased state aid and control in the voluntary school sector.

The government believed educational reform, especially in terms of efficiency and economy within educational administration, was a key solution to these problems. Post-1902, the government maintained that national education was to remain "in the hands of experts instead of amateurs" (Cruikshank 1963, 86). Professional society, rather than the clergy, would handle England's educational future. The middle-classes had trained themselves for administrative duties during the nineteenth century: now they aimed to use these skills to educate the nation. The trick would be balancing central management with the local educational authorities. World War I, however, put educational evolution and reform on the back burner.

During the interwar years, however, it was clear to most politicians and intellectuals that domestic and international difficulties had not been settled by the World War I and that ideological as well as military conflicts would be reengaged. These issues developed into overarching debates about how to move forward: appeasement versus military engagement; a return to normalcy versus radical social and political reorganization; industrial capitalism versus nationalized socialism. Conservative-minded proposals perceived nihilism in some modernist and revolutionary politics and culture, but were not against a reform-minded and progressive society. By reviving traditional values such as patriotism,

spirituality, and citizenship, proponents of middle opinion hoped to channel positive moral and spiritual energies into finding a path for England in the modern, industrialized world.

Within English education, interwar debates became focused on proposals for expanding secondary education. Although the government and leading politicians generally represented neo-liberal, moderate politics, a return to normalcy was difficult to achieve and progress appeared to be at a standstill. As attitudes hardened, the Left, especially socialist-leaning Labour circles, defined themselves as secular, modern, and radically progressive against a traditionalist, if not reactionary, brand of politics. Labour leader R. H. Tawney had introduced the key debate as early as 1922 when he coined the phrase “secondary education for all” as a proposal to provide primary and secondary education for all students regardless of class. This was a radical suggestion at the time because normally only upper and upper-middle class students, along with a few exceptional scholarship students from other classes, were given both. Although secondary education for all characterized a broad-spectrum of educational politics and proposals, its details split politicians and educationalists into broadly defined camps of egalitarians and those who favored plans to level the statuses of different types of education while maintaining diversity linked to *laissez-faire* ideals.

While politicians and educators generally agreed on the principle of secondary education for all their views differed in details and individual school programs. As Gary McCulloch (1994) has shown, the differences between the types of secondary education proposed were often finely shaded. A common goal of each was educational tracks that were diversified yet equivalent in status. The meaning of equality, however, was confused and contested within partisan debates. McCulloch has noted that one definition of equality was associated with the phrase “parity of esteem” as a desirable quality in education (1994). “Parity of esteem” could be interpreted as simply equal funding, services, and infrastructure for all secondary education. The national government had to decide if equality or parity of esteem were necessary or financially feasible.

In addition, interwar England was not yet fully committed to a national educational system funded solely by the state. Education was still reliant on private organizations and fees. The dual system of education by church and state remained an essential aspect of the system. Although the state increasingly gained authority over church-sponsored schools that required state funding, the national government was not economically prepared to provide church-affiliated and private schools with funding based on “parity of esteem” ideals. Maintaining the dual system allowed increased

state control without nationalizing state spending on education. Thus, practical economics as well as tradition helped maintain a church-state relationship in education and figured into proposals for universal education.

Interwar politicians were also aware that increasing the school-leaving age or requiring universal secondary education for all meant financial hardship for the families of working-class students. Universal secondary education would also affect the labor supply as youth left work for school. C. P. Trevelyan, President of the Board of Education under Labour, proposed legislation between 1929 and 1931 for maintenance allowances to allow working-class children to leave work to attend secondary education without restricting their families' income. Although educationalists believed increasing the school-leaving age was a necessary step in English education, in the interwar years it was not a pragmatic economic—hence political—move. The Labour government failed to pass any of the three bills Trevelyan proposed. Trevelyan subsequently resigned from office stating his disgust with the Labour government's concern over the economy rather than social welfare.

This was an early and bitter fight in what would become a drawn-out battle between educational liberals and conservatives. Historical hindsight, however, suggests that the Labour party's educational plans and proposals for liberal secondary education for all were not rooted in egalitarian educational goals. Rather, Labour's education goals were tied to solving labor disputes and helping further develop liberally educated professional classes. Interwar educational reform and legislation were difficult to achieve because they were deeply complex social and economic issues. There were no simple answers. Contemporary debates over secondary education for all—as well as historically bitter debates over Religious Education—cast deep shadows over reform efforts. Although reformers continued to work toward consensus, their efforts were ultimately derailed by the social anxieties of the late interwar years.

England's interwar social anxieties over issues such as demographic decline were sometimes measurable, sometimes relative, and sometimes imagined. The mid-1930s saw a peak in forecasts giving dire predictions for an ageing British population. Social scientists such as Enid Charles published gloomy reports of demographic decline and concepts such as preventing social waste emerged in order to support commonweal. In this vein, education was seen as a tool to alleviate social waste by British politicians who took predictions of demographic decline seriously and planned accordingly for increasing economic and labor efficiency. The need to maintain and produce citizens who could work within the various