

Islam-Oriented
Parties' Ideologies
and Political
Communication
in the Quest for Power
in Morocco

Islam-Oriented Parties' Ideologies and Political Communication in the Quest for Power in Morocco:

The PJD as a Case Study

By

Driss Bouyahya

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A couple of people are worth thanking—my father and my mother. In fact, this book is in memory to my father who taught me perseverance and dignity while my mother reared in me discipline and excellence. Special thanks go to my wife for her insightful discussions and my son, Ayman, for his typing. I dedicate this work to my sisters, brothers and their families.

I also dedicate the fruits of this study to those whose strong guidance and continuous support pushed me to realize my goals.

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When I embarked on this dissertation project, I had an agenda that was both personal and intellectual. Personally, I have always been disturbed by Islam-oriented movements because I have dearly longed to dismantle their mysteries. So, working with the dissertation has been like writing a paper on a lifelong passion. Intellectually, I wanted to address and uncover an issue scarcely dealt with in depth within national academia.

I would like to thank Professor Abdellah Malki for his precious support because he was always available, attentive and helpful. His advice has made it possible to finish this work at a record pace. I am so thankful to Professor Graham Harvey for his generosity and help. I am also truly grateful to Professor Mbarek Nazzi for his constant support and care during my health breakdowns. Finally, special thanks go to Professor Oumama El Kettani and Youssef Belal for their insightful guidance and generosity. Thanks also go to Professor Zemmouri for his help in statistics and word processing.

PREFACE

Religions and politics have changed considerably under the diverse and shifting conditions of modernity. Violence, prejudice and confusion—or perhaps wilful misunderstanding—have marked their relations. So too, however, have dialogue, exchange and at least some forms of perceived benefit. The last few decades have seen an increase in the interest paid by scholars, politicians, journalists and myriad others to questions of the relations between Islam and nation states. Questions may circulate around matters of everyday life, like what it means to be a Muslim citizen of a state ruled by other Muslims. At stake too is the issue of whether or not those states are governed by Islamic law. Then there is a wider issue of the relation between “Islamic states” (whatever that term might mean) and other nations. In this era of globalised trade and information, it seems that no-one can escape entanglement with transnational flows, often conflicting with local norms or taken-for-granted expectations. In this world, words like “Islamist” have become common currency but, to a degree more extreme than we expect of other, more regulated currencies, their translatability into locally comprehensible and precisely valued terms is less than certain. Driss Bouyahya offers us a particular insight and a powerful intervention into this arena.

In the following work, Dr Bouyahya explores the evolution of an exemplary Moroccan Islam-oriented political party within a broader political context, and considers the integral processes of professionalization and communication. Considerable complexity is involved. Morocco’s monarchy and seeming stability suggest to many observers that the nation would be immune from some of the wider changes—not to say conflicts—that are commonly associated with “Islamism.” But Salafist and other activists know no borders. Well, no, that’s not the case. More accurately, many Islam-orientated groups and individuals seek a broadening of the boundaries for the movement of their ideas and ways of life. Others seek to work within local, national or regional boundaries to increase the orientation of neighbours, compatriots or strangers towards their version of Islam and/or politics. Thus we face questions about the nature and performance of Islamic community, rule, policy and more.

I will not delay your engagement with Dr Bouyahya’s work much longer. I have limited expertise about Moroccan politics or Islam—

although having read this book I am now far better informed than previously. I do, however, have some thoughts about the words “religion” and “state” which remain at the centre of the stage that this book presents to us. Whether it is the case that the Qur’an knows no such concept as “Islamic state” or “religion” or “state” (options considered here and by other scholars), an understanding of the contemporary world is impossible unless we clarify what we and others might mean by both “religion” and “state.” Allow me to say why that is with the intention that this will reinforce the necessity of understanding the kinds of groups and processes involved in the activities and ideologies discussed in this book.

Put bluntly, religion and politics were created together in the early modern ferment of the creation of European nation states. With somewhat more nuance, although we are correct when we label earlier and global phenomena as “religion” and “politics,” the particular things that we typically assume these words to mean are peculiar products of European upheavals. Put yet another way, standard international dictionary definitions of “religion” and “politics” derive from what was once a regional circumstance but has been globalised because “Europe” aggressively colonized the world, infecting everywhere with what it deemed not only right and proper (i.e. rational) but also imaginable and desirable. Much of this is masked by processes which have made the effect of dramatic changes seem normal and even banal, and importantly as an integral mechanism of modernity’s project. The use of the supposedly transparent term “Wars of Religion” illustrates this and takes us to the heart of the matter. (It will not escape readers that we might be living through another era that someone somewhere will associate with “Wars of Religion.”) As William Cavanaugh (1995),¹ Richard King (2007)² and others have argued, these were in reality “wars of state making.” They were violent conflicts that established nation states, replacing previous ways of constituting the world. In particular, local and transnational identities, loyalties and relations had to be curtailed and were suppressed. This is why the “wars of state making” look like “wars of religion”—because Catholic and Protestant communities had not previously been constrained by national, linguistic, ethnic or other boundaries. For the rulers, ideologues and bureaucrats of nation states that was a nightmare.

¹ William T. Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House: ‘The Wars of Religion’ and the Rise of the State,” *Modern Theology* 11 (4) (1995): 397–420.

² Richard King, “The Association of ‘Religion’ with Violence: Reflections on a Modern Trope,” in *Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice*, edited by John R. Hinnells & Richard King, 226–57 (London: Routledge, 2007).

How could taxes be collected and laws enforced? How would it be if someone claimed a “higher” authority or asserted loyalty to a different authority? For nation states to work, “religious” and other assemblages had to be limited.

The establishment of nation states required the reconstitution of people into “citizens.” This entailed the individualization of matters that had previously been communal, and the interiorisation of matters that had previously been corporeal, embodied and performed. Religion had to be limited to the realm of private beliefs (or acts of believing) that have only limited contact or concern with the everyday, secular or political domains, commitments and activities. Citizens could have “rights” to believe anything that they fancied, just so long as they did not insist on acting on beliefs that conflicted with their duties and responsibilities, as citizens, to the rule of national (and later international) law. Public duties were not to be determined by these privatized and personalized ideas. As John Bowker memorably indicated, we have inherited religions as “licensed insanities” (Bowker 1987),³ weird and otherworldly thoughts that precisely do not overlap with public order. This was modernity in the making. It allowed for the export of the idea of “nation states” (with its separation of politics from religion, public from private) by the elevation and exaggeration of individualism. Europe’s colonial expansion and then the globalization of “the market” (benefitting the elites of those nations) were given a boost.

I offer one last suite of thoughts on these early modern European conflicts before saying something more about the rest of this book. It is not incidental that nation states were constructed and seeded worldwide in acts of violence. There is now assumed to be an affinity between modernity’s politics and the taken-for-granted privacy (i.e. public irrelevancy) of “religion,” because the violence of the defining of politics and religion in this way forced such notions deep into the culture of modernism. Concomitantly, the violence committed in the constraining of religion within the privacy of individual imagination (aka “believing”) both established and masked the bold assertion that only nation states (represented by military, judicial and other licensed officials) could legitimately commit violence. Many of our contemporary conflicts follow from efforts to enact and/or extend this claim—sometimes against opponents who value other reasons for varied kinds of violence. This is, at the least, the background to the questions that Dr Bouyahya addresses. However, armed violence is not the only thing in view. The twentieth

³ John Bowker, *Licensed Insanities. Religions and Belief in God in the Contemporary World* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1987).

century expansion of the modernizing project has been tagged as “secularization,” putatively the final stages of purifying rationalist political and public processes from the baleful effects of those “licensed insanities.” The weight of evidence that secularization has not, in fact, been a smooth process has led many scholars to contest it or, at least, to think more carefully about the realities of life. Among them, though *perhaps* at a tangent signalled by his identification as a sociologist of science rather than politics, Bruno Latour has asserted that “we have never been modern” (1993).⁴ In many places around the globe, people have refused to purify politics from religion. They have refused to join liberalizing processes to make religion into a cozy “spirituality” of cosmic harmony and individual well-being. Many have insisted that religion is an everyday matter that infuses all of life. It is not necessarily about “finding meaning” (which might just capitulate to that licensing of eccentricity). Rather it is, among other things, about building, protecting, contesting and re-arranging community. It is about being “us” and “not them.” This need not happen in manifestos, sermons and diatribes. Religion can be observed in the meals people eat with others—and the trading in consumable produce that enables such meals—and, importantly, in the avoidance of meals and the marketing of other edible but rejected substances.

My own exploration of alternative ways of recognizing, studying and theorizing religion emphasizes such “everyday” and “elsewhere” takes on topics of growing importance to colleagues in the study of religions and other disciplines (see Harvey 2013).⁵ The book you are now reading makes an important contribution to understanding religion in the real world. It traces what some religiously motivated people do when they seek to fuse Islam with the practice of politics. Dr Bouyahya demonstrates that religion is far from separated from the global processes that shape the modern world. This Islam-oriented politics is another form of modernity to lay alongside proliferating alternative modernities. It is certainly not a retreat into medievalism or other forms of pre-modernism. It rightly resists the identification as a “fundamentalism” in the sense given by association with a particular kind of American evangelical Christian Biblicism. It might, however, match Robert Orsi’s (2012)⁶ idea that there is a “modern

⁴ Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).

⁵ Graham Harvey, *Food, Sex and Strangers: Understanding Religion as Everyday Life* (London: Routledge, 2013).

⁶ Robert A. Orsi, “Everyday Miracles: The Study of Lived Religion,” in *Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice*, edited by David D. Hall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 3–21.

fundamentalism” that insists that religion *is* political and religionists should be political. Nonetheless, it is also fused with the kind of non-liberal religion that refuses to submit to privatization and the modernist path to religion’s irrelevance. As Dr Bouyahya traces the evolution of one Islam-oriented party, utilizing professional and communication systems suited to modern nation states in transition through a complex multinational, globalised world, we also see how religiously motivated politics attracts those for whom religion is an everyday matter. As Orsi says:

The modern world was not supposed to look the way it does ... This sort of [everyday] religion ... was fated to be outgrown by the world’s cultures, beginning with the West (specifically northern Europe) and then spreading across the globe, to be succeeded by a modern liberal faith sanctioned by (and providing sanction for) law, political theory, epistemology and science.

(Orsi 2012, 146)

The world is, in fact, a more interesting place because of such acts of resistance—some subtle and some “extreme.” This, among other facts, leads me to think that this book has much to offer to the study of religion and politics internationally.

Graham Harvey

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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party in Turkey
CDPM	The Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement
CGEM	General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises
CT	Communication technology
DSPM	The Democratic Social Popular Movement
ICT	Information Communication Technology
JC	Justice and Charity
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MJC	Movement of Justice and Charity [Al Adl wa al Ihsan]
MP	Member of Parliament
MR	Movement of Renewal and Reform
MU	Movement of Unity and Reform
NPM	The National Popular Movement
NR	National Renewal Party
NRP	National Renewal Party
PJD	Party of Justice and Development
PM	The Popular Movement
PR	Public Relations
SPD	German Social Democrats
USFP	Socialist Union of Popular Forces
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, the role of Islam-oriented movements and parties in the internal political life and foreign relations in the Middle Eastern and Northern African countries has attracted increasing attention from policy makers, scholars and experts. In addition, the recent electoral successes of Islam-oriented movements or parties in the Arab world have stimulated a broad political and academic debate.

Islam-oriented movements developed out of a long and complex political, philosophical and cultural tradition, advocating a return to the time spirit of Islam (Burgat 2003). Some of the movements have deep historical roots dating to the beginning of the twentieth century. Besides, they have a basis in a reaction to colonial cultural, social and political influences (Darif 1998; Tozy 1999). Islamism or political Islam has attained renewed support in the past decades as a reaction to the political crisis in the region. Likewise, Islamism has come to substitute nationalism and socialism as a mass ideology of the twenty-first century.

“Islamist” or Islam-oriented movements and parties¹ have demonstrated the ability to develop effective political communications, elaborate platforms for action with popular appeal and set up efficient organizational structures geared to both political and social work. Besides, they have showed a savviness by inserting ICT in their political communication (Ibahrine 2007).

Since elections have become episodes of a “political market” for negotiation within clientelist networks and for the distribution of influential positions within regimes, Islam-oriented movements and parties have emerged as the dominant opposition actors in many countries of the MENA region. These Islam-oriented movements and/or parties are complex and multifaceted political actors that are continually evolving and interacting with their domestic social and political environments. Hence, the analysis of the political context (Darif 1998; Tozy 1999) is essential to understand any participatory Islam-oriented party’s ideology and political communication.

¹ This study borrows this term from Ibahrine (2007) to refer to a group of Muslims in a movement or party with an Islamic frame of reference instead of Islamist, because the latter term has a Western biased load.

These political parties are the offspring of Islam-oriented movements that developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Darif 1998; El Ahmadi 2006; Fuller 2003; Hamzawy 2008; Okasha 2007; Tozy 1999). Besides, they based their political activism and goals on Islamic vocabulary and ideas. This shift and/or transformation of some Islam-oriented movements into parties have thrust several questions to the fore. Should Islam-oriented parties' ideologies undergo changes to fit into the functioning of the political regime? Should they adopt new professional strategies to reshape their political communication as well as their political marketing and advertising? In response to the ICTs, could they keep abreast with innovations, such as the internet, and use professionalization in their political communication?

In this regard, the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development (PJD) represents an interesting case. Contesting legislative elections in 1997, the PJD has gradually gained members in the Moroccan parliament and government, winning 9 out of 325 seats in 1997, 42 in 2002, 46 in 2007 and 104 in 2011. It has become entrenched in the Moroccan political process. However, it is struggling to redefine a sustainable and practical balance between the pragmatic demands of participation and those dictated by its Islamic frame of reference (Othmani 2011). Given the restricted political environment in Morocco and various conditions imposed by the regime, the PJD has adopted moderate positions on various societal and political matters (Belal 2012).

This book's rationale is threefold. First, it explores and/or investigates the PJD's ideological orientations since its second birth under the name "PJD," and the factors that shape the party's political ideologies. Second, it seeks to explore the PJD's political communication process (the use of professionalization). Third, it aims at uncovering the PJD's use of communication technology, notably the internet, in its political advertising/communication. It is, therefore, motivated by several reasons. In other words, the selection of the PJD as a national case study is justified on the basis of, first, the presence of a mass Islam-oriented movement (the MUR) with an important role in national politics, and second, the party represents a good regional sample of participatory Islam-oriented parties for measuring the impact of different internal politics and the political contexts of their evolution, their ideological orientations and their political communication in the quest for power.

For this purpose, the following research questions were developed to guide the work. First, what ideological orientations have the PJD endorsed since its birth? Second, how have the political contexts had an impact on the party's change in ideology? Third, how has the PJD maneuvered its

political advertising and marketing? Fourth, how has the PJD handled professionalization in its political communication? Fifth, how has the PJD used the internet in its political communication?

This study purports to explore the PJD's ideological orientations, political communication and use of ICT for the following reasons. First, the Moroccan Islam-oriented parties have been less researched than those of the east (Mashreq), and little is known on their drifting and constantly changing ideologies and political communication. For instance, the PJD (this study case) has undergone several ideological changes since its pre-MUR (1970s) days up to 2012. Second, the selection of the PJD as a national case is grounded on the basis of its presence with a crucial role in the national politics.

Third, several scholarly works have dealt with Islam-oriented movements in Morocco (Belal 2012; Burgat 1996; Darif 1992; 1995; Entellis 1997; Munson 1986; Shahin 1997; Tessler 1997; Tozy 1999; Wegner 2011; Willis 2003; Zeghal 2006), yet no systematic study has examined Islam-oriented movements' and/or parties' communication tools and strategies as well as their ideological orientations that helped to bring about their physical growth and organizational formation in Morocco.

Besides, it is evident in the existing literature that much existing research fails to systematically investigate the plurality of techniques used in Islam-oriented parties' political communication and advertising. It is, therefore, this failing that has served as the impetus for the development of a more comprehensive, but by no means exhaustive, framework for this study. Ultimately, this study hopes to fill what remains a large gap in the existing literature. To study the PJD's ideology, one has to distinguish between four phases: (1) pre-1983, (2) post-1983, (3) post-1999 and (4) post-2003. This study deals only with the two last phases because of the availability of the corpus to be studied (electoral programs and congress theses), and because the two phases are under the name "PJD."

This study uses the mixed methods design to collect and analyze data. The aim of using the mixed methods design is to integrate the quantitative and qualitative findings for each research question (McMillian 2004). Two instruments are used in this study to meet the research requirements: content analysis and semi-structured interviews. On the one hand, the content analysis of the PJD's electoral programs, congress theses, official manifesto and electoral mottos/platforms to fathom its ideological orientations, and its websites (2002–2012) to describe its political communication strategies, aims at gathering quantitative data to test the hypotheses of the study. On the other hand, the semi-structured interviews

have the purpose of collecting data that may be overlooked in the content analysis to test the reliability of the quantitative data.

“Purposeful sampling” is used in this study as a sampling strategy for two main reasons. First, there is a difficulty in accessing the PJD’s discursive produce, notably since its first birth (the pre-MUR phase). In addition, not all the PJD elites took part in the semi-structured interviews. Second, this strategy allows the present study to choose participants who belong to the party or the MUR (the da’wa wing) leaderships and have access to the party’s discursive produce and political communication strategies. Furthermore, a third category of the population encompasses Moroccan scholars interested in Islam-oriented movements and political communication in Morocco.

Political Islam has reached a considerable status recently as the outcome of the political crisis in the MENA region because it has become a mass ideology. Chapter one, “What Is Political Islam?,” defines political Islam and traces its itinerary by revealing its multifaceted trends and debates. The relationship between the religious and the political has had a myriad of different and contradictory debates in contemporary thought. Chapter two, “The Religious and the Political,” analyzes this binary opposition and provides different debates on the issue. Islam-oriented movements evolved out of a long and complex political, philosophical and political creed, calling for a return to the time spirit of Islam. Chapter three, “Typology of Islamist Movements,” sketches out the different typologies of these movements.

Islam-oriented movements and/or parties have become increasingly assertive. In the context of the weakness of institutionalized politics, these movements have become the leading political opposition, or in the case of PJD in Morocco, playing the role of governance. Chapter four, “Islamist Movements in Morocco,” provides an historical and conceptual context for the current thinking on the nature and origins of Islam-oriented movements in Morocco. This chapter illustrates how important it is to understand the historical breaks and continuities in political Islam to make sense of present and future developments.

Communication has always been instrumental to politics. Chapter five, “Is there a Political Communication,” describes the emergence of political communication, focusing in particular on its role in the political arena. Furthermore, it interrogates the debates over the relationship between political communication and its components—political marketing and advertising. Campaigning communication is a very vital component in political communication. Chapter six maps different election campaigns’ characteristics to explore the current techniques used by political

campaigners in traditional media as well as online political communication. Additionally, it surveys different phases through which election campaigns have evolved.

Ideology is a concept whose definitions are endless because the concept is in a constant flux as individuals, institutions and politics influence one another. Chapter seven, "The Institutional and Political Ideologies," defines and discusses the concept of ideology in relation to institutional authority. Since political ideologies have risen to prominence in Morocco since the beginning of the twentieth century, chapter eight, "The Main Political Ideologies," maps a survey of political ideologies because of the centre *realpolitik* issues of power.

The idea of the professionalization of political communication is very often used to signify a host of changes in organization, practice and thinking that lead to a more professional set of practices. Chapter nine, "The Professionalization of Political Communication," reviews several components in the professionalization of political communication. It also discusses its process of adaptation to changes in the political system and the media system in addition to the relationship between the two systems.

The evolving nature of communication has caused the field to engage in debates over which methods are the most useful in accessing communication in politics. Chapter ten, "Methodological Issues," delineates the methodology used to explore PJD's ideologies and political communication. Chapter eleven, "The Political Ideologies in PJD's Institutional Produce," analyses the PJD's electoral programs, congress theses and the party's official manifesto. Chapter twelve, "The Results of the Interview Data Analysis," discusses some themes in the PJD's ideologies, such as the religious and the political, the Islamic frame of reference and the relationship between the movement and the party.

There is a creed among politicians that stresses the impact of political media on the public opinion and policy development. Consequently, they adopt political communication both to communicate their actions, activities and achievement and to persuade the electorate. Chapter thirteen, "PJD: From Ideas to Actions," explores the PJD's mediated political communication. In other words, it analyzes some aspects of the PJD's political communication, such as permanent campaigning, professionalization, media relations, media management and inter/intra communication.

The heterogeneity of Islam-oriented movements in Morocco, the ethnic pluralism of the country's make-up and the diverse and at times discordant trends within the PJD are enough to urge the party to alter its ideological paradigm. Chapter fourteen, "Ideological Orientations and Influencing Factors," discusses various ideologies adopted by the PJD in different

contexts due to the influencing factors, and which are outlined and discussed in this chapter.

Since the PJD's ideological orientations change, the party's political communication is supposed to change and adopt professionalization. Chapter fifteen, "The PJD's Political Communication," discusses the ways the party keeps abreast with new communication trends in its political communication, mainly political marketing and/or advertising. If mass media and technology function both as transmitters of political communication and as senders of messages, the PJD is expected to use these technologies, notably the internet, in both political marketing and advertising to publicize its political communication. Chapter sixteen, "The PJD's use of ICT," describes and discusses the party's internet use as a conduit for campaigning messages on its election websites.

PART I

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE RISE OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

CHAPTER ONE

WHAT IS POLITICAL ISLAM?

Over the last few decades, Islam has become a central point of reference for a wide range of political activities, arguments and opposition movements. According to Charles Hirschkind (2011), the term “political Islam” has been adopted by many scholars in order to identify this seemingly unprecedented irruption of Islamic religion into the secular domain of politics, and thus to distinguish these practices from the forms of personal piety, belief and ritual. Political parties that base their appeal on their Islamic credentials appear to exemplify this instrumental relation to religion (Volpi 2011). Even regimes and monarchies have employed religion to control, establish and sustain their nations (Belal 2012; Darif 1999).

Power and politics in political Islam are so aberrant and drastically evolving that we can barely delimit political Islam or Islamism. In other words, the basic argument that underpins this study on political Islam is that different scholarly and policy approaches offer specific insights into Islamism without ever fully delimiting it (Volpi 2011, 1). The purpose of this chapter is to construct such an assemblage of insights as to uncover the key dynamics and mechanisms of political Islam.

Volpi (2011) defines political Islam as a construct that refers to what individuals in a particular socio-historical context think about the political and the religious. In other words, Islamism refers to the political dynamics generated by the activities of those people who believe that Islam, as a body of faith, defines something crucial about how society should be organized, and who seek to implement this idea as a matter of priority.

Besides, Fuller (2003) states that political Islam is growing, expanding, evolving and diversifying. The terms “political Islam” and “Islamism” are used synonymously and extensively in the literature (Fuller 2003; Volpi 2011). From another perspective, Belal (2012) defines Islamism as an apolitical ideology that aims at getting power. Likewise, the Islamist movements are said to mesh both the religious and the political. Hence, there are different perspectives within the same trend to define political Islam.

On the other hand, Fuller (2003) adds that Islamism is a political movement that makes Islam the centrepiece of its own political culture and then proceeds to improvise on what this means in the local political context. Furthermore, Fuller depicts an Islamist as "... one who believes that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion" (xi).

In this definition, Fuller aims at making political Islam broad enough to capture the full spectrum of Islamist expression that runs from radical to moderate, violent to peaceful, democratic to authoritarian and traditional to modernist. Fuller's definitions of political Islam are so broad that they may fall within the scope of over-generalization. For instance, one of his definitions states that "[a]ll fundamentalists are Islamists, but not all Islamists are fundamentalists by no means since Islamism includes those who interpret political Islam in a more modern or liberal sense as well" (Fuller 2003, xii).

According to Garrod & Jones (2009), the term "Fundamentalist" is applied to any religious group that has as one of its targets a desire to return to what is regarded the original, true religious beliefs and practices of the group. They also add that fundamentalist groups can be found within all faiths. Besides, Wahid (2007) aptly describes fundamentalism as a reaction to political circumstances, such as imperialism or the inability to face modernity. The term "fundamentalist" is widely rejected by those Muslims so labelled because Fundamentalism is of Christian origins. Instead, they prefer to be called Islamists. Thus, Fuller missed mentioning one of the most successful fundamentalist faith movements: The New Christian Right in the United States.

Fundamentalism is, here, a problematic comparative term (Saba 1994). It is inescapably rooted in a specific Protestant experience whose principal theological premise is that the Bible is the true word of God and should be understood literally. In this regard, Beinin (1997) argues that "it makes no sense to speak of fundamentalist Islam because one of the core elements of the creed of all believing Muslims is that the Qur'an is the literal word of God." The Islamic tradition has been very concerned with how Muslims should understand the Qur'an, and which passages can be understood literally and which are so complex that they require allegorical or other forms of interpretation. Nonetheless, the divine origin of the text has never been a topic of legitimate debate.

There is another sense wherein the term "fundamentalism" is inappropriate. "Fundamentalism" suggests the restoration of a pure, unsullied and authentic form of religion, cleansed of historical accretions,

distortions and modernist deviations (ibid.). In fact, this is how many Islamist leaders and ideologues present their ideas and the movements they lead. Rather, they seek to revitalize and re-Islamize modern Muslim society (Burgat 2003). Therefore, Burgat terms the movements examined in this work “political Islam,” regarding their core concerns as temporal and political because they use the Qur’an, the Hadiths (reports about the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions) and other canonical religious texts to justify their stances and actions. However, today’s Islamist thinkers and activists are actively developing selected elements of the Islamic tradition, combined with ideas, techniques, institutions and commodities of the present and recent past to cope with specifically modern predicaments, such as political, social, economic and cultural issues (Zoubida 2001; Kramer 1993).

In the literature, Islamism encompasses both Islamic politics and the process of re-Islamization (Ismail 2003). On the one hand, Islamist politics refers to the activities of organizations and movements that agitate in the public sphere while deploying signs and symbols from Islamic traditions. It entails a political ideology articulating the idea of the necessity of establishing an Islamic government, understood as a government that implements the Shari’a (Islamic law). On the other hand, Islamization signifies a drive to Islamize the social sphere. In other words, it involves a process whereby various domains of social life are invested with signs and symbols associated with Islamic cultural tradition. This definition is of paramount importance because these two concepts will help us assess PJD’s ideology as well as its orientations.

François Burgat, another authority within political Islam literature, looks past the shadow cast in recent years by Al-Qaeda on the study of political Islam in order to outline the long-term evaluations and re-articulations of the Islamist phenomenon since its nineteenth-century beginnings. From this perspective, Burgat (2003) indicates that there are three crucial articulations of Islamism that contributed to shape the contemporary practices and discourses of Political Islam: “These are the construction of a response to colonial powers, the re-articulation of these choices to interact with the post colonial state, and the engagement with the multiple aspects of globalization, especially in the post-cold war context” (19).

Burgat’s assumption shows the diversity of Islamist itineraries. This entry into Islamism is on multiple levels, tailored to individual histories and national contexts. These contexts are threefold. The first sequence is the emergence of Islamist mobilization as a foil to direct colonial presence. Here, it is necessary to recall the Salafists and the reformist preambles of