

Clientelism
and Implementing
Social Security
Programmes
in Post-conflict Iraqi
Kurdistan Region

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By

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For my Mom Khatoon, an illiterate woman,
I owe her all I have obtained in life.

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ACRONYMS

KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
RPFMGS	Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors
MoMA	Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs
MoLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
SPF	Social Protection Fund
FPF	Family Protection Fund
SSN	Social Safety Net
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
KNA	Kurdistan National Assembly
IKF	Iraqi Kurdistan Front
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
OFFP	Oil-for-Food Programme

INTRODUCTION

Living in a house with my mother and several younger siblings, without my father, during my childhood did not make me understand the reason for my mum's tears and silent sorrows. I was always seeing my mum at midnight crying, after the younger children were asleep. I thought she was thinking of my father or had news about him. Perhaps she was upset by missing my father in the genocide campaign. Only after I became old enough to understand did my mum reveal that the secret of her tears was her deep concern as to whether her children would die of hunger altogether or one after another. For me, it is still a big puzzle and mystery how we survived. My family and all other Kurdish people, affected by war and genocide (Anfal), were left without any means of life or any choice of how to live. For them, there was no work, no income, and no support from the government after the campaign.

Almost all those genocide-attacked families had lost their breadwinners and resources of life. The survivors were either children or illiterate women with no skills of work outside their villages. Despite all these extreme difficulties, they made their lives, survived and their children grew up. Nearly two decades later, with the self-ruling Kurdish government in Iraq, those people are at least financially served and some are even in high political, government or party positions. However, we are still seeing mothers and fathers in the Kurdistan Region shedding tears.

Previous disadvantaged people were labelled as 'political victims' of the war and displaced families due to the atrocities of the former regime in Iraq inflicted on them. However, current disadvantaged people are politically and economically different from war and genocide-affected people. They are unable to find a political trait (as the first group advantaged to be identified with) for themselves to be served with their livelihood by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). They are just poor and cannot afford a decent life for themselves in the recent, rapid economically developing Kurdistan Region. In contrast to the 1980s' political victims, the voice of the present needy people is heard but mostly on the television screens as advertisement materials. On one side, opposition parties and non-government local media try to show the scene of needy people and their suffering as images of dysfunction of the KRG in the area of public services. On the other side, those people are being put in different scenes,

with senior officials treating them. The KRG and its senior officials show how people's demands are met and use this as political propaganda within their clientelistic practices. This book aims to critically analyse how two types of social security programmes, covering the two above-mentioned groups of people, operate. It also discusses the bases for this and why one programme is prioritised while another programme is neglected by the government in the Kurdistan Region. In order to do so, I have employed the implementation theory and clientelism as theoretical frameworks for the research.

This book methodologically focuses on the implementation process and its actors. However, it does not take claimants of the social security programmes as its participants. It is not even involved in any kind of comparison between the previous Iraqi regime and what the KRG has implemented as Kurdish self-ruling after 1992. I have clearly demonstrated that the former Iraqi regime practised the discrimination as part of its genocide operation against those Kurds not showing any loyalty to the Ba'athist ruling party.

I drew on my experience to later explain how difficult it is when a government identifies, differentiates and implicitly discriminates politically against the population in terms of taking care of their needs and providing public benefits, although the condition that disadvantaged people experienced under the previous regime, including discrimination and exclusion difficulties, is in no way comparable with the experience of a difficult financial life under the KRG. However, I always remember my mother's tears every time I now see television programmes focusing on the plight of poor people when they are asking for help or when sometimes they are visited by senior officials to show the generosity of government and party leaders. These scenes have raised many questions in my mind. I always wondered why, in spite of the economic and financial growth of the KRG and legal framework to serve disadvantaged people in an institutionalised way, the government has been so cold-minded at all times and has not played its role in helping its population equally.

As mentioned, this book is about two social security programmes that the KRG is committed to implement. The first is the 'Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors' (RPFMGS) administered by the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs (MoMA). This programme provides monthly salaries and non-cash benefits to beneficiaries identified as family members of Kurdish liberation fighters, survivors of the genocide campaign and chemical attacks, and other war victims. The second programme is the Social Safety Net (SSN); its name has been changed from the Social Protection Fund (SPF) in 1992, then to the

Family Protection Fund (FPF) between 2001 and 2009, and recently changed to the SSN. This programme consists of means-tested benefits administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). In the SSN, a wide variety of population are targeted, based on their financial situation including people with very low or no income, the disabled, the widowed, married full-time students with a very low income, orphans and the elderly people.

Both social security programmes are implemented at ministerial level. However, the performance of the two programmes appears to be different. The main difference between both programmes is that the first programme, RPFMGS, serves a wide range of population, namely, as I prefer to call them, 'political victims'; while the second programme, SSN, covers 'socio-economic victims'. Labelling beneficiaries based on their socio-political status primarily explains the reason why the KRG deals with each social security programme very differently, amounting to 'double standards'. Although both the Rights and Privilege to Families of Marters and Genocide Survivors (RPFMGS) and SSN are based on a similar legal framework in the KRG, the first programme is highly prioritised politically, while the second is politically neglected. Though the SSN dates back to the early 1990s and the RPFMGS was established later, in the mid-2000s, in their implementation they have taken very different directions.

The relative economic development and the rapid increase in general budget has led to a development in formation and implementation of the KRG's social security programmes. However, there are still thousands of families who are living in desperate conditions. Although they are treated within so-called social cash transfer programmes, the government does not take alleviating the living conditions of poor people as seriously as the rights of 'political victims' to social protection. I argue that the KRG implements its social protection programmes in a double standard, clientelist way. This book looks at the implementation of social security programmes in connection with clientelism. This clientelist-driven implementation in social policy seems to be controversial in terms of the way and the methods of contributions to equality and appropriate public welfare system.

The aim of this book is to find out what are the critical factors in implementing social security in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and why these factors are critical. It is concerned especially with the politico-administrative conditions of the implementation of social security programmes in the KRG. This book tries to present some answers for the following questions: To what extent do political conditions affect the

implementation process? Why does the KRG prioritise some social security programmes over others? What bases are there for a social security programme to be prioritised while another is neglected by the government in the Kurdistan Region? How and why are social security programmes used for political party interests in the Kurdistan Region? What are the implementation gaps in the field of social security and what accounts for these? How plausible are the key theories/models of implementation in a politically and economically under-developed region? What lessons can be drawn from social security programme implementation in developing countries in light of the research findings?

The literature review of the book discusses experiences of Iraq (excluding the Kurdistan Region), Iran, Venezuela, Mexico and Israel in relation to social policy provisions. Common political characters of social policy implementation in developing countries will be highlighted in order to compare those experiences with those of the Kurdistan Region. Those countries have been selected based on their political condition. Iraq and Iran have experienced a long-term war and are highly politicised. Venezuela, and Mexico have a deep tradition of clientelism. The Israeli government has also practised discrimination and clientelism against non-western Jews in terms of providing public services. These case studies have been employed as selective examples to support one of the main arguments of the research. This would help to elaborate how and why the clientelism is being practiced in the design and implementation of social policy programmes.

This book has drawn on prioritising a social programme over another. I have interviewed some ‘programme implementers as actual beneficiaries’; especially employees of the RPFMGS programme, who are mostly from families of martyrs and genocide survivors. As for the second programme (SSN), the status of beneficiaries has been analysed from the perspective of officials and implementers. For that, the book examined corruption, non-transparency and sufficiency in the social benefits.

The book consists of six chapters. In Chapter One, two sets of literature and theories have been reviewed. The first is policy implementation. The mainstream theories and models of implementation in developed countries will be discussed. Thus, I will discuss the top-down, bottom-up and synthesis models of policy implementation. I also address some existing literature on policy implementation in developing countries, especially those that have highlighted the impact of political and administrative processes on policy implementation. This chapter equally refers to key policy-relevant concepts such as policy salience, policy content and policy context. The second theoretical framework of this

research is clientelism and clientelistic practice in social policy/programmes.

The above-mentioned theories and literatures will be employed in this book for two purposes. On one side, it will be used as a theoretical-conceptual framework; and on the other side, theories will be applied to seek understanding of the implementation of social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region.

Chapter Two is a contextual analysis of the politics, socio-economy and administration of the Kurdistan Region. The main focus, first, is placed on the development of the political condition that emerged in the Kurdistan Region as a special administration case amongst post-conflict developing country/regions. It starts by drawing upon the background and current political and socio-economic conditions. These backgrounds need to be presented and analysed in order to capture the context which influences the social policy and its implementation. As a result, some events, such as the displacement, marginalisation, deportation, genocide and civil war have been highlighted. I have discussed key events in the history of Iraqi Kurdistan that explain the conflict and uncertainty, plus their socio-economic consequences on the region. There then follows an argument that, due to a repressive policy that the state has followed against Kurds in Iraq, the Kurds have become politically repressed and socio-economically vulnerable.

In Chapter Three, I will present an overview of the development of social security policy and programmes of the KRG.

Chapters Four and Five present an analysis of research findings gathered from interviews with implementers of both social security programmes, the 'Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors' (RPFMGS) and the Social Safety Net (SSN). These two chapters also include an analysis of official documents and media reports about the implementation of the social security programmes. Chapter Four is devoted to the RPFMGS programme and the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs (MoMA). After outlining the legal and organisational framework of the programme, the chapter analyses four key themes. The first theme is the preference of the programme and its beneficiaries by ruling parties and senior government officials, and its impact upon the implementation process. This theme has been pursued to demonstrate how the implementation process of social security in a post-war country has been influenced by political characteristics and interests that the social security programme and its beneficiaries have conveyed. As has been shown, the implementation success of social security programmes widely depends on the political importance of the programme

and its beneficiaries to those in power. In this context, relevant sub-themes are discussed about the extent to which the political conditions have impacted on the eligibility criteria and entitlement procedures. It is also shown that the government and its ruling parties prioritised the MoMA. Both political parties, KDP and PUK, have the most beneficiaries from this scheme. Another key theme is how beneficiaries' involvement as employees and staff within the MoMA has impacted on the implementation of the RPFMGS programme. The third theme discussed in Chapter Four is how the beneficiaries are likely to become policy makers. This point has been examined in light of the bottom-up model of implementation. The last theme is the prospect of the clientelistic use of the RPFMGS programme as a social cash transfer for maintaining and consolidating party loyalty among beneficiaries.

Chapter Five looks at the implementation process of the Social Safety Net (SSN) programme. As is discussed, this programme has been subject to changes in form, objective and name. These changes have consequently created uncertainty and confusion among the implementers of the programme. I argue that the ambiguity of the programme's objectives and the instability in its practice have impacted on its implementation. This chapter examines key aspects such as the objectives of the programme perceived by implementers and the policy deviation made from a top-down tendency. More importantly, some themes such as clarity in defining the social security programmes, a lack of transparency in social cash transfers (especially in the Special Salary sub-scheme), a lack of priority of beneficiaries by government, and a lack of social welfare vision in the programme will be explored.

Chapter Six analyses the research findings and key themes in a comparative perspective. Having presented the research findings in Chapters Four and Five, some of the themes that are central to this book are discussed. This chapter aims to compare and contrast the two social security programmes in terms of their implementation problems, and to examine the plausibility of two sets of theories: the implementation theory and clientelist politics. In Chapter Six, the discussion focuses on some critical questions. Three issues in particular have been highlighted: political factors, the status of social security beneficiaries, and the lack of social welfare vision in the KRG. It also discusses the ambiguity and contradictions evident in the formulation and implementation of the KRG's social security programmes. In this Chapter, a section is also devoted to the issue of political interference in the implementation of these social security programmes from senior government officials and party leaders. In this regard, two attitudes have been distinguished. On the one

hand, interference from the top could support the implementation success. On the other hand, party leaders and government officials intervene in the programme to pursue their political interests by shifting the programme from social cash transfers to a patronage system.

Comparing the beneficiaries of both programmes, two different groups of beneficiaries with different profiles and statuses have been distinguished. Based on the two types of interference and beneficiaries that have been identified, I have introduced and will try to substantiate my contribution to the policy implementation theory. I examine the implementation of social security programmes of the KRG based on the degree of salience the government attaches to the programme of cash transfers based on the political influences of beneficiaries. Bringing evidence from the research findings, two types of treatment by the KRG towards implementation of social security programmes have been compared. The first one is characterised as political/nationalistic and thus important, and the second as public and consequently neglected. This discussion will be justified through understanding the degree of importance attached to the beneficiaries of the MoMA and SSN programmes. From this point, a clientelistic model of policy implementation has been proposed.

This book is an edited version of a research conducted by the author as a PhD programme at University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom between 2010 and 2014. My greatest intellectual debt is owed to those involved in the supervision of this research: Stephen Cope and Tony Fitzpatrick. Without their thoughtful guidance, instructions and continuous support, and most importantly patience, this work would have not seen realisation.

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CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FROM POLICY IMPLEMENTATION TO CLIENTELISM

This chapter addresses two different sets of theories which will be employed as a framework for the study: implementation theory and clientelism. It has been divided into four sections and the first addresses 'implementation' as a concept and research. Section two explores some of the key literature and theories on policy implementation. The third section of the chapter reviews policy implementation literature in developing countries. It also explores implementation of social security programmes in terms of their consistency with, or deviation from, policy regulations. The last section then discusses the relevant research literature on clientelism and clientelistic practice in social policy.

Implementation: The Emergence of Concept and Research

Implementation has been defined as actions directed at the accomplishment of goals set within a policy decision (Van Meter & Van Horne, 1975: 447). In the same vein, Pressman and Wildavsky, adopting Webster and Roget's definition of the word, used this concept to describe a stage following the policy formulation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxi). Hall and Irving have also presented a traditional, yet important definition of implementation by arguing that it is about what happens between policy expectations (goals) and programme results (outcomes) (Hall & Irving, 2009: 76). Therefore, implementation constitutes the ability to achieve the predicted consequences after the initial conditions have been met. It involves both organisational systems and processes, and actions of implementers. Researching policy implementation should include policy goals, structures (organisation or programme), regulations (law, guidance, and instructions), policy actors (implementers) and their practice.

As for the implementers, they refer to officials who have the responsibility to implement programmes in a specific area of public policy. This group of individuals is frequently in touch with top officials on the one hand and, on the other hand, “beneficiaries of public policy programmes” (Grindle, 1980: 97). Implementers are therefore considered as multifarious individuals who work at different levels of policy implementation. It is also argued that implementers are more diverse than those who scholars, such as Grindle, have grouped under this name. Operationally, throughout this research, implementers are ranked in several government positions, such as frontline staff, programme managers, executive directors and also ministers at the top of implementation agencies. Therefore, they are classified according to their ‘position’ in the policy delivery process and ‘interaction’ with higher or lower agents, or clients.

Usually, senior officials are taken into account either as policy makers at the central government and ministerial level, or selected party leaders who stay beyond the government but powerfully influence policy decisions. They directly and indirectly, as in the cases of some developing countries, run the administrative and governmental organisations (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983). In the case of the KRG, ministers are located, on the one side, in the policy-making level; on the other side, they play their role in the highest position of policy implementation.

Implementation studies are found at the intersection of social policy, public administration, organisational theory and political science research (Schofield & Sausman, 2004). This field was previously covered under the heading of public administration. Having looked at the policy implementation literature, it appears that almost all theories, models and approaches have been drawn from the context of the developed world. Regardless of their political contexts, they have been conceptualised, theorised, and tested in most democratic countries. Although researches have been conducted in the developing world (Grindle, 1980; Hadden, 1980; McClintock, 1980; Quick, 1980; Rothenberg, 1980; Sussman, 1980; Temple & Temple, 1980; Scott, 1987; Bello-Imam, 1999; Hanekom & Sharkansky, 1999[1994]; Jain, 1999; Lane, 1999; Mahler & Craig, 1999; Wollmann, 1999; Yuksel, 1999; Makinde 2005), the same developed-based models of implementation have been tested and articulated. More importantly, only a few of them emphasise the impact of political and administrative processes on policy implementation (Jain, 1999; Lane, 1999; Hill & Hupe, 2009). Hence, their explanatory power might be limited and insufficient to apply to different political environments, particularly those in developing countries. In essence, as many studies

highlighted (Hill & Hupe, 2009), policy implementation cannot be studied in a context-free manner. Hill and Hupe discussed the notion of implementation as governance and stressed the importance of political context. The political and administrative conditions within which they are set must also be taken into account.

Policy-making research has itself for long been at the centre of public policy studies; however, implementation research emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century. In comparison to policy making, studying policy implementation was almost neglected until almost four decades ago. There have been significant publications since the classical work of Pressman and Wildavsky, *Implementation* (1973), which is mostly seen outside the field of social policy, suggesting that implementation research has become multidisciplinary and dispersed. In the last century, following Pressman and Wildavsky's classical investigation, few disciplinary researches were found in policy implementation (O'Toole, 2000: 263-4).

Numerous authors have presented and assessed implementation literature (deLeon, 1999; O'Toole, 2000, 2004; Schofield, 2001; Hill and Hupe, 2009). Schofield (2001) pointed out that understanding by whom, how and why policy is put into effect could be conceptualised under the heading of implementation theory (Schofield, 2001: 249). Policy implementation as a term was used for the very first time by Pressman and Wildavsky in 1973 during their study on job creation schemes in Oakland, California, considered as the first attempt to examine policy implementation explicitly (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). This study emerged as a reaction to growing concerns over the effectiveness of large-scale reform programmes. Until the end of the 1960s, it had been taken for granted that political mandates were clear and administrators were implementing policies according to the intentions of decision makers (Hill & Hupe, 2009: 42). The process of "translating policy into action" (Barrett, 2004: 251) attracted more attention, as policies seemed to fall below expectations.

Implementation cannot succeed or fail without a goal (policy), against which it will be judged. Therefore, studying the process of implementation includes the setting of goals towards which implementation is directed (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxiv-xxv). According to the processed view, a perspective which looks at implementation as a process, implementation is considered as *policy becoming action through programmes* (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxii-xxv; Schofield, 2004: 284). However, this process will not be well defined without placing and taking it within an administrative and legal context. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) argue that what is needed before implementation is regulation and finance. In order to secure the predicted outcomes, the

regulations need to be passed and finances committed before any step is taken towards implementing the policies.

Implementation “is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxii-xxiii). In analysing the linkage between policy and implementation, Hogwood argued that the implementation stage can also contribute to the making of policy (Hogwood, 1987: 161). This can be explained within the mechanism of feedback. As we look at the implementation phase, it will be expected to explain why policies are as they are and why they have the effects that they do. This is a question towards the ‘effectiveness’ of a policy.

In the history of implementation research, three generations have been distinguished. The first generation of implementation studies, which had dominance during the 1970s, was characterised by a pessimistic attitude. This pessimism was fed by a number of case studies that represented clear examples of implementation failure. The studies of Derthick (1972), Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), and Bardach (1977) are amongst the most influential. Nevertheless, the most noteworthy achievement of the first generation of implementation researchers was to raise perception of the issue in the wider scholarly community and in the view of the general public.


While theorisation was not a central duty of the first generation of implementation studies, the second generation began to put forward a whole range of theoretical frameworks and hypotheses. This period was marked by debates between what was later named the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation studies. The top-down approach was represented by scholars, for example, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) and Mazmanian (in his shared work with Sabatier, 1983), who conceived of implementation as the hierarchical execution of central policy intentions. Scholars belonging to the bottom-up faction, such as Lipsky (1980) and Elmore (1980), instead emphasised that implementation consisted of the everyday problem-solving strategies of “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980).

The third generation of implementation research tried to bridge the gap between top-down and bottom-up approaches by incorporating the insights of both groups into their theoretical models. At the same time, the self-proclaimed goal of third generation research was “to be more scientific than the previous two in its approach to the study of implementation” (Goggin et al., 1990: 18). Third generation researchers thus put much emphasis on specifying clear hypotheses, finding proper operationalisations and producing adequate empirical observations to test these hypotheses.

A Review of Policy Implementation Theories

Implementation is considered as one of the most important elements of policy process. It begins once policy is made to target a social problem or issue, starting somewhere in the later stage of the policy process. The start point in the policy process is a problem, issue or need which compels politicians and high officials to come up with their agendas to deal with it (see Figure 1-1). Thus, officials formulate policy (policy-making stage) to overcome social and public issues. In that sense, implementation can be considered as part of the post-policy-making stages. In this section, after presenting an overview of contributions made to policy implementation research, I will discuss the key theoretical approaches of policy implementation. The three generations of implementation research have led to three distinct theoretical approaches to the study of implementation.

Figure 1.1 Social Policy Process



These three implementation models can be characterised as theories that identify how policy is translated into action by various actors in the policy process. Implementation models have been diverged according to whether assessments are developed from the perspective of the initial policy makers (centre), field-level implementing officials (periphery), or private individuals to whom the policy is directed (target group) (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981: 12). Policy process mostly starts from a policy problem and seeking to resolve it. This will explain how various policy actors are involved in a policy and how they influence the implementation and the policy outcome through the process of interaction.

Top-Down Model

This is when emphasis is placed on policy formulation and the ability of decision makers to produce explicit policy objectives. This model started from the assumption that policy implementation starts with a decision made by central government. Parsons argues that these studies were based on a “black box model” of policy process inspired by systems

analysis (1995: 463). Top-downers assumed a direct causal link between policies and observed outcomes and tended to disregard the impact of implementers on policy delivery. They essentially followed a prescriptive approach that interpreted policy as input and implementation as output factors. Due to their emphasis on decisions of central policy makers, deLeon (2001: 2) describes top-down approaches as a “governing elite phenomenon”. The following authors are considered classical top-down scholars: Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), as well as Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979; 1980; 1981).

Pressman and Wildavsky’s original work followed a rational model approach. They started from the assumption that policy objectives are set out by central policy makers. In this view, implementation research was left with the task of analysing challenges on the way of achieving these objectives. Hence, they saw implementation as an “interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973: xv). Implementation therefore implied the establishment of adequate bureaucratic procedures to ensure that policies are accurately executed. Furthermore, implementing agencies should have sufficient resources at their disposal, and their needs to be a system of clear responsibilities and hierarchical control to supervise the actions of implementers.

The American scholars, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), offered a more elaborate theoretical model. They were concerned with the study of whether implementation outcomes corresponded to the objectives set out in initial policy decisions. Their model included six variables that shape the relationship between policy and performance. These six variables are as follows (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 464-72). Firstly, policy standards and objectives provide concrete and more specific standards for assessing and evaluating the policy performance. The second is the resources and incentives made available, while the third variable is the quality of inter-organisational relationships, which organise the linkage between national and local implementation agencies, and also formal and informal relationships within the policy-making body. The fourth variable is the characteristics of the implementation agencies, such as organisational control and inter-organisational issues being an avoidable variable to address while studying policy implementation. In the fifth, they argue that the economic, social and political environment is of great importance to consider in the relationship between policy and performance. Finally, the disposition or response of the implementers should also be considered in the implementation research. This point also involves three elements: implementers’ recognition (their knowledge and

understanding) towards the policy; the direction of their response to the policy (acceptance, neutrality, rejection); and the strength of those responses. While many of these factors had to do with organisational capacities and hierarchical control, the authors also highlighted two variables that slightly departed from the top-down perspective. They suggested that the extent of policy change had a crucial impact on the likelihood of effective implementation and also that the degree of consensus on goals was important. Hence, significant policy change was only possible if consensus among actors was high. Unlike other representatives of the top-down perspective, the model of Van Meter and Van Horn was less concerned with advising policy makers on successful implementation than with providing a sound basis for scholarly analysis.

Sabatier and Mazmanian are also among the core authors of the top-down approach. Like Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Sabatier and Mazmanian started their analysis with a policy decision that was made by governmental agencies. Therefore, they proposed a clear separation of policy formation from policy implementation. Their model also lists six criteria for effective implementation (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979: 489-92, 503-4): (1) policy objectives need to be clear and consistent; (2) the programme should be based on a valid causal theory; (3) the implementation process should be structured adequately; (4) implementing officials should be committed to programme goals; (5) interest groups and (executive and legislative) sovereigns are supportive; and (6) there should be a condition with no detrimental changes in the socio-economic framework. Although Sabatier and Mazmanian acknowledged that perfect hierarchical control over the implementation process was hard to achieve in practice and that unfavourable conditions could cause implementation failure, they argued that policy makers could ensure effective implementation through adequate programme design and a clever structuration of the implementation process.

Although each classical top-down scholar has their own approach to deal with policy implementation, they all define implementation in terms of the relationship with policy as laid down in official documents. I argue that researching the implementation of social security programmes should examine programme activities. From this perspective, this book focuses on the extent to which leaders of dominant political parties and government officials control and influence the direction of policy performance. It also explores the implementation of social security programmes in terms of its consistency with or deviation from policy regulations. Additionally, I argue that regulations and specific standards are not the only elements to direct policy performance. A number of elements are also involved in this

process, for instance, implementers' discretion, politicians' intentions and dominant party agents' interests. The role of non-statutory factors is inevitable in the policy implementation process.

Bottom-Up Model

In the bottom-up model the focus is on the role that middle actors play in policy implementation. It looks at local bureaucrats as main actors in policy delivery and conceives of implementation as negotiation processes within networks of implementers. Bottom-up theories emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a critical response to the top-down approach.

Several studies showed that political outcomes did not always sufficiently relate to original policy objectives and that the assumed causal link was thus questionable. Studies belonging to this part of research typically started from the 'bottom' by identifying the networks of actors involved in policy formulation and delivery. Bottom-up researchers rejected the idea that policies are defined at the central level and that implementers need to obligate themselves to these objectives as neatly as possible. Instead, the availability of discretion at the stage of policy delivery appeared as a beneficial factor as local bureaucrats were seen to be much closer to the real problems than central policy makers. Proponents of this model include Lipsky (1971, 1980), Elmore (1980), Hjerm (1982), Hjerm and Porter (1981), and Hjerm and Hull (1982).

Lipsky (1971; 1980) analysed the behaviour of public service workers (e.g. teachers, social workers, police officers and doctors). In his influential article, 'Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform', which was first published in 1971, Lipsky argued that policy analysts need to consider the direct interactions between social workers and citizens. Street-level bureaucrats are also considered to have substantial autonomy from their employing organisations. The main source of their autonomous power derives from the considerable amount of discretion that they are given. He also addressed policy relationships between top officials and implementers on the one hand, and on the other between implementers and beneficiaries. However, what is missing from his analysis on policy networks is the real or potential relationship between beneficiaries and top officials. This model ignores the role of individuals outside the implementing agencies who might have a profound impact on the implementation process. In politically less developed contexts, the political bargaining between politicians and beneficiaries of social programmes-as voters-draws on the implementation process.

It could be argued that bureaucrats' autonomy is more questionable and deeply restricted by political regime. In countries with poor