Contextualizing Indigenous Knowledge in Africa and its Diaspora
Contextualizing Indigenous Knowledge in Africa and its Diaspora

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INTRODUCTION

A reading of Martin Bernal’s paper entitled ‘European Images of Africa: Tales of Two names, Ethiop and N’ reveals nothing but a pot pouri of abstract conjectures and stereotypical positions about Africa and its population by non-Africans and Eurocentric scholars. Another reading of Africa’s past in the direction of Bernal is that which presents Africa as worthy of pity and reinvention similarly misrepresents her past as if the problem with Africa is about her past. A third reading of Africa as a continent and people as good as the rest of the world, if not better, with reference to her glorious past and worthy of wholesale recapture is similarly fallacious. This much Frantz Fanon (1968; 168) in his “The Wretched of the Earth” debunks when he says “all the proof of a wonderful Songhai civilization will not change the fact that today the Songhais are underfed and illiterate, thrown between sky and water with empty hands and empty eyes”. What however is true of Africa, our own Africa is that it possesses a huge potential both in terms of human and natural resources. It is undoubtedly home to 12% of the world’s population, it is the second biggest continent on earth and its diversity is tremendous, enabling it to account for 46% of the world’s chromium, 48% of its diamonds and platinum and 29% of its gold. Africa accounts for 30% of the world’s languages with a total language count of 2,058. For very many reasons however, these huge heritage resources have not been translated into any meaningful qualitative development on the continent. Though African resources have contributed immensely to the development of other parts of the world, through coercion, bio - piracy and theft, the continent is still largely conceived as a receiver rather than a contributor to development. It is today no secret that, one out of every four poor persons in the world is an African. This is in addition to the fact that the continent has the lowest life expectancy and is uncontrollably ravaged by the HIV/AIDS scourge. It has very high child mortality, low literacy rates and very poor health indicators. At the intellectual level, even though Africa has top of the pack scholars scattered all over the world, no African University has made the list of the world’s top 100 Universities either in the Natural Sciences and Mathematics or Engineering Technology and Computers, Life and Agricultural Sciences, Clinical Medicine, Pharmacy
This book, “Contextualizing Indigenous Knowledge in Africa and its Diaspora” is a product of an International conference organized by the Institute of African Studies of the University of Georgia, Athens, USA which focused on the preservation of the unique identity of African Indigenous and Local Knowledge. That African Heritage resource has, and is being confronted and affronted by a number of challenges within the increasingly globalized and westernized World is today dated though, the International conference the theme of which was “Africa and Its Diaspora: Expressions of Indigenous and Local Knowledge” sought to stimulate and document ongoing scholarly discussion on the paradoxical dynamics of preserving this identity in the hope of instantiating African development.

The academic conversations and exchange of ideas among Africa’s top scholars of different generations, identities and academic bearings are what has been summarized in this volume; an engagement of African Development from the perspective that Africa is yet to appreciate the repertoire of its knowledge systems and the imperative of foregrounding its development on these heritage resources. While not challenging the revisionist positions of Nyerere and his likes who glory in the fact that there are good elements in the traditional African experience and that it is necessary to understand the past in order to appreciate the present and project into the future, the general thread of the authors in this book is that Africa cannot be reinvented by a puerile idealization of Africa’s past but by a trado-epistemic system of its indigenous heritage resource.

Captured in Seventeen Chapters, the Book, Contextualizing Indigenous Knowledge in Africa and its Diaspora offers a stimulating analysis of a philosophy of life that seeks a wholesale adoption of the African Indigenous Knowledge System (AIKS) as a paradigm for Africa’s renewal and de-entrapment from the whims of foreign interests. African Indigenous knowledge types argued in this volume involve the balance of short-term thinking and immediate gratification with long term thinking for future generations. It shifts the balance towards improving the quality of human life on earth.

This volume argues the position that Africa has a lineage and decency beyond flags and geography and so she is the sphere of the interest of Africans themselves. They must therefore act from within the African heritage resource to cause development to ensue from within Africa. The book offers intensive exchanges between scholars, researchers, and technocrats from various disciplines working in Africa, the African Diaspora, the United States and other parts of the globe on issues that
straddle between Environmental Development, Democracy and Political Systems, Religion and Philosophy, Medicine and Healthcare Systems, Education and Knowledge Transmission, Family, Household & Community, Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, morality, sexuality and security matters among others. In all these, the authors are united in their call for a functional attitude of the collective and individual knowledge and spirit of the people in retrospective dialogue with the past, to awaken the African primal source, to find its way back to itself and to help Continental and Diaspora Africans by inner action to fight for their inner independence and to free themselves from the scourge of exploitation and underdevelopment.

Here argued, the prophetic voice of Chinweizu speaks to Africans thus; “we must end our allegiance to white gods, white prophets, white religions and white ideologies, for these are psychological instruments of white supremacy; and we must return to black gods, black prophets, black religions and black ideologies of our African ancestors”. This book will enthral anyone interested in development studies in the third world. It will in particular interest Eurocentric scholars who still glory in the negative logic of contemporaneous inclusion and exclusion, which has over the centuries been paraded in the bounded reasoning of globalization. This volume speaks to all of us that, solutions to Africa’s chronic developmental problems cannot be made from without. In this regard, the book answers the many unanswered questions about the why of African underdevelopment. This book will no doubt make a vital contribution to the ongoing search for viable answers to the challenges that face Africa today.

The Editors
August 2014
CHAPTER ONE

ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BENIN AND TOGO

EDOH AGBEHONOU

Introduction

In the early 1990s, Benin and Togo were the first African countries to convene Conférences Nationales Souveraines [Sovereign National Conferences (SNCs)] in Francophone Africa. These SNCs were intended to pave the way for smooth short-term democratic transitions and the emergence of strong political liberalization in these countries. While Benin’s democratic transition was successful, Togo experienced a painful transition, which ended with the re-emergence of an authoritarian regime despite the existence of a myriad of political opposition parties. In 2012, Freedom House’s report on fifty Sub-Saharan countries reveals that 12% of these countries, including Benin, are totally free, while Togo is still among the countries that are far from meeting democratic standards. What are the reasons for such a different outcome? This paper investigates the electoral system in both countries since the wave of democratization (i.e. 1990), and examines how the system may influence the democratization process in each of these countries.

The chapter is structured in four sections. The first section provides a brief historical background of Benin and Togo. The second section discusses their respective electoral systems from 1990 to 2012 with particular attention made to their district magnitudes; the calculations of effective numbers of parties; the thresholds of representation and exclusion; and the calculations of disproportionalities. The third section discusses the findings. The last section provides some concluding remarks.
and recommendations on what can be done (based on the socio-political, economic, and cultural realities) in each country in order to either promote or consolidate democracy.

**Historical Background of Benin and Togo**

Although both Benin and Togo were former French colonies and had embarked on a similar path on how to bring about democracy, they have had, however, different historical experiences when it comes to vibrant civil society. In *Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo* Heilbrunn (1993:298) contends that “In a society with a tradition of national associations, the state is constrained by the interests of organized groups since attempts to ignore particular concerns may result in unrest” Togo, unlike Benin, did not have these national associations to influence the new wave of democratization.

From the early 1960s to 1990, military rule and a one-party system had been alternated with restricted democratic practices in Benin. Between 1960 and 1961, Benin was an emerging democracy. The Beninois nationalists formed three political parties—the Republican Party of Dahomey (PRD), the Dahomeyan Democratic Union (UDD), and the Democratic Movement of Dahomey (MDD)— during the liberation struggle. These parties had their representatives in the Territorial Assembly in 1959. However, during the December 1960 Presidential and National Assembly elections, the Dahomeyan Democratic Rally (RDD) of Hubert Maga, and the Dahomey Nationalist Party (PND) of Sourou-Migan Apithy, strategically coalesced and formed a strong political party called the Dahomeyan Unity Party (PDU), which won the elections. Because of the coalition, only the two parties (PDU and UDD) had dominated the political scene in Benin between 1960 and 1961. The following three years were marked by the imposition of a one-party system from 1961 to 1963 by the ruling PDU coalition government led by Hubert Maga and Sourou-Migan Apithy, respectively President and Vice President of the country, followed by an installation of a strong military regime (1963-1964) (African Election Database 2011). However, the need for the political liberalization engrained in the third wave of democratization during the 1990s, coupled with the late 1980s economic downturn in Africa constrained the Beninese authoritarian regime to open up to the political opposition and accept the instauration of a national forum (Heilbrunn 1993). Subsequently, the 1990 Constitutional Referendum, the 1991 National Assembly, and presidential elections, were held (African Election
Since then, multi-party democratic elections have been held every five years without recourse to post-election violence.

The political situation in Togo was quite similar to that of Benin in the early 1960s. Between 1960 and 1962, four political parties—Juvento [Justice, Union, Vigilance, Education, Nationalism, Tenacity, Optimism] (Togolese Youth Movement); the Union Démocratique des Populations Togolaises (UDPT); the Parti Togolais Du Progrès (PTP), led by Grunitzky; and the Comité de Unité Togolaise (CUT), led by President Sylvanus Olympio—dominated the political activities in Togo (U.S. Department of State, 2012). However, CUT, PTP, and a small party called Union of Chiefs and Populations of the North (UCPN) had their elected representatives in the 1958 Legislative Assembly (African Election Database 2011). With strong popular support, President Olympio banned other political parties and established a one-party system a couple of years after he was sworn into office. A brief period of democracy (from 1960 to 1962) was reversed by a bloody military coup d'état, which led to the assassination of President Olympio on January 13, 1963. A transitional government was formed and led by Nicolas Grunitzky from 1963 to 1967. The Togolese transitional government was soon overthrown in a second military coup on January 13, 1967 by the young Lieutenant Colonel Gnassingbé Eyadéma who established a strong military dictatorship with a one-party system until 1991.

From the early 1990s to the present day, there have been over 20 political parties. The major ones include the ruling RPT, UFC (Union of Forces for Change), ANC (National Alliance for Change), CAR (Action Committee for Renewal), and CDPA (Democratic Convention of African Peoples). While Benin has been experiencing peaceful democratic elections since 1991, Togo has been experiencing post-election conflicts. Consequently, the political system in Togo is still termed “restricted democratic practice” (African Elections Database 2010). A comparative analysis of the political situations in these two countries from their political history, as indicated above, reveals that Benin had more democratic experience than Togo.

**Discussion of Electoral Systems**

Electoral systems are very crucial in determining how the political system must function within a particular nation. Farrell contends that “electoral systems determine the means by which votes are translated into seats in the process of electing politicians into office” (Farrell 2011:4). Electoral systems basically determine who is elected and who is not;
which political party gains power and which does not (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis, 2008). In fact, they are mechanisms set up to convert individual preferences into representatives, or some forms of decision-making groups. Designing such systems is a rational game and in order to win the game, parties have to understand the rules. Most often, parties do not understand the rules but play and lose. Understanding the rules means being able to analyze and interpret the key variables or components of an electoral system. These variables include: a) electoral formula (the type of electoral system used, and the kind of mathematical formula used to calculate the number of seats won by candidates or parties); b) district magnitude (the number of seats in each constituency or district); c) electoral threshold (whether legal or effective, thresholds are used to exclude extreme groups from the system); d) ballot structure (how do voters cast their ballots? Do they vote for a candidate, or a party, or both?); and e) district size and design (this deals with the population, territory, and ethnicity).

The existing literature on electoral systems suggests the existence of four main electoral system families: plurality/majority systems, proportional representation (PR) systems, mixed systems, and other systems (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis, 2008); or five types of electoral systems: single-member plurality (SMP), majority electoral system - which includes the two-round systems and the alternative vote - list systems of PR, mixed-member systems, and the single transferable vote (Farrell, 2011). In order to assure simplicity in the use of terminologies, and put an emphasis on their outcomes, this paper classifies electoral systems into three main types—majoritarian, proportional, and mixed systems.

In majoritarian electoral systems, either the candidate with the highest votes wins the election (plurality system), or the candidate with the absolute majority (greater than 50% of the votes) wins the election (majority system). They aim at maintaining and enhancing a stable government, a stable political system and what Lindberg (2005:44) calls “stable legislative majorities”. The majoritarian system is also believed to be simple and relatively easy to understand, and is used by voters compared to the other electoral systems. Another advantage is that each voter has a constituency Member of Parliament who can answer his/her concerns (Farrell, 2011). These systems are designed to favor bigger parties at the expense of smaller ones. In order not to have wasted votes, parties form strategic alliances. In practice, the majoritarian system leads to a two-party system in which elections are viewed in terms of zero-sum game where the winner takes all. Whenever parties start viewing elections strictly in terms of competition, they are open to anything including post-
Electoral System and its Impact on Democratization Process

This is one of the possible disadvantages of a majoritarian system. In addition, the implementation of this system, in many countries (especially in divided societies), leads to there being many wasted votes for minorities, for women, and for religious groups; these votes are not translated into seats. This situation makes it very difficult for small parties to be represented, with the exception of those cases in which they are concentrated in one region or constituency.

Proportional representation systems are assumed to minimize the disproportionality between the percentage of votes, and the percentage of seats gained by a party in parliament. The distinguishing characteristic of PR systems is that they use multi-member districts; the higher the district magnitude, the greater its proportionality is. To ensure the representativeness of their population, countries using PR systems reserve seats for minorities and women. This is what Lindberg (2005:45) terms “representative justice”. This is the idea that the legislature should mirror the society (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2008). The ultimate goal of such systems is the reduction of conflicts by seeking input from different groups and parties. Reynolds, et al. (2008:29) argues, “Proportionality is often seen as being best achieved by the use of party lists, where political parties present lists of candidates to the voters on a national or regional basis” or “voters’ rank-order candidates in multi-members districts”. Party lists tend to lower the possibility of having wasted votes and increase the representation of small parties in the parliament, therefore, voters tend to vote sincerely. It is always assumed that the more permissible an electoral system is, the more policy alternatives will be generated. However, in PR systems, even though coalitions are formed after elections because of policy issues, they are in most cases unstable. Most often this situation leads to gridlocks in the legislative body of the government and to some extent their incapability of formulating and adopting appropriate policies. Mixed systems are sometimes used in emerging democracies, such as in Burkina Faso and Senegal. This is a combination of some elements of both the majoritarian systems and proportional systems.

Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis (2008:1) argue, “The choice of the electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions for any democracy”. Battle and Seely (2007) also emphasize the importance of the choice of the electoral system in their article It’s all relative: Competing models of vote choice in Benin. Given that policymakers are the ones who determine the electoral laws, the party - or coalition of parties - in power always try very hard to choose the electoral system that can help them perpetuate their power. Therefore, the ruling parties will never opt for an electoral reform if their current electoral system is helping them to achieve
their ultimate goal: of holding onto power for as long as they can. Both Benin and Togo inherited the majoritarian electoral system from their former colonial power (France), and both countries used this system in the early 1960s during their first “democratic” elections. Although they maintained the colonial legacy of the majoritarian system on paper until the wave of the 1990s democratization, there was no room to actually practice it in both counties, as leaders in these countries had preferred the choice of military dictatorships and authoritarianism to democracy. On the one hand while the people power movements of the 1990s helped bring a dramatic change in the electoral system in Benin, they also helped resuscitate Togo’s majoritarian system.

a. Electoral Systems in Benin from 1990 to 2012

Benin led the democratization process in Africa as a whole, and in Francophone Africa in particular. The Sovereign National Conference in 1990 was very representative of all the socio-cultural, political and economic groups of the country (Nwajiaku, 1994; Creevey et al., 2005). According to Nwajiaku, participants at this SNC had only one objective: “to introduce a constitutional liberal democracy” (Nwajiaku 1994:429). This aim was successfully achieved by a series of negotiations leading to the adoption of an electoral system design comprised of - according to Creevey et al. (2005: 473) - a unicameral legislative, with 64 representatives elected by direct popular vote through the PR system using the Largest Remainder-Hare formula in all its multi-member electoral districts, and an executive president who was also elected by direct popular vote in a majoritarian Two-Round or Run-off system. While the president is elected for a 5-year term, renewable only once, the members of the National Assembly serve 4-year terms. It is very important to note that in 1991 there were six multi-member districts, which correspond to the six administrative districts. This number tripled in 1995 because of the re-districting of the six administrative districts. Prior to the 1999 elections, six additional administrative districts were added to the existing administrative districts. The 12 administrative districts were re-divided into 24 multi-member electoral districts (Creevey et al. 2005). These administrative districts include: Alibori, Libori, Atacora, Atlantique, Borgou, Collines, Couffo, Donga, Littoral Mono, Oueme, Plateau, and Zou. The number of seats in the legislative body also increased from 64 in 1991 to 84 in 1995 and remained so until the 2011 National Assembly elections (African Election Database 2011). Since 1991, Benin has
successfully held free and fair democratic elections (legislative and presidential). This paper focuses on the legislative elections.

Since the representation of the population is one of the main indicators of democracy, I calculate the disproportionality in the parliamentary elections held in the 1990s, where the results were fully provided. This is what happened in 1991 parliamentary elections in Benin. I then hypothesize that the lower the value of disproportionality, the more the population is represented and the more likely a country will be democratic. Using Gallagher’s disproportionality index $D = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (s_i - v_i)^2}$, where “$S_i$” represents the percentage of seats won by a party, and “$V_i$” the percentage of votes it received, the calculation of disproportionality in the 1991 legislative is approximately 3.94 (Table A about here). This disproportionality result is quite low and it indicates that the system is very fair and proportional. The election results; the calculations of effective numbers of parties; and the thresholds of representation and exclusion; are provided by Table B (see appendix A).

b. Electoral Systems in Togo from 1990 to 2012

The 1992 democratic constitution, approved by the Togolese voters through a constitutional referendum with 99.18% of the votes (African Election Database, 2011), was very clear regarding the country’s electoral system. Article 193 of the electoral code stated that both the president and members of the National Assembly must be elected by a direct popular vote using a Two-Round system, whereby the winner must receive the absolute majority (above 50% of the votes) for a 5-year term. While the president serves no more than two terms, members of the legislative body have no term limit. However, that constitution was modified multiple times after the 2002 mono-color National Assembly elections, which the coalition of the main opposition parties boycotted. The current constitution, which has become an object of contention between the political opposition and ruling coalition RPT/UFC, puts no term limit to the presidency. On the one hand, it profoundly changes the Two-Round majoritarian system of electing the president of the country, to the simple majority or plurality system (one round only). On the other hand, members of the National Assembly are elected by a direct popular vote, in single-member districts, using a closed-list proportional representation with no threshold (African Election Database 2010, Election Guide 2010). Nevertheless, since the unilateral reform of the electoral system - by the governing party - no election has taken place. Two questions come to mind: First, how can a proportional representation electoral system be
implemented in single-member districts? Second, if it is implemented, what will be the outcome?

As the literature reveals, the larger the district magnitude, the more proportional and fair the system is, therefore, in single-member districts, only stronger and bigger parties are likely to win seats. The legislative and presidential elections are scheduled to take place in 2012 and 2015, respectively. If this new electoral reform is implemented in the forthcoming legislative elections, the outcome will be consistent with the SMP system, rather than the PR system the ruling party is promoting. Again, using Gallagher’s disproportionality index \( D = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (s_i - v_i)^2} \), the calculation of disproportionality in the electoral system during the 2007 legislative elections in Togo is \( D = 18.01 \) (Table D). This result is very high and more consistent with a plurality SMP system than a proportional one. Table B (see appendix A) provides the 2007 National Assembly election results. The calculations of effective numbers of parties, and the thresholds of representation and exclusion, are provided by Table E (see appendix A).

**Discussion of the Findings**

In Benin, the threshold of representation is 3.62%, and the threshold of exclusion is 6.76%. This shows that it is possible for a party to win a seat under the most favorable conditions if it passes at least 3.62% of the votes. The threshold of exclusion of 6.76% implies that even if a party receives that percentage of the votes, it will not win a seat, however, if the party wins more than the 6.76% of the votes, it will be guaranteed a seat. In Togo, both the threshold of representation and the threshold of exclusion are very high (50% each); this means that smaller parties are less likely to be represented in the country’s National Assembly. The higher likelihood of the exclusion of smaller parties, minorities, and genders - in the majoritarian electoral system in Togo - is shown in the calculation of disproportionality. In fact, the disproportionality estimate in Togo is extremely high (\( D = 18.01 \)) compared to that of Benin (\( D = 3.94 \)). For example, in the 2007 legislative elections in Togo, under the SMP electoral system, the three main parties won the percentage of votes and the number of seats as shown in the table below:
### Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rally for the Togolese People (RPT)</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Forces for Change (UFC)</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Committee for Renewal (CAR)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: African Election Database, Published 2011

If the electoral system being used was a PR system in multi-member districts, using the quota systems for allocating seats, the election results would have been completely different. Many smaller parties would have won seats. Tables I and J (see appendix B) show how seats would have been proportionally distributed among bigger and smaller parties, in the 2007 legislative elections in Togo.

### Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

What are the findings? This paper has discovered that the electoral systems in Benin and Togo are built in with low and high disproportionality, respectively. There is also a higher level of representation in the legislative body in Benin, than there is in Togo. These findings seem to support our hypothesis that “the lower the value of disproportionality, the more the population is represented, and the more likely a country will be democratic." In all, while Togo’s Freedom Score - which is the average of civil liberties score (4) and political rights score (5) - is 4.5, Benin scores 2, with 2 as the civil liberties score and 2 as the political rights score (Freedom House, 2011). These freedom scores classify Togo and Benin as partly free, and totally free, respectively. The free status given to Benin is a result of many factors, including the constitutional and electoral reforms in the early 1990s, and in respect of constitutional guarantees of freedom of press and speech, and freedom of assembly. These constitutional rights allowed the politicized Beninese press to be very critical of both the ruling coalition government, and the political opposition leaders. Because of the respect of freedom of assembly in Benin, “all political parties, regardless of ethnic or regional affiliation, operate freely throughout the country” (Freedom House, 2011). Since 1990, Benin has held six parliamentary elections using a party-list proportional representation system, and five presidential elections using a majority popular vote Two-Round system. Both the parliamentary and the presidential elections are relatively not
only peaceful, but also free and fair. This feat has earned Benin the reputation of having a stable democracy.

Unlike Benin, Togo is still struggling to meet the democratic standards that are among others free and fair elections. However, based on its history, the choice of the majoritarian electoral system did not allow the country to achieve that goal. The reason is that, in this electoral system, elections are always viewed in terms of the winner-take-all or in what I term here as: zero-sum thinking. With this in mind, in most cases, parties use any means just to win elections without thinking of the collective interests of their country. This has resulted in post-election violence in Togo since 1990, due to vote rigging, intimidations, and the repeated use of military, and security forces, to severely repress peaceful protests and demonstrations in the name of restoring security and order by the regime in place. The 1998, 2003, 2005 and 2010 post-election political unrests illustrate this well. In these elections, many voters felt that they were cheated, and therefore their votes were nothing but wasted. An electoral system in which elections are viewed as win-win situations, allowing a fair representation of various groups including both social groups and political parties, would be a better solution to prevent the post-election conflicts that are undermining the prospect of democracy in Togo.

The 2007 legislative election results in Togo clearly shows how smaller parties are discriminated against in the SMP majoritarian system (see Table C). Therefore, this paper recommends that Togo use a party-list proportional representation in multi-member constituencies for its legislative elections. To ensure that this PR system mirrors the Togolese population, the quota systems can be used as a tool for transferring votes into seats (see Tables I and J). Smaller parties, such as the Democratic Convention of African Peoples; the Patriotic Pan-African Convergence; the Party of Democrats for Renewal; and many others, that were not able to win seats under the SMP system; gained seats when both the Hare Formula-Largest Remainder and the Droop Quota systems were applied in the 2007 elections in Togo. To be more specific, Togo may now adopt the PR electoral system and use the Largest Remainder-Hare formula to allocate seats in order to prevent future post-election political instabilities (one of the main hindrances of democracy). The main reason is that, as Farrell puts it, “lower quotas result in more seats to parties receiving a full quota and fewer being allocated by remainders, and therefore somewhat less proportional results” (Farrell (2011:69). Given that the Largest Remainder-Hare formula has the largest quota, smaller parties may not necessarily win seat(s) during the “full quotas” distribution stage, but they have another good chance of getting seat(s) allocated by the remainders.
According to Creevey et al. (2005: 473), Benin has been using the Largest Remainder-Hare formula. Given that, during the 2011 elections (parliamentary and presidential), there were reports of minor irregularities and incidents, there is also a need for Benin to continuously seek to improve its electoral system. Comparing the results of how the two quota systems address the issue of equitability in allocating seats using the 1991 parliamentary elections in Benin as an example (see Tables F and G), Benin will still be better off if it maintains its current Largest Remainder-Hare formula. In order to strengthen its democracy, there should be no immediate need for Benin to change its formula for translating votes into seats. However, it may want to look carefully at how elections are being monitored and managed in order to increase the people’s trust in Beninese electoral institutions. The more people feel that elections are properly managed in their country, the lower the likelihood for that country to experience post-election conflicts, or instabilities.

Works Cited


### Table A: Calculation of Disproportionality in Benin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/[Coalition]</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>% of Seats</th>
<th>(% of Votes-% of Seats)</th>
<th>(% of Votes-% of Seats) squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union for the Triumph of Democratic Renewal [UTRD]</td>
<td>18.86%</td>
<td>18.75%</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.0121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party-National Union for Solidarity and Progress [PSD-UNSP]</td>
<td>9.84%</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>-2.66</td>
<td>7.0756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rally for Democracy (RND)</td>
<td>12.08%</td>
<td>10.9375%</td>
<td>1.1425</td>
<td>1.30530625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Common Cause (NCC)</td>
<td>10.13%</td>
<td>9.375%</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>0.570025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Movement for Democracy and Development-Movement for Solidarity, Union, and Progress-Union for Democracy and National Reconstruction [MNDD-MSUP-UDRN]</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
<td>9.375%</td>
<td>-0.975</td>
<td>0.950625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for Democracy and National Solidarity (UDS)</td>
<td>7.08%</td>
<td>7.8125%</td>
<td>-0.7325</td>
<td>0.53655625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Previous Percentage</td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally of Liberal Democrats for National Reconstruction (RDL-Vivoten)</td>
<td>5.62%</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>0.3969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Social Democracy-Bloc for Social Democracy [ASD-BSD]</td>
<td>3.47%</td>
<td>4.6875%</td>
<td>-1.2175</td>
<td>1.48230625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Democracy and Progress-Democratic Union for Social Renewal [ADP-UDRS]</td>
<td>3.76%</td>
<td>3.125%</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td>0.403225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP)</td>
<td>3.07%</td>
<td>1.5625%</td>
<td>1.5075</td>
<td>2.27255625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Republican Union-National Labor Party [URP-PNT]</td>
<td>1.99%</td>
<td>1.5625%</td>
<td>0.4275</td>
<td>0.18275625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union for Social and Economic Development (UDES)</td>
<td>2.51%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>6.3001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builders and Managers of Freedom and Development (BGLD)</td>
<td>1.49%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>2.2201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>30.9860581</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ D = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (s_i - v_i)^2} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}(30.9860581)} = 3.936118526 \]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/[Coalition]</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>(% of Votes)^2</th>
<th>Number of Seats (64)</th>
<th>% of Seats</th>
<th>(% of Seats)^2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union for the Triumph of Democratic Renewal [UTRD]</td>
<td>18.86%</td>
<td>0.03556996</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18.75%</td>
<td>0.035156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party for Democracy and Development-Democratic Renewal Party [PNDD-PRD]</td>
<td>11.72%</td>
<td>0.01373584</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.0625%</td>
<td>0.019768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party-National Union for Solidarity and Progress [PSD-UNSP]</td>
<td>9.84%</td>
<td>0.00968256</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>0.015625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rally for Democracy (RND)</td>
<td>12.08%</td>
<td>0.01459264</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.9375%</td>
<td>0.0196289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Common Cause (NCC)</td>
<td>10.13%</td>
<td>0.01026169</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.375%</td>
<td>0.0087890625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Movement for Democracy and Development-Movement for Solidarity, Union, and Progress-Union for Democracy and National Reconstruction [MNDD-MSUP-UDRN]</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
<td>0.007056</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.375%</td>
<td>0.0087890625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for Democracy and National Solidarity (UDS)</td>
<td>7.08%</td>
<td>0.00501264</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.8125%</td>
<td>0.006103515625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally of Liberal Democrats for National Reconstruction (RDL-Vivoten)</td>
<td>5.62%</td>
<td>0.00315844</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
<td>0.00390625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Margin of Error</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Overall Percent</td>
<td>Margin of Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Social Democracy-Bloc for Social Democracy [ASD-BSD]</td>
<td>3.47%</td>
<td>0.00120409</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.6875%</td>
<td>0.002197265625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Democracy and Progress-Democratic Union for Social Renewal [ADP-UDRS]</td>
<td>3.76%</td>
<td>0.00141376</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.125%</td>
<td>0.009765625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP)</td>
<td>3.07%</td>
<td>0.0094249</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5625%</td>
<td>0.00244140625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Republican Union-National Labor Party [URP-PNT]</td>
<td>1.99%</td>
<td>0.0039601</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5625%</td>
<td>0.00244140625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union for Social and Economic Development (UDES)</td>
<td>2.51%</td>
<td>0.0063001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builders and Managers of Freedom and Development (BGLD)</td>
<td>1.49%</td>
<td>0.0022201</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (S)</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.12359282</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.126945481</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.09</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.88</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ N=1/S \]
Laakso-Taagepera Index

1. Effective Number of Parties
   a. LEGISLATIVE PARTIES (SEATS) \( N = \frac{1}{\sum s_i^2} \)
      \( N = \frac{1}{0.126945481} = 7.88 \)
   b. ELECTORAL PARTIES (VOTES) \( N = \frac{1}{\sum v_i^2} \)
      \( N = \frac{1}{0.12359282} = 8.09 \)

2. The Threshold of Exclusion
   a. Upper Threshold = \( \frac{100\%}{(M + 1)} \), with \( M = 13.8 \)
      = \( \frac{100\%}{14.8} \)
      = 6.76%

3. The Threshold of Representation (Inclusion)
   a. Lower Threshold = \( \frac{100\%}{2M} \), with \( M = 13.8 \)
      = \( \frac{100\%}{2*13.8} = \frac{100\%}{27.6} \)
      = 3.62%

4. The Effective Threshold (Teff)
   \( Teff = \frac{(Upper\ Threshold + Lower\ Threshold)}{2} \)
   = (6.76% + 3.62%)/2
   = 10.38%/2
   = 5.19%
### Table C: The 2007 National Assembly Election Results in Togo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th># of Seats</th>
<th>% of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rally for the Togolese People</td>
<td>922,636</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>61.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Forces for Change</td>
<td>867,507</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Committee for Renewal</td>
<td>192,618</td>
<td>08.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Convention of African Peoples</td>
<td>38,347</td>
<td>01.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic Pan-African Convergence Party</td>
<td>43,898</td>
<td>01.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democrats for Renewal</td>
<td>24,260</td>
<td>01.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>254,842</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,344,108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table D: Calculation of Disproportionality in Togo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% of Votes- % of Seats</th>
<th>(% of Votes- % of Seats)squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rally for the Togolese People</td>
<td>-22.33</td>
<td>498.6289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Forces for Change Action</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>13.4689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Renewal</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>10.6276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Convention of African Peoples</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic Pan-African Convergence Party of</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats for Renewal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>118.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>648.7054</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ D = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (s_i - v_i)^2} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} (648.7054)} = 18.01 \]

\[ D = 18.01 \]
Table E: Calculation of effective Number of Parties in Togo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>(% of Votes) Squared</th>
<th>% of Seats</th>
<th>(% of Seats) Squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rally for the Togolese People</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.155236</td>
<td>0.6173</td>
<td>0.38105929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Forces for Change</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.1369</td>
<td>0.3333</td>
<td>0.11108889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Committee for Renewal</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.006724</td>
<td>0.0494</td>
<td>0.00244036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Convention of African Peoples</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.000256</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriotic Pan-African Convergence</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.000361</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democrats for Renewal</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.011881</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>0.311458</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td><strong>0.494589</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Effective Number of Parties**
   a. LEGISLATIVE PARTIES (SEATS) \( N = \frac{1}{\sum s_i^2} \)
      \( N = \frac{1}{0.494589} = 2.02 \)
   b. ELECTORAL PARTIES (VOTES) \( N = \frac{1}{\sum v_i^2} \)
      \( N = \frac{1}{0.311458} = 3.21 \)

2. **The Threshold of Exclusion**
   Upper Threshold = 100%/(M + 1), with M = 1
   = 100%/(1+1)
   = 50%

3. **The Threshold of Representation (Inclusion)**
   Lower Threshold = 100%/(2M), with M = 1
   = 100%/(2*1) = 100%/2
   = 50%

4. **The Effective Threshold (Teff)**
   \( \text{Teff} = \frac{(\text{Upper Threshold} + \text{Lower Threshold})}{2} \)
   = (50% + 50%)/2
   = 100%/2
   = 50%