Grammar, Expressiveness, and Inter-subjective Meanings
Grammar, Expressiveness, and Inter-subjective Meanings:

*Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology*

By
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To my father,
whose name I sculpted out of my memory with a penknife.
Just because “death” cannot be the final word.
And I remember... whenever I ask him how he feels about life,
and it was like his balloonist thoughts spoken
through the silence of his eyes and meant Job’s words:

“My soul is weary of my life;
I will leave my complaint upon myself;
I will speak in the bitterness of my soul.”
(Job, 10: 1).
“plus loquitur inquisitio quam inventio”
– Saint Augustine: Confessions.

“The Red Queen shook her head. ‘You may call it nonsense if you like’, she said, ‘but I’ve heard nonsense, compared with which that would be as sensible as a dictionary!’”
– Lewis Carroll: Through the Looking-Glass.

“I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own”
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EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS

The use of abbreviations is most frequent in relation to formal matters (appendixes, notes, glossaries, bibliographies, tables, lists, and other indexes). In the present research, the following list of abbreviations in accordance to The Chicago Manual of Style (14th edition) have been used.

- ap., apud, according to;
- app., appendix;
- ca., circa, about, approximately;
- cf., confer, compare;
- chap., chapter (pl. chaps.);
- ed., editor (pl. eds.); edition; edited by;
- e.g., exempli gratia, for example;
- Eng., English;
- et al., et alii, and others;
- etc., et cetera, and so forth;
- f., and following (pl. ff.);
- fn., footnote;
- Ger., German;
- Gr., Greek;
- i.e., id est, that is;
- inf., infra, below;
- introd., introduction;
- org., organized;
- p., page (pl. pp.);
- pass., passim, throughout;
- pub., publication, publisher, published by;
- sec., section (pl. secs.);
- Sp., Spanish;
- sup., supra, above;
- trans., translated;
- viz., videlicet, namely
- vs., versus.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IN REFERENCES TO WORKS BY WITTGENSTEIN

For convenience in the references, the following abbreviations, listed in alphabetical order, are used to refer to Wittgenstein’s published works. Wittgenstein wrote for the most part in numbered paragraphs, except in the case of BB, LWPP-II and Part II of PI. For this reason, the writings with paragraphs are cited by the symbol §, which indicates, precisely, the paragraph number. The writings without divisions, in sequential text, are cited only by the page number.

BB The Blue and Brown Books.
BT «The ‘Big Typescript’» (these are §§ 86-93 of the original typescript TS 213).
CV Culture and Value.
LC Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief.
LPP Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-47.
LSD «The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience».
LWL Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33.
LWPP-I Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology-I.
LWPP-II Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology-II.
LWVC Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle.
NB Notebooks – 1914-1916.
NFL «Notes for Lectures on ‘Private Experience’ and ‘Sense Data’».
NPL «Notes for the ‘Philosophical Lecture’».
OC On Certainty.
PG Philosophical Grammar.
PI Philosophical Investigations.
PO Philosophical Occasions – 1912-1951.
PR Philosophical Remarks.
RFM Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.
ROC Remarks on Colour.
RPP-I Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology-I.
RPP-II Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology-II.
SRLF «Some Remarks on Logical Form».
TLP Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
WLC Wittgenstein’s Conversations 1949-1951.
Z Zettel.
INTRODUCTION

“A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar.”
(Wittgenstein, PI: 222).

The present research is based on a central philosophical subject, Wittgenstein on linguistic expression. It is structured around a triple purpose: to present, to analyse and to discuss Wittgenstein’s sense of the above-mentioned concept of “linguistic expression”.

“Expression” is a fundamental concept of the philosophy of psychology as well as of some of its language theories. In several remarks and writings, namely his last works on the philosophy of psychology, Wittgenstein deals with a language conception where the use of this concept plays a decisive role, e.g. in such sentences as “expression of toothache”, “expression of a sensation”, “expression of an experience”, “expression of understanding of a piece of music” or “expression of understanding”. The same occurs in this research. The natural dynamics of the philosophical approach and discussion on the subject of linguistic expression places the obligation to cover all of the writings of Wittgenstein, who remarked in the «Preface» to PI that he was forced to move criss-crossing in all directions through a vast area of thought. Consequently, PI “is really only an album”. In Wittgenstein’s words:

“I have written down all these thoughts as remarks, short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject, while I sometimes make a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another.” (PI: vii).

It is often possible to diagnose breaks, different subjects and variations of themes or links in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts. If we call a given Wittgensteinian writing a complete and finished “work”, e.g. PI, we must not forget that there was a process of improvement carried out by Wittgenstein. The subject of linguistic expression is inseparable from other subjects and concepts, such as language-game, form of life, meaning, sense of a proposition, expressing an emotion, experience of
meaning, the grammar of words, understanding, signs or mental images. Wittgenstein discusses these subjects and concepts in several writings.

Wittgenstein’s aphoristic style presents a difficulty: he brings together many aspects of his thought in one single fragment and it is hard to connect these fragments as a coherent whole. The result for the reader is that Wittgenstein’s remarks remain insufficiently clear. On the other hand, there is not normally only one interpretation among Wittgenstein’s readers about his philosophical remarks and there does not seem to be much agreement as to what he wanted to say. I confess that I simply cannot find definite ideas in Wittgenstein’s writings. However, as I point out in the inaugural Augustinian epigraph, *plus loquitur inquisitio quam inventio*, the research is more loquacious by searching than by discovering; and I am pleased by the fact that Joachim Schulte was one of the first to emphasize in a full account this philosophical uncertainty:

“To be sure, it sometimes looks as if he wanted to defend a certain thought in a clear-cut and definitive way, but in most cases it suffices to read on for a while to see that he has changed his attitude and in now looking at the relevant question in an entirely different light.” (Schulte, 2003: v).

Except in *TLP*, Wittgenstein’s presentation of his thought is fragmentary and unsystematic. For this reason, it is difficult to understand his thought as a whole or in a larger context, as well. However, his remarked thought is fascinating and exercises a great deal of influence. Many Wittgenstein interpreters, I include myself amongst them, remain fascinated by his philosophical thought: philosophical thought that is in some parts obscure, enigmatic and consequently incomprehensible.

In his notes from 26th of December 1948, Wittgenstein wrote: “Almost the whole time I am writing conversations with myself. Things I say to myself tête-à-tête.” (*CV*: 88).

These aspects do not attribute, *prima facie*, a sense of unity to his writings. For this reason, Wittgenstein does not follow traditional philosophical activity either. The philosophers who constructed tradition in philosophy have behaved as if they had a *philosophia perennis*, in which the eternal problems would always be put by the nature of things and not by the nature of language.

Through a descriptive methodology, Wittgenstein subjugates the philosophical activity in general to a given “form of life”, i.e. to a set of collective practices where “language-games” take an essential part. Attacking the traditional method and proposing a new philosophical investigation into the pathologic working of our language, he aims towards the destruction or disappearance of traditional philosophy.
Most interpretations of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are represented in *TLP*, written and published during the first quarter of the 20th century, and in *PI*, written and rewritten during the last twenty years of Wittgenstein’s life and published shortly after his death. *TLP* and *PI*, regarded as the only reliable expositions of Wittgenstein’s earlier and later philosophy, were published well before most of his other posthumously published writings became available. Moreover, there has been an ever-increasing literature based on different personal interpretations of these two books.

Accordingly, initiating this academic work, I consider important, *in primis*, to justify the choice of the respective subject. In this specific case, to point out where the relevance lies when speaking of the linguistic expression within the scope of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. I assume that the idea is consensual or, at least permissible, that the last phase of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is linguistic psychology. Therefore, I justify the study of linguistic expression as a peculiar perspective on the expressive use of ordinary language, centred on a hybrid disciplinary area, necessarily that of the philosophy of psychology.

As I consider that philosophy is essentially aporetic, I have chosen and defined “linguistic expression” as the theme-problem, i.e. as subject or base of dispute to be developed and to be proved (analytical exercise) and as a controversial question to be understood (investigation exercise), taking into account the following five factors:

First, the restlessness that stimulates the interrogation of the conditions of social use of language, lies on the contradiction that this serves either for the agreement or for the misunderstanding between the speakers of a given language (mainly when what is in cause, necessarily, is the expressive capacity of the ordinary processes of linguistic expression of experience or of its content).

Secondly, the paradoxical assumption of what I understand to designate as “semantic inter-subjectivity”, as if it were possible, in fact, to transfer our subjectivity to our interlocutor by means of the common use of a common linguistic capacity that, however, would be capable of eliminating the aporias that covers the processes of linguistic expression of the experience.

Thirdly, the importance of the theme-problem to understand the way how the interpersonal communication processes are developed, in terms of expressive effectiveness, irrespective of following the regulation and normality imposed by the grammatical instance of a language.

Fourthly, Wittgenstein’s originality either in presenting this theme-problem as central to understanding the scope of study of philosophy,
psychology and other similar sciences or for having developed an innovative conceptual analysis based on the therapeutic task of language.

And fifthly, to contribute by presenting the possibility of discussing Wittgenstein’s last ideas on the relation between experience and language.

In relation to this last factor, I have agreed to consider this as Wittgenstein’s “anthropological perspective of language”, according to which, lato sensu, there is a necessary and complementary relation between experience and language, from where emerge the subjectivity of linguistic expression, the affectation of the meaning by the experience and the problem of language use inherent on the conditions of exteriority, rationality and regulation. These are, from my point of view, some original aspects that I intend to explore in this research.

Therefore, taking into account this perspective and its interest, this discussion is my contribution to the study of the linguistic expression theme-problem. First of all, I will underline the subjective or philosophical relativism, on the whole, ascribed to Wittgenstein’s language use. In the 1940’s and, more specifically, in his last six years of life (1946-51) Wittgenstein’s writings followed a reticent orientation, possibly due to the fact that he did not have much opportunity to do so or because he had many doubts, although he did work on certainty, experience, the content of the experience, the expression of the experience, psychological themes and problems, the clarification of psychological concepts, etc.

I intend to underline this orientation, considering firstly that Wittgenstein’s remarks on language are characterized by a pragmatic position, according to which linguistic use is conditioned by language-games that work as life forms (in spite of this anthropological perspective of language, it is acceptable to think about the subjective use of language); secondly, Wittgenstein is concerned with the reciprocal understanding of the human experience and the nature of language, as well as to characterize the psychological phenomenon; thirdly, not everything can be expressed linguistically or, at least, be expressed through signs (for this reason, the role of language as the vehicle of experience is questioned); fourthly, the importance of the social factor (of the common linguistic use) as more fundamental than the grammatical factor in the expressive use of language; and fifthly, the idea of each interlocutor being the centre of their linguistic system and the grounding for the capacity or personal ability for this language use.

The heading Grammar, Expressiveness, and Inter-subjective Meanings: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology presents both the central concern of his research and the importance of the ordinary ways of expressing experience. These means are like linguistics expressions of a subjective
inwardness; inwardness that is, however, understood by the interlocutors when it is exteriorized. The definition of the heading is concerned with explaining or, at least, suggesting succinctly and clearly the nature of the research itself. The heading discloses the specificity of the subject (the linguistic expression), the problem under discussion (language and experience), the disciplinary framing (between the approaches of philosophy and psychology) and the underlying critical perspective (that of Wittgenstein’s perspective).

I intend to explore the conceptual relations between “experience” and “expression”, stressing the role of language, i.e. questioning language as a device or mechanism commanded by expression, representation or formation of the idiosyncratic conception of experience or reality. The present research cannot fail to make an interconnected approach, because the underlying concepts and subjects are reciprocally involved. In the five chapters of the research, the repeated references to certain concepts and subjects have the purpose of highlighting the main point of the question, which is the most fundamental, and to strengthen the idea of unity and coherence of the research.

Nevertheless, it was difficult to find and to follow a clear and gradual plan of study. These two characteristics (the clearness and the progressiveness) were obtained through a simple structure and an immediate understanding of what is intended with each chapter or section.

In this way, Chapter One deals with the general topic of the introduction and presentation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. This disciplinary field is characterized by the Wittgensteinian therapeutic aim in philosophy (sec. 1.1.) and its language criticism (sec. 1.2.). This introductory chapter progresses towards a particular question: the Wittgensteinian genealogy of linguistic expression (sec. 1.3.). This last concept of linguistic expression is objectively exposed in citations from Wittgenstein’s writings, in order to define and to legitimise what it is understood by this question.

Chapter Two tries to ground Wittgenstein’s concern with language expression from TLP to PI. The aim is to understand the philosophical inflection in his two main and well-known works. There are evident changes in Wittgenstein’s treatment of philosophical subjects, such as Arthur Schopenhauer’s influence in his solipsistic idea of “I” and language conception (sec. 2.1.). Wittgenstein digresses from the main subject about meaning. From naming to usage, that is to say: from a language conception as denomination between words and things to a language conception as a meaningful use of words standing for things and sensations, according to rule-following of the grammatical game (sec.
Chapter Two concludes the Wittgensteinian argument against the use of the word “I” as a name, *stricto sensu*, and also against the Schopenhauerian solipsism of *TLP*, *lato sensu* (sec. 2.3.); both criticisms are presented in the preceding two sections.

In this thematic sequence, Chapter Three specifically broaches the pragmatic conception of the expression according to three main aspects: the confrontation of expression with different processes of impression (sec. 3.1.); processes of description (sec. 3.2.); and processes of dissimulation (sec. 3.3.).

The structure proceeds with Chapter Four, which is about Wittgenstein’s remarks on psychological experiences and focuses on meaning discussions, i.e. what Wittgenstein means by the general experience of meaning (sec. 4.1.); the meaning of an aspect (sec. 4.2.); and the meaning-blindness (sec. 4.3.). He was concerned with the meaning subject, particularly and respectively with the visual experience of “seeing as...”; the difficulty of understanding and perceiving the changes in meaning; and the establishment of the habitual meaning.

Finally, Chapter Five deals with the central relationship between language and experience or public signs of a language system and mental images of subjective experiences. In *PI*, Wittgenstein draws our attention to the case of the expression of expectations (sec. 5.1.) and to the importance of the use of words, according to their philosophical grammar (sec. 5.2.). These two subjects, for example, invite us to inquire what means “to understand a word” (sec. 5.3.). All those possible and appropriate questions converge on one of his preferred ideas, that of language as a form of life (sec. 5.4.), with which I bring to an end the research structure and its purpose of presenting, analysing and discussing Wittgenstein’s sense of the concept “linguistic expression”.

Disregarding these indications about the structure of the research, a more perfect way to justify and characterise the present philosophical research necessarily passes through three relevant points, i.e. the reference to the «State of the question» on linguistic expression; the «Analytical perspective» about the state of the question; and the «Justification of the analytical perspective», namely in accordance to its originality and its contributions to the theme-problem understanding.

**State of the question**

Much has been written about Wittgenstein’s philosophy, in general, and his language-game conception, in particular. Since Wittgenstein’s death, there has been more and more philosophical interest in relation to
his life and work. Some authors clearly evidence this (e.g. Kenny, 2006: 1 ff.; Frongia & McGuinness, 1990: vi; Hintikka, 1991: 183). Awareness of this fact guided my concern to satisfy my personal will to dedicate myself to the study of Wittgenstein’s last writings on the philosophy of psychology. This concern took me to consider that, if his writings in general had already been much read, analyzed, understood, interpreted, argued and criticized, the same had not occurred with the last writings (from 1945 to 1949) dedicated to the so-called philosophy of psychology and the nature of certain psychological concepts. Subjects about linguistic expression, experience or psychological concepts are equally important, but these topics in his philosophy of psychology have been a lamentably neglected area of study.

On this specific subject, however, I must highlight three remarkable books among the many interesting works inspired by Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In order of publication, these studies are: *Experience & Expression – Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology*, by Joachim Schulte; *Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology*, by Malcolm Budd; and *Beyond the Inner and the Outer – Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology*, by Michel Ter Hark.

The first one represents a laudable reconstruction of the distinctive features of Wittgenstein’s conceptual elucidations (i.e. manuscripts 130-8 that Wittgenstein wrote in the years 1946 to 1949) chiefly concerning the nature of some psychological concepts, the connection between instinctive reactions, linguistic and non-linguistic context, the mastery of a technique, the clarification of the concepts “thinking”, “experience”, “sensation” and “understanding”. This book provides illuminating contributions to the specific area of the philosophy of psychology and, as its title indicates, it was helpful for my research. I am not so much interested either in language-games or even in the classifications of psychological concepts that Schulte presents, but I am influenced, to a certain extent, by the subjects of expression and experience, both of which were treated by Schulte. Among the above-mentioned three books, this is the only one that alludes to the central Wittgensteinian concept of “meaning blindness”. As Schulte says in his «Introduction», the chapters of his book are meant to clarify hidden or obscure remarks in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts on the philosophy of psychology and to point out certain conceptual connections and developments in his thinking during the late forties. The five chapters of my research are written having similar aims as those of Schulte in his book.

The second study is also a fruitful approach, but, unlike the previous book, Malcolm Budd has not attempted to provide a comprehensive
treatment of Wittgenstein’s work in the philosophy of psychology. As he says in the «Preface», on one hand it is hard to understand what this would be and, on the other, it would not be desirable. The book is a selection of topics that highlight, according to Budd, the distinctive features of Wittgenstein’s approach to the philosophy of psychology.

The last one provides an interesting analysis of the whole of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology, namely his unpublished notebooks and manuscripts written between 1929 and 1951, and focuses both on the role of the context of meaning and on the agreement of forms of life and the mental perspective on first and third person statements. Michel Ter Hark explores the relation between Wittgenstein’s writings and the philosophical psychology of William James and the Gestalt psychology of Wolfgang Köhler. This study underlines important aspects, e.g. the writings on psychological concepts, the use of psychological concepts in the first and the third person and Wittgenstein’s treatment of some central concepts, such as “language-game”, “seeing-as”, “emotion”, “image”, etc.

When different readers (e.g. Schulte, Budd, Hark or myself) deal with Wittgenstein’s writings and take them as source of philosophical investigations, it is natural that the final work should treat the same subjects and themes. Therefore, it is difficult to present some original issues concerning the same domain as Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology, i.e. some innovative and singular approach which does not represent a speculative, imaginative and unbecoming perspective that must necessarily be unique.

From my perspective, the above-mentioned noteworthy studies on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology do not pay particular attention to linguistic expression. In brief, the well-known monographs on Wittgenstein, written about him and his philosophy, have said little or almost nothing about some important topics that I analyse in my research, namely: linguistic expression, the first person statement, the use and the misunderstanding of the word “I”, the “dissimulation” concept, the meaning of “seeing-as”, meaning-blindness, the experience of meaning, the use of public signs for mental images, the grammar of the word “pain” or the meaning of “understanding”.

I have however learned a great deal from these studies. The large number and great variety of psychological concepts that Wittgenstein examines and their philosophical implications in relation to language use are treated, in general, by these three different mentioned approaches. But, as I said, these works do not exhaust the analytical scope that the present research intends to fill, because, firstly, I give priority to the selectivity of
the linguistic expression of the experience, which I consider the main theme-problem; secondly, I concentrate on the respective area of the philosophy of psychology, on the basis of writings that are yet little known and studied, like *RPP* and *LWPP*. For instance, the works already published are not aimed at approaching linguistic expression as a singular characteristic of the expressive use of language.

These writings make no reference to a problem related to expression that I consider as being quite important: meaning-blindness. As the expressive and subjective use of language is the central aspect of the present research, the defined theme-problem, *per se*, reveals the necessary and sufficient pertinence, actuality, interest and academic importance, as I have already pointed out.

The grounding for the choice of linguistic expression as the theme-problem and as starting point should, however, be complemented by the analysis of the state of the question. Thus, it becomes pertinent to understand what is generally understood by linguistic psychology or philosophy of the psychology of Wittgenstein and particularly by linguistic expression. Both understandings are dealt and summed up in Chapter One (the first, in secs. 1.1. and 1.2.; the second in sec. 1.3.).

As Wittgenstein did not think of writing an integral work about topics on the philosophy of psychology, his thoughts are registered and dispersed throughout various writings. I understand, however, that of all Wittgenstein’s philosophical production (published mostly posthumously) his last writings, namely in the domain of the philosophy of psychology, lack a deep and clear analytic approach as is evidenced by their titles.

The two volumes of *RPP* and *LWPP* are the main written works where these subjects were approached in an exhaustive way and, to certain extent, repeat those subjects *ipsis verbis*. Georg Henrik von Wright and Heikki Nyman, editors of *RPP* and *LWPP* for Basil Blackwell’s editions, point out in the «Preface» of the respective first volumes, that both *LWPP* and *RPP*, are not based on typescripts, although the subject approached is the same.

In effect, the status of the subject of linguistic expression hinges on the fact that in everyday conversations the use of preconceived expressions to refer to the contents of internal experiences seems to constitute an unconditional linguistic *praxis*. It is the specific case of psychological propositions of the type “I have a headache”, which, for Wittgenstein, acquire the statute of exteriorizations. The possibility of their being linguistic expressions of experience is a singular characteristic of this type of proposition. This possibility, however, only occurs because the so-
called exteriorization assumes the form of an utterance of a seemingly affirmative statement of the type “I have a headache.”

This aspect appears superficially suggested in § 363 of PI, where Wittgenstein asks how can anything be communicated and questions when it can be affirmed that a thing has effectively been communicated. In spite of the complexity of the so-called language-game “to communicate”, the speakers consider communicating with each other to be natural, as if a listener grasped the sense of the words of the speaker, as if it were an action of welcoming them into his own mind.

Apart from this linguistic aspect, any exteriorization should be understood, according to Wittgenstein, as a sophisticated form of exteriorising the corresponding experience (the associated sensations). In this way, linguistic expressions substitute more primitive pain-behaviours (such as the scream, the cry, the groan or certain gestures). As language forms are adapted to the circumstances to which they intend to refer, there is a displacement of meaning (particular to propositions on the material reality of objects and facts) and a greater demand to understand the intended linguistic expression, since it cannot have, prima facie, an objective and clear exteriorization and linguistic understanding of the experience.

The concept “exteriorization” or “linguistic expression” is used many times by Wittgenstein, if we understand it as the translation of Äusserung; a term translated from the German into English by G. E. M. Anscombe, in RPP-I, and by C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Que, in RPP-II and in LWPP-I, as “utterance”, “expression”, “manifestation”, “statement” and “saying”. In spite of “exteriorization” appearing to a certain degree ambiguous or indefinite (because it can also mean “expression”, “manifestation” or “demonstration”), all these synonyms indicate a meaning and a linguistic context for the term. Therefore, I understand the concept “exteriorization” as a “manifestation” and a “linguistic expression”. Commonly we conceive this term to mean an act or an outcome of exteriorization, i.e. to make external, to manifest or to express an outer demonstration of inner content. It is in this sense that Wittgenstein characterizes certain uses of psychological expressions (constituted in the first person present tense) as exteriorizations (RPP-I: pass.).

Starting from the idea that expression is opposed to description, the concept “expression” (i.e. “exteriorization”) was introduced by Wittgenstein in PI and is also distinguished from the concept “communication” (Mitteilung). As I will mention ahead (cf. sec. 3.1. inf.) communication is a general, multifaceted and ambiguous process or
activity of conveying information, unlike an expression which involves always subjective elements. Though there is a verbal and non-verbal communication and there is a verbal and non-verbal expression, I am dealing in my research with the former kind of expression: the verbal one (avowals, exteriorization-utterances about our own inner experiences) i.e. the linguistic expression used in psychological sentences in the first person present tense like “I have toothache”. While the (non-verbal) expression consists of a behavioural manifestation associated with experiences such as those of pain. For example, communication is founded in an utterance of an affirmative sentence in an informative context, consequently being susceptible (i.e. observable, like the physical sentences or even the psychological sentences in the third person) of being considered true or false. According to Schulte:

“[…] psychological sentences in the first person present tense are ‘utterances’ or ‘avowals’ (Äusserungen), while psychological sentences in the third person are ‘communications’ (Mitteilungen).” (Schulte, 2003: 30).

According to Wittgenstein, a linguistic expression should be understood as a specific form of exteriorising sensations that are inherent to it. For this reason expressions have the intention of substituting primitive pain-behaviours. They are some type of vocalisations of sensations (and not expressions of the acquisition of knowledge on the occurrence of the same sensations), since they do not result out of any observation of reality (internal or external).

However, a proposition that expresses a cognitive content has to be a description of a state of things, to be comparable with reality and, consequently, to be true or false. Its use has to be as a measure, whose standard is independent from that which is being measured. That does not happen with the expression of inner experiences that, when uttered, are attributable to whoever utters them.

We should understand exteriorization as a process, because it occurs in a sequence of dynamic significance and because it implies an initial moment of intention on the part of the emitter, an intermediate moment of exteriorization, properly said, and an expected and consequent moment of understanding on the part of the receiver.

The pragmatic conception of Wittgenstein, which defends that the meaning surges out of use (cf. PI: §§ 43, 432), contributes to an understanding of exteriorization as a speech act conceived as the expression of an inner state and not as a description of something. The problem or process of exteriorization appears in a more obvious and decisive way in the last works of Wittgenstein, when they are considered
psychological or empiric expressions of the type “I have a pain”, which do not constitute descriptive statements of the inner states but expressive statements assumed as forms of behaviour, symptomatic of the inner state.

We can speak in behavioural and linguistic expressions. The first are observable and are realised by non-verbal body language (body movements, muscular contractions, facial expressions of pain, groaning, crying or screaming), liable to being applied in descriptive uses of language; the second entail a greater difficulty either on the part of the person expressing the utterance or on the part of the interlocutor in understanding it. They are summed up by verbal language, being capable of being applied in expressive uses of language.

Empirical statements of the type “He is in pain” are adjusted to the behavioural expressions, since they result from the observation of behaviours ascribed to “He” and that indicate the presence of pain, according to behaviour adjusted to the social and cultural parameters for those who are in pain and behave as such. The subject’s corporal behaviour, provoked by the pain sensation, is observable by another individual and assumed as expression of a pain experience. After being observed by another, it is inferred that a certain case of pain exists.

Empirical statements of the type “I am in pain” are adjusted to linguistic expressions, since they result from the simple transmission of information known by the subject, in accordance with the linguistic behaviour adjusted to the parameters of daily conversation by the person suffering and expressing the pain.

The connection between the experience and its expression is the basis for the use of language-games. Among these is, for example, dissimulation, in which expressions and pain-behaviour without pain (or that is not exteriorised) occur. For Wittgenstein, who also gives priority to dissimulation, avowals are not descriptions of inner experiences, but forms of linguistic behaviour associated with experiences.

Then, we should distinguish between expressions as exteriorization of the experience and as communication of the occurrence of the experience itself. Sometimes the expressions constitute exteriorizations of our expectations and do not communicate to ourselves the result of inner observations. Consider the following example presented by Wittgenstein:

“[...] when someone says ‘I hope he’ll come’ – is this a report about his state of mind, or a manifestation of his hope? – I can, for example, say it to myself. And surely I am not giving myself a report. It may be a sigh; but it need not.” (PI: § 585).
This case is demonstrative of the fact that, in daily conversation, we use propositions relating to internal states when we have the intention of exteriorising them. On certain occasions, however, we do not distinguish whether or not those propositions are adapted to that which is being expressed. That is to say, we do not think of the meanings that the statements are capable of expressing and the meanings that the same statements can lead our interlocutor to understand. The following note attests this:

“There really are cases in which one has the sense of what one wants to say much more clearly in mind than he can express in words. (This happens to me very often.)” (CV: 90).

Regardless of the expressive character of the statements, it is through their use that we characterise our intentions. Wittgenstein suggests that, in spite of the subjective nature of the inner experience, we can have the intention of communicating or exteriorising information relating to the said experience. For such, we fall back upon certain expressions that will be understood in a certain way by our interlocutor who not only shares the words and the respective meanings and usages with us, but also a given linguistic praxis:

“If I say that I am using the words ‘I’m in pain’, ‘I’m looking for him’, etc. etc. as a piece of information, not as a natural sound, then this characterizes my intention. For instance, I might want somebody else to react to this in a certain way.” (RPP-II: § 176).

There are forms for characterizing my intention, if it may be said that certain words are used not as natural sounds, but, as has already been pointed out, to communicate in a type of report something that is happening, making use of observable information regardless of propositions in the third person present tense, while propositions in the first person serve as expressions (cf. RPP-II: § 63).

Paradoxically to that which Wittgenstein sustains, empirical propositions not based on observation convey information about something, namely the occurrence of certain mental states in those who utter them. This happens in the case of fear: when I say “I am afraid”, this empirical proposition (specifically psychological) tells of my disposition in relation to something external to me, unlike the pain sensation.

“If we call fear, sorrow, joy, anger, etc. mental states, then that means that the fearful, the sorrowful, etc. can report: ‘I am in a state of fear’ etc., and
that this information – just like the primitive utterance – is not based on observation.” (*RPP-II*: § 177).

If a scream of pain or fear can only be emitted by the subject of that pain or fear, since they constitute a natural and primitive exteriorization, then the same exclusive character also happens in the expressive use of language through the proposition “I am afraid”, because it is a linguistic expression that only has meaning in the first person.

The formation of a concept, which does not just depend on a speaker of a language, can reveal various functions and meanings of its application. When related to experience, the concepts become more abstract and equivocal, once there is not a separation or rigorous division between the signified experience itself and the significant concept.

“The formation of a concept has, for example, the character of limitlessness, where experience provides no sharp boundary lines. (Approximation without a limit.)” (*RPP-II*: § 636).

It is in this reflexive context (concerning conditions for the common and expressive use of ordinary language), characterized by the pragmatic and semantic possibility of the use of words to sensations, that we encounter the theme-problem of exteriorization in the writings of Wittgenstein. This context is also characterized by the means of communicating the occurrence of sensations, through the use of words that efficiently express what is intended to be transmitted, and for the proper exteriorization both as a distinct psychological proposition and as a form of linguistic behaviour associated with the experience.

In a behavioural perspective, psychological propositions in the third person (of the type “He is in pain”), can be based on that which people do or say, because the characteristic forms of behaviour are capable of observation and standardisation and, consequently, become criteria (although fallible) to determine what occurs inwardly.

The most important position adopted by William James for the understanding of the main theme-problem of the linguistic expression is, however, one which derives from his radical empiricism, in the line with the classic English empiricism of John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume.¹⁵ This doctrine was built on a belief in the metaphysical and epistemological primacy of experience, according to which everything that is real has to pass through experience and what is experienced has to be real (cf. James, 1996: 155-189). This position of primacy of the senses is expressed by the orientating principle of empiricism, according to which * nihil in intellectu nisi prius in sensu. “Radical empiricism” is the name
adopted by James to name his philosophical doctrine, because empiricism is like a method of resorting to private experiences to attain something that was also the objective of Wittgenstein’s analysis: the resolution of philosophical problems.

This position of James rests on a specific conception of experience or, according to the name given by him, to the fundamental metaphysical nature “pure experience” (the raw material of the universe) as Ellen Kappy Suckiel says in the «Introduction» to Essays in Radical Empiricism (cf. 1996: viii). But, what is or what constitutes “pure experience?” “It is made of that, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what not.” (James, 1996: 27). For James, “experience” is just a collective name for all perceptible nature because our field of experience does not have well-defined borders as our visual field does; experience is fluent (cf. James, 1996: 71, 92).

The ambiguity of the term “experience” is present in this Heraclitian formulation of James, in which experience is fluent. What I think important, however, is Wittgenstein’s critical approach to the themes dealt by James in the domain of psychology. James was certainly one of the many authors who influenced Wittgenstein. I mention him, however, because of the role that he had on the idea of “pure experience” and for its presence, together with one of his works, Principles of Psychology, in Wittgenstein’s writings.

For this reason, the theme of linguistic expression of experience is dominated by the controversy on the rigidity or precision of the use of language to subjectively report on certain contents, opening up the possibility for the analytical perspective that I formulate below, based on the linguistic aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology.

In the context of the Wittgensteinian philosophy of psychology, the discussion about grammar, expressiveness, and inter-subjective meanings embraces many subjects, such as, firstly, the natural and linguistic (or verbal) expressions; secondly, the objective and subjective uses of language; and thirdly, the objective and subjective certainties of the experience expressed by words.

With regard to the first question, there are two possible kinds of expression: the verbal one and the natural one. The verbal expression (achieved through words) and the natural expression (achieved through behaviour or gesture) are connected. It is possible to replace the latter by the former as a substitution of symbols. The natural expression is normally involuntary, spontaneous and sudden; it is not liable to error or mistake, but to dishonesty; it is not learned, but can be assimilated as a cultural
form of expression. The verbal expression is normally a grammatical construction.

A verbal expression of inwardness is not always a clear one. While I transmit the content of my subjective experience to someone through a verbal expression like “I have toothache”; in the atomic and external word my utterance about some object would be an objective description like “This ball is green”.

Besides these two kinds of expression, Wittgenstein remarks two other kinds of use: the objective one and the subjective one. This second above-mentioned issue first appeared in 1929, at the beginning of Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy, when he devoted himself to the study of specific problems related to solipsism. Those problems implied the use of the word “I”. Wittgenstein noticed that one of the most difficult and problematic uses of language was that of the word “I”, considering that the solipsist, when using the words “I” and “me” or “mine”, systematically confounds its subjective and objective uses, mainly when referring to the incognoscibility of another person’s experience, since we can never understand (or be certain) about what someone means with the use of a given psychological proposition. This proposition is a sign for the hypothesis of what is said (cf. Hacker, 1997b: 225; Zilhão, 1993: 57).

Behavioural expression or corporal manifestation only serve as additional symptoms that tend to confirm the hypotheses of being in pain.

In § 57 of PR, Wittgenstein verified that one of the most misleading language forms was the use of the word “I,” mainly when intended to express an immediate experience, as in the expression “I am in pain [a toothache].”

Wittgenstein developed the linguistic treatment of the use of the term “I” in BB and in NFL, namely, having introduced the concepts “objective use” and “subjective use”, in which the term “I” is used in expressions of the type “I have grown six inches”, for the first case, and of the type “I am in pain”, for the second case. In the first case, “I” is used in an objective way as a pronoun, because the understanding of the expression demands the identification of a certain person and its use admits the possibility that mistakes can be made; “I” is used in a subjective way in the second case, because the understanding of the expression does not demand the identification of the subject and the possibility of mistake is excluded.

Thus, it is understood that a pain experience, expressed by language, has implications in the objective and subjective use of words. The subjective application that each user makes of the language causes it to become ambiguous (PG: § 57; BB: 66-7; PL: § 411; PR: § 57). For this reason and considering that misunderstandings of “I” used as subject lead
to philosophical illusions, Wittgenstein speaks of the two uses of the word “I” \((BB: 66-67)\).

A referentialist use, when presupposing a relationship between a sign of language and a thing or an object in the world, would be an objective use in propositions such as “I have grown six inches”. A mentalist use, when assuming a mediation of the ideas or representations of the mind between the sign (language) and the thing (world), would be a subjective use in propositions such as “I am in pain.” The case of “He is in pain” would be a descriptive use based on the observation of behaviour. The objectivist or referentialist theses and the subjectivist or mentalist theses surge out of the common vision that the basic function of language is to represent an internal or external reality, mental or physical.

If the case of “He is in pain” were of a descriptive use based on behavioural observation, then it would be different from a use as in the case of “I am in pain”, which, under this perspective, permits an expressive use. These differences between objective and subjective uses and between descriptive and expressive uses presuppose the problem of certainty transmitted by the typical propositions for each case, of which “He is in pain” and “I am in pain” are the respective examples.

In this way, the third above-mentioned subject concerning Wittgenstein’s remarks on language use is the difference between objective certainty and subjective certainty expressed by the means of words. The process of expression gives rise to the problem of the certainty or uncertainty, i.e. the possibility of a disconnection between the verbal expression (the propositional content) and the experience (the empirical content of the sense data), because dissimulation is a type of language-game. This third subject is connected with other issues and topics. In this way, Wittgenstein distinguished the expressive use of language from the descriptive use of language, on one hand, and the genuine proposition from hypothetical proposition, on the other hand \((LWPP-I: §§ 951, 952; LWPP-II: 70)\).

For example, how can I know the correct and the precise way to apply the proposition “I was a little irritated with him”? This is not the suitable case for what Wittgenstein called “objective certainty”, as opposed to what happens with mathematic evidence:

> “There can’t be a long dispute in a court of law about whether a calculation has this or that result; but there certainly can be about whether someone was irritated or not.” \((LWPP-II: 85)\).

Mathematical evidence would be a proposition such as “2x2=4”, in which the correct result is always the expected one. I cannot, however,
deduce or know another person’s anger. Even if that person expresses his anger through outer and public verbal signs, I cannot make the deduction in a constant or regular way. As Wittgenstein puts it: “Even if someone were to express everything that is ‘within him’, we wouldn’t necessarily understand him” (LWPP-I, § 191).

While my utterance of the proposition “2x2=4” allows other people to have a high degree of objective certainty, my utterance of the proposition “I was a little irritated with him” only allows other people to have a degree of subjective certainty.

These three subjects, developed in Chapter Three, represent important aspects of the theme-problem of linguistic expression. They configure the spectrum of Wittgenstein’s inquiry on linguistic expression, centered on the discussion about grammar, expressiveness, and inter-subjective meanings, the status of natural and linguistic expressions, the objectivity of the common use of ordinary language, or the demand for certainty in the expression of sensations. There are, however, more profound questions to be broached by relevant approaches to the Wittgensteinian philosophy of psychology. The present research, entitled Grammar, Expressiveness, and Inter-subjective Meanings: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology and formulated in the following «Analytical perspective», is only one of them, one that intends to be a perspicuous, accurate and serviceable approach.

**Analytical perspective**

The formulation of an analytical perspective is important, because it represents a personal vision on a theme, problem or subject. In my case, it represents my point of view on linguistic expression. That is, exteriorization understood independently as theme, problem or subject which is fundamental in the context of what is designated as Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. It is fundamental because it is above all assumed as a vision of the mental field in the scope of the relationship of this domain with the field of reality, being language the expressive intermediary.

When referring to the relationship between the mental fields and those of reality, the implications of Cartesianism are almost inevitable. Wittgenstein himself was aware of these implications and registered them critically in various writings. On Descartes, for example, or on the traditional and common philosophical conceptions, Wittgenstein clearly has a different perspective on language. Wittgenstein is not in agreement with the forms in which the perspectives of Descartes and those of common sense conceive the social conditions for the circulation and