

Cultivating Peace

Cultivating Peace:
Contexts, Practices
and Multidimensional Models

Edited by

Helen Ware, Bert Jenkins,
Marty Branagan and DB Subedi

CAMBRIDGE
SCHOLARS

P U B L I S H I N G

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ABC:	Australia Broadcasting Corporation
ABG:	Autonomous Bougainville Government
ACCES:	African Canadian Cooperative Education Society
ADB:	African Development Bank
ADR:	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AFSPA:	The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act
AIDS:	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMIS:	Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM:	African Union Mission to Somalia
ANA:	Afghan National Army
APEC:	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APF:	African Peace Facility
APRA:	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
APSA:	African Peace and Security Architecture
AQIM:	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb
ASEB:	Assam State Electricity Board
ASF:	African Standby Force
ASTC:	Assam State Transport Corporation
ATCL:	Assam Tea Corporation Limited
AU:	African Union
BGET:	Border Green Energy Team
CA:	Constitution Assembly
CAR:	Central African Republic
CBNRM:	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CBO:	Community-based Organisation
CDOs:	Community Development Organisation Groups
CDVR:	Commission Dialogue Vérité et Réconciliation
CEWS:	Continental Early Warning System
CFUs:	Community Forest User Groups
CM:	Critical Moment
CMD:	Conflict Management Division
CMPLF:	Citizens' Mandate for Peace, Life and Freedom
CNI:	Confederation of Nepalese Industries
CNURA:	Coalition for National Unity and Rural Advancement
CNVC:	Centre for Nonviolent Communication

COE:	Council of Elders
COERR:	The Catholic Offices for Emergency Relief and Refugees
CPA:	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPC:	Communist Party of China
CPNM:	Communist Party of Nepal Maoist
CPNUML:	Communist Party of Nepal United Marxist and Leninist
CPRM:	Common Pool Resource Management
CSR:	Corporate Social Responsibility
CSO:	Civil Society Organisation
DAC:	Development Assistant Committee
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID:	Department for International Development
ECOWAS:	The Economic Community of West African States
EDF:	European Development Fund
EITI:	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EIU:	Education for International Understanding
ETG:	Exhibition and Travel Group
EU:	European Union
EWS:	Early Warning System
FANCI:	Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire
FAO:	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FARC:	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FESCI:	Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire
F-FDLT:	Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
FHAO:	Facing History and Ourselves
FIDH:	Internationale des Droits de L'Homme
FIND:	Foundation for International Dignity
FNCCI:	Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industries
FOMUC:	Multi National Force in Central Africa Republic
FPI:	Front Populaire Ivoirien
FSM:	Federated States of Micronesia
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GEM:	Global Environmental Management
GHRSC:	Global Humanitarian Relief and Sustainability Community
GRA:	Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army
GTZ:	German Technical Cooperation
GUIC:	Growing up in Cities
HDI:	Human Development Index
HPC:	Afghan High Peace Council

ICAD:	Integrated Conservation and Development Program
ICG:	International Crisis Group
IED:	Improvised Explosive Devices
ILO:	International Labour Organisation
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
INGO:	International Nongovernment Organisation
IPAC:	Integrated Protected Area Co-management
ISAF:	International Security Assistance Force
ICC:	International Criminal Court
IUCN:	International Union for Conservation of Nature
JCs:	Junior Colleges
KRC:	Karen Refugee Committee
LIDHO:	Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l'Homme
LMTC:	Leader's Management Training College
LRA:	Lord Resistance Army
MAG:	Martial Arts Group
MDGs:	Millennium Development Goals
MEF:	Malaita Eagle Force
MIDH:	Mouvement Ivoirien des Droits de l'Homme
MLM:	Marxism, Leninism and Maoism
MNLA:	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MP:	Members of Parliament
MPLA:	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSC:	Military Staff Committee
MUJAO:	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NATO:	The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBI:	National Business Initiative
NC:	Nepali Congress
NCOs:	Non-Commissioned Officers
NDFB:	National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NGO:	Nongovernmental Organisation
NVC:	Nonviolent Communication
OAU:	Organisation of African Unity
OECD:	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMC:	Observation and Monitoring Centre
OMUs:	Observation and Monitoring Units
P4PD:	Platform for Dialogue and Peace in Liberia
PLA:	People's Liberation Army
PNCS:	Programme National de Cohésion et Sociale de Côte d'Ivoire

PNG:	Papua New Guinea
PNTL:	Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste
PoW:	Panel of the Wise
PP:	Participatory Photography
PRTs:	Provisional Reconstruction Teams
PSC:	Peace and Security Council
PSD:	Peace and Security Department
PSOD:	Peace Support Operations Division
PSU:	Public Sector Undertaking
PV:	Participatory Video
R2P:	Responsibility to Protect
RAMSI:	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RDR:	Rassemblement des Républicains
REC:	Regional Economic Community
RGDP:	Real Gross Domestic Product
RHDP:	Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Paix
RTG:	Royal Thai Government
SAFIRE:	Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources
SIAC:	The Solomon Islands Alliance for Change
SIAPE:	Shianda International Aids Program Education
SIS:	Small Island States
SPA:	Seven Party Alliance
TBC:	The Border Consortium
TRC:	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UK:	The United Kingdom
ULFA:	United Liberation Front of Assam
UN:	United Nations
UNAMA:	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNCOI:	United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP:	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNITA:	Union for Total Independence of Angola
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIN:	United Nations Mission in Nepal
US:	United States
VDC:	Village Development Committee
VMLR:	Verified Minor and Late Recruits
VSO:	Volunteer Service Organisation

VT:	Vocational Training
WDGs:	Women Development Groups
WASH:	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WE:	World Education
WT:	Whole Time
WWF:	World Wildlife Fund
Y3CL:	Youth Center for Communication and Creative Learning
ZOA:	Zuidoost-Azië

INTRODUCTION

BERT JENKINS AND MARTY BRANAGAN

Peacebuilding is an umbrella-term for many aspects of dealing with violent conflict. An early paper by Johan Galtung describes peacebuilding as activities used to reduce violence and promote all forms of justice (Galtung, 1967, p. 12). In a nutshell, peacebuilding is a means of achieving sustainable and durable peace. By peace, we mean an absence of all kinds of violence. In its original use, the term peacebuilding was associated with bringing about peace by peaceful means (Galtung, 1996).

The term peacebuilding came into international affairs in 1992 when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, announced his *Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Peacebuilding is a widely used term in the peace industry but difficult to define because it means different things depending on its application. The term is used commonly today to refer to assisting recovery after armed violence has ceased. It also involves a range of activities used to establish or re-establish amicable relationships between adversaries (Lederach, 1997). In general, building peace requires a long-term commitment to a complex process involving actions that support peace, in all its forms. In recent interpretations, peacebuilding can happen “before” the violence begins - to prevent conflict, “during” violent conflict - to stop violence, and “after” the fighting ends - to transform the underlying conflict, assist with healing, recovery, reconstruction and the restoration of liberal peace.

According to Lisa Schirch (2004, p. 12) peacebuilding involves values, skills, analyses and processes distributed among diverse activities and approaches including: Conflict Transformation; Restorative and Transnational Justice; Legal and Judicial Systems; Environmental Protection; Human Rights; Humanitarian Assistance; Early Warning and Response; Civilian and Military Peacekeeping; Economic, Social and Political Development; Education; Activism and Advocacy; Research and Evaluation; Trauma Healing; Military Intervention/Conversion; Governance and Policymaking. The definition of peacebuilding after Schirch (2004) fits the cultivating peace metaphor adopted in this book because it includes people and their environment:

Peacebuilding seeks to prevent, reduce, transform, and help people recover from violence in all forms, even structural violence that has not yet led to massive civil unrest. At the same time it empowers people to foster relationships that sustain people and their environment (2004, p. 9).

This book emerged from a conference held in 2012 at the University of New England's inaugural Peace Festival. The conference was entitled "Cultivating Peace: Contexts, Practices and Multidimensional Models". We focussed on peace cultivation because we wanted to move away from negative connotations associated with peacebuilding. Due to co-option by national and international interests, peace often does not eventuate in places where peacebuilding activities occur. Instead, conflict may be exacerbated during well-intentioned but misplaced peace interventions.

While "peacebuilding" evokes images of bricks, mortar and men, the term "cultivating peace" gives rise to women-friendly, eco-horticultural connotations of planting seeds, nourishing them, and allowing peace to grow in a localised organic space. In addition, this term relies, as much as possible, on local ownership of the process, using indigenous resources suited to a particular place. Cultivating peace, like permaculture, an ecological system of growing a variety of productive species in a garden, is flexible rather than dogmatic, and holistically integrated into local conditions.

Just as biodiversity is important in sustaining ecosystems, so was it at the conference, where we heard case studies from diverse countries across the globe about people who were endeavouring to build and sustain peace; many of these stories are included in this book. The book embraces a multiplicity of trans-disciplinary approaches to peacebuilding; most of these coincide, at least partially, with our eco-horticultural metaphor of peace cultivation. Ultimately, cultivating peace embodies love and compassion, while utilising wisdom not to do harm. However, there are variations to this theme herein, as the narratives in this book intersect diverse facets of peacebuilding, yet all contribute constructive messages or lessons. We have been judicious when necessary to point out anomalies where these occur, which is not unlike discouraging harmful organisms from establishing in a garden.

The chapters in this collection fall under three general themes. Some papers examine the structural and discursive causes of violence; this is how to improve situations where violence is evident or to prevent it from happening. Others deal with the aftermath of violence and how to reconcile and restore shattered lives and societies. The third category is concerned with positive social change by nonviolent means, the challenge of what Johan Galtung calls "positive peace", which is much more constructive than the "negative peace" of ceasefires and peace enforcement that is used to manage

direct violence. Yet the desire to improve things, to suggest alternatives and employ projects designed to bring about positive changes, link all these papers.

In Chapter 2, following on from this overview, Professor Helen Ware suggests that new terms (from Zero Peace to Peace Three) are needed to cover the various dimensions of peace. She argues that peace theorists underestimate “negative peace”, which she terms Peace One (“no mass violence but risk of renewed fighting”). The new terms undoubtedly add value to our broader understanding of negative peace. Helen goes on to declare the holy grail of social justice as something that is almost unattainable. In addition, she is wary of approaches that include structural violence as a cause of conflict and urges peace studies to abandon this idea because it is unhelpful. There is also a proclamation suggesting that a country not at war is a country at peace. She then challenges some of the critiques of liberal democracy, arguing that privatised basic services such as health and education are useful means of building peace.

Our approach to peace differs in that we unashamedly advocate for greater social justice and work tirelessly towards this goal in cultivating peace. How much social justice there is determines the extent of positive peace. This measured view, we believe, is preferable to removing social justice from the peace equation altogether because of its propensity to confuse people about positive and negative peace.

Helen Ware argues eloquently in her leading chapter for a neo-liberal peace and democratisation, driven by a political system like Australia’s that stands for structural stability. In this approach to peacebuilding, armed intervention to stop the killing (which many would argue is inconsistent and even counter-productive to cultivating long-term peace) is followed by development assistance, state building and economic restructuring, which are carried out by an international team alongside select local elites, often in the name of humanitarianism. However, there is a possibility of this approach being neo-colonial, and likely to end in dependency and economic subjugation. Neo-liberal peacebuilding, as state building, may be able to deal with some of the presenting symptoms but not with the underlying causes of conflict.

Professor Ware provides an extensive critique of the idea of hybridity in peacebuilding. She argues that cross-cultural hybridity is unlikely to contribute much, if anything, to conflict transformation and liberal peace in countries where interventions occur. However, the idea of hybridity being an obvious consequence rather than a planned process could be given more consideration. When the “peace industry” applies its peacebuilding formula in a country, the model may not be embraced fully by many local elites for

all kinds of reasons, including their reluctance to be re-colonised and also fear of losing their right to self-determination. Whatever eventuates may reflect a filtering process where local elites choose what is best suited for them at the time, irrespective of whether it will build peace. In fact, demanding control over decision-making, and upholding and utilising local cultural contexts, is a response to be expected. It is a means of resisting being controlled or coerced by foreigners into accepting a manipulated peace. Traditional authorities such as elders arguably represent their people no less than a democratically elected government does under the auspices of modern liberal democracy. We remember when liberal governments entered wars in Iraq and Afghanistan without asking their constituents.

Professor Ware quite rightly points to the exclusive, patriarchal nature of some traditional systems and argues for “a new system that recognises the importance of including the voices of women and young people”. However, if liberal democracy can adapt and evolve, why can't other systems? Doesn't characterising hybridity as focussed on the past and doomed to parochialism and sexism essentialize it? That said there is now a wide expectation that international human rights norms be respected everywhere, and that pressure be exerted to ensure this occurs. Although we believe international human rights is a progressive idea, many people across the globe still resist it as a western form of cultural imperialism, consequently there is a fair way to go in negotiating the acceptance of a set of universal human rights norms.

Apart from these issues about peace, and the need for decolonisation and decentralisation, the second chapter challenges us to consider the urgent need for peacebuilding in Africa. It gives numerous practical insights derived from Professor Ware's considerable experience in working on the African continent. Substituting socio-economic development and modernisation for peacebuilding in this chapter will deliver you almost to the same “liberal” destination, which is an interesting realisation.

D.B. Subedi, in Chapter 3, examines the motivations for people in his native country Nepal who enlisted as combatants to fight for the Maoist rebels in the People's War, against their own government. The chapter gives us a glimpse into how ideology and inequity interact to give rise to political indoctrination, which may have led to Maoist recruitment. The challenge is to reduce structural and cultural inequalities in Nepali society to prevent further carnage and build an equitable society by dealing with some destabilising socio-cultural phenomena. Such actions may work to defuse Maoism?

In Chapter 4, Nelson Sanz-Cadena examines episodes of violence and civil unrest in Timor Leste in 2006 that shattered the bold claim of

successful peacebuilding led by the UN and Australia following independence. Timor Leste is often held up as an example of how to transform a nation from war to peace. The youth of Timor Leste were blamed for causing the unrest in 2006 but were they manipulated into acting the way they did, and if so, by whom? Sanz-Cadena's analysis suggests the situation is an example of misplaced peacebuilding at the community level. The youth were disappointed in the dearth of employment opportunities. What ensued was the portrayal of protesting youth as a security risk, rather than adjusting the peacebuilding model to accommodate local needs. This is a situation where peace builders may have lost sight of what is important from the point of view of indigenous people.

Abraham Coalesce focuses his attention, in Chapter 5, on the complex situation in Afghanistan, which he reframes by applying terms not in common use in the peacebuilding literature. He uses the terms, Space, Density and Atmosphere to describe complex interactions between actors involved in the Afghan war. He applies this system to "village stability operations" carried out by US forces, as an extension of the dubious idea of building peace during the process of armed intervention - to win the "hearts and minds" of the local population. The new terminology is used to stress the importance for peace operations to build connections and relationships with diverse actors through understanding the "density" of networks embedded within a myriad of legal, political and social constructions in local, provisional and national "spaces", which collectively form the "atmosphere". The example used is controversial in how it contributes to peace while a war is raging, but the use of new terms to describe complex interactions during a war makes this chapter original.

In Chapter 6, the author examines post-conflict issues in his own nation, the Solomon Islands. Jack Maebuta considers socio-economic and political factors in context, where the social life of local people must be balanced with development goals and appropriate governance structures during the process of peacebuilding in order to achieve sustainable peace. According to Maebuta, economic factors gave rise to the conflict and therefore need special consideration when planning the details of economic development during post-conflict peacebuilding. The chapter combines concepts of peace, development and local context in examining peacebuilding.

Bishnu Raj Upreti sees the business sector as a crucial actor in any peacebuilding process. In Chapter 7, Upreti adopts a comparative approach in examining Assam and Nepal, where armed violence is a persistent problem in both places. His chapter draws on evidence collected during a project concentrating on "corporate engagement in peace" to

address the question of whether the creation of viable business opportunities can defuse violent conflict. The paper raises important questions for those interested in a “business path” to peace and stability.

Linda Germanis analyses the consequences of collapsing military discourses into discourses about independence in the Federated States of Micronesia, in Chapter 8. In the State of Yap, “Aid” provisions came hand in hand with militarisation. Economic intervention proceeded without regard for local power structures, challenging notions of political and economic self-determination. It was apparent that dependency was a likely outcome. There were obvious signs of changing consumption patterns associated with the emerging economy, which were underpinned by political processes. Sustainability seemed a far off reality under these circumstances, suggesting how far development assistance can go wrong when accompanied by militarisation. The chapter provides valuable lessons for peacebuilding projects in situations where planned interventions involving armed forces may not engage well with local contexts and could produce unsustainable outcomes as a consequence.

In Chapter 9, Keshav Acharya considers ways in which Community Based Organisations (CBOs) in Nepal can act as drivers of development and peace from the ground up. CBOs, by working effectively at the grassroots, contributed positively to conflict transformation as part of the peace process. The mechanism by which this works is attributed to flexible power sharing between the state, market and civil society. He found that women and mothers working for CBOs contributed to the peace process at the village level through delivery of services. The chapter describes how small business activity at the local level can enhance economic aspects of peacebuilding, along with improvements in community development and governance.

Cara Boccieri weaves a creative peacebuilding tapestry, in Chapter 10, to explain how it is possible to transform tense refugee camps on the Thai–Burma border into oases of thriving permaculture communities. The case study approach emphasises the value of addressing environmental and educational issues in refugee camps. With respect to cultural context at the local community level, this is where traditional knowledge, experience and culture intersect to enable refugees to plan and implement sustainable projects with scant resources at their disposal. Refugees adopted holistic, trans-disciplinary educational approaches in establishing sustainable permaculture communities. The transformation of refugee settlements into permaculture communities utilising appropriate technologies and adult education strategies resulted in humane and dignified, environmentally sustainable and self-

reliant settlements, with long-term benefits for host communities and host governments.

In Chapter 11, Paddy Tobias discusses his study in the Aileu district of Timor Leste. As an outsider looking in, he examines challenges to peacebuilding through the lenses of social capital and civil society development. The chapter provides insights into ways in which cultural context is an important consideration in addressing issues surrounding conflict transformation. Cultural context is especially important in the process of transition from traditional to modern ways of social interaction. He found destabilising effects on social and economic development in this post-conflict nation when party politics overlay socio-cultural dimensions of change.

Roslyn Moran has a salient point to make in Chapter 12 about nonviolent communication (NVC), which can be applied in any life situation. The chapter discusses peaceful ways of using language. The language we use to communicate can be perceived as friendly or hostile depending on what we say and how we choose our words. Every peace builder should learn how to communicate non-violently.

In chapter 13, Tingting Li describes a particular system of mediation in China. The Chinese government provides mediation as a public dispute resolution service, as a means of maintaining social order. The government pays parties in dispute to attend mediation sessions to find settlements, and in doing so sets out to pacify all parties. The author finds the Chinese mediation system makes disputants more dependent.

Many of the conflicts involved are related to earlier political-economic reforms that took place in a period in which legal frameworks were ineffective. The government is dealing with these past issues by setting standards, assessing needs for compensation and adopting a “policy-oriented” approach to conflict management. China wants more control over a society that is fragmenting and is achieving this by putting pressure on civil servants and government leaders. In this changing environment, the government sees mediation as a tool through which it can maintain social stability. Problems that were once considered “political problems” or “administrative problems” are being redefined today as “social problems”. People in China have traditionally come to expect the government to sort out their problems, including disputes and the settlement of so-called social problems. As far as the Chinese government is concerned, mediation is a special path to social transformation, which reinforces a historical relationship between the government and its people. But why would people not manipulate this system of mediation for personal gain? Disputants could, for example, escalate conflicts, become violent and create instability to gain compensation and special benefits from the government. But the government could also

counter such measures with force; hence this could be a carrot and stick management system. It would appear that the government in many cases is just paying to calm things down. Payment is a strategy used to deal with conflicts that have a destabilizing effect on society and the state. This kind of compensation system, according to Tingting Li, can be advantageous to the mediator (state) because it can work to ease distress among all parties involved. It can also avoid tying up the courts in prolonged litigation cases that would waste time and resources from the government's judicial system. When the government is the mediator and compensator, it could help facilitate these conflicts and bring them to resolution rapidly. An important meaning of mediation in contemporary China is "offering an opportunity for parties to negotiate to reach compromise". The Chinese government as the mediator is a high-status facilitator, making it easier for parties to reach agreement in the process.

Where a conflict is likely to damage the interests of the people or state, the mediator (state) puts pressure on the parties by forcing them into resolution; after all, the government is in charge. It is also plausible that this kind of mediation is a form of state governance, driven by the ideological and political values of China. Tingting Li raises the question of whether it is appropriate for the state to compensate parties involved in private disputes using public resources and funds. Also, she considers it unfair when different disputants get different amounts of compensation according to their bargaining power or willingness to escalate conflict. The most obvious problem with this system of mediation is when the government is a disputant: How can the Chinese government mediate its own conflicts impartially when there are obvious conflicts of interest? The author hints that this approach to mediation requires democratisation!

Valentina Baú explains, in Chapter 14, how the use of community media can help dialogue and reconciliation processes in post-conflict situations. Baú emphasises the importance of this approach for social renewal and civil society development in the aftermath of armed violence in places like Kenya. At its core, the chapter explores benefits of participatory approaches to effective communication in the context of a community recovering from inter-communal violence. In relation to peacebuilding, the chapter contributes to modern ways of addressing conflict transformation in a bid to change a violent culture into a peaceful culture. Media functions as a vehicle for change, along with the application of participatory methodologies involving photography, video and theatre, which are used here as tools. This approach makes storytelling a lived experience; it allows viewers from communities affected by violence to reconnect with each other and address their respective issues.

The contribution by Tanzim Khan to peacebuilding, in Chapter 15, is unique. He introduces the idea of a “critical moment” - an instance in space and time when realization flashes like a bolt of lightning to make an astounding revelation about a development project. This is the realization that a project funded and established by foreign interests in collaboration with local elites and with the blessings of the government of a nation is revealed to be not what it may seem on the surface. Indeed, a project set up to be something good and positive turns out to be a façade, for on closer examination it is harmful to the country and its people. Khan uses a nature conservation case study in Bangladesh to explain how a project that promises to enhance biodiversity turns out to be about natural gas and resource extraction. He further uses a Neo-Marxist political ecology approach to examine the project critically. It is a system of analysis that can be applied to evaluate peacebuilding projects.

In Chapter 16, Paul Bleakley suggests Trotskyist theories be applied to modern democratic activism, such as the Arab Spring, to assist in both understanding why these social movements have been largely successful and also to analyse ways in which democratic campaigners can be supported. Arguably, supporting underprivileged citizens within totalitarian regimes may prove to be an efficient way of fostering democratic activism, creating the circumstances that could lead to systemic changes required to achieve “democracy” and also instigate conflict transformation processes. However, the crucial question is whether Trotsky’s ideas can contribute non-violently to democratic movements in the 21st century. It would depend very much on how these theories are interpreted in terms of their potential for violence or nonviolence. Take the Arab Spring as an example, both violence and nonviolence are evident drivers from divergent groups, meaning there remains potential for violent revolution to manifest and do harm, which is problematic for peace. Nevertheless, this chapter is an avenue of hope for the “evolution of peace”.

Isiaka Badmus explains, in Chapter 17, how the African Union (AU) contributes to managing organised violence and armed conflicts in Africa through its involvement in security governance and peacekeeping missions. He sees this as an important exercise in multilateral cooperation to end violence in Africa and provide a safe space for socio-economic development across a continent that has been embroiled in civil wars and intra-national violence since the cold war ended. The chapter discusses the application of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine, where force is used to stop the killing and injuring of innocent civilians and peacekeepers. This strategy advocates extreme negative peace, with the view of stopping the violence and allowing positive peace outcomes to eventuate. Badmus examines the

idea of finding African Solutions to deal with African Problems, but acknowledges the need for support from African states, their leaders, the UN and the international community. The success of this approach to peacebuilding depends on the efficiency of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is a multi-layered security community.

Dele Ogunmola, in Chapter 18, examines peacebuilding in post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire. The main focus of the chapter is building peace in a country divided along ethnic lines. Although ethnicity remains a strong factor in the Ivorian political landscape, there are other challenges, including economic and democratic development, Internally Displaced Persons, and reconciliation. The current government is accused of practicing a "victor take all" approach. Dele stresses the importance of engaging in negotiations to reconcile hearts and minds now that the difficult tasks of disarmament, demobilisation, and re/integration of combatants into the new armed forces is over. He unravels the main stumbling blocks for peacebuilding and discusses how to move a tense situation forward. The main challenge is negotiating genuine reconciliation. Dele asks: can Côte d'Ivoire win the peace that encompasses forgiveness and genuine reconciliation? With respect to obstacles to conflict transformation, the most prominent is nationalism, which has risen once again after the war to threaten national unity. It appears that the interplay of ethnicity and ultra-nationalism is the main problem standing in the way of winning the peace. Peacebuilding is addressing these issues on many fronts: political, economic and social. Both national and international inputs are helping to negotiate land ownership and citizenship issues at the community level. The author believes that a just resolution of the land ownership issue will depend on how well the government accommodates divergent views through the National Assembly without evoking deep-seated ethnic tensions around the issue of belonging.

There are, however, other bones of contention. For example, offering a blanket amnesty to perpetrators of heinous crimes, in order to consolidate peace, is contentious. The victims see this as a travesty of justice and argue that it would be prudent if amnesty were granted on a case-by-case basis. Dele's view is that a broad amnesty would be healthier for post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire given that both sides committed terrible war crimes. A general amnesty could lead to reconciliation and thereby dissolve the view that the current government is unfairly practicing its own brand of "justice according to the victor". Accordingly, a critical issue in Côte d'Ivoire is balancing justice and reconciliation. It is not possible to pardon perpetrators while victims and their relatives expect them to be punished for the crimes they committed. Also, the former ruling party, now in opposition, insists on the release of all political prisoners before returning to negotiate

reconciliation, while the government wants justice to proceed. Another obstacle concerns the exiles who fled into Ghana. The government has a responsibility to disarm all non-conventional forces that are a security threat and causing cross-border tensions.

Côte d'Ivoire is undergoing an economic renaissance with the commercialisation of oil. Foreign Aid is assisting poverty reduction and contributing to the socio-economic empowerment of Ivorian war victims. All things considered, the Ivorian economy is recovering, and Dele believes this will help with peacebuilding and reconciliation.

In the final chapter, Chapter 19, Tony Lynch and Bert Jenkins remind us that “any” peace we cultivate must be a living peace, a peace that satisfies important conditions. It must be a political peace that is not imposed by force, a peace based on trust rather than coercion and spin, where parties can enter into a social contract to coexist without fear of harm. Peace interventions should happen only when invitations for assistance are extended from most of the conflicting parties rather than just the preferred elites. If and when help is given, it must be carried out with respect for the local people, their country and culture, and not as a bid to capture resources, establish businesses and engineer social and political changes to suit the interests of those providing assistance. Lynch and Jenkins do not support armed intervention as a vehicle for peace under any circumstances because it is not an approach to peace by peaceful means. In fact, it is violence, even if the interventionists argue for a declaration of “just war” on humanitarian grounds. But, these arguments do not apply in the same fashion to nonviolent action, where an unarmed multitude of courageous individuals can assemble to negotiate for the violence to stop and stand between warring parties to prevent slaughter and harm. Nevertheless, timing would be crucial as to how efficiently a nonviolent intervention would work.

Postgraduate students wrote most of the chapters in this book; they display dynamism and optimism, inspiring faith in the future. It is these committed people, many of whom represent international youth, who are contributing to a global phenomenon - the gradual but noticeable reduction in violence and thereby - the cultivation of peace. This process involves the spreading of democratic ideals and the decent values of love and compassion needed to transform the world through an evolving peace culture. As Elise Boulding reminded us, nonviolent “peace culture” does exist among some indigenous peoples, faith-based communities, peace movements and organisations; although not common, if it exists, peace culture is possible (Boulding, 1998, p. 445).

Having considered the kind of peace we wish to cultivate and after introducing the chapters included in the book, we now turn briefly to examine issues surrounding contemporary approaches to peacebuilding.

In the international arena today, three processes applied to achieving peace in conflicted societies are peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. All three processes are integrally related and may proceed along a continuum starting from the time a conflict arises, progressing through periods of armed violence, and finally the restoration of peace after a ceasefire is reached, an agreement is signed and the fighting stops. However, the sequence of these events is not necessarily linear. A particular action may take place at different times during a violent conflict or at the same time as another. During modern peace missions, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding are seen to be mutually supportive, where they interact and reinforce one another (UN, 2008, p. 19).

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations today involve the deployment of military and sometimes police personnel, and frequently include numerous civilians working in conflict situations, with the common aim of restoring peace under the collective umbrella of peacebuilding. The dynamics of these interventions are always changing. Modern missions incorporate many non-military elements: food security, human rights, reconciliation, trauma counselling, peace education, election monitoring, governance, institutional restructuring, assistance with civil administration, and restoration of the judiciary, health and education systems, as well as reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, to name some key functions. These involve activities undertaken by peace builders working in a secure environment maintained by armed peacekeepers. In the expansion of armed interventions to include many peacebuilding functions, much emphasis has been placed on economic development, infrastructure reconstruction and state-building reforms, as well as the demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation of combatants. More emphasis could possibly be placed on reconciliation efforts, mediation between estranged groups and dealing with psychosocial problems such as post-traumatic stress. Incorporating peacemaking and peacebuilding elements into modern peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations has changed how armed interventions are planned and implemented. Peace interventions are frequently described today as humanitarian missions. Analyses of recent liberal peace transitions, using case studies from across the globe, have raised questions about the lack of success of the current peacebuilding model during peace interventions (Richmond & Franks, 2011). Most of these peacebuilding efforts have failed to deliver peaceful outcomes, which should prompt us to reconsider the model.

The lack of local community consent and involvement in the recovery and reconstruction process can seriously compromise the outcome of otherwise successful peace missions. Failure to include indigenous participation is now recognised to create dependency on the one hand and reluctance of the host country, its elites and the local community to take responsibility for maintaining imposed forms of governance on the other, leading at best to the formation of a hybrid peace (Mac Ginty, 2011). Of course, the indigenous community must be allowed to confront the recovery process and engage fully in the theatre of change making. Richmond (2011) has contentiously labelled the hybrid peace that emerges from such interactions between local and international communities as a post-liberal peace.

In any war zone or area recovering from war, just as there are sections of the local population engaged in or accepting the armed violence taking place, there are always groups in the same population engaged in stopping the violence, who need recognition as an active local civil society. Unfortunately, the tendency is to import a civil society from the international community and ignore or sideline local peace initiatives. Civil society is an important actor in cultivating peace at the grassroots of a community affected by violence. A local civil society is capable of dealing with threats to peace and is a prerequisite for maintaining equity and continuing the cultivation of peace long after international peace builders have departed. An autonomous civil society is a vital instrument for checking the power of unfair governments, even those elected via a democratic process. However, exploitation could still take place through civil society because it depends entirely on who is funding the activities carried out in the name of civil society. Thus we cannot promote civil society as being homogenous and always working for the greater good. We must be careful not to idealise civil society and not-for profit organisations as being intrinsically harmonious. They can be set up to be harmful destabilising influences such as fundamentalist groups, foreign agents or engines of business that supplement government programmes and undermine local economic activity. Occasionally, with certain agencies and community-based-organisations, we should not rule out the possibility of a genuine civil society project working for the good of the indigenous community and local economy.

We have been discussing peacebuilding in terms of regulating violence and restoring order under conditions of negative peace. Negative peace prevails when organised direct violence is controlled. This peace is upheld by constantly preparing for war and sustained through defensive deterrence where a well-prepared army guarantees peace. Thus, sustaining negative peace relies heavily on the use and threat of organised armed

violence, which is antithetical to the idea of cultivating peace. This contradiction creates an impasse when linking peacebuilding with the notion of peace.

Reinforcing negative peace does not usually involve challenging a flawed economic, political, cultural or moral system because the process does not involve questioning the status quo. The belief is that peace can eventuate by uncritically adopting neo-liberal models of governance, security and economics. This paints a picture of managing violent conflict but not necessarily setting out to transform it. Transformation of conflict calls for dealing with the causes of conflict and not just the mitigation of effects. This process of change will involve reforming the political, economic and legal systems that cause cultural, structural and direct violence and that enable these underlying forms of violence to continue unchecked. Lederach & Appleby (2010) describe this process of positive change making as strategic peacebuilding.

In an analysis of peace and conflict studies, Victoria Fontan asks us to be mindful of the current situation. She calls on us to decolonise peace by decolonising our minds and to do so now rather than continuing along a circular path to nowhere. She makes the following statement about decolonising peace:

Decolonizing peace is not a utopia, but a reality; it is in the now. As scholars, stepping into our right hemisphere, and linking the right and left hemispheres through “the sacred”, can enable us to re-shape our discipline as an inclusive North-South holistic endeavour, Northern awareness of its “help” addiction and Southern appropriation of a long overdue intellectual equity (2012, p. 173).

Imagine peace falling along a continuum, with negative peace at one end of the spectrum and positive peace at the other. The concept of positive peace involves the elimination of root causes of conflict that stem from inequity, repression and injustice. These predictably lead to violence when people who are affected adversely protest and resist being colonised. With positive peace there is a deliberate effort to create a society that honours commitments to equity. It is the process by which cultural and structural forms of violence are replaced by associative, decentralised modes of interacting peacefully where ecological integrity and a common humanity are upheld. There is acknowledgement that all life on earth is interconnected. Peace is seen as a dynamic, organic process that requires continuous work, like cultivating a garden, and not something that occurs only when a country is not at war. Positive peace emphasises the importance of economic and social justice by recognising that in order to cultivate

peace, everybody must participate, not just the elite. There must be a conscious effort to move beyond negative peace towards positive peace. This is not to say that conflict won't occur; it means we must address it openly through dialogue and communication without resorting to violence. Cultivating peace means setting out to create a world where diversity is respected and difference celebrated.

In a conversation with a journalist about whether it is possible to talk about negotiation and peace during war, John Paul Lederach responded:

I say hope is not negotiated. It is kept alive by people who understand the depth of suffering and know the cost of keeping a horizon of change as a possibility for their children and grand children. Quick fixes to a long-standing violent conflict are 'like growing a garden with no understanding of seeds, soils, and sweat'. This conflict traces back across decades even generations. It will take that long to sort out (2008, p. 44).

This is how an eminent peace builder applied a horticultural metaphor to peacebuilding, one that is similar to our focus in this book on *cultivating peace*. Moreover, in the same epilogue, Lederach suggests cultivation as a metaphor because it entails fostering and sustaining committed, authentic relationships over real timeframes in any conflict situation, which must underpin all peacebuilding work. Likewise, we believe it is possible, given time and effort, to “cultivate” the ground on which peaceful coexistence can grow and flourish; an enduring challenge.

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WHAT DOES THE PERSON ON THE STREET CORNER WANT? GROWING PEACE THROUGH DEMOCRACY: ISSUES WITH HYBRIDITY

HELEN WARE

Operating in remote areas devoid of provision by the state, the conflict continues to result in destruction, abduction, displacement, trauma and death for civilians and whole communities. The conflict has also reverberated more widely, displacing people beyond the region and periodically drawing in external responses ... (Conciliation Resources, 2011, p. 5).

This quotation refers to the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda and neighbouring countries in Central Africa, but it could equally apply to Mali and neighbouring West African States. This is the reality of conflict that theorists of peace should never forget. This chapter concentrates upon the realities of war and peace in Africa because the region is often neglected, yet this is where most problems are (8 out of the 12 top countries in the 2012 Failed States Index are in Africa, 80 per cent of UN badged troops are in Africa and the UN Security Council spends 75 per cent of its time on African issues). Often those who discuss the liberal peace focus their attention on Iraq and Afghanistan. Certainly, as discussed below, the very concept of a "failed state" is much disputed. So the core assumption here will simply be that the average citizen of any territory prefers negatively, not to be under constant threat of violence; and positively, to have access to schools, health clinics, and even markets.

This chapter deals with two overlapping themes. The first is the current criticisms of liberal democracy (whether of necessity associated with global capitalism or not). The second is the notion of hybridity, a range of postulated mixtures of traditional and modern governance systems, which is one of the very few alternatives to liberal democracy proposed in the peace studies literature. It is easy to point out the difficulties of transferring liberal democracy to a range of very different cultures. It is very much

harder to suggest plausible alternative paths for countries in search of government structures which will allow them to achieve and maintain peace. As will become clear, it is the author's contention that the search for effective and enduring hybridity is doomed to failure both because it romanticises a past which never really existed and because, where a form of hybridity is temporarily achieved, it contains the seeds of its own destruction; and this, since it largely excludes the needs and views of three-quarters of the population, that is women and young men. Hybridity all too often means government by the grandfathers. Thus proponents list "village elders, headmen, clan chiefs, healers, *bigmen*, religious leaders etc" as those who will be in charge in a hybrid system (Boege et al. 2008).

Roger Mac Ginty (2011, p. 210) has defined hybridity as "the composite forms of social thinking and practice that emerge as the result of the interaction of different groups, practices and world-views. In terms of internationally supported peacebuilding contexts, we can take hybridity as the summation of actions and worldviews by a series of actors ... both a condition and a process, and involves a complex dynamic of conflict, cooperation and coalescence". Whilst the author would agree that conflict and peacemaking are often messy and awkward rather than matters of systems and rational patterns, a definition as vague as "a composite and fusion of multiple factors" is simply unhelpful if not unusable. Hybridity here refers to attempts to develop systems of government which combine modern and traditional elements, often with government at the local level left to the "traditional authorities".

There is also the core question of why hybridity is considered to be a good idea. Is it welcomed simply because it is believed that it can deliver peace, at least during a transitional period? Or is it considered to represent what the people want, which again raises the crucial question of just whose wishes are being taken into account. As the case study from Northern Uganda discussed below demonstrates, local people have a very shrewd understanding of what traditional authorities can deliver and, if allowed to, will choose for themselves. The Bantustans of Apartheid era South Africa were rejected for many good reasons including their assumption that native peoples prefer authoritarian government.

Since the term peace has been used both very broadly and very narrowly, it is necessary to define what is meant by peace in this chapter. Many peace theorists appear to undervalue the simple virtues of negative peace: the fact that children, women and men are no longer subject each day to being bombed, shot at or cut up by machetes. Certainly, simply achieving negative peace will rarely be enough to ensure that fighting does not break out again. However, if social justice is defined as a necessary