Metaphysical Themes, Medieval and Modern
Volume 11
Also available in the series:

The Immateriality of the Human Mind, the Semantics of Analogy, and the Conceivability of God
Volume 1: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

Categories, and What Is Beyond
Volume 2: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

Knowledge, Mental Language, and Free Will
Volume 3: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

Mental Representation
Volume 4: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

Universal Representation, and the Ontology of Individuation
Volume 5: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

Medieval Skepticism, and the Claim to Metaphysical Knowledge
Volume 6: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

Medieval Metaphysics; or Is It "Just Semantics"?
Volume 7: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

After God, with Reason Alone—Saikat Guha Commemorative Volume
Volume 8: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

The Demonic Temptations of Medieval Nominalism
Volume 9: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

Skepticism, Causality and Skepticism about Causality
Volume 10: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

Metaphysical Themes, Medieval and Modern
Volume 11: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
Alexander W. Hall

**Part One: Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671**

Remarks on Pasnau’s *Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671* ................................. 9
Andrew W. Arlig

Categories and Modes of Being: A Discussion of Robert Pasnau’s
*Metaphysical Themes* ......................................................................................... 27
Paul Symington

Response to Arlig and Symington ........................................................................... 57
Robert Pasnau

**Part Two: Substance Ontology, Medieval and Modern**

An Argument for Hylomorphism or Theism (But Not Both) ....................... 75
Travis Dumsday

The Rises and Falls of Analysis and Metaphysics: Comments
on “An Argument for Hylomorphism or Theism (But Not Both)”
by Travis Dumsday ............................................................................................... 85
Gyula Klima

Response to Gyula Klima’s “The Rises and Falls of Analysis
and Metaphysics” ................................................................................................. 89
Travis Dumsday

Rejoinder to Travis Dumsday’s Response ......................................................... 93
Gyula Klima
Table of Contents

Part Three: The Natural Theology of Thomas Aquinas

The Burden of Proof: Aquinas and God Science ........................................... 97
Alexander W. Hall

Comments on Alexander W. Hall’s “The Burden of Proof: Aquinas
and God Science” .................................................................................... 117
Michael Sirilla

Response to Michael Sirilla’s Comments .............................................. 123
Alexander W. Hall

Appendix ................................................................................................. 129

Contributors ............................................................................................. 131
INTRODUCTION

ALEXANDER W. HALL

The *Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics* (PSMLM) collects original materials presented at sessions sponsored by the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics (SMLM). Founded by Gyula Klima (Director), Joshua Hochschild, Jack Zupko and Jeffrey Brower in 2000 (joined in 2011 by Assistant Director and Secretary, Alexander Hall) to recover the profound metaphysical insights of medieval thinkers for our own philosophical thought, the Society currently has over a hundred members on five continents. The Society’s maiden publication appeared online in 2001 and the decade that followed saw the release of eight more volumes. In 2011, PSMLM transitioned to print. Sharp-eyed readers of these volumes will note the replacement of our (lamentably copyrighted for commercial use) lions, who guarded the integrity of the body of an intellectual tradition thought to be dead, with the phoenixes that mark our rebirth. Friends of the lions will be happy to note that they remain at their post, protecting SMLM’s online proceedings and announcements at http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/.

This volume gathers papers read by SMLM members at the 2012 meetings of The International Congress on Medieval Studies (ICMS) and The American Catholic Philosophical Association (ACPA). Parts I and II (taken from the ICMS and ACPA sessions, respectively) look at important figures in the history of the study of the metaphysics of substance over the last eight centuries. Attention to this period sheds light on contemporary disputes as well as the history of thought that leads into the modern period. The essays in Part III, read at the ACPA’s SMLM satellite session, present vying, contemporary interpretations of what metaphysical and logical presuppositions underlie the natural theology of Thomas Aquinas.
Part I: *Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671*

The ICMS session papers that make up Part I discuss Robert Pasnau’s *Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671* (Oxford University Press, 2011), which treats the metaphysics of substance over the four centuries that separate the deaths in 1274 of Aquinas and Bonaventure from the completion of the first drafts of Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* in 1671, thereby picking up with early critics of classical scholasticism and drawing to a close in the birth of the modern period. The narrative in six parts concerns the material substratum of change, material substances and their properties, modes or accidents, and the persistence of substances over time. Though a single session of papers cannot do justice to Pasnau’s rich study, the essays in this volume speak to central concerns of the work, namely, category theory and medieval mereology.

Medieval mereology is the study of parts, wholes and the relations between them that develops out of Plato’s use of the method of collection and division to demarcate natural kinds and Aristotle’s discussions of parts and wholes in *Metaphysics* and *Topics*. In his “Remarks on Pasnau’s *Metaphysical Themes*,” Andrew Arlig reflects on Pasnau’s discussions of holenmerism and nominalist approaches to identity over time. Holenmerism is the thesis that one thing can be present as a whole in a multiplicity of discrete things, as most scholastic thinkers believe the rational human soul to be present in the body’s integral parts and God in everything. In response to Pasnau’s suggestion that, were it the case that immaterial things exist, holenmerism would be a plausible candidate to distinguish them from material things, Arlig expands upon arguments by Henry More that call into question the possible unity of holenmers (which, like universals, must exist wholly in discrete things) to argue that holenmerism is incoherent. Arlig then turns to Pasnau’s discussion of John Buridan on identity over time, taking issue with Pasnau’s statement that Buridan denies persistence across time for humans and other animals.

---


2 And not just scholastics. The list of figures who subscribe to the existence of holenmers would include Plotinus, Augustine and Descartes, to name but a few. For references, see *Metaphysical Themes* p. 337 n. 18.
Agreeing that some arguments against universals will probably work equally well against holensmers, Pasnau notes that by limiting the existence of holensmers to God and the rational soul, one may preserve the unity of holensmers by pointing to the fact that, unlike universals, holensmers have operations beyond those they perform in discrete parts of things. Pasnau then contends that Buridan’s nominalism prohibits him from accepting that two things similar and yet somehow distinct can ever literally be described as identical (as one and the same universal cannot subsist in disparate individuals), and hence, whatever commonsense ontology may suggest, persons (for instance) cannot persist across time in the literal sense that would require that their parts remain the same.

As regards the categories, Aristotle describes them as a division of “things that are” (Categories (Cat.) 1²20);³ but whether the things in question are extramental, linguistic or mental entities (or some combination thereof) is unclear.⁴ On the one hand, Aristotle states that accidental and universal features cannot exist apart from the individual substances whom they characterize (Cat. 2²4-6), thereby inverting a Platonic realism that hypostasizes universal features into unique, immaterial, paradigmatic forms, participation in which renders individuals the types of things that they are (hence many beautiful things would be more or less beautiful to the extent they participate in the form of beauty).⁵ On the other hand, Aristotle presents the ten categories themselves as a list of “things said without any combination” (Cat. 1²25), thereby giving rise to the impression that the work is about terms or what they call to mind.

Mid-thirteenth-century interpretations of the Categories are shaped by the reception in the Latin West of the complete writings of Aristotle, viewed in part through the lens of his Islamic commentators. Responding to (1) the distinction between concepts of first and second intention (i.e., concepts of things in the world, e.g., cats, and concepts about these concepts, e.g., the species cat, respectively); (2) attention to the boundaries

⁵ See, e.g., Republic 504e–518c; 596e–597a, Phaedo 100b–102a3, and Phaedrus 247c3-247e6.
of various Aristotelian sciences (such as metaphysics, physics and logic); and (3) Aristotle’s notion of an isomorphism between things, concepts and words, medieval thinkers enter into a sustained dialog regarding the ontological status of substances and the accidents (making up the other nine categories) that depend on these substances for their existence (as a quality, for instance, cannot exist apart from its subject)\(^6\) and wonder whether there exists a method (a *sufficientia praedicamentorum*) to fix the number of categories, either through attention to predication, with the belief that such corresponds to some extent to ways in which things are (as we see in Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas) or by attention to various modes of being (as with Simon Faversham and Radulphus Brito). These different medieval accounts of what the categories categorize and how to fix the number of categories have led contemporary scholars to class medieval accounts with reference to whether or not they are reductionist or deflationary, with reductionist accounts seeking to reduce the number of irreducibly different types of beings picked out by the accidental categories (as we see in fourteenth-century authors such as Ockham and Buridan) and deflationary accounts interpreting talk of accidents as of ways in which substances exist, with these accounts ranging from a realism that views accidents as beings (though less real than the substances in which they inhere) to eliminativism.\(^7\)

Robert Pasnau and Paul Symington are in broad agreement that Aquinas’s account of the accidental categories is deflationary, whereas the two differ over whether it is reductionist, with Symington contending in his “Categories and Modes of Being” that this is the case and that Aquinas develops his account via an approach (idiosyncratic relative to later scholastics) to metaphysics involving the real distinction between essence and existence, the analogy of being and an isomorphism between thought and reality, concluding with remarks on the limitations of Pasnau’s approach to metaphysics in general given what Symington describes as Pasnau’s resistance to viewing conceptual or linguistic structures as useful guides to the practice.

---

\(^6\) Though medievals allow that such is possible through divine agency, as in transubstantiation, wherein the accidents (appearance, smell, etc.) of bread and wine persist absent the substance of the host.

\(^7\) Good places to begin sorting out these various issues regarding medieval interpretations of Aristotle’s *Categories* are the article on this topic by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Lloyd Newton in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-categories/#ThiCen](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-categories/#ThiCen) and Newton ed., *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories*, (Brill, 2008).
In response to Symington, Pasnau speaks to the value of what ordinary talk can tell us of the world, reckoning attention to such one of the valuable features of scholastic metaphysics, while cautioning that it is unlikely language serves as a guide to what fundamentally exists. As regards the claim that Aquinas looks on the accidental categories as each corresponding to an irreducible kind of being, Pasnau contends that for Aquinas this likely holds only for the categories of quantity and quality, marking the lesser accidental categories as mere structures or features of reality, not themselves items over and above the items in the other categories, illustrating this with reference to Aquinas’s treatment of the categories of action and passion.

**Part II: Substance ontology, medieval and modern**

Part II concerns the development of analytic metaphysics and principal, competing theories in contemporary substance ontology literature: (1) substratum theory (2) bundle theory (3) primitive substance theory and (4) hylomorphism. The respective theories construe material objects as (1) bare substratum-attribute compounds (2) aggregates of properties (3) primitively unified and individuated or (4) prime matter-substantial form compounds. Travis Dumsday’s “An Argument for Hylomorphism or Theism (But Not Both)” contends that concerns bound up with (1) force the substratum theorist either to abandon (1) for (4) or to recognize the existence of a causal agent or agents operating outside the laws of nature, and thereby move in the direction of some form of theism or, at the least, a denial of metaphysical naturalism, closing with some reflection on the relevance of substance ontology to natural theology.

Gyula Klima’s “The Rises and Falls of Analysis and Metaphysics” sees the substratum theorist’s dilemma as a result in part of a desire for metaphysical novelties that grew out of the logical positivists’ conviction that the study of the history of philosophy offers little of value. Klima judges Dumsday’s attempt to saddle the substratum theorist with a dilemma a success, adding that analysis likewise reveals that the substratum theorist’s notion of bare-particularity is self-contradictory, as the truth of the statement ‘x is a bare particular’ assigns the bare particular a property, viz., bare-particularity, given that, as Klima contends in his rejoinder to Dumsday’s reply (which works on multiple fronts to save the substratum theorist from advancing an open contradiction), ‘bare particular’ must here indicate a common predicable rather than a directly referring term, like a singular term.
Part III: The natural theology of Thomas Aquinas

In Part III the discussion turns from analysis, metaphysics, substance ontology and the importance of the latter to natural theology to the natural theology of Thomas Aquinas in particular, whose Five Ways are generally taken to be demonstrative proofs of the type Aristotle terms ‘that’ or ‘hōtι’ (rendered ‘quia’ in Latin) in Posterior Analytics (An.Post). Such proofs are thought to be able to reason from phenomena to the existence of what is their cause. Recent scholarship issuing from Radical Orthodoxy thinkers Catherine Pickstock and John Milbank, however, contends that the proofs are merely probabilistic. Again, Aquinas’s own Commentary on Aristotle’s “Posterior Analytics” rules out quia proof in the ordinary sense as regards God. Alexander Hall’s “God Science” disputes Pickstock and Milbank on the status of the Five Ways as demonstrative and identifies the type of quia proof at work in the arguments as the ‘through the accidents (per accidens)’ variety discussed at An.Post. 2, 8-10, illustrating this thesis with reference to the First Way.

Michael Sirilla’s comments on Hall’s paper accept Hall’s criticism of Pickstock and Milbank as well-founded, while noting that if per accidens quia proof of the type Hall describes really is at work in the First Way, it would render the proof invalid as (what Sirilla takes it to be) a demonstration of God’s existence, as the First Way would then show rather only that some first mover exists. Hall’s response acknowledges this difficulty in his account of Aquinas and notes that it arose from his having supposed that the First Way would use the same form as the syllogism that Aquinas uses to illustrate per accidens quia proof. Unfortunately, the proof that Aquinas uses to illustrate per accidens quia proof falls prey to a formal fallacy. Nevertheless, this difficulty is not endemic to per accidens quia proof as such and therefore does not vitiate the First Way, which Hall reconstructs as a valid per accidens quia proof intended by Aquinas to demonstrate the existence of God and not merely some first mover.
PART ONE:

METAPHYSICAL THEMES:
1274-1671
Robert Pasnau’s *Metaphysical Themes* is a bold work, covering a large swath of relatively unknown and sometimes underappreciated material. It is a tremendous contribution to the study of both medieval and early modern philosophy. Pasnau’s subject is material substance as it was understood by thinkers living and working in the period between the fourteenth century and the seventeenth. He surveys the views of both well-known philosophers (including Ockham, Buridan, Suarez, as well as Henry More, Pierre Gassendi, and René Descartes) and many lesser known figures, some of whom deserve more attention (my votes go to John Wyclif and Anne Conway). By bringing this body of work into view, Pasnau reveals a number of interesting avenues for future research, both in medieval philosophy and in early modern philosophy.

When I say that Pasnau’s focus is material substance, I mean that he considers almost every conceivable way of analyzing material substances: their essences, their parts, their properties and modes, their identity and persistence conditions, and so forth. Given the ambitious sweep of this study and the amount of space at my disposal, clearly I can cover only a small part of Pasnau’s book. In the following remarks, I will focus on two issues that arise in the book. I hope that by detaching these topics from the complex whole of which they are parts, I have not distorted Pasnau’s views inappropriately.

1. Holenmerism (chapter 16)

As Pasnau notes, the standard Scholastic line on immaterial things—including, in particular, the intellective soul of a human being—is that
they are present in every region or part of a body as a whole (p. 337). This
commitment comes in degrees. Aquinas, for example, holds that every
substantial form exists as a whole in each part of the composite substance.2
Many later thinkers, including those in the so called “nominalist” camp
(such as Ockham, Buridan, and Nicole Oresme) assert that it is only the
intellective, or rational, soul that exists as a whole in the whole body and
as a whole in each part of the body (tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte
corporis). So, for example, in what is thought to be his first series of
lectures on Aristotle’s On the Soul, Buridan clarifies the ways in which an
animal or plant soul is wholly in its body:

Here then is the first conclusion: If we interpret “whole” categorematically,
the whole soul of a horse is in the whole body. This is clear because [the
soul] is extended through the whole body. The second conclusion: If we
interpret “whole” syncategorematically, it should be accepted that the
whole soul of a horse is in the body. This is clear because each part of the
soul of the horse is in the body. But if we interpret “whole”
syncategorematically, it is false that the whole soul of a horse is in the
whole body and in each part of [the horse]. This is clear since it is false
that each part of the soul of a horse is in each part of the body. The part of
the horse’s soul which is the part in the eye is not in the foot.3

Or, consider this assertion in a question on Aristotle’s On the Soul
attributed to Nicole Oresme:

This kind of soul is not in every part as a whole, not integrally, not
potentially, and not essentially. That it is not integrally is obvious, since
the part that is in the foot is not in the hand. Nor is it potentially, since it is
not the case that all the powers are in every part. Nor is it essentially, as I
explained previously, since the part that is in the hand is not soul, but
something belonging to soul. For this reason, Aristotle compares a
sensitive soul to a figure. For example, the figure of a quadrangle is not in
each part of a quadrangle.4

---

2 See for example, Summa Theologiae 1a 76.8c.
3 Buridan Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima (prima lectura) 2.6 (Patar ed., pp.
284-5, lines 122-32). (Text: Benoît Patar (ed.) Le Tracté de l’Âme de Jean Buridan
de prima lectura. Philosophes Médiévaux 29. Louvain-la-Neuve / Longueuil
(Québec): Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie / Éditions du Préambule,
1991.)
4 Oresme Quaestiones in Aristotelis De anima 2.4 (Patar ed., p. 144, lines 108-15).
(Text: Benoît Patar (ed.) Nicolai Oresme Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis
De Anima. Philosophes Médiévaux 32. Louvain-la-Neuve / Louvain-Paris:
Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie / Éditions Peeters, 1995.)
In short, the soul of a non-human animal or a plant is “extended as its body is extended” (*extensa extensione sui corporis*), and hence the whole soul is in the whole body only because one part of the soul imbues one part of the body and no part of the soul is not imbuing some part of the body. The rational soul of a human, however, “is not extended in the manner that its body is extended”, and thus it can be wholly in each part:

Again, if in a human there is not some other soul, then it ought to be said without qualification (*absolute*) that the whole soul of a human and every power is in every part of a human, and hence that the intellective [power], the visual [power], and so on, are in the foot. But if in a human there is another soul and form—such as a sensitive [soul]—then one should say the same thing about those [lower souls] as [it will be said] about the souls of brutes.7

Indeed, if the rational soul is mereologically simple, then there is no other way in which it could animate the whole body:

Now we should briefly elaborate upon the intellective [soul] (about which more is to be made apparent in Book 3). I say that [the intellective soul] is not whole properly speaking, because “whole” is not said of anything except a divisible thing having parts (although sometimes it is improperly said of an indivisible thing). And, thus, it should be said that an intellective soul is in each part as a whole in this manner [i.e. improperly] because it informs a body and is not extended as a body is extended (*extensa ad extensionem corporis*). Thus, it follows that in every part either it or part of it is, and given it does not have a part, it follows that in every part it exists as a whole.8

Later on in the same question, we are given an explanation for the difference. The human intellective soul is a form that is not drawn out from the potentiality of the matter.9 And it is for this reason that the intellective soul is not extended throughout the body in the way that the body itself is extended. That is, unlike a body or non-human soul, the

---

5 Buridan *Quaestiones in De anima* (prima lectura) 2.6 (Patar ed., p. 281, line 68).
6 Ibid., lines 66-67.
7 Oresme *Quaestiones in De anima* 2.4 (Patar ed., p. 142, lines 50-5).
8 Oresme *Quaestiones in De anima* 2.4 (Patar ed., p. 142, lines 39-47). See also Buridan *Quaestiones in De anima* (prima lectura) 2.6 (Patar ed., p. 283, lines 105-9).
9 Oresme *Quaestiones in De anima* 2.4 (Patar ed., p. 145, lines 133-39 and 143-47).
intellective soul is not extended by having one part here and another part there.

Pasnau sees in the doctrine of holenmerism a “promising” way to demarcate the immaterial from the material: “All and only material things have corpuscular, non-holenmeric structure” (p. 342). Of course, this method for marking the material off from the immaterial can only succeed if holenmerism is intelligible and ontologically principled. In this section, I will try to raise some concerns about holenmerism.

Let me restate the doctrine of holenmerism with a little more precision. An entity X is holenmerically present in something else, Y, if and only if, Y has integral parts and for each integral part of Y, the whole of X exists in that part. Specifically for my purposes, this fact about a holenmeric soul is important:

If a soul is holenmerically present in a body, the soul will be present in at least two parts of the body, P1 and P2, in such a way that the soul is wholly present in P1 and it is wholly present in P2, and P1 is mereologically discrete from P2.

To say that “the soul is wholly present in some part Pn” is to say that

10 The restriction to “integral” parts is here because medieval authors tend to recognize a host of different kinds of parts, some of which probably cannot be hosts for holenmers. There is no common definition of integral parts, but many medieval philosophers characterize integral parts as proper parts (in contrast to the contemporary mereological notion of an improper part), which comprise some sort of quantity. For more on the types of parts in medieval mereologies, consult Andrew Arlig “Medieval Mereology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published 2006, revised 2011 (latest version on-line: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology-medieval/).

11 X is mereologically discrete from Y if and only if no part of X is a part of Y and no part of Y is a part of X. Of course, it is not true that every pair of parts of the body that one could pick out are discrete from one another. Some pairs will be overlapping parts. But in the cases we are interested in, there will be non-coincident overlapping parts (say, my forearm and my hand), which entails that there will be at least two parts of the body that do not overlap at all (e.g., the one-inch long part near my elbow and the index finger).

12 If the soul is simple, then the only part of the soul is the soul itself, and then it would follow as Oresme notes that the soul is present in Pn only if the soul’s
Now let us consider a criticism of holenmerism by Henry More:

[I]t is the same as if someone were to say that there is nothing of the soul that is not included within [bodily part] A, and yet that, at the same moment of time, [...] the whole soul is in [some distinct bodily part] B, as if the whole soul were outside its whole self. This is clearly impossible in any singular and individual thing. As for universals, they are not things, but rather notions we apply in contemplating things.13

More observes that if a soul were present holenmerically in a body, then it would behave as a universal is often said to behave. But More thinks that there is something metaphysically unprincipled about this. No concrete thing can behave in the manner that a universal behaves.

To see the parallel, consider the classical understanding of a universal as a thing that can be wholly present in many discrete particulars at the same time.

U is a universal if and only if it can be wholly present in an individual I1 and wholly present in another individual I2 at the same time, where I1 is mereologically discrete from I2.

This notion of a universal was famously problematized by Boethius in his second commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*:

But genera and species cannot be. And this is understood based on these [considerations]. Everything that is common to many at one time cannot be one. For that which is common is of many, especially when one and the same thing is in many at one time as a whole. For no matter how many species there are, in all of them there is one genus, and not because each species grabs from it some, let us say, “parts”. Rather, at one time each [species] has the whole genus. The result of this is that because the whole genus has been posited in many individual [species] at one time, it cannot be one. For it cannot come about, when the whole is in many at one time, that it itself is numerically one. But if that is so, then the genus in particular cannot be one. And the result of this is that [the genus] is altogether nothing. For every thing that is, is precisely for the reason that it is one.14

13 *Enchiridion Metaphysicum* 27.12 (translated by Pasnau, p. 342).
14 Boethius *In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta, editionis secundae*, book 1, c. 10 (CSEL 48, pp. 161-2).
If some thing—a concrete thing, not a concept—were universal, it would have to be capable of existing wholly in I₁ and wholly in I₂, where I₁ and I₂ are mereologically discrete things. But, then, this universal thing would have to be, as More puts it, “outside itself”: All of it would have to be here and, yet, at least some of it is not here but there. But some of it cannot be there, since every one of the potential parts that could be there is already spoken for; they are all here.₁⁵

Pasnau sees that More’s argument boils down to the Boethian assertion that no thing can behave like a universal, and he is right to insist that in so far as this is the criticism, More can be accused of begging the question. The behavior attributed to universals—existing wholly in many discrete particulars at the same time—is precisely what would have to set them apart from particulars (p. 342). Thus, if a realist were confronted with Boethius’s argument, he could merely shrug: “Yes,” he could say, “that is how universals work; that is precisely what makes them universal.” Hence, in so far as More tries to undermine the doctrine of holenmerism by asserting that no thing can be wholly present in many discrete particulars, the argument does not have any force.

But let me try to help More out here. The real impetus behind More’s argument is that no particular thing can exist holenmerically in some other particular. Of course, to merely assert this is not sufficient, since then too one could be accused of begging the question. But the Moreans could take up a stronger position if they were to call into question whether holenmerism is a principled position.

Notice that the advocate of holenmerism is forced to give away the notion that being wholly present in many discrete particulars at the same time is the proprium (or perhaps differentia) of universals. After all, for most of the Scholastics in the period covered by Pasnau’s book, substantial forms—and specifically souls—are particulars. Hence, some kinds of particulars, rational souls, are capable of existing wholly in discrete bodies or regions at the same time. But other particulars cannot exist in this

₁⁵ An analogous worry is raised by Anselm concerning God’s presence in the world (Monologion c. 21, Opera Omnia, ed. Schmitt, vol. 1, pp. 36-7): If God were wholly in R₁, then it would seem that He could not be wholly in a non-overlapping region R₂. For if He were wholly in R₁, then nothing of Him is not in R₁. And if He is wholly in R₂, then nothing of Him is not in R₂. But by hypothesis He is in R₁ as well as R₂. Hence, it cannot be the case that nothing of Him is in not in R₂.
manner. Why are both kinds of particulars each *particular*? If there are universal things, what sets them apart from particulars? Considered from this angle, it seems that once we give away the notion that being wholly present in many at the same time is the *proprium* of universal things, the metaphysician’s nonchalant shrug begins to look rather unprincipled.

Here then is my challenge, inspired by More, to the advocate of holenmerism:

You, the advocate, should give us some reasons for thinking that a non-universal, natural thing can be extended without being divided. At the very least, it seems that either

(1) you must concede that my soul is in fact a universal,

or

(2) if my soul is a particular, then

(2a) if you think that there are universal things, you owe us another distinguishing characteristic (a *differentia* or *proprium*) that separates universal beings from particular beings,

or

(2b) if you think that there are no universal things, then you owe us a reason—a reason different from the one that Boethius identified—why there can be no universal things.

As we have already noted, no one in the period we are concerned about will concede (1). It should be stressed that (2) spells out the bare minimum that the advocate of holenmerism must provide. But to really satisfy the Morean critic, much more than the bare minimum would be desirable.

Let us start with (2a): The *realist* advocate of holenmerism owes us that distinguishing characteristic. But another plausible candidate does not come to mind; for the other obvious *proprium* of universals—namely, *being predicable of many numerically distinct things*—has its own difficulties. Homogeneous wholes (i.e. stuffs and masses) share this behavior. Every portion of the lake is, like the whole lake itself, water.\(^{16}\)

\(^{16}\) For this difficulty see Boethius *De Div.* 879d-880a (Magee ed., p. 14). Boethius’s solution is that while a portion of the lake is the same in substance as
Moreover, if the whole animal gets its name and definition in virtue of being imbued by a soul of a certain type and this soul imbibes each part as a whole, then it would seem that each part can take the name and definition of the whole animal. In other words, it seems that holenmerism implies that each part of a human will be human, and hence that the soul is predicative of the each part in the same way that a universal is predicative of each individual. And, in fact, a common challenge to the doctrine of holenmerism is that, if true, then each part of an animal (e.g. its foot or ear) would be animal, and each part of a man would be man.\textsuperscript{17}

The nominalist advocate of the doctrine runs into trouble further down the path, since he has a whole host of reasons why there cannot be universals anywhere outside the mind.\textsuperscript{18} Some of the nominalist’s arguments are better than others. But for the present, I will concede that there are no

---

\textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., Oresme \textit{QQ. In De Anima} 2.4, challenge # 2 (p. 141), and Buridan \textit{QQ. In De Anima (ultima lectura) 2.7}, challenge # 1 (p. 81, in Peter G. Sobol, \textit{John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation. An Edition of Book II of His Commentary on Aristotle’s Book on the Soul with an Introduction and a Translation of Question 18 on Sensible Species}, Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1984). In the replies to this objection, medieval authors try out several strategies for restricting the predication of substance terms to whole animals or humans. Intriguingly, in his later lectures, Buridan seems to concede that there is a sense in which a hoof is animal (Sobol, pp. 94 f.). The reason that we are not entitled to say that a horse’s hoof is a horse is that, in fact, “horse” is a connotative term, not strictly speaking a substantial term (p. 97).

\textsuperscript{18} For a representative list, see Ockham \textit{Summa Logicae} part 1, c. 15 (\textit{Opera Philosophica} 1, pp. 50-4) as well as the mind-numbingly comprehensive discussion in his \textit{Ordinatio} 1, d. 2, qq. 4-7 (\textit{Opera Theologica} 2, pp. 99 f.).
universal things and that there are reasons to hold this that are independent of the Boethian objection. In other words, I will concede that the nominalist can give us an answer to (2b).

But recall that I said giving an answer to (2a) or (2b) was the bare minimum. To thoroughly eliminate the suspicion that holmenmerism is an unprincipled, perhaps even ad hoc, doctrine, the nominalist advocate of holmenmerism should give us some reasons why a soul—which again, I will stress, is a particular thing inhabiting the natural world—can be extended throughout a body without being divided and apportioned part to part. This last demand is all the more urgent for nominalists like Buridan and Oresme, who restrict holmenmerism to rational souls, since here in particular it begins to appear that holmenmerism is brought in solely to save some cherished doctrine of the faith.

To be sure, when it comes to metaphysical disputes, it is not always clear upon whom the burden of proof lies. But in the present case, I think the Moreans have the stronger claim. After all, both the Moreans and the advocates of holmenmerism believe that some kinds of particulars, if they have parts, must have these parts spread out part outside of part.

There is an even trickier point that needs to be stated as a caveat, and that is that in metaphysical debates reasons and explanations must at some point come to an end.19 Philosophers rightfully complain if their opponents refuse to offer any reasons or explanations, but the tougher part is determining whether someone has said enough. However, on this point as well, I think the Morean has the stronger case. As Pasnau acknowledges, later medieval advocates of holmenmeric rational souls generally have nothing substantial to say in response to the Morean (p. 339, note 23). The best that our authors apparently can do is offer an analogy:

And about the intellective soul as it is related to a man it should be imagined just as we imagine about God as He is related to the universe: For God is present to each part of the universe in virtue of [His]

---

19 See for example David Lewis’s observation that in the debate over the existence and status of universals, all sides must resort to some primitive relation or fact: the realist has the primitive instantiation relation, the resemblance nominalist takes it as a primitive fact that some things resemble other things, and the natural class nominalist takes it as a primitive fact that things break down into natural classes (p. 347). David Lewis “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1983): 343-77.
unmediated assistance and lack of distance (\textit{indistantiam}), and not by delimiting Himself with respect to some specific state or some specific place. And, thus, [by existing] in the East He is not distant from Himself who is [also] existing in the West. For distance is due to quantity, and God is affected by no quantity. About the intellective soul as it is related to a man it ought to be imagined that [they are related] in a similar manner: that [the soul] is present to each part of the man in virtue of unmediated assistance and lack of distance, and in this way [even though it is] in the head it is not distant from itself, since it exists in the foot.\footnote{Buridan \textit{Quaestiones in De Anima (prima lectura)} 2.6 (Patar ed., pp. 283-4, lines 109-118).}

This seems to be no more than an acknowledgement that some part of the natural world has supernatural properties, and it leaves the holonmerist with a gap in his account of nature, if not his ontological framework.\footnote{In this respect, Aquinas might have the stronger position, since he asserts that all substantial forms exist holonmerically in their composites. (Of course, he still needs to explain why accidental forms do not have this property.) Looked at from this perspective, one might think that what is really most remarkable in this whole discussion is the later Scholastic position that the souls of plants and animals do not exist holonmerically in their corresponding bodies.} In my view, the explanations have run out too soon and that More is entitled to say, “So much the worse for holonmerism!”

2. Identity over time (chapter 29)

The fact that an animal soul is \textit{not} holonmerically present in the animal body has implications for the permanence and persistence of animals over time and change. If an animal soul imbues a body by having one part here and one part there, then if one of the bodily parts (the one here, say) is removed, it appears that the soul has lost a part as well. This seems to entail that the animal—the hylomorphic composite—does not endure as a whole if it gains or loses parts.\footnote{This line of thought is elaborated in some detail in an interpolation in the version of Buridan’s \textit{Quaestio (prima lectura)} 2.6 found in the Turin MS H.III 30 (a transcription can be found in the apparatus of Patar’s edition (1991), pp. 282-4).} And, indeed, as Pasnau shows, several fourteenth-century “nominalist” thinkers did conclude just that. Here I think that Pasnau gets the broad outlines of the nominalist view right. But I think some refinements should be noted.
We will focus on Buridan’s theory of persistence over time. On several occasions Buridan pondered whether a composite can endure if it gains or loses parts. In answering this question, Buridan reveals his allegiance to a principle embraced by, among others, Ockham and Abelard: a whole is the same thing as its parts taken together all at once. For this reason, only mereological simples and composites that never gain or lose parts (for example, perhaps celestial substances) can persist as numerically the same thing in the strictest sense. Since humans do gain and lose parts, they cannot be “wholly” the same in number over time and change.

The second conclusion is that the exact thing that is Socrates today is not wholly the same (idem totaliter) with that exact thing which was Socrates yesterday, because some parts have flowed away from that exact thing which was Socrates yesterday and other parts have come in from the outside. But no thing is wholly the same before and after, if anything has been removed or anything has been added. This can be confirmed just as the first [objector] argued: that exact thing that was Socrates yesterday will be A, and that which comes to him, given that he is augmented, is called B. It follows that now Socrates is the composite of A and B. Therefore, Socrates [now] is not wholly the same as what is A, and yet yesterday he was wholly the same as that which is A. Therefore, it is clear that Socrates now is not wholly the same as that which Socrates was yesterday.

If a human or a mundane non-human substance is to persist, it would seem that it can only do so in a less than total sense of numerical sameness. Otherwise, we would be stuck with the absurd consequence that Socrates

---

23 I will mostly be drawing on Buridan’s discussion of persistence in his questions on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption, book 1, question 13. (Text: John Buridan Quaestiones super libros De generacione et corruptione Aristotelis. Edited by Michiel Streijger, Paul J. J. M. Bakker, and Johannes M. M. H. Thijssen. Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2010.) For other discussions of persistence, see Buridan’s Questions on the Physics 1.10, the briefer treatment in his Questions on the Metaphysics 7.12, and the quick summary in his Quaestiones in De anima (ultima lectura) 2.7 (Sobol ed., pp. 100-2).


25 The first objection is this: “The whole is its parts, as it is commonly said. But the parts do not remain the same; rather, they come in and flow away. Therefore, [the proposition under] investigation is false.”

26 Quaestiones super De gen. 1.13 (pp. 112-13).
today “would have been generated from scratch”. 27 For humans, the
solution is to fix upon a part of him that does persist in the strictest sense:

The third conclusion is that, from the beginning of his life up to the end, a
man remains partially the same (idem partialiter), or I should say, [the
same] with respect to his noblest and most principal part (that is, with
respect to the intellective soul, which always remains wholly the same).
And from this we can conclude that speaking in an unqualified way and
without anything added that a man remains the same from the beginning of
his life to the end. And this is because we customarily denominate,
unqualifiedly and without adding anything, a thing by means of its most
principal part, and this is especially so if the most principal part is
something that manifestly stands out (valde excedens) in the way that the
intellective soul stands out from the body. 28

Non-human animals and plants, however, cannot even persist in this sense.

But I believe that something else should be said about [for example] a
horse or a dog. For I believe that this big horse, the exact one here today,
even if it were partially the same with that exact one born from a mother’s
womb, nevertheless is not the same with respect to its greatest part or even
with respect to its most principal one, because in the big horse there is
much more of the matter added since he was born than of the matter which
was then in him—[and this is true] whether we are speaking of the matter
of the head or the heart or the brain or any of the other limbs. 29 Moreover,
since in the case of material forms (namely, those which are brought out
from the potency of the matter) a form does not migrate from [one batch
of] matter into [another batch of] matter, 30 it follows that there is much
more of the substantial form (both in the heart and in the brain) which was
not in the newborn than of that [form] which was. And so it follows that if
there were partial identity (identitas partialis) between this exact [horse]
and that exact [horse], this identity is in virtue of lesser or smaller parts.

27 “from scratch”: de novo (Opp. # 2, p. 112). That is, if Socrates exists today but
he did not exist yesterday, then he must have come into existence as if out of thin
air.
28 Quaestiones super De gen. 1.13 (p. 113).
29 In all likelihood, Buridan mentions the head, the heart and the brain specifically
because these are some of the obvious candidates for a most principal part of an
animal. After all, if you remove a horse’s heart (or its head, or its brain) the horse
dies, even if the remaining parts are left intact.
30 “migrate from [one batch of] matter into [another batch of] matter”: transeat de
materia in materiam.
And similarly, [in the case of these smaller parts] there is more of diversity
than of sameness.\textsuperscript{31}

Brutes and plants, then, persist only in an improper sense, namely, in the
way that rivers persist:

It follows from this that, in order to see how a horse remains the same in
number, we should return to the opinion of Seneca and speak of a horse as
[we do] of a river, with this caveat, which Seneca expresses well: A river
more rapidly and manifestly passes by and changes (even when
considering its greater parts taken all at once), whereas a horse [changes]
more slowly and with respect to smaller parts, and hence [it does so] more
obscurely, nay, imperceptibly.\textsuperscript{32} Hence, both the name “Browny” and the
name “Seine” are discrete names properly belonging to a quality. And for
this reason, it must be conceded that in some manner or other [something]
for which [the name] supposits remains the same in number. Moreover, I
believe that this [kind of] numerical identity should be considered in virtue
of a continuous succession of new parts coming in while previous parts
recede, and thus that if I say, “The Seine has lasted for a thousand years,” I
mean that some parts have succeeded other parts continuously for a
thousand years. And it is thus also the case for a horse or a dog, when this
is so: in a succession of this sort, there always remains the same or similar
shape. Even if there is not in this case unqualified identity, nevertheless an
animal is said, without qualification and anything added, to remain the
same by the commoner, to whom the coming and going of parts is not
apparent to the senses (especially in the case of living things).\textsuperscript{33}

Buridan is perhaps overstating his case, since the river and the horse in
fact seem to exhibit a weaker form of partial identity.\textsuperscript{34} As the quotation
above makes clear, Buridan admits that there may be partial identity
between stages in a horse’s life. Our horse Browny does not change parts
wholesale from moment to moment. Some of the material parts present at
t\textsubscript{1} are also present at t\textsubscript{2}. Thus, in fact, Browny is really a succession of

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Quaestiones super De gen.} 1.13 (pp. 113-14).
\textsuperscript{32} This is a paraphrase of Seneca. In his \textit{Epistulae ad Lucilium}, 58.23, Seneca
compares a river to a human, not a horse. Both fluctuate, but the river’s
fluctuations are more manifest. Hence Seneca is amazed by “our madness”,
namely, that “we love the most fleeting of things, the body, and we live in fear that
we may at some point die, when every moment is disposed to be a death for the
previous one” (OCT p. 158).
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Quaestiones super De gen.} 1.13 (pp. 114-15).
\textsuperscript{34} See Klima “Buridan on Substantial Unity”, p. 2. (Gyula Klima “Buridan on
Substantial Unity and Substantial Concepts.” Paper accessed through Klima’s
webpage: http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/)
Remarks on Pasnau’s Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671

partially identical horses. It also is quite plausible to think that a river does not change parts in a wholesale manner from \( t_1 \) to \( t_2 \). Although, in the case of a river, the parts change much more rapidly, and so I grant that it is hard to verify whether we have partial identity between stages or wholesale mereological change.\(^{35}\) At any rate, even if horses are partially identical, they are not identical with respect to the “most principal part”, and hence they do not persist in the way that a human does. Therefore, I will not linger any longer over whether this means that we really have three distinct modes of numerical identity, or merely two, one that is all-or-nothing (the kind that corresponds to the standard contemporary interpretation of “\( = \)”) and one that comes in degrees.

No matter whether we have two or three modes of numerical sameness, it is tempting to think that Buridan is drawing a distinction between, on the one hand, a strict and proper sense of “same” and, on the other hand, a “loose and popular” sense.\(^{36}\) Certain things that Pasnau says suggest that he is enticed by this interpretation.

What Buridan’s discussion makes clear, however, is that this is one of those instances where the way we talk does not correspond with the

---

\(^{35}\) This might be why Albert of Saxony suggests that a river is an example of a thing that does change its parts completely from moment to moment. In a fascinating discussion in his questions on Aristotle’s Physics Albert asserts that if God were to create a series of instantaneous Socrateses, rather than create him once and conserve him, then Socrates would be a successive entity (in the way that time is a successive entity, not in Chisholm’s sense):

An example of this would be if Socrates were continually made and made again by the First Cause, corresponding to the way in which the Seine continuously flows and flows, so that nothing of the preexisting [river] remains. (Albert of Saxony Quaestiones in Phys. 3.3 [pp. 483-4], translated by Pasnau [p. 393].)

Intriguingly, Albert even concedes that a series of Socrateses would be indistinguishable from a permanent substance (p. 484).

metaphysical facts on the ground. It is perfectly legitimate to say, with qualification, that Socrates persists through change—this is legitimate, because our customary idioms allow it. From a metaphysical point of view, however, such claims are liable to mislead, if they are understood as entailing that Socrates wholly survives.37

The last part of what Pasnau says is right. In so far as our idioms suggest to us that Socrates or Browny wholly survives mereologically change, these idioms are deceptive. But I want to suggest that Buridan is not distinguishing between a metaphysically correct sense of “being numerically the same as” and two loose, popular senses of the phrase.38

Now, I grant that Buridan’s choice of terminology is not always helpful. For example, in his treatment of this issue in his Physics commentary, Buridan claims that the third mode of numerical sameness is that something is the same as another “less properly”.39 But I think that on a careful reading of these texts, one will see that Buridan thinks all three senses of numerical sameness are “proper” in the sense that they are rigorously defined notions with more or less precise criteria for application. The only place where custom clearly creeps in is that in many cases it is acceptable to say “This horse is the same one you saw last year” or “This man is the same person you knew as a boy.” That is, it is acceptable to drop the modifier “wholly”, “partially”, or “successively”40

37 Pasnau, p. 698.
38 I have argued for this claim in a recent paper, “Parts, Wholes and Identity”, pp. 457-8. (Andrew Arlig “Parts, Wholes, and Identity,” in John Marenbon ed., The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 445-67. Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.) In early drafts of this paper I myself had been tempted to think that Buridan was distinguishing between a strict sense of identity, and looser and popular senses. I was urged to reconsider this notion by Claude Panaccio, Peter King, Henrik Lagerlund, and other members of the audience at Toronto, where I presented a draft of the article.
39 In Phys. 1.10, f. 13vb (Pasnau, p. 696). Compare Albert of Saxony In Phys. 1.8, where the three modes of being the same in number are (1) being the same “properly”, (2) being the same “less properly or partially”, and (3) being the same “improperly on account of the continuous succession of parts in relation to one another” (p. 129). (The text of Albert of Saxony: Benoît Patar (ed.) Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis ‘Physicam’ ad Albertum de Saxonia attributae. Vol. 2. Philosophes Médiévaux 40. Louvain-la-Neuve / Louvain-Paris: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie / Éditions Peeters, 1999.)
40 Buridan does not use this term to modify the third sense of numerical sameness. I coin it based on the longer qualification that he offers when responding to the opening objections: “…at least that it remains the same when identity is asserted in
when speaking to one’s neighbors or making transactions in the marketplace.

One reason to think that Buridan wants to identify more than one legitimately philosophical sense of “being numerically the same” is that, on the one hand, he needs to account for the fact that humans and animals change and so (as even common sense admits) humans are not altogether the same from time to time. But, on the other hand, Buridan must find a way to deny such untoward consequences as ones that are alluded to in the discussion about augmentation and decrease:

And in light of these arguments it is not necessary to concede anything more. Nor are certain pronouncements about a human valid, namely, the ones in which it is said that if you are not the same [human] who you had been, you had not been baptized. For it was said that a man does not remain the same unqualifiedly, but [he does] with respect to his most principal part.41

I do not think that Buridan wants to validate the claim that I am the one who was baptized merely by appealing to custom. Rather, as I see it, this claim is true, as are claims about moral responsibility for past actions, for principled metaphysical reasons. Socrates is not the kind of thing that is mereologically changeless. Instead, Socrates is the kind of thing such that, if Socrates’s soul is present, then Socrates is still present and the proper bearer of many important properties. Indeed, to see that Buridan thinks this is a philosophically principled reason, notice that he attributes the position to Aristotle (as well as to the Church):

For this reason in books seven and nine of the Ethics Aristotle says that a human is principally an intellect or an intellective soul.42 And thus it is said that a man is your lover if he loves the intellectual part [of you]. And our faith holds this to be true, since we say that Saint Peter is in Paradise (and in the Litany one says, “O’ Saint Peter, light on our behalf…”), even though the bodies of saints have been corrupted and only their souls are in Paradise.43

virtue of [the fact that there is] a continuous succession of parts succeeding one another through a period of time” (Quaestiones super De gen. 1.13 [p. 115]). See also Albert’s formulation (previous note).
41 Quaestiones super De gen. 1.13 (p. 115).
42 Compare Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 7.6, 1150a1-4, and 9.8, 1168b31-34.
43 Quaestiones super De gen. 1.13 (p. 113).