

Interests and Stability or Ideologies and Order in Contemporary World Politics

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By

Fabio Fossati

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To Irene and Rosalba

*...Let me take you on a trip
Around the world and back
Let me show you the world in my eyes...*
(Depeche Mode, "World in my eyes" 1990)

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INTRODUCTION

The first important objective of this book is to present a broad analysis of world politics, with a focus on the contemporary (post-1989) phase. This is probably the first attempt to apply the methodology of the Italian school of political science to the study of world politics. This group of scholars (Sartori, Stoppino, Morlino, Panebianco, Cotta...) has always conducted research with a strong emphasis on both analytical theory (definitions and qualitative models) and empirical (mostly qualitative) inquiry in order to understand politics, more than to explain it by formulating theories. Instead, the explanatory theories of the so-called philosophical traditions (Realism, rationalist and reflective liberalism, post-Marxism...) of International Relations (IRs) will not be presented in this book. Italian political scientists have elaborated precise definitions of concepts (for example Stoppino's definition of politics), and qualitative analytical models (for example Sartori's models of party systems). American and British scholars have been less "obsessed" with definitions, sometimes confusing conflicts with wars, or nations with states. For example, seven definitions of order have been proposed in the IRs literature in English. Then, some political scientists have developed definitions that fall into the trap of "conceptual stretching" (Sartori 1979). Take the definition of anarchy as the absence of world authority; it has never existed, and we do not need a concept without empirical cases. Another example is the misuse of the concept of interests; according to some scholars, actors are always influenced by interests, so that it becomes a sort of "catch-all concept". Many political scientists have specialized in either analytical theory -becoming experts in political theory-, or empirical research (for example in the public policies sub-discipline). However, without concepts and models, political scientists simply become second-rank historians; instead, without empirical research, we become second-rank philosophers. In this book, world politics will be analyzed in light of some important concepts (interests, ideologies, order, stability, power, institutions, cooperation...) and qualitative models (of political cultures, foreign policy, international systems, conflict resolution, globalization, political regimes, dependence...). Thus, this book may be classified within the boundaries of "World Politics", the sub-discipline that has tried (since the 1980s) to build bridges between IRs and comparative politics.

My work has also been inspired by Johan Galtung, who has been one of my masters since we met for the first time when I graduated at the University of Firenze in 1986. In accordance with his teachings, I have not specialized in a single sub-sector of the world, compulsively repeating more or less the same researches across the decades. Rather, I have conducted many studies, each on the most relevant sub-sectors of world politics. This “holistic” book is not a random assembly, but a coherent collage of different inquiries conducted over the years. Of course, one cannot start with holism from the outset. All research needs specialization, but every time I finished a specialized inquiry, I was moved by curiosity to start another one on a different topic. Only after thirty years of studies, could I develop a broad analysis of contemporary events. I started with a dissertation thesis on peace research, and my PhD thesis was on political and economic institutions of Latin America after the 1982 foreign debt crisis. I studied economic regionalism, models of the international system, and global economic organizations/regimes; I analyzed processes of world order, governance and anarchy; I compared the foreign policy of Italy and Spain; I studied political conditionality in foreign aid and in the EU enlargement process; I analyzed the role of political cultures, interests and ideologies in international relations; I focused on armed conflict resolution processes; I studied non democratic regimes and the relation between market and democracy. After thirty years (we are in 2016), I have prepared this book, by combining those specialized (but not compulsive) researches, and trying to say something about the “overall picture” of world politics. It seems that carefully studying each sub-sector of the world is the only way to advance a coherent diagnosis on the whole. This is a heterodox research book, but it is not a monograph; because it is a sum of specialized (but not compulsive) studies, it can also become a holistic text-book for university courses. Galtung’s (1981) teachings also concern knowledge cosmologies, by which the *tertium datur* principle can be applied to identify something in between the research volumes and the teaching books.

I have been influenced by another of Galtung’s (1985) suggestions, that research should focus on relevant objects of analysis. Instead, in the post-modern phase of human sciences (since the 1980s), research has become too sophisticated and has focused on very marginal topics of analysis. It is assumed that political science can study less important events with more precision, while critical junctures of history are to be treated as uncertainties. This book will focus on the topics that are considered most rewarding to study, according to its holistic approach. Galtung has also suggested that research should be policy-oriented; see the section in this book on some therapies in conflict resolution processes.

This objective was advanced by peace researchers in the modern phase of the human sciences (the 1960s). By contrast, behaviorism has always assumed that if a scholar interacts with politicians, he will be “corrupted”, and will no longer be able to conduct independent research. This is not the main risk, even though it may happen. With the advent of post-modernity since the 1980s, normative efforts have almost been forgotten in the human sciences, with some exceptions (in public policies). However, even if a peace researcher envisaged a preferred world, politics would also be characterized by unintentional effects, so that any attempt to influence it will probably lead to another unforeseen and often worse outcome.

The theories of the so-called philosophical traditions of IRs will not be analyzed in this book. In the first century of IRs, Realism, rationalist and reflective liberalism, and post-Marxism developed many explanatory theories (on peace, war, cooperation, imperialism, under-development...), giving rise to a significant progress of the discipline (Fossati 2015). The core of my criticism is not the formulation of these theories; it is difficult, but it can be done. After a hundred years, those schools of thought and their theories have probably become outdated, because they were also a legacy of the Cold War: with the “Republicans versus Democrats” cleavage, and the strong influence of Marxism in Europe (Sil, Katzenstein 2010). In the spring of 2012, the European Journal of International Relations (2013) organized a panel entitled “The end of International Relations theory?”. It seems that since 2001 the main conceptual cleavage is not “power versus institutions”, but “interests versus ideologies”. We can use all these concepts, but why should we emphasize only one of them, according to Realism, liberalism or Marxism? Should we continue to talk of the “main” actors of IRs (states, international organizations, multi-national corporations...), or could we just study the “relevant” actors (governments, regional organizations, global institutions, trans-national groups, domestic movements...)? Especially since 2001 the survival of these philosophical traditions risks producing empty academic intellectual “clans”. Every IRs scholar knows that these clans exist, and that they condition the editorial committees of political science journals. These clans have often turned into “prevailing” schools of thought. In the USA this role has been played by Realism, whose scholars developed assumptions about how politics works, that since the 1950s have come to be shared by most IRs researchers. Guzzini (1998) showed how Realism’s attempts to build general theories of IRs have been unsuccessful, because empirical evidence has never confirmed all the assumptions of Realism taken together. In Europe, since the 1980s yet another prevailing school has materialized in opposition to Realism: so-called “constructivism”.

Keohane's (1989) expression of "reflectivism" will be preferred. Many books and articles have been written with the aim of criticizing Realism, and formulating too sophisticated theories on marginal topics of research.

In this book, the study of political cultures and ideologies has been emphasized, while in the literature of IRs these concepts have not received their due consideration, because many political scientists have been afraid of being influenced by their own values. Then, the prevailing political cultures of our societies have played a major role: rightist conservatism (in the 1950s and 1960s), and leftist "political correctness" (after the 1980s). The practice of under-estimating ideologies has become established, because most political actors have developed a patterned behavior, coherent with those prevailing political cultures. They themselves could not appear to be ideological, precisely because the promoters of those political cultures wanted to avoid the so-called "naked king" effect. For example, pluri-national states have been promoted in foreign policy (with few single-nation exceptions like East Timor) since 1989. This means that the value of multi-culturalism has a strong influence in world politics, but this diagnosis is discouraged by its promoters, because leftist political correctness has become the prevailing contemporary political culture.

The book has been structured into eight chapters plus the conclusions. Chapter 1 deals with the definition of the main concepts that are the cornerstones of correct understanding of international relations: power, politics, governance, anarchy, institution, nation, civilization, conflict, war, violence, crisis, peace, security, terrorism, cooperation, organizations, regimes, globalization, political cultures -defined as a mix of interests and ideologies-, and world order. The focus of this book is on two of these concepts: political cultures and order. The relationship among political cultures, interests and ideologies has never been properly understood in the literature of IRs because of the influence of its prevailing school of thought: Realism. In the past, only Goldstein and Keohane (1993) tried to emphasize the role of ideas in world politics. Culture and values are important, but cannot be studied with the overly theoretical and abstract definitions of constructivist scholars. Wendt's (1999) analytical confusion between interests and values should be avoided. In Western politics, there are four models of democratic political cultures: the conservative, the liberal, the leftist constructivist and the leftist Manichaeic. A (qualitative) model is a Weberian ideal-type, like Sartori's models of party-systems; it is a representation of political reality according to the criteria of simplicity and coherence. Then, every political culture is influenced by philosophical traditions (respectively Realism, liberalism and Marxism), but these models have been built by observing international political behaviors.

Thus, the relationship between interests and ideologies cannot be conceptualized abstractly, because it differs for each model; conservatism is “interests-intensive”, the other three political cultures are “ideologies-intensive”. Conservatism starts from the promotion of some interests, that generate nationalist ideas. Liberalism, constructivism and Manicheanism start from the promotion of ideologies (democracy and the market, solidarity and multi-culturalism, anti-Americanism and anti-market) and then some interest groups (business groups, unions, NGOs, movements...) support them. In the USA there is too much confusion surrounding the meaning of “liberal”, whereas in the history of European political philosophy there is great precision in the way liberalism has evolved. Finally, in the IRs literature the conceptualization of the two leftist political cultures (and of the difference between them) has been non-existent. Instead, the concept of world order has been defined in too many ways: seven! The innovative definition put forward in this book has been linked to its meaning in everyday language. The starting point has been the original definition by Stoppino (1994) (a pioneer of Italian political science) of actual (more than potential) power and politics: the search for stabilized compliance. Governance is the stabilization of compliance, that usually leads to pluri-national states. Then, order is a sub-category of governance, and compliance must be anchored to a unit of measurement, a criterion, a benchmark, a value. The post-1989 world order must be anchored to the four values of each arena of international relations: national self-determination -the only one being lowly promoted-, market, democracy, and peace. Consequently, anarchy cannot be defined as the absence of world authority (as in the IRs literature); this is conceptual stretching because a world authority has never existed, and we do not need a concept without empirical cases. Rather, anarchy simply means absence of governance: “political *laissez faire*”, i.e. abstention from intervening and from trying to stabilize compliance. Power is just the search for compliance, but it is mostly an instrument of politics, to achieve certain aims, like interests and/or ideologies -that may compatible or lead in opposite directions. Institutions have been well defined in the literature of IRs, and the domestic ones are state actors and state laws. The only way to avoid conceptual stretching is to link global regimes to international law, and international organizations to inter-governmental actors. Institutions cannot include informal norms and repeated practices. Organizations without bureaucracy and space are inter-governmental forums. Cooperation has been better defined by Stoppino (1995): an interaction among certain actors, intentionally and reciprocally favorable to them. Thus, it cannot be confused with coordination, which is only a sub-

category of cooperation. Globalization must be linked to interdependence and does not necessarily mean the spread of market reforms. There are concepts that cannot be confused; conflict and war are not synonyms. Conflict is only an incompatibility of ends, while war is armed conflict. Many wars come to an end, but conflicts are not necessarily resolved. Moreover, nations are sociological entities, i.e. groups of individuals with a common identity, while states are juridical organizations. Using these two concepts as synonyms is another unacceptable mistake. Many scholars have often confused conflicts with wars, and nations with states. Then, concepts of peace and security have been more precisely defined, in order to avoid conceptual stretching; peace is absence of war (and not of structural violence) and security is control over threats. Finally, also Galtung's (1981) definition of civilization has been presented and anchored to objective criteria (the cosmologies, that is to say the common visions of the world), while Huntington's (1996) subjective conception of civilization has been linked to collective identities.

The following two chapters focus on foreign policy (the second) and on the international system (the third). Both of these dimensions are important, and it is just non sense to elaborate useless theories on which of them is more important, as some scholars of Realism and liberalism have done. According to the Italian school of political science (and Stoppino's teaching), the focus must be on actual (and not potential) power, which conditions both statuses of foreign policy, and power distribution at the systemic level. However, power is mainly an instrument to achieve the objectives of the actors: interests and/or ideologies. Chapter 2 deals with foreign policy. It presents an innovative typology of power statuses of foreign policy: low profile, small, medium, great, and super-powers. In the literature of IRs, the features of these ranks are too vague. Super powers are those of bipolarism; great powers are those of multipolarism; medium powers are former great powers; small powers are small countries; low profile has been anchored to apathy. This typology starts from actual power (behaviors) and not from potential power indicators: *per capita* income, military expenditures, population... Next, the deviant pre-1989 "low profile" diplomacy (Italy) is presented and explained by the radical ideology of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The latter was the only left party in Europe with a Manichaeic/socialist, rather than a constructivist-social-democratic ideology; the PCI was anti-market, anti-NATO, and anti-EU. Italy became a small power after 1989. China, Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) are middle powers; Spain, Brazil, India, Japan, Australia and South Africa are between the statuses of small and medium powers. The USA have been the only great power, at

least until Obama. The four (conservative, liberal, leftist constructivist and leftist Manichaeic) models of political cultures are applied to diplomacy and migration flows. What matters more: interests, ideologies, or both? In American diplomacy the promotion of interests has always (before and after 1989) prevailed. It has been linked to the “lesser evil” principle (support for military or personalist regimes) over the absolute evil (communism or Islamic fundamentalism). Liberal and constructivist ideas have been promoted only since 1989, together with the neo-con diplomacy in the 2003 Iraq war. However, conservative diplomacy (and the “lesser evil” principle) was abandoned by Obama during and after the Arab Spring. “Low intensity” bombings against Isis in Iraq, Syria and Libya were also far from the promotion of interests. European middle powers (France, Germany, and the UK) have always privileged the promotion of interests, especially in foreign economic policy. Finally, the main features of domestic institutions of foreign economic policy (public bodies entitled to give support to national firms, or foreign aid agencies) are highlighted to elaborate some decision-making models: hierarchy versus coordination, or centralization in ministries versus decentralization in technical agencies.

Chapter 3 analyzes the (qualitative) models of the international system after 1989. First, it presents an innovative typology with which to classify the four hypotheses (unipolarism, multipolarism, concert of powers, and economic tripolarism) on models of the post-bipolar structure. The rigid diagnoses (like US unipolarism) of some IRs scholars, only based on potential (and not actual) power, are criticized in this chapter. According to Stoppino’s (1994) definition of politics, labeling the international system as unipolar is a mistake. The USA tried to stabilize compliance, but did not succeed, especially after 2001. According to Rosecrance (1992), in the 1990s, the model of the international system was the concert of powers, while since 2001 both the unipolar push of Bush Jr and the multipolar efforts of Obama have failed. A stable power configuration of the current system has not yet emerged; hence the empirical evidence gainsays the models. Then, international stability is conceptualized as a control process over change. Instability may be the outcome of both international change (as from 1915 to 1945, or after 1989) and domestic values, like those of Islamic fundamentalism. Since 2001, the current international system has naturally become quite unstable.

The next empirical chapters analyze the four arenas of international relations: the cultural (the fourth, on conflicts among different civilizations or nations), the economic (the fifth, on North-North or North-South globalization), the political (the sixth, on external processes influencing domestic regimes) and the military (the eighth, on wars and peace-keeping).

The seventh chapter analyzes the relation between the economic and the political arenas: between market or state institutions and democratic or authoritarian regimes. Each empirical chapter has an introduction and a conclusion focused on the influence of political cultures in every arena of IRs: both “interests-intensive” conservatism and “ideologies-intensive” liberalism, leftist constructivism and Manicheanism. Thus, the interplay between interests and ideologies is the main dimension of the world order (and not the dialectic between power and institutions), with Western countries trying to stabilize certain values. It can be better understood by emphasizing the role of domestic political cultures; the influence of the schools of thought (Realism, rationalist and reflective liberalism and post-Marxism) is less relevant for understanding contemporary events.

Chapter 4 analyzes the cultural arena of IRs. First, twelve models on conflict resolution processes, starting from Galtung’s (1987) typology, are presented: integration (with federalism, consensual pacts, or administrative autonomy), (either single or pluri-nation) separation, compromise (with condominiums or confederations), exchange (with amnesty), persuasion (with arbitration), transcendence (with democracy), dominion (with military victory), incapacitation (with ethnic cleansing), multilateralization (with UN peace-keeping)... This section is innovative because the Anglo-American scholars of IRs have mostly forgotten conflict resolution. Then, nearly ninety armed conflicts in Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Asia are analyzed. Finally, some alternative (both fair and effective) normative solutions are presented, according to the peace research tradition.

Chapter 5 analyzes the economic arena of IRs, starting with North-North relations. First, an innovative typology of globalization processes, built on the two dimensions of standardization and uniformization, is presented and linked to political cultures. Second, the main global (trade, monetary, and banking) economic institutions (both organizations and regimes) are classified into hierarchical, reciprocal and preferential, because of different power relations, and linked to political cultures. Other economic interactions are characterized by informal rules (investments by trans-national corporations) or repeated practices (energy sector or foreign aid), and they have not been institutionalized, contrary to the diagnosis anchored to “conceptual stretching” made by some reflectivist scholars. Third, global economic power relations are conceptualized through the scenario of three “open regions” (Americas, Euro-Africa and Asia); some statistics on North-South economic flows are presented to support this diagnosis. The second part of the chapter deals with North-South relations, which have not been sufficiently explored in the Anglo-American literature of IRs. Some sort of delegation has been made to neo-Marxist-

third-worldist scholars, but they have done little empirical research, which has also been too biased by leftist Manichaeic values. First, statistical data on economic development (*per capita* income and its distribution) of non-Western countries (Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) are presented, together with a typology of four different development processes according to the combination of those two economic variables. Second, Emerson's model of power/dependence relations is applied to North-South relations and political cultures, in order to identify four strategies to break dependence relations: self-reliance, import-substitution industrialization (ISI), export promotion, and collective organization. The third section of the chapter analyzes economic institutional change in Latin America and Asia, with the different shifts towards protectionism (in 1929 and 1945) or *laissez faire* (in 1989). Before 1989, economic institutional change in the Third World was conditioned by some "ideological" political cultures (socialism in communist countries, radical liberalism in Pinochet's Chile, and social-democratic ISI in Latin America,) but "interests-intensive" conservatism was also applied by the four Asian tigers through export promotion. After 1989, many countries (Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile) returned to conservatism, applying moderate market reforms. Venezuela's Chavez was Manichaeic, pushing countries like Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina to social-democratic protectionism.

Chapter 6 analyzes the political arena of IRs. Four innovative models of external anchorage to democracy are presented, starting from Whitehead's (1996) classification: military control, inertial contagion, political conditionality, and positive rewards (diplomatic pressures, increase of economic aid, and democratic assistance). The following sections consider the evolution of political conditionality (on foreign aid to developing countries and on the EU's enlargement in Eastern Europe), rewards (to democratizing states) and contagion (in Latin America's regime transition and consolidation processes after the mid-1970s). Finally, the exceptions to democracy in non-Western states are presented: autocracy promotion (by authoritarianisms), and models of (protected, no law and limited) hybrid and (post-communist, neo-patrimonial, military and theocratic) non-democratic regimes. Neo-patrimonial regimes may be personalist or federal; theocracies may be traditionalist or fundamentalist. The category of theocracy has often been neglected by political scientists, owing to the negative influence of the prevailing political culture in post-modern societies: leftist political correctness. A paradox of the current world order is that democracies (especially the USA) have sometimes supported authoritarian regimes, doing so on the "lesser evil" principle.

Chapter 7 deals with the relation between democracy and the market outside the West after 1989. A positive correlation materialized in the West, together with its opposite trend, when both protectionism and authoritarian regimes emerged (in Russia, Italy and Germany) between the two world wars. Before 1989, Latin America privileged democracy but applied protectionism, while the Asian tigers were market-oriented but still authoritarian. The chapter presents post-1989 statistics on non-Western countries (Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, North Africa and the Middle East). Even if most developing countries are pushing towards both democracy and market reforms, there are some objectors to both values of the world order (Cuba, North Korea, many Islamic states...), or only to democracy (China, Russia...). Developing countries have been classified in a typology with nine boxes, and three different (high, intermediate and low) combinations of the two variables.

Chapter 8 analyzes the military arena of IRs, and the strategies of the main powers in their decisions to start wars after 1989. Even if Western governments have mostly promoted one of the values of the world order (peace), they have also launched eight wars since 1989: in Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and against Isis (in Iraq, Syria and Libya). This is one of the paradoxes of the current world order. It will be explained in the conclusions. Finally, the peace-keeping missions of the United Nations (UN) are presented, to show where (and why) the UN has organized them, or (on the contrary) has chosen anarchy.

The conclusions emphasize the increasing role of ideological political cultures (liberalism, leftist constructivism and Manicheanism) since 1989. Ideologies were frozen after Yalta, and during the Cold War the USA mostly promoted its own interests, with few exceptions like the Vietnam war. Ideologies only mattered in the domestic politics of Western countries, with market and democracy versus socialism and communism of the Eastern bloc. The USA never supported national self-determination, market, democracy and peace outside the West; the Third World was characterized by national frustrations, wars, authoritarian regimes and state (or very protectionist) economic institutions. The definition of the Cold War as an ideological period (with much rhetoric) is not only a stereotype, but also a thesis without empirical evidence. Ideologies become more relevant when international systems change, as they did from 1915 to 1945 or after 1989. This book reaches the innovative conclusion that ideologies were of scant importance during the Cold War (phase 1), contrary to the diagnoses of most IRs scholars. This occurred precisely because behaviors matter much more than declarations, according to Stoppino's (1994) definition of politics: the search for stabilized compliance on some values.

After 1989 (phase 2), the West promoted world order with the increasing influence of ideologies: multi-culturalism of the constructivist left in conflict resolution; radical liberal ideas in economic globalization; neo-con, liberal “just” and leftist “politically correct” wars; no-global and peace movements of the Manichaean left. However, conservatism remained the prevailing political culture in diplomacies until the Arab Spring. These changes occurred because of the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996), the change of the international system (Wight 1979), and the West’s transition to post-modernity (with the decreasing role of ideologies in domestic politics). Obama decided another, more important, diplomatic change. He abandoned conservatism: first with his neglect of the lesser evil principle in the Arab Spring of 2011, second with his refusal to wage war against the Islamic fundamentalist groups, except for the “low intensity” bombings against Isis in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Western leaders hoped that not making war against Isis would avert terrorism in Europe, but this “catalyst” strategy failed when Isis attacked Paris in November 2015. The USA has lost any consistent diplomatic strategy; Obama has neglected interests (except in the economy), and has not coherently promoted any other ideology (like liberalism or constructivism). Since 2011 (phase 3), conservatism has no longer been the prevailing political culture in diplomacies. The conclusions on the three phases are innovative (1. Cold War: only interests; 2. Post-1989: both interests and ideologies; 3. Post-2011: few interests and incoherent ideas) in the IRs literature. In the last section, the concept of world order has been linked to international stability, because the promotion of ideas often favors some world order, while the defense of interests usually gives rise to more stable international systems. When Islamic fundamentalist actors object to all the values of world order, there is the greatest threat to international stability. In these cases, according to the conservative diplomatic model, Western states should stop promoting democracy and peace (with the “lesser evil” principle, and high intensity wars against Islamic fundamentalist groups), within the paradox of the current world order. This conservative scenario of a *disordered stability* has never been applied with coherence by the West, but it could undergo a revival in the near future. In the 1990s there was an effort to consolidate *both order* (with democracy, market reforms and efforts to stop the ethnic wars in Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia) *and stability*, within the concert of powers. After 2001, there was *neither order* -with many wars, promoted by Islamic fundamentalist actors-, *nor stability* -both unipolarism and multipolarism failed. The “potential” scenario of an *unstable order* would be linked to the liberal promotion of single-nation (only Sunni, or only Shiite) states, especially in the Middle East.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE DEFINITION OF THE MAIN POLITICAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS

A special focus on analytical theory has been the cornerstone of the Italian school of political science, while in the USA and the UK there has not been the same emphasis on the definitions of concepts. This has especially occurred since the 1980s, when post-modern cosmologies were advanced, with rejection of the theoretical framework of the positivist phase of our discipline. For example, Wittgenstein's slogan was proposed; concepts must not be defined, and their meaning is the outcome of their use. Sartori (1979) insisted on methodological precision, especially in definitions, in order to avoid both conceptual stretching (an excessively broad application of them) and conceptual redundancy, where many terms have the same meaning. For example, conceptual stretching is apparent in the definitions of peace or security, and in the mainstream definition of anarchy, provided by realist scholars. If anarchy means the absence of one authority in world politics, the conceptual stretching trap is certainly not avoided; such a definition of anarchy corresponds to nearly 100% of the empirical cases. Another example of conceptual stretching is the definition -used by reflective-constructivist liberals- of global regimes as repeated practices; in most empirical cases there are repeated practices! The concepts of war, conflict and crisis have often been used interchangeably, and this has been a mistake. Other concepts (politics and cooperation) have been better defined by another Italian political scientist (Stoppino 1994, 1995). In the following chapters, innovative definitions of world order and political cultures (as mixes of interests and ideologies) will be advanced. Words have simple meanings in everyday language, and political scientists must eschew both over-simplification and artificiality. Sartori provided guidance on how to build typologies and classifications, which must be both exhaustive and exclusive. He also elaborated some models, for instance of party systems. Models can be conceptualized according to Weber's ideal-types; they are simplifications of the reality, that follow the two basic principles of simplicity and coherence.

1. Definitions of the political arena: power, politics, governance, anarchy, institution

The starting point is Stoppino's (1994, 1995) definition of politics. Many scholars have refused to give a definition of such a complex concept, but Stoppino's effort has probably been the best in the history of political science. He rejected the mainstream definitions that link politics with government or the allocation of values (Easton 1953), because those processes do not fit in the international arena that has no central authority. He resumed the conception of politics as a power struggle (Morgenthau 1948), but elaborated it further. Politics is the action that reinforces the exercise of power, which is limited in time and space. Actual power is more important than potential power; if the latter does not materialize, there is a diffusion of power. Power is the search for compliance, while politics is the search for guaranteed (or ensured) compliance, which seeks to stabilize it in time and generalize it in space to many actors. Tribes of prehistory only stabilized compliance in time, while clans of agricultural societies also sought to extend it in space. The first political actors materialized when there arose a "bosses' boss" structure (Buzan and Little 2000), as exemplified by mafias. Stoppino applied this definition of politics to the monetary (domestic) arena, in which there are government institutions, and to the natural (international) one, in which there are none.

In the model of "monetary politics", the authority produces and distributes rights or dues (guaranteed compliance): the activity of political production. Hence, the scenario of domestic (monetary) politics, where values are defined by the government in a constitution, is this:

Actor: Resources → Compliance.

In the model of "natural politics", there is no authority defining the ultimate interests and values of the actors. The scenario of world politics has many (and different) interests and values to be promoted. This model shows that power is just an instrument of interests and values.

Actor: Resources → Compliance → Interests and Values

The concept of governance has recently been developed in the political science literature by Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) in *Governance without Government*. They distinguished hierarchical government, as in domestic politics where a single actor rules, from "governance", where the key decisions are accepted by the main actors through a multilateral (or "minilateral") decision-making process (Kooiman 1993). Government concerns the subject level: i.e. those who make the decisions; governance concerns the compliance level. Politics (and not governance) is the search for guaranteed (stabilized in time and generalized in space) compliance.

When politics succeed, and compliance is stabilized and generalized, governance materializes (Fossati 1999a). In governance, some values are fulfilled, but are not fixed and may change, because actors can guarantee compliance with their resources. In the IRs literature, governance has often been used as synonym for politics; instead, politics concerns the process of searching, while governance concerns that of obtaining something.

The concept of anarchy cannot mean absence of a world authority, as orthodox realists (Waltz 1979) usually assume, because this definition falls into the trap of conceptual stretching. There would be a connotation with no empirical cases, because a world authority has never existed; this is probably the highest level of conceptual stretching. There has never been an international system with either a world government or a single hegemon. On the contrary, a correct way to conceptualize anarchy is to view it as the absence of governance. It materializes when the international actors adopt a “political *laissez faire*”, and abstain from stabilizing and generalizing other actors’ compliance (Fossati 1999a). For example, if China occupies Tibet and Western states do not intervene, that is anarchy.

It is then important to understand what institutions are, so as to avoid redundancies in meaning and conceptual stretching. In the current political science literature, the meaning of “institution” is almost clear, but there are still some ambiguities, because there are too many definitions and they sometimes differ among disciplines. Many of them do not establish rigid boundaries with informal rules (conventions) and repeated practices. In fact, the sociological definition of an institution as something linked to a high value identification by participants in the system (like the *Palio* for citizens of Siena, or *Pizza* for citizens of Napoli), cannot be used in political science. According to Keohane (1989) and Lanzalaco (1995), institutions can be both rules (of the state) and actors (of the state). Instead, rational choice supporters assume that individuals are the only significant actors in politics; hence institutions can only exist as rules (North 1990). The rules of domestic politics are institutionalized only if they are recognized by the state -consider the different kinds of wedding ceremony-, while the regulations of a private club are not. Informal rules (for example on the correct way of speaking) are not institutions. Also repeated practices -for example going to the cinema on Saturday evenings- cannot be considered institutions. State actors are usually classified into two categories of public institutions: the political (government, parliament, president ...) and the neutral (bureaucracy, judges, armed forces, police...); the latter are not the outcome of elections. Finally, non-state actors, like parties or interest groups, are not institutions.

2. Definitions of the cultural arena: nation and civilization

The nation is a sociological concept, while the state is a juridical one. States have an authority and a constitution, within a territory, and are recognized in international law. In Europe, most nations coincide with the same states, but this does not occur in other parts of the world, especially in former European colonies. There are three objective dimensions of nations: language, religion and ethnicity (as a sub-category of race: for example, Hutu and Tutsi among black Africans). This is the “biological” definition of ethnicity, rather than the cultural one whereby ethnic groups almost coincide with nations; in fact, there seems to be some conceptual stretching in this last definition, and also some redundancy between the two terms (Fossati 1998). The promoters of political correctness are trying to erase biology, because of the guilt felt by European nations after centuries of nationalistic wars, genocides and racism. Instead, the subjective definition of nation is linked to the self-perception, by a group of individuals, of sharing the same collective identity (Goio 1994). For example, Latin American nations have the same language (except Brazil), the same (Catholic) religion, and the same biology, but they have different subjective identities. However, there are either single-nation (in Europe, Japan...) or pluri-national (in the rest of the world) states.

There are also two definitions of the concept of civilization. The objective one (Galtung 1981) was anchored to cosmologies: that is, the visions of the world shared by a group of nations. Galtung identified six cosmologies: conception of time (progress or cycles-linearity); conception of space (center/periphery or decentralization); knowledge foundations (atomistic or holistic, deductive or inductive, Aristotle’s principles of non-contradiction and *tertium non datur* or *yin-yang* dialectics); person/person relations (verticalism; individualism or collectivism); person/nature relations (exploitation or vegetarianism); person/god relations (one god or a plurality of gods; universalism or no universalism; transcendence or immanence; eternal soul or reincarnation-nirvana; separation or integration between political and religious spheres). Huntington’s (1996) definition was based on a subjective criterion: the highest level of collective self-perception of identity. In sum, for social and political researchers the identification of nations and civilizations is difficult, because perceptions change over time. According to the objective definition, Galtung’s civilizations are seven: Western (Christian, Jewish, Islamic), Hindu, Eastern (Buddhist, Sinic, Japanese). Huntington excluded the Jewish and the Buddhist civilizations, and added the Eastern-Orthodox, the Latin American and the African ones, according to the subjective criterion.

3. Definitions of the military arena: conflict, war, violence, crisis, peace, security, terrorism

The definition of conflict is as follows (Galtung 1987, Fossati 1998): a relationship among social groups and/or political actors whose objectives are incompatible. Aims must be incompatible; if they are only different, there is no conflict. War is a violent conflict among organized actors that lasts in time; the indicator of 1000 deaths is only used in statistical studies (Bobbio 1984). Thus, conflict and war cannot be used as synonyms; this is a very frequent mistake committed not only by peace researchers or strategic studies' scholars, but also by some political and social scientists, historians, economists, jurists... Violence is the intentional use of force by someone, that produces suffering in another actor (Stoppino 1995). Instead, a crisis is the sum of three pre-conditions: a severe threat to security, limited time to make decisions, and a high probability of being involved in a war (Brecher 1986). Thus, also the concepts of crisis and conflict cannot be confused, even if they are often used as synonyms.

In the 1960s, Boulding (1957) and Galtung (1969) conducted their well-known debate on the definition of peace. Boulding's orthodox negative definition (peace as the absence of war) finally prevailed. Galtung's heterodox positive definition (peace as the absence of structural violence) was a typical case of conceptual stretching. If structural violence is everything that causes the difference between human potentials and empirical realizations, there are too many empirical cases of positive peace. Thus, peace would become almost anything: absence of war or of violence, economic development, democracy, fulfillment of human rights, respect for the environment... In fact, it was precisely outside the West that the negative peace conception prevailed. Latin American, African and Asian countries were full of sociologists, economists and historians dealing with problems of development and social justice. But those countries lacked experts on the arms race, disarmament proposals, or conflict management and resolution. Hence peace research institutes in the Third World (in Chile, Brazil, Nigeria, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines...) mostly avoided studies on structural violence, and focused on negative peace (Fossati 1987).

Then, Galtung (1987) identified two kinds of conflict: latent conflict, in which actors do not perceive the incompatibility of their ends; manifest conflict, in which actors perceive it at the level of either (psychological) attitude or (violent or otherwise) behavior. Conflict is often not perceived, precisely because there is much structural violence. According to the "objectivists", the researcher can decide whether or not there is conflict.

Instead, the “subjectivists” (like Boulding) identify conflicts only at the manifest level, and latent conflict is the psychological one. This “conflict” may be resolved, by identifying potential issues of incompatibility through previously defined indicators (latent level). Then, the perception of incompatibility must be tested on actors’ declarations and behaviors (manifest level). The context of perceptual analysis is structural analysis, where the observer identifies potential incompatible objectives (Fossati 1998). The first step in conflict analysis is identification of actors and issues of incompatibility. The second step is identification of the crystallization level and of the resolution models. “Crystallization” means the presence of a conflict; a conflict crystallizes when no resolution is found. A low-crystallized conflict does not last for long, and may take the form of a simple declaration of discord that is not followed by actions. A high-crystallized conflict is not immediately resolved and manifests itself repeatedly, or it is often temporarily frozen (Fossati 1998).

In the 1990s, a new debate began on the definition of security. It was the “same old story”. The new slogan was: we cannot conceptualize security only in the military arena. Military security was defined as control over threats to the survival of individuals (Cesa 1991). It cannot be the absence of threats, which always coexist with human life. There are three levels of military security: domestic -when single persons are threatened by other criminal individuals or by their own government-, international -when a state is threatened by another state or by terrorist organizations- and global -when the threat of nuclear weapons is against the planet’s survival. Galtung (1985) identified four (military, political, economic, cultural) arenas of security, and the targets (survival, freedom, welfare, identity) of violent threats (use of force, repression, misery, alienation). However, several conceptual difficulties arise if we try to export the definition of military security to the other three arenas. It is hard to conceptualize political security; we must define concepts in the simplest possible way. We already use the terminology of human rights to deal with political security. Instead, the term “cultural security” can be accepted. There are numerous social and political actors, which feel that their identity is threatened by globalization, such as no-global (*globofóbicos*) groups. Buzan (1983) objected that the economic arena is a typically insecure environment. Thus, market institutions always lead to insecurity, because in that arena conflict is the normal condition of human relations. By contrast, in the military arena peace and the absence of violence are the normal conditions, so that a threshold can be identified, when there are significant threats to human survival. Instead, it is difficult to identify that threshold in the economic arena. However, Buzan admitted that at least so-

called “energy security” can be conceptualized. When oil or gas prices strongly increase, or when the quantities of energy exports drop, there are high threats to economic/energy security. Some Third World scholars (Valdes 1981) have emphasized that outside the West there is also a significant threshold (human survival): when the basic needs of poorest people are not guaranteed. This is so-called “food security”. Finally, there are two other important dimensions of security, which are somewhat linked to the military and economic arenas (Fossati 1994): environmental (against major threats of catastrophes or accidents) and demographic - when population birth rates or immigration flows greatly increase.

Of course, terrorism is the greatest threat to security; its aim is cause collective fear, and violence may occur at any moment and with any instrument. In recent decades, there have been four kinds of terrorism, according to their ideology: political (communist or Nazi-fascist) and cultural (nationalist or religious), at both institutional and social levels.

4. Definitions of the economic arena: cooperation, organizations, regimes, globalization

Cooperation is an interaction among actors that is intentionally and reciprocally favorable to them (Stoppino 1995). The level of reciprocity cannot be considered in rigid manner (fifty-fifty), but various levels of more or less symmetric outcomes of interactions are cooperative. In the IRs literature, Keohane’s (1989) definition of cooperation has been more often cited: the policies coordination by which actors adjust their behavior towards preferences of other actors. The latter is unsatisfactory because it is vague -reciprocity is not mentioned-, and uses a concept (coordination) that (like collaboration) is only a sub-category of cooperation (Stein 1993).

Cooperation can be applied to bilateral, minilateral or multilateral relations. Bilateral cooperation often materializes in agreements that are *una tantum* events, or may be repeated in time: in firms’ investments, arms control... Minilateral (among few actors) cooperation can also lead to *una tantum* agreements or may be repeated in time. In the multipolar system, explicit alliances or informal coalitions were formed among European powers: France, Great Britain and Russia, or Germany, Austria and Italy. Since 1945, minilateral cooperation has also led to regional organizations, like the European Union (EU) or MercoSur. These regional organizations are more institutionalized if they have integration targets and supra-national institutions (Commission, Central Bank...), like the European Union. Organizations that are not provided with a (neutral) bureaucracy only remain inter-governmental forums, like the Conference on Security

and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) before 1989. There are also some unilateral trans-regional organizations, that are not geographic. These actors are usually called either alliances (like NATO) in the military arena, or coalitions (like OPEC) in the economic arena; they can never be labeled institutions. Finally, there are some unilateral regimes, i.e. regional institutionalized rules, like for example the regime on acid rain in Europe.

Multilateral cooperation is global in nature and usually leads to institutions (Keohane 1989): both rules (global regimes) and actors (inter-governmental organizations), such as the UN (United Nations), the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the WTO (World Trade Organization). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like Amnesty International and the Red Cross, cannot be considered international institutions. Institutions are naturally stronger if a global regime has a parallel organization that tries to stabilize the compliance of both governments and domestic actors. Global regimes and institutionalized organizations usually have functional aims like trade liberalization (the WTO), foreign debt management (the IMF), or peace keeping missions (the UN). For example, environment regimes are weaker because there is no international organization on the environment. At the same time, there are global organizations that do not have a neutral bureaucracy and a permanent space; they remain inter-governmental *forums* (such as the GATT, the G-7, the G-20...).

Global regimes are those embedded in international law. Rules are always explicit. There is both customary and codified law; in the case of conflict among them, the former usually prevails. International regimes can be defined as sets of architectural principles and explicit rules on which all the actors' expectations (on an issue/area) converge. Principles concern the capacity of a regime to generate compliance and to specify the outcomes of an interaction, that is, who is going to win: who devalues, who opens the markets, etc. Rules only define the processes: how to devalue, how to protect, etc. If principles and rules are effective, there is a regime; hence "dead letter regimes" are rules only from a law (and not a political science) perspective (Rittberger 1993). The genesis of a regime is usually connected to a code signed by governments: for instance, the documents of the rounds of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and the Bretton Woods charter for the IMF. Then there may be some sections of a codified regime, that are not observed by states, and remain ineffective; thus, custom prevails over codes. This definition is much simpler than Krasner's (1983). In fact, two further connotations have been eliminated. On the one hand, the difference between norms and rules seems to be significant in comparative law but not in political science; on the other hand, decision-making procedures are a sub-category of rules.