

Royalists, Radicals, and les Misérables

Royalists, Radicals, and les Misérables:
France in 1832

Edited by

Eric Martone

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P U B L I S H I N G

Royalists, Radicals, and les Misérables: France in 1832,
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This book first published 2013

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

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ISBN (10): 1-4438-4721-6, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4721-6

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people worked to bring this book to fruition. A collective work like this is the product of academic collaboration. I would, therefore, like to thank the scholars who contributed their work to this collection. I have enjoyed corresponding with all of them. It has been a great experience and a real joy to work with them. At Cambridge Scholars Publishing, I would like to thank Carol Koulikourdi, Amanda Millar, Emily Surrey, and Sean Howley for their assistance.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Michael E. Nolan for his valuable mentorship while I was a graduate student at Western Connecticut State University (which feels like ages ago) and for his advice, assistance, and encouragement after I went on to pursue my doctorate and find an academic position. I would also like to thank Anne-Marie Brinsmead, Michael Kline, Nancy Mellerski, Lew Kamm, Bryan Mark Rigg, David Keithly, Eric Roman, and Lenore Schneider for teaching me about European history and/or French culture during my formative years.

Part of the early research for my first chapter in this collection was supported through my participation in a National Endowment for the Humanities summer seminar on “French Identity in Crisis” at Dickinson College.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, especially my wife, Nicole, and children, Domenic and Gianna, for their support and cooperation during the completion of this project. I would like to dedicate this book to them.

INTRODUCTION: 1832 IN FRANCE—A MILESTONE YEAR

ERIC MARTONE

“The French Revolution is a watershed in history and that its consequences of every kind will be felt far beyond the time of its outburst and the limits of its birthplace.”

—Joseph de Maistre¹

Almost everyone knows something about the year 1832 in French history, even if many are unaware of this knowledge. The persistent popularity of *Les Misérables* on stage and film has made the June Revolution of 1832 one of the most recognizable events in French history. In the past fifteen years alone, three major film adaptations have appeared, including the big-budget 2012 adaptation of the iconic stage musical starring Hugh Jackman, Russell Crowe, Anne Hathaway, and Amanda Seyfried.² Yet, 1832 was a monumental and tumultuous year in France. In addition to the June Revolution, 1832 was marked by the cholera epidemic in Paris and a failed royalist coup in Southern France and the Vendée in support of the recently ousted Bourbon monarchy. While the events of 1832 are significant, they have been relatively ignored because scholars have been distracted by the Revolution of 1830 (which replaced the Bourbon monarch with the more liberal “citizen king” Louis-Philippe) and the Revolution of 1848 (which established the Second Republic). Paradoxically, the situation of the events of 1832 between the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, a primary reason for their oversight, is also the source of their importance. The year thus marked a critical turning point in the years between these two monumental events.

The Age of Revolutions (1789-1848) was a complex era of French history and a brief recounting of events is perhaps warranted to contextualize the subsequent chapters in this collection.³ The events of the French Revolution (1789-1799) left a deep impression on the French population. Revolutionaries initially sought to establish a constitutional monarchy. However, political radicals soon gained control of the central government. A republic was declared and the king was soon executed.⁴

The subsequent rise of Napoleon Bonaparte, who conquered his way to power through promises of stability and order, also left a distinct impression on the French people. Wary of war and the excesses of the Revolution, much of the French population rallied behind the “little Corsican,” who became emperor in 1804.⁵ In the wake of the collapse of Napoleon I’s empire in 1814, the Bourbon dynasty returned to the throne of France. Louis XVIII, whose brother, Louis XVI, had been executed during the French Revolution, assumed the throne in 1814 and ruled until his death in 1824.⁶ His brother, Charles Philippe de Bourbon, the Comte d’Artois, subsequently inherited the throne as Charles X. Although the monarchy’s return was initially popular, the nostalgia surrounding it dissipated as the efforts of Louis XVIII (and later his brother, Charles X) to reverse the changes of the French Revolution mounted.⁷

Louis XVIII was a cautious king who relied primarily on moderate ministers to run the government.⁸ He was forced to grant a written constitution, known as the Charter of 1814, guaranteeing a bicameral legislature with an appointive Chamber of Peers and an elected Chamber of Deputies. Only men of exceptional wealth, property, and education were eligible to vote. The king argued over the constitution’s preamble, steadfastly maintaining the view that his right to rule derived from providence rather than the people. While Louis XVIII may have been too conservative for many French liberals, he was far too liberal for many royalists. The ultras, or ultra-royalists (since they were perceived as “more royalist than the king”), were an extremist faction of aristocratic reactionaries opposed to the ideologies of the French Revolution. They called for the elimination of many revolutionary-era reforms and the purge of Bonapartists, who supported Napoleon. Some of the ultras were *émigrés*, but many were members of the rural aristocracy. Ultras were often militant and inflexible, since they believed that any compromise with the ideals of the French Revolution betrayed their principles and those of their class. During Louis XVIII’s reign, they turned toward the king’s brother, the Comte d’Artois, as a symbol of hope.⁹

In 1815, Napoleon escaped from his exile on Elba and landed in France, beginning the adventure of the “Hundred Days.” The king fled as Napoleon temporarily regained control of the government. After Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, the Bourbon dynasty was again restored.¹⁰ What followed was the White Terror, a bloody purge of Bonapartists and anti-monarchists in France conducted by reactionary supporters of the monarchy. The *Chevaliers de la Foi*, a secret society of ultras, was instrumental in bringing about the White Terror.¹¹

After 1815, the ultras swept the national elections to dominate the Chamber of Deputies, creating a tensioned relationship among the king, his moderate royalist ministers, and the ultra-dominated Chamber. The ultras supported universal manhood suffrage under the assumption that the common man was more loyal to the aristocracy and tradition, while the wealthier bourgeoisie had become corrupted by un-French ideas. In 1816, Louis XVIII, fearful of the repercussions of extreme conservatism, dissolved the Chamber, paving the way for more moderates in the legislature. The ultras, however, regained political favor following the assassination of the Comte d'Artois's youngest son, the Duc de Berry, in 1820. The event prompted the fall of the moderate ministry of Elie Decazes and the rise of the Comte de Villèle, who continued to serve briefly under Charles X after Louis XVIII's death in 1824. The ultras dominated the French government for much of the 1820s, but the death of his favorite son devastated Charles, and he never recovered emotionally.¹²

Upon ascending the French throne as Charles X in 1824, d'Artois planned a coronation ceremony at Rheims Cathedral with all the pomp and pageantry of the Old Regime.¹³ Charles X's popularity plummeted as his reign became increasingly reactionary. He symbolized the Bourbons' inability to reconcile monarchist traditions of divine right with the more liberal and democratic climate produced by the French Revolution. Perhaps unsurprisingly, he continued to oppose the notion of constitutional monarchy and the idea that the king's right to rule derived from the French people rather than providence. While retaining the support of the Catholic Church and much of the aristocracy and peasantry, Charles X lost the favor of many industrial workers and much of the bourgeoisie.

From 1827 to 1830, a series of economic downturns led to a growing number of liberal deputies in the Chamber. Charles X became frustrated with this more liberal Chamber, which increasingly blocked his legislation and threatened his existing policies. In 1829, he appointed ultra-royalist Prince Jules Armand de Polignac as his new chief minister. The Charter of 1814 granted the king extensive power over policymaking, but the Chamber had to pass his legislation. The Charter also granted the Chamber the right to determine the election method for its deputies and their rights within the Chamber. The liberal deputies issued a final no-confidence vote in March 1830, prompting Charles X to overstep his constitutional restrictions by attempting to modify the Charter by a series of royal decrees known as the Four Ordinances. The decrees called for the dissolution of the Chamber, new elections based on a new electorate, strict censorship of the press, and the restriction of voting rights to only the wealthiest in France. Polignac conceived of the 1830 invasion of Algeria,

partly to rally support for Charles X at this tumultuous time with a foreign triumph reminiscent of Napoleon. In this it failed, but the invasion succeeded, and Algeria became one of the regime's lasting legacies.

Meanwhile, the July Ordinances led to outcries in the press and urban mobs in Paris mobilized against the king, assembling barricades in the streets.¹⁴ The uprising quickly mounted until it went beyond the means of the monarchy to control. The revolution occurred over three days in July 1830, resulting in the abdication of Charles X and his eldest son, the Duc d'Angoulême, thereby ending the Bourbon monarchy.¹⁵ The abdication seemingly favored the passing of the throne to Charles X's grandson, Henri, the son of the assassinated Duc de Berry. The liberal, bourgeois Chamber of Deputies, however, refused to recognize Henri as king. In a vote opposed by conservative deputies, the Chamber declared the French throne vacant and transferred the monarchy to Louis-Philippe, head of the house of Orléans, a cadet branch of the Bourbons.¹⁶ Republicans were also angered over this settlement. Nevertheless, Louis-Philippe ruled the "July Monarchy" from 1830 until 1848, when he too was overthrown during a revolution.¹⁷ A Second French Republic then emerged.

Within this context, 1832 was a particularly significant year because of three monumental events. Legitimists, supporters of the Bourbons' claim to the French throne, continued to plot against Louis-Philippe. In early 1832, after failing to launch a successful coup in Southern France, Legitimists plotted an uprising in the Vendée, a region in Western France that had supported the royalist cause during the French Revolution. The unsuccessful rebellion, led by the Duchesse de Berry, sought to place her son, Charles X's grandson and heir, on the French throne. The Duchesse de Berry has been the subject of countless French and English biographies, but the uprising itself has received less scholarly attention. The revolt, however, marked the last attempt by the Bourbons to retake the throne by force and helped solidify the end of the Bourbon dynasty.¹⁸ Another monumental event in 1832 was the cholera outbreak. Lower income areas in Paris suffered higher losses to cholera, for they were more likely to have contaminated water supplies. The lower classes spread rumors that the outbreak was an elitist plot to subdue the masses. Attacks on physicians were common. As a result, the cholera epidemic exacerbated tensions between classes, leading to a greater polarization of class identities.¹⁹ Finally, although the Revolution of 1830 was officially over after three days in July, conditions in France continued to be characterized by violence during the early 1830s, as Louis-Philippe attempted to establish the authority and legitimacy of his "July Monarchy." The most significant of these uprisings was the republican-dominated June Revolution of 1832.

Victor Hugo, as well as Louis Blanc and Victor Considerant, perceived the barricades of June 1832 as natural extensions of the cholera epidemic, or the “political continuation of a biological crisis.”²⁰ The sad fate of the uprising, however, prompted republicans to regroup and develop new strategies for success.²¹ As a whole, then, 1832 helped solidify the end of the Bourbon monarchy and burgeoning class identities, and was a crucial moment in the (re)organization and growing solidification of French republicanism.

This collection is the first piece of scholarship to examine these three events in an interconnected pattern to better examine this portion of France’s journey as it transitioned from a monarchy to a republic. As a result, this collection will be of value to historians and academics studying diverse subfields within French and European studies. The collection is divided into three parts: part one focuses on the Legitimist uprising of the Duchesse de Berry, part two examines the cholera outbreak in Paris, and part three explores the June Revolution. The events are organized in this fashion to generally match the chronology of how they initially unfolded (although the events overlapped to various degrees).

In “The Last Vendée: The Duchesse de Berry, Legitimist Propaganda, and Alexandre Dumas,” the first and only chapter in part one, Eric Martone focuses on the Duchesse de Berry’s failed rebellion in the Vendée in 1832. After an overview of Counter-revolutionary ideology and the Bourbon Restoration, he explores how the Duchesse was depicted in Legitimist propaganda to reinforce these ideologies amongst the French people. He subsequently examines the famous writer Alexandre Dumas’s connections with Western France and the Duchesse’s uprising, his republican political leanings, and his perceptions of historical change. Finally, he uses an analysis of Dumas’s novel, *The Last Vendée*, to examine how this narrative reflects the struggle between the “two Frances” of the Revolution and Counter-revolution and presents a strong republican polemic to argue that France is destined to be a republic. Such an image and message contrasted with the Duchesse’s public personas depicted by Legitimists in their propaganda. This comparison illuminates the socio-political complexities of the post-revolutionary era and the significance of both the Duchesse and her failed 1832 coup against the July Monarchy within the context of the legacies of the French Revolution.

In “The 1832 Cholera Epidemic in Paris: The Disease that Changed France and Urbanity,” the first chapter for part two, William P. Klady examines the 1832 Paris epidemic in its full socio-historic context. Klady first explores the history of various cholera epidemics, the 1832 Paris epidemic, and responses. He then considers the cholera epidemic’s impact

on nineteenth-century French society, the history of medicine and public health, and urban planning. Following an analysis of the conflicting ideas about disease in relation to such topics as population, treatment, technology, and empire, Klady provides a brief conclusion looking at modern-day applications.

Kevin Donnelly's subsequent chapter, "Social Physics or Social Disease? Quetelet, Villermé, and Cholera in Brussels and Paris, 1832," examines the French reformer Louis-René Villermé's relationship with the Belgian polymath, Adolphe Quetelet. In particular, Donnelly explores how their collaboration transformed raw health data into conventional knowledge of disease. The two worked closely during the 1832 cholera epidemic in Paris.

Next, Martone's chapter, "Not Just the Uprising of *Les Misérables*: The Legacy of the June Revolution of 1832 in Paris," the first in part three, argues that the June Revolution's significance stems from its role as the first republican insurrection after the French Revolution. Further, for the first time, a union was formed between earlier republicanism and the burgeoning workers' movement over social demands and political struggle. Republicans' extreme disappointment with the outcome of the Revolution of 1830 not only set the stage for subsequent republican uprisings, like the 1832 June Revolution, but also a change in the composition of the loose republican factions in France. As a result, the June Revolution was a—if not the—decisive moment in the development among the urban masses of both a sense of republicanism and a revolutionary consciousness through civic education manifested through mass participation in the democratic process. After 1832, radical republicans increasingly incorporated socialist ideas in varying degrees to their ideologies to court the working classes to the republican cause. The June Revolution, therefore, prompted many republicans to embrace aspects of Romanticism and socialism to an increased degree, culminating in the Romantic republican-socialist victory in 1848.

In the final chapter, "Rebellious Types: Missing Bodies and Artistic Afterlives in George Sand's *Horace*," Elizabeth Erbeznik argues that Sand's 1840s novel, *Horace*, set during the July Monarchy, documents an array of urban social types and traces their predictable trajectories through the city. Sand exploits her readers' familiarity with these types, but she presents her working-class characters in a more nuanced light and does not wholly abandon them to predictable destinies. By seeming to "kill off" these characters, especially the heartbroken *grisette*, Marthe, and revolutionary idealists, Paul Arsène and Jean Laravinière, Sand creates a break in the story for new narratives about these types, and the turbulent

events that shape them. By examining several “deaths” in the novel as instances of narrative disruption, this chapter considers how Sand uses the missing bodies of Marthe, Arsène, and Laravinière (all incorrectly presumed to be dead) to signify a gap in knowledge about the city and its citizens. These gaps subsequently allow for a revision of the conventional discourses dominating 1830s print culture: namely, the tale of seduction featuring the bourgeois student and working-class seamstress and the narrative of defeat following the June Revolution of 1832. While the June Revolution was constructed as a total defeat by Louis-Philippe’s government, the existence of surviving insurgents challenged this claim. In other words, by surviving, Arsène and Laravinière propose a new way of looking at the events of June 1832 and they gesture toward the promise of a future political reorganization.

Notes

¹ Joseph de Maistre, *The Works of Joseph de Maistre*, trans. and ed. Jack Lively (New York: Schocken, 1971), 60.

² Other film versions include the Bille August-directed 1998 film starring Liam Neeson, Geoffrey Rush, Uma Thurman, and Claire Danes; and a 2000 mini-series, directed by Josée Dayan from an adaptation by Didier Decoin, starring Gérard Depardieu and John Malkovich. This production was simultaneously filmed in French (as a 4-part adaptation) and English (as a 2-part adaptation) for international audiences. An interesting 1995 cinematic take on the novel, written and directed by Claude Lelouch, follows a story set during World War II that parallels that of Hugo’s Jean Valjean.

³ Denise Dersin, ed., *What Life Was Like in Europe’s Romantic Era: Europe, AD 1789-1848* (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 2000).

⁴ On the French Revolution, see: William Doyle, *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); D.M.G. Sutherland, *France, 1789-1815: Revolution and Counterrevolution* (London: Fontana Press, 1985); J.F. Bosher, *The French Revolution* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988); Richard Cobb, *The French and their Revolution*, ed. David Gilmour (New York: The New Press, 1998); Ronald Schechter, ed., *The French Revolution: The Essential Readings* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001); Michel Vovelle, *The Revolution against the Church*, trans. Alan José (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1991); Albert Soboul, *The Sans-Culottes*, trans. Rémy Inglis Hall (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972); Lynn Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992); James A.W. Heffernan, ed., *Representing the French Revolution: Literature, Historiography, and Art* (Hanover: University Press of New England,

1992); Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution*, trans. R.R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Georges Lefebvre, *The French Revolution: From Its Origins to 1793*, trans. Elizabeth Moss Evanson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); Georges Lefebvre, *The French Revolution: From 1793 to 1799*, trans. John Hall Stewart and James Friguglietti (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Sandy Petrey, ed., *The French Revolution, 1789-1989: Two Hundred Years of Rethinking* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1989); Christopher Hibbert, *The Days of the French Revolution*, rev. ed. (New York: Perennial, 2002); François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, trans. Elborg Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Jeremy Popkin, *A Short History of the French Revolution*, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2009); Paul Hanson, *Contesting the French Revolution* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); Philippe de Carbonnières, Prieur, *Les Tableaux historiques de la Révolution: Catalogue raisonné des dessins originaux* (Paris: Paris-Musées/Éditions Nicolas Chaudun, 2006); T.C.W. Blanning, *The French Revolution: Aristocrats versus Bourgeois?* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1987); Gilbert Shapiro and John Markoff, *Revolutionary Demands: A Content Analysis of the Cahiers de Doleances of 1789* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

⁵ On Napoleon, see: Geoffrey Ellis, *Napoleon* (New York: Longman, 1997); Frank McLynn, *Napoleon: A Biography* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1997); Felix Markham, *Napoleon* (New York: Mentor, 1963); J. Christopher Herold, *The Age of Napoleon*, rev. ed. (New York: Mariner, 2002); Louis Bergeron, *France Under Napoleon*, trans. R.R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); James Marshall-Cornwall, *Napoleon as Military Commander* (1967, reprint; New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1998); Alan Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997); Isser Woloch, *Napoleon and His Collaborators: The Making of a Dictatorship* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Philip G. Dwyer, ed., *Napoleon and Europe* (New York: Longman, 2001); Michael Broers, *Europe Under Napoleon, 1799-1815* (New York: Arnold, 1996); Somerset de Chair, ed., *Napoleon on Napoleon: An Autobiography of the Emperor* (London: Cassell, 1992); Gérard Gengembre with Pierre Jean Chalençon and David Chanteranne, *Napoleon: The Immortal Emperor* (New York: Vendome, 2002); Sudhir Hazareesingh, *The Legend of Napoleon* (London: Granta Books, 2004); David Stacton, *The Bonapartes* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966).

⁶ Royalists recognized Louis XVI's young (but never crowned) son, who died in a French prison during the French Revolution, as Louis XVII. See: Deborah Cadbury, *The Lost King of France: A True Story of Revolution, Revenge, and DNA* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002).

⁷ See: Sheryl Kroen, *Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 1815-1830* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration*, trans. Lynn Case (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966); Philip Mansel, *Paris Between Empires, 1814-1852* (London: John Murray, 2001); Irene Collins, ed., *Government and Society in France, 1814-1848* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970).

⁸ For an English-language biography, see: Philip Mansel, *Louis XVIII*, rev. ed. (London: Sutton, 1999).

⁹ See: David Higgs, *Ultraroyalism in Toulouse: From Its Origins to the Revolution of 1830* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); David Higgs, *Nobles in Nineteenth-Century France: The Practice of Inegalitarianism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Philip Mansel, *The Court of France, 1789-1830* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); James Roberts, *The Counter-Revolution in France, 1787-1830* (London: Macmillan, 1990); Brian Fitzpatrick, *Catholic Royalism in the Department of the Gard, 1814-1852* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Christopher Olaf Blum, ed. and trans., *Critics of the Enlightenment: Readings in the French Counter-Revolutionary Tradition* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004); Darrin M. McMahon, *Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹⁰ See: Andrew Roberts, *Waterloo, June 18, 1815: The Battle for Modern Europe* (New York: Harper Collins, 2005).

¹¹ See: Daniel Philip Resnick, *The White Terror and the Political Reaction after Waterloo* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

¹² See: David Skuy, *Assassination, Politics, and Miracles: France and the Royalist Reaction of 1820* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003).

¹³ For an English-language biography, see: Vincent W. Beach, *Charles X of France: His Life and Times* (Boulder: Pruett, 1971); See also: Richard A. Jackson, *Vive le Roi! A History of the French Coronation from Charles V to Charles X* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).

¹⁴ D.L. Rader, *The Journalist and the July Revolution in France: The Role of the Political Press in the Overthrow of the Bourbon Restoration, 1827-1830* (New York: Springer, 1974)

¹⁵ See: Robert Alexander, *Re-Writing the French Revolutionary Tradition: Liberal Opposition and the Fall of the Bourbon Monarchy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Pamela Pilbeam, *The 1830 Revolution in France* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991); David Pinkney, *French Revolution of 1830*, new ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

¹⁶ See: Georges Poisson, *Les Orléans: Une famille en quête d'un trône*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Perrin, 1999); Philippe de Montjouvent with Dominique Charenton, *Le Comte de Paris, Duc de France et ses ancêtres* (Charenton: Éditions du Chaney, 2000); For histories of the Bourbon dynasty, see: J.H. Shennan, *Bourbons: The History of a Dynasty* (London: Humbledon Continuum, 2007); Oliver Thomson, *The Impossible Bourbons: Europe's Most Ambitious Dynasty* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley, 2009).

¹⁷ See: Jill Harsin, *Barricades: The War of the Streets in Revolutionary Paris, 1830-1848* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Ronald Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades: Class Formation and Republican Politics in France, 1830-1871* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael Rapport, *1848: Year of Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Jonathan Sperber, *The European*

Revolutions, 1848-1851, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Roger Price, ed., *1848 in France* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975); Pamela Pilbeam, *Republicanism in Nineteenth-Century France, 1814-1871* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Gabriel de Broglie, *La monarchie de Juillet, 1830-1848* (Paris: Fayard, 2011).

¹⁸ See: Hugues de Changy, *Le soulèvement de la duchesse de Berry: Les Royalistes dans la tourmente, 1830- 1832* (Paris: Albatros/Diffusion-Université-Culture, 1986); Hugues de Changny, *Le Mouvement légitimiste sous la Monarchie de Juillet, 1833-1848* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2004); Marvin L. Brown, *The Comte de Chambord: The Third Republic's Uncompromising King* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967).

¹⁹ The cholera epidemic is perhaps the most studied of all the events of 1832. The classic works on the event include: François Delaporte, *Disease and Civilization: The Cholera in Paris, 1832*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986); Ange-Pierre Leca, *Et le choléra s'abattit sur Paris* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1982).

²⁰ Anthony Vidler, "The Scenes of the Street," In *On Streets*, ed. Stanford Anderson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 42, 71.

²¹ Thomas Bouchet is the only scholar to write a book-length work on the June Revolution of 1832: *Le Roi et les Barricades: Une Histoire des 5 et 6 Juin 1832* (Paris: Seli Arslan, 2000). The only other book on the event is: Robert Sayre and Michael Löwy, *L'insurrection des Misérables: romantisme et révolution en Juin 1832* (Paris: Minard, 1992). This book collects primary accounts about the revolution. Both studies are unavailable to English readers. In addition, the event's political and social impacts are largely unstudied.

PART ONE:

**THE LEGITIMIST UPRISING
OF THE DUCHESSE DE BERRY**

THE LAST VENDÉE:
THE DUCHESSE DE BERRY, LEGITIMIST
PROPAGANDA, AND ALEXANDRE DUMAS

ERIC MARTONE

“It is certain that in the movement of history there is never any turning back, and that restoration *in toto* does not exist.”

—Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci¹

Historians have often painted a portrait of “two Frances” colliding with each other in the wake of the French Revolution: the France of the Counter-revolution and the France of the French Revolution. Adherents of both ideological currents recognized that a restoration of the Old Regime *in toto* was impossible; the heart of the debate, however, was how much of the Old Regime to restore and how much of the French Revolution to keep. This conflict was particularly intense during the Restoration era (1814-1830), characterized by the return of the Bourbon monarchy and many French aristocratic *émigrés* to France following Napoleon’s defeat at the hands of a European coalition. While historians have debated the extent to which the French population as a whole embraced the returned monarchy (first, Louis XVIII, then, his brother, Charles X), one of the keys to the Bourbons’ popularity, as far as it developed, was the Duchesse de Berry, who emerged in the national spotlight following the 1820 assassination of her husband, nephew to then king, Louis XVIII, and the birth of her son (and Bourbon heir) seven months later. Fondly called the “miracle child” because of the events surrounding his birth, he symbolized the hopes of the Bourbon line and conservative Counter-revolutionary doctrinaires.

In propaganda, which drew from various French cultural texts to counter Bonapartist, republican, and later Orléanist factions, the Duchesse de Berry’s public image included two broad (and interconnected) personas—the Good Wife and the Good Mother—that reinforced Counter-revolutionary ideologies. However, during the Restoration and subsequent July Monarchy (1830-1848), a continued blurring of the distinctions between the upper bourgeois ranks and the nobility created an amalgamated rank of French

notables. The aristocracy, particularly in urban centers, increasingly adopted bourgeois values. Legitimists portrayed the Duchesse “as the symbol of royalist popular sovereignty because her motherhood permitted her to represent politically all French families.”² After the Revolution of 1830, which overthrew the Bourbon monarchy, Louis-Philippe, Duc d’Orléans, a member of a cadet branch of the royal family, became “king of the French.” Consequently, the Duchesse de Berry, in the name of her son and “proper” Bourbon heir, “was to play the part of a royal and matronal Joan of Arc, to rally army and nation round the white flag, and to drive the usurper headlong from the throne.”³ She made a dramatic covert return to France from exile to launch a failed coup in 1832 to gain the throne for her son. After her arrest—and the sudden discovery of her pregnancy and emerging mystery over the father’s identity—her ultimate usefulness to the Legitimist cause became muted.

Romantic writer Alexandre Dumas, best known for *The Three Musketeers* and *The Count of Monte Cristo*, initially worked in Paris as a clerk for Louis-Philippe before the former became a hugely successful writer and the latter became king. Dumas carried the theme of a conflict between the “two Frances” in the post-revolutionary era in his 1850s novel, *The Last Vendée*. Building on first-hand experience of the region of Western France and the primary information he obtained through an earlier (and anonymous) collaboration with General Dermoncourt, charged by the government with apprehending the Duchesse in 1832, Dumas constructed a tale based on the Duchesse’s failed uprising to represent allegorically this broader struggle between Counter-revolutionary and Revolutionary France. In Dumas’s view, the fate of the uprising determined the fate of the nation. For example, in his memoirs, ghost-written by Dumas, General Dermoncourt expresses republican sympathies and a view of historical change in keeping with that elaborated by Dumas in his future historical works. As the memoir relates:

if this last campaign in La Vendée be unimportant, in a military sense, it is not so politically. Here, the two principles, for which France divided her sons into two hostile camps, armed against each other ever since 1789, met face to face; and, in this their last duel, the revolutionary principle has killed the monarchical principle, and popular right has reaped the inheritance of divine right.⁴

Thus, to Dumas, the 1832 defeat of the Duchesse and her Legitimist supporters marked a decisive turning point on France’s road to realizing its republican destiny as outlined during the French Revolution.

The first section of this chapter provides an overview of Counter-revolutionary ideology and the Bourbon Restoration, while the second section explores how the Duchesse de Berry was depicted in Legitimist propaganda to reinforce the Counter-revolutionary ideologies previously noted. The chapter subsequently examines Dumas's connections with Western France and the Duchesse's uprising, his republican political leanings, and his perceptions of historical change. In the final section, I analyze Dumas's literary masterpiece, *The Last Vendée*, to reveal how the narrative reflects the struggle between the "two Frances" and presents a strong republican polemic to argue unmistakably that France is destined to be a republic. Such an image and message contrasted with the Duchesse's public personas depicted in Legitimist propaganda. This comparison illuminates the socio-political complexities of the post-revolutionary era and the significance of both the Duchesse de Berry and her failed 1832 coup against the July Monarchy within the context of the legacies of the French Revolution.

Counter-revolutionary Ideology and the Bourbon Restoration

On April 24, 1816, Princess Maria Carolina Ferdinanda Luisa of the House of Bourbon-Sicilies found herself a member of the French royal family upon her marriage to Charles Ferdinand d'Artois, Duc de Berry, the nephew of King Louis XVIII. Not yet eighteen years old, the young princess had spent her childhood in Sicily and Naples as the daughter of the future King Francis I of the Two Sicilies. With a new Francophized version of her name, Marie-Caroline-Ferdinande Louise, she became known during the following decades as the Duchesse de Berry, or simply Madame de Berry.⁵ Despite being an arranged marriage, it was generally a happy one. She became a prominent and popular royal and member of Parisian high society during the Restoration.⁶ In fact, some historians have even argued that the French Revolution resulted in a stronger monarchy and a larger and more elitist series of courts than had existed before.⁷ Nevertheless, the Duchesse found herself in a France amidst a sea of change, as Counter-revolutionary forces regained control of the government after Napoleon's 1815 defeat at Waterloo.⁸

The political right is an enduring tradition in modern France, which is the product of the competing philosophies of the French Revolution and Counter-revolution.⁹ Conflict between these two ideologies, both rooted in the Enlightenment, has shaped French society.¹⁰ While historians generally share this view, there is disagreement over which tradition has been more

influential.¹¹ Nevertheless, the Counter-revolutionary tradition formed the foundation for the French political right, a general characteristic of which is its hostility to the Revolution and the values that emerged.¹² The French right's consistent elements include a series of definable political attitudes (like realism, conservatism, and a belief in established authority) and traditional values (like religion, monarchy, and hierarchy).¹³ When classifying the French right tradition(s), most historians have been influenced by René Rémond. In his classic study, Rémond perceived the 1815 to 1830 era as comprising the first tradition of the extreme right, which ultimately came into conflict with a more liberal right-wing tradition that came to power after the 1830 revolution.¹⁴ This first tradition had its origins in the Counter-revolution and its opposition to the French Revolution. Many of its torch-bearers were members of the nobility and royal family, whose lives were thrown into tumult due to the Revolution. In exile for much of the Revolution, they ultimately returned to France following Napoleon's defeat and the Bourbon monarchy's restoration. Therefore, as philosopher Alain Badiou has maintained, "France is a deeply conservative country, which responds to the revolutionary episodes in its history with long sequences of black reaction." He thus argues that the Restoration "declared that it would restore public order and morals after the bloody anarchy of revolution."¹⁵

Although Counter-revolutionary ideology dominated the Restoration, it had not been guided by a single doctrine during the Revolution and had assumed extremely diverse forms.¹⁶ Rémond classified Counter-revolutionaries into two broad schools: the theocratic school, which deduced systemic principles from religious considerations, and the historical school, whose views rested on positivist and experimental analysis.¹⁷ From the first school came the ultras, of which Joseph de Maistre is intellectually affiliated, and from the second, derive the moderate conservatives (or Orléanists).¹⁸ Rémond, however, did not perceive anything "revolutionary" about the Counter-revolutionary tradition during the Restoration; instead, it was a filter working to prevent the Revolution's ideas from seeping into French society. The year 1815, when the Bourbon monarchy was restored for a second time following Napoleon's brief return to power after escaping from exile on Elba, marked a dramatic collision between the "two Frances": the "new" France and the France of the Old Regime.¹⁹ Therefore, the politics of restored monarchy reflected the "different mentalities, the different approaches that would become those of 'the French Right' in the century to come."²⁰ Rémond's interpretation has largely colored how following historians have viewed these events.

As Stephen Holmes has argued, under the Old Regime, hereditary succession had been a custom. By the Restoration, it had become an ideology. Only when the concept of legitimacy ceased to be taken for granted “could it be placed on walls as a party slogan and defiantly flaunted as the ‘cause’ of ultra-royalist militants. Only when dynastic continuity had been broken and political allegiance had become a genuinely open question, could fealty be transformed into Bourbonism.” After the Old Regime’s collapse, the principles of legitimacy were thus new “to the extent that those who used them were responding to unprecedented problems. The theoretical justification of hereditary entitlement to the throne had to be not merely retouched but fundamentally restructured” in order to suit Counter-revolutionary thought and propaganda.²¹

Yet, the Restoration started off with moderate intentions. The Charter of 1814, for example, sought to encourage a new moderate consensus. Louis XVIII attempted to comply, thereby satisfying constitutional monarchists while frustrating reactionary *émigrés*, or ultras, who had returned to France. Nevertheless, Rémond perceived the 1815 election following Napoleon’s defeat, during which many ultras gained parliamentary seats, as the birth of ultra-royalism as a political force. In 1820, however, events surrounding the Duc and Duchesse de Berry had profound consequences on both the popularity and political strength of the ultra-royalist cause.

On their marriage in 1816, the Duc de Berry allegedly remarked, “*J’aurai, je l’espère, des enfants qui, comme moi, porteront dans leur Cœur l’amour des François.*” This patriotic statement revealed a pressing concern: the birth of children. In letters leading up to the union, his family had expressed its eagerness to “augment the number of children in our Family.”²² Indeed, the childless Louis XVIII was relying on his brother’s sons, the Duc de Berry and the Duc d’Angoulême, to sire heirs to secure the dynasty. However, the Duc d’Angoulême’s chances of success seemed slim. When the future Duchesse de Berry arrived in Southern France, she was connected to Marie de Medici, second wife of Henri IV, the dynasty’s founder, and the mother of Louis XIII: the “mother” of the Bourbon kings. The connection was clear: Madame was to give birth to an heir to renew the Bourbon dynasty, a new Henri IV. Much hope (and pressure) was placed on her. However, the couple had difficulty bearing a suitable heir and their only surviving child was a girl.²³ In 1820, an anti-royalist assassin stabbed the Duc de Berry as he stepped into his carriage to exit the opera. The fatal wound took time to take the Duc’s life. As he lingered on his deathbed, it seemed as if the hopes of the entire Bourbon line were about to die with him. The Duc, however, not only forgave his assassin,

but he also made a startling announcement: he and his wife had arrived late to the opera on that fateful night because of the Duchesse's fatigue, a fatigue caused by her pregnancy! It would be hard to explain just how profound and miraculous such news had at the time, not only to royal supporters and politicians, but also to the French people as a whole. The Duchesse was actually carrying a child, the final hope for the Bourbon line!²⁴



Figure 1: Illustration of King Louis XVIII, from Alexandre Dumas's *The Last Vendée*, published by the Colonial Press Company (Boston and New York) circa 1894. Collection of the author.

Several months later, on September 29, a boy was born: Henri-Charles-Ferdinand-Marie-Dieudonné.²⁵ He was granted the title of Duc de Bordeaux to honor the wishes of Louis XVIII, who declared in 1816 that the Duc de Berry's male heir would be named Bordeaux to honor the city that had first flown the Bourbon white flag in 1814.²⁶ Henri was quickly dubbed the "miracle child." As David Skuy has observed, "In the eyes of the nation, this was no ordinary child; he was the product of divine intervention, a sign of God's love for the Bourbons and the French monarchy. This monarchy had suffered mightily during the previous quarter century, its property destroyed and confiscated, its representatives guillotined and exiled.... Yet, for all that, nothing could tarnish the glory of the miracle child, a boy whose very existence affirmed that the era of the

revolution and republicanism had ended.”²⁷ Many at the time hoped that the child would restore “order” to France and consequently Europe. As papal nuncio Msgr. Macchi declared, “This child of sorrows, of regrets, of remembrances, is also the child of Europe; he is the prediction and guarantee of the peace and repose which must follow so many agitations.”²⁸ For the occasion of Henri’s birth, Victor Hugo, a royalist in his youth, even composed an *Ode sur la naissance du duc de Bordeaux* in October 1820:

Now stares the world at thee, poor infant thing
 Whose father sees thee not—My King!
 These thoughts of piety profound
 As homage to thee here I bring.
 They mother’s lasting sorrow.
 The sorrow of all France,
 Console, O thou in suffering brought to life.
 O’er thee may God his mighty arm extend,
 And may this Bourbon crown defend
 Its bearer from all harm!²⁹

The Duchesse did not forget Hugo, recommending him in 1822 for a 1,000-franc pension.³⁰

Nevertheless, the Duc de Berry’s assassination and his son’s posthumous birth led to a royalist reaction during the 1820s that set the seeds for the dynasty’s destruction.³¹ However, it is important to note that royalism remained a popular force at this time, largely due to the birth of the “miracle child.” Consequently, “hindsight and the July Revolution [of 1830] have obscured how seriously the general population took the characterization of Bordeaux’s birth as a miracle.” The Bourbons were never as popular after the French Revolution as they were during the period immediately after Henri’s birth, and they were generally accepted as legitimate rulers of France.³²

When Louis XVIII’s brother, the Duc d’Artois, became King Charles X in 1824, the former Counter-revolutionary *émigrés* gained control of France and dominated the rest of the 1820s.³³ Rémond thus interpreted Louis XVIII’s death as a watershed event, unleashing a new wave of right-wing extremism. In his equally classic study, Eugen Weber regarded an ultra as “an extremist, the man of simple faith and faithfulness which experience in no way affects...[a man who] had forgotten nothing and learned nothing” from the French Revolution.³⁴ Yet, the ultras perceived themselves as renewing France. In this attempt, they looked to the Middle Ages for their “ideal society.” Nicholas Davidson argues that Counter-revolutionary theorist Louis Bonald pioneered the modern use of

conservatism. Bonald originated the term from the medieval usage of the post of *conservator*, noted as one who protects existing rights and liberties and preserves peace.³⁵ His use of a Medieval term reflected the ultras' affinity for the period and their conception of their societal role. Peter Davies, however, interprets the desire to renew France as materializing in the ultras' emphasis on religion. The ultras, in part, reacted against the French Revolution's atheistic elements, and were concerned with the re-Christianization of France and the "restitution of privileges, wealth, and influence of the Catholic Church."³⁶ Consequently, as de Maistre declared in his *Considerations*, "there is a satanic element in the French Revolution which distinguishes it from any other revolution known or perhaps that will be known. Remember the great occasions—Robespierre's speech against the priesthood, the solemn apostasy of the priests, the declaration of objects of worship, the inauguration of the goddess of Reason, and the many outrageous acts by which the provinces tried to surpass Paris: these all leave the ordinary sphere of crimes and seem to belong to a different world."³⁷ Ultras thus advocated provincial liberties, opposed strong governmental centralization, championed the central role of the family, and often used familial imagery to describe the relationship between the monarch and his subjects. Bonald's writings thus expressed these views. For example, "the family, composed of the father, mother, and children, is an actual society made up of three persons: power, agent or minister; and subject, like every society."³⁸ The Enlightenment and the French Revolution, both of which had glorified the individual and the state, were scornful of institutions and communities coming between the two. Ultras fostered an appreciation of ties between human beings, of which family and Church led the way. As Bonald argued, "society is domestic, political, and religious; it is family, State, and religion."³⁹ Davies, therefore, notes that the Counter-revolution subordinated the individual to the social group, which started with the family.⁴⁰

During the later 1820s, several factors, including Charles X's government's increasingly reactionary nature, as well as its conflict with the Chamber's growing number of liberal deputies elected due to economic downturns, led to the decline of bourgeois and worker support for the Bourbon monarchy. Ultimately, a revolution erupted in July 1830 overthrowing the Bourbons. Charles X and his son abdicated in favor of Henri, the Duc de Bordeaux. The ultras duly named him "Henri V." However, amidst some political wrangling, a new monarchy was established with Louis-Philippe, the Duc d'Orléans, as "King of the French." The Bourbons eventually fled to Scotland and established a court in exile.⁴¹ The Duchesse had profound differences with Charles X, who was not a fighting

man, and his inner circle. She wanted action against the “July Monarchy” and was not predisposed to waiting for better circumstances. Charles X and his supporters, however, reverted to the *émigrés*’ position held during the French Revolution. They generally viewed themselves as a “court in waiting” and made limited attempts to regain control by force.⁴² The ultras, now termed Legitimists, supported the elder Bourbon line’s rights against the new king, Louis-Philippe. Legitimists eventually found themselves in an uneasy alliance with republicans, and the conservative man of letters, François-René de Chateaubriand, even attempted to found a joint publication, *La Nation*, with mixed results.⁴³ Ultras’ view of the concept of legitimacy, however, “was so doctrinaire and rigid partly because it represented a denial of the obvious: it was a desperate attempt to suppress general public awareness that, in 1814, the re-enthronement of the Bourbons had been a human choice” rather than that of providence.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, during the early 1830s, Louis-Philippe had difficulty establishing his legitimacy as king and his early reign was marred by social unrest.⁴⁵ In particular, the close links between the Church and Charles X’s regime led to the development of an anti-clerical component to the 1830 revolution and its aftermath. Charles X came to symbolize the Bourbons’ inability to reconcile divine right monarchist traditions with the more liberal, democratic climate produced by the French Revolution. In addition, the ultras had advocated a return to traditional Catholic values and Church power. Consequently, the Bourbon dynasty as a whole became closely linked with the Church. In February 1831, some Legitimists went to the church of Saint Germain l’Auxerrois to affirm their faith in God and “King Henri V.” Their worship, however, was interrupted by the July Revolution’s committed republican defenders. They trashed Saint Germain l’Auxerrois, invaded and damaged other churches, and sacked the palace of the archbishop of Paris. A period of anti-clerical demonstrations followed. Such actions resurrected the French Revolution’s anti-clerical actions.⁴⁶ The government sought to conciliate the rioters, first by keeping out of their way, then by removing the Bourbon fleur-de-lis from the new regime’s official representations. This weak response and other violent incidents contributed to a substantial conviction that things were out of hand, but it was not enough to lose faith *en masse* in the July Monarchy.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, Legitimists generally had strong support in staunch Catholic regions, especially in the South and West. This support for the “throne and altar” offered a glimmer of hope to the Duchesse de Berry and her aristocratic entourage. Ferdinand de Bertier, who had organized secret royalist movements during the Empire and Restoration, returned to the task of underground conspiracy after Charles X’s exile.⁴⁸ A futile royalist

movement in Paris in March 1831 in response to the anti-clericalism associated with the new regime frustrated his early efforts and he had to take refuge in England. There, he and the Duc du Blacas and the Marshal de Bourmont formed a triumvirate that advised the Duchesse de Berry. In 1831, when she left for Italy to see her family, Bourmont managed to oust the others and obtain control of her plans.

Based on what Legitimists perceived as the conditions in France, the Duchess de Berry planned a rebellion to overthrow the July Monarchy and restore the Bourbon regime, with her son as king: a “third restoration.”⁴⁹ She left Italy and entered France, reaching Marseilles in early 1832. However, she found less support than anticipated.⁵⁰ According to the Duchess de Maillé, the Duchess hoped to set foot in France and march across the country, gaining support like Napoleon did when he landed from Elba and began his “Hundred Days” return to power in 1815.⁵¹ After the abortive attempt in Marseilles, the Duchesse traveled in disguise across France, but continued to find little support until she reached the Vendée and Brittany in Western France.⁵²

Western France had historically supported royalist causes. During the French Revolution, it had served as one of the main areas of Counter-revolutionary action.⁵³ Many contemporaries thus viewed the Vendée as a bit of an enigma.⁵⁴ Charles Tilly’s analysis of the earlier rebellion, while much criticized, has remained the dominant paradigm for interpreting the event.⁵⁵ The brutal rebellion consisted of episodic revolts from 1793 to 1796.⁵⁶ Its motives included royalism, resistance to conscription, support of religion, and rebel leaders’ self-interests.⁵⁷ The poorly-trained Vendéan peasants scored victories over the National Guard, but the regular army slaughtered the rebels, who reverted to guerilla tactics. Such methods invoked atrocities from the Republican army, in turn prompting the rebels to inflict cruelties on soldiers.⁵⁸ Counter-revolutionaries perpetuated the belief that the king and Church were supported by “a pious and... uncorrupted peasantry.” However, revolutionaries believed that priests and aristocrats manipulated the peasantry for their own ends. Thus, these troublemakers’ removal would result in rural support for the Revolution.⁵⁹ Indeed, even in 1832, police officers like Henri-Joseph Gisquet continued to believe that the Duchesse and her supporters were the source behind “all the disorders attributed to the Carlist party,” rather than the local population’s convictions.⁶⁰

In any case, the Duchesse de Berry amassed a group of aristocratic followers, including Cathelineau, La Rochejaquelein, Beauchamp, Bourmont, Clinchamp, Bordigne, Charette, De la Roberie, Brissac, and Mesnard.⁶¹ To some contemporaries, such individuals’ minds were filled