Nietzsche and Phenomenology
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Edited by

Andrea Rehberg
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ABBREVIATIONS OF NIETZSCHE’S WORKS


<table>
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<th>Title and Editor(s)</th>
<th>Publisher/Location</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>KSB</strong></td>
<td>Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe in 8 Bänden, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari</td>
<td>Berlin and New York: dtv/de Gruyter</td>
<td>1975-1984</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WLN</strong></td>
<td>Writings from the Late Notebooks, trans. Kate Sturge.</td>
<td>Cambridge: Cambridge University Press</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WM</strong></td>
<td>Der Wille zur Macht, Stuttgart: Kröner Verlag.</td>
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A few years ago Tony O’Connor, formerly of University College Cork, and I were invited by the executive of the British Society for Phenomenology to organise the annual conference of the Society on the theme of "Nietzsche and Phenomenology", a task we accepted with great pleasure. In the Spring of 2009 this conference took place and was, by common consent, a great success. At about the same time we were asked by Cambridge Scholars Publishing to edit the papers for publication. Unfortunately, soon afterwards Tony O’Connor had to withdraw from the project for a number of extrinsic reasons. I would like to take this opportunity to express the great debt this collection nevertheless owes to him, for without his work in helping to organise the conference this collection too would not have come into existence. I would also like to thank Carol Koulikourdi and Amanda Millar of CSP for all their swift and efficient work and for their support throughout the project. Special thanks are also due to Selma Aydı̇n Bayram for her unstinting technical support.

Thinking back to the above-mentioned conference, as is in the nature of these things no prior arrangements were made to determine the specific topics to be addressed within the general area of "Nietzsche and Phenomenology", and so the astonishing variety of papers it produced is all the more remarkable. To my mind this indicates, above all else, the philosophical wealth inherent in this area, and the contributors’ great acuity in attending to and presenting it.

Even though most of the contributors to this volume have provided their own translations of German, French and other foreign-language texts and terms, and – if they have done so – have therefore not given references to existing translations, I have provided, as appropriate, chapter, section, or page references, so that the reader who is less at ease in other languages can nevertheless find the texts quoted. When a contributor has provided their own translations, this is indicated in their first endnote; t.m. means "translation modified".

References to Nietzsche works are to the Kritische Studienausgabe Sämtliche Werke (KSA) and Sämtliche Briefe (KSB). Bibliographical
details for these and the translations used can be found on the Abbreviations page. KSA volumes 1-6 contain Nietzsche’s published or finished works. References to these volumes are therefore given as volume number, followed by page number, so that, for instance, KSA 5:257 refers to the first page of the main text of Zur Genealogie der Moral. KSA volumes 7-13, by contrast, contain Nietzsche’s famous Nachlass, the unpublished, posthumous notes and fragments. References to these are given by volume number, followed by the numbers of the notebook and the note, e.g., KSA 10:7 [212], without page numbers, except in cases where a note continues for a considerable number of pages, so that finding the reference without the page number would be unnecessarily time-consuming. KSA volumes 14 and 15 contain the text-critical apparatus. All KSB references give detailed information as to where a letter can be found, again starting from volume numbers.

Given the large number of different English translations of Nietzsche’s works that are available, and in order to avoid any possible confusion between page numbers, section numbers, chapter numbers etc., I have aimed for maximum explicitness in the references, in the hope that this will be considered a boon, rather than a burden, for the reading experience. But with all due respect for all translators of Nietzsche’s works – and the utmost respect is due to anyone who takes on such a formidable task – Nietzsche’s thought takes place in German, it is an event in the German language, just as the thought of any essential thinker is an event in the language that articulates it. Ultimately, then, in order to hear and to appreciate the tremendous subtlety and complexity of Nietzsche’s thought, as that of any significant philosopher, it has to be read in the language in which it was written, in which it thinks.
INTRODUCTION

ANDREA REHBERG

I. Heterogeneities: Phenomenology and Nietzsche

"Nietzsche and Phenomenology"? This title above all suggests a series of questions\(^1\) – questions which do not admit of straightforward answers, in fact questions that do not demand answers at all, but rather a series of exacerbations of the initial conundrum. The papers in this collection carry out exactly such exacerbations, that is, they practice the type of philosophical investigation associated both with Nietzsche and with phenomenology, i.e., one that eschews simplification and instead complicates and differentiates to the greatest possible degree. Towards the end of this introduction a brief overview of the essays will be provided, but to begin with it may be helpful to outline some of the questions which seem to subtend the title of this collection, and to suggest – even if as yet only very broadly – some of the ways in which Nietzsche’s thought and phenomenology at times converge, at others diverge, depending on the perspective from which this conjunction is being viewed.

One of the questions surrounding our title is surely what is meant by phenomenology here. As has been said many times, but perhaps most decisively by Heidegger when he stated that "there is no such thing as the **one** phenomenology"\(^2\), no single, definitive, final answer to that question is possible, and the reasons for this are legion. To begin with, phenomenology is nothing like a system of philosophy, or a unified school, with a set of shared doctrines, or anything like an agreed programme. In a sense, then, there is no such easily delimitable phenomenon which could be called "phenomenology", but at most a certain continuity of concerns between different phenomenologists, although even these concerns may be conceived in very different ways, and according to very different styles of thinking, by different practitioners of the philosophical "genre" of phenomenology. But despite these caveats, the general characteristics of phenomenology – or at least the three most pre-eminent of them – can preliminarily be outlined in the following terms.
1) It is first and foremost a philosophical method, and specifically a method which enables pure descriptions of phenomena cleared of all extraneous impositions. Hence, although to speak of the phenomenological method is in one sense a tautology (phenomenology is, or is supposed to be, nothing but a method), this expression may be used in order to emphasise this central feature of phenomenology. One of the key distinguishing features of this method is that it aims to reject all prior constructions, or "doxa", surrounding and distorting phenomena – summarised by Husserl as the "principle of freedom from presuppositions"\(^3\), or "freedom from prejudice" (Vorurteilslosigkeit\(^4\)), so that we may "see" the phenomena under investigation as they are given to consciousness, without any of our habitual pre-given assumptions, constructions or theories intruding into our investigations. This is what is expressed in Husserl’s famous demand that "we must go back to the 'things themselves'"\(^5\). Foremost among these prior, extrinsic ways of approaching phenomena could be named a) modern science (with its proclivity to quantify phenomena and thereby to make them calculable); b) so-called common sense (which claims to look at phenomena in an unbiased way but is instead the repository of self-naturalising and highly problematic ideologies); and, of course, c) traditional philosophical approaches.

On the one hand, then, it can be said that Nietzsche and phenomenology share this understanding of philosophy, according to which its first task is to dismantle the doxa – in the case of phenomenology, so that phenomena are allowed to show themselves from themselves uninterruptedly; in the case of Nietzsche, so that the soothing, comforting reassurances of our doxic convictions may be interrupted. It is obvious from the outset, then, that Nietzsche and phenomenology share suspicions about scientific, commonsensical, and traditional philosophical constructions, and indeed about any other means (such as religion, morality, politics, society, etc.) of "framing" phenomena before they have been allowed to show themselves. But, on the other hand, it should immediately be emphasised that in Nietzsche’s thought this aspect of the "method" is complicated by the complex mode of enquiry into these constructions that is genealogy. One of the numerous implications of this is that, for Nietzsche, the idea of presuppositionless access to phenomena requires abstraction from the very forces which the genealogical enquiry is intended to investigate, in other words, that this idea is itself idealist.

Without going into the subtleties of the seminal exposition of this, namely Foucault’s analysis of Nietzschean genealogy\(^6\), it can briefly be
said that genealogy is more than a method in the strict sense. Not only does it absorb the genealogist herself into the maelstrom of its destabilising forces, but it transforms the phenomena it investigates, literally, beyond recognition. As Foucault puts it, Nietzsche challenges the search for pure origins because,

…it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities, because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world…what is found at the…beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity⁷.

In other words, the assumed identities both of the practitioner of genealogy and of the phenomena submitted to its disruptions are subjected to extensive practical revaluations, such that the latter – at the very least – take on entirely new aspects and, as happens for instance everywhere in the Genealogy of Morals, surrender their apparent goodness and innocence to reveal the subterranean web of their sinister, nihilistic provenance.

2) As is well known, and here merely restated by way of reminder, in contrast to the above-mentioned ways of categorising phenomena beforehand, the phenomenological manner of doing philosophy aims to let the phenomena under investigation show themselves as they are given in intuition, i.e., without first subsuming them under any conceptual schema, model, or theory. So prior to the customary problems dominating the traditional branches of philosophy (e.g., ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc.), phenomenology "only" aims to describe phenomena as they are given in experience, as opposed to theorising about them.

Phenomenology thereby draws attention to the fabric of experience itself, i.e., to those features of experience that had tended to fall between the conceptual cracks of traditional philosophy, with its inclination to universalise, to subsume under larger concepts and, more generally, to privilege the abstract constructions of thought over descriptions of the concrete ways in which the multiple, often ineffable, aspects of life are experienced. In this respect, the same can be said about Nietzsche, who pays careful attention to the very phenomena and aspects of phenomena that escape the blunt instrument of the concept, the category, the idea, etc., which above all operate by "making equal" (ausgleichen, gleichmachen, etc.⁸) all that in fact tends towards increasing differentiation and complexification⁹.
The self-understanding of phenomenology, whereby it investigates the subtle phenomena that escape traditional philosophy, inevitably leads to questions about a) where the experience of phenomena registers with us, b) how it registers, how it becomes meaningful, and c) whether there are privileged phenomena, the experience of which is especially important for us. Here only the first of these questions need to concern us. Heeding only that question, then, we can remind ourselves of Husserl’s dictum that "phenomenology has to do with 'consciousness', with all types of lived experiences, acts and act-correlates". By contrast, when Nietzsche turns his attention to the phenomena of consciousness, and to consciousness as a phenomenon, he is struck by its capacity for falsification under the reign of herd values. For Nietzsche, what registers with us on the level of consciousness is merely froth, the latest outcome of the struggle between different forces, a struggle which takes place in the unconscious and – it should be stressed – entirely impersonal realm he calls the will to power.

Although it would go a long way beyond the scope of this Introduction to pursue this here, one of the most fascinating – or symptomatic – texts to consider in the context of this respective privileging of consciousness or the unconscious as the primary "site" of experience is surely "Appendix VIII", on "the Problem of the 'Unconscious" penned by Eugen Fink – to Husserl’s Crisis. In lieu of a detailed discussion, I will confine myself to quoting one especially telling sentence from its concluding paragraph, where it is stated programmatically that, "only after an explicit analysis of consciousness [i.e., by transcendental phenomenology] can the problem of the unconscious be posed at all".

3) I would suggest that perhaps the most lasting and important feature of all forms of phenomenology, bestowed on it by Brentano (in Husserl’s words "my one and only teacher in philosophy"), was what Brentano called the "intentional inexistence" of an object in mental experience, or "immanent objectivity". Summarised briefly, this refers to the object’s being-in (being immanent to) the mind, in the same way that an accident (property, characteristic) necessarily is in, belongs to, a substance, according to Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy. What Brentano uncovered in the notion of intentionality was the ineluctable directedness of each and every mental act to an object which is nonetheless qualitatively distinct from it. Leaving aside all questions about such an object’s real existence or actuality, Brentano saw that in all of its activity, the mind is inevitably concerned with and related to something (an "object") which, although somehow given to it, is at the same time profoundly different from it. It is thus a central structural (or dynamic)
feature of the mind that it necessarily goes beyond itself in order to carry out its most essential activities and, it should be emphasised, such directedness or relationality is a feature considered to be absent from all phenomena other than the mind. Brentano’s early key statement of this was,

Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although [not all mental phenomena] do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.\(^{17}\)

What makes the issue of intentionality so momentous for phenomenology is that it establishes two of its most productive convictions, namely 1) the fundamental relationality between so-called "mental acts" and the phenomena they are concerned with, the fact that experience is always the experience of something, whether that something is real or not; and 2) the "givenness" of phenomena, including the mysterious ways in which they present or show themselves to experience. Both of these features were taken up and adapted, if in significantly different ways, by post-Husserlian phenomenologists. The first, an originary relationality – albeit purged of its mentalist bias – can be seen to re-emerge, for example, as the notion of being-in and its equiprimordial extensions (being-in-the-world, etc., being-towards-death) in *Being and Time*, or as a certain understanding of our corporeal being in Merleau-Ponty’s later works. The second arguably gives rise variously to Heidegger’s notion of the "*es gibt*", to Levinas’ "*il y’a*", as well as to Derrida’s notion of "the gift", and thereby to core concepts of the later phenomenological tradition.

Although intentionality (both as a central feature of early phenomenology and of its later adaptations) could be juxtaposed with many different aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, I propose a "Nietzschean" rejoinder to it which points only in one particular direction. For it could be pointed out that, from a Nietzschean perspective, the early phenomenological understanding of the intrinsic relatedness of mental acts to their objects, although on the one hand showing the mind\(^{18}\) to be essentially directed beyond itself\(^{19}\), at the same time enshrines an anthropocentric bias at the core of classic phenomenology. But such a bias presents for Nietzsche the greatest obstacle, not only to thought, but to the affirmation of life itself. From his earliest works (e.g., *The Birth of Tragedy*, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense") to the final notes of 1888, Nietzsche maintains that human being – if not an altogether illusory fixed point – is no more than a node in a perpetual if discontinuous material becoming, the core
aspects of which are will to power, eternal recurrence and physiology. To elevate and valorise this nodal point into a privileged, unique perspective represents to Nietzsche’s thinking a type of delusional phantasy.

The centrality of the descriptive method to phenomenology in comparison to the tenets of Nietzschean genealogy; the position, and the value placed on consciousness in early phenomenology and in Nietzsche’s thought, respectively; the core phenomenological concept of intentionality in contrast to Nietzsche’s critique of anthropocentric conceptuality – do these points not lead us inevitably to conclude that the connections between Nietzsche and phenomenology are so few and so tenuous as to doom from the very beginning any attempt to pursue, develop and intensify them? Although the foregoing, adopting the position of devil’s advocate, seems to suggest so, this impression can swiftly but decisively be countered by the simple reminder that phenomenology, despite tracing its inception to that phase, is by no means reducible to its Husserlian instantiation. In fact, several of the papers presented here carry out subtle readings of the texts of Nietzsche by – broadly – phenomenological means and others, conversely, enhance our understanding of phenomenological issues by engaging with the thought of Nietzsche. What we see in them, then, is a kind of cross-fertilisation between apparently very heterogeneous types of thought. This is very far from the appropriation of one to the other, and rather in the nature of a series of mutual enhancements, of reciprocal elaborations and challenges, in each case sensitive to the textures of thought and the complexities of texts attended to.

II. Convergences: Nietzsche’s Readers

Continuing our gradual approach to the matter of thought in these essays, allow me to outline in broad terms the history of the reception of Nietzsche over the past century or so, at least as it presents itself to us today. This may help to set the scene for some of the following papers, and to indicate some of the issues and discussions which form part of their background.

It is possible to distinguish three important events or incisive points in the history of Nietzsche interpretation, firstly, Heidegger’s seminal (if not unproblematic) mid-1930s to mid-1940s readings, which unfolded Nietzsche’s texts in serious philosophical terms for the first time; secondly, the French readings of and responses to Nietzsche of the second half of the twentieth century, above all, those of Deleuze, Foucault,
Bataille, Klossowski, Kofman, Derrida, Irigary, and Blanchot; and thirdly, the continuation and mediation of both of these highpoints of Nietzsche interpretation to a predominantly anglophone audience, above all in such ground-breaking volumes such as *The New Nietzsche* and *Exceedingly Nietzsche*, to name but two.

In his sustained, if not univocal, confrontation (Aus-einander-setzung) with Nietzsche, Heidegger drew out many of the central themes of Nietzsche’s thought – will to power, eternal recurrence, the overman, nihilism, justice, Platonism, revaluation of all values – which still occupy our attempts at reading Nietzsche today, and eventually (in 1940) drew them together into the quasi-systematic whole of what he then called Nietzsche’s metaphysics. Put all too swiftly, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s thought must at least in large part be understood as a continuation of the concerns, structure, language and, above all, of the internal logic of occidental metaphysics, although at the same time he finds Nietzsche in the ambiguous position of the "consummation" (Vollendung) of metaphysics. What is therefore Heidegger’s greatest achievement vis-à-vis previous readings of Nietzsche, namely the demonstration of the internal coherence of his thought, as of its continuity with the central themes of Western metaphysics, presents itself at the same time – from the vantage point of more than half a century and innumerable subtle Nietzsche readings later – as the problem of the over-systematisation of a thought which has been shown essentially to escape such regimentation. Needless to say, the details and complexities of Heidegger’s confrontation with Nietzsche lie beyond what can be considered here. Suffice it to say that Heidegger’s Nietzsche volumes – regardless of the degree of explicitness with which they enter into the discussions in this volume – form something like their more or less distant background. That is to say, they are simultaneously "condition of possibility" and something from which differentiation is necessary in order for new readings to be able to emerge.

Much the same could also be said of the second wave of European Nietzsche interpretations, namely by a variety of French thinkers, in that they too – albeit to different degrees and in different ways – found it necessary to put a distance between Heidegger’s hermeneutic-phenomenological and seinsgeschichtliche reading of Nietzsche and their own understanding of his thought. Although it is – fortunately – impossible to unify these French readings under any one heading, certain tendencies traversing them can be pointed out, although these too finally
escape homogenisation. So the following points are in the nature of general indications, rather than precise definitions.

I would suggest that two broad, but by no means mutually exclusive, orientations can be discerned among the French interpretations of Nietzsche. The first may be characterised as displaying a great sensitivity to the nuances of the text, of its fluctuating rhythms, its variegated tones, its subtle modulations of language, both in Nietzsche’s writings and in those of the French authors themselves. No less philosophically serious than the most literal-minded, technically rigorous treatises, these readings incorporate as their starting point one of Nietzsche’s most profound insights, namely that thinking is itself a matter of desire flows, of the body and the senses, with which it is entirely continuous, rather than being dualistically opposed to these libidinal-material streams. They thereby celebrate the *jouissance* of the body, of the differential play of language, and of the sensuous textures of textuality, in the full knowledge that concepts – if they have any force at all – are not abstractions but signs and symptoms.

The second orientation, although by no means devoid of these insights, may perhaps be said to tend more towards philosophical analysis and the creation of concepts with which the complex structures of Nietzsche’s thought can be approached, for example, by exploring this thought via new and revealing conjunctions with other thinkers or modes of thought.

I would furthermore maintain that both orientations are driven – if to different degrees – by what must finally be understood as a political motivation, even though the thinkers’ conceptions of the political, of the interconnections between philosophy and the political, and of their relative priority, tend to differ significantly from one another. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that Nietzsche’s incisive analyses of the conceptual machinery of what has become known as the metaphysics of presence, and his thorough dissections of the herd mentality and other forms of slavishness, are not only philosophically revolutionary, but are also capable of constituting powerful instruments of political transformation, in thought and deed.

It should be remembered that the English-speaking reader had to wait (especially in some cases) an inordinately long time for translations of the major works of the French Nietzsche reception to be made available. Given this situation, it can easily be appreciated why the 1977 collection...
of essays, *The New Nietzsche*, edited by David B. Allison, and containing selections from the works of many of the major exponents of the "French Nietzsche", was so influential. It was followed (in some cases after an interval) by a flurry of books, essays, and collections of essays written in English, such as *Exceedingly Nietzsche*, edited by Krell and Wood. We are most fortunate in being able to include original essays by two of the main figures of the third, English-language, wave of Nietzsche interpretation, namely David Krell and John Sallis\(^{30}\), in this collection.

These three waves, then, provide some of the context – although not of course exclusively so – for the essays presented here. But I would like to emphasise that the convergences of the section heading equally apply to these essay themselves, in that different perspectives, concerns, tones, voices, etc. converge here, not to coincide or to harmonise, but so that the plurivocity and exuberant wealth of contemporary readings of the issues surrounding Nietzsche and phenomenology can be heard again.

### III. The Phenomena of Thought

The following papers have been grouped according to whether a thematic approach or a "comparative" approach – that is, in each case the staging of an encounter between Nietzsche and an important figure in twentieth-century thought – has been the relatively more dominant organising principle. Before going into this in more detail, it should be pointed out though that a number of alternative groupings would have been possible. One alternative way in which papers could have been arranged is according to whether they pursue the question implied in the title "Nietzsche and Phenomenology" in a more "classical" manner, that is, by addressing themes or figures commonly associated with phenomenological concerns, or in what might be termed a more "ex-centric" way, opening up new and perhaps unexpected avenues of enquiry. The chief virtue of the former group surely lies in their deepening and enhancing our understanding of issues that have variously occupied both phenomenology and studies of Nietzsche; whereas the latter group extend or expand our ideas about what can at all fall into the purview of an investigation of the nexus "Nietzsche and Phenomenology". In the former group fall the papers by Sallis, McNeill, Haase, Krell, and myself; in the latter those by Burnham/Jesinghausen, Kirkland, Marsden, Parkes, and Urpeth.

Above I say "relatively more dominant" organising principle because some of the thematic approaches, such as for instance in Jill Marsden’s
paper, also have a comparative element – in that case between Leibniz and Nietzsche. Conversely, as is the case for instance in Jim Urpeth’s essay on Nietzsche and Bergson, the comparative approach is tempered by the thematic focus, namely, as the title of his paper indicates, on what he calls "natural religion". So the division between Parts One and Two is not a rigid or absolute one. Similarly, a number of cross-groupings could be seen to be at work within and across the two parts of the collection. For instance, the challenge of immanentism (or what is called "life" by Nietzsche) is addressed and/or confronted in several of the papers, especially in those by Sallis, Marsden, Urpeth, and myself. In a related vein, Kirkland, Parkes, and Urpeth explore the task of affirmation and its implications. And so one could continue to point out several other subdivisions that undermine the thematic-comparative division, some of which will resonate more with certain readers than with others.

Having pointed out some of the potential alternative ways in which continuities between these papers might be conceived, let us now turn to the papers in their actuality, and try to tease out some of the issues, concerns, texts, and figures they deal with. In the opening paper of the collection, "Shining in Perspective: Nietzsche and Beyond", John Sallis addresses what may be thought of as the underlying issue connecting Nietzsche and phenomenology, namely the central meaning of appearance, "shining", i.e., the entire register of terms surrounding the German *Schein, Erscheinung, scheinbar*, etc. More concretely, this paper explores the consequences of Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism and it shows how this inversion, if radically carried out, opens upon phenomenology and how, in the late fragments concerning shining and the perspectival, Nietzsche already inaugurates the task proper to phenomenology.

Albeit it in an entirely different vein and manner, Douglas Burnham and Martin Jesinghausen continue this theme by enquiring into the fate of the figure of Apollo, associated with "beautiful appearance" (*der schöne Schein*), in Nietzsche’s writings. The paper begins with a discussion of the curious, gradual disappearance of the figure of Apollo from the text of Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*. The interpretation of Nietzsche’s strategy centres upon the metaphor that in Socratism the Apollinian pupates and cocoons itself away (*sich verpuppt*). The cocoon not only covers over what is within it and hides it from view, but it also protects and preserves what is within, and it thus creates the "space" for transfiguration. At the end of *The Birth of Tragedy*, the Apollinian re-emerges in glory. According to the authors, this involves two initial tasks: first, to enquire...
into the phenomenological structure of the cocoon as a double hiding; second, to ask how this structure fits into Nietzsche’s understanding of art in the book. The second half of the paper outlines how this double-hiding function reappears in Nietzsche’s middle-period and later works as the theme of the mask, in turn showing that the duality of Apollo and Dionysus that is essential to *The Birth of Tragedy* is not dropped by Nietzsche in favour of mono-pole key ideals, but continues in a modified form.

In "Zarathustra and Redeeming the Past", Sean Kirkland thinks through the temporal aspects of the philosophical persona of Zarathustra and their implications for the self-understanding of human being. Specifically, the essay concerns an aspect of Nietzsche’s project in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that is usually overlooked – our relation to the past. Given the explicitly "prophetic" mode of Zarathustra’s discourse, the temporal mode on which interpreters usually (and rightly) focus is the future. However, if this occurs at the expense of Zarathustra’s remarks about the proper relation to the past, his project will be misinterpreted. After first considering the "causal" function of the overman, as an essentially futural figure, the discussion shifts to Zarathustra’s call for an "Erlösung" or "Redemption" of our past. Kirkland argues that "redeeming" our past with Zarathustra entails a setting free of the multiple, dynamic, non-self-identical origin still active there, and, in this creative act, a bringing into proximity of the disavowed, anti-metaphysical, past source and an open, unanticipatable future.

In her paper on "The Immeasurable Fineness of Things", Jill Marsden tackles one of the thorniest issues in phenomenology, namely the role and the understanding of the workings of consciousness, and plays it through a broad register of Nietzschean reflections on the issue. She reminds us that, according to Nietzsche, the psychologists’ chief error is to take the indistinct idea to be a lower species of idea than the luminous one. To this Nietzsche opposes the thought that "what moves away from our consciousness and thus becomes obscure may yet be perfectly clear in itself". Via the highly original route of Leibniz’s suggestive propositions on the issue of perception, Marsden discusses the ways in which Nietzsche, as part of a broader fascination with elusive forms of awareness and anomalous perceptions, insists upon the existence of a vast array of perceptual and affective phenomena which are only sensed at thresholds beyond empirical representation. In a gesture akin to peripheral vision, she
explores how in certain estranging moments something unassimilable for consciousness is fleetingly apprehended.

Another paper that significantly broadens our sense of the possible ambit of any enquiry into Nietzsche and phenomenology is that by Graham Parkes. By way of staging an encounter between Nietzsche’s thought and that of classical East-Asian thinkers, he reflects on our relation to the phenomena of nature and asks whether there is any way of getting back to "the things themselves" when they are the things of nature. In response to this Parkes discusses the variety of ways, suggested in Nietzsche’s texts, in which we might come to experience a "de-anthropomorphised", "de-divinised", and "newly redeemed" nature. Assuming we attempt to pursue these paths, and do so successfully, he asks what we would then encounter, if – perhaps – no longer our own selves.

Each of the papers in the second part of the collection, as I mentioned above, is chiefly concerned with staging an encounter between Nietzsche and one of the influential figures of twentieth-century phenomenology, although in each case they do so in order to allow a specific philosophical issue to emerge. William McNeill and Ullrich Haase both explore the Nietzsche-Heidegger connection, albeit in rather different ways; the differences being not least due to the different texts by Heidegger, on the basis of which each examines the famous Auseinandersetzung. Both McNeill and Haase eschew discussions of Heidegger’s Nietzsche volumes in favour of less obvious – but therefore perhaps all the more telling – textual sites of the encounter.

McNeill explores the trope of the "descent" of philosophy and, by linking it to genealogy, he uncovers a largely hidden legacy of Nietzschean thought, and not just in Heidegger’s work of the 30s and 40s. The "other" Nietzsche whom he discovers makes his appearance much earlier, namely in Being and Time in 1927. McNeill shows how this early, phenomenological work is also intensively concerned with the genealogical issue of descent, despite what might appear to be a metaphysical or transcendental concern with origins. By broaching this genealogical dimension of Heidegger’s phenomenology, McNeill’s paper does not merely reveal a common ground between Heidegger and Nietzsche, but demonstrates that the Heidegger of Being and Time was already decisively influenced by Nietzsche.
Ullrich Haase’s paper on history and life in Heidegger and Nietzsche provides a neat continuation of McNeill’s investigation of the Nietzschean legacy in *Being and Time* by choosing as its main textual foci what is now widely considered to be Heidegger’s second magnum opus, i.e., *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, and the first of the group of texts that continue its concerns, namely *Besinnung*. By concentrating on the issues of history and life, but also on a host of related issues, such as, importantly, justice, Haase is able to carry out a multi-faceted investigation of the Nietzschean elements of Heidegger’s works surrounding the famous Turn (*die Kehre*).

In my paper I discuss the nexus of issues surrounding Nietzsche’s key concept of physiology, arguably one of the richest and most complex notions in his thinking. In the first part the textual and thinkerly effects of the concept of physiology are being chiselled out to discover, not so much what Nietzsche means by it, but how it works in his texts. I then turn to an examination of the most important and sustained phenomenological work on the body, that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Here his late text "The Intertwining – The Chiasm" from *The Visible and the Invisible* is examined and its notion of flesh is placed alongside Nietzsche’s thoughts on the body and on physiology. One of the chief questions motivating this enquiry is whether it is Nietzsche or Merleau-Ponty who can be read to make a more radical and far-reaching contribution to our understanding of our "own" physicality.

In his essay on "Nietzsche in Derrida’s *Politics of Friendship*", David Farrell Krell first of all provides a brief but incisive analysis of the textual sources and key theses of each of the ten chapters of Derrida’s text. He then turns to a more nuanced consideration of the role or roles Nietzsche plays in *Politics of Friendship*. He subtly interweaves Nietzsche’s and Derrida’s with his own reflections on the challenges and difficulties, the aporias, of friendship between mortals (especially if they are of different genders), and thereby also draws out the implications of this for a genuine democracy, for a *politics* of friendship.

Finally, Jim Urpeth discusses some themes in what he terms the "philosophical biologies" of Nietzsche and Bergson that bear upon the articulation of a philosophical naturalism which offers a non-reductive account of the origin and nature of religion on the basis that the real is "religious" in essence. He reads both of them as advocates of the view that ultimately religion has a reality irreducible to and distinct from
anthropomorphic projection, psycho-physiological illness, ideological conflict, etc. Implicitly, an alternative is thereby proposed to the approaches and presuppositions of the "theological turn" in contemporary phenomenology.

What all these essays in their great variety demonstrate, then, is that both the thought of Nietzsche and that of phenomenology are essentially unfixable and unsubsumable to one organising principle, term, or word, and that they both, singly and in conjunction, continue to challenge readers to ever more incisive and, perchance, daring interpretations of their texts. Not for this reason alone readers will continue to feel that they have not done with these texts, which perpetually engage, provoke and productively confound us in equal measure.

Notes

1 In this respect I wholeheartedly agree with David Farrell Krell, who also takes his essay's point of departure from this insight or intuition.
5 LI 1, 168.
6 See Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", in Donald Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. New York: Cornell University Press, 1988, hereafter NGH. See also the papers by Sean Kirkland and William McNeill, which touch on this text.
7 NGH 142.
9 These points are being developed in greater detail especially in the papers by Jill Marsden and myself.
10 Needless to say, disagreement about the answers to these questions is precisely one of the factors by which practitioners of phenomenology can be distinguished.
See, for instance, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", as well as innumerable sections of *The Will to Power*.

Several of the papers either discuss this in some detail or at least touch upon it in passing, e.g., Marsden, Parkes, Rehberg, and Urpeth.


In Heidegger’s understanding of this relationality Dasein becomes "outstanding", "ecstatic", and "futural", cf. *BT*.

See, for instance, the opening pages of WL, *KSA* 1:875-7, or *Twilight of the Idols*.

In this regard too I agree with points made by Krell in the opening remarks of his essay.


David Allison (ed.), *The New Nietzsche – Contemporary Styles of Interpretation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986; David Farrell Krell and David Wood (eds.),

25 Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche,* 2 vols.. Pfullingen: Neske, 1961, hereafter *Nie,* 9. See also David Krell’s enormously illuminating Introductions, Notes, and Analyses to the four volumes in English of Heidegger’s *Nietzsche.*

26 *N* vol. 3, 185-251.

27 Here Deleuze’s understanding, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* of Nietzsche’s genealogy as a radicalisation of Kantian critique in general, and his path-breaking analyses of Nietzsche and Kant on the problem of paralogistic thinking in particular, could be mentioned.

28 The most obvious exponents of this conviction are, I would claim, Deleuze, Foucault, and Irigaray, albeit in markedly different ways.

29 Both in the case of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and of *Nietzsche and Metaphor,* twenty-one years, incredible to say.

30 Both are not just enormously influential writers on Nietzsche but of course also tremendously important readers of Heidegger and of the broader (post-) phenomenological movement. In addition, Krell edited and co-translated the four volumes of Heidegger’s *Nietzsche* into English. Sallis is the author of too many essays and books to mention here.
PART ONE:

THEMATIC APPROACHES
For Nietzsche, as for phenomenology, Platonism never ceases to be a provocation. Never, despite all the gestures in this direction, is Platonism made to settle into a well-defined form and thus brought under control; never, despite all the effort expended, is it consigned once and for all to a pre-ordained place in the history of thought in such a way as to guarantee that it will not return to haunt thinking in the very turn to another beginning. While expressing his deep mistrust of Plato, branding him as an aberration from the basic instincts of the Greeks, as pre-existently Christian, Nietzsche describes him, at the opposite extreme, as an artist who preferred appearance (Schein) to being. It is hardly otherwise with Heidegger: on the one hand, it is through Plato that, with the ascendancy of the idea, the older Greek sense of truth is lost, and yet, on the other hand, it is precisely the Republic that, in its concluding myth, is said to name in its essence the lethe of aletheia\(^1\).

Yet most often, for Nietzsche, Platonism assumes the guise of something to be overcome; as subsequently, for Heidegger too, Platonism, identified with metaphysics, is to be surpassed in and through the overcoming of metaphysics. For Nietzsche, in particular, this overcoming is to be an overturning, an inverting, of Platonism. This figure of inversion remains effective throughout the entire course of Nietzsche’s thought, from the time of The Birth of Tragedy up through his final creative year. It is already explicit in one of the sketches made as Nietzsche was preparing The Birth of Tragedy. In the sketch he writes, "My philosophy an inverted Platonism: the further removed from true being, the purer, the more beautiful, the better it is. Living in Schein as goal”\(^2\). There is perhaps no other passage that anticipates so perfectly and at such an early date the inversion that will come more and more to structure Nietzsche’s thought as a whole.
The terms of this inversion are first taken up thematically in the initial volume of *Human, All Too Human*, published in 1878. What in the early sketch was called "true being" is now designated as "the metaphysical world", this designation serving as the title of the aphorism addressed to this theme. Nietzsche begins with what has the appearance of a concession, "It is true, there could be a metaphysical world; the absolute possibility of it is hardly to be disputed". This possibility is, however, of the emptiest, most abstract sort, and Nietzsche characterizes it as "a purely scientific problem", one not likely to be much of a bother to anyone. But then, with a sudden injection of genealogy, Nietzsche completely recasts the problem; for what he declares to lie behind the belief in metaphysical assumptions, prompting this belief, begetting these assumptions, is passion, error, and self-deception. He concludes, "When one has disclosed these methods" – in effect, these non-methods – "as the foundation of all extant religions and metaphysical systems, one has refuted them!". Nietzsche grants that even after this refutation the empty possibility of a metaphysical world remains; and yet, he adds, "one can do absolutely nothing with it, not to speak of letting happiness, salvation, and life depend on the spiderwebs of such a possibility". Nothing could even be said of this world except that it is other, that it is inaccessible and incomprehensible. Even if, against all likelihood, the existence of such a world could somehow be demonstrated and if knowledge could be had of it, this knowledge would be utterly useless, even more useless than knowledge of the chemical composition of water would be to a sailor endangered by a storm at sea. Short of such a most unlikely demonstration, there is nothing to motivate positing such a metaphysical world as existing, granted that the passion and lies that otherwise supported it have been exposed as such.

In this aphorism a shift is detectable, a shift from the metaphysical world in general to the thing-in-itself specifically. Another aphorism, entitled "Appearance and Thing-in-itself", stages the problem dramatically. Philosophers are portrayed as stationing themselves before the so-called world of appearance as though it were a painting depicting a scene; their task is to interpret this scene so as to draw a conclusion about the nature of the thing-in-itself, which is regarded as the ground of this world. While some venture such conclusions, other philosophers contend that there is no connection, that from the world of appearance no conclusion can be drawn regarding the thing-in-itself. Against both parties, against both those who affirm and those who deny such a connection, Nietzsche poses another alternative: that the character of the world of appearances has, in its