

Rethinking Kant Volume 2

Rethinking Kant Volume 2

Edited by

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The goal of the series *Rethinking Kant* is to bear witness to the richness and vitality of Kantian studies in North America. The collection is unique in its kind, for it garners papers from a whole generation of Kantian thought, ranging from doctoral students and recent Ph.Ds, to up-and-coming young scholars, to some well-established and influential players in the field. This combination is designed to take the pulse of current Kantian scholarship in the U.S. and rethink its fundamentals.

The first volume was published in 2008. It contained papers presented at the meeting of the Eastern Study Group of the North American Kant Society a year earlier. Our second volume has broadened the scope. There are pieces from the 2007 meeting of the Pacific Study Group at UCLA, from the 2008 and 2009 meetings of the Eastern Study Group at the New School and Penn State University, respectively, and from the 2008 meeting of the Midwest Study Group at Purdue University. *Rethinking Kant* has thus become a truly national affair.

Special thanks are due to Patrick Kain and Peter Thielke, who generously allowed me to reach out to the participants at their meetings and encouraged them to join this project. Oliver Thorndike and Abraham Anderson read the introduction and made useful comments. Jay Bernstein and Jennifer Mensch were gracious hosts at the 2007 and 2008 Eastern Study Group meetings. Although I have been head of this group for a few years, the credit for the success of our conferences goes to the selection committee: Yvonne Unna (Seton Hall), Efraín Lazos (Universidad Autónoma de México), and Oliver Thorndike (Morgan State University / Peabody Institute of the Johns Hopkins University). They did the hard work of reading through numerous high quality submissions, and displayed judiciousness and wisdom in their choices.

Papers in this volume have not been previously published, with the exception of Ina Goy's, "Immanuel Kant on the Moral Feeling of Respect," which appeared in German in the *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 61, vol. 3 (2007): 337–60. Christof Rapp, the editor of the journal, has kindly agreed to its publication here, and Alberto Vanzo

converted the system of references in Goy's paper to make it consistent with our conventions.

Anyone familiar with the high selection standards of NAKS's conferences can vouch for the quality of these papers—a fact that has made the task of editing this second volume both pleasant and humbling for me.

—Pablo Muchnik

ABBREVIATIONS

All references to Kant's works are in accordance with the *Akademie-Edition* Vol. 1-29 of *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin/Leipzig, 1902-. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* follow the customary pagination of the first (A) and second (B) edition. Unless otherwise indicated, the English translations are from the *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Ca) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992-). The following abbreviations are used throughout the book:

- Ak *Immanuel Kants Schriften*. Ausgabe der Königlich Preussischen (Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1902–)
- BM *Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace* (1785), Ak 8
Determination of the Concept of a Human Race
- D *Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll* (1790), Ak 8
On a Discovery whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to Be Made Superfluous by an Older One
- DS *Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume* (1768), Ak 2
Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space
- DS-S *Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik* (1766), Ak 2
Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics
- G *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785), Ak 4
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
- I *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (1784), Ak 8
Idea toward a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim

- ID *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis* (1770), Ak 2
On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World
- KrV *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781, 1787). Cited by A/B pagination.
Critique of Pure Reason
- KpV *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788), Ak 5
Critique of Practical Reason
- KU *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), Ak 5
Critique of the Power of Judgment
- LF *Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte und Beurtheilung der Beweise, deren sich Herr von Leibniz und andere Mechaniker in dieser Streitsache bedient haben, nebst einigen vorhergehenden Betrachtungen, welche die Kraft der Körper überhaupt betreffen* (1747), Ak 1
Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces
- MA *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (1786), Ak 4
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
- MR *Neuer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe und der damit verknüpften Folgerungen in den ersten Gründen der Naturwissenschaft* (1758), Ak 2
New Theory of Motion and Rest, and the Connected Consequences in the First Principles of the Natural Sciences
- MS *Metaphysik der Sitten* (1797-1798), Ak 6
Metaphysics of Morals
- ND *Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio* (1755), Ak 1
A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition

- NM *Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen* (1763), Ak 2
Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy
- O *Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?* (1786), Ak 8
What does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?
- OBS *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen* (1764), Ak 2
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime
- P *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (1783), Ak 4
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
- PG *Physische Geographie*, Ak 9
Physical Geography
- PM *Metaphysicae cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam* (1756), Ak 1
The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry, of which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology
- PP *Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf* (1795), Ak 8
Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project
- R *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* (1793-1794), Ak 6
Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
- RL *Reflexionen Kants über Logik*, Ak 16
Kant's Reflections on Logic
- RM *Reflexionen Kants über Metaphysik*, Ak 17
Kant's Reflections on Metaphysics
- SF *Streit der Fakultäten* (1798), Ak 7
Conflict of the Faculties

- TH *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels oder Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebäudes, nach Newtonischen Grundsätzen abgehandelt* (1755), Ak 1
Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, or Essay on the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Entire Universe, Treated in Accordance with Newtonian Principles
- TP *Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis* (1793), Ak 8
On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory But It Is of No Use in Practice
- UTP *Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie* (1788), Ak 8
On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy
- VA *Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1798), Ak 7
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Standpoint

Vorlesungen über Anthropologie, Ak 25
Lectures on Anthropology
- VE *Vorlesungen über Ethik*, Ak 27
Lectures on Ethics
- VL *Vorlesungen über Logik*, Ak 9, 24
Lectures on Logic
- VM *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik*, Ak 28, 29
Lectures on Metaphysics
- VP *Pädagogik*, Ak 9
Lectures on Pedagogy
- VPG *Vorlesungen über Physische Geographie*, Ak 26
Lectures on Physical Geography
- VR *Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen* (1775), Ak 2
Of the Different Races of Human Beings

- VPE *Vorlesung philosophische Enzyklopädie*, Ak 29
Lectures on the Philosophical Encyclopaedia
- WA *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* (1784), Ak 8
An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?
- WP *Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolf's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?*
(written 1793-1794, published 1804), Ak 20
What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?

INTRODUCTION

PABLO MUCHNIK

I- Intuitions and Concepts

Few claims are so central to Kant's epistemology as the assertion: "Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (KrV A51/B75). There is a surfeit of negative phrases in this statement—a fact perhaps indicative of a larger philosophical strategy on Kant's part. For, Kant frequently determines his position in contraposition to the dominant views of his contemporaries. Against the rationalists, for example, Kant refused to intellectualize sensations, and against the empiricists, to sensualize concepts. These seemingly opposite philosophical schools, Kant realized, shared a fundamental assumption about the human mind: they conceived it as something unitary and homogeneous. This assumption motivated the belief, typical among the rationalists, that concepts could particularize themselves and relate directly to objects, as well as the contrary belief, typical among the empiricists, that intuitions could generalize themselves and subsume various objects under them. Kant's genius consisted in having challenged this unitary model of the mind and proposed an alternative model in which the mind was construed as something intrinsically heterogeneous, composed of two fundamentally different stems of knowledge.

Given the centrality of this doctrine, it is remarkable that Kant did not try to justify the presence of sensibility as a separate faculty in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Julia Krause undertakes this task in "The Doctrine of Subjective Space as a Precondition for the Distinction between Sensibility and Understanding." Krause argues that the distinction was motivated by a development in Kant's thought about space at some point between 1768 and 1770. The premise of her reconstruction is that, although Kant does not justify the distinction between the faculties in the first *Critique*, he does argue for a related claim, namely, that space and time are *a priori sensible* principles (KrV A22/B36):

This claim presents a possible motivation for the distinction between sensibility and understanding: If space and time are non-conceptual and a priori, then Kant is justified in assuming that we have a non-conceptual cognitive capacity. Restricting this thought to space, my hypothesis is that Kant came to view space as a non-conceptual and a priori element of cognition, and consequently introduced a non-conceptual stem of knowledge. Both characteristics of space are independent of each other, and both are necessary if the claim that we have sensibility is to follow: space has to be a priori in order to belong to our cognitive capacities, and it has to be non-conceptual in order to motivate the introduction of a non-conceptual stem of knowledge. (pp. 29-30)

Kant's first articulation of the a priori and non-conceptual character of space appears in the *Inaugural Dissertation* (1770). Krause, however, finds the seeds of this conception in an earlier, less studied text, *Directions in Space* (1768). During the two years separating these works, Krause argues, Kant grew increasingly dissatisfied with the Newtonian conception of absolute space. This was the result of his analysis of incongruous counterparts in *Directions*, i.e., three-dimensional bodies that are completely alike but do not fit onto each other (for example, the left and right hands). The example recurs in the *Dissertation*, but with an important difference: while the goal in 1768 was to vindicate the Newtonian conception, the argument of 1770 was to show that space is not a concept but an intuition. This suggests that Kant's change of perspective was due to the need of tackling an internal conflict within his earlier text. In *Directions*, Kant embraced the Newtonian view, because the Leibnizian position (that space is relational) was incapable of accounting for the difference between incongruous counterparts. Yet, he simultaneously held the view (more prominent in the *Dissertation*) that space was something we can grasp with the senses but not conceptually. This latter position, however, was at odds with Kant's Newtonian commitments: it is impossible to sense an empty substance (as absolute space was supposed to be). The gist of Krause's analysis, then, is that Kant experienced an impossible double bind in *Directions*, for he was forced to admit that space must be absolute, but could not be so. The attempt to overcome this contradiction led him to consider space as a priori and non-conceptual in the *Dissertation*. Such a stance dissolves the prior conflict: it allows Kant to affirm the priority of space over bodies while denying its reality as something independent of the mind. Thus, placing the origin of space within the mind, Kant provided a non-problematic understanding of space as independent of objects. This allowed him in turn to save what was attractive in the Newtonian position, but avoid the difficulties that accompanied it: "as a form of intuition, space

is still absolute with respect to objects and thus potentially empty—but not in the sense of a self-subsistent entity” (p. 44).

Alberto Vanzo’s “Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument” deals with another aspect of Kant’s distinction between cognitive sources, namely, the problem of the correspondence of our representations with the portion of reality they purport to represent. This problem is the backdrop of the Transcendental Deduction, but it is in the *Jäsche Logic* that the comparison argument finds its clearest formulation:

Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only *by cognizing it*. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgment on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. (L 9:50)

The problem, Vanzo argues, is that, according to the correspondence theory of truth, a truth-bearer p (what Kant here calls “cognition”) is true if and only if it corresponds (or it agrees) with a portion of reality—typically, the object(s), state(s) of affairs, or event(s) p is about. In order to know whether p agrees with that portion of reality, one must check if that portion of reality is as p states. However, this is impossible, because our epistemic access to reality is in the form of cognitions, whose agreement with reality is as much in need of justification as the agreement of p with reality. This is why Kant claims that all we can do is to judge whether “[our] cognition of the object agrees with [our] cognition of the object.” Such an agreement assures us that the cognition is *thinkable*, but proves nothing at all about its putative agreement with an object. The comparison argument then concludes that determining the agreement between truth-bearers and reality would require something impossible—something like trying “to step outside our skins.”¹ Once the correspondence theory of truth is admitted, we cannot know which truth-bearers are true.

In Vanzo’s interpretation, Kant, after 1781, drew an anti-realist lesson from this argument.² The problem in comparing truth-bearers with reality

¹ See Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. xix.

² There is no agreement among Kant scholars on this point. Some argue that Kant drew an anti-correspondentist lesson from the comparison argument (e.g.,

arises only if that portion of reality is mind-independent. But if that portion of reality is, in some sense, constructed by us, we are not required to undertake the impossible task of getting outside our skins, for we have immediate cognitive access to it and hence can discriminate between true and false judgments. The skeptical import of the comparison argument hangs then on the presupposition of transcendental *realism*, which identifies objects of cognition with things in themselves. Transcendental *idealism*, by contrast, allows Kant to hold three fundamental claims: that the objects with which true cognitions correspond are mind-dependent, phenomenal objects; that we have an immediate, non-inferential knowledge of phenomenal objects; and that we have a criterion to confirm or disprove the truth of our cognitions of phenomenal objects.

Of all the transcendental rules of knowledge, the causal law is arguably the most important in Kant's system. Its centrality is the result of Kant's engagement with the philosophy of David Hume. As Kant famously put it in the *Prolegomena*, "the remembrance/objection (*Erinnerung*) of David Hume was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my researches in the field of speculative philosophy" (P 4:260).³ In Kant's narrative of philosophical maturation, transcendental idealism resulted from generalizing Hume's questioning of the rational origin of the concept of cause. Through this generalization, Kant discovered "that the concept of the connection of cause and effect is far from being the only concept through which the understanding thinks connections of things a priori; rather, metaphysics consists wholly of such concepts" (*ibid.*). Thus, in order to put metaphysics on the secure path of science, Kant realized that he needed "to ascertain the number [of these concepts]...from a single principle [and proceed] to [their] deduction" (*ibid.*).

This is a well-known tale. In "The Objection of David Hume" Abraham Anderson sets himself to revise the main lines of the story. He

Melchior Palágyi, Ernst Cassirer, Gerold Prauss, etc.), while others deny that conclusion (e.g., Ernst Henke, James Van Cleve, Jonathan Waskan, etc.). For a more comprehensive list of sources, see notes 8 and 9 in Vanzo's paper (p. 57).

³ Although "Erinnerung" in modern German simply means "memory," in the eighteenth century it had the alternative meanings of "reminder," "observation," and "objection." In this latter sense, the "Erinnerung des David Hume" could be interpreted as identical with Hume's "question," "problem", "doubt", and "attack," to which Kant refers in the Preface and later in the *Prolegomena*. Abraham Anderson follows the lead of Manfred Kuehn, Lewis White Beck, and Lothar Kreimendahl in making this connection.

takes issue with the dominant interpretation, associated with Vaihinger and Kemp Smith, according to which Kant was woken from dogmatism by Hume's questioning in the *Treatise* of the principle "every event has a cause." This questioning, it is assumed, made Kant sensitive to the problem of synthetic a priori judgments. Such interpretation, however, does not hold water. Anderson notes two main objections against it. (1) Kant's own description of his awakening is at odds with the dominant account. "The question was not," Kant says, "whether the concept of cause is right, useful, and, with respect to all cognition of nature, indispensable, for this Hume had never put in doubt; it was rather whether it is thought through reason a priori, and in this way has an inner truth independent of all experience, and therefore also a much more widely extended use which is not limited merely to objects of experience" (P 4:258-9). (2) Kant (it is generally agreed) did not read English, and the *Treatise* was not translated into German until after the publication of the first *Critique*.

Following Gary Hatfield, Anderson tries a new strategy: he suggests we turn from the *Treatise* to the *Enquiry*.⁴ This move avoids the chronological problem altogether: a translation of the *Enquiry* (originally published in 1748) appeared in 1755 and Kant had most probably read it by the 1760s. More importantly, it recommends a shift of philosophical attention: the target of Hume's scathing arguments in the *Enquiry* is not the principle of causality as such, but its metaphysical progenitor, i.e., the principle of sufficient reason. Rationalist philosophers traditionally wielded this principle to acquire knowledge through concepts of objects beyond experience, and this was at the heart of what Kant calls "dogmatism." According to this interpretation, what is at stake in Kant's awakening is not that Hume challenged the foundations of empirical knowledge, but that he put into question the "causal relation as a bridge to an intelligible world."⁵

This reading evokes Susan Neiman's interpretation of what drives the development of modern philosophy.⁶ Against those who try to confine Kant's project to narrow epistemological concerns, Neiman argues that it should be interpreted as a response to the existential threat evil posits to

⁴ See Gary Hatfield, "The *Prolegomena* and the *Critiques of Pure Reason*," in *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung, Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Band 1, Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Ralph Schumacher (eds.) (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 2001), pp. 187 ff.

⁵ This is Hatfield's language. Cf. Hatfield, "The *Prolegomena* and the *Critiques*," p. 187.

⁶ Susan Neiman, *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

the nexus of intelligibility of the world. “The claim that Hume woke Kant by challenging the principle of sufficient reason,” Anderson points out, “acquires further significance in relation to this thesis, for the principle of sufficient reason was the means by which Leibniz answered the problem of evil, and the rejection of the dogmatic validity of the principle of sufficient reason is also a rejection of dogmatic theodicy” (p. 85). If what woke Kant from his dogmatic slumber was Hume’s challenge to the principle of sufficient reason, the problem of theodicy becomes more central to the concerns of both thinkers than is usually assumed. Seen in this light, the importance of Hume lies in the fact that he compelled Kant to do theodicy by other means. Thanks to Hume, Kant came to accept that the intelligibility of the world could not be grounded, as the rationalist had fancied, in the metaphysical use of the principle of sufficient reason. One could vindicate knowledge by confining reason to experience, and save morality by turning the unsatisfied drive to cognize the unconditioned to a strictly practical use.

II- Morality and Respect

This diversion of the interests of reason is central to Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy. As Korsgaard puts it:

practical reason shares the “fate” of theoretical reason insofar as it, too, is driven to “seek the unconditioned.” In an important sense, however, the fate of practical reason is different from that of theoretical reason; this is one of the most central tenets of Kant’s philosophy. Theoretical reason, in its quest for the unconditioned, produces antinomies; in the end, the kind of unconditional explanation that would fully satisfy reason is unavailable. Practical reason in its quest for justification is subject to no such limitation. This is part of Kant’s doctrine of the primacy of practical reason.⁷

The difference between the fates of theoretical and practical reason is due, in part, to the fact that the theoretical attempt to cognize a “first cause” leads to antinomies, while practical reason can not only cognize the unconditioned condition of value (the good will), but also show the value of other values on its basis. In part, the difference in fate also depends on the fact that, while theoretical reason can only *think* the unconditioned,

⁷Christine Korsgaard, “Kant’s Formula of Humanity,” in *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 119.

practical reason can *realize* it.⁸

These two features of practical reason undergird Kant's theory of value and obligation. The most famous recent attempt to connect them is Korsgaard's "regress argument":

what makes the object of your rational choice good is that it *is* the object of a rational choice...[Kant's] idea is that rational choice has what I will call a value-conferring status...We act as if our own choice were a sufficient condition of the goodness of its object...If you view yourself as having a value-conferring status in virtue of your power of rational choice, you must view anyone who has the power of rational choice as having, in virtue of that power, a value-conferring status...Thus, regressing upon the conditions, we find that the unconditioned condition of the goodness of anything is rational nature, or the power of rational choice. To play this role, however, rational nature must itself be something of unconditional value—an end in itself. This means, however, that you must treat rational nature wherever you find it (in your own person or in that of another) as an end. This in turn means that no choice is rational which violates the status of rational nature as an end: rational nature becomes a limiting condition (G437-38) of the rationality of choice and action. It is an unconditional end, so you can never act against it without contradiction.⁹

Crucial to this argument are Korsgaard's claims that rational willing is the *only* unconditional value, and that rationality confers *all* value. Together they buttress a constructivist reading of Kant. In "Mimicking Korsgaard," Jon Garthoff challenges such a reading. According to Garthoff, "[t]he good will is not plausibly understood as the source of the value of *human* well-being; and while rationality is both *a* source of value and *a* source of moral requirements, it is not the *only* source of value and it is not the source of *all* value" (pp. 132, my emphasis). Garthoff reaches these conclusions by examining a difficulty in Korsgaard's reconstruction, namely, that it appears to conflate the value of humanity and the value of the good will. These notions play very different roles in Kantian ethics: humanity refers to the mere capacity for rational choice, the good will to the full-

⁸ This happens when pure reason becomes practical: when the will acts out of duty (independently of empirical determination and according to a law it gives to itself), reason proves the reality of "its concepts by what it does (*durch die Tat*)" (KpV 5:3)

⁹ Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*, pp. 122-123. Garthoff quotes extensively from Korsgaard's work to present variants of this argument (see pp. 127 ff.).

blown exercise of that capacity (i.e., morality).¹⁰ Korsgaard's elision, Garthoff believes, is not accidental. It is motivated by the fact that the regress argument is modeled upon the traditional cosmological arguments for the existence of God. "These arguments posit a constraint on a complete explanation of causation—traditionally known as the principle of sufficient reason—and seek to show that this constraint is satisfied only on the supposition that God exists" (p. 131). When the same argumentative strategy is used in the context of Kant's ethics, it generates anti-skeptical expectations.

The trouble, for Garthoff, is that such expectations cannot be met. He construes a dilemma to show it: "if we understand 'humanity' as necessarily coextensive with 'good will,' then the formula of humanity fails to vindicate the claim that persons who lack a good will are worthy of respect" (p. 135). Kant could not possibly accept this conclusion: his formula is meant to protect *all* rational beings, no matter their moral disposition. Yet, if we were to embrace the other horn, the result is equally unacceptable. To consider humanity as unconditionally good would contradict "Kant's claim that only a good will is good without qualification...[and] it is obvious that humanity can be used for bad aims" (p. 136). Awareness of this fact, Garthoff argues, leads Korsgaard to "invoke something other than the exercise of humanity itself to explain the difference between the value of permissible ends and the disvalue of impermissible ends" (pp. 136-137). But this invocation flies against the strictures of a cosmological type of argument: it is equivalent to postulating a *second* first cause to account for why the first one did not produce all the expected effects.

In the face of these difficulties, Garthoff proposes to scale down the ambitions of Korsgaard's regress argument. This strategy is meant to justify a realist reading of Kant. Garthoff's goal is to extricate the compelling structure of Korsgaard's argument from the constructivism it upholds. To this end, he formulates an "analogue" of the argument, coined in terms neutral between constructivism and realism. This analogue serves to substantiate two essential claims of Kant's moral theory: that the exercise of rational capacities helps sustain the *final* value of aims, and that we are obligated to respect humanity. The first is justified because, although there are choice-worthy aims independent of our rationality, these aims grossly underdetermine what we should do. It is the agent's rational adoption that makes those aims sufficiently action-guiding. The second is justified because, when one person fails to respect another, she at

¹⁰ For Kant's most systematic distinction between these notions, see R 6: 27n.

once values rational capacities in herself and fails to value them in others—and such exception-making is for Kant the mark of all wrongdoing.

What drives Garthoff's criticism of Korsgaard, I believe, is a fundamental disagreement about how far the power of reason can reach. Garthoff contends that rational capacities do not generate values *ex-nihilo*, for the choice-worthiness of aims is what first makes them *good* candidates for choice. For Korsgaard, on the other hand, reason goes all the way down: constructivism endorses the Kantian credo that "the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law (for which, as it would seem, this concept would have to be made the basis) but only...after and by means of it" (KpV 5:63). Reason has a value-conferring status, and the value of all our aims derives from it. For Garthoff, instead, we encounter choice-worthy aims and reason invests them with final value *when* we adopt them. Thus, Garthoff's realism contains a moment of receptivity in practical reason reminiscent of the role of intuitions in Kant's epistemology. Such receptivity, Korsgaard would protest, overlooks practical reason's capacity to *realize* the unconditioned. Yet, it has the advantage of expanding the scope of the moral community: "disconnect[ing] the value of rational capacities from the value of a good will...opens the door for the straightforward attribution of moral standing to beings that lack the capacity for a good will, such as infants and intelligent animals" (p. 152).

No matter how we decide to settle the question about the power and scope of practical reason, it is clear that moral experience contains an ineliminable *aesthetic* dimension. This is the topic of Ina Goy's paper, "Immanuel Kant on the moral feeling of respect." Goy's goal is to discard a tired shibboleth: the claim that Kant's ethics is grounded *solely* on pure practical reason. For Goy, this claim is an exegetical oversimplification and a misrepresentation. The fact that Kant's practical philosophy revolves around rational concepts (e.g., freedom, autonomy, duty) does not mean that Kant did not develop an *equally* important theory of moral feeling. "The moral feeling of respect belongs to the a priori elements of the foundation of morals no less than the practical law itself...[I]t cannot be replaced by the moral command of reason because it makes a separate, purely sensible contribution to the morality of an action. But, conversely, it alone is not sufficient to establish the morality of an action" (p. 156).

The aprioritization of moral feelings, Goy explains, is "partly a development, partly a radical reinterpretation of the British Moralists' theory of moral sense" (p. 159). Kant's influential predecessors (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume) share a fundamental assumption:

they all “tend[ed] to give an empirical interpretation of the moral feeling” (p. 160). In the early 1760s, and as a result of his engagement with this tradition, Kant added a “material principle” (an “unanalysable feeling of the good” (DS 2:299-300) to the formal principle of perfection that henceforth dominated his ethics. However, Goy recounts, Kant grew increasingly dissatisfied with the empirical interpretation of this feeling. By the middle of the decade he turned away from it, and in the *Inaugural Dissertation* (1770) he finally identified morality with *pure* philosophy, excluding any material or psychological element from its foundation.

The transition to critical ethics, formulated some fifteen years later in the *Groundwork*, combines the lessons gathered throughout this pre-critical period. Kant’s mature conception, Goy argues, “includes a twofold insight: 1. In addition to the formal principle of morals, feeling plays a decisive role in moral philosophy. 2. If feeling is to take part in the foundation of morals, then it cannot be empirical but must be interpreted as an *a priori* pure feeling” (p. 161). Insofar as it is a *a priori*, moral feeling is different from all empirical feelings. While these are subjectively contingent and varied, “respect is singular and uniform. It appears in the same way in all subjects and therefore has more than mere subjective validity. It represents an objective value (the idea of morality) and thus has the same power of moral justification for every acting person” (p. 162). Furthermore, unlike causally determined desires, respect is self-wrought by human reason. As an effect on the subject’s sensibility, it contains a sequence of pain and pleasure determined *a priori*. This distinguishes it from both the effect of empirical objects, which is *a posteriori*, and the mere exercise of our rational capacities, which belongs to the spontaneity of the mind. In making a case for an *a priori feeling*, Kant manages to preserve the kernel of truth in the competing moral views of his predecessors (very much as he did in his epistemology).

According to Goy, if nothing else, her interpretation provides the first systematic outline of the function of respect in the Kantian corpus. She detects three main functions. In the *Groundwork* (1785), respect has above all an *evaluative* function: moral feeling assures that all people are susceptible to an awareness of the moral character of an action and hence are able to recognize its moral worth. Thus, respect is not simply an indicator, but more importantly, a warrantor, of the universal validity of moral values. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), respect has a primarily *causal* function: it serves as an indispensable incentive for moral action. Kant resorts to the moral feeling to explain “how the objective command of reason can become the subjective basis for determining action and therefore can be the cause of an action in an individual subject”

(p. 166). Finally, in the Doctrine of Method of the second *Critique* and the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793), the role of respect is chiefly *educational*: it sustains the hope that, over time, agents can acquire a moral character and hence make teleological progress in history.

III– The Clash of Narratives

There is a tension lurking in the *educational* function of respect: Kant’s commitment to transcendental freedom seems to preclude the idea of *gradual* moral progress. In “Devils with Understanding: Tensions in Kant’s Idea of Society,” Efraim Lazos traces the roots of this tension back to the heart of Kant’s political philosophy. He detects two faultlines there. On the one hand, Kant is interested in solving the problem of “how to conciliate the greatest degree of individual freedom with the greatest degree of social order” (p. 182). Yet, he is of two minds regarding the solution: he argues sometimes for the independence of the political with respect to the moral, sometimes he defends the contrary thesis and embraces the primacy of the moral over the political. The first view commits Kant to claim that the “rational social order does not require agents to be morally good to act from duty...[It] has in its favor the healthy notion that moral questions, which concern each agent’s conscience, do not fall within the scope of political authority” (p. 183). The second view is more ambitious: it commits Kant to claim that the genesis and stability of the social order requires more than prudential calculation from its members. Unless cooperation is embraced as a duty and upheld for its own sake, human beings will remain in an ethical state of nature.

In addition to this duality, Lazos detects a second conceptual faultline. In texts like *Perpetual Peace*, for instance, Kant embraces a teleological type of narrative, which “takes the history of the human species–human events, considered ‘on the large scale’–as a plan of nature whose purpose is to establish a special kind of human concord...in a perfect civil constitution that guarantees free and egalitarian relations among individuals and peoples” (p. 183). At first glance, this narrative converges with a different, transcendental type of narrative, characteristic of texts like *Theory and Practice*. Here, however, Kant projects to the political sphere a fundamental principle of his critical philosophy: “a mere aggregate of elements does not of itself constitute a relevant unity” (p. 183). The social pact is construed as an “unconditioned and first duty,” essentially different from the calculus of interests that underwrites other compacts (TP 8:289). The problem is that each narrative style rests on a

different conception of agency. When we consider, within the transcendental account, what ought to be in place for agents to enter into a civil condition, Kant refers to notions such as a “good will” and a “final end.” These are unmistakable moral capacities, and they are in sharp contrast with the prudential requirements of the teleological narrative, according to which “even a people of devils” could solve the problem of setting up a state (PP 8:366).

The result of Lazos’ interpretation is that Kant’s duality with respect to politics and morality (the first faultline) is reproduced at the level of conflicting conceptions of agency and narrative styles (the second faultline). These tensions, Lazos claims, can only be resolved by locating “the transcendental narrative at the center of Kant’s idea of society” (p. 184). This is because the mechanism of unsocial sociability, which is the driving force of historical progress in the teleological narrative, “is always one step short of what is required in order to agree to an original contract and thus head towards perpetual peace” (p. 195). To enter into a pact for its own sake, agents need to draw on pure practical reason. Prudential considerations can at most prepare the ground: “from the angle of teleology... a pact for its own sake is a *salto mortale* that nature cannot make” (p. 198). The leap requires autonomy and self-legislation—precisely the moral capacities linked to the transcendental narrative. Unlike those who advocate the autonomy of the political, Lazos believes that Kant must embrace the thesis about the primacy of morality (along with its transcendental narrative and a priori apparatus), if he is going to be consistent.

In “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Peace,” Sharon Anderson-Gold focuses on a neglected aspect of Kant’s gradualist account of moral progress: the role of “cosmopolitan right” (*Weltbürgerrecht, ius cosmopolitanicum*). This right belongs to individuals and states as citizens of the world. It represents the capstone of a comprehensive system of law, which includes the civil rights of individuals as citizens of a state and the international right of nations, and is required as a precondition to eradicate war in the “Third Definite Article” of *Perpetual Peace*. Opposing those who dismiss cosmopolitan right “as a minor principle at odds with Kant’s presumed strong statism” (p. 206), the goal of Anderson-Gold’s essay is to justify Kant’s claim that cosmopolitan right is the *only condition* under which “we can flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace” (PP 8:360). The strong correlation between peace and cosmopolitanism, she argues, rests on the fact that “cosmopolitan right is essential to the rightful character of the Kantian federation and the principle that regulates,

through a process of historical development, approximation to the ideal of a republic of republics” (p. 206).

To understand why the Kantian system of law forms an interconnected whole, Anderson-Gold turns to the *Metaphysics of Morals*. Here Kant argues that, while civil right is necessary to end the state of nature and secure the individual’s external freedom, international right is necessary to regulate the relations between states. The contribution of cosmopolitan right is to cover interactions not only within and between states, but also between states and foreign individuals. This function presupposes “a fundamental right to attempt association that belongs to the individual as an individual and does not end with the establishment of the individual’s national identity” (p. 207). Such a right represents a limiting condition for the other two legal spheres: both national and international laws must comply with the basic rights of individuals and communities to constitute a “we” *beyond* political citizenship.

To be effective, however, the right of cosmopolitan association requires a peaceful context, and hence a federative league of states. Although initially instituted for defensive purposes, Kant believes that the federation of states spearheads a true cosmopolitan condition. Anderson-Gold interprets the three Definite Articles of *Perpetual Peace* as providing the transcendental conditions for the possibility of achieving this goal. According to Kant, lasting peace requires: (i) that the constitution of each state be republican, (ii) that states belong to a federation of free nations (and hence renounce war but preserve their sovereignty), and (iii) that they all respect the conditions of universal hospitality. “The right of hospitality,” Anderson-Gold explains, “generates the duty to respect the right not to be treated with hostility [and hence] establishes a baseline for toleration, respect, and decent treatment in mutual interactions” (p. 213). Under this principle, “[t]he peoples of the earth have...entered in varying degrees into a universal community...developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere” (PP 8:360).

Two main consequences follow from Anderson-Gold’s analysis. First, cosmopolitan right leads to a reevaluation of the role of the state in Kant’s teleological narrative. “Kant did not believe that republicanism alone would be sufficient to achieve lasting peace. Rather, lasting peace would require ‘the development of a consistent body of law above the state’ that would require all states to treat all individuals with respect and would

guarantee the basic rights of individuals everywhere” (p. 214).¹¹ Second, cosmopolitan right raises a healthy doubt about the ideology of exporting republicanism, so prevalent among contemporary peace theorists. “[G]iven the tendency of republicans to overstate their own ‘piety’ while engaging in international misconduct, the only effective guarantee that a particular state is republican in the true sense ‘is to be traced to its recognition of and respect for cosmopolitan rights both at home and abroad’” (p. 214).¹² This suggests that one should revise the importance of Kant’s “First Definite Article”: there is no conclusive evidence to exclude from the federative league of nations “non-republican governments that are willing to accept the principle of cosmopolitan right and afford basic human rights to their citizens” (p. 214).

Such a revision rests on what we might call the thesis of the *primacy of cosmopolitanism*. This thesis adds a layer of complexity to the cluster of tensions discussed in Lazos’ essay. Since the same antagonism that drives individuals to form societies resurfaces, in the form of war, at the level of international relations, the primacy of cosmopolitanism is the logical conclusion of Kant’s teleological narrative. The calculation that recommends joining a federation of states faces the same problem that stymied the development of civil rights: without a master to ensure its proper function, the federation itself would always be on the brink of disintegration (I 8:23-24). The third Definite Article of *Perpetual Peace* is designed to overcome this hurdle, for it generates the conditions for the masterless dominion of a system of law. Yet, adherence to this system presupposes the presence of moral capacities whose genesis cannot be trusted to the dynamics of unsociable sociability. The same conflict of narratives reemerges at the level of cosmopolitan relations—and, once again, Kant is forced to embrace the primacy of morality at the expense of his teleological narrative.

In “The Moral Import of the *Critique of Judgment*,” Kristi Sweet proposes a way to extricate Kant from this predicament: the solution lies in reflective judgment, the faculty meant to bridge the “incalculable gulf” separating freedom and nature. As Kant puts it:

Now although there is an incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of

¹¹ Here Anderson-Gold is quoting from D. Archibug, “Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law, and Peace”, in *Kant’s Perpetual Peace: New Interpretative Essays*, Luigi Caranti (ed.) (Roma: Luiss University Press, 2006), p. 97.

¹² Again, from D. Archibug, *Op. Cit.*, p. 129.

freedom, as the supersensible, so that from the former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason) no transition is possible, just as if there were so many different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second: yet the latter [freedom] **should** have an influence on the former, namely the concept of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible; and nature must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that are to be realized in it in accordance with the laws of freedom. (KU 5:176)

The task of the third *Critique*, Sweet argues, is to account for the possibility of realizing the demands of moral goodness in the order of nature. This demand led Kant to revisit the mechanistic picture dominant in the first *Critique* and propose a new, purposive view, in which nature appears to be “at least in agreement” with the ends freedom sets for us. For Sweet, the gulf between these different domains can be bridged “insofar as the principle of the purposiveness of nature that Kant develops in the third *Critique* is employed in a radically new and important way; namely, that *the structure of the reflective judgments in which the principle of purposiveness is employed is such that the judgment arises not from a need of reason (either theoretical or practical), but rather is occasioned by and dependent upon our “experience” of nature itself*” (p. 224). So interpreted, the contribution of the third *Critique* to Kant’s practical philosophy resides in the type of evidence it provides about what nature is *for us*.

To appreciate the originality of Kant’s position in the third *Critique*, Sweet contrasts it with the one that gives rise to the doctrine of the highest good. This doctrine stems from the dialectical nature of human reason, which “demands that the totality of our ends [have] the form of an unconditioned whole, wherein our conditioned ends stand in a causal relation to our unconditioned ends” (p. 226-227). Thus, Kant is confronted with the predicament of how to integrate, in synthetic fashion, the radically heterogeneous goals of virtue and happiness, which respond to different sets of laws (moral and natural). Given the strictures of the critical system, the combination seems *prima facie* impossible. To resolve the impasse, Kant introduces the postulates of immortality and God’s existence: if we are granted the possibility of endless moral progress, we can attain virtue; if a moral creator exists, the union between virtue and happiness is possible.

Although the highest good leads Kant to rethink nature “as purposive, as having a causality in accordance with ends” (p. 230), Sweet argues that the postulates cannot work as Kant intended. They suffer from a serious

imbalance, particularly evident in the case of God: “*as the moral author of nature [this postulate] does not relate or have reference to nature itself, to anything given in a representation; it has only a practical reference*” (p. 231). As Sweet sees it, the problem is that nature is lost from view in the postulates—it is completely eclipsed by the needs of reason. Thus, Kant’s “rethinking of nature *remains merely ideal*, and squarely in the domain of the concepts of freedom; as such it bears no relation to nature itself” (p. 231).

By contrast, the third *Critique* avoids such one-sidedness. Reflective judgments arise when the particular is given and the universal needs to be found (KU 5:180). Unlike determining judgments, which follow an already existing rule, reflective judgments “emerge precisely when there is no concept or universal rule” (p. 233). They produce no knowledge, and therein resides their service: in reflection, judgments are free to resort to the principle of purposiveness in order to make sense of the object given in empirical representation. Thus, we come to know that nature is *not* sheer mechanism. As opposed to the postulate of God’s existence, this negative knowledge is occasioned by a *sensible* encounter—an encounter that sheds the ideality of the doctrine of the highest good in favor of a *real* mediation between nature and freedom.

IV– Beauty and the Search for Completion

In “Kant on the Universal Communicability of Judgments of Beauty,” Bart Vandenabeele analyzes one of the most perplexing features of pure judgments of taste: in spite of their strictly subjective ground, these judgments make a claim to universal validity. To deal with this question, Vandenabeele develops a type of methodological holism: we need to consider the four moments in the *Analytic of the Beautiful* “as a common web of interrelated constraints [which] are necessary to assess whether or not one’s judgment is in fact a pure judgment of taste” (p. 255).

Vandenabeele focuses primarily on the moments of quantity (universal validity) and modality (exemplary necessity). For Kant, when we encounter a beautiful object, we cannot help judging that the feeling of pleasure we experience *ought* to be shared by others. Our judgment makes a demand on everyone else’s assent; yet, such a demand cannot possibly be based on concepts or proofs (KU 5:231). “I have to *feel* the pleasure or (displeasure) *myself*, and won’t be convinced by someone else’s judgment... That which has pleased others can never serve as a ground for an aesthetic judgment: the reference to my own pleasure or displeasure is ineliminable” (p. 241). Although this reference is also present in judgments of secondary qualities