Anthropological Fieldwork
Anthropological Fieldwork:
A Relational Process

Edited by

Dimitrina Spencer and James Davies
We devote this volume to our much loved colleague - the late Galina Lindquist
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... ix

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1
Emotional Labour and Relational Observation in Anthropological Fieldwork
Dimitrina Spencer

Chapter One .................................................................................................................... 48
Emotional Apprenticeships: Reflection on the Role of Academic Practice in the Construction of “the Field”
Celayne Heaton Shreshta

Chapter Two ................................................................................................................... 75
In “The Field”: Intersubjectivity, Empathy and the Workings of Internalised Presence
Maruška Svašek

Chapter Three ................................................................................................................. 100
Emotional Interpretation and the “Acting” Ethnographer: An Ethical Dilemma?
John Curran

Chapter Four .................................................................................................................. 119
Assessing the Relevance and Effects of “Key Emotional Episodes” for the Fieldwork Process
Peter Berger

Chapter Five .................................................................................................................... 144
Emotions In and Out of a Meditation Retreat
Shuenn-Der Yu

Chapter Six ..................................................................................................................... 172
Mixed Emotions about Barbie’s Nose: Narratives Against Despair
Marjorie Mitchell
| Chapter Seven | "Being a Hostage to the Other:" Levinas’s Ethical Epistemology and Dysphoric Fieldwork Experiences | 195 |
| Chapter Eight | Emotions, Interpretation and the Psychoanalytic Countertransference | 204 |
| Conclusion | Subjectivity in the Field: A History of Neglect | 229 |
| Contributors | | 244 |
| Index | | 247 |
We are indebted to many individuals who supported us in the preparation of this volume. We thank Professor David Parkin for all his inspiration, wisdom and backing of the project as a whole. We also thank Professor Marcus Banks, Professor Michael Jackson, Professor Vincent Crapanzano, Dr Francine Lorimer, and Professor Tanya Luhrmann for their intellectual and moral support. We are also grateful to Professor David Gellner, Professor Harvey Whitehouse, Professor Del Lowenthal, Professor Roland Littlewood, Dr Jenny Hammond, Dr Celia Kerslake, Sarah Bryson, Dr Stephen Clarke, Dr Elizabeth Ewart, Joanna Cook and Professor Elizabeth Tonkin. We also thank all those involved in the early meetings at the University of Oxford and at the seminar held at Harvard University.

We thank Carol Koulikourdi, Amanda Millar, Soucin Yip-Sou and Nick James for helping tremendously with the production of this volume. We are indebted to Creative Advisors (Sofia, Bulgaria) for designing the excellent cover of this volume.

We also thank the British Academy, The Institute for Social and Cultural Anthropology (University of Oxford), the Centre for Therapeutic Education (Roehampton University), and the Oxford University Anthropological Society for their financial support and institutional backing.
INTRODUCTION

EMOTIONAL LABOUR AND RELATIONAL OBSERVATION IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELDWORK

DIMITRINA SPENCER

The Truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is, in fact, an event, a process.
—William James (1978:97)

Introduction

Despite various transformations, fieldwork remains at the heart of anthropological research and continues to be “the rite of passage” for aspiring anthropologists. Indeed, immersion in “the field” and gaining knowledge through experience and interaction continue to be the predominant methods of anthropologists. What this immersion entails and how it becomes transformed into knowledge has been a central topic in anthropology since its inception. The way we think about anthropology has undergone a series of intellectual leaps through the years, yet key intricacies of anthropological fieldwork experience remain to be uncovered in order to demonstrate anthropology’s potential, strengths and rigour.

Our individual trajectories in making sense of fieldwork experience sometimes mirror those of our discipline. It is not unusual to encounter young anthropologists who arrive at their first fieldwork site under the spell of romanticism, scientific idealism and the promises of “traditional empiricism,” (which, despite abundant critique, continue to find ways into our work) only to uncover both personal and professional challenges in becoming a participant observer. Some of the usual difficulties surrounding the reflection upon lived experiences during fieldwork, have pointed to the
need for transmitting the craft of fieldwork methodology through training where the main use of method is not only meant to alleviate anxiety (see Devereux 1967, Jackson 2010) but to reveal the depths and meanings of life as well as the authority of our discipline. How many of us have got to grips with, say, phenomenology² or psychoanalysis³ which might offer some useful tools for understanding fieldwork experience, before going to do fieldwork, say, on transnationalism or community development? Our volume documents and discusses a range of experiences of fieldwork, in particular, emotional ones, as well as common challenges in making sense of these experiences both personally and academically. In this way, we highlight the values - academic, moral, ethical, political and humanistic – inherent in sharing and discussing our research process. We argue that emotional reflexivity should be an important part of our methodological palette – it allows us to gain deeper understanding of our involvement in the field. Anthropologists are affected by and affect others through emotional engagement; they “manage” emotions or allow them to unfold as vehicles of understanding. The contributors to this volume show that participant observation is an embodied relational process mediated by emotions,⁴ some of which could be described as a relational observation or relational reflection. Emotions could be ways of knowing and they form the living flesh of relating in the field - through acting upon or living our emotions, we affect our relationships, the ways we know and what we know.

The contributors to this volume are mostly young scholars who have completed their first fieldwork only recently and who initially met at the conference Emotions in the Field: the Psychology and Anthropology of Fieldwork Experience in September 2006 at the University of Oxford in the UK.⁵ The conference call for papers addressed the following themes, also reflected in this volume:

Emotions in the field are often buried in individual memories and personal diaries, in confidential accounts to friends and family, colleagues and students. And yet, despite ‘scientific’ efforts to exclude, tame, or redress our own feelings and personalities, subjectivity leaves its mark upon all facets of research: from the topics we select and the methods we employ, to the tone and hidden messages of our ethnographies.
- How do our emotional experiences, attachments and detachments, affect anthropologists as both persons and researchers?
- How do we cope with them, integrate them, and employ them as methods for deeper understanding?
- How do emotions influence our participant observation, and our wider interpretive and explanatory enterprise?
How do we reconcile the emotional and the subjective with our scientific goals, and what are the consequences of such integrations for anthropology?
Are all of the above issues relevant to the training of anthropologists?

The chapters in this volume engage with these questions and provide valuable insights. We portray the uneven trajectory of knowing and bear witness to the forces affecting the anthropologists and their fieldwork relations. These vivid autobiographical accounts show the challenges and opportunities for young anthropologists who are searching for ways to think and talk about fieldwork, and the methodological lessons that follow. We also show some individual or professional limits to knowing through reflection upon emotional experience. Each chapter documents important stages in the professional and personal trajectory of the writer and these trajectories contain, like a fractal, the strengths, needs and weaknesses of our discipline as a whole. By describing individual shifts between methodological approaches and aspirations, we partake in discussion about the opportunities to shift from positivist beliefs and practices to prioritising practical knowledge and lived immediacy, and accepting vulnerabilities in knowing through fieldwork experience (cf. Jackson 1989, 1998; Behar 1996). We bring into focus the anthropologists themselves and their experiences of fieldwork.

Here, in this first section of the Introduction, I briefly remind the reader of some episodes in the long history of the demystification of fieldwork experience before I discuss fieldwork as a relational process.

Little was published on fieldwork experiences and emotions until the 1970s. Barbara Tedlock (1991:69) describes the 1970s as involving a “shift in cultural anthropological methodology from ‘participant observation’ toward the ‘observation of participation.’” In the former, ethnographers “attempt to be emotionally engaged participants and coolly dispassionate observers;” in the latter, the ethnographers “both experience and observe their own and others’ co-participation within the ethnographic encounter.” As Tedlock (2000:471) further describes it, this transition “from objectifying methodology to intersubjective methodology” also led to changes in representation, and ethnographers began to bring together the political and the personal, as well as the philosophical in their written accounts. This shift opened a more systematic discussion of fieldwork experience and revealed it as “intersubjective and embodied, not individual and fixed, but social and processual” (p.471).

*Marginal Natives at Work*, edited by Morris Freilich (1970), is a vivid record of some general concerns with “fieldwork culture” before this shift. He documents several key reasons for the “mystification” of fieldwork
experience until then, some of which may still be relevant today: the “common sense” approach to fieldwork due to the lack of consensus over whether anthropology was a science; fieldwork as a “private affair” between anthropologists and the people they studied; and the commitment to collect a large amount of data, rather than spend time reflecting on how it is being collected (p. 15).7

Freilich’s solution (p. 17) to fieldwork “mystification” was to devise core principles for “field work as science” – to standardise techniques and replicate methods. And, yet, he was aware of the importance of psychological processes during fieldwork. Like many others, he was aware8 of questions that later became central to postmodern anthropology and are still valid today: how do the internal experiences of the anthropologist affect data and analysis?9 What can be done about expanding writing about the research process? Interestingly, in 1977, in the preface to the second edition of Marginal Natives at Work, Freilich announced that:

The mystique of fieldwork – the aura of magic, mystery and glamour which anthropologists once attached to life in the field – had gone. In its place, in less than a decade, there was an ever-growing literature of what problems, pains and pleasures face the researcher in a foreign culture and, thus, the “mystique has been solved.”

Clearly, his “scientific” optimism grounded in the few publications that “tell it like it is” (see Freilich 1977: vi), was rather naïve - as we can see from the ongoing debates about the nature and methods of fieldwork in anthropology today.

Around the same time, a different approach to understanding the self and the Other during fieldwork developed. This was the self-reflexive approach. In 1974, Rabinow (2006:xiv-xv) shared his experience when attempting to publish on his fieldwork experiences. When his manuscript Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco was first written he had trouble finding a publisher and: “the reception was one of shock and annoyance; it was held to be inappropriate for a young anthropologist to reflect on his experience […].”

However, the book did get published in 1977 and became one of the icons of reflexive anthropology, as did Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan by Vincent Crapanzano (1980) among others. This work revealed the ethnographic encounter and knowledge production as an intersubjective dialogue and critically addressed the limits of objectivity.

Since the 1970s and 1980s, following the reflexive turn in anthropology and the rise of postmodernism, and particularly the publication
Emotional Labour and Observation in Anthropological Fieldwork

of Writing Culture: the Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Clifford and Marcus 1986) and Anthropology as Cultural Critique (Marcus and Fisher 1986), as well as the contributions of feminism (e.g. Cesara 1982) and anti-colonialism (e.g. Asad 1973) anthropologists have begun to engage more with eliciting knowledge from experience and with different ways of writing about it. The major contributions of this work critically reveal the inherent workings of power and inequalities in the ethnographic encounter; a residue of colonial domination in the ethnographic gaze; the impact of rationalistic thinking; the workings of racialised and gendered discourses; and the situatedness and partiality of knowledge. They also addressed the need to question the positionality of the researcher at all times. We partake in this critical approach by focusing on some of the power dynamics in fieldwork and on post-colonial, racial, gender-based and nationalist forces in fieldwork research. We also discuss how subjectivity, emotions, the relational, and the political are mutually constitutive in social interaction (see in particular, Curran; Lindquist and Mitchell, this volume)10. At the same time, as we bring forward the self of the anthropologist, it is important to bear in mind Ruth Behar’s reminder (1996:13), that there is value in this only if one is able to draw deeper connections between one’s personal experience and the subject under study. That doesn’t require a full-length autobiography, but it does require a keen understanding of what aspects of the self are the most important filters through which one perceives the world, and more particularly, the topic being studied.

Our feelings and personalities, enacted through our engagements in relation to our fieldwork - whether acknowledged as part of our professional activity or not - continue to define, rather than undermine the strength of anthropological knowledge-production. In this sense, we attempt to respond to the call that Rabinow (1986:253) made - to make the practices defining anthropological authority visible - and to the invitation by Behar (1996) to allow ourselves to experience, acknowledge and understand the authority and insight that might come with vulnerability.

While many anthropologists have followed suit with the “confessional” literature about the ethnographic Self, which places limits on the possibility of knowing the Other, others have made important contributions to understanding how the ethnographer’s subjectivity, lived experience and relatedness in the process of fieldwork may lead to valuable insights and valid ethnographic knowledge.11 But despite the accumulation of self-reflective experience in anthropology, in the mid-nineties, Hastrup and Hervik (1994:1) felt that it was still far from clear
how fieldwork experience makes knowledge. Their main reasons included the difficulty of putting experience into writing; and the tension between two poles of framing knowledge: on the one hand, rationality and objectivity - sometimes taken to extremes in the hope of a “scientific” method - and on the other, subjectivity and intuition - sometimes taken to extremes in the postmodernist denial of realism.

Within this tension, the understanding of what Hastrup and Hervik (1994:7) refer to as ethnographic “internalisation,” and “gradual familiarisation in practice,” has continually escaped the analytical lens. Hastrup and Hervik called for an anthropological reflection that sustains the legitimacy of anthropological authority while leaving behind both the positivist notions of observation and the romanticisation of participation. Hastrup (1995:15-16) argued that the nature of fieldwork experience implies a dissolution of the subject-object opposition, “posits truth as an intersubjective creation” and posits anthropology as “radical interpretation.”

At around the same time, Watson (1999:11) describes the British context: “What we have from British anthropology [in terms of books describing the subjective experiences of fieldwork] is relatively meagre.” He points to the fact that most of the literature on fieldwork experiences is from American anthropology. The reasons listed by Watson (p.12-15) refer mainly to a culture of “self-disclosure” where the British confessional style is “more ironic, more detached, never in fact being explicit, and frequently obscuring emotion entirely behind self-mockery and humour” (p. 12). Shore (1999: 27-29) also explores British academic reluctance to write about fieldwork experience. Recognising that “fieldwork is an emotional encounter as well as an intellectual exercise,” Shore (p. 28) critically discusses the following reasons for this silence: that anthropologists may feel insecure and uncertain in talking about fieldwork experiences; that anthropologists are trained in conditions of a “… conspiracy of silence” on fieldwork; and the grips of the structural-functionalist legacy on British anthropology. He elaborates further on how British anthropology held to a rigidly Durkheimian self-image, one that was positivistic but strongly anti-psychological, that defined anthropology as a scientific study of “other” cultures. British anthropologists were therefore strongly discouraged from introducing their own ‘subjectivities’ into the frame of analysis...

It is important to note here, that today we see not only a shift in the way in which emotions are addressed as form of knowledge within anthropology but we also see that how anthropologists employ the notion of emotions
Emotional Labour and Observation in Anthropological Fieldwork

has transformed over time as our approach to knowledge has transformed. Davies (this volume) offers further thoughts on the neglect of subjectivity in British anthropology highlighting three reasons: the Durkheimian legacy; the influence of “traditional empiricism”; and the “poor provision in anthropology departments for training students to think psychologically about field experience;” see also Watson (1999:17).

At other times, omission of the subjective experience as a source of knowledge in publications might have been led by moral and methodological concerns - such as the conscious act of protecting people in the field, or ourselves. Thus, some details of the research process might have been left outside the account on ethical grounds or to close the doors to the most sensitive aspects of what Herzfeld (1997) terms “cultural intimacy.” For example, one of the chapters in this volume was withdrawn by its author although it was written up and even presented at a seminar series. This author’s reflections on her field relatedness were valuable in showing the process of understanding people in the field through emotional engagement but, on this occasion, the author chose to respect the deeply painful intimacy through which this understanding was reached. Vulnerable anthropology, as each author here demonstrates, is challenging on many levels as it is insightfully discussed by Ruth Behar (1996).

Some discussion of fieldwork may justifiably remain in the corridors of academia or only continue to be transmitted orally. Furthermore, as Herzfeld (2007) discusses it, the recent rise of new positivism invites us to resist rampant accountability and the seduction of methodological replication; and we need to be careful with invitations to “measure” experience – however, we also need to note here that there have been recent advances in cognitive anthropology and psychology that may open exciting possibilities for combining different methods (see e.g. Whitehouse and Laidlaw 2007 and Luhrmann 2010). Some anthropological experience may not lend itself to analysis or writing or may indeed be better off left in the realm of “persistent ambiguity” and outside the “totalising professional models of knowledge,” as Hastrup and Hervik remind us (1994: 9-10).

However, most anthropologists would agree that there is value (personal, moral, methodological, theoretical, and political) in understanding how we produce knowledge through experience. The rapidly growing anthropological effort to understand fieldwork experiences as methodologically and theoretically relevant has resulted in the opening of whole new areas of research. Anthropologists have finally begun to produce more systematic analyses of how our behaviours, thoughts, feelings, memories, fantasies and imaginations or states of being\(^{13}\), may
Introduction

affect the collection, analysis, writing up and sharing of anthropological data - see, in particular, work by Tanya Luhrmann, Michael Jackson and Vincent Crapanzano. More recently, the importance of analysing fieldwork experiences has been highlighted directly and indirectly in a number of publications, particularly in the fields of psychological anthropology, medical anthropology and phenomenological anthropology. The volume *Emotions in the Field: the Psychology and Anthropology of Fieldwork Experience*, edited by James Davies and Dimitrina Spencer (2010) calls for the approach of radical empiricism introduced by the Harvard psychologist William James and more recently, brought back to anthropology by Michael Jackson (1989, 1998). As Michael Jackson reminds us, the central proposition of William James’ radical empiricism is that “the field of empirical study includes the plurality of all experienced facts, regardless of how they are conceived and classified – conjunctive and disjunctive, fixed and fluid, social and personal, theoretical and practical, subjective and objective, mental and physical, real and illusory” (James 1976:22-23 in Jackson 1996:7). A radical empirical approach as described in Jackson (1989, 1998) focuses on the relations between people, things, concepts, the environment and with the self and it is informed also by a psychological perspective (see Braddock, Curran, Davies, Lindquist, and Svašek, this volume). The contributors to *Emotions in the Field* also argue for the empirical value of certain emotions, senses, experiences or reactions arising in the fieldworker. The radical empirical approaches to fieldwork show that the emotional is not opposed to reason and it could complement the “traditional empirical” methods of anthropological research. Drawing on the case studies in *Emotions in the Field* and, like some of our contributors and the introduction here, Davies (2010) discusses the interrelationship between person and method – see also the chapters by Luhrmann 2010, Jackson 2010, Crapanzano 2010, Hage 2010 and Spencer 2010.

In other fields of anthropology, a variety of innovative methodologies has developed, some of which would link anthropology to other disciplines. Insightful experiential approaches in psychological anthropology such as person-centred ethnography and studies of transference and countertransference, or dream analysis can be found also in The *Handbook for Psychological Anthropology* edited by Conerly Casey and Robert B. Edgerton (2005). The authors employ such methods in order to study the relationship between the particular and the universal, the individual and the collective, the local and the global.

Anthropologists whose work is informed by concerns about social agency - such as the team editing *Subjectivity. Ethnographic Investigations*
João Biehl, Byron Good, and Arthur Kleinman (2007), explore “how individuals actually interact with global processes and local symbolic forms” and “how to relate psychological constructs to analyses of political subjectivity...” (p.16). The authors provide a number of case studies from different disciplines and demonstrate that in order to understand the “inner reworkings of the world and the consequences of people’s actions toward themselves and toward others,” (p.15) we need to focus on subjectivity and study it as “refracted through potent political, technological, psychological, and linguistic registers” (p.5).

Another rich discussion of fieldwork experiences focuses directly on the parallels between the life worlds and ways of knowing of those we study and anthropologists themselves - in the volume *Ways of Knowing* edited by Mark Harris (2007). This volume explores knowledge in practice and experience as a shifting phenomenological trajectory comprising the political, philosophical, and biological bases of participant perception, or participatory learning (Dilley, 1999 cited in Harris 2007:2) - always emerging and transforming; and situated in a particular place and time. Their contributors suggest stepping away from formal procedures and methods and propose an artisanal approach to anthropology whose field techniques elicit the tacit in the ethnographic encounter. In order to avoid reducing what people know to what they say, they bring together work from anthropology, philosophy, history, linguistics, art, and neuroscience. As they explore how others know in practice, they also draw parallels with the way anthropologists come to know. Their volume also makes a contribution to the debates about the links between cognitive and subjective ways of knowing, which Harvey Whitehouse (1999, also cited in Harris 2007:21) identifies as one of the key debates to engage with in anthropology today.

Our volume offers some variety of theoretical and methodological approaches coming from medical anthropology, migration studies, anthropology of childhood, anthropology of development, and psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Future research may explore in more depth how the themes we discuss about fieldwork as relational process could establish a dialogue with other anthropological sub-disciplines and approaches as well as with other disciplines such as neuroscience, cognitive science, philosophy, migration studies, and in particular, feminism, psychology, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. It is very important that in future research we also draw links to other contributions to “the intersubjective turn” (see Jackson 1998:5-38) and also to approaches engaged in the “affective turn” (Clough and Halley 2007) from sociology, critical theory, women’s studies and cultural studies and,
particularly to recent work on the relational in feminism such as Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) and earlier feminist work on emotions and knowing such as Jagger and Bordo (1989) and, in particular, Jagger (1989).

In the sections to follow in this introduction I discuss field work as “emotional labour” (Hochschild 1983) referring to when anthropologists believe they should or feel compelled to “manage” their emotions and I note some possible implications. I then distinguish this way of thinking and experiencing emotions from other ways in which emotions can offer a route to understanding and insight. In this context, we argue that emotional self-reflexivity should become a key element of the self-reflexive project, as Curran (this volume) stresses in particular. Such a project would demand better self-knowledge from the anthropologist – and I examine some potential questions regarding the training of anthropologists. I then briefly explore fieldwork as an embodied relational process marked by psychological, bodily, social, political, cultural, and bureaucratic forces. Finally, I suggest that acquiring knowledge through embodied relating can also be discussed as “relational observation” or “relational reflection” pointing to the work of Crapanzano (1992, 2010) and Jackson (1989, 1998, 2010). Drawing on such work, I argue that our lived relationships (past, present and future) at home, at our fieldwork sites, and with our always emerging inner self (as indivisible from the relational and the political) all together constitute what we understand by “the field.”

**Emotional Labour, Emotions as Knowing and Anthropological Fieldwork**

Every profession entails some form of emotional work insofar as it may involve a focus on emotions. Some professions involve emotional performance, such as the service industries (as described by Hochschild, 1983, see further below). Other professions, however, can be singled out for their particularly interpersonal or intersubjective (and, thus, unpredictable) nature, where emotions play a key role. Such professions (especially nursing, psychotherapy, psychiatry, child-care, and social work) can generate strong emotional experiences and involve various degrees of attention to emotions. We have long known that emotions (particularly during fieldwork) play an important role in anthropological insight and work before, during and after the “field,” but until recently (as pointed out by Davies 2010 and this volume and Spencer 2010), there has been little explicit and systematic discussion of how emotions actually form part of anthropological method. While anthropologists have only
recently begun to write in more depth on our own fieldwork emotions, they have often discussed the emotions’ formative and informative nature of others as discussed in Lutz and White (1986), Beatty (2005), Casey and Edgerton (2005) and Wulff (2007).

Such work has pointed to the cultural construction of emotions and to the cultural variations in felt experiences of relatedness; in this sense, when we discuss emotions as knowledge, we need to bear in mind how we think about emotions and knowledge and also how people in the field think about emotions and knowledge. Some may argue that by focusing on the emotional, we reproduce a familiar dichotomy between thinking and feeling. If emotions are defined from a “traditional empirical” standpoint, such accusation may be tenable. However, referring to the emotional here, is seeing it as inseparable from other aspects of existence – emotions permeate, as capacities or potentialities, all human and social experience, affecting it and being affected by it. When we emphasise them, we hope to show precisely this relationship. More specifically, following Lutz and White (1999), Casey and Edgerton (2005), Lindholm (2005), Svašek (2006), we see emotions are both cognitive and physical, both discourses and embodied experiences, both individual and collective and arising within a relational domain. They become mechanisms or ways with which we may, through analysis of their meaning in our lived relational engagements, better grasp, orient ourselves in, question, sense and embody the lifeworlds we study (cf. Jackson 1989, 1998, Davies and Spencer 2010). Such analyses include close attention to the workings of power and politics, and to rationalist, statist, gender-based, sexual, racist, colonialist or nationalist ideologies, which might partake in the research process. As many have argued, taking emotions seriously could demonstrate how the emotional and the political mutually constitute each other (e.g. Navaro-Yashin 2003, 2008, Hage 2010, Hsu 2010, Smith and Kleinman 2010).

Emotional Labour in Anthropological Fieldwork

Experiencing emotions as part of anthropological research can be explored as “emotional labour” when anthropologists believe they have to “manage” their emotions to elicit knowledge (cf. Bellas 1999, Svašek, this volume). The term “emotional labour” was introduced by the American sociologist Arlie Hochschild (1983) in her The Managed Heart (informed by Marxism and the performance theory of Goffman 1959). Hochschild was referring to the kind of “management of emotions” that occurs in response to the demands of working face-to-face with people in the service economy (e.g. flight attendants) and is seen as a product of and as producing the capitalist
system.\textsuperscript{19} Hochschild critically discussed how such emotional “management” induces the employee to suppress their own feelings in order to sustain an outward countenance that produces the “proper state of mind in others” (p. 7). Hochschild also introduces the notion of “emotional dissonance” – when the “private” feelings of the worker differ from what the worker is allowed to express “publicly,” denoting an interplay between detachment and involvement and places these in the capitalist context.\textsuperscript{20}

Following Hochschild, sociological research has expanded the term “emotional labour” to include work centred on efforts to “understand others, to have empathy with their situation, to feel their feelings as a part of one’s own” (England and Farkas 1986:91). It has also focused on “genuine” emotions at work, not just the ones performed under management control. Today, this sociological research has grown significantly, and has become a sub-field spanning several related fields: the sociology of emotions, the social construction of skills, and organisational behaviour (Steinberg and Figart 1999).\textsuperscript{21} A part of this research in sociology has taken a rather problematic empiricist direction concerned with the refinement of how one could “operationalise” or “measure” emotions or aspects of emotions – and this is different from the insightful potential that some cognitive and psychological studies offer (e.g. Luhrmann 2010). Some of these sociological approaches evoke the gloomy spectre of what Strathern (2000) describes as the contemporary audit culture. Our volume testifies to the value of resisting undue standardisation and codification of fieldwork methodology and, instead, we employ ethnography (including the historical ethnography of emotions in William Reddy 2001, see Heaton Shrestha, this volume) and emotional reflexivity as methods in understanding critically how the “emotional labour” of anthropologists evolves. Future research may lead to links with quantitative approaches in cognitive anthropology and psychology. Although all chapters study emotions’ “management” in one way or another, three of the contributors to this volume (Svašek, Heaton Shrestha and Curran) explicitly discuss it. Some of our contributors (e.g. Berger, Mitchell and Shuenn-Der Yu) also pose questions about how we may sometimes stop ourselves from participating through the use of methods, or what we have embraced during professional socialisation and internalised as rules of how to do research.

Here, we draw on the sociology of emotional labour, because it pays attention to institutional practices, and how institutions and individuals shape each other’s emotions; and because it also unpacks critically the production of “emotional labour” as part of the contemporary conditions of capitalism and globalisation. Wharton (1999:173) for example, points to
the key role of the way Americans spending money and time on their emotions could be seen as part of the culture of “therapeutic individualism” which involves the belief that each person has a unique, uncorrupted, inner self that deserves expression and thus views emotions management, not as a deviant, but, rather, as a normative process.” In the current UK socio-political climate “emotions management” takes on its own particular meaning, with the government planned expansion of short-term cognitive-behavioural therapy that will “manage symptoms” rather that address the causes of suffering. How does “emotional labour” in anthropological research form part of the dynamics of the wider world? How is it institutionalised? In addition to the crucial and urgent debates surrounding globalisation, racism, gender and anti-colonialism which could provide an insight here, anthropologists could also turn toward exploring the role of the daily work of educational and research institutions, funding bodies and stakeholders in the conditions of the flexible academic labour market. What is the role of anthropologists in this institutional arena?

As Christopher Wellin and Gary A. Fine (2007: 323) put it eloquently: “Whatever else it may be, ethnography is work. This reality and its implications for the doing of and institutional support for ethnography has largely been neglected.” These authors draw our attention to the importance of distinguishing between, and attending to, two different levels involved in anthropological work. They say that “revealing the fluidity of meaning within research encounters is different from documenting the obdurate institutional contexts in which such fluidity is either glossed over or resolved in routine ways,” (p. 325). Some of the contributors to our volume directly show the importance of examining both levels as well as the links between them.

It is timely to understand how teaching and learning anthropology, reading textbooks, going to conferences, dealing with the demands of publishing, and attending the weekly seminar can be a key part of how we become “tools” of fieldwork research and conduct fieldwork. As Shore (1999:45) stresses:

A more critical and analytical reflexivity should also oblige anthropology to turn its professional gaze towards the broader context in which the research practices are embedded, including the institutional setting in which anthropology takes place (particularly the conditions of its existence within the university system).

This, according to Shore, should include questions such as: who funds research? And, what is the impact of government policies, publisher
demands, of research councils’ strategies, commercial constraints, on research and training? The immediate contextual and institutional factors shape anthropological lived experiences in the field as much as broader and historical contexts and it is well worth exploring their significance.

Anthropological “emotional labour” marks all stages of our professional career: from our early educational experiences, through to our fieldwork encounters and writing-up. It evolves within the context of the emotional regime of academia and of anthropology as a discipline. The main questions that anthropologists need to address, with regard to anthropology as emotional labour, concern the impact of these emotional “regimes” (see Heaton Shrestha, this volume) on ourselves and the people we study. One way to examine this is to pay attention to how we acquire and adhere to our methodological habits and relate to our methods (cf. Davies 2010, Spencer 2010).

The chapters in this volume provide a range of examples about how we develop, challenge or sustain our methodological beliefs in social practices. Celayne Heaton Shrestha (this volume) analyses the emotional regimes of anthropology and shows how they do not foreclose the space for the emotional (as some traditional empiricists might have hoped); rather, they shape emotions in particular ways, playing an important role in data collection and analysis. Her auto-ethnographical account shows how the process of writing up her doctoral fieldwork among NGOs in Nepal involved a complex “management” of her emotional experiences, where certain emotions were suppressed and others altered, unleashing important ethical, moral, methodological and theoretical implications. Heaton Shrestha describes a number of institutional, pedagogic and interpersonal relational practices, as well as writing practices and conventions. She illustrates how such emotion work could result in the researcher reinterpreting her experience, in the light of dominant institutional prejudices, at the expense of more nuanced and even vulnerable experiences that might command a different analytical framework.

An analysis of such post-fieldwork “emotion work” contributes to our understanding of how anthropologists construct the field through emotional distancing, that is, how our methods may stay in the way of particular forms of relational engagement and our understanding of it. Similarly, Maruška Svašek (this volume) describes her experiences with empathy as “method.” Svašek reflects upon her relationship with a Dutch migrant, Jan, and explores their connection as a trajectory influenced by inner presences and emotional resonance. Despite her personal reservations and professional doubts, the empathic relationship that develops inspires a willingness to engage with the Dutch society in
Northern Ireland. Sharing happy childhood memories with Jan also transforms her research persona: from applying empathy as a "formula," or a "method," to empathy as "feeling a mutual connection." Svašek demonstrates how sharing emotions and feeling empathy during fieldwork is riddled with ambiguity and may pose ethical dilemmas that may eventually foreclose "the field." Svašek’s chapter poses further questions about the difference between what may be seen as “technical” empathy and a more authentic empathic engagement in the field that comes from getting to know people. As Lorimer (2010: 106) suggests about the latter:

The empathy an anthropologist feels is part of his or her desire to be in a real human relationship with some informants; one that will outlast fieldwork. It is a celebration of a genuine mutual understanding between anthropologists and the people they come to know, based on the anthropologist’s struggles to grasp what informants really mean in their own terms.

Thus, we could distinguish between the performance of “method” as part of emotional labour and the authentic emotional engagements in the field, each of which may lead us different ways and, as Svašek points out, this poses important ethical questions. In this manner, we discuss the impacts of emotional labour on both the anthropologist and the people we engage with, on our institutions and our discipline. Some of the questions arising here include: How do we create and reproduce the emotional regimes of anthropology and with what impact? What do we do with emotions during fieldwork (or before and after) – do we “manage” them and how? How is this part of a wider socio-political and economic landscape? But most importantly, how do these emotional regimes shape our relationships with people in the field?

Emotions and Knowing

A different but still related set of questions arises when we focus on the actual experiencing of emotions. How do we notice, experience and think about our emotions? How do we reflect on and with emotions? How might we rely on emotions as methods for deeper understanding and how is this different from emotion management? In addition to these, Vincent Crapanzano proposes that “it is less interesting to pose questions about knowing the emotion of the other or our own, but instead, it is important to pose questions about how we participate in each other’s emotions.”

Our main goal in this volume is to demonstrate the important role of reflection upon emotion and to open further discussion about how we
might expand the methodological relevance of such reflexivity. We also show how the analysis of embodied emotions in fieldwork, including political and moral emotions, as well as non-cognitive ways of knowing might support us in understanding and knowing each other. Similarly to most of our contributors, Louise Braddock argues that:

experiencing an emotion does more than orient the subject to the way the social world bears on his interests; it also orients him to the experience of other persons in that world and to their own sense of self as a subject.

Indeed, upon reflection, emotions may illuminate something beyond the way we are influenced by the world, they also tell us something about life, about the people we study, about us and about our work. Thus, we explore emotions in terms of how we might develop an understanding, a sense of the people and the field and learn through them. This includes paying attention to a variety of sensing and embodied experiences (in the chapters by Shuenn-Der Yu and Mitchell), “third space” (Mitchell, this volume) empathy and “internalized presence” (in the chapters by Svašek and Lindquist), “inner phantasies,” (Curran, this volume), “key emotional episodes” (Berger, this volume), distancing and cynicism (Heaton Shrestha, this volume), and projection, transference and countertransference (in the chapters by Lindquist and Braddock). These examples present analyses of how the ethnographer’s emotional experiences play an important role in the production of anthropological knowledge.

For example, John Curran, this volume, describes his fieldwork experiences in a London hospital and analyzes his feelings as part of “inner phantasies,” where “feelings of power and desire, belonging, hatred and racism are present within the anthropologist’s mind, but also suppressed within it” and which influence conscious attitudes and behaviour. These “inner phantasies,” as Curran demonstrates in his chapter, impact on the questions posed and on subsequent analyses that allowed him to understand deeper the meaning and reproduction of prejudice and race in the hospital where we conducted his fieldwork. The author argues that through being emotionally reflexive, the anthropologist may become more aware of the limitations of impression management that our field oscillation between “back stage” and “front stage” performances involves. On these grounds, Curran calls for an on-going awareness that includes fieldwork emotions as methodologically and theoretically legitimate data for thick description.

Fieldwork as an embodied experience of relatedness is also discussed by Marjorie Mitchell, this volume. Drawing on her field experiences in the Philippines, the author explores how her embodied self was inscribed and
redefined by her fieldwork relationships, and how she was able to reflect productively upon this process, albeit in retrospect. Mitchell describes that she was only able to reach a deeper understanding of the field in a “third space” where the ethnographer is as affected in the field as the people they study. The chapter opens with the discussion of a widespread ethnographic practice: the splitting of fieldwork experiences into professional (fieldwork journals) and private accounts (countless letters, mainly e-mails, to colleagues, friends and family). The journals where Mitchell strove to achieve “objectivity” adhering to the ideals she embraced during her training contained hardly any information about her feelings during her fieldwork among children in the Philippines. In contrast, her e-mails were full of systematic accounts of her emotions and daily encounters, constituting her field position as a local marginal in both body and class.

The author shows how the post-fieldwork re-reading and re-connecting to her lived experience described in her e-mails became the key to understanding her field conceptually. It was her reflections upon the diverse and nuanced lived moments of field interactions with people that led to insights, rather than simply her collected “conventional ethnographic data,” which followed the requirements of “traditional empiricism.” The chapter bears witness to the fact that reflecting systematically on the lived experience of fieldwork relations, may play an important role in understanding the dynamics of power in the field and, in particular, the living embodiment of local and global power hierarchies. Further analysis may address the role of new technologies in field research - such as the use of internet in the field – are they creating a partial or fragmented experience or a new way of relating and co-presence? While one may argue that e-mailing may be a way of withdrawing from fieldwork experience or a source of emotional support (cf. Cook 2010), we could ask if e-mails might also form an additional social and psychological space and an arena to explore the bridges and barriers between relations at home and those in the field.26

Drawing on Luhrmann (1989 and 2010) Shuen-Der Yu explores how he was engaged in learning his field through an embodied experience of meditation in a Buddhist retreat in Taiwan. In the retreat space where little explicit didactics was available (yet it was nevertheless important), Shuenn-Der Yu zooms in on his own non-cognitive learning through bodily practices, which facilitated the learning of Buddhist concepts. Further ethnographic data could possibly show some parallels to what Luhrmann (1989) describes as the “interpretive drift” in social learning (cf. Cook 2010) among the magicians she studied in London - they learned ideas, and then they confirmed them in their experience; once they would
experience the “magical power” in their bodies, they would regard the discourse as more real, which would then lead to further confirmation in experience and so on.

Shuenn-Der Yu describes how his embodied emotions allowed him to establish a “contact zone,” to formulate new sets of questions and to arrive at new takes on phenomena that may have otherwise been taken for granted, misunderstood, misinterpreted or considered unworthy of research. This allowed him to engage in completely different way of relating in the field, which regards the experience of the Other as valid. Jackson (1983: 337) discusses further how “bodily practices mediate a personal realization of social values, an immediate grasp of general precepts as sensible truths” (cf. Desjarlais 1992:27, Csordas 1994). Reflexivity should include emotional as well as intellectual reflexivity about embodied habits and, in some cases, emerging fully in “participant experience” (cf. Hsu 2008), may be the only way forward to reach an adequate understanding. Shuenn-Der Yu’s description of learning Buddhist meditation may pose questions about anxiety and doubt and the embodied process of acquiring certainty in both meditation practices and field research (cf. Cook 2010).

Many anthropologists have discussed what happens when we participate fully, with our whole being at fieldwork, and some have focused on sudden or powerful emotional experiences emerging from such involvement. Such experiences may illuminate our non-cognitive knowledge of the field (e.g. Luhrmann 2010, Hastrup 2010) and allow us to experience our common humanity (e.g. Rosaldo 1984). Kirsten Hastrup (2010) analyses some of the experiences that she had during her fieldwork in Iceland, as “raw moments,” which allowed her to understand intimately the importance of landscape in the Icelandic world-view. She sees “raw moments” in the following way:

moments where emplacement within the field impinges upon subjectivity and allows for an unmediated perception of something that cannot be called up but which manifests itself as a presence… (p.206, author’s emphasis)

She describes how “they are related to the feelings of the fieldworker rather than the analytical habitus. The raw moments strip us bare of conceptual prejudice and deliver us to pure sensation.” Hastrup’s and Luhrmann’s (2010) discussions of “raw moments” show how fieldwork experiences and methods simultaneously affect and are affected by the researcher’s subjectivity (e.g. through their proclivities), the environment
and landscape, social practice, and the immediate moment and in this process produce insight, an entry to the local lifeworlds.

From a different anthropological perspective, Peter Berger, this volume, suggests that such moments may be part of the immersion into the local *habitus*. Berger refers to such emotional situations as Key Emotional Episodes (KEE). He provides an analysis of a key emotional episode during his fieldwork in India and compares it with key emotional episodes reported by other anthropologists. During such episodes, the anthropologist may not have conscious control over the flow of events or their own behaviours and experiences, and as a result may act in unexpected ways that could change their position in the field.

The author makes two methodological points about such episodes: firstly, they may exert a strong influence on the field situation and may change the status of the researcher, facilitating or rupturing field relationships; secondly, they may highlight certain crucial themes, norms or values of a particular society. Further research may examine the role of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in these episodes as suggested by Hastrup (2010). As I discuss also in the next section below, Tanya Luhrmann (2010) shows the importance of one’s proclivity in learning in the field. Her work demonstrates that psychological, bodily, and emotional qualities of the researcher shape significantly the way she engages in field research and makes meaning out of it – thus, they seem to have a direct impact on our methods and vice versa, our methods may produce specific emotional experiences.

We could also consider further how key emotional episodes may become spaces for arriving at what Jackson (1983:339) describes as “experiential truths,” which,

> seem to issue from within our own Being when we break the momentum of the discursive mind or throw ourselves into some collective activity in which we each find our own meaning yet sustain the impression of having a common cause and giving common consent.

One of the most widely known key emotional episodes in anthropology is the one described by Renato Rosaldo in *Grief and a Headhunter’s Rage* (1984). Rosaldo (p.193) describes how “most anthropologists write about death as if they were positioned as uninvolved spectators who have no lived experience that could provide knowledge about the cultural force of emotions (cf. Berger, this volume). When Rosaldo experienced grief himself, he began to see connections between the Ilongot experience and his own. Michael Jackson (1989:5) sees this emphasis on connectedness as
an experience of the common humanity and as going against the grains of traditional empiricism

which assumes the knower and the known inhabit disconnected worlds and regards experience as something passively received rather than actively made, something that impresses itself upon our blank minds or overcomes us like sleep.

He then argues that Rosaldo’s essay reveals “the extent to which our thought is metaphorical and our choices of metaphor partly determinative of the kind of understanding we reach.” Could literal understanding sometimes be (among other things) a part of objectification? How could we know that our experience of empathy is not actually a “projection” or identification with the other?31

Several of the contributors to our volume (in particular, Curran, Svašek, Lindquist and Braddock) discuss some possible ways (among many) in which a radical empirical approach and a psychological perspective can inform fieldwork methodology and the analysis of the emotional labour in which we engage (cf. Jackson 1989, Davies 2010, Davies and Spencer 2010). They aspire to the radical empirical approach in that they attempt to derive insight from experience and translate emotions into knowledge through becoming participants and observers not only in field relations but also in their own subjectivity. A fruitful engagement between anthropology and psychoanalysis (see also Lorimer 2010) on this front is present in our volume in the dialogue between our late colleague Galina Lindquist, an anthropologist, and Louise Braddock, a philosopher and a psychoanalyst. Galina Lindquist shared her field experience and offered it for analysis to Louise Braddock in the discussion of “countertransference” and its potentially useful application to anthropological fieldwork.

Galina Lindquist’s chapter is centred on the analysis of an experience of dread induced in a field interaction with a healer in Russia. The author shows how anthropological subjectivity is central to epistemology, especially in studying processes such as healing, predicated on intersubjective manipulations of embodied consciousness, and in cultural contexts where “the borders between selves are blurred and permeable.” Lindquist describes how her understanding evolved through the phenomenology of an intersubjective encounter built on power games, subjugation and fear. The author poses the question: what happens to understanding through empathy when the fieldworker experiences the same pains and dangers as those the Other experiences in her life? Lindquist considers some of her fieldwork experiences as a challenging