The Cross and the Star

The Cross and the Star: The Post-Nietzschean Christian and Jewish Thought of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig

Edited by

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The Cross and the Star: The Post-Nietzschean Christian and Jewish Thought
of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig,
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TO FREYA VON MOLTKE

God is the cross and is David's star.
—Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Judaism Despite Christianity*

The history of every person paints his character. I will tell you what my life has been: do you too place a little trust in me; and let us be united even when distance parts us. The world is so waste and empty ... but to know of some one here and there whom we accord with, who is living on with us even in silence, this makes our earthly ball a peopled garden.
—Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface xi

Acknowledgements xxiii

Part I – Rosenstock-Huessy's Engagements with Nietzsche

Chapter One 3
The End of the World or, When Theology Slept (1941)
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy

Chapter Two 17
Hölderlin and Nietzsche (1941)
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy

Chapter Three 21
Nietzsche's Untimeliness (ca. 1942)
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy

Chapter Four 27
The Perils of Intellectual Spaces (1956)
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy

Part II – Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy:
The Star and the Cross—Affinities and Differences

Chapter Five 49
From the Star of Redemption to the Cross of Reality (1959)
Georg Müller

Chapter Six 73
The Discovery of the New Thinking (1987)
Wolfgang Ullmann

Chapter Seven 105
Franz Rosenzweig's Letters to Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy, 1917-1922 (1989)
Harold M. Stahmer

Chapter Eight 139
The Great Gift—The Impact of Franz Rosenzweig's Jewishness on Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy
Wayne Cristaudo

Chapter Nine 163
Orate Thinker Versus Literate Thinker
Michael Gormann-Thelen

Chapter Ten 175
Sovereignty and Sacrifice in Writings by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig
Gregory Kaplan

Chapter Eleven 191
The Stubbornness of the Jews
Robert Erlewine

Part III – Liturgical Speech and Deed: Church, History, and Education

Chapter Twelve 209
Speech Is the Body of the Spirit (1987)
Harold M. Stahmer

Chapter Thirteen 225
Grammar on the Cross
Peter J. Leithart

Chapter Fourteen 243
Goethe, the First Father of the Third Age of the Church
Matthew del Nevo

Chapter Fifteen 277
Rosenstock-Huessy's Anti-transcendent Critique of Karl Barth
Wayne Cristaudo

Chapter Sixteen 291
Rosenstock-Huessy and Liturgical Thinking
Donald E. Pease

Chapter Seventeen 307
From Here to Eternity
Michael Ermarth

Chapter Eighteen 333
Education in the Shadow of Camp William James
Claire Katz

Chapter Nineteen 349
Christian, Muslim, Jew (2007)
Spengler

Notes.. 359

Index.. 409

PREFACE

FRANZ ROSENZWEIG is hardly a household name in a discussion of the world's philosophers. Nor is his friend and interlocutor, the social philosophy scholar Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, a household name. Nevertheless, it was their mutual engagement with social thought and with speech-thinking that collectively created both a tension and an illumination in the discourse on language and on Jewish-Christian dialogue. It has not been the fashion of philosophy to mix and match these two men into the garb of generally accepted disciplines in the field.

Nevertheless, it cannot have escaped anyone who takes a serious interest in Jewish philosophy that Rosenzweig was enormously important for Emmanuel Levinas and was a close friend of Martin Buber's, with whom he translated the Old Testament into German.

For that matter, if Buber is somewhat out of philosophical fashion today, the same cannot be said of Levinas. His first philosophy of ethics has for many scholars become the essential supplement to Heidegger's enormous impact on post-World War II social theory. It is no accident that Levinas's star has started to shine so brightly, following the two public scandals involving Heidegger and Paul de Man, which brought on a crisis confronting French social theory in the late 1980s. In the case of Heidegger it was the publication by Victor Farias of (what in English appeared in 1991 as) *Heidegger and Nazism* that put on the table again much of what had long since been known about Heidegger's politics, combined with some new revelations about Heidegger's personal behavior while he was a National Socialist rector at Freiburg University. In the de Man case, it was the headline of the *New York Times* on Dec. 1, 1987, "Yale Scholar Wrote for Pro-Nazi Newspaper" that opened the can of ethical worms.

The real importance of these two scandals was that they pushed contemporary social theorists to insist upon disclosure of the ethical credentials of their own work. It was, after all, their work that had fused Marxian hostilities to capitalism with the more Nietzschean and nihilistic elements of will to power, and Heidegger's radical ontology and the moods activating social action. The fact was that whereas Marxist party hacks remained convinced that his thoughts on the materialist account of history could be tailored to form a coherent philosophy, those familiar with Nietzsche and Heidegger did not see any point in remaining in

Marx's philosophical jalopy when much better philosophical sports cars were available. Further, the failure of the working classes in World War II to overleap their nationalism required a much more voluntarist style of politics than Marx had allowed for.

Thus, through the somewhat unsavory, but commonsensical, prejudice of guilt by association, the political engagement of the 1968 generation could be sharply severed from the political stench surrounding Heidegger and de Man, and the hermeneutical benefits derived from the two be retained. Broadly, the 1968 paradigm was borne in guilt and trauma—the guilt of having Nazi parents (Germany); the guilt of being in Vietnam and the guilt of having turned a blind eye to slavery and the terrible treatment of Native Americans (the United States); and the guilt of the empire's colonies (Great Britain and France). The black, women's, and gay movements would become burning issues as well, and a range of theories and discourses, including women's studies, post-colonialism, and queer theory, would emerge and change not only university culture, but also public culture generally. The political character of the paradigm had nothing specifically to do with Heidegger or de Man, but everything to do with sensitivity to the scope and character of injustice, oppression, persecution, and the fallout and aftermath of the trauma of the Holocaust and World War II.

It was in France that the paradigm received its greatest theoretical sophistication, though the Frankfurt School was important in Germany and the United States. Unlike Germany, where irrationalism had been seen as inherent to Nazism (so evident, for example, in Thomas Mann, György Lukács, and Jürgen Habermas), France had seen rationalism as a curse culminating in fascism. (The various interpretations of Nietzsche in both countries would also reflect this divide.) Thus, even in World War I, the French avant-garde reacted to its faith in reason; for far from having saved the world, reason had thrown it into such horror. Given that the one characteristic that seemed to unite the various post-World War II social theories—from the Frankfurt School to deconstructionism, to post-structuralism, to post-modernism—was their opposition to any and every form of fascism; the thought of the enterprise being completely undone by its association with fascism was unthinkable. Levinas was not only an ethicist, but if any man had displayed anti-fascist credentials, it was this Jewish ethicist who also happened to be one of the greatest students and internal critics of Heidegger's work. And while (as a French officer and under the protection of the Geneva Conventions) he had not spent time in a concentration camp; he had spent it as a French prisoner of war in a German military camp.

Further, Jacques Derrida had already engaged critically, and respectfully, with Levinas. But his close association with de Man and the centrality of Heidegger in his work left him particularly vulnerable to the charge of nihilism. It is correct to say that no one who read any of Derrida's writings after the two scandals could accuse Derrida of not being interested in justice or ethics. Cynics might say that Derrida's reinvention of himself and his deconstruction as an ethicist were shrewd career-saving moves. And so when he announced that justice was undeconstructible in his article for the *Cardozo Law Review,* "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority" (July-August 1990), he had bade goodbye to any lingering sense of nihilism. A more charitable interpretation would have it that his practices had always been deployed by those with an ethical agenda and who wished to give voice to the marginalized. Derrida would ascribe to Marx the same overwhelming concern for justice—breezily indifferent to the fact that Marx certainly never thought justice was "undeconstructible," but was always a ruling-class ruse.[1] But this only confirmed Derrida's status as a leading social theorist of the left, at a time when the left was in desperate need of some direction to save it from the end of Soviet communism (made no less difficult by the fact that academic communists had mostly given up long before on the Soviets). But by the 1990s, the times had changed substantially since Michel Foucault had somewhat dumbfounded, if not utterly incensed, Noam Chomsky in a famous debate in 1971 when Foucault, in a perfect rendition of Marx, had ridiculed the concept of justice as a smokescreen of vested interests.

What, then, Levinas offered social theorists, who wanted to expose the vestiges of fascism within western institutions and relationships that came after World War II, was the fusion of two things. One was a critique of totality, which was as central to Theodor Adorno's negative dialectic as to Foucault's critiques of prisons and asylums and clinics and "the author," as to Gilles Deleuze's critique of arboreal logic, as to Derrida's deconstruction of the hegemonies of writing and totalitarian reading strategies, as to Jean-François Lyotard's critique of meta-narratives. The other was an ethics that was as decisively non-nihilistic as it was opposed to any status quo that harbored nascent fascist potencies.

The critique of totality and the opening-up of the value of the infinite (again, Adorno, Derrida, Deleuze, et al., were also embracing openness) seemed to be the philosophical question of the moment. And it did not take scholars of Jewish studies long to notice that the case against totalism had

[1] Marx makes this statement on numerous occasions, including *The German Ideology*, but perhaps his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* is the most theoretically developed account of his position on this issue.

been made by the very man Levinas referred to as the greatest source of inspiration for his *Totality and Infinity*, Franz Rosenzweig. It is also no accident that the star of Rosenzweig started to rise again around the same time, resulting in a flurry of new books on him. Among them have been (and they are still appearing regularly) numerous essays, articles, and books that compare Levinas and Rosenzweig.

To some extent this volume of essays is part of the same wave of social critique briefly traced above. And it is very likely that a reader who comes here will be engaging in the cluster of concerns that has brought Rosenzweig into philosophical prominence today. Since Rosenzweig has found a growing philosophical audience outside, it is not surprising that his friend and teacher, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, is also beginning to find some new readers. Certainly one cannot read a page of Rosenzweig's intellectual biography without coming upon the role of Rosenstock-Huessy in leading him to a radical new understanding of the meaning of faith in the modern world.

Usually, though, Rosenstock-Huessy is quickly dismissed as the incidental friend / teacher / mentor who wanted to convert Rosenzweig to Christianity but failed. In the past there have been a few obscure essays that have tried to redress this interpretation, usually coming from the flanks of a very small body of scholars who are familiar with the writings of Rosenstock-Huessy. We have included translations of two exceptional essays, by Wolfgang Ullmann and by Georg Müller, in this volume. And I myself am in the process of completing a large work—provisionally titled *Religion, Redemption, and Revolution: The Speech Thinking of Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy*—which is devoted to showing the common core of concerns that united them, as well as the different areas of endeavor they each dedicated their lives to serving.

However, whereas I have long thought that the track that leads from Derrida to Levinas to Rosenzweig would also inevitably lead back to Rosenstock-Huessy, I also think that Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy are driven by concerns that do not neatly fit in with the paradigm of post-World War II social theory. And if they are read with care in the context of their own problematic, then one sees that their unique and profound power comes in large part from belonging to a very different paradigm. Indeed, I think it is a paradigm that has been passed over, or at best overlooked, because of the massive trauma inflicted by fascism and the multiplicity of problems generated by what we may broadly call "fascist forces." But the greatest weakness of the 1968 paradigm was not what its conservative critics have always said—viz., that it is essentially nihilistic and in danger of slipping into fascism. It is true that the left has, along with every other

group, had its fair share of moments of madness and was often compromised by falling silent and being hesitant in criticizing true, existing communism. Nevertheless, from the Dadaists and surrealists, France had always had a substantial left that had been anti-totalitarian, even if some of their most distinguished members (Louis Aragon, and Paul Éluard, for example) kept falling into the maw of Stalinism. I think the real danger of the 1968 paradigm is that its focus on fascism means that it does not see dangers that do not fit that kind of form. Another way of saying this is that it operates under a "logic" in which oppression and skewed power relations provide the gates through which fascism can and does march. But the world is full of evils that do not make their entrance through these portals.

Now Rosenstock-Huessy and Rosenzweig were major contributors to a paradigm that Rosenzweig termed *the new thinking* and whose other participants included Rudolf and Hans Ehrenberg, Viktor von Weizsäcker, Martin Buber, and Florens Rang. The basics of this paradigm assume the centrality of speech, time, history, and faith. This book is, to some extent, an induction to that paradigm. However, I do not want to suggest that all contributors read Rosenstock-Huessy and Rosenzweig the same way, or that all have grappled with them for the same amount of time.

The point I wish to emphasize here, though, is that the new thinking was formed on the eve of, and during World War I, by German thinkers. It was formed before the emergence of fascism, and its relationship to rationalism was different from that of France. Coming from Germany it also had less historical hatred toward the Church and, concomitantly, again in general, its Christian voices were less "Medieval and / or reactionary."[2] It was formed largely, as Rosenstock-Huessy suggests in his explanatory essay accompanying the publication of the 1916 correspondence on Judaism and Christianity between him and Rosenzweig, as a reaction to the failures of humanism, a failure all too evident to them in World War I itself. Rosenzweig's "remaining" (as he called it) a Jew, by really participating in and continuing to create the world through his Jewish faith and not the liberal secular orientation that so many Jews of his class and time had adopted, was as important to the paradigm as were the conversions of Rosenstock-Huessy and the Ehrenbergs from Judaism to Christianity.

Rosenzweig would die before the Nazis came to power in Germany,

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[2] In general I think Rosenstock-Huessy's *Out of Revolution* and *Die europäischen Revolutionen* provide a remarkable vantage point for detecting the different national "biographies" of several Western European nations in the context of the revolutions that formed their respective national characters.

while Rosenstock-Huessy, who left Germany immediately on Hitler's ascension, always thought of World War II as the continuation of World War 1. He was far more attuned to the passions of love and hatred that drive people to the kinds of idolatry exhibited by fascism than by a more structural, quasi-Marxist analysis of social conditions of the sort that one finds in the Frankfurt School, for example, which would become so important for the development of the politicization of literary studies and the evolution of cultural studies.

A telling difference between the two paradigms, and one that for me alerts us to the strength of one and to the weakness of the other, is the way in which incalculability is fundamental to the paradigm of new thinking, while it is almost ignored in the social theory of the post-World-War-II / 1968 paradigm. Given the emphasis on marginality, on hidden visibilities, on arboreal logics and the like in the 1968 paradigm, this might seem a strange claim of mine. And I concede there is a desperate *hope* for a not-yet, not-known, in the various post-thinking that has also led to another reversal of Marx—viz., the revision of *utopia* as a good term. Yet I think the proof is in both the focus of attention and the kind of solidarity favored by the paradigm. The focus is on observable power hierarchies—race, class, gender, ethnicity, sexual difference and, more recently, religious difference being the most commonly cited. This focus basically looks at power as something one group has more or less of. It is not unlike Marx's view of the capitalist economy as a kind of zero-sum game. Further, it seeks to resolve these problems through political action. It is true that the tremendous artistic and creative explosion, particularly in popular music and film, was cultural rather than political, and hence should not be contained, constrained by, or confused with the 1968 paradigm I am talking about. But therein largely lies the difference—the 1968 paradigm valorized politics, the artists of the 1960s generation was more interested in simply expressing and creating, and only secondarily in giving it political expression. (The parents were as confused and equally tormented by both.)

Now I do not want to say that the 1968 paradigm is worthless or that it does not deal with important issues, or simply, again as conservatives tend to imply, everything was fine if only we had just left well enough alone. The world might not have been greatly improved, but thanks to the 1968 paradigm, racism, homophobia, and masculine brutality—when brought out into the light—can no longer dress themselves up in any kind of excuse or pseudo-dignity. But what I want to point out is that the new-thinking paradigm is different because it is more interested in invisible power and in new, unanticipated and redeemed forms of life.

The Christian and Jewish faiths are perfect examples of this, and it is not surprising that the new thinking both gravitates around these faiths and revives them by reintroducing us to ways that often are archaic, very orthodox even, but almost unknown and unrecognizable by people who take the commonplace (mis)representation of them as their essence.

Both religions emerged unexpectedly, as God creates the world—out of "nothing." And here is nothing predictable at all about their respective power or even about the kind of power that each has. Jews have been enslaved and threatened with extinction time and time again—until the establishment of the state of Israel, they had been stateless—and for Rosenzweig being stateless was part of their very being And that, as well as not being bonded primarily through the other great mark of identity—a common language—is what, with their faith and endurance, Rosenzweig's thought makes the Jews a "remnant." Christianity, on the other hand, became the most powerful religion in Europe. But originally it was a mad belief among the riff-raff in the most miserable posts in the Empire. And the paradox goes further. How was it possible that from such powerlessness and idiocy that such empires and intellects and artists and geniuses emerged? What Roman equivalent of our contemporary academics would ever have thought that Rome's grandeur would be lost, and a thousand years later Jesus would be alive, hailed, in far greater a territory than Rome had ever been, as King of Kings, including by people so uneducated that they could not even name a Roman emperor? But then there is another issue that is every bit as important as Christianity's emergence into visible power. For whenever Christianity has been most powerful, its essence has been most imperiled. And it has reinvented itself in the most unexpected and contradictory of ways. Those who think the Church is wherever the sign of the cross is visible neither understand God nor (the d)evil. For the one loves constantly and unexpectedly, and does not conform to signs; and the other deploys our slovenly and blind conformity to signs to do the opposite of what the holiest of signifiers pointed to only yesterday. Just as the Church was rotting from the corrosion of its splendor, when St. Francis rejuvenated it by embracing lepers and poverty, so did Rosenstock-Huessy see the Jacobins, with their fighting to emancipate the Jews, as the real Christians in France. In sum, the new thinking takes faith, hope, and love as far more important than present power structures. For it thinks as much of future calling as of past emitting, and of present powers as but a play within these intersections, even when they are murderous.

Or, to take another example: The rehabilitation of Carl Schmitt has been a fascinating one. Schmitt who, at the last minute (Rosenstock-

Huessy sees him as the modern German Talleyrand), threw his lot in with the Nazis, had become by the late 1980s an important new addition to the 1968 paradigm. Again, not that the paradigm was becoming more fascist, but its line of vision was definitely compatible with Schmitt's emphasis on spatiality or territoriality (the very term makes one immediately think of Deleuzean politics). However, the new thinking does not think in terms of *spatial primacy*, but of *temporality*. It is interested in the act of founding and endowment (*Stiftung*), incarnation, and eons. Even the way Rosenstock-Huessy casts the problem—the same problem we all face today, of living rich lives at peace in our differences, which is also a key problem of the 1968 paradigm—suggests a different approach. For him the problem of difference is not cast primarily in terms of cultures or groups per se—again a spatialization of the issue, whose grave danger is to essentialize and to romanticize behaviors that actually support the fascism the paradigm wants to uproot. Instead the problem of difference is cast in terms of *distemporaries* and *contemporaries*.

Time-thinking is interested in and patient enough to sow seeds; it eschews the immediate peace as much as it does the immediate crisis and the immediate power structures. It sees veneration of a visible power as idolatrous and thus as suicidal. And it sees love's seeds as the real source of future potency. Having more wealth, power, fairness, opportunity, and so on, may not be a bad thing, but it does not stop sin; it does not stop the corrosions and toxicities of the human heart. The invisibility of the heart can never be understood, and its inspiring and expiring nature can never be cultivated by seeking to replace the tiniest acts of loving grace with the more abstract and general solutions and laws. One only has to consider the damage of litigious cultures, of family law courts, of the prison system in countries where the rule of law is triumphant, to see that the rule of law is no end in itself, any more than redressing unequal power relations will guarantee communities.

In sum I am suggesting that the way of looking at power in terms of fascisms or better distribution fails to open us up to the invisible and the incalculable; they are neither grace nor love. And I think it no accident that love and theology have been receiving more social theoretical attention in more recent years. The relatively recent addition of theology to the 1968 paradigm (something always in Levinas) is indicative of the pushes of reality and the need to readjust thinking to come to grips with circumstance and a move in this direction.

But there is one other stumbling block in the paradigm. And that is the stumbling block of "purity." Bear in mind that Rosenstock-Huessy wrote a work called *I Am an Impure Thinker;* the very title is indicative of

a key aspect of the new thinking that is especially pertinent to this thought, and which alerts us to a gulf between the 1968 paradigm and the new thinking. For the 1968 paradigm is really, in the terms of Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy, still fundamentally a pagan paradigm. For purification is a pagan strategy for dealing with the tumult of the dangerous energies of the world (it is Plato's response to the dying Greek city-states, the Stoic response to Rome's cruelty, the educated North American response to American imperialism). Thus, if the current paradigm is successful we will not be racist, sexist, homophobic, anti-Islamic, and so on. Surely, though, that is not a bad thing. No; put thus, it isn't. But it will be no more effective than Plato was, or than Marcus Aurelius was in cultivating a genuine peaceful future. If we are not more loving, we will definitely find something else to be, and we will be that something else before we even know we are it, because we will not be attuned to what is growing up in our hearts, focused as we are on eliminating certain impurities and shaming those who exhibit them. That we defile, that we err, that we injure, that we get it wrong, that we are weak, that we do not see, that we mess up, that our plans go astray, that life is uncontrollable, that we fester, that we get lost, that we are imperfect, that we lack energy, that we go mad, that we stumble, and so on—and let us simply say that we sin—does not mean we should not try to be better. Yes, let us have some place for Plato and Kant and Levinas, and for ethics and morals. But we are the material of any future kingdom, and a hermeneutics of suspicion tells us nothing about cultivation of that material. The new thinking is concerned with cultivation, and it starts with us always being impure—we will always defecate and have to deal with that.

Let me follow up on the idea of our being sinners, or weak and broken in need of God's love. To return briefly to the point: the new-thinking paradigm came out of World War I to contrast it with the purer one of 1968, and something pertinent for understanding its character. World War I, unlike World War II (at least seemingly so) has no simple source. All of Europe was to blame, and all of its history led it into war. I should also mention in passing, on this point, that Rosenzweig did not at all welcome the new democratic Germany dawning at the end of World War I, because he rightly sensed it would be swarming with anti-Semitic elements that threatened Germany's future. But a more straightforward understanding would recognize that the popular-power good and the aristocratic-power bad would have been too busy celebrating the overthrow of an illegitimate power to grasp really how much the forces of future destruction were swelling, as Rosenzweig had.

Thinking of where contemporary social theory is today, I am

reminded of Rosenzweig's central critique of Hegel that runs through his two-volume work on *Hegel und der Staat*, that Hegel had tried to understand the political problems of the age via an oscillation between Rousseauan atomism of the will and Montesquieu's institutional complex of social layers. The problem was that, in being focused thus, he omitted all sorts of other forces in motion—most notably, nationalism and empire. Which is to say, he overlooked the dominant problems of nineteenth-century politics. It is very noteworthy that Hegel's twentieth-century renaissance as a political philosopher was in the fallout of fascism and against the background of the Cold War, where there was a preoccupation with questions revolving around the state or collective and the individual. It is equally noteworthy that for theorists like Foucault and Deleuze, Hegel was hate-worthy because he was seen as the very embodiment of a way of thinking that would suffocate all difference. The Hegel renaissance and the kind of criticisms directed at Hegel by French neo-Hegelian critique are very telling, indeed. They show where post-World War II intellectual attention was (and for so many, still is) and how the problem of peoples driven by different ends, by different faiths was left largely unnoticed. To his credit Foucault saw that the Iranian revolution was a moment of great importance. But his reportage of the event was so based in Sorelian fantasies of myth and social energy that his analysis is a source of constant embarrassment to his acolytes—as it undoubtedly was to him, himself, a few years later. More recently, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have certainly taken on board the anti-imperialist sentiments of Islamism. But their entire analysis rests on a fantasy of creating allies with peoples who do not share any of their philosophical commitments. Their trust in Western (neo-Hegelian) philosophical hegemony is unshakeable.

The study of Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy is timely—more timely than merely making Rosenzweig a supplement to Levinas. For the timely issue of the day is, once again, not individuals versus totalities. This was a thought raised by Rosenzweig, but not in a way that is analogous to the left-wing Hegelian break with totality, showing a real arc (as Rosenstock-Huessy once noted) from the young Marx and Ludwig Feuerbach to the various neo-Marxist, neo-Kantian, and neo-Nietzschean ideas that so strongly run through much of the twentieth century. Rather, the issue is one of traditional faiths and the way nations are shaped by those faiths. Samuel Huntington was alert to the change in geo-politics when he spoke of a clash of civilizations. However, his designation of a *civilization* (as well as the nomenclature itself) was something of a distraction from the real issue of what Rosenstock-Huessy had far more convincingly depicted as the major political problem of the next century.

That is, Rosenstock-Huessy identified the clash *and* reconciliation, already alluded to above, between different bodies of time and, to repeat the above point of making contemporaries of distemporaries, of creating a "metanomic society." To the extent that he had emphasized the necessity of establishing concord without requiring the homogenization of unrelinquishable differences, his idea of metanomics has a degree of affinity with the political solution to what had, indeed, held together so much post-World War II social theory. That is, the dedication to a politics of the valorization of difference.

But, as we have already also suggested, an all-important point dividing Rosenstock-Huessy from the post-structuralists, post-modernists, and others, was the weight Rosenstock-Huessy placed upon time. For the most part, post-structuralist thinking remained utterly oblivious to issues of faith-based social life, where negotiation cannot be broken down into the variables of social identities—gender, race, and ethnicity—and class that dominated their own discursive regimes. Irrespective of one's take on the various issues that have been woven around these four social variables, the dominant resolutions do not travel easily into peoples whose soul-scapes have not been formed by faith in the powers of freedom and equality. And it must be added that in spite of the great noise made about how different post-modernists, which by the 1990s had started to become the favored label for the various 1968 Parisian-based social philosophies, were from modernist ideologies, freedom and equality are as much the two puppet-masters of post-modernism as of modernism. What divides post-modernists from modernists is the issue of where and how freedom and equality can be realized—not whether these are the most venerable of social norms. But freedom and equality (and sexual equality between the West and Islam is a major issue of difficult difference) are not held in such esteem by all peoples, particularly those whose historical trajectories have only recently been made to adapt to the global commercial and human rights-based normative international order.

I have also mentioned that Rosenstock-Huessy, if known at all today outside Germany, is known mainly through his association with Franz Rosenzweig. There have been a handful of works on him in his own right, but mostly in German. By and large scholars interested in Franz Rosenzweig have found Rosenstock-Huessy to be unworthy of study. But things are changing. When I started writing on the two of them some four years ago—about fifteen years after I started reading Rosenstock-Huessy—I would never have guessed that I would be asked to attend two conferences in the same month (one in Frankfurt, and one at Dartmouth College, in 2008) devoted to the two men. This volume was the result of

one of those conferences. (The other conference has produced another volume, which will be published in Germany.) What struck me about many of the papers in both conferences was that a generation of younger scholars is turning to their thought. I was also struck by the fact at Dartmouth there were older scholars writing about Rosenstock-Huessy for the first time, and were unencumbered by his unfashionableness, or unorthodoxy, or (completely undeserving) reputation as a fanatical Christian proselytizer, and were simply dealing with the issues as they see them.

WAYNE CRISTAUDO

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THE IDEA FOR THIS BOOK sprang from a conference with the all-encompassing title, “Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy: Dimensions of a Relationship,” held at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, USA, in July 2008. The conference was sponsored by the Jewish Studies Program, the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, the Fannie and Alan Leslie Center for the Humanities, the Department of Philosophy, and the William Jewett Tucker Foundation at Dartmouth; and above all, by the Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Fund. In particular, we gratefully acknowledge the innovative approaches, hard work, and rewarding outcomes for which that event’s organizers—Susannah Heschel, the Eli Black Professor of Jewish Studies at Dartmouth; and Norman Fiering, President of the Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Fund and Librarian Emeritus of the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University—were responsible. Seven of the papers from that conference are included in this volume. Taken together, the titles of these conference papers speak to Rosenzweig’s and Rosenstock-Huessy’s interlocutory tension in their thought, theology, language, speech, and the legacies of education:

“Rosenstock-Huessy and Liturgical Thinking” (Donald Pease);

“Grammar on the Cross” (Peter Leithart);

“Sovereignty and Sacrifice in Writings by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig” (Gregory Kaplan);

“The Stubbornness of the Jews: Resources and Limitations of the Jewish-Christian Dialogue of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig” (Robert Erlewine);

“From Here to Eternity: The Philosophy of History of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy as Eschatology on the Transmodern Installment Plan” (Michael Ermarth);

“Orate Thinker Versus. Literate Thinker: Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Versus Franz Rosenzweig—A Difference that Makes a Difference” (Michael Gormann-Thelen); and

"In the Shadow of Camp William James: Philosophy, Practice, and the Politics of Education" (Claire Katz).

We are very grateful to the authors for their willingness to further the conversation, with insight and engagement, on these two great dialogical thinkers. The work of the other authors in this volume is also deeply appreciated. Not only are they adding to the vitality of the discussion around Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-Huessy, but they also widen and deepen the appeal of these two thinkers across times and spaces. That is, this book contains:

Significant new contributions from Australia (Matthew del Nevo and the translator, Jürgen Lawrenz) and Asia ("Spengler" and the translator, Roland Vogt);

Two still-timely contributions from a former Rosenstock-Huessy student, Harold Stahmer, who provided previously published articles on speech-thinking and the human and intellectual dimensions of the relationship among Eugen and Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy and Franz Rosenzweig; and

Two posthumous contributions—from Wolfgang Ullmann (theologian and scholar from the German Democratic Republic, a political conscience for the reunified Germany, and an eventual Green Party member in the European Parliament); and from the founding director of the Friedrich von Bodelschwingh-Schule in Bethel, Georg Müller, who was also the founder and first chairman of the Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy-Gesellschaft and founder of its archives in Bethel.

Our heartfelt gratitude goes particularly to the heirs we contacted—Esther-Marie Ullmann-Goertz and Jakob Ullmann, and Richard Müller-Dombois—for their willingness to share the outstanding legacy of their respective parents' work.

Our thanks also go to:

The other members of the Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Fund Board (John Baldwin, Tom Duncanson, Clint Gardner, Raymond Huessy, Giles Jackson, Russell Keep, Wim Leenman, Leon Martel, Freya von Moltke, Helmuth von Moltke, Robert Pollard, and Paula Huessy Stahmer); and

The Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Literary Heirs (Paula Huessy Stahmer, Hans G. Huessy, and Mark Huessy) for their support of this publication concept and for their very kind permission to publish the four essays by their grandfather—and in particular, the translation by Jürgen Lawrenz of the chapter on Descartes and Nietzsche from *Soziologie I.*.

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The verification of text statements, citations, and footnotes throughout this volume could not have been completed without the indispensable resources available from the *Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy Collected Works on DVD* archive and the *Guide to the Works of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy.* The editors gratefully acknowledge the earlier support, particularly of Leo and Cynthia Harris and the Omina Freundeshilfe, of those projects in assuring the development and existence of both critically important additions to the library on Rosenstock-Huessy. And finally, our deep thanks go to the bibliographer Lise van der Molen, whose foundational work in both of those resources profoundly supported the editorial work of this book.

—WAYNE CRISTAUDO AND FRANCES HUESSY

Specific additional acknowledgments

BY WAYNE CRISTAUDO:
I wish to thank Roland Vogt for being the best colleague anyone could have and coming to my rescue by translating the essays of Wolfgang Ullmann and Georg Müller. Special thanks also go to Jürgen Lawrenz for his vibrant translation of the chapter on Descartes and Nietzsche from the *Soziologie,* and his dedication to rapidly absorbing the thought of someone who has proven for decades to be difficult to translate. I also want to thank my close friend and the best boss in the world, Dixon Wong, who has made life at the University of Hong Kong so fantastic. Mano Mora, my friend and colleague and musical accomplice for letting me interminably bash his ear on this stuff. Jennifer Buckley, Lelani Paras, Wendy Baker—God bless you for your love. As always, I would like to thank Freya von Moltke for her inspiration, support, and openness to any who are interested in scholarship on Rosenstock-Huessy.

BY FRANCES HUESSY:
In the weeks during which the editing and the interactions with authors, translators, publishers, and heirs occurred—not to mention the late-night phone calls from Wayne in Hong Kong—all the members of my expanded family stood by with great patience and understanding: Mark and our son James Huessy; our two international exchange students this year, Julia Czaplinska and Richard Linstedt—all occupying our house in Vermont; and our daughter Mari, a student in her first year at Grinnell College and

who returned home for the summer. Thank you so much for adding to the miraculous character of this book. I am also very grateful to each of the living authors whose papers appear in this volume; to Wolfgang Ullmann's and Georg Müller's heirs I was able to contact; and to the translators, Jürgen Lawrenz and Roland Vogt. The conversations with each of them, through their papers, permissions, or translations, and through the correspondence attendant to a publication of this kind, were a perfect demonstration of responding although we mutually risked being changed.

And finally, I join Wayne in thanking Freya von Moltke, whose unswerving influence and love for so many years have brought the inspiration of both Franz Rosenzweig and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy into all of our lives in a way no book, not even this one, could possibly do.

PART I:

ROSENSTOCK-HUESSY'S ENGAGEMENTS WITH NIETZSCHE

CHAPTER ONE

THE END OF THE WORLD, OR WHEN THEOLOGY SLEPT (1941)

EUGEN ROSENSTOCK-HUESSY

Editors' note. This essay is a selection from a manuscript submitted to *Christendom* magazine, in response to an article entitled, "Realized Eschatology," by Frederick S. Grant (Spring 1941 issue). There is no record that this essay was ever published. The draft manuscript as presented here contains minor corrections to spelling, punctuation, and grammar, and conforms to a single, consistent citation style. The original typescript, in two sections, can be found at Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, "The End of the World or When Theology Slept," *Collected Works on DVD* (Essex, Vt.: Argo Books, 2005).

IN THE SPRING ISSUE OF *CHRISTENDOM,* Frederick S. Grant dealt with "realized eschatology" as the basis of the Church. Genuine Christianity realized *an end of the world*. And Grant pointed out that it took the theologians fifty years, after 1892, to reclaim this completely abandoned "eschatological" position. Before that, for more than a century, the life of Jesus had been the subject of research, along with eschatology, and like the miracles, a point of omission or of embarrassment. Eschatology was a stranger to the frame of reference of progressive Christianity.

When it was readmitted to the fundamentals of source Christianity, men like Kirsop Lake in all honesty concluded that thereby Source Christianity was divorced forever from reasonable modern man. For could reasonable man believe in an end of the world?

In this way, the specific "historical" enlightenment of the nineteenth century, after inheriting "natural Christianity" without Last Things from eighteenth-century Enlightenment, finally refilled the empty cup of eschatology for the founders of the Church, but only by widening the gulf between these Founders and our modern world, by 1900 years, simultaneously.

When I taught at the Harvard Divinity School, I once asked everybody in the room if he believed in a Last Judgment. Everybody laughed; I hope

I did, too. And ever since, I have been told, there has been jesting about the mooncalf that literally believed in the Nicene Creed. The belief in the Last Things was left to mooncalves and jesters. G. K. Chesterton was allowed to sing the majestic verse in his immortal *Ballad of the White Horse:* "For the end of the world was long ago." Who would take such a phrase seriously, as the stark truth of everyday life, among progressive Christians?

However, in Europe, this progressive theology is at an end. Before me lies a great document which I received two months ago from a famous historian of the Church, somewhere in Europe. In this letter he simply asked me to read numbers 10, 832, and 1771 in Rouet de Journel, *Enchiridion Patristicum*, and he added that these were the texts of actual interest to the peoples of Europe. His quotations, Didache 16, 3; Cyril's Catecheses 15, 11; and Augustine are the most solemn and violent descriptions of the Last Judgment, the Antichrist, and "eschatology realized" before our eyes.

This theologian, then, lives at present the truth which F. Grant's essay presented to the American "professor of the crucifixion" as a fact 1900 years ago. This truth of eschatology realized is not a theologoumenon to be rediscovered scientifically, and put on our desk in the form of a book. It is an event of eternal truth, of our own times to be recognized on, and by faith.

Three years ago, I was allowed by the Ecumenic Council of Churches to state this position in an essay, "*Heilsgeschichte* = History of Salvation versus Theology."

Although Theology now rediscovers the Source Eschatologyof the Church, Christendom at large—and the States in particular—are still living under the anti-eschatological bias of nineteenth-century criticism. The lag between research and laity in any field is considerable; but in the case of eschatology realized, the lag has reached ominous proportions. And the lag is not altogether on the side of the laity. No people can live without eschatology. And while theology slept, the laity betook itself to other sources of Last Things.

And how could it be otherwise? Should the whole world wait patiently for 150 years until the theologians might have untied their knot? What can the laity do during the erratic brainstorms of the scholars in the deserts of their hypotheses? The layman cannot live on the latest scientific news. He needs complete faith, hope, love. Hence the overthrow of eschatology by the Enlightenment had tremendous repercussions, especially in Germany, the center of theological studies.