Rethinking Kant 5
Rethinking Kant 5

Edited by
Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike

Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Rethinking Kant 5

Edited by Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike

This book first published 2018

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2018 by Pablo Muchnik, Oliver Thorndike and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... vii

Abbreviations ............................................................................................... ix

Introduction ................................................................................................... 1
Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike

## Part I: Formal and Material Conditions of Knowledge

Kant on Concept Generality and Logical Extensions ................................. 17
Hyoung Sung Kim

Epigenesis of Pure Reason and the Source of Pure Cognitions:
How Kant is No Nativist about Logical Cognition .................................... 35
Huaping Lu-Adler

On Kantian Intuitions ................................................................................ 71
Luca Oliva

Kant on Reason in the Sciences ................................................................. 93
James Hebbeler

Kant on the Systematicity and Purposiveness of Nature ......................... 131
Hannah Ginsborg

What is the Human Being? The Link between Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* and the *Opus postumum* .......................................................... 163
Dilek Huseyinzadegan

## Part II: Moral Bridges

The Second ‘Type’ in the *Critique of Practical Reason* .......................... 187
Adam Westra
Virtue as its Own Reward: Kant on the Benefits of Virtue ....................... 207
Anne Margaret Baxley

The Inveterate Debtor as Arrogant, Conceited Ass and Servile,
Sycophantic Flatterer: Kant and Austen on Failures in the Virtues
of Self-Respect and Debt Management ................................................... 231
Jeanine Grenberg

Part III: Teleology Reconsidered

Formal Purposiveness in Kant’s Aesthetic Judgment................................. 253
Gerad Gentry

From Natural History to History of Nature: Kant between Buffon
and Herder .................................................................................................. 281
John H. Zammito

Contributors.................................................................................................. 311

About the Editors.......................................................................................... 315
This volume contains papers presented in the 2014 to 2016 meetings of the regional Study Groups of the North American Kant Society (NAKS). We would like to thank all of those who contributed to the success of these conferences. We are deeply grateful to all scholars who have contributed to Rethinking Kant and have thus helped to make it the well-regarded book series it has now become. Rethinking Kant is designed to take the pulse of current Kantian scholarship from a broad variety of perspectives. This would not be possible without the generosity of the contributors – doctoral students, recent Ph.Ds, postdoctoral fellows, assistant and associate professors, and well-established thinkers. Working with them was pleasant, challenging, and humbling for us.

—Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike
ABBREVIATIONS

All references to Kant’s works are in accordance with the Akademie-Edition Vol. 1-29 of Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin, 1900–. References to the Critique of Pure Reason follow the customary pagination of the first (A) and second (B) edition. Unless otherwise indicated, the English translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–). The following abbreviations are used throughout the book:

AA  Immanuel Kants Schriften. Ausgabe der Königlich Preussischen (Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1900–)

Anth Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), AA 7 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Standpoint

BGSE Bemerkungen in den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (1764), AA 20 Notes inserted in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime

BM Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace (1785), AA 8 Determination of the Concept of a Human Race

Br Briefe, AA 10-13 Correspondence

EEKU Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft, AA 20 First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment

FM Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolff’s Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? (written 1793-1794, published 1804), AA 20 What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviations</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| GMS | Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), AA 4  
*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* |
| GSE | Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (1764), AA 2  
*Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* |
| GUGR | Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume (1768), AA 2  
*Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space* |
| IaG | Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), AA 8  
*Idea toward a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* |
| KpV | Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), AA 5  
*Critique of Practical Reason* |
*Critique of Pure Reason* |
| KU | Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), AA 5  
*Critique of the Power of Judgment* |
| LK | Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte und Bearbeitung der Beweise, deren sich Herr von Leibniz und andere Mechaniker in dieser Streitsache bedient haben, nebst einigen vorhergehenden Betrachtungen, welche die Kraft der Körper überhaupt betreffen (1747), AA 1  
*Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces* |
| Log | Jäsche Logik, AA 9  
*The Jäsche Logic* |
| MAM | Muthmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte (1786), AA 8  
*Conjectural Beginning of Human History* |
| MAN | Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786), AA 4  
*Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Volume/Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MpVT</td>
<td>Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee (1791), AA 8</td>
<td>On the Failure of all Philosophic Attempts in Theodicy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Metaphysik der Sitten (1797-1798), AA 6</td>
<td>Metaphysics of Morals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis (1770), AA 2</td>
<td>On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (1763), AA 2</td>
<td>Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Neuer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe und der damit verknüpften Folgerungen in den ersten Gründen der Naturwissenschaft (1758), AA 2</td>
<td>New Theory of Motion and Rest, and the Connected Consequences in the First Principles of the Natural Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op</td>
<td>Opus postumum, AA 21, 22</td>
<td>Opus postumum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Päd</td>
<td>Pädagogik, AA 9</td>
<td>Pedagogy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>Physische Geographie, AA 9</td>
<td>Physical Geography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Metaphysicae cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam (1756), AA 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry, of which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PND</td>
<td>Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio (1755), AA 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prol</td>
<td>Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (1783), AA 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refl</td>
<td>Reflexion, AA 14-19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reflection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGV</td>
<td>Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793-1794), AA 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Streit der Fakultäten (1798), AA 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict of the Faculties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TG</td>
<td>Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (1766), AA 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis (1793), AA 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory But It Is of No Use in Practice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÜE</td>
<td>Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll (1790), AA 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On a Discovery whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to Be Made Superfluous by an Older One</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÜGTP</td>
<td><em>Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie</em> (1788), AA 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAMS</td>
<td><em>Vorarbeiten zur Metaphysik der Sitten</em>, AA 23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAnth</td>
<td><em>Vorlesungen über Anthropologie</em>, AA 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td><em>Vorlesungen über Ethik</em>, AA 27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VL</td>
<td><em>Vorlesungen über Logik</em>, AA 24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VM</td>
<td><em>Vorlesungen über Metaphysik</em>, AA 28, 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPE</td>
<td><em>Vorlesung philosophische Enzyklopädie</em>, AA 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPG</td>
<td><em>Vorlesungen über Physische Geographie</em>, AA 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRML</td>
<td><em>Über ein vermeintes Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu lügen</em> (1797), AA 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRL</td>
<td><em>Vorlesungen über Religion</em>, AA 28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VvRM</td>
<td><em>Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen</em> (1775), AA 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td><em>Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?</em> (1784), AA 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDO</td>
<td><em>Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?</em> (1786), AA 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations

ZeF Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf (1795), AA 8
Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project
INTRODUCTION

PABLO MUCHNIK AND OLIVER THORNDIKE

I – Formal and Material Conditions of Knowledge

Throughout his career, Kant argues for the systematic character of science. By

*science [Wissenschaft] … is to be understood the complex of a cognition as a system. It is opposed to common cognition, i.e., to the complex of a cognition as mere aggregate. A system rests on an idea of the whole, which precedes the parts, while with common cognition on the other hand, or a mere aggregate of cognitions, the parts precede the whole. (Log 9:72)*

The possibility of such a system of knowledge, and thus of scientific knowledge proper, is meant to be demonstrated by Kant’s transcendent al philosophy. The latter, however, depends on formal rules of logic that provide the forms through which we can think anything at all. This means that transcendent al philosophy is logically articulated, through and through – a view which in turn entails that, at the basis of our representation of the world, lies Kant’s conception of formal logic as “the science that exhaustively presents and strictly proves nothing but the formal rules of all thinking” (KrV Bviii-ix). The first three papers in this anthology aim to provide an interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of formal logic and its place in transcendent al philosophy; the three contributions that follow attend to the other side of the question, namely, how certainty and systematicity in the empirical sciences are possible in Kant’s critical system.

In “Kant on Concept Generality and Logical Extensions,” **Hyoun g Sung Kim** starts with Kant’s distinction between a concept’s form (its generality) and its matter (the objects it represents), and asks what “generality” precisely means. Kant writes that “All judgments are acts that … strictly relate general representations” (KrV B141). However, there seem to be at least three ways in which Kant speaks of generality. First, there is thing-generality: TREE is thing-general insofar as it represents what is common to a multiplicity of distinct things. Since Kant’s
transcendental philosophy cannot presuppose the existence of things, thing-generality cannot be the most fundamental form of generality that Kant has in mind. Consequently, Kim distinguishes a second way in which we can understand Kantian generality: genus-generality. On this view, concepts are more fundamental than things, because TREE is genus-general insofar as it represents what is common to types of trees in a genus-species relation: the concept of tree, e.g., contains under itself spruce, oak, and birch. Kim argues that the legitimacy of genus-generality, however, presupposes a sense in which the subject of cognition must have already combined the relevant concepts in question. This leads him to discuss a third sense of generality: form-generality, which Kim takes to denote “a unity that is prior to its parts such that the parts are the kinds of parts they are in virtue of the whole” (p.23). Kant says:

In every cognition of an object there is, namely, unity of the concept, which one can call qualitative unity insofar as by that only the unity of the comprehension of the manifold of cognition is thought, as, say, the unity of the theme in a play, a speech, or a fable. (KrV B114)

According to Kim’s reading, then, Kant’s logical doctrine takes a three-layered approach to generality: thing-generality presupposes conceptual relations at the level of genus-generality, which, in turn, is based on the more fundamental notion of form-generality. Kim concludes his paper by showing how this conception of logic translates into contemporary extensionalist commitments:

[T]hing-general judgments, such as ‘Socrates is human’, can be modeled by ‘an individual thing a is a member of the extension of concept C’. Genus-general judgments, such as ‘humans are animals’, can be modeled by ‘concepts C_1, C_2, … are species of a concept C’. Finally, form-general judgments, such as ‘animals are complex, sentient, and living creatures’ can be modeled by ‘a concept C is uniquely constituted by other concepts C_1, C_2, …’. Each class involves fundamentally different types of thought about different kinds of intentional objects. (pp.31-2)

Understanding the precise sense in which concepts can be said to be general still leaves us with the question of where these concepts originate. What is the source of our cognition of such rules? In virtue of what is logic a science? What are its a priori grounding principles? What gives it its systematicity? Where does the normativity of logical rules come from? In “Epigenesis of Pure Reason and the Source of Pure Cognitions – How Kant is No Nativist about Logical Cognition,” Huaping Lu-Adler argues that just as Kant’s transcendental deduction establishes pure concepts of
the understanding as valid for all possible experience, so does Kant’s critical philosophy establish “logical rules as valid for all possible thinking” (p.64). Lu-Adler illuminates the significance that the Locke/Leibniz debate on innate concepts has for Kant’s critical standpoint. She shows that, historically speaking, there are three options regarding the origin of logical rules: they are innate (Leibniz), derived from experience (Locke), or, as Lu-Adler argues, originally acquired \textit{a priori} (Kant). Consulting Kant’s published works, lectures and reflections, Lu-Adler shows that, for Kant, the acquisition of logical rules involves a kind of radical epigenesis of pure reason, i.e., self-legislation of logical rules:

On occasion of the use of the understanding (in thinking), reason reflects on the ground of the possibility of all thinking as regards its form and thereby deduces a system of logical rules... On this account, the cognition of logical rules boils down to an act of self-legislation by reason with respect to the necessary laws of thinking. (p.63)

The significance of this reading consists in providing a Kantian alternative to Leibnizian innatism, which Lu-Adler shows to be unsatisfactory for Kant; and it does so by evading the charge of infinite regress. For, the pure concepts of the understanding still presuppose some kind of preformation: they must be traced to their first germs, i.e., logical rules, and the derivation of these logical rules cannot be traced to yet another set of prior conditions. The thesis of the complete spontaneity of reason in the epigenesis of logical rules avoids this conundrum altogether.

Formal logic alone, however, is not sufficient for knowledge of the world. Among the many dichotomies within the philosophical framework of Kant’s transcendental idealism none is perhaps more central than the distinction between concept and intuition. The Neo-Kantian critique of this distinction has dominated much of the discussions at the beginning of the previous century. Yet, neither Cohen and Natorp from the Marburg School, nor Windelband and Rickert from the Southwest School are read much today.\footnote{A noteworthy exception is Michael Friedman, \textit{A Parting of the Ways}. Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago: Open Court, 2000). The following remarks are indebted to his work.} What was at stake in these 19th century debates? How do they help us understand the role of formal logic within Kant’s transcendental idealism?

For the historical Kant, all knowledge proceeds from two stems of cognition, sensibility (intuition) and understanding (concept), and their mediation through the faculty of judgment (schematism). Neo-Kantianism
rejects this dualism of a logical faculty of the understanding, on the one hand, and an intuitive faculty of sensibility, on the other. Space and time, according to this line of thought, are not forms stemming from two independent logical operations. The constitution of experience proceeds from purely conceptual, i.e., non-spatio-temporal, structures. Knowledge, therefore, becomes possible through the logical faculty alone. A case in point is the conception of “number” as a place within a series, i.e., as a merely relational or logical concept. In “On Kantian Intuitions,” Luca Oliva presents a logical interpretation of this notion by drawing from the Neo-Kantian insight described above: “Kantian intuitions,” Oliva argues, “carry two logical connotations. First, they behave like placeholders: since pure intuitions stand for anything empirical whatsoever, they recall the idea of logical variable. Second, the framework of these intuitions is characterized by part-whole relations. And intuitions represent such relationship” (p.75). A key element in Oliva’s contribution to this volume is to show that the ideality of space and time already carries with it logical connotations on which quanta ultimately depend. This analysis of Kantian intuitions puts Kant’s philosophy of mathematics at center stage, since, as Oliva claims, mathematics is central to both Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge and his entire theoretical philosophy. Evaluating the recent literature on Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, Oliva details why Kantian intuitionism must be seen as primarily logical, and Neo-Kantians would agree. In our view, the crucial importance of continuing this discussion lies in the fact that it overcomes Kant’s dualistic conception of knowledge, which, despite its numerous contemporary advocates, has proven unsuccessful in describing the spatio-temporal world of experience that we inhabit: the empirical world, we have come to realize, is not Newtonian as Kant used to think.

But, how central are Newton’s laws of motion for Kant’s conception of certainty in the natural sciences? James Hebbeler addresses this question in “Kant on Reason in the Sciences” Hebbeler begins by reminding us of Kant’s claim that there is reason in the sciences only insofar as something in them is cognized a priori; but what precisely does this mean? Leading with examples from the Logic, Hebbeler outlines how Kant’s concepts of the “a priori,” “rational,” “necessary,” “apodictic,” and “sufficiently grounded” provide us with a picture of properly rational sciences as sciences that deliver well-grounded explanations of laws. Hebbeler then analyzes key passages from, among other texts, the Critique and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, in order to reveal significant but underappreciated differences between the a priori cognition at work in the different sciences. For example, Hebbeler distinguishes between the
“progressive” a priori proofs of geometry, where premises constitute the *explanans* and the conclusion the *explanandum*, and the “regressive” a priori proofs of transcendental philosophy, where premises constitute the *explanandum* and the conclusion the *explanans*. This distinction, Hebbeler proceeds to show, sheds light on the differences between the metaphysics that, according to Kant, lies at the basis of natural science, and the geometrical cognition such science applies, and that, on his reading, constitutes an a priori discipline in its own right. As a second example, Hebbeler argues that, because geometrical cognition is ultimately the result of self-evident principles, individual demonstrations in geometry can stand on their own as apodictically certain instances of a priori cognition. However, this is not so in regard to the a priori cognition at work either in transcendental philosophy or in natural science, for the latter, Hebbeler notes, contains Newton’s fundamental laws of motion as part of its premises. This interpretation has an important consequence: it shows “how the feature of certainty in a priori cognition has to do with the well-groundedness of its conclusions, not their infallibility, and why it is not surprising to see Kant’s emphasis on the systematic requirement of science where self-evidence cannot be achieved” (p.127). In natural science, for example, the fact that both terrestrial and celestial motions can be systematically comprehended as instantiations of the more fundamental law of universal gravitation provides an independent source of justification for the a priori cognition of the laws that this science yields.

In “Kant on the Systematicity and Purposiveness of Nature,” Hannah Ginsborg deepens our understanding of Kant’s notion of systematicity in transcendental philosophy. Famously, Kant argued in both the *Appendix to the Dialectic* and the Introductions to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* that we must presuppose the systematicity of nature in its divers empirical laws. But why must this be so? As Kant says:

> It is a subjectively necessary transcendental presupposition that (...) nature itself, through the affinity of particular laws under more general ones, qualifies for an experience, as an empirical system (...). This presupposition is the transcendental principle of the power of judgment. (...) The power of judgment, which is obliged to bring particular laws, even in regard to what differentiates them under the same general laws of nature, under higher, though still empirical laws, must ground its procedure on such a principle (...). Only under the presupposition of it is it possible to organize experiences in a systematic way. (KU 20:209-211)

There have been two general ways to account for Kant’s systematicity claim. On the first reading, the presupposition of nature’s systematicity is a subjective maxim required to *encourage* the activity of empirical enquiry.
This means: it would be irrational to look for systematicity unless we could assume that nature itself is systematically organized. Ginsborg argues that this reading is too weak, because the scientific activity of systematizing various empirical laws does not require “advance assurance that these activities will be successful” (p.158). On the second view, the necessity of empirical laws is a function of their systematizability. This view, which Ginsborg attributes to Buchdahl and Kitcher, makes systematicity a necessary attribute of nature’s lawfulness: a particular law cannot be necessary unless it can be located within a system of laws. Ginsborg points out, however, that this reading seems to be too strong. Indeed, Kant repeatedly expresses his skeptical worry about whether nature’s laws are in fact systematic: “we judge the unity of nature according to empirical laws (...) to be contingent” (KU 5:183). So, if the systematic unity of empirical laws is contingent, and cannot be directly derived from the transcendental lawfulness prescribed by the understanding, the problem remains on both standard interpretations: why is it necessary to assume that nature is systematically organized? It is here that Ginsborg offers a third alternative: she explains the notion of systematicity via the notion of purposiveness. Even though the systematic organization of nature’s laws is a contingent matter, reflective judgment must assume that nature is purposive in order to carry on its own activity of systematization. “If we are to regard the empirical regularities we observe as necessary, we cannot regard the relation between nature and our cognitive faculties as a merely contingent one” (p.154). In other words, the principle of purposiveness is a principle that reflective judgment prescribes to itself, not to nature; and it is a necessary presupposition because otherwise “all reflection would be carried out at random and blindly, and without legitimate expectation of its agreement with nature” (KU 5:212). Thus, Ginsborg concludes, assuming that nature is purposive for our cognitive faculties is tantamount to assuming that its laws can be systematized by us. This assumption, in turn, is a necessary presupposition for understanding empirical regularities as truly lawful, because the only way science can inquire into the lawfulness of nature is by locating it in a systematic theory.

Ultimately, Kant believes, such a systematic theory must comprise both theoretical and practical knowledge. In “What is the human being? The link between Kant’s Critique of Judgment and the Opus postumum,” Dilek Huseyinzadegan confronts the gap between nature and freedom within Kant’s critical system. Against the background of recent commentators who are skeptical of Kant’s capacity to complete the critical system, Huseyinzadegan argues that the notion of the human being as the
unity of nature and freedom provides Kant with all he needs to secure the transition between theoretical and practical philosophy. Kant makes this point in a cryptic remark in the Opus postumum, where he refers to “the subject as a rational world-being” (Op 21:27). Interpreting Kant’s late fascicles in the Opus postumum, Huseyinzadegan unpacks the significance of this view on Kant’s behalf by returning to the Critique of Judgment, where Kant presents three gradual accounts of a transition between mechanistic nature and freedom. While other commentators (e.g., Guyer, Allison, Zammito) have also turned to the third Critique in search for a bridge between nature and freedom, none has developed a gradualistic account of how Kant accomplishes the task. Huseyinzadegan argues that the most obvious candidates for the transition in the third Critique are “sensus communis” and “beauty as a symbol of morality” These notions, however, emphasize either our empirical or noumenal dimensions, and thereby neglect the in-between character of humanity, our irreducibility to either nature or freedom. Huseyinzadegan attempts to show that Kant’s final standpoint on the transition comes to posit the human being as the highest standpoint of transcendental philosophy and that this transition is ultimately grounded in a regulatively teleological way of thinking about the world and our place in it. In this way, the question “What is the human being?” constitutes the link between the Critique of Judgment and the Opus Postumum and provides an important interpretive key for the underlying unity of Kant’s critical system. (p.168)

II– Moral Bridges

Even if, as Kant explains in the Jaeschke Logic (Log 9:25), anthropology provides an answer to the question “What is the human being?” and hence contains the key to understanding the relation between metaphysics, morality, and religion, the problem of transition is overarching and plagues each domain of his critical philosophy. Adam Westra’s “The Second ‘Type’ in the Critique of Practical Reason” tackles this problem as it plays itself out in Kant’s morality. Here, the faculty of judgment is tasked with connecting the supersensible moral law to concrete actions in the sensible world. It does so by means of a “type”, which Kant identifies with the law of natural causality, the universality of which works as a formal analogue of the moral law and allows it to be applied in experience. “With this type in hand, one can perform a moral appraisal by means of a thought experiment in which one asks oneself if one could will to be part of a counterfactual nature in which one’s maxim were a universal law” (p.189).
This thought experiment operates on the assumption that there is “an abstract structural correspondence between the moral and natural realms qua orderly, lawful systems” (p.196), but it is far from clear how such “structural correspondence” ought to be understood. Interpreters have tried to make sense of it by appealing to the kind of teleological considerations Kant introduces in relation to the kingdom of ends in the *Groundwork* (GMS 4:438-9). But, Westra notices, these extraneous considerations do not square with the text of the Typic in the second *Critique*, where one finds no traces of teleological language whatsoever. To overcome this impasse, Westra suggests, we should focus on another sense of “type” which has been often ignored in the literature. According to this view, besides the law of natural causality (“type” in the first sense), “it is also permitted to use the nature of the sensible world as the type of an intelligible nature” (KpV 5:70).

The efficacy of this “second type” rests on a fundamental Kantian assumption, namely, that “the moral law commands us... to impart the world in which we live and act – i.e., sensible nature – with the form of a purely intelligible moral order – i.e., a ‘supersensible nature’”’ (p.197). The intelligible world, Kant believes, “could be called the *archetypal world* (*natura archetypa*) which we cognize only in reason, whereas the latter [i.e., the sensible world] could be called the *ectypal world* (*natura ectypa*) because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the former as the determining ground of the will” (KpV 5:43). The terminology Kant employs in this passage is important, since, as Westra explains, it brings to the fore the Greek etymology of “*τύπος*” (*typus*, *τύπος*), which derives “from the verb forms meaning ‘to strike’ (*τύπτω*) or ‘to stamp’ (*τυπόω*), [and] had three related meanings: (1) that which stamps, impresses, or imprints; (2) that which is stamped, impressed or imprinted; and (3) the relationship between these two things” (p.198). This cluster of meanings contains the clue to understanding the Typic chapter. For, while *archetypal* and the *ectypal* nature capture, respectively, the first two Greek meanings, Kant reserves “type” to the third – a use that then allows him to account for the connection between the intelligible and the sensible worlds. So interpreted, the “*typus*” designates what “archetypal and ectypal nature share in spite of their specific differences, namely the form of ‘nature’ itself (*natura formaliter spectata*)” (p.200). This shared form, i.e., universal lawfulness in general, is what allows the type of the second *Critique* to bridge what would otherwise be two utterly incommensurable senses of nature. In this way, Westra’s interpretation has a distinctive advantage over the teleological readings in the literature: it remains true to Kant’s text.
In “Virtue as Its Own Reward: Kant on the Benefits of Virtue,” **Anne Margaret Baxley** addresses a variant of the problem of transition: how are we to conceive of the relation that happiness and morality have in a virtuous life? As every reader of the *Groundwork* knows, for Kant morality and happiness “can – and often do – conflict” (p.209), and the good will shines more brightly when devoid of worldly adornments. Yet, Kant is nonetheless adamant about defending a much softer view: virtue is its own reward. Unlike action out of duty, which often requires self-sacrifice, the life of virtue is self-enhancing: it brings our sensible and rational natures closer to a harmonious relation, for virtue “gives [an agent] pleasure, it provides her with a lasting sense of contentment, it makes palpable to her a sense of freedom understood as independence and self-sufficiency, and it enables her to enjoy life by instilling in her the ever-cheerful heart of Epicurus” (p.210) Baxley shows that Kant’s account of virtue in no way contradicts his views on duty, for although the “consolations of virtue” provide tangible benefits, “these rewards themselves do not constitute happiness” (ibid.) Virtue generates moral pleasure, but this feeling should not be confused with its sensuous (“pathological”) counterpart. While the latter consists in having a satisfaction with one’s sensible condition that amounts to “happiness,” “Kant thinks of virtue as moral strength of will or moral self-mastery, where strength involves a firm disposition to do one’s duty from the motive of duty and the force to withstand the temptation to transgress the moral law” (ibid.).

Strength so conceived expresses “the autocracy of pure practical reason,” where autocracy is characterized as a form of moral self-rule or self-governance that goes beyond autonomy” (p.211). The autocratic agent, Baxley argues, experiences moral pleasure as a consequence of having acted out of duty, and, unlike sensuous pleasure, this feeling neither precedes nor triggers her conduct – it supervenes upon moral action, crowning the primacy that reason has acquired in her will. When this primacy is lasting, it gives rise to “self-contentment,” which, once again, differs from happiness: while the former is an expression of “what one does” (MS 6:388), the latter expresses what nature bestows upon us. “Being satisfied with one’s existence (who one is and what one has made of oneself) is presumably part of what it means for one’s life to go well” (p.223). The virtuous agent experiences peace of mind and inner tranquility, the “consciousness of needing nothing,” which Kant associates with autarchy and self-sufficiency. The freedom of self-mastery, however, goes beyond subduing one’s affects and governing one’s passions (MS 6:407). It imbues the agent with a cheerful heart, an aesthetic moral
constitution or temperament that is “courageous and hence joyous” in the performance of duty (R 6:25n.). Although, as Baxley notices, the benefits of virtue do not obliterate the differences between the heterogeneous goods of morality and happiness, they do go a long way into forsaking the old caricature of Kant as a moral curmudgeon.

In “The Inveterate Debtor as Arrogant, Conceited Ass and Servile, Sycophantic Flatterer: Kant and Austen on Failures in the Virtues of Self-Respect and Debt Management,” Jeanine Grenberg foregrounds the impact that our relationship with money and status have in our moral lives. The management of the household and our attitude toward social hierarchies and expectations, Grenberg argues, directly affect our chances of becoming virtuous. Although Kant does not recognize a specific duty of household management, its connection with servility is clear in the following passage from the *Doctrine of Virtue*:

> Be no man’s lackey. – Do not let others tread with impunity on your rights.– Contract no debt for which you cannot give full security.– Do not accept favors you could do without, and do not be a parasite or a flatterer or (what really differs from these only in degree) a beggar. Be thrifty, then, so that you will not become destitute. (MS 6:436)

There is a thread connecting these seemingly unrelated items: to “acquire the right attitude toward money and persons with money” is crucial to avoid putting oneself “in morally compromising positions that would injure [one’s] dignity” (p.235). So understood, the problem with indebtedness (or, for that matter, with lying or making false promises) is not so much the “moral wrongness inflicted upon others (…). I am, rather, failing myself in some very basic ways” (p.236). Even if we were to accept this construal and treat such issues as matters of virtue and not right, Kant nonetheless seems to misdescribe the situation: far from being servile, a debtor expresses a conceited excess, a mistaken sense of deserving objects she cannot afford. Grenberg, however, vindicates the Kantian view by showing that servility and self-conceit are complementary attitudes that “conspire as colleagues in the moral psychological world of the inveterate debtor” (p.237). This is so, because at their basis lies a similar illicit relation between our self-love and the demands of morality: while the conceited agent has an inflated sense of her value and hence expects others to defer to her whims, the one who is servile lacks self-esteem and is thus willing to “throw herself away” (MS 6:420), to disavow her own dignity. A self-inflicted moral injury precedes in both cases the injury one does to others. Over-valuing oneself is the flipside of the failure to respect oneself.
This means, then, that arrogance and self-debasement are psychologically contiguous attitudes. As Kant pithily puts: “someone arrogant is always mean in the depths of his soul. For he would not demand that others think little of themselves in comparison with him unless he knew that, were his fortune suddenly to change, he himself would not find it hard to grovel and to waive any claim to respect from others” (MS 6:465-466). The character of Sir Walter Elliot in Jane Austen’s *Persuasion*, Grenberg proceeds to argue, epitomizes Kant’s inveterate debtor. Although Kant and Austen might seem to be odd bedfellows, they “share a conception about the challenges in being moral: they both offer us a picture of humanity tempted by excesses of self-love which is resolvable into a respect for one’s dignified self – and proper love and sympathy for others – only via reduction of these excesses of self-love” (p.233). Through Grenberg’s analysis of the novel, we see Sir Walter as prey of his own vanity, blinded by the glitter of his aristocratic milieu, and thus unable to separate his sense of personal dignity from the trappings of his social status. This inability entices him to live beyond his means, to contract debts he cannot repay, to flatter or despise other characters according to their station, and dismiss the wise counsel of family and friends who urge him to recalibrate his lifestyle and turn his gaze inward. In Grenberg’s hands, philosophy and literature work in tandem: while Austen makes Kantian concepts more vivid, Kant illuminates Sir Walter’s features with the colors of genuine universality.

III– Teleology Reconsidered

In “Formal Purposiveness in Kant’s Aesthetic Judgment,” Gerard Gentry presents a way to avoid two typical mistakes when it comes to the third *Critique*: “Either the principle of purposiveness is not given the kind of interpretative prominence that Kant gives it, or if it is given due attention, it is seen as easily criticizable” (p.256). For Gentry, purposiveness is “central to a unification of the faculties of the mind,” and, in the case of aesthetic judgments, it must be understood as a “strictly formal principle of cognitive relation” – that is, “it should not be understood to pertain directly to an object, but to a relation between the creative faculty (the imagination) and the lawful faculty (the understanding)” (p.257). Although indebted to Rachel Zuckert’s “whole formalism,” Gentry’s interpretation shifts the attention away from the properties of the object to a purely subjective relation between our cognitive faculties. Seen this way, what triggers the aesthetic judgment is not directly the object, but “the purposiveness of form in a representation
given by the imagination,” which engages the understanding in a “purely transcendental relation in the mind” (p.260). Objects thus play an indirect role – what generates aesthetic judgments are “the representations given by the imagination, qua determinable representations, which already have something of the lawful mark” (ibid.). Lawfulness, therefore, is no longer the exclusive property of the understanding: the imagination in aesthetic judgments is “already functioning in a lawful way in order to produce such determinable matter for the understanding to determine (i.e., make lawful)” (ibid.).

This subjectivist interpretation, Gentry believes, can do better justice to Kant’s text than Zuckert’s “whole formalism” As Kant puts it: an aesthetic judgment “relates the representation by which an object is given solely to the subject, and does not bring to our attention any property of the object, but only the purposive form in the determination of the powers of representation that are occupied with it” (KU 5:228) Gentry’s view “in no way denies that objects are involved” – but it insists, instead, that “these objects are only indirectly related as necessary content of the imagination” (p.263). For, the most salient feature of the aesthetic judgment is the “relation between two activities of the mind” (ibid.) that engage in free play. The cornerstone of the third Critique, therefore, is not, as most interpreters suppose, an object-to-mind relation – purposiveness is to be found, rather, in a mind-to-mind relation. The free play between the faculties is due to the fact that “the representation produced by the imagination meets the criterion of the understanding of being lawful, i.e., unifiable according to a concept. So, even though the understanding cannot produce the unifying concept, it recognizes the determinable form of the representation, and so the mind is delighted by what is both lawful and given to cognition yet beyond its reach” (p.269). The understanding feels the normative pull to determine the representation, but the manifold is so rich that it cannot be subsumed under any given concept. This surfeit leaves the imagination free, and “reveals to the mind in general that it is capable of perceiving and creating far more than it is able to grasp in determinate ways” (p.274).

Our collection closes with John H. Zammito’s “From Natural History to History of Nature: Kant between Buffon and Herder”. This shift, Zammito argues, took place throughout the 18th century. It responded to the emergence of a new conception of nature, a thoroughly developmental view which replaced the traditional conception of nature as constant and immutable, and hence called for a radical methodological adjustment to reflect the new vision of the natural world. This epistemic change is captured by the move from “natural history” in its classical sense of
natural description [German: *Naturbeschreibung*], which had found brilliant systematization in the work of Linnaeus, to ‘history of nature’ [German: *Naturgeschichte*], i.e., the explicit recognition that nature changed and developed over time” (p.283).

Kant, Zammito explains, played a major role in this process of historicization: “He sought to have [*Naturgeschichte*] mean quite literally a developmental and generative reconstruction of nature’s past, an ‘archeology of nature.”’ (p.286). After his critical turn, however, Kant developed “second thoughts” with respect to the new science – reservations which, Zammito shows, were “especially spurred by the radically historicist reception of Buffon’s work by Johann Gottfried Herder” (p.286). It will fall onto others, most notably onto Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, to bring to fruition the impulse to create the *Naturgeschichte* which Kant eventually abandoned.

With the patience of a sleuth and enormous erudition, Zammito reconstructs the conceptual stages that led to Kant’s change of heart. The first appearance of the term *Naturgeschichte* in the Kantian corpus is in a little essay on the earth’s rotation (1754), where Kant announces his forthcoming *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755). This minor text is important, since Kant attributes to “history of nature” features that will dominate future usage: “First, Kant indicated that this was a (thought) experiment, not anything close to an apodictic knowledge claim. Second, Kant affirmed ‘actualism,’ i.e., the applicability of ‘current relations of the universe’ in reconstructing earlier natural configurations. Third, the basis for such an extension of knowledge into the past was the availability of ‘traits’ (*Merkmaalen*) or traces which persisted into the present. Finally, and crucially, Kant concerned himself with *original condition* [*erste Zustand*] and with *gestation* [*Erzeugung*], not simply development [*Auswicklung*]” (p.287). Soon afterwards Kant inaugurated his course on physical geography. The concerns of this course overlapped with those of this early essay. Yet, “[d]espite the course offering, there was a twenty-year gap before the term *Naturgeschichte* again appeared in a publication by Kant” (p.290), namely, in his controversial 1775 “On the Different Races of Human Beings,” where he severed its connections with “natural description” altogether. Buffon’s influence looms large in this text, and underlies the language of “*Keime*” (seeds) and “*Anlagen*” (predispositions) which will accompany Kant the rest of his life.

By the 1790s, however, Kant became openly suspicious about the new science. As Zammito sees it, “we have good historical reason to believe that Kant made a decided shift over the 1780s from participation in actual theorizing in life science (to be sure, from his armchair) to a much more
skeptical *critique* of its method” (p.297). The shift is largely due to Kant’s “bitter disputes” over race with Herder and Forster, which, along with the development of his own critical philosophy, generated “epistemological scruples [which] overshadowed Kant’s scientific ambitions” (ibid.). In Kant’s mind, the very project of a history of nature in the way his contemporaries were undertaking it was predicated on the possibility of constitutive judgments of teleology, which transcended the bounds of our experience and bogged reason down in the quagmire of dogmatic metaphysics. Part of Kant’s motivation in writing the third *Critique* must be explained in light of these debates. Teleological judgments, Kant comes to believe, cannot provide constitutive knowledge of organic nature “but can at best have ‘a negative influence on procedure in theoretical natural science.’” (p.305) This view, Kant recognizes in §80, “could hardly appear congenial to practicing inquirers in this emergent field of empirical science” (ibid). Their project was a “daring adventure of reason” (KU 5:419n.), but had no prospect of becoming a science in the proper sense (p.306).

For Zammito, far from promoting our knowledge of nature, Kant’s skepticism about the scientific prospects of *Naturgeschichte* (and of the sciences of life in general) has been a major obstacle to achieve it. The restrictions on teleological judgments imposed by Kant’s critical philosophy, triggered in part by ideological disputes with his contemporaries, did not champion the new sciences but unwittingly delayed their development. Zammito thus invites us to reevaluate the role transcendental philosophy played in the genesis of the natural sciences as we know them – he invites us, like the other contributions in this volume, to rethink Kant.

**Works Cited**

PART I:

FORMAL AND MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE