

Russian-Turkish
Relations from the
First World War
to the Present

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By

Vefa Kurban

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PREFACE

This research book, on which I've worked for a long time, analyzes Russian-Turkish relations from the First World War until today. It is clear from the collected documents and data that this is a process with its ups and downs.

In my study, I wanted to explain the treaties, crises and other issues which are the turning points in Russian-Turkish relations by making use of both Russian and Turkish archival documents and sources. I have done research using the Moscow State Archive, Turkish Prime Ministry Republican Archive, Turkish General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies (ATASE) Division Archive, and Azerbaijan National Library archives; and during my study, I have benefited from the documents and information I have gathered from these sources. Since harm could have been caused by the disclosure of official documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive, these documents could not be made use of in my study.

I owe my thanks, in particular to my family, my husband Dr. Asif Kurban, my friends, my colleagues, Dr. Araz Aslanlı, Dr. Nazim Cafersoy, Dr. Hatem Cabbarlı, the archivists, and my students, especially Tulay Ozer Demir, who supported me in this process.

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INTRODUCTION

As we know, the relations between the Tsardom of Russia and the Ottoman Empire before the First World War were bad. Since Tsar Peter I, who ascended the throne at the beginning of the 18th century, Russia took the policy of reaching warmer seas and achieving the world domination, and chose the Ottoman geography as its area of expansion. Russia, who wanted to dominate the Black Sea by getting the Straits, made a great effort to reach this aim.

Although the Ottoman and Russian Empires were against each other during the first of the two big wars of human history, it must be known that after the war, Bolshevik Russia supported the Turkish war of independence, in line with its own interests.

During the Second World War, Turkey perceived the USSR as a threat and, following the war, it was faced with its northern neighbor's demands for land and base camps at the Straits.

Turkey's unrest continued during the Cold War years. In the new bipolar world, Turkey took sides with the Western bloc. After Stalin's death, the USSR emphasized that it had changed its policy towards Turkey, which had positive effects on the relations between the two states. However, Turkey is now a NATO member and a strategic ally of the USA. So, Turkey followed its foreign policy in line with this.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relations between Turkey and the states who gained their independence - and especially the Turkic states separated from the Soviet Union - gained different dimensions, and the relations between Turkey and these states were maintained not through Moscow, but directly.

Together with Vladimir Putin's accession to power in the Russian Federation, the relations took a normal course at first. However, the Syrian war went on for many years, pushing Russia and Turkey towards opposite camps in line with their own regional interests, and in fact, the Syrian war is also associated with the aircraft crisis of 24 November 2015. This crisis was the spark that caused the deterioration of the bilateral relations.

It seems that the downed Russian aircraft will have important repercussions which will affect the functioning of the international system over the two states' foreign policies and the Syrian crisis.

CHAPTER ONE

CAUSES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND TURKEY'S ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR

After the industrial revolution in 19th century Europe, Europe became the stock, industry and manufacturing center of the world. The nationalist movement awoken by the French Revolution significantly changed the balance of power in this continent and gave rise to the establishment of new nation-states.

After 1871, Germany gained national unity¹ and expedited colonial activities. Italy got interested in Ethiopia. Germany invaded the Alsace-Lorraine region, which harbored precious hard coal deposits needed for industry. As a result of the German invasion of the coal-rich region, a conflict broke out between Germany and France, which set the stage for the First World War.

After unification as a nation-state in 1871, Germany's trade and industry accelerated, and in some areas started to challenge the industry and commerce of Great Britain. An all-around cutthroat competition developed between Germany and Britain, and it intensified when Germans got down to work on the building of a strong navy for transoceanic expeditions. At the beginning of the 20th century, Britain and France began to draw closer together in the context of international diplomacy to even out the rise of German power. There had been already a conflict between Germany and France resulting from annexation of the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine², which had rich hard coal deposits necessary for industry, by Germany. On the other hand, Germany was becoming closer to Tsarist Russia as German leaders perceived the Britain-France friendship as a sign

¹ Maurer, Hartmut: Staatsrecht I; Grundlagen, Verfassungsorgane, Staatsfunktionen, 6. Aufl age, Verlag C. H. Beck, München 2010, p.41.

² Mesut Hakkı Çaşın, Understanding the Balance of Power and its Impacts on World War One in Modern European Security, Understanding the First World War At Its Centenary, From 1914 To 2014, International Symposium November 20-21, 2014, Istanbul / Turkey, p.46.

of the risk of "encirclement" by hostile nations. These developments contributed until the outbreak of war in 1914.

As a matter of fact, the First World War can be considered as an unfavorable result of the decisions taken by the leaders of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France and Britain, which were referred to as the great powers.

On the sunny morning of 28 June 1914, at around 10 a.m., Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, arrived in Sarajevo for an official visit. The citizens of Sarajevo lined up along both sides of the road to wave a greeting to the motorcade of the Archduke; however, in the crowd there were also some Bosnian nationalist Serbians plotting an assassination. The motorcade passed the first assassin, Mohammed Mehmedbašić, who failed to act and then left his place. The first three assassins lost their courage and thus could not attempt to assassinate the Archduke. When the convoy approached the Cumuria Bridge, Nedjelko Cabrinovic flung a bomb at the Archduke's car. The fourth assassin would almost succeed, but the Archduke fended off the bomb with a little arm movement and his car continued advancing rapidly. The street lamps and windows of the buildings in the surrounding area were either broken or damaged due to the severity of the explosion. Two people from the vehicle behind, namely Boos Count Waldeck and Colonel Erich von Merizz, were injured, along with six other people from within the crowd. The shouts of "Zivio!" ('Long may he live!') and "Hurrah!" were heard from the location of the bomb explosion. Subsequently, the fourth assassin, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, was promptly arrested just after his failed attempt at an assassination. It was identified as a result of investigation that the bomb was made of a large bottle packed with nails and bullets, and a lining was attached at the bottom of it.

The car of the Archduke sped to the Town Hall and departed at 10:45, approximately 30 minutes after arrival. The Archduke wanted to leave the Town Hall after the official reception to visit the executive assistant Colonel Morizz and other injured persons at the Garrison Hospital. Meanwhile, despite all the unrest, the governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Oskar Potiorek, stated that there was no possibility of a second attack and suggested they take the route back along the Appel Quay without sweeping into the interior streets under additional measures. The Archduke agreed to go via the advised route. However, although Archduke Ferdinand demanded his wife Sophie be taken to the governor's mansion, she insisted on accompanying him for the hospital visit.

On the journey to the hospital along the planned route, the two front cars mistakenly took a right-hand turn into the narrow Franz Joseph Street,

and Ferdinand's car naturally followed behind them. General Potiorek ordered the driver to go back and stay on the waterfront as soon as he recognized that they were advancing on the wrong line. Thereupon, the roadster carrying the Archduke and his wife stopped to reverse. Nevertheless, before the driver could reverse the car back to the correct route, Gavrilo Princip, standing in front of the Schiller's Store (the narrowest part of the street) where the car stopped, noticed the Archduke and fired two shots at Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and his wife Sophie, with his revolver, which tragically took the lives of both the heir and his wife. The first bullet struck the stomach of the Duchess, while the second bullet pierced the Archduke's jugular vein. The Duchess immediately fell on the knees of the Archduke and then the Archduke also lost consciousness.

The driver drove the car straight ahead to the Mansion, as the surgical service of the army was available there. However, when the car reached the mansion, the head physician of the hospital identified that they were already dead. 50-year-old Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his 46-year-old wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg lost their lives as a result of the assassination. The news regarding the success of the assassination was passed on to Lieutenant Trebtevitich in Belgrade through a telegram conveying the statement "Two bears have been sold"³.

Indeed, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, on 28 June 1914 in Sarajevo (Bosnia)⁴ was only an excuse for starting the First World War. Powers faithfully fulfilled their diplomatic commitments and the crisis quickly went from a local incident to a general war in Europe.

The terrorist attack in Sarajevo was the spark that started the fire of the First World War.⁵

However, if we focus on the processes leading up to the war, it can be argued that small incidents seemed to have deeper repercussions. The global power struggle and fierce competition between the European Great Powers, which started approximately 30-40 years before the outbreak of the war, continuously circulated the whole continent and ultimately resulted in the division of Europe into two opposite poles, which would later be referred as Allied Powers and Central Powers. The hostile

³ Meryem Günaydın, The Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 , *Akademik Bakış*, 1, Vol-8, Issue 15, Winter 2014; *Sabah*, "Suikast Etrafında", p.1, 13 July 1914.

⁴ Peyam, "Avusturya Veliyahdı ve Refikasının Katli", p.1, 29 June 1914.

⁵ The First World War, <http://www.historiasiglo20.org/4ESO/WWI.pdf>, 30.01.2016.

competition between these two sides was projected to turn into an effort for revenge, and due to that projection, both sides were secretly preparing for war. Everybody perceived the danger of possible upcoming conflict which would affect the whole world, more or less. Indeed, the assassination of the Austrian heir provided the related states with the pretext to rationalize the war.⁶

The Ottoman Empire's Entry into World War I

The Ottoman Empire, one of the actors in the First World War, was caught unprepared for war. The Empire was not able to pick up the pieces after an unexpected defeat in the Balkan Wars, in which its economy and military were harshly damaged.

The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) seized power in a coup d'etat in 1913, and thus, a "single-party government" was created in the country. The CUP-led government was aware of the impending European war, and thus, endeavored to seek allies so as not to stand alone in case of war. However, Britain, France and Russia, which were considered to be allies of the Ottoman Empire, did not give a positive response to the Ottomans' calls for an alliance⁷. The Ottoman Empire approached even Greece; however, it was also unwilling to form an alliance with the Empire. As a result, they had no choice but to approach the Central Powers represented by Germany.⁸ At the end of the negotiations, the Ottoman government and Germany came to an agreement and signed the Turkish-German Alliance Treaty on August 2, 1914, on the condition that it would remain a secret.

When the war began on July 28, 1914, the Ottoman Empire declared its impartiality and, taking the advantage of the wartime environment, announced that the capitulations had been abolished. Even though that decision was not taken seriously by the parties of the war, it was implemented by the government of the Committee of Union and Progress.

The Ottoman government started preparations for a partial mobilization. In the meantime, the German ships - *Goeben* and *Breslau* - escaping from

⁶ Turkish Republic State Archives General Directorate of Ottoman Archives Department Publication No: 130 (2013) World War I in the Ottoman Documents, Istanbul, p.3.

⁷ Yusuf Hikmet Bayur (1991) History of Turkish Revolution, Vol.I, Section IV, Ankara, p.504-510.

⁸ Turkish Republic State Archives General Directorate of Ottoman Archives Department Publication No: 130 (2013) World War I in the Ottoman Documents, Istanbul, p.4.

the British navy harbored in Istanbul, and because of their anger towards the British, the Ottoman Empire announced that they had purchased the ships. The ships were renamed Yavuz and Midilli, and enrolled into the Ottoman fleet without changing crew. Towards the end of October, these vessels were patrolling the Black Sea, but the ship Yavuz - formerly *Goeben* - was ordered by its German captain to attack the Russian positions of Odessa and Sevastopol on the night of 29-30 October, thus bringing the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers. In response, firstly Russia and then its allies successively declared war on the Ottoman Empire. In this way, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on 30 October 1914.⁹

The Tipping Point of the War

In 1917, the course of the war was changed through two significant events, namely the entry of the U.S. into the war in April, and Russia's withdrawal from the battlefield in December.

As a matter of fact, the United States preferred to remain neutral in the conflict, but at the same time, it had supplied the Entente countries. However, as a result of Germany's decision to undertake submarine warfare, i.e. attacking and sinking the ships of the Entente Powers, several American ships - neutral shipping - sunk and several American lost their lives. Following these developments, President Wilson declared war on the Central Powers.

Russia was staggering under the weight of the problems brought about by the war. The damages of World War I on the state's economy were apparent in every facet of life. Revolutionary groups, who were trying to transform the negative attitude of Russian citizens against Tsardom into an uprising, were producing non-stop propaganda. The strike wave spread all over the country in 1917. Hundreds of thousands of people were pouring into the streets calling for an immediate end to the war. However, neither Tsar Nicholas¹⁰ nor the government officials were interested in trying to find solutions for the increasing unrest.

⁹ World War I, <http://www.ait.hacettepe.edu.tr/egitim/ait203204/16.pdf>, 30.01.2016.

¹⁰ Tsar Nikolay Alexandrovich Romanov (18.05.1868-17.07.1918) was the last Russian Emperor. He was the eldest son of III.Aleksandr. He was married to Aleksandra Fedorovna. He witnessed the Russia-Japan War, the First World War, "Bloody Sunday", the military-year field trial in 1905-1907, Stolypin's events and other important events during his period of office. After the February Revolution in 1917, he was dethroned. After the victory by the Petrograd workers, he was imprisoned in Tobolsk, then he was sent to Yekaterinburg after the Socialist

Towards the end of February 1917, the street fights intensified and the government also got into a bind when some soldiers took sides with the rebels.¹¹ These were the alarm bells for an upcoming revolution.

The First World War is, without a shadow of a doubt, one of the most important reasons for the Russian revolution. The war led to a crisis affecting all classes of society, causing tension related to the overloaded economy and stress in socio-political relations.

Russia's huge losses during the war caused the government to fall from power, feelings of resentment in society, and the deterioration of living conditions. All of these factors came together and triggered the anti-war movements and strikes that reached their peak during the February Revolution.¹²

Russia left the war in March 1918 by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers, yielding vast territories.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Russia's Withdrawal from the War and the Turkish-Soviet Relations after the Treaty

Turkey was engaged in war on the side of Germany in the first months after the October Revolution. The Ottoman Empire was one of the signatories of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, together with Germany¹³.

Allies were expected to send representatives to join the negotiations, but they failed to show. As a result, Russia had to sit at the negotiation table alone to conclude a peace settlement. After talks which lasted for one week, the Russian delegation returned to the country to give a report to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. It became clear at this meeting that there were three differing views about the peace talks held within the Bolshevik hierarchy.

Trotsky believed that Germany would offer wholly unacceptable terms to the Russians and that this would spur the German workers to raise a revolt against their leaders in support of their Russian compatriots. This rebellion would, in turn, spark a worldwide workers uprising.

Revolution. He and the members of his family were executed by firing squad on the decision of the Ural Provincial Committee. Source: Ioffe, G.Z. (1977), *Krah Rossiyskoy monarhičeskoj kontrevolutsii*, Moscow; Kasvinov M. K. (1978) *Dvadsat tri stupa NEW v niz Moscov*.

¹¹ Ramin Sadikov, "The Power Struggle in Russia after the February Revolution: Road to the October Revolution, DOI: 10.1501/Tarar_0000000471, pp. 101-108.

¹² Payps R. (1994) *Russkaya Revolyutsiya*, Moscow, pp.28-42.

¹³ Potemkin Vladimir. (1945) *İstoriya Diplomatii*, Vol. 2, *Diplomatiya v novoevremya (1872-1919)*, Moscow pp.9-40.

Kamenev believed that the German workers would uprising even if the terms of the treaty were reasonable.

Lenin believed that a world revolution would occur over many years. What Russia needed then was an end to the war with Germany, and therefore, he wanted peace, effectively at any cost.¹⁴

Soviet Russia withdrew from World War I by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, called 'a disgraceful treaty' by Kirillov, with Germany and its allies. Under the treaty, Russia lost its lands in Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine, some areas of White Russia, and some areas in the Caucasus, and was also obliged to pay 3 billion rubles as compensation. Moreover, the treaty prohibited Russia from disseminating revolutionary ideas in Central and Eastern Europe¹⁵.

In the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the Ottoman Empire was represented by Berlin ambassador Ibrahim Hakkı Pasha and military attache Zeki Pasha. On 16 December 1917, Zeki Pasha met L.B. Kamenev from the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk. During that meeting, Zeki Pasha (on Enver Pasha's say-so) demanded that Russia quit the territories under its occupation, and informed the representative of atrocities the Armenian militias were committing against Muslims in the places under Russian occupation. Zeki Pasha also demanded that Russia ensure the termination of those atrocities as soon as possible¹⁶.

At the insistence of Talaat Pasha, the treaty declared that the territory Russia took from the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), specifically Ardahan, Kars, and Batumi, were to be returned. At the time of the treaty, this territory was under the effective control of Armenian and Georgian forces.

Paragraph 3 of Article IV of the treaty states:

The districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum will, without delay, be cleared of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the reorganization of the national and international relations of these districts, but leave it to the population of these areas to carry out this change in agreement with the neighboring States, especially with the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷

¹⁴ Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Citation: C N Trueman "Treaty of Brest-Litovsk" historylearningsite.co.uk, The History Learning Site, 22 May 2015. 17 Dec 2015.

¹⁵ Kirillov V.V. (2012) *İstoriyaRossii*, Moscow, p.425

¹⁶ Bal Halil (2004) "Turkish-Armenian Relations after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk", *Recent period Turkish studies*, Vol. 5.p.25.

¹⁷ Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, 21 November-3 March, 1918, Washington Printing Office, 1918, http://www.gwpda.org/1918/conf_brestlitovsk.pdf, 30.01.2016.

According to the words of Gromiko, Turkish Government violated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and launched military action in the Caucasus. However, Turkey shared the same fate as the other defeated powers of the Quadruple Alliance due to lack of experience. On the date of October 30, 1918, the Entente States forced Turkey to sign the Armistice of Mudros¹⁸. The Treaty stipulated that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus had been captured by the victorious states, the Straits were to remain open for their warships, an army was to be allocated in Istanbul and, last but not least, the telegraph system and railways were to be controlled by the Allied Powers¹⁹.

The Armistice of Mudros started the de facto decomposition of Turkey. At the Paris Peace Conference, the American President Wilson suggested several principles regarding Turkish territories²⁰. Thus, Turkey faced the danger of completely losing its National Independence²¹.

The Armistice of Mudros was concluded on 31 October 1918 with the signatures of British Admiral Calthorpe and Ottoman Navy Minister Hüseyin Rauf Bey. The armistice comprised of 25 articles that brought onerous provisions. For instance, soldiers of Entente States would occupy the Straits; the Entente States would control all railway and telegraph lines within the territory; the Ottoman troops (excluding small contingents needed to keep law and order) would be demobilized and disarmed, and all Entente prisoners captured by the Ottomans would be freed. Furthermore, the Armistice stated that all German and Austrian military personnel must leave the country within two months. While all articles were challenging for the Ottoman Empire, Article 7, which gave the Entente the right to occupy any place in the Ottoman Empire itself if it considered its security to be under threat, was considered the most dangerous clause. Furthermore, Article 24²² stipulated that the Entente had the right to

¹⁸ Gromiko A. A. (1980) *İstoriya Vneşney Politiki SSSR 1917-1980 gg*, Vol. 1, 1917-1945, Moscow.p.108.

¹⁹ Soysal İsmail (2000), *Turkey's Political Treaties with Background and Explanations*, Vol. 1, TTK, Ankara. pp. 12-14

²⁰ ACE (1978) *Azerbaijan Soviet Encyclopedia*, Vol. 2, Baku p.480.

²¹ Gromiko A. A. (1980) *İstoriya Vneşney Politiki SSSR 1917-1980 gg*, Vol. 1, 1917-1945, Moscow, p.109.

²² The provisions of Mudros Armistice were challenging. Specifically, Articles 7 and 24 were added to implicitly prepare the ground for the Entente powers to be able to invade any place they desired in Anatolia. The region specified as 'Vilayet-iSitta' (Six provinces) in the Turkish copy of the Armistice was expressed as 'The six Armenian Vilayets' in the English text. That is important evidence which shows how serious their 'Armenia' design was. It is also understood that geographical terms used in the British and Turkish texts were perceived differently

intervene militarily in the six provinces (Erzurum, Sivas, Elazığ, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakır) in the event of law and order breaking down there.²³

The armistice came into force on 1 December 1918. However, problems arose over Mosul, Sancak and Alexandretta. Despite the conclusion of the armistice, the British command insisted on the occupation of Mosul under Article 7 of the Armistice. Even though the local Ottoman commander refused occupation and informed Istanbul about the matter, the Istanbul government ordered him to comply. As a result, the Ottoman troops left the town between the 8 and 15 November. The occupation was brought onto the agenda in the coming years as a controversial implementation of the Armistice provisions.²⁴

Communist Propaganda

The survival of communism in Russia depended on persuading other countries to adopt communism as well. Therefore, revolutionary propagandism was the central component of the foreign policy of the Soviet Government after 1917. Comintern²⁵, the international communist organization, was founded in May 1919 to carry out this activity.

As most of its leaders supported participation in World War I, the Second International, an organization of socialist and labor parties, was subjected to Lenin's condemnations during the war. According to Lenin, socialists betrayed Marxism and the Proletariat by supporting the imperialist war. For this reason, Lenin and his supporters, who were against the war, condemned the war and the attitude of the Second International in the strongest terms during the war years. They supported the idea of founding a new International that stood up for communism.

The first Congress to establish the Communist International, which is also referred as Comintern, took place on 2-6 March 1919. At the end of

by the parties. For instance, Turks thought that when the terms 'Syria' and 'Iraq' were stated in the Armistice, they meant the regions according to the Ottoman administrative structure; however, as the British considered Mosul as a part of Iraq, they expected Turkish soldiers to evacuate Mosul according to Article 16. Mosul was a separate province in the Ottoman administrative structure. Furthermore, the British side deliberately used historical terms like Cilicia and Mesopotamia without definite borders in the Armistice, which led to confusion.

²³ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey (2007) A Modern History*, I.B.Tauris, London, New York, pp.133-134.

²⁴ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey (2007): A Modern History*, I.B.Tauris, London, New York, pp.133-134.

²⁵ Comintern- Communist International

the first Congress, the leaders declared the establishment of the Comintern and announced its fundamental principles, along with their plans for a future Congress. However, the Comintern dissolved in 1943 before achieving the goals expressed at the end of the Congress.²⁶

Operating goals of Comintern were as follows:

- To make international propaganda to spread communist ideas
- To support and help communist parties in other countries
- To prepare the world communist revolution²⁷

The actors of October Revolution in Russia wanted to achieve communist revolution around the world. They turned their attention towards the East. Despite the defeat, the Ottoman Empire was of significant importance in the East. It was not possible to ignore the developments in Anatolia while searching for support in the East²⁸.

Lenin and all the Bolsheviks believed that the Russian Revolution would be the beginning of a world revolution. Lenin kept saying that "The movements initiated by the Russians will be followed by Germans, French and British, and socialism will be successful... if German revolution does not come true, we will be destroyed."²⁹

During that period, the Soviet Union's approach towards Turkey was a tentative agreement, as they searched for support for world revolution and help to demolish England, the representative of global imperialism³⁰. However, the Soviet-era historians interpret events in a different way:

"Under the influence of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I and of October Revolution, Turkish people started the liberation war under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha against imperialism and internal rebellion. Soviet Russia offered succor to Turkish people in that challenging struggle."³¹

²⁶ The Comintern, http://www.yale.edu/yup/pdf/082428_1.pdf, 08.02.2016.

²⁷ Esmer Ahmet Şükrü (1953), *Political History (1919-1939)*, Güney Matbaacılık ve Gazetecilik T.A.O., Ankara, pp. 29-30.

²⁸ Bilge A.Suat (1992), *Difficult Neighborhood, Turkey-Soviet Union Relations, (1920-1964)* Türkiye İşbankası Publishing House, Ankara, p. 60.

²⁹ Kamuran Gürün (1991), *Turkish-Soviet Relations (1920-1953)*, TTK, Ankara, p.13.

³⁰ Bilge A.Suat (1992) *Difficult Neighborhood, Turkey-Soviet Union Relations (1920-1964)*, Türkiye İşbankası Publishing House, Ankara, p. 61.

³¹ Dokümanı Vneşney Politiki SSSR, (1959), Moscow, Vol. 3.p.683.

On September 13, 1919, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation addressed Turkish workers and peasants:

"Turkish workers and peasants! Your Russian worker and peasant brothers decided to get the internal bloodsuckers and the foreign predators that want to split Russia, as well as European robbers, by the balls. Therefore, they have been struggling to strengthen themselves and workers almost for 12 years. There is a short period for Soviet Russia to [gain] victory by defeating the enemy imposing on labor and workers. However, this is not enough! All the workers of the world must be in solidarity.... At that crucial point, Russian workers and peasants hope that you, their Turkish worker and peasant brothers, [will] extend a helping hand and... [voice] your support for fighting the European robbers that seek... happiness out of our grief."³²

The establishment of the Communist International was a significant development because it was a striking indicator of the large fissure between two separate worlds, particularly within the international labor movement. The founders of Comintern believed that the workers suffering under war and massacre would immediately leave the international social democrat and labor parties, which led them into such a slaughter, and gather under the goal of founding an international labor association led by Comintern.³³

The Reasons for the Turkish-Soviet Convergence, and the Armenia Factor

In the beginning, Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire were aiming to gain autonomy under the protection of Western states. Nevertheless, this objective changed over time and transformed into the desire to found the Great Armenian State in an area reaching from Baku to Batum, and even encompassing Bursa and Alexandretta.³⁴ In this way, the

³² "İzvestiya" (1919), September 13.

³³ Edward Hallett Carr (2010). *The Russian Revolution from Lenin to Stalin 1917-1929*. Translated by: Levent Cinemre, Yordam Kitap, Istanbul, p.64.

³⁴ The Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) that Russia initiated in the Balkans and Caucasus against the Ottoman Empire in order to ensure "Pan Slavism" in the Balkans came to an end on 3 January 1878 with the truce offer of the Ottoman Empire after the fall of Plevne, which paved the way to Istanbul for the Russians. The peace provisions, however, were specified in the Treaty of San Stefano. During the peace talks taking place in San Stefano, Armenian Patriarch Nerses Varjebedy, some Armenian leaders, and the chairman of the Russian executive

Armenian issue gained an international dimension, and became a strong determinant of the imperialist policies of Britain and Russia. In this context, Britain always regarded Russia as a threat to its policies regarding the Middle East and Near East. Therefore, regardless of Russia's regime, Britain preferred to keep away from the region. On the other hand, Russia was determined to maintain their policies concerning the Bosphorus and the Caucasus in order to achieve its goal of "reaching the open sea" within the scope of its colonial policy. When it came to Armenians, their desires and views were taken into account as long as they were useful for the colonizers, and the Western powers could consider them or any of the eastern communities when necessary, for the sake of their plans for sharing the territories of the Ottoman Empire. The newly founded Soviet regime created some opportunities for the realization of the classic Russian expansionist ideology. The United States appeared as a new power and stood in the region for its financial interests after the War.³⁵

committee negotiated with the Tsar's brother Grand Duke Nicholas, and thus, were able to have an article regarding Armenians added to the treaty. Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano, signed on 3 March 1878, was devoted to the Armenians. Article 16 reads that as the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia, which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte will carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians. With this Treaty, the name "Armenia" was stated in a formal international agreement for the first time. Therefore, the Treaty of San Stefano was considered to be a significant step towards independence for the Armenians. Moreover, this Treaty is a cornerstone of Turkish-Russian relations. With the acquisition of Bayazid, Ardahan, Kars, and Batum, Russia became a significant threat within Anatolia. In this way, Russia, on one hand, captured a significant bridge in Eastern Anatolia, contributing to their dominance in the Middle East, and strengthened its influence over the Armenians on the other hand. Ultimately, the fact that the 1877-1878 Ottoman- Russian War was concluded with the victory of the Russian side, and Russia became the protector of the Armenians via the Article 16 added to the Treaty of San Stefano, would give rise to the emergence of the "Armenian issue". However, this Treaty would not enter into force, because with this treaty Russia was violating the inter-state balance in the Middle East. Source: Erdal İLTER (1996), "The Role of Britain in Emergence and Development of the Armenian Issue", *OTAM* 7, Ankara, pp.162-163.

³⁵ Rahmi Doğanay (2003), "Armenian activities in Kars province after the Mudros Armistice",

http://journals.manas.edu.kg/mjsr/oldarchives/Vol04_Issue08_2003/53.pdf, 07.02.2016.

Besides their traditional services, the American missionary schools and American Embassies in the territories of the Ottoman Empire not only conducted evangelization activities, but also paved the way for the emergence and development of separatist ideas among the Ottoman subjects. American schools in Anatolia contributed to the occurrence of Armenian rebellions, and directly or indirectly supported the terrorist acts against the Ottoman rule. Ottoman authorities sought to deport all missionaries working in the interests of Britain and the United States in the provinces of Anatolia, because of their aim of disrupting regional peace.³⁶

One of the reasons that the United States paid court to Armenians was the Armenian lobby within the Empire. After the tragedy, which caused suffering for both Armenians and Muslims during the First World War, the Armenian propaganda of the missionaries created significant reactions in the United States, and as a result, they gained American support and charity that would go continue after the war progressed into Anatolia. In fact, the U.S. sent several battleships to the region after the war. Armenians, looking to take advantage of that environment, worked on the creation of a sovereign Armenia that would set the tone for the future Armenia, with Yerevan as the capital. Furthermore, Armenians signed the Armistice of Mudros, and thus, were in the process of obtaining the largest share of the Turkish territory after the Empire dissolved. As a matter of fact, the Armenian acts performed in that exciteable spirit were laying the groundwork for military intervention under the command of by Kazım Karabekir.³⁷

In the face of the Soviet Russia's policy regarding Iran, Turkey and Caucasus in the last years of the war, Britain directed all its attention towards that region and the local communities (particularly to Armenians). That was the reason for adding Article 24 to the Armistice of Mudros on the condition that they would ensure the safety of Armenians for the purpose of granting possession of the Eastern Anatolian provinces to the Armenians.³⁸ Another clause of the armistice stipulated that the Turkish

³⁶ Celal Öney (2014), "The Role of Missioners in Emergence of Armenian Nationalism in Anatolia", *Yeni Türkiye* 60, p.1498.

³⁷ Rahmi Doğanay (2003), "Armenian activities in Kars province after the Mudros Armistice"
http://journals.manas.edu.kg/mjsr/oldarchives/Vol04_Issue08_2003/53.pdf,
 07.02.2016.

³⁸ Article 24 - —In case of any disorder in the six Armenian provinces, the Allies reserve the right to occupy any part of them. Resource: Nihat Erim (1953)

army would evacuate Caucasus and withdraw to the borders by 1914. Armenians committed severe violence against the Turks when they were in league with the Russians, and moreover, they showed a similar attitude in the Caucasus as of the beginning of 1918 by taking advantage of the authority gap after the foundation of the Soviet regime. The American media reported that Soviet Russia was more willing to solve the Armenian issue as compared to the Allied and the USA, and the Yerevan Armenia could be created under the benevolence of the Soviets. Soon after the 1917 October Revolution, Maveria-e-Caucasus (including Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) was established on November 15-28, 1917 against the Bolsheviks. However, it dissolved on May 26.³⁹ Thereupon, while the

Interstate Law and Political History Texts: Agreements with the Ottoman Empire, Vol. I, Ankara, pp. 520-524.

³⁹ The Caucasus dominated by Russia was governed through a general administration. Russia, where serious problems arose towards the end of the First World War, witnessed the February Revolution and then a "Provisional Government" came to power. This government replaced general administration in the Caucasus with the Ozakom (Osobyi Zakavkaski the Komitet), founded on March 22, 1917. As Ozakom could not establish authority in the Caucasus, as other nations in the Maveria-e-Caucasus (South Caucasus), Armenians also began to organize in order to establish an independent state. The "Provisional Government" that closely followed these developments handed the civil administration in the Ottoman territories under occupation over to the Armenians. For this purpose, Armenians were appointed as the leaders in Van, Erzurum, Bitlis and Trabzon provinces. Armenians gathered a congress in October 1917, with the intention of occupying the authority gap in Anatolia that emerged after the evacuation of the region by the Russians. In this congress, they took the decision to found the "Great Armenian", including the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia. While the Armenians were getting ready to take action, Russia was greatly distressed by the 1917 October Revolution. However, the Soviet Government that seized power in Russia declared that "each nation will be allowed to determine their own destiny", while preparing to call a truce with the Central Powers. Soviet Russia created a truce with the Ottoman Empire in this context, and although Soviet Russia did not want to leave Eastern Anatolia, the Russian Army withdrew. Following the 1917 October Revolution, the nations in the Maveria-e-Caucasus would not recognize the Bolshevik government and accelerated efforts to establish their national entities. Representatives of the Allied Powers and regional leaders gathered in a meeting on November 24, 1917 in order to determine the policies regarding the future of the Maveria-e-Caucasus. On November 28, 1918 the Maveria-e-Caucasus Commissioner (Government), which would replace the Ozakom, was established. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks hindered the activation of the constituent assembly to be founded by this Commissioner. In response, the Maveria-e-Caucasus Commissioner cut free from the Bolshevik administration and established a legislative assembly (Seim) (on 23 February 1918). While these developments were taking place in South

Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed between the Imperial Ottoman Government and the Republic of Armenia on May 31, 1918, was about to bring moderation and reconciliation to Turkish-Armenian relations, the intervention of the Entente (and Britain in particular) hindered that development. While the British-Ottoman struggle for Baku was underway, the Armenian troops, on the brink of dissolution, wanted to surrender themselves to the Ottoman military, but this was hedged by Bolshevik Armenians supporting Russia and British sympathizers.⁴⁰

In that period, the Armenian leaders were composed of Menshevik British supporters and Bolshevik Russian supporters. In response to Mensheviks, who were members of the Dashnak organization and followed a racist line, Bolshevik or socialist Armenians were equally nationalist. The conditions were convenient for the development of the Armenian movement supported by Russia, even during the war years.

Although Soviet Russia withdrew its soldiers from the Caucasus, it did not want the region to fall into the hands of the Turks. Long before the outbreak of World War I, tens of thousands of Armenians were enrolled in the Russian army or employed to create independent military units. After Russian troops had retreated from eastern Anatolia according to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the gap left by these soldiers was mostly filled by Armenian forces. Armenian militia forces were established in order to ensure peace in the region. Local authorities were handed over to

Caucasus, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed between the Bolsheviks wishing to withdraw from the battle and the Central Powers. In order to determine the provisions of the Treaty, the Ottoman Empire consulted General Prjevalskiy - the Russian army commander in the Caucasus front - who did not recognize the Bolshevik government and acted in accordance with the Maveria-e-Caucasus Commissioner. As a result of his attempts, the Armistice of Erzincan was concluded between the Ottoman government and the Maveria-e-Caucasus Commissioner. On December 18, 1917 the mavera-year armistice was signed by the Commissioner for the Caucasus in Erzincan. By making agreements both with the new Soviet Government and the independent Maveria-e-Caucasus Commissioner, the Ottoman Empire aimed to ensure the security of its Eastern border. However, disputes concerning the borders continued. The Maveria-e-Caucasus Republic was dissolved from on May 26, and this took place across the Batum Congress between May 11 and June 4. Source: Abdurrahman Bozkurt (2013) "Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920)" OTAM, 34/Fall, 19-58 pp.20-23.

⁴⁰ Rahmi Doğanay (2003) Armenian activities in Kars province after the Mudros Armistice, http://journals.manas.edu.kg/mjsr/oldarchives/Vol04_Issue08_2003/53.pdf, 07.02.2016.

Armenians by the Russians, and in this way, all the preparations were completed for the establishment of an Armenian state in this area. At this point, Armenians attacked the Turks and started assaulting Turkish villages out of hatred. After the Armistice, they intensified the propaganda that Christians were being murdered to ensure the intervention of the great powers. This propaganda worked especially against Yakup Şevki Pasha, the Commander of the IX. Army. Ultimately, General Milne demanded the recall of Yakup Şevki Pasha on charges of gathering intelligence for the Black Sea Army. Yakup Şevki Pasha left Erzurum on 14 April, and Kazım Karabekir was appointed the Commander of his army, which was transformed into the XV. Army, on 3 May. Europe-based Armenian organizations were not content with the propaganda, and after the First World War, they undertook terrorist movements in the Ottoman country.⁴¹

The Bolshevik Shaumyan government that dominated in Baku as of March 1918 massacred thousands of Muslims in March.⁴² Moreover, on 25 April 1918, 750 people were killed in Subatan village, in Kars province. On 29 April, three thousand women, elderly people and children being transferred from Gyumri to Akhalkalaki were killed, and the villages in Yerevan and Kulpwere were set on fire. There were many more incidents, such as the murder of a group of 60 people including children, men, and women in Şiştepe and Dörkene, the burning of the Ahilkelek and Arpaçay villages and the decimation of their population, as well as the murder of Turkish prisoners in Kars and Gyumri. The Russian Army ignored the massacres of Turks and Muslims during the phase of

⁴¹ Rahmi Doğanay (2003) Armenian activities in Kars province after the Mudros Armistice, http://journals.manas.edu.kg/mjsr/oldarchives/Vol04_Issue08_2003/53.pdf, 07.02.2016.

⁴² On 31 March 1918, Armenians carried out massive genocides in Baku, Guba, Shamakhi, Kurdemir, Salyan and Lankaran provinces. In just a few days, twelve thousand people were massacred in Baku. According to some foreign resources, this number reached twenty-five thousand. The number of Turks killed in the province of Shamakhi was seven thousand. The genocide started as of March 1918, and continued until September, when the Islamic Army of the Caucasus, at the command of Nuri Pasha, took the situation in hand. During these genocides, a total of 50, 000 Azerbaijani Turks were killed. On the other side, 1100 soldiers and 30 military officers were martyred in the Islamic Army of the Caucasus. Today, there are several martyr memorials built in memory of these martyrs. 31 March had been remembered as the Day of Genocide against Azerbaijanis since 31 March 1998. Source: Sinan Oğan, “31 March is the Day of Genocide against Azerbaijanis” <http://www.turksam.org/tr/makale-detay/45-31-mart-azerbaycan-turklerine-yapilan-soykirim-gunudur>, 31.03.2015.

withdrawal, and thus the murders went on until the Ottoman Empire started the Caucasus operation. Western countries under the influence of Armenian propaganda turned a blind eye to these killings. The situation in the Ottoman territory satisfied Soviet Russia and Britain, as they believed these developments would help them to strengthen their dominance in the region. Britain decided on an alliance with Armenians and supporters of the Tsar, while Russia preferred the Soviet Bolshevik elements of the area. Therefore, the Russians supporting the Tsar, Kazakhs and Armenians were also involved with the British troops moving from Enzela to Baku under the command of General Wed Dunsterville. The reason for that move was to prevent the occupation of Baku, either by Turks or Soviets. This status was maintained until 15 September, 1918, when Turkish troops took Baku. Nevertheless, shortly after the ratification of the Armistice of Mudros, it was conquered by the British General Thomson on 17 December 1918 and left to the control of the powers of Armenian and Tsarist sides.

In the meantime, concerns were growing at the Ottoman supreme military command headquarters, as they were worried that if the British stayed in Baku for a long time, they would give the possession of a large part of Azerbaijan to Armenians, and in this way, build a strong Armenian presence in the region. Thus, it would be easier for Britain to carry out its plans in the Caucasus, Iran, and Georgia. Britain, in this context, gave both political and military assistance to Armenians. An Armenian officer, Ohannes Arpesy, described the British aid to the Armenians in detail in his memoirs.⁴³

The British advocated the Armenian claims, but they were of the opinion that the Turkish territories to be left to the Armenians for the "Great Armenia Project" should remain larger than the actual Armenian population, while not extending them too much, so as not to run afoul of the demands of the allies. Lord Derby, one of the British delegates to the Paris Peace Conference, stated in his message to Lord Curzon regarding the requests of Armenians that they did not constitute a majority in anywhere outside Van; the total number of Armenians was 407 thousand in the whole of Cilicia, while the population of Adana alone was 420 thousand. Curzon expressed in his response; "the actual problem is not

⁴³ Rahmi Doğanay (2003) Armenian activities in Kars province after the Mudros Armistice, http://journals.manas.edu.kg/mjstr/oldarchives/Vol04_Issue08_2003/53.pdf, 07.02.2016.

related to the identification of the borders of Armenia, but to be able to find Armenians within the territories of [the] projected Armenian state.”⁴⁴

As a result of the Soviet Union's defeat in the war against Poland⁴⁵, it became an operational necessity for the Union to develop an intimacy with Turkey. That defeat is a decisive moment in the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks. That situation prolonged the Soviet Union's reluctance to take any action against Turkey in Armenia, and also declined to support the desires of Armenians any longer⁴⁶.

The idea of the “Caucasus Barrier” emerged in January 1920, in order to hinder the Turkish National Struggle, Soviet expansionism, and Turkish-Soviet cooperation. This idea was put forward by Oliver Wardrob, a British Commissioner in the Caucasus. Lord Curzon advocated the idea of providing Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia - instead of supporters of Tsarism - with money, weapons, and food. The Entente Powers that supported the Armenia and Pontus projects also aspired to other alternatives for their ‘Caucasus Barrier’ design. Their barrier design covered Iran, Kurdistan, and even Turkey, as well as Georgia, Azerbaijan and the small republics that emerged in Caucasus as a result of the War and Soviet Revolution.

⁴⁴ Mehmet Okur (2012) “From the Caucasus to the Black Sea ‘Great Armenia Project, Claims and Facts’ ”, *KÖK Social and Strategic Studies Journal*, Köksav Publication, p.23.

⁴⁵ In the process whereby Poland, Finland and the Baltic States (Estonia-Latvia and Lithuania) attempted to integrate into the international system, the fact that the Status Quo States did not establish relations with Soviet Russia would give rise to new challenges in the coming years. At the Paris Peace Conference, the Polish-Russian border was determined by the proposal of the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, and therefore called the Curzon Line. This line left the eastern Polish territory to Russia, after considering that the majority of the population was composed of White Russians and Ukrainians. However, that land was the territory of 1772's Poland. Therefore, the Poles did not recognize the Curzon line, and as they insisted on acquiring the borders in 1772, they declared war on Soviet Russia in 1920. At the end of this war, Poles obtained most of their requests with the Peace of Riga on March 19, 1921. However, the Peace of Riga would become one of the key elements of Russian policy to work against Poland in the future. Source: Mehmet Sait Dilek (2013) *The Treaties Signed between the TBMM Government and the Republic of Poland (Lehistan) on 23 July 1923 and the Foreign Policy Approaches of the Parties*, Turkish Studies - International Periodical For The Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic Volume 8/9 Summer, Ankara, p.1133.

⁴⁶ Bilge A.Suat (1992), *Difficult Neighborhood, Turkey-Soviet Union Relations, (1920-1964)* TürkiyeİşbankasıPublishing House, Ankara, p. 61.

The intention of Britain, i.e. the prevention of Soviet expansionism, was brought to light by Lloyd George at the House of Commons in 1920. Lloyd George said: "The act against Turkey is not about Turkish-British or Turkish-Greece relations. This is just a struggle between Britain and Russia". This statement by Lloyd George did not necessarily mean that they had given up with Turkey. He was just pointing out Soviet expansion in the fields in which Britain was interested, and the Turkish-Soviet cooperation which was developing. He was saying that such cooperation might cause Britain to lose all the benefits it had obtained from Turkey and its immediate vicinity. He was right, because when the First World War was over, Britain set its sights on a share of Russia, having withdrawn from the war because of the revolution. Istanbul, the Bosphorus, and the Caucasus should have been in Britain's control to ensure the security of the route to India. On the other side, the cooperation between Turkey and Soviet Russia would facilitate Soviet invasion and open the doors of Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and India to the Russians. Furthermore, the Caucasus Barrier, brought to the agenda by the Entente Powers, might boomerang in the event that the states in the region decided to cooperate either with Turkey or Russia. This possibility could be avoided only if the Caucasus Barrier, including Iran, was achieved.

To reach its goal, Britain recognized the independence of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. They became independent in May 1918. By sending military advisers and armaments to these states, Britain was putting the initial obstacle in the way of the Russia-Turkey-Iran triangle. The Caucasus Barrier was set, and the Black Sea was completely under the dominance of the Entente navy. Additionally, Britain also recognized the "Kars Muslim Council." Britain was giving support to all governments and powers that formed the region and did not join the Soviets, and in this way it was trying to pull the strings in the area.⁴⁷

The Turkish Government based in Ankara was established under the leadership of Atatürk in April 1920. The revolution in Turkey received intense reactions from the Entente Powers, particularly Britain. On April 26, Kemal Pasha applied to the Government of Soviet Russia with a letter requesting the establishment of political affairs to bring potential aid to Turkish people in the fair fight against the occupation forces⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ Rahmi Doğanay, (2009), "The Caucasian Politics of Turkey, Soviet Russia and the Entente States during The Turkish National Independence War, *Firat University Journal of Social Science*, Vol.: 19, No: 2, pp.279-298, Elazığ.

⁴⁸ Gromiko A. A. (1980) *İstoriya Vneşney Politiki SSSR 1917-1980* gg, Vol. 1, 1917-1945, Moscow, pp.108-110.

Regarding the underlying philosophy, Turkey's approach towards the Soviet Union was not so different from that of Soviet Russia. Turkey aimed to found an independent state within the national borders. However, foreign or external assistance was necessary to complete the War of Independence. Atatürk shared the idea of receiving external assistance in the confidential meeting of the Great National Assembly that took place on January 22, 1921⁴⁹.

On June 3, 1920, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union notified Kemal Pasha that they welcomed the governing principles of the New Turkish Government⁵⁰.

In his letter dated June 3, 1920 Georgy Chicherin - the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs - wrote: "We, as the Soviet Government, follow the heroic struggle of Turkish people for the sake of independence and sovereignty with interest and are glad to lay the solid foundation of friendship which unites the Russian and Turkish people during the difficult times of Turkey."⁵¹

The Turkish Foreign Minister at the time, Bekir Sami Bey, responded to the letter of Chicherin on July 4, 1920, by stating that the response of the Soviet Government was acclaimed by the Turkish Government, and the mediation suggested by the Soviet Government in order to solve the frontier problems between Armenia-Iraq-Turkey was welcomed favorably. In the same letter, Bekir Sami Bey also emphasized that he believed the Turkish Grand National Assembly, with the aid of Soviet Government, would overcome capitalism and imperialism⁵².

"The policies followed by the Great Assembly are not based on communist principles... The Assembly and the Government, as the representatives of the independent state, are deeply faithful to the national values and have never touched upon the principles of communism or Bolshevism within the scope of the political relations with the Russian Bolshevik Republic..."⁵³

After Bekir Sami Bey had arrived in Moscow, the state of Caucasus changed significantly. The Bolshevik regime came to power in Azerbaijan on 27-28 April 1920. In May and June of 1920, the Yerevan Armenian Republic witnessed Bolshevik uprisings. Georgians made an agreement

⁴⁹ Bilge A.Suat (1992), *Difficult Neighborhood, Turkey-Soviet Union Relations, (1920-1964)* Türkiye İşbankası Publishing House, Ankara, p.61.

⁵⁰ DokumentüVneşneyPolitiki SSSR, (1959), Moscow, Vol. 3, p.555.

⁵¹ DokumentüVneşneyPolitiki SSSR, (1959), Moscow, Vol. 3, p. 555.

⁵² DokumentüVneşneyPolitiki SSSR, (1959), Moscow, Vol. 3, p.556.

⁵³ *Official Reports for the Closed Session of Grand National Assembly*, Vol. 1, 333.