Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus
Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus:

Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean

By

William Mallinson
To the victims of geopolitics
CONTENTS

Foreword ................................................................. ix
Alan Sked

Acknowledgements ................................................... xiii

List of Abbreviations ............................................... xv

Some Key Dates ..................................................... xvii

Preface ................................................................... xix

Introduction ......................................................... xxiii

Statesman or Political Opportunist?

Chapter One ......................................................... 1
Kissinger’s Outlook

Chapter Two ........................................................ 27
The Asset

Chapter Three ..................................................... 41
The Art of Dismemberment

Chapter Four ....................................................... 55
The Obsession with the USSR

Chapter Five ....................................................... 65
Officials’ Views on Kissinger’s Views

Chapter Six ......................................................... 83
Procrastination, Evasion and Invasion

Chapter Seven ..................................................... 121
Aftermath and Goodbye
Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 153
The Undermining of Diplomacy?

Chapter Nine ............................................................................................ 169
Then is Now

Appendix ................................................................................................. 185

Bibliography ............................................................................................ 187

Index ........................................................................................................ 193
FOREWORD

Henry Kissinger seems to be once again in the news. In February 2016 in the New Hampshire primary in the United States the supporters of Senator Bernie Sanders used Kissinger’s friendship with Hillary Clinton to undermine the foreign policy credentials of that lady. They pointed out that in 2010 a White House tape from the Nixon era had been released on which Kissinger could be heard telling the president that helping Soviet Jews to escape oppression ‘was not an objective of American foreign policy,’ adding: ‘And even if they put Jews into gas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern. Maybe a humanitarian concern.’ The Sanders camp also reminded voters that between 1969 and 1973, Kissinger’s policy of secretly bombing Cambodia had caused 100,000 deaths and the coming to power of the genocidal Pol Pot. The secret bombing of Laos for nine years had caused another 100,000 casualties.

Academically, Kissinger was also in the news with the publication of Niall Ferguson’s first massive volume of Kissinger’s official biography, entitled Kissinger 1923-1968: The Idealist. This appeared in 2015 at about the same time as Greg Grandin’s Kissinger’s Shadow: The Long Reach of America’s Most Controversial Statesman. Ferguson’s book is very defensive, while Grandin has little good to say about Nixon’s Secretary of State. Unflattering portraits of Kissinger, of course, are not new and have been drawn most famously by Christopher Hitchens, Seymour Hersh, Robert Dallek and others. The novelist Joseph Heller memorably referred to Kissinger as ‘an odious schlump who made war gladly’. His leading biographer, Walter Isaacson, however, was less hostile, merely calling him ‘a brilliant conceptualizer’ who was ‘slightly conspiratorial in outlook’.

Ferguson tries to explain the near universal hostility to Kissinger by suggesting motives such as envy or even anti-Semitism, although critics like Hitchens and Hersh were Jewish. Also, Kissinger’s lack of solicitude for Soviet Jews rather undermines any sympathy for him in this respect, even if it were true. It certainly undermines Ferguson’s case that he was an idealist, as do the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Cambodians and Laotians. When Cambodia was being bombed, Alexander Haig, apparently,
was given the parameters ‘anything that flies or anything that moves’. Kissinger, of course, attempted to keep all this secret. His other policies showed little evidence of idealism either, whether it was the ‘Tar Baby Option’ of supporting the racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa in southern Africa or the aid given to the right-wing military regimes of Chile and Argentina in Latin America together with his defence of their subsequent records of torture and murder. He told Pinochet in 1976: ‘We are not out to weaken your position’. Before the invasion of East Timor, he told General Suharto of Indonesia: ‘It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly’. That brought about yet another 100,000 deaths. Gary Bass of Princeton has accused him of expediting Pakistan’s genocide in 1971 in Bangladesh.

Ferguson argues—correctly—that the crimes of the Communists were much worse: ‘[A]rguments that focus on loss of life in strategically marginal countries—and there is no other way of describing Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Chile, Cyprus and East Timor—must be tested against this question: how, in each case, would an alternative decision have affected US relations with strategically important countries like the Soviet Union, China, and the major Western European powers?’ In a similar vein, Ferguson asks, given that since the West won the Cold War, how would different policies have provided better results? In his own review of Ferguson’s book, Grandin pointed out that the question was meaningless, given that there were millions of different possible counterfactual answers to it. More to the point, if all the areas in which Kissinger has been accused of war crimes were ‘strategically marginal’, why should different policies there have affected the outcome of the Cold War in any case?

Grandin’s book argues that Kissinger’s legacy included the use of war as an instrument of policy and asks why Kissinger lurched consistently to the militarist right all the way from Vietnam in 1969 to Iraq in 2003. One answer according to Grandin was Kissinger’s fear of stasis in international affairs—the status quo had always to be tested by great power rivalry. Part of this fear was Kissinger’s obsession with the need to maintain credibility, which led in turn to a need for action, if only to avoid the appearance of being unable to act. (The same fear underpins Republican criticism of Barack Obama’s foreign policy today). His other legacy, of course, was secrecy, and his attempts to cover up the bombing of Cambodia and Laos, Grandin rightly asserts, was much worse a crime than Nixon’s futile attempt to cover up Watergate.
Ferguson attempts to defend Kissinger from the charge that although always ambitious for personal advancement, he was two-faced about his employers. Grandin points out, on the other hand, that there are too many witnesses who can attest that while obsequious to Rockefeller and Nixon while in their company, he was derisive about them behind their backs. Again, during the presidential election of 1968, he was in contact with both the Republican and Democratic camps. Despite Ferguson’s best attempts, it is difficult to see Kissinger as a modest idealist or really sympathetic in any way. Grandin at least publishes one of his jokes. After dumping more than six million tons of bombs on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people there, before negotiating a peace in 1973 not much different from the one on offer in 1968, Kissinger said: ‘We bombed them into letting us accept their terms.’ Very drole.

Bill Mallinson’s book is his fourth on Cyprus, on which he is an acknowledged expert. In fact, he probably knows the British archives better than anyone does where the question of British policy in Cyprus is concerned. In this volume he uses these archives to great effect to discover Kissinger’s role in the Cyprus crisis of 1974. Large extracts are provided from key documents, and the British government—whose role in independent Cyprus was always to play off Greek and Turkish Cypriots against each other to secure possession of the British bases there (more than half the treaty establishing Cyprus’s independence is related to these bases)—is clearly shown as consistently and obsequiously submitting to Kissinger. For example, after informing the US Secretary of State that Britain in the aftermath of the crisis preferred to withdraw from the bases, Kissinger protested that this would undermine Western interests in the Middle East. Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, then replied: ‘We shall not in present circumstances proceed with our preferred policy of withdrawing from the bases altogether,’ adding that Kissinger’s argument was the ‘determining consideration’. Callaghan does not emerge well from the book. Mallinson proves conclusively that he denied to a parliamentary committee that he had foreknowledge of the Turkish invasions, when in fact the documents demonstrate that he did know.

As for Kissinger, Mallinson uses a variety of original sources to demonstrate that he was hardly universally admired by his diplomatic contemporaries. Mallinson, too, is no admirer. Kissinger is seen as an inveterate cold warrior with a dislike of Greece, Greek Cypriots and of the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios. He was obsessed with keeping Turkey as
an ally and an intermediary between the Soviet Union and the Arab world. Indeed, Cyprus was merely seen as a ‘staging post’ for the Middle East and its own interests were of little consequence as far as Kissinger was concerned. He was always in favour of partitioning it and, like Callaghan, knew in advance of the Turkish invasion. Whether he actively encouraged it, however, remains a moot point. Mallinson, who does not mince his words or restrain his opinions, describes Cyprus in this story as ‘a geopolitical victim’.

Mallinson also reviews Kissinger’s works and his ideas. However, he is not impressed. Kissinger was trained as a political scientist, not a historian, and he finds his books unoriginal. Nor was he a trained diplomat. Hence, in Mallinson’s view, he was ‘a pseudo-diplomatic bull in a china-shop’. He ‘abused diplomacy’ and his impact on diplomacy was minimal. He was naïve about nuclear weapons, obsessed with ‘power’ and ‘power vacuums’, and in the medium term, his great achievement of separating Russia and China has now been reversed. He concludes: ‘Considering his studiedly incompetent behaviour over Cyprus, if he can be described as a statesman, he can also be described as a geopolitical engineer who treated people as geopolitical fodder and reduced morality to the status of a tactical tool, as did his wishful alter ego Metternich.’

Clearly, therefore, Mallinson does not agree with Ferguson. His book strengthens the critiques of Grandin and others by offering a very detailed, well-documented analysis of Kissinger’s role in the Cyprus crisis. It will have to be read by all those interested in either Kissinger’s reputation or the details of how the Cyprus crisis of 1974 was resolved.

***

Alan Sked
Emeritus Professor of International History, London School of Economics and Political Science
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Zoran Ristic, for his help in locating some interesting articles and in producing a decent text (he was one of the above-mentioned victims of geopolitics, having been bombed illegally by NATO for 78 days); the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of yesteryear for improving my reading and writing skills and my understanding the importance of documents; and various retired and late British diplomats for writing incisively and knowledgeably.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKEL</td>
<td>Cypriot Progressive People’s Working Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAM</td>
<td>National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDES</td>
<td>National Republican Greek League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td>National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBFR</td>
<td>Mutual Balanced Force Reductions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA</td>
<td>Sovereign Base Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMT</td>
<td>Turkish Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Forces in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SOME KEY DATES**

1191 Richard Coeur de Lion captures Cyprus, selling it to the Knights Templar.
1192 Guy de Lusignan acquires Cyprus.
1473 Venice becomes protector of Cyprus.
1489 Venice introduces direct rule.
1571 Ottoman Turks capture Cyprus.
1878 Britain rents Cyprus.
1914 Britain annexes Cyprus.
1923 Henry Kissinger born.
1925 Britain introduces colonial constitution.
1931 Cypriots burn down Government House: constitution revoked.
1953 British Prime Minister refuses to discuss Enosis.
1955 EOKA enosis campaign begins; British-Greek-Turkish conference blows up; anti-Greek riots in Turkey.
1957 Kissinger’s book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* published.
1958 Turkish Cypriots riot against Greek Cypriots, having planted a bomb against themselves, in order to blame the Greek Cypriots.
1960 Cyprus gains nominal sovereignty over most of its territory.
1963 Archbishop Makarios introduces his ‘Thirteen Point Plan’, with the Foreign Office’s support, to amend the constitution; ‘communal troubles’ begin.
1964 Soviet and American pressure averts war between Greece and Turkey.
1967 Military government takes over in Greece; war between Greece and Turkey threatens; EOKA leader Grivas withdraws 12,000 men.
1973 Kissinger appointed Secretary of State, keeping his position as National Security Advisor and chairman of the ‘Forty Committee’ (clandestine operations); 17 November anti-junta demonstrations in Athens; Brigadier Ioannides takes over backstage.
1974  15 July: anti-Makarios coup in Cyprus; Kissinger does not denounce coup; Britain refuses to invoke Treaty of Guarantee; on 20 July, Turkey lands troops on Cyprus; on 23 July, Clerides appointed as acting president, thereby restoring constitutional order; Geneva conference 25 to 30 July; Turkey continues to slowly advance; conference resumes on 8 August; Turkey walks out of conference on 14 August, and consolidates invasion, occupying over one third of the island.  
1974/5  Kissinger expresses strong opposition to British wishes to give up its bases.  
1976  Kissinger introduces his ‘Principles Initiative’ for re-unifying Cyprus, leading to, so far, over forty years of fruitless negotiations.  
1977  Archbishop Makarios dies.
I have never met Henry (né Heinz) Kissinger, and am therefore neutral about him as a private person. However, my thoughts about his reported actions and behaviour - gained mainly from official documents, his own writings and various books and articles by others -, while detached and dispassionate, are nevertheless critical, negatively and positively. I do not count among those such as the late Christopher Hitchens, who appears to have succumbed in *Cyprus, Hostage to History*¹ and *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*² to an element of annoyance. Wishing to sound neither negative nor positive, I need to state that I am impressed by the sheer volume of Henry Kissinger’s works after he left the formal trappings of power. Most people in his position, even at the reasonably young age of fifty-three, would simply have made as much money as possible, provided that they were still fit enough. But Kissinger appears to have had the mental and physical energy to both write and to have a strong line in international business consultancy, while remaining influential in Washington governmental circles and elsewhere. In contrast, Mr. Blair left formal politics at the same age as Kissinger but, having had only his - rather mediocre - memoirs published, is probably more interested in his business career than in writing.

Without knowing anything about Kissinger’s internal moral make-up, I nevertheless suspect that he took his teaching seriously (at least before he had to stop it when increasing his consultancy workload for Rockefeller *et al*), and that his prolific, and occasionally promiscuous, writing since he left formal politics may be intended for students’ intellectual betterment as well as for profit. Yet the thought also lingers that he is worried that his name in history will be either besmirched, or even ignored, and that he therefore needs to explain, and even justify, some of his decisions, particularly those that led to mass overseas violent death. That may be one

---

of his motives for having prevailed upon a well-known historian to write his biography.³

One can also wonder whether Kissinger has some difficulty in writing from the heart, unless it is expressed and hidden in bromides as, for example in his latest book. In his writings he does not come across as overly caring for people as human beings, but rather more for his perceived systems in which people live. I find this strange, and wonder whether he is using rationalisation and cognitive self-dissonance to explain to himself the unfortunate results of some of his decisions and wheeling-dealing on Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Chile and Cyprus.

I have to say that I have been intrigued, and possibly affected by, inter alia, Hitchens’s occasionally vituperative but nevertheless incisive and journalistic approach, and hope that the thought of hundreds of thousands of utterly innocent South East Asian families blown to pieces by, it has been claimed, Kissinger’s decisions, has not affected my writing. I do not think that it has, since I am not a judge dealing with the evidence or otherwise on such matters, but rather an academic, hunting, consulting, reading, analysing and evaluating documents on Kissinger’s dealings vis-à-vis Cyprus. Original documents form the basis of my views.

At this point I must make it clear that this book specifically uses the case of Cyprus to demonstrate Kissinger’s behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean, behaviour which may well have been replicated in other connected fora such as the Arab/Israel dispute (as we shall see, one of the reasons that Kissinger pressurised the British into retaining their military and intelligence territories in Cyprus was the Arab/Israel dispute). But it is up to diplomatic historians with expertise in the Middle East, South East Asia and South America to judge whether the documents covering their area bring out the same characteristics in Kissinger’s behaviour as those covering Cyprus.

Brendan O’Malley’s and Ian Craig’s The Cyprus Conspiracy (an odd title) is also relevant here. They uncovered much, but since 1999, I have uncovered much more, plenty of which lends credence to much of what they state. Their book is racy written, hence the occasional odd slip,⁴ but

⁴ For example, on page 139, we read that Ioannides was ‘not a long-time client of the CIA’, while on page 165, they write: ‘[…] Ioannides, with whom the CIA, with
nevertheless readable. While Eugene Rossides’s book *Kissinger and Cyprus* is a robust attack on Kissinger’s rôle in the Cyprus fiasco, I learnt little new of significance. Had I met him, I might have slipped him a document or two. But the Greek lobby in the US can be surprisingly parochial, as well as being steppenwolfishly torn between love of American anti-Russian ideals and frustration at American pro-Turkish policy. I have also been impressed by Niall Ferguson’s recent *magnum opus, Kissinger 1923-1968: the Idealist*, although understandably Cyprus does not figure in his book. He has obviously done a great deal of homework, and despite his writing the book at Kissinger’s behest, does record, almost by default, some of Kissinger’s fence-sitting techniques and failures, such as when he was trounced by Michael Foot on his attitude over Vietnam. He also tries to dismiss not only Hitchens’s, but Seymour Hersch’s criticisms of Kissinger. That part of his book reads a little like a semantic battle, with Ferguson - surely inadvertently – managing to cast aspersions on, in particular, Hersch, who is known for his use of reliable sources. Thankfully, I am not in the Kissinger cheerleading league, and have only the documents to rely on. I nevertheless have little doubt that my book, a thankless task, will arouse vicious reviews as well as good and balanced ones. My first book on Cyprus, for example, attracted one of the most intemperate, emotional, thoughtless and uninformed reviews that I had ever read, possibly because the author of the review saw himself as the leading expert, and had never heard of me. Thankfully, his review made little difference, and has been more than counterbalanced by good reviews and decent sales. At any rate, this book might well attract some nastiness, simply because the combination of Kissinger and Cyprus is a nasty one.

---

6 In Hermann Hesse’s *Steppenwolf*, the chief character is torn between the urges of his ‘wolf-half’ and his ‘man-half’.
9 Robert Holland’s review in *International Affairs*, October 2005. I was allowed to reply in the following issue, but not at length. Holland did half-sheepishly seem to apologise to me at a conference in Cyprus just after his review had been published. I had actually referred to his own book several times in my book, in a positive manner.
My twenty-two years of research on the diplomacy surrounding Cyprus, which has included my gaining access to previously unavailable files, sometimes with the help of the Information Commissioner, means that I can support my book with original source documents, rather than simply with other books or interviews. I am not a social scientist and international relations theorist, but simply a historian of diplomacy who hunts, captures, ravishes, devours, analyses and evaluates documents, the kind of documents with which I used to deal with in my first career as a British diplomat. I have done my best to avoid cherry-picking from those diplomatic documents about Kissinger that I have excavated, choosing to produce long tracts, rather than ‘soundbites’. Although the diplomatic documents generally seem to be somewhat negative about Kissinger, a few do come across as positive.

When I had the idea of writing this book, I had already written four about Cyprus and related matters, in which Kissinger had figured. Documents that I had excavated for those books, allied to the new ones that I have found, cajoled me, quite legitimately, into seeing that Kissinger was a major factor, perhaps even the crucial lynchpin, in deciding Cyprus’s current *kismet*. Hence this book which, unlike my other books, focuses specifically on Kissinger within the context of Cyprus, and brings a tawdry tale up to date, a story which the battered people of that island deserve to know, since, as you read this, plans may well be afoot to further legitimise the Turkish occupation that Kissinger, at the helm of the foreign policy of arguably the world’s most powerful country at the time, apparently failed to prevent.
INTRODUCTION

STATESMAN OR POLITICAL OPPORTUNIST?

[...] it is his manner of conceiving and conducting foreign policy without reference to, or knowledge of, the State Department or anyone else which is most worrying. It leaves one with the fear that any day something could go seriously wrong because the normal sources of advice, restraint and execution are by-passed.¹

This book sets out to demonstrate how Heinz Kissinger, a German Jewish émigré to the US in 1938, who then became a political scientist via accountancy studies and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), was able to confuse, persuade or hoodwink - whether by design, default, jokingly sarcastic mannerisms, persuasive power, intellect, a lack of experience of professional diplomatic procedure, extenuating circumstances, or a combination of some or all of these - the various protagonists in the Cyprus débâcle of summer 1974, protagonists who included not only the governments of Greece, Cyprus, France and Britain, but even his own American government, all in the name, some might think, of his brand of balance-of-power politics which, if one considers the substance as well as the presentation, can be interpreted as a guise for simple power politics/political realism. By juxtaposing his own prolific writings with diplomatic documents excavated from the British Archives, sometimes with the help of the Information Commissioner, this book aims to show, chiefly in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, not only the methodology he used to circumvent diplomatic norms, procrastinate and gyrate semantically, but his reasoning in acting as he did. This is where the documents come in so useful, particularly when juxtaposed with his own writings and with those of his apologists. Before weighing in, it needs to be stressed that any book on Kissinger - and on Cyprus, for that matter - is bound to be controversial, attracting some opprobrium as well as praise, given that he has his cheerleaders and apologists as well as his detractors.

This book will be no exception, even though it is based essentially on documents, some of which suggest that he was rather unprofessional in his approach to his work.

Kissinger, the quintessential well-educated Cold War warrior of the Fifties, Sixties and Seventies, is a pretty controversial figure internationally, even apparently taking French leave from Paris in April 2002 just after receiving a police summons to testify before a judge about the disappearance of five French citizens in Chile. One is inclined to wonder why Kissinger did not co-operate with French justice.\(^2\)

He is also well-known for his involvement in the secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos, and the concomitant violent deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians. And of course, there is more. A serious analysis and evaluation of his alleged crimes against humanity are however beyond the scope of this book: it would involve years of documentary research into South America and South-East Asia. But it is worth mentioning that one of the world’s most cited academics, Noam Chomsky, wrote in 2010 that Kissinger could certainly be brought to trial for his rôle in the bombing of Cambodia, ‘if the world were governed by justice, not forces.’\(^3\) This book will however be useful in understanding his behaviour vis-à-vis his alleged acts against humanity, since the case of Cyprus serves as an accurate microcosm of, and pointer to, his behaviour in other world fora.

That Kissinger is well-known is not open to question. But a number of qualifications need to be made: first, he was only in official policy-making and executive rôles for eight years, hardly comparable to his mentor Metternich’s long sojourn; second, it can be argued that he is as infamous as he is famous; third, although he is credited with negotiating an end to the Vietnam war, and was even awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, it should be noted that the war continued with the invasion of South Vietnam by the North, albeit without American involvement. And not only did the North Vietnamese leader refuse to accept the prize, as Kissinger did, but two of

---

\(^2\) Ferguson, op. cit., p. 10, mentions attempts by various judges to question Kissinger, but does not take the matter further, understandably, since I doubt that he had access to the judges’ papers. I nevertheless assume that in part two of his biography, he will seriously address these issues, and Kissinger’s explanations as to why he avoided French justice. One also hopes that Kissinger will have allowed more of his papers to be released.

\(^3\) The Phnom Penh Post, October 2010.
the members of the Nobel committee resigned in disgust. It is also possible that the Vietnam war would in any case have ended with or without Kissinger.

Kissinger is also well known for having established relations with Maoist China. Although at the time this irritated the Soviet Union, whose relations with China were at a nadir, Kissinger nevertheless managed to become known as a leading exponent of détente, although it needs to be borne in mind that Willy Brandt, and arguably even his predecessor, had already begun the process.

Kissinger himself has not been overly helpful in shedding light on many of his dealings in the Seventies. According to Christopher Hitchens, on leaving office, he classified many of his papers as personal, leaving them to the Library of Congress on condition that they be held privately. To add insult to the injury of serious researchers, from 2001, the State Department was loth to release hundreds of Kissinger’s telephone transcripts covering the years 1973 to 1977, despite a Freedom of Information request and the National Security Archive itself recently filing suit. It was only in August 2015 that the State Department was obliged to release them, but some of them have been so heavily excised as to render them meaningless or open to misinterpretation. Serendipitously, this book reproduces parts of two transcripts, that were released by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, after three years of badgering by this author and the Information Commissioner. The Greek government is even more coy about the story, refusing, by a law passed in 1981, to release any serious papers on the Cyprus débâcle. Several skeletons still linger in the cupboard.

It may strike some as odd that the man who almost singlehandedly helped to revive the term ‘geopolitics’ in the 1970s, by using it as a synonym for balance-of-power politics, recently told Der Spiegel:

---

You can’t accept the principle that any country can just change its borders and take a province of another country. But if the West is honest with itself, it has to admit that there were mistakes on its side. The annexation of Crimea was not a move towards global conquest. It was not Hitler moving into Czechoslovakia.7

This viewpoint seems highly contradictory, given his behaviour over Cyprus, and his subtle condoning of the invasion, resulting in de facto changed borders, ethnic cleansing matched by that of Palestine in 1948 and since, and an occupation that continues as I write. One is inclined to wonder why he did not try to justify the invasion and dismemberment of Cyprus by saying that Turkey, like Russia, was also not aiming for global conquest. Instead, he chooses to blame the Watergate scandal for his apparently being caught on the hop over the Turkish invasion. On top of that, he delayed his account of the Cyprus invasion until the third volume of his memoirs,8 published in 1999, only touching on the question in the second volume, published in 1982.9 The delay itself speaks volumes, if one can pardon the accidental pun.

As people near their deathbeds, they often tend to re-examine their past actions critically. One is inclined to wonder whether there is an element of this in Kissinger’s very recent pronouncements, or whether, rather than publicly wishing to atone for his diplomatic lack of savoir faire in a crisis, he is simply trying to deflect criticism - and even self-criticism - by his art of self-contradiction and possibly even self-deception, amounting to a form of cognitive self-dissonance. Or perhaps he is too realistic for any of that. Various examples of his possible intellectual inconsistency and semantic chicanery will crop up in this book. It is up to the reader to decide whether he has mellowed, and become less of a realist in terms of international relations theory, or whether it is but a question of semantic massaging, trying to protect his name in history, and ensuring that he will be remembered.

At a meeting in Moscow in October 2013, Kissinger stated that although Russia and the USA disagree on some things, they no longer oppose each other. This might strike some as somewhat ingeniously ingenuous, since Russian academics were already wondering why

7 Interview with Der Spiegel, 13 November 2014.
8 Kissinger, Henry, Years of Renewal, Simon and Schuster UK Ltd., 2012 (first published 1999).
America was behaving towards Russia in an incipiently hostile fashion.\textsuperscript{10} On the other hand, he was playing to an audience of a new generation of Russian academics, and hardly wished to appear confrontational. Although Chatham House rules (also in operation at this meeting) forbid me from being more specific, Kissinger did appear somewhat sanguine about the state of the world, when in fact it was already sliding into a degree of chaos, which continues as I write. Was he just rationalising, in order to believe in a peaceful order, or did he underestimate the increasing level of chaos in international politics in our world? After all, today we are witnessing a harsh denial of the renowned strategist’s opinions.\textsuperscript{11}

In some of his books, Kissinger claims, as do his diminishing band of apologists, that he was not properly focused on Cyprus during the crisis that led to its illegal dismemberment. Thus he seems to be admitting that what happened was wrong, yet still saw fit to imply that the Cyprus problem was solved in 1974.\textsuperscript{12} One brace of apologists, supporting Kissinger’s contention that he was not closely involved in the Cyprus crisis, claims that Kissinger did not see Cyprus as a priority; they also claim, without offering any evidence, that the communications in the British Sovereign Base Areas did not merit the importance attributed to them by “conspiracy theorists”.\textsuperscript{13} The precise opposite will be demonstrated in Chapter Six.

\textsuperscript{10} When I gave a keynote speech at Lomonosov Moscow State University (‘Sorokin Readings’, Eighth International Conference, ‘Social Inequality as a Contemporary Global International Problem’, 5-6 December 2013), the Head of the Sociology Faculty and other senior academics asked me (at a Ukrainian restaurant!) why America was being hostile towards Russia. They really seemed to have trouble understanding. I did attempt to explain that financial profit was a political ideology in the US.

\textsuperscript{11} Russian International Affairs Council, meeting in Moscow on 27 October 2013.

\textsuperscript{12} Op. cit., Kissinger, \textit{Years of Renewal}. On page 239, he writes: “If success is measured by “solving” every problem, America’s Cyprus policy failed in restoring a unitary Cypriot state. But not every problem has a definitive solution, and not every status quo ante can be restored. The communal conflict between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus has proved intractable for centuries. However, preserving the general peace and the structure of the Western Alliance on which peace depended were important objectives in their own right. And those objectives the Ford Administration did achieve in the Cyprus crisis of 1974.”

Another academic (who works in the occupied part of Cyprus) believes that there was no communication between Kissinger and the British Foreign Minister, Callaghan, on the first day of the invasion of 20 July 1974.\textsuperscript{14} Again, these claims will be torn apart, using the documents.

While on the subject of ‘conspiracy theorists’, this is a label often applied unfairly by sloppy academics and government information departments. One of the better-known books that has come in for some criticism, for example by the above-mentioned brace of academics, namely \textit{The Cyprus Conspiracy},\textsuperscript{15} has in fact been proven to have been fairly accurate in some of its evaluation. Had a certain historian speculated eight years ago that Kissinger was desperate that Britain keep its bases, he would have been dismissed as a conspiracy theorist. So he held his fire, as any self-respecting historian must. But since then, he has obtained documents which show not only how important Kissinger considered the bases, but how he pressurised Britain into keeping them. The documents suggest that far from being a conspiracy, there was simply a secret high level idea to allow Turkey to invade and keep over one third of Cyprus, a plan which initially only Kissinger (and perhaps a small coterie) and his former student, the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Eçevit, were really focused on. But we still do not know whether the invasion was agreed well in advance, or whether it was agreed on the hoof. We need more documents, and in particular all the above-mentioned telephone transcripts, unexpurgated.

Of the better-known recent books which highlight Kissinger’s rôle in Cyprus’s destiny, Christopher Hitchens’s \textit{Hostage to History},\textsuperscript{16} the above-mentioned \textit{The Cyprus Conspiracy}, Hitchens’s \textit{The Trial of Henry Kissinger},\textsuperscript{17} and Eugene Rossides’s recent offering \textit{Kissinger and Cyprus: a Study in Lawlessness},\textsuperscript{18} are noteworthy for their critical stance. None of the authors are however historians. The first two books are by journalists, while the last one is by a retired US Treasury official. This book will put those books into a realistic current context through the documents.

\textsuperscript{15}Op. cit., O’Malley, Brendan and Craig, Ian, \textit{The Cyprus Conspiracy}; I think that ‘conspiracy’ is too strong a word to use, although there was certainly plenty of skulduggery.
\textsuperscript{16}Op. cit., Hitchens, Christopher, \textit{Hostage to History}.
\textsuperscript{17}Op. cit., Hitchens, Christopher, \textit{The Trial of Henry Kissinger}.
\textsuperscript{18}Op. cit., Rossides, Eugene, \textit{Kissinger and Cyprus}.  
excavated, as well as offer some criticism. This book will refrain from vituperation, allowing the documents to do their job. This author has never met Kissinger, and so is - perhaps thankfully – unable to feel anything personal about him. He hopes that he has time to read this book, as his reaction to the documents will be welcome and, surely, a help to international historians and students of relations between states, particularly given his clear penchant for those such as Kautilya, Richelieu, Metternich and Castlereagh. The book will also home in on various of Kissinger’s views which appear sensible per se, yet incongruous, and out of kilter with his general stance.

It is a paradox that Kissinger is often referred to as a diplomat, for he was never trained as such. He was, rather, a political scientist who worked his way into three of the top jobs in the United States, namely Secretary of State, head of the National Security Council and Chairman of the Forty Committee, concurrently for a period, into the bargain. In its conclusions, this book will deal with this amassing of power and responsibility, juxtaposing his book Diplomacy with its much earlier namesake, by Harold Nicolson.

As an academic, in 1957, several years before he hit the heady heights of international diplomacy, Kissinger wrote:

But for the foreseeable future we should be able to count on […] Cyprus or Libya as staging areas for the Middle East, and on Great Britain as a staging area for Europe.

We shall see that this passion with Cyprus’s position (as well as that of Great Britain’s) as a Cold War asset will crop up as we proceed, reaching a climax in the mid-Seventies. Kissinger is a prime example of those who consider Cyprus as a cat’s paw of great power diplomacy.

---

19 A review of Kissinger’s World Order comes out with the following: ‘Kissinger’s book takes us on a dazzling and instructive global tour of the quest for order, from Cardinal Richelieu to Metternich and Bismarck, the Indian Foreign Minister Kautilya of the 4th century BC and the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman, and a succession of American Presidents beginning with Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, all culminating in a world order based on sovereign nation-states at the end of World War Two.’ See Isaacson, Walter, Time, 6 September 2014.

In the same year that *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* was published, so was his (1950) doctorate, in which his fascination with, and admiration for, Castlereagh and Metternich glimmer through. In particular, his support for the ‘Congress system’, agreed by the major powers in 1815 after Napoleon’s defeat, comes through, although he qualifies its failure by writing on page 174 that ‘Metternich’s policy should be measured, not by its ultimate failure, but by the length of time it staved off inevitable disaster.’ As we shall see, much of his thinking appears to have been influenced to a considerable extent by these two people, even if he criticises them a little. Thus, it would be reasonable for an insightful critic to claim that Kissinger’s ideas and actions are not self-made, and that he is more of an academic turned top unelected politician than original thinker. This book should help the reader to make up his mind on how original Kissinger’s ideas were and are. But in defence of Kissinger’s ideas, let us recall Oscar Wilde’s dictum that most people are other people, their thoughts being someone else’s opinions, their lives a mimicry, and their passions a quotation. This author sometimes finds himself wondering how many of his own ideas, even if seemingly original, have not been subliminally shaped by his parents, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Herodotus, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Oscar Wilde, Bernard Shaw, Henry Williamson, Somerset Maugham, George Orwell, Ted Hughes, Graham Greene and John Le Carré, to mention just a miniminipiny number of people. For example, although this author thinks that his definition of a human being as a ‘bipedic memory’ is original, he has to accept that it may have originated in some pre-Socratic line he read, and then forgot, which then reappeared in new semantic colours years later; the same can possibly be said for his contention that in order to think, one need space not to think. At any rate, with Kissinger, it is not difficult to identify what influenced his writing and actions, tactical inactions, and studied procrastination and obfuscation. Some of his suppressed personal aversion to certain people and peoples comes through, for example, vis-à-vis the Greeks, just as Metternich’s aversion comes through. Indeed, the latter said of the Greeks:

---