Atomization or Integration? Transborder Aspects of Multipedagogy
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INTRODUCTION

As a result of moving beyond the frameworks of given fields of study and the paradigms and methodological apparatus assigned to such concepts, it is contemporarily possible to capture cultural processes manifested within the contemporary areas of public, political and educational practice. The latter concern parallels, yet presents to a different degree, the processes of European integration and atomization occurring within political and ideological planes as reflected in sociological and educational phenomena.

The cultural diversity that accompanies the processes of European integration or results from cultural atomization is related not only to the existence and contact of various ethnic groups or religious communities in a given area, but concurrently reveals a fundamental sphere of pedagogic influences, i.e. attitudes towards representatives of culturally diverse environments. Such attitudes often reflect ideological aspects of implemented policies on multiculturalism, concurrently exposing educational activities anticipating permanent redefinitions of ontological and axiological stances in interaction with “the Other” in Europe and the world globally. Such a perspective is in line with, for instance, the labelling theory of Howard S. Becker, according to whom

“social groups create deviance by making rules whose infraction creates deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. The deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label” (Becker, 1973, p. 9).

Hence, deviation, understood also in the context of stigmatizing difference and its representatives, does not provide the characteristics of a given act of behavior, but is rather created by a social group (culturally atomized), stigmatizing “aberrational”, i.e. “other”, individuals.

Furthermore, it nowadays appears urgent to introduce multicultural discourse to the political, social and cultural as well as educational areas, recognizing the threat of globalization as manifested within seeming universalism, aiming at cultural homogenization (Grillo, 1998, p. 24).

Moreover, taking into consideration the features of postmodernity,
which establish a specific doctrinal universe entailing pluralism, ambiguity, contingency, freedom, and the disappearance of the epistemic borders between the subject and the object, there is a new ontological area generating the phenomenon of integration and atomization, as reflected, for instance, in the postmodern concepts of Z. Bauman. This sociologist puts emphasis on the fact that for decades now, Europe has been the scene of working out ways to live with difference, and accordingly, does not force its citizens to forsake their own cultural differences, as we all have to face the challenge of learning to live with a cultural diversity that is not a temporary discomfort, but something inherently part of the cultural landscape of contemporary Europe (Bauman, 2011, p. 243).

Hence the demand to establish a new reflection on multiculturalism, one that will allow a redefinition of the nature of cultural (co)existence, released from assimilating practices and moving toward the advantages of cross-culturalism, grounded in dialogue, sociological asymmetry and moral contract, acknowledging the fact that these days multiculturalism is in us and next to us (Golka, 2010, p. 5).

Taking the above into account, we assume that a multitude of cultures functioning within the same area generates processes that assign a given order to such cultural diversity. Hence, they can be located on a continuum, determined, on one hand, by the advanced atomization (followed by stigmatization) of various connotations within the range of recognition of cultural diversity, and on the other, by the acceptance of such differences, which can usher in coexistence and transcultural integration. As a result, the categories of borderlands and transborderland are becoming essential for the process of getting to know and understanding the world of contemporary individuals, including the symptomatic mechanisms within. The latter, consequently, conditions the meaning and quality of life at the meeting points of cultures. Therefore, acknowledgement of such a perspective in perceiving multiculturalism orientates us towards interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary insight. Thus, such matters should be recognized as of paramount importance, requiring inspection from different research perspectives, as well as from different cultural authorisations.

Difference in itself encompasses all that is not a part of grand narratives of modernism based on logocentrism, i.e. all that is alternative, eccentric, or conflict-generating. Hence, postmodernity puts difference in the ontological, dispersed and chaotic area, which in turn calls for a new scientific interpretation. And as Clifford Geertz implies, the dialectic relationship between tradition and modernity reveals, on the one hand, the desire of a minority to maintain its own cultural individuality and local
specificity, and on the other hand, a pursuit of integration (Geertz, 1993, p. 241).

Recognizing the demand for empirical and academic discourse about the above indicated issues, we put forward for readers the study “Cultural atomization or European integration? Transborder aspects of (multi)pedagogy”, which came to life as a result of the cooperation of representatives of different disciplines, in particular, researchers dealing with multiculturalism, cross-cultural education, civil education and penitentiary pedagogy in the context of global and European cultural and demographic transformations, as well as ethnopedagogues, sociologists and historians. The authors were united by their common research interests concerning cross-border interpretations of cultural differences within pedagogical discourse, i.e. an attribute of contemporary man’s everyday life. Therefore, dilemmas perceived through the prism of a contemporary fusion of ideological canons (such as educational or political) were made a point of reference, expressed within the crucial antinomy of postmodern culture, that is, integration versus atomization. Acknowledging the inevitability of the processes of cultural change, reflecting political, social and economic repercussions, the authors have attempted to combine the European paradigms of theoretical thought and pedagogical practice. Priority was given to the quality and character of manifestations of integration and atomization in the cross-border area conceptualized within the European community and beyond. Orientation towards societies functioning in cross-border areas allowed the authors not only to throw light on phenomena and mechanisms contributing to cultural coexistence or conflict, but also to expose good practices concerning the process of overcoming cultural differences.

The multiple-author study consists of four parts. Within the framework of reflection on the European space of multi- and cross-cultural discourse in the first part, the authors tackle European dilemmas related to the concept of cosmopolitanism and the threat of “mega-nationalism” (D. Sokolović), new ways of understanding borderlands in the European Union (M. Galent), the doctrine of defence by culture (M. Tomaszewska), cross-cultural education in the context of contemporary dilemmas of cultural diversity ideology (J. Nikitorowicz), and an ethnopedagogical approach to cross-cultural education (A. Tufekčić).

The second part of the study revolves around educational and socialization discourse in cultural diversity and processes that occur in the cultural borderlands, including analysis of educational undertakings addressed to children, young people and adults in multicultural societies, regional and cross-border aspects which promote education for freedom of
thought and conscience, helping to develop cultural identity and concurrently protecting it from marginalisation. These analyses focus on the phenomenon of the centuries-old presence of Islam in Europe and the intense, not only bilateral contact between the Muslim civilization and the West, the education of national minorities in the historical borderland of Poland (S. Walasek), the axiological orientations of young Poles and Lithuanians in the Vilnius region (A. Szerlag), school culture as the premise of cultural diversity accomplishment (V. Targamadzë, V. Grincevičienė), the educational processes of Azeri and Armenian minorities in Georgia (U. Markowska-Manista), historical aspects of Muslim Andalusia and its scientific potential (T. Stefaniuk), the transnational identity of the Muslim diaspora (B. Pasamonik), religious education in the preschool education of Christians and Muslims (J. Karczewska), the sense of subjectivity among young Bosnian Muslims (J. Pilarska), students’ cultural identification in the context of transculturality (E. Żyłkiewicz-Płońska), civic education in culturally diverse environments (I. Jurgena), and religious education in the context of contemporary secularization (M. Humeniuk-Walczak).

Subsequent parts make reference to the broad political discourse on cultural atomization and integration, as well as to penitentiary practice and theory in the context of cultural diversity and the execution of deprivation of liberty. Thus, the third part elaborates on areas of political, cultural and educational cooperation in the cultural borderlands, as well as on problems of integration and marginalization threats to minority groups, indicating new patterns of activity contributing to the process of fulfilling needs by culturally diverse communities in the transborder dimension, followed by constructive criticism of existing legal and organizational solutions. Hence, the political connotations of multiculturalism are subject to reflection from the political perspective of pluralism and exclusivism philosophy (M. Turowski), the complementary character of the culture exemplified by mutual, stereotyped images of Poles and Arabs (Z. Abou Saleh), the widely understood (political, cultural and social) presence of Muslims in Europe (B. Dwierski), the cognitive-educational dimension of cultural tourism in the Polish-Czech and Polish-German borderland (E. Dawidejt-Drobek), the acquisition of the German language and regional policy regarding bilingual education in the Polish-German borderland (B. Jatczak), and the operations of non-governmental organizations directed at minor refugees applying for political asylum (K. Gandecka).

Since migration and issues of social integration generate problems and are concurrently a source of key challenges to state and international institutions, the authors of the fourth part of this study concentrate on
penitentiary discourse in the context of cultural differences, tackling theoretical, legal and methodological activities and procedures carried out in dealing with representatives of cultural minorities. Penitentiary practice is linked here to the area of law, where examinations in culturally diverse groups constitute the premise to formulate *de lege ferenda* demands for the Polish system within the implementation of penal law. As a result, it provides a reflection on this, which has already been developed and implemented, but which is also still lacking in terms of revealing the complexity of issues related to executing the detention and imprisonment of foreigners in Poland (S. Lelental, A. Nawój-Śleszyński), the complaints of culturally diverse prisoners on the penalty of imprisonment in penitentiary units (S. Grzesiak), the process of decision-making by penitentiary tutors in matters concerning foreign prisoners (A. Urbanek), and the pedagogical framework of imprisonment in the context of linguistics (P. Perska).

Despite the broad spectrum of presented issues and, at times, boldly presented theses, the study does not fulfil the issues of pedagogical transborderness in the light of theoretical and empirical aspects of cultural integration and atomization. Nonetheless, it can provide a substantial premise for the interpretation of pedagogical disciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary obligations in the context of cultural diversity, dynamically interspersing its discourses.

The applicable value of this study for educational practice is expressed in the conclusions formulated by the authors, with indications of specific areas of utilization, such as educational, institutional, penitentiary, or legal matters.

Presenting to readers the study “Cultural atomization or European integration? Transborder aspects of (multi)pedagogy”, we hope that drawing the attention of representatives of various fields of social science that explore cross-cultural social reality, as well as representatives of the practice, management and implementation of the ethics of recognition of cross-cultural values to various social areas, and acknowledging the importance of the issues related to cultural diversity and the specific processes it entails, will generally support the development of new administrative, social and educational practices as an adequate response to the key elements of the contemporary phenomena concentrated around cultural atomization and integration.
PART 1:

MULTICULTURALISM AND INTERCULTURALISM IN EUROPE

Džemal Sokolović  Europe at a Crossroads: From a Champion of Cosmopolitanism to Mega-Nationalism

Marcin Galent  Towards a New Understanding of the Borderlands in the European Union

Monika Tomaszewska  Cultural Defence – the Myth or Reality of Contemporary Civilization – Selected Issues

Jerzy Nikitorowicz  Intercultural Education in the Context of Contemporary Problems of Multiculturalism

Adnan Tufekčić  An Ethno-pedagogical Approach to Intercultural Upbringing and Education
CHAPTER ONE

EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS:
FROM A CHAMPION OF COSMOPOLITANISM
TO MEGA-NATIONALISM

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Abstract

Recent Roma expulsions from France, Angela Merkel and David Cameron’s disappointment in multiculturalism, the Swiss referendum on minarets etc., all raise ominous questions about the political and cultural future of Europe. Significantly, this has been happening in the countries of Condorcet and Voltaire, Kant and Hegel, Locke and Swift, therefore the part of the world where the idea of cosmopolitanism was born and the voice in favour of religious tolerance was raised. Even Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, has recently had to warn of Islamophobic prejudices. An emerging anti-Americanism is a phenomenon contributing to the puzzle of actual and possibly even more xenophobic developments in Europe. Does this mean that Europe has started building a wall to keep out the rest of the world? Are we facing the appearance of euro-nationalism? The author is eagerly searching for a response to these questions. The paper undertakes the task of finding out the fundamental causes of prejudice. Quite hypothetically, it raises the question of whether democracy itself, as the defining feature of political culture in Europe, is appropriate to multiculturalism, multi-ethnicity, cultural diversity etc. as the prerequisites of any cosmopolitan role of Europe in the forthcoming future. It is in fact the people of Europe, not only the leaders, who share such prejudices. The author maintains that Europe’s troubles with itself, and the rest of the world, rest on the inappropriate comprehension of freedom as the basic assumption of
democracy. He reminds readers of Hegel’s concept of freedom and challenges and the risks of the wrong application of freedom. He also tests freedom as the fundamental value, in comparison with Aristotle’s concept of virtue. Freedom is fundamental to both Europe and democracy, but it has its limits as well. Following in the footsteps of Hegel, the author attempts to detect these limits. Ultimately, the author’s interest in the theoretical approach to the issue has its practical purpose, aiming to find out whether Anders Behring Breivik’s shooting due to multiculturalism in Oslo, as well as Mevlid Jašarević’s recent shots at the American Embassy in Sarajevo, has its source in Europe’s incorrect understanding and application of freedom.

**Key words**: cosmopolitanism, democracy, Aristotle, Hegel, meganationalism, multiculturalism, freedom, value, virtue

**Introduction**

Two infamous pages of human history – colonialism and fascism (Nazism) – were written by states that are democratic today. They had also been democratic before they wrote them. Colonialism and fascism are socio-political-economic systems based on nationalism, that is, social prejudice about the superiority of chosen social groups. Although democracy is a form of society based on the political equality of people, it has not been a sufficient obstacle to nationalism – either in its colonial or its fascist (Nazi) manifestation.

Nationalism today is, perhaps more than ever, a widespread social prejudice. It is also spread as a form of social reality. It might just be that its contemporary manifestations are more sophisticated and more hypocritical. If this is correct, then the inevitable question is what the possible consequences of nationalism are today. Social prejudice, unlike preconception, is a very resistant and sustainable form of social consciousness. In its extreme forms it assumes the character of fanaticism. In moderate forms, prejudice loses nothing of its character, but endeavours to justify itself by rational, political and legal, reasons. Such hypocritical nationalism primarily manifests in the current form of anti-multiculturalism. As a form of social reality, nationalism also has extreme and moderate manifestations. *Terrorism* is an act of extreme nationalism; the abolition of any diversity is a moderate act of nationalism. Both have their roots in nationalism as a form of social conscience; just as it is the root of fanaticism, so it is the root of hidden nationalism as well. The common denominator of both nationalist social prejudice and acting nationalism is anti-multiculturalism. Recent ideas on the failure and,
consequently, impossibility of multiculturalism, are instances of such social prejudice. Undoubtedly, nationalism is becoming a part of European social reality as well. The question is only which forms of manifestation it will assume. After the 22nd of July 2011 in Oslo, it is clear that the manifestations of nationalism will not be merely moderate. What is crucial is the fact that the prejudice of nationalism, the form of social conscience, an idea or ideology, stands behind every act of nationalism. And behind these ideas may stand scholars, artists, priests, politicians, parents.

The political frame within which anti-multiculturalism appears is the modern European nation state. Does this mean that the nation state in its current stage of development, having more or less completed national assimilation on a social level, has the setting up of monoculturalism as its forthcoming goal? It is indicative that the carriers of these social prejudices are only democratic states which have marked the history of nationalism with its most extreme forms. Such a state of affairs opens a serious theoretical dilemma on the (in)compatibility of nation state and mono(multi)culturalism with democracy. In other words, will the nation state, after wiping out ethnic pluralism in order to be more efficient, undertake cultural assimilation, in order to become more monolithic and consequently even more efficient?

Therefore, it is significant that in the country (and culture) of Immanuel Kant, more than 200 years after his ideas of world law (*ius cosmopoliticum*), the principle of universal hospitality, and eternal peace, there appears a prime minister who claims that multiculturalism has failed (Kant, 1999). It is also significant that Gypsies are declared undesirable and forced from the country of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen/Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, the country (and culture) of Marquis de Condorcet (an abolitionist and a member of Society of the Friends of the Blacks in 1780!) (Williams, 2004) and Voltaire (who even dared to fall in love with French girl who was not catholic!) (Sakmann, 1971). It is significant, in particular, that in the country of John Lock, author of *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (Marshall, 2006), about religious tolerance in the aftermath of ghastly religious intolerance (within Christianity!) in Europe, and the country of Jonathan Swift, author of the essay *The Art of Political Lying* (Swift, 1993) the prime minister reiterates and confirms the words of his German counterpart on multiculturalism.

It does no harm to remember that the big, cosmopolitan ideas of these European thinkers arose before these countries become democratic. In fact it is significant.
Europe has adopted new values with the emergence of democracy. Among the fundamental ones on which the ‘nouveau régime’ or democracy rests is the value of liberté. The aim of this paper is to find out whether freedom has actually become a European value, whether Europe is aware of the ambiguity of freedom, and even whether freedom, or ‘freedom’, is the cause of growing anti-multiculturalism and a possible source of the emergence of imminent mega-nationalism.

Missing assumption in Europe: freedom

Ambiguity of freedom

Among all the questions raised by social theory so far, two stand out as fundamental: 1. Why do people live together? And 2. Why can people not live together? The answers to both rest on the notion of freedom. Either of the anticipated responses implies that one knows what freedom is.

The beauty of the human dream of a cosmopolitan unity of mankind breaks down as soon as it faces the cruelty of the state of waking. Even while dreaming about the brotherhood of all people, people live in states which disintegrate, stratifying societies and groups (ethnic, religious, etc.) which either assimilate or split, families falling apart. The same occurs with even the most humanistic ideas about the world political order when they face the hurdle of political pragmatism. And yet, neither dreamers nor philosophers renounce their dreams and ideas. Both the dream and idea of cosmopolitanism have become the values of numerous individuals, movements, and even social upheavals (revolutions). The value of cosmopolitanism is one of the fundamental human and thus universal values. No matter how imaginary, the value of cosmopolitanism rests on the real, i.e. biological, condition of the unity of the human species. That is to say that the value of cosmopolitanism does not stem from any specific social identity, including European, but from the anthropological identity of man. As such, and only as such, it is European. If it were only European, the value of cosmopolitanism would be contradictio in adiecto.

Yet, despite the sustainability of human dreams and ideas, the question that arises is whether the European dream and idea of cosmopolitanism are simply wishful thinking if existing democratic states cannot bear, do not want or fail in multiculturalism. Moreover, if European democratic states are not ready for or capable of multiculturalism, how can Europe itself or any form of European political unification be possible? If EU member states disintegrate because they find multiculturalism unbearable, then it is
not only cosmopolitanism that is wishful thinking, but also Europe, inclusive of every single nation state.

The value of Europe is merely a specific form of cosmopolitanism as a general political value. The question of what assumption is missing in Europe that would make it cosmopolitan is hence at the same time the question of what the premise of Europe is. These two questions are thus one question. There can only be, therefore, one answer. Europe implies multiculturalism, even without Muslims. The purpose of these lines is to try to determine what the missing assumption and condition sine qua non of Europe is, but also the political unity of the world. Is there a connection between the assumption that is missing and the recent anti-multicultural assertions of European leaders and the fanatically growing anti-multicultural sentiment among Europeans? (I almost do not dare to proceed with the logical next question: is there a connection between the missing assumption of Europe and cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and anti-multicultural ideas, and newly emerging anti-multicultural terrorism, on the other?)

**Freedom as value and as virtue**

Europe proclaims freedom, almost officially, for its own value. Consequently, Europe regards itself as the value of its inhabitants.

In order for Europe to be of value, it has to be willed by its citizens. That is to say: in order for Europe to be the value of Europeans, freedom must be their value. However, freedom as a value, thereby Europe as a value, is possible only on the assumption of freedom as a virtue. Value and virtue, like the value of freedom and the virtue of freedom, are not identical notions. The value of freedom rests on and springs from the virtue of freedom; freedom as a value is not possible without the virtue of freedom. This is precisely what European mainstream political science does not take into account, for it has lost its ties with political philosophy. This is also what European states to take into account, for they have lost their ties with the mental praxis of their citizens. It is not sufficient that European states and European political science will Europe. For Europe to be feasible, it has to be the expression of the free will of its citizens, that is, it must become their value. Is it? In order for Europe to be the value of its citizens, the citizens of Europe must be aware of the virtue of freedom. Are they? If not, Europeans without the virtue of freedom will continue to want Europe, but now without foreigners (some in particular), and then without some among themselves.
For the sake of all of that, it is indispensable to investigate what the virtue of freedom is. Without it, it is impossible to know not only what freedom is, that word of seduction, but what the possible consequences of not knowing what it is are. That is the aim of this paper. The character of European integration, as well as that of a broader political integration, depends on whether Europe rests on the assumption of freedom, both as value and virtue.

What determines the character of the political unification of Europe is its purpose: does Europe unite in order to set up endogamous borders which will separate it from the rest of world, or is Euro-politism established for the sake of wider integration leading to cosmopolitanism? If the value of Europe does not already imply (or include) the value of cosmopolitanism, then Europeanism risks becoming Eurocentrism, i.e. nationalism lifted to a higher level; mega-nationalism. If Europeans really want Europe, then multiculturalism must become (remain) their value within existing states, and before their political unification. For a political Europe to be born, its states and citizens need to politically mature. There are reasons enough – and the statements of two European leaders are not the only ones – to assert that Europe stands at the crossroads where it must choose between cosmopolitanism, as an indicator of the value of European political integration, and mega-nationalism, as a particularism that will separate it from the rest of world.

There is something which determines the mere purpose of the political unification of Europe. What paves the future road of Europe, the way forward from its current crossroad, will depend on whether freedom becomes the virtue of its citizens.

In order to define freedom, including its ambiguous character, it will be methodologically most productive if we set up the distinction between value and virtue, and thereby between the value of freedom and the virtue of freedom as well, and search for it in their relationship.

The point of origin of value is the will, “which is free, so that freedom makes its substance and determination” (Hegel, 1996). In other words, value is the expression of man’s free will, i.e. freedom itself. Every value, therefore, and not only the value of freedom, is an expression of freedom. A value which was not the expression of will which is free would not be a value. An imposed value does not count as a value. This refers to the value of cosmopolitanism as it does to the value of Europe. There is no value without will. In fact, freedom is will. “That which is free is the will. Will without freedom is an empty word, and freedom becomes actual only as will, as subject” (Hegel). However – and this is where the trouble with the ambiguous character of freedom begins – values can also be negative. In
addition to the value of political integration, for example, there is the value of political disintegration. Both negative values and positive ones are the expression of free will. It must be, therefore, that there is something wrong, as well as something right, inherent to the notion of freedom. Freedom, as such, is not taken to be solely positive. For this reason, the value of freedom, as the expression of freedom in itself, can also not be taken to be solely positive. That is why sometimes, even political disintegration, or secessionism, is not always negative, and can be positive. What determines the ambiguous character of values is the ambiguous character of freedom; the ambiguous character of freedom determines the ambiguous character of freedom as a value as well. Negative values are expressions of freedom, but not of freedom in its form as a virtue. This is the first and most basic distinction between values and virtues: values, both positive and negative ones, derive from freedom, but freedom is not only a virtue, but also something else too.

According to Aristotle, virtue can be learned, any virtue by any man, at the right time (age) and with the right teachers. People can, however, also be taught a value, any one. As a matter of fact, everything can be learned as a value. That is not what distinguishes a value from a virtue. And yet, there is a value that cannot be learned. People cannot be taught the value of freedom. If people are taught the value of freedom, then it is an imposed, or manipulated, or apparent freedom, and does not count as a value. For freedom to become our value, it must emanate from our will, thus from freedom as a virtue. I cannot will freedom if freedom is not a virtue to me. This is the second distinction between the value of freedom and the virtue of freedom. I cannot be taught the value of freedom. It is not even necessary. Once taught the virtue of freedom, I will actually struggle to make freedom my own value.

Consequently, the value of Europe counts as a value only if it rests on the virtue of freedom of its citizens. In order for Europe to be possible, it must be the value of its citizens. That is why Europeans must firstly be taught the virtue of freedom in order to make Europe their value. As Aeschylus, and then Democritus, Plato and Aristotle taught the Greeks to hold in high esteem the middle, that is, the midpoint between freedom and dependence, so too must someone teach modern Europeans this fundamental wisdom of life. Only then, on the assumption of freedom as the virtue of European citizens, and on the assumption of freedom as the value of European citizens, will the value of Europe not exclude the value of cosmopolitanism. Otherwise, without this assumption, the idea of Europe will be the goal of a new nationalism, euro-nationalism, presumably mega-nationalism. Regrettably, the ‘value’ which currently
dominates, shapes and defines Europe is ambiguous. It is ambiguous because it rests on freedom, which does not emanate from the virtue of freedom. The outcome is hence uncertain and ambiguous. Europe stands between growing nationalism and retreating cosmopolitanism. To stop such a trend, the ambiguous character of freedom needs to be pointed out. Not all freedom is a virtue.

**Freedom as virtue and as vice (the deficiency of freedom and the excess of freedom)**

Europe easily proclaims freedom as a value. It also uncritically proclaims it to be value held by its population. Europe is not aware of the ambiguity of freedom.

In order to be a virtue (grc. arete; lat. virtus), freedom must be neither withheld nor imposed. Freedom is an essential thing. Only essential things are their own purposes. Freedom is its own purpose. The purpose of the virtue of freedom is the value of freedom. All other values emanate from freedom as a self-purpose. Regrettably, freedom can be withheld. Then there is too little of it. The deficiency of freedom or insufficient freedom is not a virtue. Freedom can also be imposed; then, there is more freedom than there should be. An excess of freedom or exaggerated freedom is not freedom either. Virtue, according to Aristotle, is in the middle, between two extremes. In this case, the virtue of freedom is the midpoint between a deficiency of freedom and an excess of freedom. Only medium freedom is a virtue. It goes without saying that a deficiency of freedom is dangerous; an excess of freedom, however, is dangerous as well. Neither imposed freedom, that is an excess of freedom, nor withheld freedom, that is a deficiency of freedom, count as the virtue of freedom, but they are often referred to as freedom. These forms of freedom serve a purpose which is external to freedom. If neither an excess of freedom nor a deficiency of freedom are the virtue of freedom, then what are they? It is clear that the withholding of freedom, i.e. a deficiency of freedom, is a perversion of freedom, thus a vice. However, the imposition of freedom, i.e. an excess of freedom, is also a perversion of freedom, thus a vice.

In order for freedom to become a value, one needs freedom as a virtue. Only freedom in its medium, righteous form can be the virtue of freedom. Without the virtue of freedom, grasped in the Aristotelian manner, the value of Europe, thus Europe itself, is unattainable. What is it that the value of Europe rests on? The virtue of freedom or freedom in its extreme forms? The ambiguity of freedom is what makes Europe so ambiguous.

How about freedom as a European value?
Europe, including, I suppose, Merkel and Cameron, proclaims freedom to be its fundamental value. If it is really so, then why do they deny the value of multiculturalism? After their statements, the question which seems inescapable is that of whether Europe, first of all political Europe, knows at all what freedom is; that is, ipso facto, whether Europe knows what Europe itself is. Is Europe aware that it is not as it claims itself to be? To put this another way: does Europe know that freedom is ambiguous, both a virtue and a vice? Europe would have to be aware of the temptations if this question were to be answered in the wrong way.

Therefore, what do Merkel and Cameron lack? Hegel! No less, no more.

**Hegel’s concept of freedom**

As freedom is the content of will, so intelligentsia – in its most developed definition as thinking – is the content of freedom (*Hegel*). Without thinking, freedom would be empty. For the sake of clearness, it may be better to say ‘without critical thinking’. Some deem thinking to be ‘separated from will’ and ‘even detrimental to the will, especially good will’ (*Hegel*). So, the thinking which maintains that freedom is not possible without multiculturalism is very detrimental to the will that wants freedom but without multiculturalism. Europe, for example, has good will when it comes to its two officially declared values: democracy and the nation state. Both of them, it is taken for granted, rest on the value of freedom. However, is will, in this case good will, fulfilled with thinking, i.e. critical thinking? Is not the European value of freedom, which is to say the values of both democracy and nation state, based on will which is empty, for it is without thinking? Critical thinking, including critical thinking on democracy and the nation state, includes critical thinking on freedom. What is it that Europe actually wants when it wants freedom, but without multiculturalism? Europe suffers from two vices: the excess of freedom and the deficiency of freedom. Our hypothesis is that the nation state rests on the vice of the excess of freedom, while democracy rests on the vice of the deficiency of freedom. In other words, Europe lacks just what it uses to define itself, its fundamental value – freedom in its righteous, middle form. In order to grasp this, one should remind oneself of Hegel’s concept of freedom. In Hegel’s analysis of freedom, one unveils the ambiguity we have just set out through the dichotomy of freedom as a virtue and freedom as a vice. The analysis identifies three elements of freedom.
First element of freedom

Will is, in the words of Hegel, the ‘absolute possibility that one can abstract from every determination…, escape from every content as a fence’ (Hegel). Such a will, thus freedom, Hegel – protestant, Christian, German and European – calls ‘negative freedom or the freedom of reason’ (Hegel). The word freedom is today used with much ease in European as well as American political discourse (Hegel) when it comes to democracy and the nation state, i.e. the rule of people and ethnic diversity. It is very important to see what the content of freedom is in democracy as a form of political order, and what kind of freedom of peoples (ethnic groups) exists within the frame of a nation state. Let us once more remind ourselves, not for the sake of Hegel and theory, but because of ourselves and actual political praxis, that Hegel also calls ‘freedom’ without fences, without limits, abstracted from every determination, a ‘freedom of emptiness’ (Hegel). The consequence of such limitless freedom, in reality, whether in politics or in religiosity, is:

a ‘fanaticism which would destroy the established social order, remove all individuals suspected of desiring any kind of order, and demolish any organization which then sought to rise out of the ruins. Only in devastation does the negative will feel that it has reality. It intends, indeed, to bring to pass some positive social condition, such as universal equality or universal religious life…So what it thinks it desires, can be for itself an abstract preconception, and its realisation nothing but the fury of desolation’ (Hegel, §4).

Can it be the that European will to establish democracy and nation states has in fact transformed into limitless freedom, the final result of which will be – in spite of good will, but deprived of thinking which disagrees – the ‘state of universal equality and universal religious life’, thus ‘the fury of desolation’ of multiculturalism, of all diversity, including the religious and the political, but ethnic diversity above all? Is Europe, led by the value of freedom without content, approaching a negative and empty freedom?

Let us attempt, just as Hegel does, to explain this inductively, in order to make it clear even to those who will disagree with us to these in particular. Freedom of man, comprehended abstractly, without limitations, implies that man can free himself from everything and even from his own life: a free man can commit suicide. Freedom of this nature, freedom without boundaries, also implies this. We can hardly do anything against this element of freedom on the level of the individual. What matters is:
does this, negative freedom, imply a suicidal moment, the moment of desolation of diversity, on a social level as well? First of all, one should keep in mind that ‘this negative freedom or this freedom of reason’ (Hegel), freedom without limits, empty freedom, exists on a wider, social and universal level. Man can act against himself not only as an individual, but also as a social and political entity. A society or state can act not only against its own parts or other entities, but against itself as an entirety. Suicide is not simply individual, but also a social and political impetus and, as such, is the consequence of this element of freedom, freedom without limitation. Yet, one should not rush into judging this element of freedom, for – now Hegel goes on dialectically – even this negative freedom or freedom of reason ‘is not to be discarded’, though it is one-sided, for ‘the defeat of the understanding is that it exalts its one-sidedness to the sole and highest place’ (Hegel). Negative freedom, freedom without limits, is still not freedom. It is not freedom in its conceit, but only in its nascent, negative element, which is to be abolished. (What a prophetic analysis of the hypocrisy of European freedom, freedom from which democracy and the nation state will spring up as the greatest temptations in the realisation of freedom in its conceit!)

Negative freedom, in one of its moments, the first element, happened in the past as well repeatedly. Hegel reminds us of a case to which he was contemporary. (We, contemporaries of the 20th century, have more numerous and more blatant examples.) The French revolution was free will having proclaimed liberté as its purpose, thus its value, and yet it ended in:

‘the fanaticism of political and religious life. Of this nature was the terror epoch of the French revolution, by which distinctions in talent and authority were to have been superseded. In this time of upheaval and commotion any specific thing was intolerable. Fanaticism wills an abstraction and not an articulate association. It finds all distinctions antagonistic to its indefiniteness, and supersedes them. So it happened that people in revolution destroyed again institutions made by itself, for every institution is contrary to abstract self-conscience of equality’ (Hegel, §4).

The French revolution was only one, perhaps paradigmatic, example of European freedom at work. Later on, Europe recorded other cases of good will that wants without knowing what it wants, cases of ‘negative freedom’, freedom which abstracts from the concrete, which wants, but wants nothing specific; will which is undetermined. That will is dangerous, for will ‘which wills only the abstract universal, wills therefore nothing and it is not a will’ (Hegel, §6).