Global Justice
and Consecutive
Constructivism
Global Justice and Consecutive Constructivism:

A Political Theory in the Age of Global Environmental Crisis

By

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To Sankuk Yeom
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I have been indebted to many people for writing this book. First, I would like to thank my high school teacher Sankuk Yeom for discussing the major themes of this book with me for more than five years and teaching me how to write and think so that I could publish a book by myself, though still I am a novice now. I am sincerely obliged to him, as he paved a road toward infinite possibility for me. I also appreciate incisive criticisms and unstinted encouragements I received from Professor Robert O. Keohane and Professor Lawrence E. Susskind. If it were not for the solicitude and humility the two great scholars showed to me, I would never dare to write this book or even try to seriously study politics.

I am grateful to my high school teacher Geena Kim, who kindly reviewed and provided lots of materials useful for writing academic essays when I, who had never written such an essay before, blindly requested for help. Her warm and friendly advice was a great help in the last year, which was the hardest period for me. And I would like to thank lecturers Kyungho Song and Mankwon Kim at Yonsei University, who have greatly helped me to set a direction of this book and specify the contents of it.

As a matter of fact, even after deciding to write this book, I worried about which publisher would benevolently determine to publish this book. Fortunately, after reviewing my proposal, the editors of Cambridge Scholars Publishing decided to publish my book, and I truly want to express my deepest gratitude to them for their kind decision and support. Also, I would like to thank editors of Ecolivres, including Jaehwan Park, for generously deciding to publish a Korean translation of this book. And, above all, I would appreciate my family and friends for supporting and encouraging me for almost a year. My especial and utmost gratitude is for my mother, who might have felt lots of distress while watching me writing it.

For the last, I am thankful to the readers who are to read this book of a callow youth. I roughly depicted the underlying basis of the theory that I want to keep studying and develop in the future. Though at first I planned this book to contain more than 300 A4-sized pages and wanted to add many other contents and specific details, I feel sorry for not being able to
do so, as a year given to me before the deadline was too short for me to
depth and thoroughly deal with the question I tried to answer. So I just
concentrated on organizing the thoughts that I have regarding the theory
and suggesting theories I would like to keep studying later on (mainly
political philosophy and normative ethics). Even if I read some academic
books on international relations when I was a high school student, the
period during which I prepared and wrote this book was my first time
studying political theory. As I have read and studied by myself books and
articles on political theory from the last September and finished writing
the book this September, the time I have spent studying it is merely
approximately a year. Currently I am just an amateur with a very short
career. If there are any logical errors in this book, it is all because I did not
dispassionately deliberate upon those matters. The reason I, nonetheless,
publish this book now is because I believe this is a great opportunity for
me to receive feedback on my thoughts and a stimulus that could let me
deeply delve into this topic from now on. I hope I could receive many
healthy criticisms from the readers all over the world. Thanks again for
reading this book.
I consider the 21st century to be the age of global environmental crisis. This means that one of the most notable features of the 21st century is the environmental crisis occurring transnationally, though some people may doubt the significance of this matter. Since I am not an expert in natural science or environmental engineering, I will not provide detailed reasons for why this environmental crisis has occurred. Instead, I would like briefly to point out what the discussion of this issue at the global level shows us.

In the discourse on the environmental crisis, many people express skepticism. They argue that the crisis is imaginary and that research results supporting its existence have been exaggerated by environmentalists. For example, they insist that global warming is a normal phenomenon, given the lifecycle of the earth and the constant iteration of glacial and interglacial periods, and that human activities such as carbon emission contribute only very little to it.¹ The conflict between environmentalists and skeptics has continued ever since the 1970s, when concerns over environmental protection became a political issue. In fact, it seems irrational to adhere to only one position and exclude the other, for neither of them can currently present decisive evidence supporting their arguments. What, then, can both positions agree upon?

First, they both agree that the discourse on environmental crisis is a historical product. In other words, its formation was mainly promoted by the reflection on modernity. Specifically, here the term “modernity” refers to Western modernity, which is related to various types of environmental destruction committed by the West during the Industrial Revolution. One example of this is the London Smog, which in 1952 caused the deaths of approximately 8,000 people through cardiopulmonary disease, owing to air pollution caused by industrial activity.² Moreover, Western countries

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² Virginia Berridge and Suzanne Taylor (eds.), *The Big Smoke: Fifty Years after the 1952 London Smog* (London: Centre for History in Public Health London
destroyed nature in their colonies in Asia, Africa, and America by
deforesting and mining natural resources in order to obtain resources for
industrialization. Even today, comparable practices continue, such as the
deforestation taking place near the Amazon River. Though it is true that
this is also usually related to the problem of human rights of the citizens of
developing countries, right now I will concentrate on discussing the
destruction of nature per se.

What is notable is that not only environmentalists but also
environmental skeptics recognize these historical circumstances.
Environmental skeptics also fiercely criticize the human rights violations
committed in the colonial era for the exploitation of resources. However,
they do not think that such conduct has led directly to the present
environmental crisis. They argue that the damaging of nature and the
exploitation of resources was justified. They also maintain that such
activities have not occurred on a large enough scale to influence the
lifecycle of nature and cause enormous natural disasters.

Second, both of them acknowledge that one of the significant reasons
the discourse of environmental crisis has developed is that people have
come to enjoy relative material affluence and peace compared to past eras.
Humans—especially those in the developed countries—have become able
to produce more goods through economic activities, such as trade, and to
take care of not merely themselves but also others, as well as the
environment. Though environmental skeptics acknowledge this point, they
insist that it is still hypersensitive to cite environmental problems as a
reason for objecting to economic growth or development.

However, material abundance cannot be a direct reason for the
development of the discourse on environmental crises. If nature had been
properly protected, people would not have been concerned about
environmental issues. There are plenty of other issues that attract the
attention of affluent people. For example, human rights or women’s issues,
which did not draw attention before, have come to be discussed by the
public, and it is highly likely that leisure or cultural activities might
flourish in the developed countries.

Still, the environmental problem is one of the most important issues
facing humanity in the 21st century. What is the implication of this
phenomenon? First, humans not only enjoy wealth but also have improved
their own consciousness. Of course people may make public policies to deal with natural disasters that directly degrade the quality of life, such as yellow dust or fine dust, the wind-blown air pollutant originated from the desert and plateau of Northern China which transnationally exercises a bad influence on the air quality of Korea and even Japan. However, beyond such concerns, people also become interested in issues such as global warming, which do not yet have much of a concrete influence on the lives of most people—especially those who live in temperate climate zones. Second, and most importantly, the destruction of nature is a relatively objective fact publicly recognized and discussed. Though politics is fundamentally conducted in the public realm—and even if some say that the public and private realms are difficult to separate—the issues dealt with in the public realm are essentially selected from a sort of consensus in the private realm. It is true that, traditionally, issues directly related to the survival of states, such as those involving security or the economy, are often directly handled by small elites in the public realm. However, ordinary issues affecting the lives of the public and generated mostly in contemporary society, such as gender or labor issues, emerge based on bottom-up demands made possible by the establishment of civic democracy.

In this sense, the environment appeared as a major issue in the contemporary world due to bottom-up pressure. This shows that the public recognizes the destruction of nature. Furthermore, as mentioned above, environmental skeptics may also agree that nature is being destroyed. Thus it is obvious that the way humans currently treat the natural world and its flora and fauna is wrong. Thus I use the term “global environmental crisis” in this broad sense. That is, it does not necessarily mean an exigent crisis but refers to a widespread and observable destruction of nature recognized by almost everyone. The usage of the term is justified, for (1) the massive environmental crisis is happening globally in various ways and (2) those who either accept or deny the concept of an “environmental crisis” have, wittingly or unwittingly, contributed to the generalization and expansion of the use of this term by participating in the discourse. So I believe it is possible to consider the 21st century the age of global environmental crisis in a broad sense.

Another point I want to emphasize is that the destruction of nature is often conducted transnationally, and these problems can be resolved only through the discussion of global justice. The main reason why the destruction of nature is conducted transnationally is that (1) the ecosystem does not always correspond to the state borders, (2) multinational
corporations destroy nature in more states besides that in which their headquarters are located, and (3) the amount of natural destruction in any given state committed by travelers from other states has skyrocketed, owing to the general increase in travel abroad. Thus to solve these problems, the normative considerations are required for which the state ought to be the subject regulating these matters, to what extent the regulation should proceed, and whether such regulations per se are necessary. In this respect, environmental problems require moral and political consideration across borders, unlike other international issues, such as those involving the economy or security. As there are issues requiring transnational consensus or solutions, including environmental issues, the discussion on global justice is worthwhile. Furthermore, it needs to be broadened into a discussion of whether a unified authority is needed at the level of world politics, just as at the domestic level.

Keeping these points in mind, I seek to prove in chapter I that globalization can cause not only procedural or institutional injustice but also structural injustice. This structural injustice could be exacerbated to a degree that could intensify global procedural injustice. Hence, by adhering to strict institutionalism, one must also inevitably seek to mitigate structural injustice at the same time in order to accomplish one’s ultimate goal. Structural injustice ought to be restrained to the extent that it does not induce or strengthen procedural injustice. I suggest *consecutive constructivism* as an alternative that could play this role of restraint at the global level, securing procedural justice. This is a normative theory and ideal theory based on reality. Furthermore, this is a moral and political theory that aims to mitigate structural injustice by securing individuals’ perception of private morality—that is, inventing procedural devices to make people enhance moral consciousness—and at the same time encourage people to deliberate on the matters of procedural justice and public morality. The reason I advocate this position is this: (1) Dealing with the problem of justice indirectly, by discussing the problem of morals, is needed to avoid the lucid criticisms of statists that there is no such thing as sovereign ruling states with authority or a world government. (2) It is not to dogmatically presuppose metaphysics by starting from morality and the subjective capabilities of individuals existing in the real world. In fact, concerning (2), I evaluate the moral agent hypothesized in consecutive constructivism as the first-person singular “I.” “I” is a part of the self that has the minimal qualities and capabilities necessarily presupposed in every political theory, and, in so doing, I start the discussion by intentionally excluding the metaphysical identity of moral agents.
In chapter II, I study what moral principle every human subject considered “I” could agree with in order to determine what constitutes a universal moral principle operating as the basis of global justice. I find that such a fundamental moral principle is the proposition that analytically represents the moral intuition of humans, and I discuss which proposition it corresponds to most. Specifically, in this chapter, I discuss such matters using the example of environmental problems, the nature of which requires that they be dealt with at the level of global justice. I try to find the implication of the normative statement “Humans ought to protect nature,” which is deemed intuitively reasonable, in order to represent the moral intuition in the form of a proposition. Namely, I consider this statement to be a fundamental and crucial one in the normative discourse regarding environmental issues and then seek the reason why people deem it reasonable. This is an analytical work, and, if it is successful, I might be able to suggest an example of a moral proposition that could be universalized.

However, the intuitive moral principle discovered in chapter II is merely what is thought to be universal subjectively by an “I” identical to the author (or who constitutes the core psychological part of the author). As a matter of fact, the procedure of verifying whether it is truly universalizable is needed. If I depict this procedure in the descriptive sense, it will just become a positive social theory. However, I would like to establish a normative theory. Therefore, to give this theory normativity, I will at the same time study what qualities and capabilities moral agents should have to establish a universalizable moral principle, in chapter III. This is the study of ideal conditions that “I” as a moral agent ought to fulfill. Here, I concentrate on the discussion of universalizable moral principles among the scholars professionally studying ethics, political theory, and political philosophy within the academic communities (phronetic communities), for it might be similar to the discussion conducted by ideal “I”s. So I argue that the moral principles could be established by reasonable people on the basis of the normative discussion conducted within the community. And I would also deal with how this principle could be harmonized with the ethical and metaphysical hypotheses each “I” believes in.

The crucial moral agent discussed above is “I.” The consensus that a certain moral principle is universalizable among some “I”s in the phronetic community is just an intersubjective agreement. It cannot be universal in itself. To expound on this problem, in chapter IV, I will prove that thoughts acquired with the ability of self-directing objectification of “I”s who fulfill
the ideal condition are not merely subjective. This thought could be
deemed as being sufficiently objective, and, in this case, objectivity is
redefined as a relative concept formulated based on one’s subjective
standard. For instance, people ordinarily say “It’s quite objective” when
reading some articles in a daily newspaper. The attribute of objectivity I
focus on is just like that, i.e., the objectivity in the subjective sense. This
does not mean that I identify objectivity with universality. I call this
concept of objectivity judgmental objectivity and consider the moral
principles that have this to be universalizable. In order for a moral
principle to be recognized as universal, it needs to go through a real
normative public debate. At this point, I believe that the universality
secured by this debate is not merely identical to intersubjectivity but
actually represents objectivity. I call this objectivity perspectival
objectivity, for the moral principles proposed in the public debate are
already judgmentally objective (or commonly believed by the agents of the
debate to be so.).

Lastly, in chapter V, the conclusion, I briefly examine the possible
criticisms of the project of consecutive constructivism. Specifically, I
would like to discuss some criticisms of my adherence to postmetaphysical
thinking and the unique aim of the consecutive theory, a realization of
procedural justice through the improvement of private morality, which is
the key point of my project. Consequently, I endeavor to explain why
consecutive constructivism (1) is not dogmatism, (2) does not presuppose
metaphysics, and (3) does not try to advocate a perfect resolution of
structural injustice. In so doing, I emphasize that handling the problem of
public justice indirectly, via the realm of private morality, is one possible
legitimate methodology for dealing with the issues regarding global justice
in the contemporary world. Furthermore, realists may suggest that any
discussion of global justice, including mine, is useless. I will end this book
by briefly rejecting this viewpoint, showing that this criticism is self-
contradictory and that normative theories are not just empty and abstract
armchair arguments in dealing with world politics. In so doing, I seek to
encourage a closer look at the implications of a new theory that I call
“consecutive constructivism.”

I wrote this book to solicit comments on and criticisms of consecutive
constructivism, which I plan to study and refine from now on. I think this
book is especially suitable for people interested in transnational
environmental problems or the general theory of global justice, and I try to
show them the possibility of a new theory whose theoretical methodology
differs from existing theories of global justice. Moreover, the reason I have
written this book is to let many people acknowledge their own role as “I,” as will be emphasized throughout the rest of the book. I think that doing so mainly requires justifying the importance of realizing private deliberation and public consensus. I did not think this was of great importance when I first decided to write this book; originally I planned to write about ecological political thought. However, after further reading and study, I have come to recognize the urgent need to deal with the issue of global justice and think that it is far more worthwhile to design a conceptual framework of a general theory that could be applied to any transnational issues, including environmental problems. This book is the result of such thoughts and is a sketch and proposal of a subject that needs to be continuously studied in the future. I hope this book can be a foundation for both proactive discussions on global justice and my future studies.
1. Globalization and Global Justice

1.1. The Necessity of a Discourse on Global Justice

Globalization, one of the most remarkable phenomena in the contemporary world, is a process by which the world transforms into a unified and integrated society or community due to the development of transportation and information technologies, the intensification of economic interdependence, and the augmentation of international political communities based on specific regions or agendas. Globalization is now in progress, surpassing spatio-temporal limits and integrating diverse fields of specialization, and no one can predict what the outcome will be.

This is why many people ardently argue for and against the continuous deepening and extension of globalization. Those in favor of it optimistically anticipate the consolidation of democratic order, the proliferation of state-of-the-art technologies, and economic development, while those against it criticize the gradual destruction of cultural diversity, the intensification of economic inequality, and the comprehensive subordination of developing countries to developed countries, all of which they think are the results of globalization. Both arguments are logical to an extent, although they sometimes rather irrationally appeal to the emotions. Still, it is obvious that globalization is accelerating and deepening, regardless of which side one agrees with. Also, as with any other social phenomenon, globalization entails certain side effects that all those for and

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1 For an overview of the pros-and-cons discussion on globalization raised in various fields, see Peter M. Haas, John A. Hird, and Beth McBratney (Eds.), *Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2009).
against it must address. Though differences might exist in opinions on the
degree to which they need to be fixed and methods by which to do so,
those in favor of globalization will try to resolve the side effects to
consolidate its legitimacy, while those against it will do so in order to
minimize the damage perceived to be generated as a result of it.

What, then, are the side effects of globalization? First of all, as many
international relations scholars have pointed out, globalization is not
universal. As globalization is propagated in large part through media
such as the Internet, the economically and technologically disadvantaged
are naturally marginalized and isolated from the main current of the
changes. One of the fields where globalization is advancing most rapidly is
the economy. Nation-states that once relied upon Westphalian sovereignty
no longer exert an integrated authority based on their borders in the field
of economy and trade, and it seems that their economic dominance has
been mostly ceded to multinational corporations (MNCs). Furthermore, as
the world’s economic system has been realigned by MNCs, the
establishment of monopolies and the concentration of the world’s
economic wealth has accelerated. This phenomenon also shows that
globalization does not benefit everyone living on earth.

One significant side effect derived from this is the entrenchment of the
gap between the rich and the poor, among both nations and individuals.
Another problem is related to the wars that could break out when conflicts
between states get worse. Lastly, it is obvious that social issues such as
considerations for the disadvantaged, gender inequality, environmental
problems, etc., draw the attention of people all over the world. In order to
minimize the number of diverse social and political problems generated at
the global level, it is necessary that people ponder which normative
position to choose and how to achieve the democratic ideal on earth as a
whole with reference to these issues.

In this sense, I believe that a discussion on global justice is required.
Therefore, in this book I will briefly depict a new method for dealing with

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global justice. Before jumping to my main point, I think it is important to analyze the reason why the current world is deemed to be rife with injustice. This would make it possible to understand which approach is more effective in realizing global justice.

1.2. Global Injustice, Structural Injustice, and Rawls

Why is the current world so beset by injustice? This question is the same as asking whose unjust behaviors caused the current situation of injustice that the world confronts today. It is because the concepts of justice and injustice are defined in the context of complex relationships between individuals and societies, and so wrongful acts that give rise to injustice must always, through the process of identifying their causes, be found to derive from specific individuals as agents. In the normative sense, this question also implies the question of who ought to be considered accountable for an injustice in a specific context. As a result, I may ask this question: From which agents’ wrong behavior has the current global injustice originated?

However, this question implies a blind spot that becomes evident in discussing the problem of global justice, for it is de facto impossible to pick a specific agent or agents as the main culprit reproducing the injustice. In dealing with the problem of global justice, it is impossible to exclude the problem of structural injustice, which is the result of a plethora of actions on the part of unspecified agents and pre-existing norms. Structural injustice refers to injustice generated by individuals making their living, both ordinarily and not maliciously, resulting in an unwitting fixation on socially stratified structures or a system of vested rights. Its defining feature is that certain classes, groups, or agents cannot be legally or politically accused of committing acts out of a determination to generate it. Structural injustice is perpetuated by the failure of socially internalized norms due to the complex interaction among agents belonging to diverse social classes who are mutually indifferent.

As a matter of fact, many side effects occurring as the result of globalization have a great many aspects that must be considered as contributing to structural injustice. For instance, many children and adults in developed countries purchase soccer balls made by famous brands, because they think that these particular soccer balls are sturdy and ergonomically designed, or perhaps just because they particularly like certain brands. However, approximately 75 percent of soccer balls sold all over the world are produced in Pakistan, where little children sew them for
over 10 hours a day, receiving only roughly 13 cents per soccer ball (as of 2006); the same soccer balls are then sold for more than US$85 each.\(^4\) This example is a relatively widely known one, and some sports brands’ sales suffered for a while following this revelation. If academics and mass media had not scrutinized these facts, the massive MNCs in question might have continued to exploit child labor, for if the selling price of a product is not raised, it is wise to cut down production costs in order to sustain or increase profits.

In this case, though the injustice that occurred is primarily the responsibility of the huge MNCs, consumers of soccer balls produced through this process bear a secondary responsibility, as they (unwittingly) connived in perpetuating the process by purchasing the items, thus maintaining the demand for them, which are essentially the result of unrighteous acts on the part of MNCs. However, most consumers were unaware of these facts before they heard the news from the mass media, which means that they had involuntarily supported the perpetuation of an unjustifiable social structure. This sort of structural injustice can also be found in a multitude of industries, including those making soccer balls, and the reason that ordinary and even well-intentioned people are implicated in proliferation is that, as mentioned above, information about the production and distribution of such items mostly converges on is often concealed by the headquarters of MNCs, because globalization is not universal. Owing to the economy of scale at the global level, if a structural justice is instigated, it can cause extreme socioeconomic polarization to an extent unimaginable at the domestic level. This is the reason why the discussion on structural injustice needs to be included in dealing with the problem of global justice.\(^5\)


\(^5\) Some might doubt whether anything like a unified “structure” exists anywhere in the world. However, as in social science, the term “structure” is not always used in dealing with social problems and phenomena, whose range of influence is restricted to state borders; it seems reasonable to hypothesize that there could exist a social (rather than political) structure of the world in a very loose sense, as a result of the accumulation of each agent’s socioeconomic traces and complex interactions with one another at the global level. To learn about more specific social and political theoretical concepts and definitions of structure, see Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction
Another characteristic of structural injustice is that it could occur in societies whose social and political institutions are designed to maintain harmony between two crucial values of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. In this sense, I agree with Iris Young’s analysis; she rejected the stances of both John Rawls, who paid particular attention to institutional and procedural justice, and Rawls’ critics, who as an alternative tried to secure justice in the process of interpersonal interaction, arguing instead that normative judgments of both structure and interaction are necessary. She especially criticized Rawls’ statements on the grounds that he had not seriously dealt with the problem of structural injustice. She thought that Rawls’ idea that particular social interactions inevitably generated inequality insufficiently considered people’s inabilities and misfortunes, and that, so as to resolve these accidental factors in dealing with right and wrong, normative judgments of particular relationships among people (apart from those of social institutions) are required.

This criticism is also in line with Peter Singer’s criticism of the liberalistic approach to global justice suggested by Rawls in The Law of Peoples. Singer deemed Rawls’ argument to be a treatment that disregarded the people who are suffering in their daily lives in that it allowed economic aid merely to the extent that it helped societies suffering from poverty, starvation, etc., to develop their own liberal democratic political culture, while not appropriately observing other direct duties of socioeconomic aid. Additionally, I believe that the entire plan of establishing the law of peoples based on the normative constraints operating between societies and distributing economic aid to disadvantaged societies in accordance with it is somewhat idealistic, though Rawls contended that it is not. In reality, many developing countries are ruled by privileged comprador capitalists who monopolize almost all the wealth and power within the domestic realm by maintaining abnormally conjunct relationships with certain developed countries and MNCs. Their authority is not only political but also, at least domestically, socioeconomic. Thus, if a society subject to the unfavorable conditions mentioned by Rawls is a place where

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8 Ziegler, Empire, 79–147, 247–324.
stratification among social classes has been exacerbated and all rights to interact economically with overseas agencies and corporations are controlled by the uppermost class of society, economic aid in the Rawlsian sense might rather encourage the adhesion of inequality and anti-democratic political culture. I believe this raises reasonable doubt with regard to his argument, insofar as he used the term “non-idealistic” to mean “realizable.”

I shall now return to Young’s criticism of Rawls’ argument. I agree with her idea that Rawls could not propose an effective suggestion dealing with structural injustice, because he does not discuss the idealistic organization of interpersonal interactions corresponding to the idealistic construction of social structures. However, he did not only write that the inequality generated from particular interactions is inevitable; he also thought that it would actually help accomplish the ultimate aim of the theory of justice, the maintenance of social cooperation.\(^9\) This argument of his, empirically speaking, is highly persuasive, for most Communist states self-destructed on account of the diminution of the will and desire to participate in social production activities. Therefore, if Young were to adhere to her own statement against Rawls, she needs to prove how structural injustice could impede social cooperation in a Rawlsian society. Furthermore, to justify its presupposition, it must be proved that structural injustice could exist in a Rawlsian society. Concerning this matter, I think that structural injustice could reach its severest level and ultimately interfere with social cooperation, even if the hypothetical citizens of this Rawlsian society are rational and reasonable in that they propose fair conditions for cooperating with others based on a sense of justice.

At this point, it is necessary to remember that those who assist in the extension and reproduction of structural justice do not always do so viciously, based on the perception that their behaviors would deepen social injustice, conducting acts that result in more structural injustice. This is what occurs when the separate results of people’s pursuit of their own self-interests accumulate. Moreover, although the citizens in Rawls’ hypothetical well-ordered society possess a sense of justice, they do not always prioritize exercising it, even in considering occasions not directly related to their ordinary lives. This is identical to the Kantian moral point of view, which Rawls follows closely in that he is not assured that it is a fact that the will to obey the categorical imperative is superior to other desires in

any case representing a moral dilemma. This is because, following Rousseau, the sense of justice is understood as a moral feeling developed and regulated by reason. The citizens of Rawls’ well-ordered society could thus unwittingly facilitate depriving other citizens—perhaps those who belong to the same society, although they do not communicate directly whatsoever and in most cases reside in geographically distant places—of opportunities to access resources and commodities, for the feeling of guilt or responsibility that is suggested as the conceptual origin of the sense of justice could not be exercised when the occasion is beyond the limit of rational perception or the subject lacks information about it. Because the citizens are not fully aware of the situation they are in, notwithstanding their sense of justice, they could never doubt that their acts of reasonably pursuing their own self-interest would cause harm to others. Specifically, they might not think that pursuing their own self-interest is unreasonable, believing that the social institutions they constructed would resolve any injustice to an extent that all members of the society could be satisfied with. In this sense, structural injustice could occur in a well-ordered society. How, then, could this be advanced to a level that hinders social cooperation?

Such a scenario could occur because social institutions, as conceived by Rawls, fundamentally guarantee social welfare to the extent that the worst-off receive very basic social primary goods, in obedience to the difference principle. These institutions concentrate on providing fair opportunities to the worst-off so that they escape the unfavorable conditions per se, rather than primarily offering them many chances to permanently shed their unequal status. Pointing out this is not to say that I believe that the worst-off must be prioritized to ameliorate conditions of inequality, and neither is this the only way to solve the problem of structural injustice; rather, it is a description of what is perceived to be what must be amended and resolved, and as a result of this inquiry I think it is something that would be dealt with in a procedural and negative sense.

As in other societies, the worst-off in Rawls’ well-ordered society might feel a sense of relative deprivation, though they recognize the fact that their status is reasonable and granted to them through a procedure regulated by justified institutions and structures. This is because feeling helpless and frustrated is as natural as being human when comparing one’s

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unfavorable conditions to others’ success.\footnote{Make sure that this feeling is different from envy. While envy is fundamentally generated within the mind of the self, the feeling of relative deprivation related to the problem of structural injustice derives from the mind (or the point of view) of people (often the rich) who look down on others. Namely, what incurs the feeling of envy in one’s mind is the knowledge of others being in a better socioeconomic condition than herself, and what makes her feel relatively deprived is—regardless whether factual or imaginary—knowledge that others treat her as a person not in the equal social class with themselves. The matter of envy dealt with Rawls is stated in John Rawls, \textit{A Theory of Justice}, Rev. Ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), 464–474.} Needless to say, this feeling is compatible with a sense of justice or rationality. Unfortunately, the sense of relative deprivation unintentionally becomes more and more potent due to structural injustice, and procedural equality cannot directly influence feelings and perceptions that have been removed; securing procedural equality aims not to directly improve the socioeconomic status of the worst-off, but to guarantee an open possibility of rehabilitation by providing a fair opportunity to compete with others. The worst-off must overcome unfavorable conditions by themselves at every given opportunity with their own capabilities and efforts. However, it is not so certain whether they, whose wills have been weakened significantly due to the accumulation of discouragement, could make an effort to rehabilitate at all. If the worst-off keep failing despite their attempts to escape from their status or do not overcome helplessness—and do not even try to do so—this vicious cycle will be endlessly reiterated, resulting in the polarization of consciousness and an amplified sense of relative deprivation. This would lead to the repression of the exercise of the sense of justice, as the sense of relative deprivation might be gradually internalized in the conscious minds of the worst-off. This after all reveals the possibility of structural injustice hampering social cooperation in a well-ordered society. I believe this is a possible result of the thought experiment when one adds the variable of time to a well-ordered society. Considering not only the procedure of constructing a well-ordered society but the mechanisms by which it is operated, there is a high possibility that the worst-off would be constantly left in that state if they continue to internalize the accumulated sense of failure. Thus, the effort to realize justice ought to include—to an extent that liberals may also comprehensively agree with—an effort to resolve structural injustice so that it cannot interfere with social cooperation.
Another reason that structural injustice might occur when applying the Rawlsian conception of justice to the real world is that, because his discussion on the well-ordered society is framed within the political conception of justice in a logical sense, and though people in the real world accept such a conception of justice and innovate social institutions to establish something similar to a well-ordered society, these efforts cannot directly affect the moral consciousness of individuals. This is why unconsciously generated structural justice could possibly exist for a long time and yet individuals might not incisively understand the moral implications of their own conduct. This is methodologically parallel to H. L. A. Hart’s criticism of Rawls, that political conceptions are not expected to exercise their full influence when adapted to real political and legal procedures. Though I am not dealing with the problem of such adaptations, I am similarly trying to point out the disjunction between moral motivation and moral knowledge when trying to realize the political conceptions of justice. Knowing how to judge what is morally right does not necessarily mean being morally motivated to do so. Though a plan for realizing procedural justice is formed, it does not guarantee that individuals’ morality will be enhanced so that they will follow it just as Rawlsian citizens do their sense of justice. In particular, despite the existence of the normative power of political conceptions of justice, if they do not surpass that of an individual’s original subjective motivational standard, he or she would merely unavoidably succumb to and externally obey the power of institutions, while involuntarily (but intentionally) taking more care with regard to moral issues, or making judgments based on more stringent moral standards. In this case, because the real world is far less idealistic than Rawls’ well-ordered society, structural injustice at the level of hindering established institutional justice—which also could be found in the well-ordered society—might exist forever.

Therefore, in this sense, Young’s criticism of Rawls could be supplemented. However, my theoretical plan, stated below, is not so radical as Young’s; she focused on structural injustice per se and suggested

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12 Rawls differentiates between “concept” and “conception.” “Concept” refers to what is commonly perceived when non-philosophically using the words conception and concept, while “conception” means the concepts and explanations of those concepts required for forming a “concept” of something and the logical presuppositions implicitly connoted in it. For a more detailed explanation of this, see Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 6–15.

an alternative social model wherein every member shared responsibility for overcoming it. Here the responsibility is equally distributed to all people, irrespective of the quantity and quality of the “sins” they had previously committed. What Young urgently sought to solve is not the problem of procedural justice but that of structural justice, which is why she demanded all people participate in resolving it through socioeconomic solutions. In contrast, my opinion differs from Young’s in that I contend that to some extent the harmful influence of structural injustice needs to be controlled and attenuated in order to maintain the amicable social cooperation guaranteed by institutions. The ultimate goal of my plan is to consider the problem of structural injustice so that it does not have a harmful effect on procedural justice. Insofar as procedural justice is not damaged by structural injustice, it should be regarded as an inevitable condition that exists to maintain society in its socio-structural aspects, because the complete resolution of structural injustice through a total realignment of society means the Marxian emancipation of class and perfect substantial equality, which has been empirically proved to be unrealizable. Consequently, I would—though it not in a strictly formal and procedural manner, as Rawls did—depict a method of considering structural injustice and promoting the perceptual change of individuals in order to adapt stricter standards in evaluating institutional justice in this book. In the next section, I will briefly analyze the remaining problem in Young’s argument and propose an alternative to it.

2. Consecutive Constructivism: A Postmetaphysical Suggestion

2.1. The Starting Point of the Discussion on Global Justice: From Moral Consciousness to Procedures

I think the solution suggested by Young contains a logical leap. Young insists that, in order to resolve structural injustice, all people must discard their original mindset of ferreting out who is guilty and share the burden of responsibility for the injustice. According to her, this shared responsibility is future-oriented and has nothing to do with directly punishing the person who committed the sin. I believe that, as Young notes, it is unreasonable to endow a specific person or group with the responsibility to resolve structural injustice, but by the same token, it is also unreasonable to adjure all to share this responsibility.

To illustrate, many rich people living in developed countries pursue
harmony between private and public interests only by purchasing fair-trade products to practice ethical consumption or by living frugally and donating regularly. I shall call one such individual “A.” Should the obligation imposed on A to handle the problem of structural injustice then be precisely equivalent to that imposed on a large stockholder of an MNC that exploits child labor in developing countries and holds others in contempt? (I shall call such an individual in this example “B”). Young’s response to this question is also “No”: she sets power, prerogative, interest, and collective capability as variables and differentially distributes responsibility corresponding to the evaluation of the magnitude of each. However, is it right to impose even a relatively small amount of responsibility on A—the portion of responsibility that ought to originally be undertaken not by A, who does not avoid social responsibility and voluntarily participates in social contribution activities, but by B, who commits misdeeds, according to the traditional legal system—merely because A assisted in deepening the injustice because she is also a rich person living in a developed country and thus shares an interrelated social structure with B? In this case, A is to be understood as already making an effort to resolve the injustice generated by the relative benefit(s) accruing to her through a particular interaction, regardless of whether or not she considered the conceptual meaning of her conduct. As Young does not use the concept of sin, the legal standard could not be defined to overtly distinguish humanitarian actions based on the moral considerations of the resolution of structural injustice from ordinary actions based on moral turpitude intentionally committed by certain others, which have a disastrous influence on global justice. As a result, the power of moral lessons that make vicious entrepreneurs such as B at least compulsively reflect on their own wrongdoings significantly decreases, while the uncritically adopted concept of responsibility ethically underestimates the virtues possessed by philanthropists such as A. Therefore, this is the consequence of not intentionally disentangling inborn luck from the interests generated by the intention of an agent throughout a social interaction—the same argument presented in Ronald Dworkin’s idea of luck egalitarianism, which Young also criticized.

We must then turn to possible alternatives. I think, at least in some sense, Young’s solution was ultimately retrospective: she encouraged people to participate in sharing the burden of responsibility for structural injustice as a solution to the cumulative injustice remaining in the present from past actions, but did not sufficiently address the prevention of such injustice in the future. However, I believe the comprehensive suppression of diverse problems of injustice occurring at the global level is needed, not
just a solution for specific kinds of injustice committed in the past. If this sort of ideal alternative could be identified, it would also be possible to naturally suggest a solution for perpetuating injustices from the past. As Young emphasized the importance of considering both social institutions and personal interactions, I believe she would to some extent agree with the suggestion I make in this book regarding this matter—specifically, bolstering the moral consciousness of people in general. In a society comprised of citizens whose moral consciousness is highly developed, occasions where the citizens need be controlled by reasonable socio-structural or legal standards would occur far less frequently than in a society whose citizens are less conscious of morality. Also, it would become possible to appraise citizens’ degree of moral consciousness much more stringently and critically than before, based on a mutually cooperative attitude toward the justice of social structures. This kind of concern for structural injustice, achieved by enhanced moral consciousness, is required, at least to the extent that it does not infringe on the realization of institutional justice.

Moral consciousness refers to the comprehensive capability of understanding moral norms and adapting them to real life. To elucidate this definition, I use the term “comprehensive capability of understanding moral norms” as including the following meanings: (1) to establish and critically evaluate a universal moral law through practical reason; (2) to perceive what is immoral and what is to be considered a moral dilemma; (3) to reasonably determine the order of priority among moral norms that are often at odds with one another; and (4) to practice the moral law and be motivated by it to do so. Even though moral feelings such as the senses of justice, conscience, guilt, and so forth are excluded from the category of moral consciousness, they must be considered an important component of mind ruled by reason, which has a great impact on the formation, development, and manifestation of moral consciousness. This is why the procedure of normative inference could in general improve those capabilities deemed components of moral consciousness, and that procedure would roughly be the process of obtaining, through justified methods, other rational agents’ assent to the moral law that one predicts is universalizable. It is worth noting throughout this procedure not that a universal moral law would be established, but that the moral consciousness of each agent would be greatly enhanced by agents participating in public moral debates.

In order to prevent this process of arousing moral consciousness from descending into a process of indoctrinating or attracting others, the