Peacemaking
Strategies in Cyprus
Peacemaking Strategies in Cyprus: *In Search of Lasting Peace*

By Eleftherios A. Michael

Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Dedicated to my
Parents and Teachers

and to
Jenny, Alexi and Thalia
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There are a great many people and friends in Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Europe at-large and in the United States who I need to thank. To protect the identity of the people I worked with on the island of Cyprus and elsewhere, I have chosen not to name them and to keep their perspectives anonymous. I did this to keep up with the ethical protocols in protecting interviewees in conflict and post-conflict zones while carrying on field research as a doctoral candidate at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in the late 1990s and onward. I give special thanks to my editors and my unconditional love to my family for their endless support.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH

“But what they fought each other for, why that I cannot tell”
—“The Battle of Blenheim,” Robert Southey

1.1 What is this Research About?

What is it about some peacemaking processes and their dynamics that at times can produce successful agreements between “so-called” former enemies, while at other times can lead to mistrust between parties and a perpetual belief that the other side is exploiting their genuine goodwill for peace? In particular, what is it that prevents Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking top leaders in Cyprus from finding a political settlement to their conflict, and why have 41 peacemaking initiatives between 1955 and onward (2015) failed to produce an integrative agreement and sustainable peace?

Peacemaking initiatives or “gestures for conciliation,” as Mitchell (2000) coined them, are the first signposts to a durable and lasting peace.1 Apparently, peacemaking initiatives / processes do not always lead towards integrative solutions where the aim of the former antagonists is to transform the fabric of their relations and move towards social reconciliation, trauma healing and restoration of mistrusted relationships that once were torn apart by destructive modes of interaction, as this (Cyprus) classical case study reveals.2 Peacemaking processes in Cyprus constitute the central theme for analysis in this research, and how very few initiatives have led to a breakthrough towards substantive negotiations. For instance, of the 41 initiatives to settle the political question in Cyprus from 1955 to 2015, only a handful of those outcomes were eventually accepted by the two sides (top elites) as frameworks for a political settlement.3 I was puzzled by that for years, often asking: Is it because top leaders in Cyprus mistrust one another? Or is it because their minds are entrapped into some sort of self-stimulating and self-perpetuating mode of interaction that is stacked with competitive modes of thinking instead of collaborative modes? Does it have to do with the sectarian division of the
1960s and the barbed wire fences that have divided the two larger communities in Cyprus from 1974 and onward? Could the failure to reach a political settlement be attributed to the presence of seemingly incompatible visions as to what the parameters of an endgame solution ought to be? Sometimes, after a few interviewees told me that the “Cyprus issue has already been settled,” I wondered whether that was in fact a reality. Whether it is a well-framed mode of sectarianism that has been settled satisfactorily in all the fabrics of the society or not is a question that really puzzles top elites the most across the cease-fire line, as I came to learn. Therefore, I started searching for those obstacles en route to a permanent, just and durable peacemaking solution for all in Cyprus.

Before continuing, I find it important to highlight briefly for my readers what this research does not aim to do. Firstly, it does not fall into the blame game that top leaders across the buffer zone in Cyprus orchestrate with the purpose to torpedo each other’s side, a course that they learned to master very well over the years. Secondly, my approach does not aim to chastise a methodology and approach for a political settlement as right or wrong and allocate blame as to why 41 peacemaking initiatives have failed to produce a breakthrough at the official track-one (T1) level. Instead, my objective is to develop an in-depth understanding of what are some of the factors and obstacles that led to the collapse of so many initiatives over the course of four consecutive periods from 1955 and onward. Lastly, if one really wants to know what ordinary Cypriots across the divide think and feel about the so-called “Cyprus problem,” or their attitudes and behaviors towards each other and their sense as to how it should be settled, then they ought to visit the island. Only ordinary Cypriots can provide such information, which they do in a rather peaceful and passionate way. In this research, I can only reveal what I have learned as a result of my analysis and synthesis of:

- A data set (based on archival research) that I compiled of all peacemaking initiatives/processes that occurred in Cyprus that fulfilled the selection criteria (see Chapter 2: Methodology) for the classification process longitudinally from 1955 to 2015;
- several islands of knowledge that derive from the juncture of various literature in the field of conflict analysis, international conflict resolution, leadership studies, international negotiations, comparative peace processes and foreign affairs;
- a data set comprising 62 anonymous and confidential interviews with top political leaders representing the two largest ethnic communities (Greek-centric and Turkish-centric communities) in
Cyprus carried out during the period between 2004-14; as well as interviews with UN officials and foreign diplomats who were directly involved in peacemaking efforts in Cyprus during the period between 1955 and 2014 and

- knowledge that derives from my interviews and discussions with about 70 key informants, including journalists, academics, historians, former elites and political advisers in Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, the UK and elsewhere (EU and USA) who have followed the politics and peacemaking efforts in Cyprus over the years. These structured conversations were conducted between 2004 and 2014.

What this research lays out is twofold. First, it explores the characteristics of the peace process in Cyprus with a core emphasis on the peacemaking initiatives (processes, phases, structures, systems, strategies and outcomes) for a political settlement on the island spanning from 1955 to the current period. Second, it constructs a data-set of 41 peacemaking initiatives and the analysis is conducted from a number of perspectives: (i) holistically, (ii) longitudinally and (iii) comparatively with the aim to identify parties’ perceived orientations for an endgame solution and identify a number of obstacles en route to sustainable peacemaking in Cyprus. Lastly, this research suggests a number of propositions, recommendations and hypotheses for various audiences, including top leaders in Cyprus, third party interveners and researchers and other peacemakers who are looking for more exploratory insights in this case.

The rest of this introductory chapter is divided into four sections. The first presents some of the arguments that top leaders in Cyprus are very likely to sit around the negotiation table and express, with very little having been done to study all those initiatives and find out what seems to prevent them from settling their differences satisfactorily. The second section is a literature review that is organized into six approaches that form some of the preliminary arguments as to how peacemaking has been conceptualized in other studies that serve as departing points for my investigation. In the third section, I synthesize the literature into a systemic approach to better understand the relationship between peacemaking initiation-process-dynamics-outcomes and how various endogenous and exogenous factors have influenced the inter-party interaction for a political settlement in Cyprus over the course of four chronological periods. The fourth and final section is a brief synopsis of how the rest of the research is organized into chapters.
1.2 Understanding the Puzzle of Peacemaking Initiatives in Cyprus

Starting with some basic figures, between 1955 and 2014, only 11 out of 41 peacemaking initiatives come to a conclusion by producing some sort of an implementable agreement between the two parties in Cyprus (see Figure 1-1).\footnote{Eleven out of the 41 peacemaking initiatives led to some form of substantive negotiations. Thirty, or 73\% percent, of the initiatives collapsed during a stage of pre-negotiations or at an earlier phase of a peacemaking process.} Looking at this further, three out of the 11 initiatives were partially implemented (or parties took steps towards post-accord implementation). In fact, one of the three peacemaking agreements to settle the Cyprus issue, namely the Zurich-London Agreement (1955-1959/60), set the pretext, whether directly or indirectly, for the initiation of political intimidation and eventually violent conflict during the post-accord implementation phase of the agreement in the years that followed. The other two agreements, namely the Makarios-Denktash (1977) and Kyprianou-Denktash (1979) high level agreements, were deemed conclusive by the two sides and the United Nations, but both have remained unimplemented (with the exception of occasional small steps forward and backwards) and have served as points for political controversies not only between top elites across the divide, but also between political parties and leaders on each side from that time and onward.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure1-1.png}
\caption{Percentage of Peacemaking Initiative that led to an Agreed Framework for a Settlement: 1955-2014}
\end{figure}

Note: Eleven out of the 41 peacemaking initiatives led to some form of substantive negotiations. Thirty, or 73\% percent, of the initiatives collapsed during a stage of pre-negotiations or at an earlier phase of a peacemaking process.
From a slightly similar methodological perspective, Figure 1-2 (below) shows that among the 41 peacemaking initiatives, four collapsed during the very early stage of “signaling” (SG); 13 collapsed during the next phase of “preliminary contacts” (PC); seven peacemaking initiatives succeeded in “signaling” and “preliminary talks” and moved towards the “pre-negotiations” (PN) phase, but without going as far as substantive negotiations; nine peacemaking initiatives went through all of the previous normative phases but eventually collapsed during “substantive negotiations” (SN); five initiatives collapsed during the stage of completing / implementing the final agreement or accord (AI); and lastly, three initiatives were accepted by top negotiators and finalized as accord documents – two are sitting in government files and one collapsed during the “post-accord implementation” (PA) phase.

Key: Signaling (SG); Preliminary Contacts (PC); Pre-Negotiations (PN); Substantive Negotiations (SN); Accord Completion/ Implementation (AI); Post-Accord Implementation (PA)

Figure 1-2: Peacemaking Phases: From Signaling to Post-Accord Implementation
### List of Peacemaking Initiatives and Processes in Cyprus

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<td>Inter-Communal Talks (IC)</td>
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<td>Dulles Initiative (DI)</td>
<td>1972-74</td>
<td>Inter-Communal Talks (IC)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Draft Framework (DF)</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>Rusk-hlpe Prop. (RP)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Vienna Talks (VT)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Indirect Talks (ID)</td>
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<td>Hugh Proposals (HP)</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Denktash-Makarios Talks(DM)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Gali’s Set of Ideas (OSI)</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>Makarios Prop. (MP)</td>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>R. Holbrooke Init. (HI)</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>London Conference (LC)</td>
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<td>Kyprianou Framework (KF)</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Christofias-Talat Initiative (CT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Working Points (WP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(08-09) Direct Talks (DT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proximity Talks (PT)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(10-12) Christofias-Eroglu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(12-15) Anastasiades-Eroglu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1-1(b): Peacemaking Processes (1955-2014)

Key: See Table 1-1 for abbreviation of Initiatives. (SG) Signaling; (PC) Preliminary Contacts; (PN) Pre-Negotiations; (SN) Substantive Negotiations; (AI) Accord Implementation; (PA) Post-Accord Implementation
Table 1-1(b) continued: Peacemaking Processes (1955-2014)

Key: See Table 1-1 for abbreviation of Initiatives. (SG) Signaling; (PC) Preliminary Contacts; (PN) Pre-Negotiations; (SN) Substantive Negotiations; (AI) Accord Implementation; (PA) Post-Accord Implementation
A closer examination of the 41 peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus from 1955 to 2014, from both a statistical and a qualitative perspective, shows that getting top leaders to the table does not guarantee they are genuinely in the right frame of mind for a just and sustainable peace on the island. Also, by calculating the frequency in which the peacemaking initiatives are introduced in Cyprus, as well as the time lapse between every initiative in relation to the previous one, leads to the observation that getting top leaders or their representatives around the table to talk is not very difficult after all. Furthermore, a number of propositions that are derived from the data set suggest that:

**Proposition 1-I:** Conditions for signaling, as well as conditions following the process of signaling in getting Greek-speaking Cypriot and Turkish-speaking Cypriot top leaders to the table for talks, are necessary but not sufficient in establishing the collaborative mindset that would navigate them through finding and bridging their differences satisfactorily.7

**Proposition 1-II:** Peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus are very likely to go through the phase of signaling rather successfully, but the greatest difficulties arise during pre-negotiations and substantive negotiations due to ever-present antagonism and lack of accommodating each other’s concerns and needs for lasting peace.8

**Proposition 1-III:** Conditions that appear in literature to encourage pre-negotiations and substantive negotiations are necessary to keep the parties seated across the table facing one another, but are not sufficient to produce compromised agreements or even integrative agreements for lasting peace.9

**Proposition 1-IV:** Third party mediators and outside interveners in Cyprus are important and necessary agents for keeping the channeling of information open, but do not have any contribution in securing and guaranteeing the same flow of communication once peace plans are completed and towards post-accord implementation.

**Proposition 1-V:** Conditions for stalemate, “mutual hurting stalemate” and the presence of “enticing opportunities,” are important factors for bringing mistrusted parties to the table, but not sufficient factors in producing a mutual endgame set of solutions or visions for their future.10

**Proposition 1-VI:** Issues that are linked to the local ethnic identity of each of the two larger groups in Cyprus, as well as to their ethno-national identity (linkages to Greece and Turkey), are less likely to be bridged without the consent of the mother lands and/or other
political spoilers on the island who deem every concession a “sell out to the other side.”

Proposition 1-VII: While it is conventional to believe, or as some other studies suggest, that the more divisible the issues are from one another, the more likely it is for the negotiators to reach a middle ground on an acceptable set of options. It is also likely that the linkage of one issue to another could construct a range of trade-off possibilities for negotiators.

To keep the record free of possible ambiguities, I am not arguing that conditions for getting to the table or starting talks are not important. Cypriot leaders and their top negotiators have no chance in settling the Cyprus problem unless they are willing to start genuine negotiations to address the grievances, insecurities and fears that seem to separate them. Then they can find an integrative set of outcomes that leaves everyone with enough peace dividends (as a rational to begin or jump start a process) to exploit what the current sectarian status quo division can no longer offer.11

1.3 Literature Review and Theoretical Arguments

The practice and methods for peacemaking, whether direct or through intermediaries, has a very rich history across time and settings, from Thucydides’ and Herodotus’ description of virulent wars, to the “CODESA conventions” in South Africa, the “Good Friday” agreement in Northern Ireland, to the current efforts to settle the Cyprus dispute, which span four chronological periods and settings between 1955 and 2014 and beyond:

Period I: (1955 - 1959)  
Period II: (1960 - 1974 August)  
Period III (1974 - 2004 April)  
Period IV: (2004 - Current)

Obviously, there are significant differences in all of those chronological periods, and these have to do with a number of circumstances (but not limited to these) such as:

(i) the distinctive “situations, attitudes and behaviors” of conflict cycles as well as those of the parties involved;12
(ii) conflict processes, dynamics and outcomes;
(iii) the distinctive attributes of the methods, perspectives and approaches used to settle the conflict;
(iv) the roles which particular methods and parties involved play in the actual process of peacemaking and afterwards;
(v) the peacemaking dynamics, processes and other characteristics; and
(vi) the distinctive attributes of endogenous and exogenous factors that might influence the context and processes of a peacemaking initiative from its early phases to its anticipated outcomes.

Whatever its specific characteristics and conditions, which I will describe later on, peacemaking is a very complex phenomenon to grasp and it entails a number of direct or indirect methods, techniques and structures such as mediation, good offices, conciliation, facilitation and negotiation for opening up and keeping the communication among mistrusted parties open with the purpose to terminate, manage, settle or resolve their differences satisfactorily. In this research, I am taking an integrative approach in analyzing and understanding peacemaking as a phenomenon with many start-up conditions, as well as a process(-es) of inter-party interactions, with some sort of intended and or unintended outcomes. As a starting point, this is done by synthesizing several published accounts into six distinct approaches listed in Figure 1-3 below and summarized in Table 1-2, also below.

![Figure 1-3: Peacemaking: An Integrative Approach](image-url)
Approach I: Peacemaking as a Process

Peacemaking is defined as a process or a sequence of interactions where moves and countermoves are exchanged (Bartos 1974) or by which contending parties come to an agreement once conditions of timing and ripeness are satisfied, Zartman (2002). Within this approach of reasoning, (i) Dupont and Faure (2002), and Raiffa (1968) define the peacemaking as a strategic approach process; (ii) Cross (1977) as a learning process; (iii) Zartman and Berman (1982) as well as Gulliver (1979) as a joint decision-making process; (iv) Pruitt (1981) and Druckman (1977) as a reactive process of concessions and counter-concessions and demands; (v) Rubin (1975) as a psychological process where perceptions and expectations influence the overall characteristics of interaction and outcomes; and (vi) Zeuthen (1930) as an adjustment process where issues are affected by the level of concessions made.13

Approach II: Peacemaking as Phases (Stages) of Inter-Party Interaction

From this island of knowledge, peacemaking is seen as a sequence of interaction that goes through various phases (or stages), according to Douglas (1962) and Guelke (2002); Also, according to Gulliver (1979), Stein (1989), Druckman (1983), Pruitt (1981) and Mitchell (1981), among others, peacemaking includes phases such as (a) pre-talks; (b) secret talks; (c) multilateral talks; (d) negotiating a settlement; (e) gaining endorsement; (f) implementing the provisions; and (g) institutionalization of the new dispensation.

Approach III: Peacemaking as a Structure

To look further at this approach, a few studies emphasize the linkage between structure (bilateral, multilateral, etc.) and outcomes. For example, some studies approach peacemaking from a structural point of view, as in Thompson (2001) and Fisher (1986) where various conditions such as stalemate (Zartman 1989) have an impact on the outcomes. Some other researchers link peacemaking structures with the use of power (symmetrical or asymmetrical power) in the domestic and international settings, including Zartman (1974), Dahl (1976) and Axelrod (1970). From a slightly similar perspective, some other researchers use parameters to define the structure such as multiple levels of interaction found in Putman (1988), Saunders (1991) and Karras (1970).
Introduction to the Research

Approach IV: Peacemaking as a System

From this approach, peacemaking is viewed as a systemic organization of networks or sub-systems in domestic and international settings, as Kremenyuk (2002) argues, incorporating formal / informal talks, direct talks, and/or teams of experts / working groups engaged together in a process and a structure of talks within a larger system. Peacemaking as a system also refers to a systemic approach in exploring alternatives, legitimacy, options, commitments, communication and relationships, as defined by Fisher and Brown (1988). Peacemaking as a systemic approach also includes in this research the same sub-systemic structures of mediation / negotiations as those found in Bercovitch et. al. (1996), Mitchell and Banks et. al. (1988) and Wall (1981).

Approach V: Peacemaking as Strategies

From this perspective, a number of approaches are integrated here that regard peacemaking as a decision-making process as is found in Raiffa (1982) and Brams (1975), where players / antagonists in conflict make strategic choices for moving toward an agreement, including: contending, problem-solving and yielding. Similar modes of interaction are also cited in Thomas (1976), Pruitt and Rubin (1986), Pruitt, Rubin and Kim (1994) and Kelman (1985), including: competition, collaboration and accommodation. From a slightly similar perspective, I also classify here approaches that do not focus primarily on modes of interaction but methods for lowering mistrust and building relationships for better outcomes, including Fisher and Brown’s (1988) “working relationship” approach, Mitchell’s (2000) “gesture of conciliation” approach, and Osgood’s (1962) “gradual and reciprocal tension reduction” approach.

Approach VI: Peacemaking as Outcomes

Traditionally, the ultimate purpose of parties who have been involved in a peacemaking process is to reach the outcomes they desire. There are a plethora of approaches that try to understand the scholarly linkage between peacemaking processes and outcomes. In this research, I incorporate literature that assists me in linking processes with modes of interaction, outcomes and successful implementation of the peace accords. For example, Easton (1965) and Sharkansky (1970) distinguish between decision-making processes that can lead to peace accords and the consequences of implementing and adapting the accords over time. Others talk about types of outcomes, such as integrative and compromising outcomes (Pruitt and Kim 2004; Zartman and Berman 1982), as well as changes in circumstances during talks that may affect the overall outcomes.
(Keohane and Nye 1977; Ilké 1964), and eventually impact the behavior of negotiators (and third parties) towards integrative solutions (Fisher and Ury 1981; Bercovitch 1996).

Table 1-2: Traditional Approaches to Peacemaking

| Peacemaking as Process | Peacemaking is defined as a process or a sequence of interactions where moves and countermoves are exchanged (Bartos 1974) or by which contending parties come to an agreement (Zartman 2002). Within this avenue of reasoning Dupond and Faure (2002) define the peacemaking process as: (a) a strategic approach process (Raiffa 1982); (b) a learning process (Cross 1977); (c) a joint decision-making process or processes (Zartman and Berman 1982; Gulliver 1979); (d) a reactive process of concessions and counter-concessions and demands (Pruitt 1981; Druckman 1977); (e) psychological processes where perceptions and expectations influence the process and outcomes; and (f) an adjustment process where issues are affected by the level of concessions made.

| Phases | These separate time and dynamics in the interparty sequence of interaction. Phases include an approach by Guelke (2002), including seven stages: (a) pre-talks phase; (b) secret talks; (c) multilateral talks; (d) negotiating a settlement; (e) gaining endorsement; (f) implementing the provisions; and (g) institutionalization of the new dispensation. Also see Stein 1989 and Mitchell (2000).

| Structure | This involves at least two parties seeking to reach a joint outcome. Researchers in this literature link the structural analysis to the bargaining situation for a settlement through real case studies or simulations (Rapoport 1960; Rubin and Brown 1975; Thompson 2001) and some other researchers link structures with power (symmetrical or asymmetrical power) between the antagonists in the domestic and international settings (Zartman 1974; Dahl |