The United States between China and Japan
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Edited by

Caroline Rose and Victor Teo
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors thankfully acknowledge the assistance of the colleagues who have made this book possible. A great debt is owned to the School of Modern Languages and Cultures, University of Hong Kong for making the logistical and financial resources for this project available. We are grateful to Dr. Kendall Johnson and Dr. Dixon Wong, present and former head of the School respectively, and Professor Kam Louie, Dean Faculty of Arts who have been so supportive of the project. The editors are also tremendously grateful to Miss Cheryl Lee, Miss Lolo Yu, Miss Belle Ho, Mr. Richard Edele, Miss Rose Vickridge, Mr Shu Sheng-Chi, Mr. Samuel Wong and Mr. Watson Lam for all their assistance in the organization of the workshop at the University and the subsequent production of this book. We would also like to express our sincere thanks to the learned scholars who have taken the time to come to Hong Kong to attend our workshop, in undertaking the many revisions required as well as their forbearance in waiting for this book to materialize. Even though the materials do not cover the very latest developments, there are nonetheless numerous insights that the various chapters could offer in terms of outlining the patterns and complexities of East Asian International Relations. Finally, we would also like to convey our sincere thanks to the editors and staff at Cambridge Scholars Publishing for their confidence in us and for making this book possible.
Once again in August and September 2012, large scale anti-Japanese protests broke out across major Chinese cities as a result of the Japanese government arresting and deporting 14 Hong Kong, Taiwan and Chinese activists who landed on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands on 15 August 2012. This landing was interpreted as a victory on the part of many
Chinese but proved both provocative and opportune for Japanese ultraright nationalists and politicians in Japan. On 20 August, a similar landing was carried out by a 20-strong flotilla led by Satoru Mizushima, President of Gambare Nippon, a right-wing organization in Japan. They landed on Uotsuri (Diaoyu) and planted the Hinomaru (the Japanese flag) there. Among the group was Eiji Kosaka who was then running for election in Tokyo’s Arakawa Ward. Shintaro Ishihara, the Governor of Tokyo, indicated he would lead another survey party in October 2012 to prepare for the Tokyo Metropolitan government’s purchase of three out of the five islets, even explicitly challenging the authorities to arrest him. There is nothing new about Chinese activists landing on Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands nor is there anything new to Japanese right-wing reactions or politicians utilizing this issue to garner political capital. What is new about this episode is that it came only a few days after the Japanese and Koreans traded words over President Lee Myungbak’s visit to the Dokdo (Takeshima Islands) on 10 August 2012. President Lee’s visit, while not entirely unrelated to South Korea’s domestic politics, reminds us of President Medvedev’s visit to the Kuril islands on 1 November 2010.

Despite a call by Prime Minister Noda, two cabinet ministers, Jun Matsubara, Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission and Transport Minister Yu’ichiro Hata visited the Shrine. See http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120816a3.html


5 “‘If I get arrested, OK’ says Ishihara on his upcoming visit to Senkakus” http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/if-i-get-arrested-ok-says-ishihara-on-his-upcoming-visit-to-senkakus 25 August 2012

6 Known as the Liancourt Rocks in English, Takeshima in Japanese and Dokdo in Korean, this group of islands has been one of the core problems between South Korea and Japan. The Koreans consider that the Dokdo were lost when the Japanese annexed the islands as part of its territory in 1905 without informing Seoul amidst the Russo-Japanese War, incorporating the islands as part of the Shimane Prefecture. Many Korean scholars believe that in 1951, the United States, in pursuit of her strategic interests during the Cold War, softened her stance on Dokdo and that the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 was neutral towards the question of sovereignty over these islands. Interviews in Seoul in 2011 and 2012.

7 Russia controls the four southern Kuril islands over which Japan claims sovereignty – Iturup/Etorofu, Kunashir/Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Khabomai/Habomai. The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 does not explicitly recognize the sovereignty of the Soviet Union of those islands and this was vigorously disputed by the USSR at the time. See statement by Andrei Gromyko, USSR Permanent
Together with Japan’s ongoing dispute with Russia over the Kurile Islands, the Dokdo (Takeshima) and the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) islands disputes all have their origins in the postwar settlement surrounding Article 2 of the Treaty of San Francisco signed in September 1951. While the Russian Federation and Korea effectively have administrative control of the islands over which Japan claims sovereignty, the administrative control of Diaoyutai/Senkaku was transferred to Japan with the reversion of Okinawa in 1971. Today, Japan’s claim is heavily premised on the doctrine of terra nullius – the idea that Diaoyutai/Senkaku were “no man's land” that was first discovered by the Japanese and over which Japan resumed sovereignty in 1971. Both China and Taiwan reject Japanese claims outright. In response, Tokyo has attempted to strengthen her grip on the islands through regular reiteration of her position in the international media, diplomatic maneuvers and domestic political rhetoric. What is significant about Tokyo’s position is that it is backed by the fact that the Senkaku islands are covered under her defense alliance with the United States. Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to territories under the administration of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. Hence in November 1996, Assistant Secretary of Defense Campbell stated that the basic position of the U.S. is that the Japan-U.S. security treaty would cover the Senkaku islands. Secretary of Defense William Perry reconfirmed this on 3 December 1996, and the State Department again in 2004. Prime Minister Taro Asō emphasized Japan’s American support twice within his short tenure.

This ongoing territorial dispute raises questions not only about the direction of Sino-Japanese relations after the 2008 Hu-Fukuda joint communiqué in which it was agreed that China and Japan would seek to build a forward-looking and mutually beneficial relationship after the tempestuous Koizumi years, but the dispute also highlights the significant

9 For text on the treaty, see http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm
10 See write-up on Senkaku/Diaoyutai at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm
role that the United States continues to play in East Asian international relations, especially in the relationship between China and Japan. In particular, coupled with the memories of the Pacific War that continue to haunt East Asian politics, the postwar institutional arrangements hastily put in place at the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War have had a lasting impact on Sino-Japanese relations. Contextualized in this way, this volume interrogates the role the United States has played in Asia through her engagement with China and Japan, and the implications this has for Sino-Japanese relations as a whole.

Recent scholarship on the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations has focused on the reasons and factors behind the disagreements between China and Japan. In turn, the increasingly frequent and high-profile disputes between China and Japan over a host of issues have elicited much interest in this bilateral relationship. From the emergence of the history textbook disputes in the mid-1980s to the surfacing of tensions over various economic, political, territorial and strategic issues, China and Japan appear to find cooperation difficult. The antagonisms include: PRC’s nuclear tests (1995), almost yearly disputes over Senkaku/Diaoyutai since 1996 including quarrels over East China Seabed oil and gas reserves and alleged Chinese naval activities in Japan’s territorial waters (or in the vicinity of Senkaku/Diaoyu), history-related issues such as visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the publication of revisionist historical texts and controversial remarks by Japanese public figures and politicians. The

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14 Yuko Tojo, granddaughter of Hideki Tojo is a prominent revisionist who feels that “Japan did not fight a war of aggression. It fought in self-defense. Our children have been taught that their ancestors did evil things, and their country is evil. We need to give these children back their pride and confidence.” Associated Press, 11 June 2007; Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro is known to have claimed that the Rape of Nanking is fiction and a lie fabricated by the Chinese in an interview given to Playboy magazine (Vol 37, No. 10, p. 63). He is noted to have said that “prostitution was a good way of making a living at that time and that there were no signs that the women had entered the sex trade unwillingly”, Chosun Ilbo, 24
narratives have shifted from merely seeing “historical disputes” between China and Japan as an issue of differing interpretation, to an issue where these historical disputes are symptomatic of larger and more insidious processes at work in the erosion of healthy and strong Sino-Japanese bilateral relations. Scholars such as Rose and He have argued that it is the lack of reconciliation between China and Japan after the Pacific War that is casting a shadow over their current interactions. Gilbert Rozman argues that the bilateral distrust in the relationships between each country has in effect impeded the prospects of regionalization. From the perspective of International Relations theory, this continuing antagonism between China and Japan is puzzling, especially when predictions made by advocates of economic interdependence theory appear applicable to

August 2012; former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also famously denied that the Japanese military was involved in the recruitment of wartime sex slaves, and this led to the U.S. House of Representatives adopting a non-binding resolution calling Japan to acknowledge and apologise for its wartime sex slavery. See House Resolution 121 tabled 31 Jan 2007, see text at http://etan.org/action/action3/02honda.htm#resolution; see also Tessa Morris Suzuki, “Japan’s Comfort Women: It’s time for the Truth (in the ordinary everyday sense of the word)”, Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Tessa-Morris_Suzuki/2373; former Prime Minister Taro Aso also holds a revisionist view of history. He consistently avoided answering questions on his family firm’s use of forced labour during the Second World War, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/19/japan. There are many others: for example, Yoshihisa Komori, Editor-at-Large for Sankei Shimbun, who denies the Nanjing Massacre and is renowned for his nationalist views, criticised Japanese intellectuals such as the President of the Japan Institute for International Affairs, Yukio Sato, for allowing essays critical of Japanese politicians who visit Yasukuni Shrine to be published on the JIIA website in 2005-2006. Nariaki Nakayama who served as PM Koizumi’s Education and Culture Minister also fought to censor textbooks that touched on Japanese wartime sex slaves, and also holds the position that Nanjing Massacre is a complete fabrication. He assisted then PM Abe in attempting to revise the 1993 Kono statement in which Japan admitted that the Japanese government had some responsibility in this issue. (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html ), and challenged the Japan Teachers’ Union, whom he considered to be extremely harmful to Japanese education because of their “defeatist” attitude towards history.

15 Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future?, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005);
Sino-Japanese relations. For Neo-Liberalists, the problem is a question of inadequate engagement and the institutionalization of co-operative structures in East Asia. China and Japan have yet to embark fully on the joint development of regimes and institutions that could help ameliorate tensions in the region and harmonize the differences in opinions and outlooks in both their countries. Neo-Realists on the other hand, however, attest that the tensions in Sino-Japanese relations occur simply because they both have competing rather than complementary goals and national interests. 18 Scholars working in the Constructivist camp argue that nationalism exhibited in Sino-Japanese relations emanates from deep-seated differences in national identities, 19 their worldviews, perspectives and norms.

There have been many surveys on how the Chinese and Japanese view history and historical questions. 20 Most surveys show that public opinion polls point to “history” as the main impediment to stronger bilateral relations. However, such public perceptions may mask deep ideational and structural issues between China and Japan and prompt further questions: How did the historical issue develop into what it is today? How did the difference in perceptions come about? What were postwar China and Japan’s reasons for not taking measures to address these issues? Are these issues purely “bilateral” in nature, or do they involve multiple parties? Can these historical issues be fully addressed by China and Japan? Are these issues really “historical” in nature or could they be identified as a political power play? Rozman’s recent volume, United States Leadership, History and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia, hints at the significant but often understated role that the United States plays in the region’s historical

20 For example, the 2008 Yomiuri Shimbun - Xinhua News Agency joint survey in 2008; the periodic Asahi Shimbun-Chinese Academy of Social Science Survey as well as the regular Asahi Shimbun Regular Public Opinion Poll (http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/polls/polls_listing.htm ); Asian Barometer, http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/surveys/ ; in addition, also see Mindy L. Lotler, Naotaka Sugawara and Tetsuya Yamada, ‘Chinese and Japanese Public Opinion: Searching for Moral Security’ in Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No.1 2007, pp. 93-125; there are also regular Polls on Foreign Policy conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office.
disputes. This volume further problematizes the role of the United States against the backdrop of the issues and tensions found in the tempestuous relations between China and Japan.

The first part of this volume thus tackles the history question in relation to Sino-Japanese relations and attempts to delineate the role of the United States against this backdrop. The questions deriving from the “burden of history” form the first set of fundamental obstacles in Sino-Japanese relations. Victor Teo’s chapter provides a historical survey of the United States’ role in East Asia and contextualizes the discussion by highlighting the importance of the United States’ role in the historical dispute between China and Japan. Teo notes that the problems faced by China and Japan, especially in their lack of a common understanding of history as well as the structural problems between them, are an unintended consequence of historical developments as well as institutional arrangements made by the United States. In addition, while the United States may enjoy a privileged position of playing the “middleman” in these disputes and managing the tensions, Teo questions whether this is sustainable in the face of China’s rapid rise and Japan’s normalization agenda.

Bu Ping’s chapter proceeds to lay out the critical importance of understanding the nature of the historical issues that trouble East Asian diplomacy. Outlining the efforts that have been made to transcend political boundaries through the study of history, Bu Ping identifies three layers in the dialogues over the history problem between China and Japan, namely political, emotional and academic. When the three layers coalesce, the history dispute becomes further complicated. Compared with the history of reconciliation in Europe, reconciliation in Asia lags behind. However, as Bu Ping argues, there are fundamental obstacles to reaching a common understanding of history, and that is the question that historians in both China and Japan need to contemplate. Historians need to rise above personal beliefs and cultural bias in order to clearly understand history from the perspective of the different layers, and subsequently offer suitable solutions. Mutual understanding is an active way to confront the disputes in the emotional and academic layers.

Arguably, many of the problems between China and Japan today appear to have their roots in the 1950s. This raises further questions with regards to the role of the United States in the “creation” of these problems. Today, as we look for various solutions to try and temper, if not solve, the

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history issues, more issues emerge. Would the resolution of these issues necessarily pave the way for smoother Sino-Japanese relations? Are the problems interlinked, and if so, how? How is it that historical issues have become “structural”, in an ideational sense, and further impede Sino-Japanese relations from moving forward? Caroline Rose’s chapter considers the role of the U.S. in the origins and construction of the Sino-Japanese history problem. It first traces the developments of the early postwar period, considering the impact of a rapidly changing international environment and emerging Cold War hostilities on Occupation policies in relation to Japan and the peace settlement. The chapter then turns to look at events in the 2000s and the U.S. government’s stance on such issues as the textbook controversy, Yasukuni Shrine issue and military sexual slavery. It also considers the role of U.S. domestic activist groups and individual politicians who tried to raise the issue of restitution between Japan and other Asian countries to a political level (albeit with little success), and explores the reasons for the U.S. government’s continued reticence – or inability – to apply pressure on the Japanese government. The chapter argues that although the U.S. often appears to take a neutral stance on the more sensitive issues in Sino-Japanese relations, in fact the tendency to ‘lean to one side’ has contributed to the persistence of the Sino-Japanese history problem.

Ma Xiaohua further interrogates the question of history in Sino-Japanese Relations. In her chapter on “The Yasukuni Controversy and Sino-Japanese Reconciliation”, Ma scrutinizes the important role that collective memory has played in contemporary U.S.-China-Japan relations. Answers to this question must reckon with the impact of the memories of World War II, or the Asia-Pacific War of 1931-1945 - the foundational moment of contemporary politics in the Asia-Pacific region. Ma’s chapter focuses on how history disputes based on different memories emerged and subsequently became an important factor affecting the relationships among the United States, China and Japan. Ma pays particular attention to the persistence of clashing collective memories as symbolized by the Yasukuni Shrine issue, and the ways in which the issue has escalated and become intertwined with other problems in the China-Japan relationship.

He Yinan’s chapter examines the relative strength and mutual interaction between two distinct driving forces that have shaped postwar Sino-Japanese relations. One is the East Asian structural environment, which is to a great extent defined by U.S. strategy toward the region. The other is the enduring psychological and emotional shadow cast by the two countries’ history of traumatic conflict. When the international structure is negative, such as in the 1950s-60s with a solid U.S.-Japan alliance and
Sino-American confrontation, it has the effect of trumping other factors and antagonizing China-Japan relations. But a positive structural pressure, such as Sino-American rapprochement during the 1970s-80s, improved Sino-Japanese relations to a limited extent because of both the U.S. security guarantee for Japan and the constraints of their historically-derived mistrust and antipathy. He argues that since the Cold War, China and Japan have faced a unique structural environment that is neither clearly positive nor clearly negative. Although regional balance of power is more important than before, their relationship continues to be shaped and reshaped by their respective responses to the U.S. policy on the one hand, and their approaches to the historical legacy on the other hand.

One of the biggest questions is, thus, how these historical issues are now intertwined with the development of Chinese and Japanese national identity and the corresponding values in Chinese, Japanese and American societies. **Victor Teo’s** chapter on “Reappraising U.S. preponderance through the prism of Sino-Japanese Relations: Some Implications for East Asia” reviews the implications of the contestation between China and Japan. Teo’s basic argument is that as a direct result of the difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations today, the United States has an unprecedented advantage in terms of her ability to exercise leadership in the region, ironically mirroring the circumstances created during the early stages of the Cold War. His chapter emphasizes that historical misunderstandings have come to be integrated into the national identity of these two giants, and explains how they have in turn contributed to the hegemonic status of the United States in Asia-Pacific. His assessment is that unless China and Japan are able to harmonize their collective memories and reconcile their differences, the situation in Sino-Japanese relations will continue to bolster the United States in a leadership position in Asia-Pacific affairs. This, however, might not be such a positive development given the need for the region to develop healthy and rigorous institutional mechanisms that are commensurate with economic development and political maturing. Festering nationalism based on lopsided interpretations of history cannot be sustainable in the long run.

Today, many Japanese and Americans believe that they are very similar to each other, while the Chinese and Japanese believe that they are fundamentally different from each other – but it is questionable if this is true. Are the Americans and the Japanese so fundamentally different from the Chinese? Much of the narrative emanating out of Tokyo and Washington in support for the U.S.-Japan security alliance is based on existing public opinion and elite discourse. We often hear that the Japanese people espouse very different values, outlooks and aspirations
from the Chinese and that they are ideologically much closer to the West. This could be seen in the much-debated idea of a “value-based” diplomacy for China espoused by former prime ministers Abe and Aso. After the collapse of the USSR, American and Japanese officials spoke of the ‘China Threat’, debating whether they should engage or contain China. From the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration, we have heard terms like “engagement”, “containment” or even “congagement” with regards to China. Chinese people’s aspirations and outlook are not so different from those of the Americans or the Japanese – as they too aspire to higher standards of living, peace and stability. Young Chinese are just as eager as Japanese or American youths to go abroad to work and travel and the ordinary citizen in Shanghai, Osaka or Chicago also has his/her worries about jobs, financial security and health costs. Most Chinese are just as proud of their country and as nationalistic as their Japanese or American counterparts. The point here is that the value schisms we are led to believe are not as big as prevailing Western discourse and public opinion would suggest.

The second important category of obstacles in Sino-Japanese relations appears to be structural in nature. “Structural” here simply refers to concrete material and even ideational obstacles that prevent reconciliation between China and Japan. There is no shortage of scholars who argue that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is responsible for keeping things on an even keel between China and Japan. The Americans are responsible for “containing” the China threat as much as they are for keeping Japanese nationalistic sentiments in check. They are responsible for “balancing” and “engaging” the ascendance of China as much as they are for reassuring the region of the righteousness of Japanese “normalization”. From a longer-term perspective, this state of affairs might not be the best way forward. China and Japan must learn to handle and take their relations forward in a sincere and honest manner in the future. While the role of the United States is instrumental indeed in keeping the peace, no one in Asia today could actually imagine and forecast an Asia without the United States, much less one that is dominated by China and Japan. This arrangement ironically has become accepted by both China and Japan. Consequently, the United States has become, for a lack of a better word, the de facto “honest broker” when it comes not just to regional affairs, but also in mediating relations between various states. This is especially true when it comes to Sino-Japanese relations. Today there is a huge difference between diplomatic discourse and political reality, between the apparent will of the leadership and popular public opinion over the tone and direction of Sino-Japanese relations.
The spirit of the 2008 Fukuda-Hu communiqué stipulates that the basis for the future of Japan-China interactions would be the “all round promotion of strategic and mutually beneficial relations.” While no doubt noble in intent and far-sighted in its aspirations, such a joint statement begets more questions: can Japan and China truly build a “strategic partnership” based on mutually beneficial interests, especially if Japan is structurally tied to the U.S. in regional security arrangements?

The subsequent chapters thus examine perhaps what might be considered the greatest structural impediment to Sino-Japanese relations – that of the U.S.-Japan Bilateral Treaty (promulgated in 1951, revised and signed in 1960). In 1996, President William Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto reaffirmed the alliance and in 1997, the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Co-operation were revised. As an institution, this is one of the main reasons why “stability” has been maintained in East Asia, but its exceptional longevity after the Soviet threat has receded, and its unquestioned role cannot be taken for granted. Of course, many American scholars are of the persuasion that this bilateral alliance is critical to U.S.-Japan defense co-operation and the preservation of the stability that East Asian economic growth needs. It is, however, the same alliance that arguably allows the more conservative elements in both countries to have the upper hand in domestic political debates. At the same time, many Asians believe that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is critical for peace and security in the region. In fact, the alliance is seen as sacrosanct by many defense policymakers and diplomats.

From the Japanese and American point of view, the fundamental element that underpins the U.S.-Japan Security relations is the “China threat” theory that has found resonance among scholars and defense planners since the early 1990s. Today, neo-conservative politicians, the military-industrial complex and Pentagon officials’ think tanks act in concert with conservative elements of the Japanese elite. For the United States, this provides the impetus and the motivation for the Japanese to realign their goals more closely to U.S. foreign policy and preempts the possibility of Japanese strategic independence. This alliance allows the United States to achieve her strategic goals in Asia at subsidized cost, and provides a financial and technological basis for continued defense spending, rejuvenation of the military-industrial complex and maintenance of an entrenched presence in the most economically dynamic region in the world. Yet, as much as the U.S.-Japan security alliance is a bilateral agreement between two sovereign nations, the United States is keen to

22 Please see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html
justify the alliance and reduce strategic friction. To the Chinese, the existence of the alliance has always been justified implicitly on the basis of the prevention of a potential Japanese resurgence i.e. the Japan threat, and the ability of the U.S.-Japan security alliance to act as a political latch on Japanese strategic and global ambitions. At the same time, there are Japanese who support the U.S.-Japan Security alliance to oppose the rise of China, but who are also at the same time proponents of anti-U.S. rhetoric. Their views are either not publicized in the United States or ignored by the U.S. administration. Many specialists in the United States elect to turn a blind eye to the rhetoric of these nationalists whose views and narratives largely coincide with those presented in the Yushukan,23 in the name of national interests. Ironically, tolerance of such views in the name of national exigencies, largely rooted in the postwar era, continues to be relevant to today’s East Asia as Japanese mainstream politics shift rightwards. Notwithstanding the above factors, there are concrete reasons to consider whether the U.S.-Japan alliance is to be as effective and as useful when it comes to real world operationalization with regards to any scenarios involving China. Even during the Bush-Koizumi era (arguably the two leaders most “in sync” with each other in recent U.S.-Japan relations history), there were marked differences with regards to how both Tokyo and Washington approached the alliance.24

The next section of the book begins with a chapter that surveys Sino-Japanese relations past and present from a Chinese perspective. Jiang Lifeng, former director at the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, explains how the Chinese perceive the development of Japanese politics, economics and society in the short term and suggests ways forward for the future conduct of Sino-Japanese relations. Jiang’s paper is written from the viewpoint of an area specialist and focuses on analyzing the developmental trends in Japan as the Chinese see it. As such, the chapter is written purely from a Chinese point of view and while the recommendations might be seen as partial only to the Chinese cause, the paper is nonetheless a very frank and sincere attempt at grappling with the very difficult road ahead for China and Japan in the short-term.

Chu Shulong’s chapter, on the other hand, takes on the subject matter from an International Relations perspective. His chapter on “U.S.-China-
Japan Trilateral Relations in Asia” examines the question of the United States’ role between China and Japan taking a holistic perspective. In particular, Chu argues that the relationship between China, Japan and the United States is both the foundation of peace and stability in East Asia but also the major source of strategic conflicts in the region. What Asia will become in future depends very much on these three countries and their relationships. The early decades of the 21st century are an era of dynamic change for China and Japan as well as the rest of Asia. The changes provide some opportunities but also pose significant challenges for all the countries in the region. Chu argues that to ensure that changes are going in the right direction, promoting peace and stability as well as managing the uncertainties caused by the dynamics, the U.S., China and Japan need a long-term stability mechanism to manage their relationships and regional issues.

Liu Shilong, another esteemed scholar from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, focuses on the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations from 1969 onwards, evaluating its positive and negative influences on various aspects of the relationship. Liu makes the case that the impact of the U.S. on the Taiwan issue and the Diaoyu Islands issue between China and Japan has been largely negative. In the 1970s, US policy towards China had a positive impact on Sino-Japanese relations, but in the 1980s it played a less positive role, and in the early 1990s, the U.S. influence on Sino-Japanese relations was negative. In the early 21st century, the politically-cold Sino-Japanese relationship gave the United States a chance to play a positive role between China and Japan. Liu suggests that in the next decade, the United States might assume different roles in Sino-Japanese relations. The U.S. would probably play a negative role in the Taiwan issue in time to come, but on other issues such as the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute, the United States would probably play a more positive role. Looking into the future, Liu argues that the U.S. factor in Sino-Japanese political relations will be more stable. The reason for this is that so long as there is enough room for Sino-Japanese relations to develop fully, the greatest dynamism will come, not from the external power of America, but from the two Asian neighbors themselves - China and Japan.

Moving to the post-September 11 world, Yoneyuki Sugita surveys how the 9/11 attacks changed the way the United States managed its relations with the two Asian giants. Since 1945, the United States has not tolerated the existence of any hegemon in the East Asian region other than itself. Recently, however, Asian countries have begun to assert their autonomy and have formed pan-Asian organizations and forums such as ASEAN + 3 and the East Asian Summit which eschew U.S. involvement.
The events of 9/11 acted as the springboard for the United States to develop what Sugita calls “Asian nexuses.” In order to manage the U.S.-Japan relationship, Washington used an “Iraq-Indian Ocean-North Korea” nexus. Japan reluctantly assisted the United States in Iraq and the Indian Ocean because it considered U.S. help vital for resolving issues concerning North Korea. Similarly, in its relationship with China, Washington took advantage of a “North Korea-Taiwan-China” nexus. The 9/11 attacks compelled the United States to focus its attention on Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, Washington asked Chinese President Hu Jintao to take the lead in organizing the six-power talks, which he accepted. In return, the United States supported China in its position regarding Taiwan. These Asian nexuses have strengthened U.S. bilateral ties with China and Japan, maintaining the former’s commitment and influence in Asia.

The next section of the book focuses on the United States and its linkage to an extremely sensitive issue in Sino-Japanese Relations – Taiwan. **Hoi-Yan Yau and Heung-Wah Wong** examine the legacy of the Japanese colonial past by scrutinizing the cultural influences on Taiwanese identity and the implications for cross-strait relations. Yau and Wong chart the efforts of the U.S.-sponsored KMT government to ‘de-Japanize’ the Taiwanese people when they first came to the island in 1949. The KMT government adopted a globalization-cum-homogenization perspective in evaluating the cultural effects of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan. Yau and Wong argue that the KMT government was not completely correct because it was clear that the Taiwan people had, to an extent, resisted Japanese cultural homogenization. To be sure, resistance was not even; some Japanese cultural institutions were rejected, while others were welcomed by the Taiwanese people. By the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, we can even see the ‘resistance of culture’ through which some Taiwanese people tried to use the legacy of the Japanese colonial past as the cultural base for their own identity building, aiming at distancing their culture from Chinese culture. In the event, the legacy of the Japanese colonial past has become part of Taiwanese culture, marking the difference between Taiwanese and Chinese culture. Finally, Yau and Wong argue that such cultural separatism is further mediated by the Chinese concept of guojia (nation-state) and converted into a type of political separatism represented by Lee Teng-hui’s “two countries thesis” — posing a major problem for cross-strait relations. Yau and Wong’s paper provides a glimpse of the cultural and ethnic politics that complicates Taiwanese domestic politics today. There is no question that the survival and growth of the American-backed KMT regime has had interesting
implications for Taiwan’s continued development and in cross-strait affairs; but the Taiwan issue is taken seriously by Chinese analysts because of Japan’s sympathy for Taiwan. Due to this, Japan is often drawn into the U.S.-China debate on Taiwan unwittingly, even though Japan’s official position is to actually downplay her own relations with Taiwan.

The question of Taiwan’s role in East Asian security is an important one. Chen Mu-Min argues that any thoughtful discussion of East Asian security must consider the centrality of China-Japan relations. What is easy to overlook, however, is the role of Taiwan in the power competition between China and Japan. Realists argue that a weaker state’s options include balancing (e.g. Taiwan aligning with Japan), bandwagoning (e.g. Taiwan leaning towards China) and neutrality. This chapter utilizes this framework to examine Taiwan’s relations with China and Japan in past decades, and attempts to answer the following questions: what are the motives behind Taiwanese leaders’ decisions to either seek an alliance with Japan or bandwagon with China? Does Taiwan play any role in the competition for power between China and Japan, or is its influence overstated? The article first introduces Taiwan’s three strategic options, followed by historical overviews of Taiwan-China and Taiwan-Japan relations, and the changes they have undergone since 2008. The balancing/bandwagoning model is then employed to offer explanations regarding Taiwan’s shift from tilting toward Japan to seeking reconciliation with China. This chapter also argues that political leaders in Taiwan are capable of altering relations with China and Japan, but find it difficult to please both heavyweight neighbors.

Li Dajung offers an alternative perspective on the Taiwan issue in Sino-Japanese relations. Li’s chapter proffers some insights into the impact of the Ma Ying-Jeou’s mainland policy on the quadrilateral relations among the U.S., China, Japan, and Taiwan. This chapter argues that since 2008 the Ma administration has developed cross-strait ties and foreign policy in parallel. In terms of Taiwan’s traditionally most important trio of bilateral ties, the Ma administration can and should actively stabilize its respective relationships, positively and healthily promote cross-strait interactions, restore and repair mutual trust and cooperation between Taiwan and the United States, and work to establish special partnership relations between Taiwan and Japan on an unofficial basis. Li argues that in regional matters and with respect to cross-strait issues, moreover, Taiwan should not fall into the trap again of being seen as a ‘troublemaker’, but instead develop a forceful role as a regional peacemaker.
In his chapter, Tsai Tseng-Jia, Director of National Chengchi University’s Institute of Japanese Studies, offers a sanguine analysis of the role of the United States and Japan in “Ma’s Cross Straits Policy towards China”. Tsai argues that since the Ma Government took office, it has adopted an active engagement policy toward China in contrast with the relatively passive posture taken by the DPP government in the previous eight years. Under the active engagement policy, the Ma government not only conducted a diplomatic truce with Beijing, opened up Taiwan to Chinese tourists and forged links in a comprehensive way, but also advocated a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Although this significantly reduced tensions with Beijing, the Ma government’s active engagement policy raised serious doubts from both American and Japanese government perspectives. In particular, Japan was concerned as to whether the Ma government’s new measures would change the previously longstanding policy of following the U.S.-Japan security alliance. As such, American and Japanese attitudes were the main force that recalibrated Ma’s mainland policy. In the meantime, the Ma Government began walking a tightrope on the Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangular equilibrium.

Yen Chen-Shen’s chapter entitled “Taiwan on the Backburner of United-States Relations with China” offers another take on Taiwan’s international relations within the framework of U.S.-China relations. Yen argues that the confrontational but isolationist approach adopted by President Chen Shui-bian was jettisoned in favor of a conciliatory one leading to a relaxation of cross-strait relations. Such a transformation was welcomed not just by Beijing but also produced a sigh of relief in Washington, D.C. At a time when the United States was trying to weather the financial storm and revitalize its economy, Washington needed Beijing’s cooperation in meeting challenges on many different fronts. Taiwan’s position of non-provocation of China, thereby not forcing the hands of Beijing and Washington to take action, would present a win-win-win situation for the triangular relations, allowing the three sides to all enjoy the fruits of a peaceful Taiwan Strait. However, this prompted concerns amongst others that Taiwan would be ignored and sacrificed as the US continues to strive for improvement of its relations with China. Thus, Yen argues that although Taiwan may have been dropped from the list of pressing issues in Washington’s bilateral relations with Beijing, it is nevertheless still on the stove, albeit on the back, rather than the front, burner.

Beyond the question of Taiwan, the other extremely sensitive question in Sino-Japanese Relations is the question of how China and Japan will
handle their maritime disputes – especially the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands. **Zou Keyuan** offers us some thoughts on developments in Sino-Japanese maritime relations and considers the legal implications therein. Maritime encounters and communications between China and Japan can be traced back several thousands of years. In recent years, the two countries developed their maritime relations in various ways, including *inter alia*, marine fishery management, joint marine scientific research and joint efforts in the protection of the marine environment. However, while there has been cooperation between the two sides in the maritime sector, tensions do exist. Both countries are keen to expand and maintain their rights and interests in their adjacent oceans. They both joined the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and accordingly enacted relevant laws governing the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf at the domestic level. The extension of national maritime zones inevitably caused tensions and conflicts between neighboring countries. The most salient maritime disputes between China and Japan rest with the East China Sea where the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are located. Considering the possibility of a settlement, Zou contrasts China’s ambivalence towards the use of international judicial mechanisms with Japan’s more active approach. Despite these differences, however, Zou concludes that a peaceful solution could be reached in the East China Sea.

**Tomoko Okagaki**’s chapter, enticingly entitled “Ripe for the Revival of ‘Concert’?: The U.S. Approach to a New Regional Order in Northeast Asia”, raises an important question that affects the nature of U.S. foreign policy towards Sino-Japanese relations. After discussing how variables at different levels of analyses have shaped the way the U.S. has approached Northeast Asia since the end of WWII, Okagaki then assesses the nature of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration in light of the circumstances that would enable a concerted, comprehensive approach to the solution of global problems among states. She argues that under the (first) Obama administration, there appeared to be a fortunate congruence among the direction in which the U.S. foreign policy, Sino-Japanese relations, and the international environment were moving. The U.S. administration was more selective and prudent in taking decisive diplomatic action, emphasizing multilateralism, negotiations and consultations with its partners. On the part of China and Japan, the two had recovered from the animosities that had prevailed in 2005, were rebuilding trust, and were becoming increasingly integrated into multilateral frameworks of regional and global cooperation. Okagaki argues that since 9/11, the need for global cooperation to meet new security threats has been shared among
countries. The economic crisis also encouraged cooperation among great powers, rather than engaging in confrontation. The international environment, therefore, was ripe for the reemergence of an Asian-style “concert of Europe,” blending well with the nature of the new U.S. foreign policy, and that of regional politics. Under these circumstances, Okagaki considers the ways that the Obama administration might fine-tune its role, weighing and calibrating the capacity and willingness that China and Japan demonstrate in engaging in world affairs, which in turn would require both countries to articulate their respective policy stance vis-à-vis their bilateral relations as well as the nature of their standing in global security.

Looking at the macro-picture of the United States’ global strategy, the multilateralism the United States is pursuing in Europe stands in stark contrast with the bilateral alliances that the United States is undertaking in Asia. These bilateral alliances render the United States very nervous about any groupings in Asia that exclude the Americans. 25 Through their diplomacy in Japan, the Americans have made it known that any regionalization plan that precludes the United States is doomed to failure – as demonstrated by Mahathir’s still-born East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in the early 1990s. Yet making the U.S.-Japan Security an essential part of regionalization efforts might in the long run backfire. Today, the ASEAN +3 formula is itself a reborn and repackaged version of Mahathir’s EAEC – and the fact that the proposal ostensibly emanated from ASEAN shows that the United States has very limited options to “contain” China. The United States can only be successful if the rest of the countries follow her lead, and this might not be likely.

From a regionalization perspective, it is clear that during the last two decades, China, as opposed to Korea and Japan, has been most willing to facilitate Free Trade Agreements in the region. These FTAs will enlarge the Chinese-led Free Trade Zones to overshadow those of the Korea and Japanese FTAs. As economic rather than political integration is much easier to achieve, this puts China at the forefront of any regional integration exercise. Implicit in this is the influence of China in fostering the regionalization of the region as well as the exercise of leadership, especially in the economic sphere which has been the domain of the Japanese for almost fifty years. Rather than working with the Chinese to ensure that any form of regionalization does not exclude the United States, the United States encourages the Japanese to take on a leadership role and

supports Japan to vie with China in casting its vision for U.S.-Japan alliance. It asks the Japanese nation to support the LDP’s agenda of normalization under the “umbrella” of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and posits that the Treaty has the ability to solve many ills. As Ming Wan notes, this itself is a contradiction as it effectively turns the U.S.-Japan Security alliance, traditionally suited for regional security problems (especially pertaining to Taiwan and North Korea), into one that is supposedly built for global problems. At the same time, this no doubt undermines any prospects for the United States to build a partnership with the Chinese which could truly be global in its influence. After all, China seeks to make with friends with regimes around that world that eschew contact with the Americans (and whom Americans balk at working with). As China’s economy grows, it is only a matter of time before the size of her economy gives China the clout to assist or deter the United States in shaping and regulating global financial and economic matters. In many aspects, China, not Japan, is the natural partner in matters of global governance – starting from climate change to financial regulation to even disaster relief. A true-blue Sino-U.S. alliance might actually help to alleviate the global burden that the United States is shouldering if the Americans were less bent on promoting the importance of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in the Asia-Pacific at the expense of Chinese national interests.

One of the most important strategies that regional countries have undertaken to temper China’s and Japan’s geopolitik contestation is through the building of multilateral institutions and the propagation of regionalization. In the final chapter, Lee Chyungly addresses this important issue by examining the compatibility of East Asia and Asia-Pacific multilateralism. Lee argues that developments in Asia-Pacific multilateral diplomacy suggest patterns of multi-track policy communications from networks of think tanks to state summits. In terms of footprints, APEC and ARF are the major multilateral processes in Asia Pacific, while APT and EAS are two relatively new ASEAN-hubbed establishments in East Asia. In spite of their overlapping memberships and agendas, Asia Pacific and East Asia multilateralism seem hard to merge but are compatible. Balanced interests of geopolitical strategies among major regional security actors, including the U.S., China and Japan, are critical determinants in sustaining such compatibility. Japan holds membership in all these mechanisms. Lee analyzes Japan’s multilateral strategies in the region and

their relevance to regional orders, and argues that elements of regional multilateralism suggest that the two common bases, that is, the ASEAN “informal” way of diplomacy, and the evolutionary way of institution building and economic integration, serve Japan’s strategic interests and thus explicate its founding memberships in all the major regional processes.
CHAPTER TWO
THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN: BALANCER, ARBITRATOR AND LIMITS OF CHANGE
VICTOR TEO

Today we have learned in the agony of war that great power involves great responsibility ... We, as Americans, do not choose to deny our responsibility. Nor do we intend to abandon our determination that, within the lives of our children and our children's children, there will not be a third world war. We seek peace — enduring peace. More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginnings of all wars -- yes, an end to this brutal, inhuman, and thoroughly impractical method of settling the differences between governments. The once powerful, malignant Nazi state is crumbling; the Japanese war lords are receiving in their own homeland, the retribution for which they asked when they attacked Pearl Harbor. But the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough. We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed, which made this horror possible.
—Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1945

Preamble

When asked to comment on the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific, the ubiquitous response given by analysts in Tokyo, Seoul or Bangkok is that the United States’ role underwrites the peace and stability of the region. This image of the United States as a security guarantor underpins the primary raison d'être that many of her allies are willing to go beyond mere rhetoric to support the presence of the United States in the region. In Southeast Asia, smaller countries like Singapore, the Philippines and even Islamic Brunei have been vocal proponents; while in Northeast Asia, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan have been vocal proponents of the
US presence.1 Ironically, some Chinese scholars also hold the same view, despite their opposition to US hegemony.

Taiwan’s security, largely maintained by the Taiwan Relations Act passed in 1979, firmly commits the United States to Taiwan’s security and defense. Today, Taiwan’s independence and viability as an international actor is not only maintained by the 150 F-16s the United States sold to Taiwan in 1992 (with another 60 F-16s under negotiation), but also thrives on the continued support by the United States for Taiwan’s democratic evolution and security posture. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, a domestic United States law that compels the United States government to come to the aid of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, is still critical to the preservation of de-facto Taiwanese independence today. Singapore, described as “steadfast friends”2 by US officials, is one of those without a formal alliance with the United States. Based on a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1990, Singapore today hosts the Task Force CTF73, the Logistics Group Western Pacific of the United States Navy’s Seventh Fleet. The Changi Naval base, a strip of reclaimed land several times larger than the old Pulau Brani Naval base, was constructed to meet the growing needs of the Singaporean Navy, as well as fulfilling the larger logistical need of visiting US Naval vessels, including the Nimitz-Class aircraft carriers. In 2013, the United States will deploy four new "littoral combat ships" - smaller, surface vessels intended for operations close to shore and able to deploy quickly to crises in Singapore.3 South Korea is in the process of constructing a controversial new naval base for the South Korean Navy, ostensibly for the North Korean threat. Ironically, the base is situated on the idyllic Jeju Island, also known as an “Island of World Peace” that hosts a large number of UNESCO World Natural Heritage sites.4 The South Korean government justifies that the base will bring

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1 This comes at a time when Southeast Asia military spending is increasing exponentially. Jane’s Defense estimated that Southeast Asian countries have collectively increased spending by 13.5% in 2011 up to $24.5 billion. It is estimated this will rise up to $40 billion by 2016. For a detailed analysis of Southeast Asia security see, “Military Balance in Southeast Asia”, www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP11-79.pdf
2 Rumsfeld, Donald H. "Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies." 6 June 2004.
4 For a firsthand account of the activism on Jeju, see http://savejejuisland.org/Save_Jeju_Island/Welcome.html The protests have been prominently covered by the major broadsheets and media centers, for example, see