The Crowe Memorandum
The Crowe Memorandum:
Sir Eyre Crowe and Foreign Office Perceptions
of Germany, 1918-1925

By

J.S. Dunn
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ vii

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
Eyre Crowe, The Foreign Office and the Era of the First World War: Some Previous Research

Chapter One .................................................................................................................. 47
Sir Eyre Crowe, the Foreign Office at Versailles and the Post-War World

Chapter Two ............................................................................................................... 74
The Foreign Office and Conference Diplomacy

Chapter Three ............................................................................................................. 113
The Foreign Office and the Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924

Chapter Four ............................................................................................................. 139
1924, Ramsay MacDonald, the Foreign Office and the Dawes Plan

Chapter Five ............................................................................................................. 171
1925: The Foreign Office and Locarno

Chapter Six ............................................................................................................... 201
Crowe, the Foreign Office and Germany, 1900-1925

Chapter Seven ......................................................................................................... 215
The Foreign Office After Crowe

Appendix 1 ................................................................................................................. 220
The 1907 Memorandum

Appendix 2 ............................................................................................................... 229
“Friends of Europe” Publications
# Table of Contents

Appendix 3 .............................................................................................. 233  
German Foreign Policy before the War  
Bibliography ............................................................................................ 254  
Index of Authors, Editors and News Media ............................................ 265  
General Index, including People, Places and Events ......................... 269
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is the result of several years interrupted effort. It could not have been completed without the encouragement, friendship, assistance and advice of many people. The list is long, but, although many are omitted, they will never be forgotten. Others such as the endlessly helpful staff at the National Archives in Kew, the British Library in St. Pancras, the Bodleian Library, Oxford, Churchill College, Cambridge, Liverpool University, Liverpool John Moores University, the William Brown Library, Liverpool and the Crosby Library, Sefton, will always be in my debt, even if I cannot give their names.

I have always appreciated just criticism, especially when it produces positive outcomes, but when someone is attempting to complete higher degrees and complete a book whilst in mostly full-time employment the need for the encouragement and inspiration of others cannot be overestimated. For these and other reasons I wish to thank many people: Professor Frank MacDonough, Dr Nick White, Professor David McEvoy, Professor Alan Sharp, Dr Ann Dempsey, Dr David Steven, John Woods, Roy Shannon, George Lyons, Colin Wilson, Dave Brennand, Noel Logan, Sir John Jones, Frank Fitzgibbon, Kathy Upfold, Fran Cunniffe, Mo Williamson, Jonathan Greenbank, Lisa Davies, Glenn Laidler, John Gargan, Denise Young, Ian Campbell, Mike Harvey, Sarah Smith, Clair Maloret, George Hogan, Steve Davis, Geoff Owens, Ron Ringer, Jill Owen, Ian ‘Rio’ Owen, Harry, Keiron, Phil, Mick, Sarah, Sandra, Andrea, Ryan, Fern, Sam, Hannah, Josh, Ellen, Etty, James, Leo, Lily, Gaynor, Geoff, Carole, Sharon, Nick, Luka, Bud, Matthew, Ashley, Callum, Marie, Paul, Sylvia, Mark, Philip, Rachel, Loretta, Lorraine, Brian, Gary, Detta, Gina, Norman, Emerald, Grainne, Martin, Lesley, Shirley, Melissa, Rachel, Marje, Paul, Emma, Suzie, Dewi, Gill, Chris, Jason, Alison, Jay, Jenny, Barbara, Pam, Liz, Stuart, Lesley, Robert, Gill, Rod and Vanessa. Nor can I forget some of my teachers and lecturers, at least two of whom have passed away: Peter Upton, David Jones, Peter Hills, John Witton, Ivor Williams, Ian Gowers, Dr Jack Williams, Dr Mike Hopkins and John Davies.

Most of all, my greatest debt is owed to my two inspiring and much missed parents for their love of history, novels, music, sport, education, humour, children and family life. In their lives they had to overcome challenges and dangers that have made the obstacles in my life seem very small in comparison.
The Foreign Office, c. 1890
Sir Eyre Crowe
Charles Hardinge, Viceroy of India, 1910-1916, Permanent Under-Secretary at the FO, 1906-1910 and 1916-1920

William Tyrrell, Permanent Under-Secretary at the FO, 1925-1928
INTRODUCTION

EYRE CROWE, THE FOREIGN OFFICE
AND THE ERA OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR:
SOME PREVIOUS RESEARCH

There has been an exhaustive literature on almost every aspect of the causes and consequences of the First World War. A great deal of this writing has concentrated on the failings of the Paris Peace settlement and the international crisis of the 1930s, which culminated in the outbreak of the Second World War. What has been far more neglected is the period following the peace conference, leading up to the signing of the Locarno Treaty of 1925. Within the extant literature, the single most influential figure on British foreign policy in this period, Eyre Crowe, has certainly been neglected. Indeed, very little is known about Crowe’s important contribution to the course of British foreign policy and especially his views towards Germany following the end of the First World War. Yet there is considerable evidence of the influence of Sir Eyre Crowe (1864-1925) on the perceptions of Germany held within the Foreign Office and, it will be shown, on some of his political masters.

Crowe was the Foreign Office’s foremost expert on Germany and he was the Permanent Under-Secretary of State from November 1920 until his death in April 1925. On 1 January 1907 he submitted to the Foreign Office a document entitled ‘Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany.’¹ It had an immediate as well as a lasting impact upon Foreign Office attitudes to Germany. It has also been claimed to have had a very negative effect on German attitudes to

¹ Eyre Crowe, ‘Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany,’ 1 January 1907, partly reproduced as ‘German Foreign Policy Before The War: The 1907 Memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe, with a foreword by Hilaire Belloc in A Friends of Europe Publication, London, 1934, pp. 1-30. It was then highly unusual for a State document to be allowed to be published in this way.
Introduction

Although the Crowe Memorandum had particular relevance to the period before and during the First World War it continued to have great resonance after 1918. But it was not used by the Foreign Office as an inflexible dogma, but rather as a framework within which policies towards Germany could be formulated and business conducted.

British governments’ treatment of Germany from 1918 to 1925 cannot be understood without regular reference to the work of Foreign Office diplomats, especially, Crowe. During key diplomatic events of the period, most notably, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the London Conference of 1924, at which the Dawes Report on German reparations was agreed, Crowe’s ideas on Germany were extremely influential on his political superiors, certainly three Foreign Secretaries, Lord Curzon (1919-1924), Ramsay MacDonald (both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in 1924) and Austen Chamberlain (1924-1929) and arguably on the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George (1916-1922). Although Lloyd George did not like the ‘experts’ of the Foreign Office and tried to conduct foreign policy towards the German government almost without reference to them at important times, his attitudes to Germany mirrored those of Crowe. Both wanted Germany to be treated firmly, but fairly after the war, and were opposed to Germany being crushed.

After the fall of Lloyd George in October 1922, Crowe was indispensable to the brilliant, but indecisive Curzon, and that it was Crowe’s work that moved British policy forwards in the direction of an end to the Ruhr crisis. In 1924, when MacDonald formed the first Labour government and assumed the onerous dual role, he was content to allow Crowe and Foreign Office officials to formulate policies, enabling himself to make decisions rapidly. It was Crowe’s work that was behind the great success of the London Conference of 1924, although, as in Paris before the Treaty of Versailles, Crowe himself was pushed to the background and MacDonald took the credit. When the new Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin came to power, the new Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, was overwhelmed by the question of European security, including how to improve relations with France and Germany. It was Crowe and the Foreign Office that provided a solution that ultimately

---

2 ‘The Crowe Memorandum “was long considered in Germany to be a major factor contributing to war,” but for Geiss it “proves to have been the most intelligent and the most precise analysis of German Weltpolitik for a very long time to come.” I. Geiss in H.W. Koch, The Origins of the First World War, Macmillan, London/Basingstoke, 1984, p. 57. He also said that “It can be regarded as the key document of British foreign policy before 1914…”ibid, p. 62. Unfortunately, it is “it seems, more denounced as anti-German than actually read…”ibid, p. 57.
ended in the signing of the Locarno Treaty in December 1925. In fact, Crowe had always hoped for a peaceful Germany and it is probable that, had he lived, Crowe would have advocated an ‘eastern Locarno’ that dealt with Germany’s eastern frontiers, but the Foreign Office was, for a few years, a ship without a rudder.

The Foreign Office had been created in 1782. The first Foreign Secretary, albeit briefly, was Charles James Fox. During the nineteenth century, several of his successors, notably Castlereagh, Canning, Palmerston and Salisbury held considerable control over key decision-making regarding foreign affairs. It was the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, not the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, who informed the House of Commons, and thus the country, that Britain was at war with Germany in August 1914. There was soon much criticism, and not just in Britain, that the methods employed, namely ‘secret diplomacy,’ favoured by the governments of the old monarchies of Europe instead of ‘open, democratic diplomacy’ was the main cause of the outbreak of the Great War. “It is no exaggeration to claim that in the next decade a large section of informed opinion believed that ‘secret diplomacy’ was the principal cause of the war.”

A critical question was asked in July 1914 as the Kaiser’s government almost dissolved into a leaderless vacuum: “Who rules in Berlin?!” In Germany, following its defeat in 1918 and the Versailles Treaty’s controversial Article 231, the so-called ‘war-guilt clause,’ historians and political commentators strove hard to counter this accusation and to level the blame elsewhere. Yet, it was not until the 1950s that Fritz Fischer became the first German historian to be allowed unrestricted access to the bulk of the archives of the Kaiserreich and it is hardly surprising that in the extraordinary climate that prevailed in Germany during the Weimar Republic and then the Third Reich that so little was known by the general population about the real guilty men who took Europe into the catastrophe.

Thus, there was even an attempt to depict Crowe, a virtually unknown German-born British diplomat, as the ‘evil spirit’ of the Foreign Office who had had a malign influence on British policy towards Germany up to 1914. But Eyre Crowe did not cause the Great War and nor could he have

---

4 The words of Leopold von Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Secretary, in July 1914.
Introduction

prevented it, although he did try to clarify Britain’s stance vis-à-vis Belgian neutrality in July 1914, much to the annoyance of Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary. What will be shown to be beyond doubt was that Crowe had a significant influence on British foreign policy before 1914 and on attitudes within the Foreign Office towards Germany after 1918. His work at the Blockade Ministry ought to be more well-known as well. How deeply and sadly ironic then that during the ‘Hun-baiting’ hysteria of the war that Crowe was a leading target of the loathsome Horatio Bottomley and his cronies.7

Where is the evidence of Crowe’s career? Extensive use has been made of a number of private papers, including, Lord Hardinge (former Viceroy of India and Crowe’s predecessor as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 1916-1920), Tyrell (his successor), Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, Bonar Law, Austen Chamberlain, Vansittart (perhaps Crowe’s most celebrated successor) and the journalist and author John Strachey. Also consulted extensively were Foreign Office archives, private papers, letters, Parliamentary debates, newspaper extracts and articles from journals and books. Also available are the collected entitled “Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,”8 and the first of the series covers the period from 1919 to 1924. The first volume of the next series covers the year 1925, including the Locarno Treaty.

But, the most important collection proved to be the Crowe papers, which, unaccountably, have been neglected in many previous studies. Crowe did not live long enough to write his memoirs and so it is through the Documents on British Foreign Policy that historians can discover the depth of his insight and directness of his views in his daily work from 1920 to 1925. But the private papers not only reveal the private family man and that his marriage was an intellectual partnership (he did not show any sign of condescension in his reports of diplomatic affairs to his wife, Clema), but also Crowe’s very strong opinions on his political masters and the great events in which he participated. This is particularly true of the events of 1919 and 1924. It is astonishing that many large-scale works of the period have apparently not used the Crowe Papers, for example, Margaret MacMillan’s ‘The Peacemakers,’9 or indeed the private papers of other senior diplomats. Even Sibyl Eyre Crowe and Edward Corp did not

7 See Ch. 2, pp. 55-56.
use them fully, for example, neglecting to discover what Crowe and the Foreign Office actually did in Paris in May and June of 1919. They seemed to be so determined to assert the importance of Crowe and to counter Alan Sharp’s view that the Foreign Office was ‘in eclipse’\textsuperscript{10} that they failed to confront the considerable evidence that ran contrary to their opinion and to persuade historians that they were still right.

There is one large single volume biography of Sir Eyre Crowe written in English, and co-written by his daughter, Sibyl Eyre Crowe, and Edward Corp.\textsuperscript{11} It was invaluable for this work, was well researched and is particularly useful up to the final five years of Crowe’s life when he was Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. It does have a number of weaknesses, in particular its hagiographic nature and a tendency to criticise all those whose ideas and actions conflicted with Crowe, especially his predecessor as Permanent Under-Secretary, Lord Hardinge. It is also critical of Lloyd George and Curzon. Yet the book contains a chapter on the work of Crowe and the Foreign Office in Paris in 1919, and focuses on his highly important work as Ambassador Plenipotentiary after Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George had gone home. It contains very little about the largely secretarial role of Crowe and his fellow delegates in the first six months of 1919, prior to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles – the ‘German Treaty.’ To some extent, using the private papers of Crowe himself, this gap will be filled. Their biography also does not give sufficient space to the four and one half years when Crowe was the Permanent Under-Secretary, too much attention being given to Crowe’s early life.

Crowe and Corp aimed to raise the profile of their subject, claiming that his place in the history of the period had been undervalued and, more often than not ignored. Yet, Eyre Crowe was not unknown to scholars of diplomatic history. Harold Nicolson, one his juniors in the Foreign Office, described his chief almost in terms of hero-worship.\textsuperscript{12} Nicolson said that, in Paris in 1919, that Crowe had stood up so successfully to the bullying tactics of the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, that even ‘The

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\end{thebibliography}
Tiger' was forced to admire him. Gordon Craig, who knew many of the diplomats who served in the Foreign Office in the 1930s, praised Crowe in his work. Three of Crowe’s successors as Permanent Under-Secretary, Robert Vansittart, William Strang and Ivone Kirkpatrick all lauded Crowe in their memoirs. John Connell believed that Crowe’s views on Germany influenced the Foreign Office until the 1950s, with the disastrous exception of the two peacetime years of Neville Chamberlain as prime minister and the years of World War Two. This view was supported by a more recent historian who stated that “it has been argued correctly that the 'Crowe doctrine' became the litmus by which all policy discussed within the Foreign Office was measured until the early 1950s…” According to Erik Goldstein, Crowe was “one of the outstanding diplomats in British history…” who made a very positive contribution to post-war Europe.

Perhaps the greatest praise of all came from John Gregory, in a book written after his premature departure from the Foreign Office in 1928.

“How rarely it must happen to any institution to have been led by a man who is so wedded to it, so identified with it, that you might almost say that he was that institution, that he was of its very substance, as it was of his!

---

13 He said of him: “Crowe, c’est un homme à part.” See Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 211.
Crowe and the Foreign Office were one and indivisible. He was its life; and his life was the Foreign Office and nothing but the Foreign Office."\textsuperscript{20}

Historians, though, have not always been complimentary about Crowe. In her seminal work on the Foreign Office before the First World War, Zara Steiner was less enthusiastic about the Crowe Memorandum, believing it to be a negative account of recent German history.\textsuperscript{21} After becoming Prime Minister in December 1916, Lloyd George frequently expressed an unfavourable attitude to the diplomats of the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{22} It is perhaps inevitable that supporters of Lloyd George, such as his compatriot, Kenneth Morgan, were also critical of the Foreign Office and tended to view its personnel in the same light as he did.\textsuperscript{23}

Steiner’s book stimulated the production of a number of articles that discussed Crowe’s career. Keith Wilson showed that Crowe’s opinions on Germany were not, at first, accepted by some of his superiors before the 1907 Memorandum was submitted.\textsuperscript{24} Richard Cosgrove refuted what he believed was the traditional portrayal of Crowe as the British equivalent of the devious, poisonous and disloyal Holstein of the German Foreign Office, prior to the war. He described Crowe’s family background and said that he did not have the advantages of aristocratic lineage or connections. Furthermore, he was born and educated in Germany and France (not an English public school and Oxbridge) and had married into a minor German aristocratic family. “Crowe achieved success by virtue of his superior gifts, but he was never fully integrated into the Foreign Office hierarchy. His German origins set him apart at once.” Yet Cosgrove named eighteen former Foreign Office officials, including Sir Edward Grey, who paid special tributes to Crowe in their memoirs. Cosgrove concluded that Crowe’s criticisms of Germany “were indistinguishable from those of Hardinge, Nicolson and Lord Bertie (British Ambassador in

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, p. 255.
\textsuperscript{21} Z.S. Steiner, \textit{The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914}, Cambridge, 1969, p. 69. See also Chapter 2, page 52. This book greatly increased the awareness of scholars of modern diplomatic history of the personalities and work of men such as Crowe, Hardinge and Tyrrell.
\textsuperscript{22} See Chapter 1, p. 11.
Paris), but it was his ability to verbalize those fears and formulate policy clearly and logically that made him remarkable. By stating policy choices in unequivocal language, Crowe fostered the impression that he led opinion within the Foreign Office. He declared plainly, however, only what other colleagues believed but expressed in muted form. Crowe crystallized ideas which had already gained currency among other diplomats; his logic did not convert them but they assented to conclusions already accepted. It is a highly plausible argument, but it only tells part of the story. What set Crowe above his contemporaries, as Crowe elsewhere explains, were his industry, superior subject knowledge and directness. In an article written shortly after Crowe and Corp's biography, Sir Alan Campbell attempted a more balanced assessment. In Campbell's view, Crowe was the arch professional and despised what he called 'meddlesome busy bodies' such as journalists or members of parliament. He does not seem to have been aware of the dangers to his own profession of being thought to be isolated from public and parliamentary opinion. His insistence on high professional standards even led to his opposition to several overdue reforms in the recruitment and structure of the Foreign Office.

It would not be correct to infer that Crowe was simply expressing the foreign policy of the Conservative Party, before, during and after the war. Inbal Rose, though, was right to identify some areas of mutual agreement between it and Foreign Office mandarins such as Crowe after 1918, for example, regarding Germany's ambitions towards Russia and the threat posed by Bolshevism to the British Empire. "An acquaintance with present and, perhaps more significantly, past opinions of some of the members of the Foreign Office encouraged the belief that they shared a similar, traditional conservative view of policy." In a work that is essential reading for diplomatic historians of the period before the First

---

26 Sir A. Campbell, 'Sir Eyre Crowe, 1864-1925', FCO Historical Branch, Occasional Papers, Number 8, August 1994, pp. 31-45.
27 Campbell, 'Sir Eyre Crowe', p. 43.
28 Crowe was "a life-long Liberal," said Zara Steiner, in Britain and the Origins of the First World War, London and Basingstoke, 1977, p. 185.
World War, Paul Kennedy supported the notion that there was a ‘Foreign Office mind’ on Germany.32

The Foreign Office is still an institution with an air of mystery to many British people. Yet, there are a number of accounts of its history, some of which come from the Foreign Office History Department.33 There are a number of relevant articles in a collection by Roger Bullen.34 Nor did Foreign Office mandarins keep their work secret forever, judging by the autobiographies of some of them. They provide fascinating and very readable accounts of their careers, although they are not always completely reliable, as they are as prone to selective memory and self-justification as any other autobiographies.35 However, they did not usually provide historians with amount of detail that they required in order to cross-reference evidence. It would not be until the availability of substantial, hitherto unseen archive material in the 1960s that a greater academic awareness of the role of Foreign Office mandarins before, during and immediately after the First World War was facilitated.

The importance of Zara Steiner’s book on the Foreign Office cannot be overstated.36 Using the newly available archives, she analysed the organisation of the ‘Office’ and showed that it was not living in the past, but had undergone considerable reform in 1905 and 1906, of which Crowe himself was the prime mover.37 Her work altered many perceptions of the ‘old’ Foreign Office. “The nineteenth century Foreign Office (had) long been regarded as the epitome of ‘old diplomacy’.”38 It was criticised for being old-fashioned in its methods,39 but actually had been repeatedly reformed and in 1914 was in “modern sociological parlance … a

33 Library of the Foreign and Commonwealth office, FCO Historical Branch, Occasional Papers. See Bibliography.
35 The memoirs of Lord Hardinge are a good example. See Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Old Diplomacy, London, 1947.
36 Steiner, Foreign Office.
37 “The decisive role played by Crowe in the introduction of the reforms increased his reputation for brilliance…” E. Maisel, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926, Brighton, 1994, p. 46.
knowledge-based organisation with efficient information management procedures geared towards informed policy-making.\textsuperscript{40} In 1920, it was reformed again when the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service were amalgamated, although Christina Larner argued that this was “less complete and less effective than has hitherto been thought…”\textsuperscript{41}

Steiner also supplied invaluable biographical detail about men such as Hardinge, Tyrrell and Crowe (including her unfairly critical view of his 1907 memorandum), elucidated the confused days before Britain’s declaration of war on Germany in August 1914 and discussed the declining influence of the Foreign Office. In July 1914, Crowe quarrelled with the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. Crowe wanted a clear government statement to Germany that Britain would support Belgium if it were to be invaded, but Grey prevaricated.\textsuperscript{42}

Very important themes in Steiner’s study have since been developed by other diplomatic historians. Roberta Warman analysed the question of the erosion of Foreign Office power during the war. Beginning with Hardinge’s return to the Foreign Office as Permanent Under-Secretary in 1916 (he had been Permanent Under-Secretary from 1910 to 1913 and then Viceroy of India from 1913 to 1916), she showed how the war, and

\textsuperscript{40} Otte, ‘Old Diplomacy’, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{42} In his memoirs, Lloyd George also blamed Grey who, he said, could have united the Cabinet over Belgian neutrality, but had merely demanded an international conference. See G.W. Egerton, ‘The Lloyd George War Memoirs: a study in the Politics of Memory,’ \textit{Journal of Modern History}, Volume 60, 1-2 (1988), pp. 74-75. Another view is that during the crisis of July 1914, Crowe “pushed too hard for an early British commitment to go to war with Germany … Grey admonished him and (in 1916) blocked his certain promotion to succeed Nicolson as Permanent Under-Secretary.” See McKercher, ‘Old diplomacy and new’, p. 88.

In an angry memorandum of 31 July 1914, Crowe had advocated that the British government reject German overtures to stay neutral in any war between Germany and France and make it clear to Germany that in the event of “a just quarrel England would stand by her friends.” See \textit{British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914}, ed. by G.Gooch and H. Temperley, Volume XI, The Outbreak of War, ed. by J. Headlam-Morley, pp. 228-229. Given the evidence revealed much later by Fischer, it is highly questionable that this would have made much difference to the Bethmann-Hollweg government and to a Kaiser that refused to heed the repeated warnings of his Ambassador in London and who preferred, naively, to believe the words allegedly spoken by George V to Prince Heinrich that Britain would not go to war with Germany. See M. Carter, \textit{The Three Emperors: Three Cousins, Three Empires and the Road to World War One}, London, 2010, p. 427.
consequent internal events had greatly weakened the status of the institution. After the outbreak of war, the relationships between the Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office altered because the Foreign Secretary, previously largely independent, now had decisions taken at Cabinet level. The Foreign Office was relegated in importance below the War Office and the Admiralty. The decision to move Eyre Crowe (then Assistant Under-Secretary and Head of the War Department) to the Contraband Department (in 1915) deprived the political departments of his abilities until the end of the war.

Warman looked at the role of the War Cabinet of Lloyd George and, in particular, the position of A.J. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, who was excluded from the inner circle of five men, but was “not isolated” because he was often required to attend meetings. Balfour’s performance as Foreign Secretary from 1916 to 1919 has come in for much criticism, for example that he had an “excessively compliant attitude to Lloyd George.” For Warman (and many contemporaries) the main obstacle that the Foreign Office faced between 1916 and 1918 was the Prime Minister, who, she said, “had little respect for traditional institutions (and) was prepared to ignore the Foreign office when it suited him to do so.” In his opinion, “Diplomats were invented simply to waste time.” Lloyd George even questioned their right to represent their government. “It is simply a waste of time to let (important issues) be discussed by men who are not authorised to speak for their countries.”

The massive increase in the size of the parliamentary electorate in 1918, including the vote for women over thirty, made Britain arguably a truly democratic country for the first time. After December 1918, it begged questions as to how Britain should be governed, how best should Britain be represented abroad and who should decide policy, especially the matter of taking the country or not taking the country to war. Warman’s

---

article showed that Lloyd George believed that Britain needed a ‘new diplomacy even before it became a ‘new democracy.’ Supporting his view, Arno J. Mayer argued that the allied leaders in Paris “were not as ignorant of international politics as legend would have it…” and that a political rather than a diplomatic background was really an advantage “to them in their peacemaking task. Party politics are not antithetical. Quite the contrary, experience in the domestic politics of modernized societies … is an excellent school for aspiring practitioners of international politics.” It was not a prerequisite for their appointment to have “an overall view of and an insight into the processes of international politics rather than a thorough knowledge of a few select geographical areas.”

Soon after becoming Prime Minister in December 1916, Lloyd George created a Cabinet Secretariat and utilised a coterie of assistants who replaced the Foreign Office experts as advisers, policy makers and even, on occasion, diplomatic envoys. This group became known as the ‘Garden Suburb.’ It included Maurice Hankey (the Cabinet Secretary from 1917 to 1941), Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s private secretary and Leopold Amery, the latter two being disciples of the arch-imperialist Lord Milner. Kerr said that the Foreign Office had “no conception of policy in its widest sense.” The Cabinet Secretariat was to act, Hankey believed, as “a kind of informal ‘brains trust,’ to be ‘Ideas Men.’ Men such as Eric Drummond were sent on special missions abroad and then had to report back to the Cabinet Secretariat, not the Foreign Office. In 1917, there were a number of ‘extra-diplomatic’ missions such as that of Kerr to Switzerland, Milner to Petrograd, Northcliffe to the U.S.A. and Arthur Henderson to Russia. The Foreign Office was furious. It was also upset by Amery’s ‘Appreciations,’ a weekly summary of world events sent to the Cabinet and prime minister of all the Dominions, the setting up of Beaverbrook’s Ministry of Information in February 1918 (a possible rival to the Foreign Office) and particularly the interference in the appointment and dismissal of ambassadors without consulting the Permanent Under-Secretary of State.

---

52 Ibid, p. 139.
54 In 1918, two outstanding ambassadors were removed from their posts to make way for political appointments of Lloyd George. Lord Derby and Auckland
Alan Sharp took Warman’s research further and argued that the Foreign Office, for most of Lloyd George’s premiership, was in a state of ‘eclipse.’55 This position was, unsurprisingly, vehemently opposed by Crowe and Corp,56 but has more recently been questioned by historians of Lord Curzon’s period in office as Foreign Secretary (1919-1924), such as Harry Bennett57 and Gaynor Johnson.58 Their argument is only partially convincing as they focus on the questions that interested Curzon most, particularly the Near East. Indeed, after discussing Curzon and the Foreign Office and then Western European security in the first two chapters, Bennett’s book is mainly about Curzon, Russia and the East. On German matters, especially reparations, Curzon was largely redundant, as were the Foreign Office mandarins, judging by the figures supplied by Sharp of the attendance records of Curzon and his experts at the post-war reparation conferences.59 Sharp’s argument should be reinforced, with the addition that, despite the ‘eclipse,’ the perceptions of Eyre Crowe on Germany still remained extremely influential within both the Foreign Office and the government itself.

This was true even during the Paris Peace Conference and the framing of the Treaty of Versailles. Michael Dockrill and Zara Steiner60 were highly critical of the Foreign Office in Paris, especially the performance of Lord Hardinge. They explained how Lloyd George chose Maurice Hankey, rather than Hardinge, to be the head of the British secretariat, despite the latter’s greater experience of foreign affairs, and how Crowe emerged as the leading Foreign Office personality in Paris. Dockrill and

---

Geddes replaced Francis, Lord Bertie and Sir Cecil Spring-Rice in Paris and Washington respectively.


Steiner defended Crowe over his clash with the Prime Minister in December 1919 in connection with the French note.\textsuperscript{61} They believed that the Political Intelligence Department played “a crucial role” in shaping post-war policies towards the Central Powers\textsuperscript{62} and gave evidence of Curzon’s negative opinions of his Foreign Secretary as well as his Prime Minister, his methods and the ‘Garden Suburb.’\textsuperscript{63} To Curzon, Lloyd George, “Hankey and Kerr were a little Camarilla who ruled the country and managed or sought to manage the Foreign Affairs of the Continent.”\textsuperscript{64} He regarded Balfour “as the worst and most dangerous of Foreign Ministers with whom I have been brought into contact in my public life.”\textsuperscript{65} Dockrill and Steiner were far more sympathetic, believing that Balfour, despite his failings, “when given the opportunity...proved to be an able co-ordinator and his many minutes suggest that he was not lacking in astuteness or awareness.”\textsuperscript{66} They question the extent of his alleged marginalisation by Lloyd George in Paris, pointing out that he had a flat above the prime minister at 23 rue Nitot and met him daily to discuss the business of the peace conference. Balfour himself did say though that, both in peace and wartime, the Cabinet continued to give, “a free hand for the little man.”\textsuperscript{67} In response to accusations that, in Paris, Balfour was lethargic, Egremont said that this was unfair and stated that he was still capable of “constructive, if intermittent activity.”\textsuperscript{68}

The descriptions of the work done by Foreign Office experts in Paris by those of them who were there are invaluable sources, but must be used with varying degrees of scepticism, as often they reveal as much about the author’s character flaws as they do about events and other people. For many years, Harold Nicolson’s views were quoted by critics of the Treaty

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, pp. 81-82. See Chapter 2, pp. 66-67.
\textsuperscript{62} Dockrill and Steiner, ‘Foreign Office at Paris’, pp. 55-56. On this subject see also Goldstein, Winning the Peace, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{63} See also A. Sharp, ‘Holding up the flag of Britain...with Sustained Vigour or “Sowing the seeds of European disaster”? Lloyd George and Balfour at the Paris Peace Conference’ in M.Dockrill and J. Fisher (eds.) The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace Without Victory, Basingstoke, 2001, pp. 35-50.
\textsuperscript{64} Dockrill and Steiner, ‘Foreign Office at Paris’, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid, p.84.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} A. Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost Peace, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 7.
of Versailles as evidence of the failures of the political leaders in Paris. He was particularly critical of the choice of the venue – “that shell-shocked capital…” and of President Woodrow Wilson. “Why did he come?” he asked. He believed that Wilson was an idealist who was incapable of coping with the wily British and French leaders. On the other hand, Nicolson praised Lloyd George and eulogised his hero, Eyre Crowe. Writing some years later than Nicolson and published two years after the death of the victim of his literary knife, Lord Hardinge’s autobiography, presents a different, highly subjective perspective on the former prime minister. “Lloyd George was quite the most dangerous representative it was possible to have” and that “…responsibility for the Treaty rests principally” with him. Lloyd George even told Hardinge, allegedly, that “if I had to go to Paris again I would conclude a different treaty.”

The memoirs of Lord Vansittart unfortunately ended before he could give his version of his period of service under Neville Chamberlain, but, like Nicolson, he was a promising junior official in 1919 and his book is a highly readable, but often flawed account, of his life and career, written in an idiosyncratic style, full of epigrammatic wit about the great figures that he had known. Even so, it does contain some important insights concerning British policy towards Germany in the immediate post-war years. Vansittart was certainly negative towards German policy and cynical about the peace process in Paris. “Our contingent was eighteen strong – ‘picked men’ Hardinge called us to make us look better, but without avail.” However, Vansittart, like Crowe, and unlike Hardinge, defended the Treaty of Versailles and, in particular, criticised the work

---

70 Ibid, p. 69. Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, agreed (ibid, p. 69), as did Lord Derby (Liverpool Record Office, Derby Papers, 920 DER (17) 28/1/1, diary entry, 16 December 1918) among others.
71 Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 69.
72 Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 242.
73 Ibid, p. 238. Hardinge recalled that these words were spoken to him when he was sat next to Lloyd George at a dinner in 1923 and after the recently retired diplomat had, according to his own account, launched a scathing attack on the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and his dinner companion.
74 Sir Robert Vansittart was Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1930 to 1938 when he was ‘promoted’ to the newly created post of Chief Diplomatic Adviser. He retired in 1941 and died in 1958.
75 Vansittart, Mist Procession.
76 Ibid, p. 201.
77 Vansittart was though prone to self-revisionism, in the opinion of one biographer. “His views on Versailles were never as clear-cut and uncompromising
of Maynard Keynes and blamed him personally for the decision of the U.S. Congress to vote against the Treaty. 78

There is an undoubted need for more research to be produced on the role of the Foreign Office in 1919, but there is already a substantial amount of excellent source material on the role of Lloyd George, the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles in general. Books by Michael Dockrill and Douglas Goold, 79 Alan Sharp, 80 Ruth Henig, 81 Anthony Lentin 82 and Erik Goldstein 83 have all contributed to academic debates on 1919. Among their many criticisms of the ‘peace without promise,’ Dockrill and Goold felt that perhaps given the sympathies of some Foreign Office officials, including Crowe, it might have been a good thing that the Foreign Office had so little influence in Paris. 84 The view that the attitude to Germany of Crowe was unhelpful to the British delegation should be rejected for reasons that will become clear. Elspeth O’Riordan held a very different view to Dockrill and Goold, as, in her opinion, Versailles “was a treaty of promise. Had the victor powers worked together, it had the potential to be either implemented or revised to lead to a peaceful, secure Europe.” 85 This happened, she said, during the Locarno honeymoon. “The tragedy … was that it took the Ruhr crisis … before the policies of the major powers … were co-ordinated and in particular the dichotomy between the American and French positions removed.” 86 Sharp 87 analysed the peace conference and the Treaty of Versailles and emphasised the immensity of the tasks facing the peacemakers and concluded that there was still a ‘German problem’ after
1919. Ruth Henig believed that the treaty itself could not be blamed for the failure to secure a lasting European peace. The First World War produced serious, deep-rooted economic and political problems, including severe economic dislocation. The peacemakers had to grapple with forces of nationalism and militarism unleashed by the war. Vansittart wrote that the Second World War happened because the treaty was broken, not because it was too severe. Sharp stated that this view was now more acceptable to historians, but as Anthony Lentin said, “the legend of Versailles as a doomed settlement dies hard.” Lentin, a barrister, believed that, as a lawyer, the Prime Minister of Great Britain should have known that imposing an indemnity was against international law. Then, in his later book, he quotes Lord Riddell’s recollections of the speed with which key decisions were made in Paris. In 1918, Lloyd George believed that the war was a crime against humanity, that the Kaiser was primarily responsible for it, that he should be put on trial and executed. Agreeing with Harold Nicolson, Lentin believed that the war-guilt clause was for British public opinion and that “Lloyd George of all men should have been the first to grasp the unwisdom of article 231.” Then, for the next seven years Lloyd George argued that the Treaty as a whole was built on German war-guilt and would collapse if it were abandoned. As Lentin rightly pointed out, Lloyd George therefore played, unwittingly, into the hands of the German treaty revisionists as this was exactly their position.

88 Henig, Versailles and After, p. 48.
89 Sharp, Holding up the flag of Britain, p. 48. Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 220.
92 Lentin, Lloyd George and the Lost Peace, p. 3. According to Riddell, a friend of the Prime Minister, at the end of 31 March 1919, a day when a number of huge decisions were made, including the war-guilt clause, the remarkably energetic Lloyd George was “full of fun.” See Lord Riddell, Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After, 1918-1923, London, 1933, p. 263.
93 Ibid, p. 12.
95 Ibid, p. 18. This question still provokes controversy. Yet, Fischer’s access in the 1950s to the German archives showed that in 1914 the royal family in concert with the military, financial and business elite were united in their desire for a war that would transform their country into the dominant power in Europe and Africa and ultimately much further. Great Britain would be isolated and destroyed by a virtual trade embargo imposed upon it by its neighbours who would be vassal states of Germany. See Fischer, Germany’s War Aims, pp. 95-113. There were also pressures
Yet even Keynes accepted that Germany bore “a special and peculiar responsibility for the war itself, for its universal and devastating character, and for its final development into a combat without quarter for mastery or defeat.”

In the twilight of his career, the indefatigable former British Prime Minister was determined to correct many of what he deemed to be the falsehoods and misunderstandings about the post-war peace conferences and treaties. Lloyd George called the Versailles Treaty, “this much abused and little read document …” Egerton explained how and when the books came to be written and the valuable assistance that he was given by his secretaries. Maurice Hankey checked the memoirs with the government and Basil Liddell Hart checked military facts. Lloyd George was still Hankey’s hero. Egerton focused on two things – “the
coming of war and the failure of Grey’s diplomacy and then the struggle with Haig and the generals for the control of war strategy …

Probably the most famous book to have been written following the signing of the Treaty of Versailles was by John Maynard Keynes, who had been a member of the Treasury team in Paris. Jan Smuts, the Prime Minister of South Africa, had urged Keynes “as soon as possible to set about writing a clear, connected account of what the financial and reparation clauses of the Treaty actually are and mean.” In December 1919, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, was first published. In it, Keynes made a strong personal attack on the ‘Big Three’ – Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George – and said that the treaty was unjust. Germany was unable to pay more than £2bn. in reparations at the outside. It was a ‘Carthaginian peace’ that would lead to the economic and political collapse of Europe. Its impact was enormous in Britain, but was utterly devastating in the United States (sections of it were read aloud in Congress) where it destroyed the post-war diplomatic aims of President Wilson. The Congress rejected the Versailles Treaty and American participation in the League of Nations. The U.S.A. returned to international isolation with disastrous consequences for the post-war peace settlement. Lentin said that “whatever were the economic consequences of the peace, the political consequences of Maynard Keynes were wholly monstrous.”

However, the Second World War made many people question the inter-war sympathy shown towards Germany and the views of Keynes in particular. A critique of Keynes’s book by a brilliant young French economist, Etienne Mantoux, was published posthumously. Keynes had stated that Germany would never be able to pay the reparations that the allies demanded and, for some, the collapse of the German economy into hyperinflation in 1923 verified Keynes’s argument. But, Mantoux said that

“reparations were not paid because Germany, as was quite natural, did not want to pay them, and – which was perhaps not quite so natural – the Allies showed themselves incapable or unwilling to take jointly the necessary

---

102 Ibid, p. 73. Grey had died in 1933 and Haig in 1928.
103 Lentin, Guilt at Versailles, p. 137.
105 Lloyd George, Truth About Reparations and War Debts, p. 18.
106 Lentin, Guilt at Versailles, p. 137.
107 Ibid, pp. 137-140.
109 E. Mantoux, The Carthaginian Peace or The Economic Consequences of Mr Keynes, New York, 1952.
measures which could have made Germany pay. The whole question, therefore, boiled down to political expediency.”

Zara Steiner believed that the treaty “was not ‘a Carthaginian peace.’ Germany was not destroyed.” Keynes pamphlet was “pernicious but brilliant … and still the argument found underpinning too many textbooks.” Margaret MacMillan said that Jan Smuts was “the most eloquent critic of all.” But, she pointed out that it was Smuts who wanted pensions for widows and orphans of Allied soldiers, thus inflating the reparation figures.  

The German reparations question and the post-war German economy has been and remains highly controversial. Sally Marks insisted that reparations were a political question, which explained “why Britain’s best efforts at treaty revision never satisfied Germany” and why the reparations question blighted relations between France and Germany until 1932. Marks also pointed out that the war and the ensuing peace treaty did not economically cripple Germany. “Despite the loss of Saar coal and Lorraine iron ore, Germany remained Europe’s ‘industrial power-house,’ able, in a remarkably short time, to dominate the trade of the central and eastern European states.” Gerald Feldman has consistently rejected this view. “Apparently, the only people who really believed that the Germans could fulfil their reparations obligations … are some historians." Elisabeth Glaser pointed out that others, for example, Hoover, Lansing and Headlam-Morley shared Keynes’s views, but his views “appeared more

---

110 Lederer, Versailles Settlement, p. 63.
111 Z.S. Steiner, The Lights That Failed, Oxford, 2005, p. 67. The deficiencies of some school history textbooks on the causes, final months and consequences of The Great War need to be highlighted particularly as the centenaries of 1914, 1918 and 1919 will soon be upon us. The sympathetic treatment given to the Kaiserreich’s militarism can beggar belief, as in one statement that “The German Army remained undefeated, but its government had no alternative to surrender.” See Heinemann, Understanding History 3, London, 1993, p. 32. The truth is that the German Army’s High Command asked the United States for a Pre-Armistice Agreement in October 1918.
112 MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 479.
113 Ibid.