Positioning Daniel Defoe’s Non-Fiction
Positioning Daniel Defoe’s Non-Fiction:
Form, Function, Genre

Edited by

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The success of the author Daniel Defoe was, if we believe a significant number of twentieth-century critical appreciations of his work, more or less accidental. There has perhaps been near universal agreement that Defoe was able to produce effective political propaganda, in prose and verse, and that he had an almost uncanny talent for mimicking the voices of others, but, with regard to his more artistic creations, or what one may call “literature,” scholars of the previous century have found Defoe distinctly lacking. Although he has enjoyed the status of “the first true novelist” for some time and variously been considered a “master of plain prose and powerful narrative,” Defoe’s works have received more critical assessments. Ian Watt, for example, saw an “inordinate number of cracks” in texts such as Robinson Crusoe and Moll Flanders, and expressed his “doubts about the completeness of Defoe’s control over his narrative.” Almost three decades later, the notion of Defoe’s lack of control over his pen persists in Michael Boardman’s assertion that Defoe “does not fully understand at all times what he is doing,” and it reappears in recent surveys of the English novel, such as Terry Eagleton’s, in which readers learn that the narrative of Defoe’s Moll Flanders “tumbles forward,” while “two quite different literary forms”—the adventure story and the spiritual autobiography— “rub shoulders somewhat incongruously” in Robinson Crusoe. Gabrielle Starr’s contention that Defoe was neither “overly concerned with maintaining the boundaries of genre,” nor “primarily concerned with pushing those boundaries, either,” neatly reflects the general critical view of Defoe’s lack of interest in and, indeed, inability consciously to control the formal aspects of his work, even if this work represents some sort of major literary achievement. And, if we believe Irving Rothman, neither did Defoe want to pay attention to this dimension of his work: with reference to The

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Family Instructor, Rothman speaks of Defoe’s “characteristic indifference to
details of structure and form.”

There have, of course, been critical accounts that offer a more positive view
of the matters of form, structure, and genre in Defoe’s writings, most notably
perhaps John Richetti’s Defoe’s Narratives: Situations and Structures (1975) and
his more recent essay “Defoe as narrative innovator” (2008), but, as the above
examples demonstrate, doubts concerning Defoe’s control over his texts, over his
ability consciously to construct texts that adhere to established generic parameters,
persist in recent scholarship. It is important to note that the heterogeneous—per-
haps, more aptly, heterogeneric—nature of Defoe’s prose problematised by schol-
ars should not be seen in isolation from our author’s writing practice: Defoe, as
is well known, was an occasional writer. He wrote because he needed money,
he wrote because he felt compelled to comment on a particular event, and he
wrote when he felt the moment had come for a particular type of publication.
One consequence of this occasionality is that a significant proportion of Defoe’s
work was written relatively quickly and without a process of revision. In the 1716
preface to one of his most successful publications, The True-Born Englishman,
Defoe makes a revealing comment concerning his reluctance to revise his work:
“I had long ago design’d to have made such Additions to, and Corrections in, this
Piece,” he explained, ‘But I always put off that good Purpose of mine, either thro’ an
unjustifiable Indolence, or from the want of a proper Season for its second Appear-
cance.” “Too busy” or “too lazy” were thus Defoe’s excuses for not publishing
more polished works, and by making statements of this kind he perhaps actively
invited negative critical assessments of his writing style and authorial competence.
However, what Defoe’s own words and modern critical views of his work obscure
is that form and style did, in fact, represent matters of significant importance to
him.

A survey of Defoe’s oeuvre demonstrates that he wrote in a wide range of
genres and modes: different verse forms; prose pamphlets; journalistic essays;
extended first-person narratives; conduct manuals; panegyric; and satire. Even
drama appealed to the puritan Defoe at one point. In the preface to the second
dition of his commercially successful conduct book The Family Instructor he writes:

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6 Irving Rothman, “Defoe’s The Family Instructor: A Response to the Schism Act,”
7 John Richetti, “Defoe as narrative innovator,” in The Cambridge Companion to Daniel
8 Daniel Defoe, The True-Born Englishman: a satyr. Corrected and enlarg’d by the author
“Preface by the Author.”
The whole Work being design'd both to divert and instruct, the Author had endeavoured to adapt it as much as possible to both those Uses, from whence some have call'd it a Religious Play. It would more have answer'd that Title, had the Author's first Design been pursued, which was to have made it a Drammatick Poem; But the Subject was too solemn, and the Text too copious, to suffer the Restraint on one Hand, or the Excursions on the other, which the Decoration of a Poem would have made necessary.\(^9\)

What Defoe's comments suggest is an acute awareness of the importance of form with regard to the occasion to which he was responding and the context within which his text was to appear. The right kind of writing, writing that was acutely topical and captured the mood of the moment, could and did generate significant interest, winning him a wide readership on many occasions. Indeed, it is not too much to say that Defoe's "fame" rested on his ability to appeal to a broad readership through his often shrewd judgments concerning the most suitable dress for his words at a given moment. The result of Defoe's preoccupation with form and genre is, as J. Paul Hunter has put it, "an astonishing series of personations, genre-invasions, genre-modifications, genre-takeovers, mixed generic addresses, disguises, cross-dressings, and genre-inventions."\(^{10}\)

The present volume offers investigations of the ways in which Defoe engaged with and responded to some of the dominant political, religious, social, economic, and geographical discourses of the period. While the essays naturally consider and analyse what Defoe said in a selection of his non-fictional works, a key focus of the discussions is how Defoe said these things. In order to situate Defoe's publications meaningfully in their relevant contexts, the authors of the essays have adopted a broadly historicist approach to questions of form, function and genre. The collection is divided into three sections, the first of which specifically explores the rhetorical strategies Defoe employed in his non-fiction. Glynis Ridley's chapter thus considers Defoe's best-known pamphlet, *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters*, in relation to classical rhetorical structures. Ridley demonstrates that Defoe's method of argumentation derived from the ancient tradition of the *chria*, a technique Defoe learned during his time at Morton's Academy. A careful analysis of the pamphlet shows a Defoe who was able to employ classical rhetorical models with great accuracy and efficacy in


his writing, an aspect of his work that was lost on the majority, if not all, of contemporary readers of *The Shortest Way* and, indeed, one that has been largely neglected by modern scholars. Alongside Ridley’s essay, but focusing on matters of rhetoric in a more localised fashion, Penny Pritchard’s chapter explores Defoe’s use of two specific rhetorical devices, *apophasia* and *paralipsis*, and finds that the manner in which the devices are employed in Defoe’s pre-1719 writings on Dissent signals his lifelong immersion in nonconformist rhetoric, while simultaneously revealing how the authorial voice of the texts seeks to distance itself from certain divisive elements of contemporary Nonconformity and ministerial discourse. The section is concluded by Sharon Alker and Holly Faith Nelson’s discussion of Defoe’s use of tropes, in particular figures of embodiment, in his publications on the Anglo-Scottish Union. Their analysis reveals two distinct contexts in which Defoe drew on the image of the body to reflect on the Union: in his more measured and carefully constructed propagandistic commentary on the matter Defoe employed organic tropes to convey Union, while his invectives against anti-Unionists exhibit an excess of less rationally constructed tropes of the body. Ultimately Alker and Nelson’s chapter demonstrates Defoe’s acute awareness of the power of symbolic representation.

The second section of the collection focuses on two elemental aspects in Defoe’s non-fictional narratives, namely time and place. Defoe’s *Tour Through the island of Great Britain* is surveyed in two of the essays. Pat Rogers analyses Defoe’s use of paratextual formal devices in order to reveal how the *Tour*’s three volumes create a textual version of reality. Rogers’s exploration bring to the fore the element of circularity that forms a central element of the rhetorical design of the book. The use of textual augmentations, such as diagrams and tables, and embedded forms, such as citations from existing sources, reveal another example of Defoe’s creativity in formatting new textual practices. Ben Pauley, on the other hand, takes a detailed look at the *Tour*’s representation of London, which figures as Defoe’s supreme centre of the country’s trade, political power, and culture in the text. Pauley’s essay exposes how Defoe’s depiction of London is simultaneously a coming to terms with the city’s unsettling heterogeneity and an act of envisioning a future state of perfection for the metropolis. Pauley demonstrates that Defoe’s skill as a writer becomes most apparent in his positioning the reader in ways that provide the “right” perspective of the city and its buildings, a future perspective that Defoe has already fully formed in his mind. The final essay in this section shifts our attention from place to the various conceptions of time that appear implicitly in Defoe’s writings on the great storm of 1703. Aino Mäkilä’s essay explores the question of why Defoe needed three different genres of writing—a pamphlet, a history and a poem—in order to write “enough” about this natural disaster. What were their functions? To answer these
questions Mäkikalli draws on both Christian and secular ideas of time as important contexts for Defoe’s publications on the storm and highlights the temporal similarities and dissimilarities between Defoe’s fictional and non-fictional texts.

The final section of the collection deals with the genre of the conduct book, broadly defined, and the manner in which Defoe used this genre to his purposes. Andreas Mueller’s chapter reads the first volume of Defoe’s *The Family Instructor* (1715) in the context of the Jacobite unrests of the period and suggests that the book was aimed at, in part at least, a specific group of rioters and their masters. Mueller’s analysis demonstrates that Defoe’s generic choice of the conduct book was guided by his intended target readerships and that, in addition, Defoe undertook important modifications of established generic features in order to increase the rhetorical efficacy of his text. Rebecca Anne Barr discusses the relationship between gender and genre in her essay on *The Complete English Tradesman*. Barr’s essay emphasizes the formal heterogeneity of the work but focuses on its function as a conduct book for men. Barr shows how the subjectivity of the “complete tradesman” is constructed of both contemporary masculine and feminine ideals. Evert Jan van Leeuwen’s essay concerns itself with one of Defoe’s later texts, *An Essay on the History and Reality of Apparitions*, which explores forms of conduct in a broader sense. Van Leeuwen studies the way Defoe imagined the spirit world with a specific focus on the ways in which Defoe adapted the generic conventions of the apparition narrative. The chapter’s final analysis suggests that Defoe’s rewriting of the apparition narrative anticipates the sublime aesthetic associated with the Romantic era.

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to several people and institutions that have supported us managing through this project. We are grateful for Paul K. Alkon and Beyazit Akman for co-operation and patience with the project. We also wish to thank Christine A. Retz and Alexandru Diaconescu for proofreading and copyediting the manuscript. The University of Worcester and the Academy of Finland project “Literature and Time: Time, Modernity, and Human Agency in Literature” (AF 133834) supported us financially, for which we are sincerely grateful.

Andreas K. E. Mueller and Aino Mäkikalli
Worcester
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Part I

Rhetorical Strategies
CHAPTER ONE

A GOOD ARGUMENT: CICERONIAN PRESCRIPTIONS, PAMPHLET LITERATURE AND THE SHORTEST WAY WITH THE DISSENTERS

GLYNIS RIDLEY

When a warrant for Defoe’s arrest was issued following the first publication of The Shortest Way with the Dissenters (1702), a number of pamphlets and sermons were suggested as wholly innocuous models, and targets, for the satire. In his own defence, Defoe published A Brief Explanation of a Late Pamphlet entitled The Shortest Way with the Dissenters (1703), directing readers to works by his contemporaries, such as Charles Leslie’s The New Association (1702), the tenuous implication being that as Defoe’s antecedents in this branch of the pamphlet wars had failed to generate much controversy beyond the usual partisan outrage, so The Shortest Way was at once less original and less provocative than it first appeared. Defoe’s defensive finger-pointing at Leslie’s work has, undeniably, been of benefit to Defoe scholars who have elevated Leslie’s pamphlet above the mass of contemporary texts dealing with occasional conformity; cataloguing the many instances where the satire of The Shortest Way echoes the venom of The New Association word-for-word. And just as Leslie’s text is cited as a partial explanation of what preceded The Shortest Way, so Swift’s A Modest Proposal (1729) is regularly offered up as a logical successor to The Shortest Way: as though the twenty-seven-year gap between the two in some way marked increasing sophistication on the part of satire writers and their readers. Where Defoe’s pamphlet secured its author a symbolic rendezvous with the hangman, Swift’s proposal led straight to the modern course anthology as a textbook example of the satirist’s art.

Summing up the critical history of pairing The Shortest Way with A Modest Proposal, DeLuna crystallises the question thrown into relief by such a strategy: “is a work ironical if it employs a reductio ad absurdum strategy that would not have been clearly recognized as such by its original audience?”1 With Leslie’s

New Association seen as a source for its language, and Swift’s Modest Proposal frequently preferred as the best illustration of the rhetorical strategies of early eighteenth-century pamphlet satire, discussion of the language and form of The Shortest Way rarely pauses to consider whether Defoe, Leslie, and other pamphleteers are not all indebted to literary contexts and rhetorical strategies beyond those occasioned by the conditions of the first decade of the eighteenth century. As Richetti says:

if one consults the new Owens and Furbank edition of all of Defoe’s works now in progress and reads the introductions to the volumes containing these writings, one will find scrupulous historical discussions and annotations that fill in the background of Defoe’s religious and political tracts. What is missing in the excellent introductions… is some attempt to explore the rhetorical textures and strategies of those writings and to say why at least some of Defoe’s early works should continue to be read by non-specialists.²

Examining the classroom exercises undertaken by Defoe at Charles Morton’s Newington Green Academy, and that Morton subsequently recommended in his printed works, the paper will show how these rhetorical exercises influenced Defoe’s views of the form of didactic pamphlet literature. Recognising that any discussion of the efficacy of classical rhetorical maxims in Defoe’s work must account for the furore surrounding the publication of The Shortest Way, the paper will engage in a detailed reading of this infamous satire, showing its indebtedness—in both form and function—to the schoolboy exercises undertaken by Defoe in Morton's classroom. Leslie’s New Association may have suggested words and images to Defoe that were included in The Shortest Way, but Ciceronian rhetoric provides a structural template that ultimately determines the shape of the text. And to address Richetti’s call for an exploration of the rhetorical strategies of Defoe’s most infamous satire is to begin to explain why it—and the pamphlet literature of which it is representative—matters to the general reader. They are superb examples of argumentative strategies good and bad and from which orators in a variety of arenas, past and present, can continue to learn.

To know what an author was made to study is, of course, not necessarily an aid to studying that author’s work. School and university syllabi may allow us to make confident assertions about a writer’s exposure to certain texts but, on their own, they can tell us nothing about the young author’s responsiveness to what was read. As unexceptionable principles, such general observations

need to be made with the proviso that, in specific cases, an author may insist upon the importance of his early studies to his later habits of thought and composition. Certainly Defoe never refers to his time at Newington Green in anything other than laudatory terms. On a superficial level, the Dissenting academy attended by Defoe appears to be typical of the majority of academies at the time, in that it was a one-man enterprise in which the interests and abilities of a single schoolmaster shaped every aspect of the academic experience. Yet when the fourteen-year-old Defoe entered Newington Green in 1674, his schoolmaster was already something more than a typical academician. Increase Mather’s subsequent invitation to Charles Morton to assume the presidency of Harvard was made on the basis of Morton’s international scholarly reputation, the justification for which is best demonstrated in Morton’s two most sustained prose works, *A System of Logick* (1692) and *The Spirit of Man* (1693). That these works are never mentioned in relation to Defoe’s own writing is surprising, given that many of the directions they contain for choosing the subject of an argument and structuring its stages are so clearly elaborations upon the lesson plans delivered at Newington Green, as will be apparent in consideration of what is known of the syllabus there.

As a theological student Defoe spent five years at Morton’s academy, in contrast to a lay student’s duration of three years. The ambitious curriculum paralleled that of the universities: instruction in the medieval trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, leading to study of the quadrivium, comprising arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music, though the quadrivium was reserved for more advanced students. Among the subjects of the trivium, rhetoric was the most important, for grammar and logic were taught through consideration of examples of classical rhetoric, rather than in abstract isolation. Defined by Aristotle as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion,” rhetoric occupied a central place in the school curriculum (and therefore the education of all literate men) in the classical world and derivative western traditions: the hallowed trivium dominating school and university syllabi from the ages of eight to eighteen, from 500 BC to 1800 AD; the same Latin and Greek authors providing models down the centuries for speech-making exercises in both classical and vernacular languages.

Expanding upon the benefits to be derived from such study in his *Spirit of Man* (1693), Morton sees the importance of rhetoric in its promotion of “Fairness

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and Confidence of Address,” especially useful to the storyteller who might wish
to put across an unpalatable truth to his audience:

Romance & parables, or fables, that have no truth in the matter, but Morall
honesty in the Design; As also Enlargement of stories by variety of phrases, &
manner of expression, (Provided they are no part of a testimony) are noe Lyes,
but Ingenuous Poesie (In the proper Notion, distinct from the art of versifying,
or poetry) or handsome Oratory, The better to Inculcate the virtue, or expose
the vice they Designe to represent: and are of singular Use in all Discourses.⁵

In Morton’s view, fiction is not a “lye” when it promotes virtue and exposes
vice, nor is rhetoric an unnecessary ornamentation if it blackens vice and gilds
virtue. (The significance of this distinction between truth and falsehood for
understanding the claims of Defoe’s fictions to be “true Histories” cannot be
overstated.) Hand-in-hand, rhetoric and prose fiction work to represent our
better and worse natures to us in heightened form. That students at Newington
Green were encouraged to test the values of these precepts for themselves is
evident in the amount of time devoted to “practical oratory” at the academy.
Saturday and two weekday mornings were set aside for disputes on philosophical
topics; remaining mornings were devoted to debating theological, historical, and
scientific controversies. Morton’s students “weighed, considered, and argued
endlessly. In addition to wide reading and rhetorical skills came habits of thought
that marked Defoe’s personality as strongly as his personal faith.”⁶

It is not surprising that much of the rhetorical dispute at Newington Green
had a casuistical bent. As a minister in charge of educating future generations
of Dissenters, Morton wisely enabled his pupils to conduct well-structured
arguments showing the virtue of listening to one’s conscience in a specific
instance, as opposed to the dictates of a law designed for the many in general
circumstances.⁷ Morton’s own works abound with the principles of rhetoric
serving casuistical ends. For example, The Spirit of Man is divided into sections
marked “Text Opened,” “Expositors Differ,” “The most proper Interpretation,”
“Constitution of our Spirit,” “Types of spirits,” and “Inference,” the latter paying
close attention to the conflicting impulses operating upon men’s consciences

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in the course of any serious decision-making process. In *A System of Logick* (1692), Morton offers an exhaustive explanation of how the differences of opinion acknowledged to exist in *The Spirit of Man* might be presented to an audience in the hope of persuading everyone of the same point of view. Morton’s solution involves representing potentially contentious material three different times and in three different ways: “(1) that you may have a more General notion (2) that you may distinctly Judge of it (3) that you may reclaim it.” The advantages and disadvantages of adhering to any given course of action are therefore fully canvassed and the debater assured that he has ultimately made the right decision cognizant with private morals and public law. This exercise is not original to Morton, for it is modelled on the *chria* or “refining of a theme,” as explained in that standard handbook of elementary rhetoric, the *Ad Herennium* (IV. xliii – xlv 57): a text believed in the eighteenth century to represent the distillation of Cicero’s rhetorical wisdom but now thought unlikely to be by him. Whatever the origins of the pseudo-Ciceronian *Ad Herennium*, its Western influence from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century is incalculable. As a rhetorical treatise, its appearance in school and university curricula and its citation by writers and artists is rivalled only by Aristotle’s *Poetics*, Cicero’s *De Oratore*, and Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoriae*.

In classical rhetorical manuals, the *chria* is one of a number of standard models for structuring an argument, the models collectively being known as the *progymnasmata*. Whether the medieval scholar wished to appeal to a benefactor for more money, or the Renaissance burgher hoped to bring a private prosecution at his local assizes, the *progymnasmata* laid out templates for the best rhetorical strategies to be employed in each case. Like all models, some will prove more useful—and adaptable—than others and will continue to be a source of inspiration for successive generations. The classical model of the *chria* was particularly liked and well developed by Humanist rhetoricians, perhaps because it suggested an argumentative structure as suitable for a paragraph as a pamphlet or an even more extended treatment. And what is true of humanist schooling applies also to the late seventeenth century and Morton’s Newington Green Academy.

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10 [Cicero], *Ad Herennium* trans. H. Caplan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). All subsequent references to the *Ad Herennium* are to this edition and are given parenthetically in the text.
According to the *Ad Herennium* (which a modern editor suggests contains “our oldest extant illustration of a *chria*”) the *chria* is a treatment of a theme in eight parts: (1) statement of theme, (2) reasons, (3) restatement, (4) reasons, (5) argument from contrary, (6) argument from comparison, (7) argument from example, (8) authority. At its centre lies a series of three comparisons that are successively negative (the argument from contrary), positive (the argument from comparison), and positive exemplary (the argument from example). A favourite exercise of schoolmasters from the Renaissance until the nineteenth century, a demonstrated mastery of *chriaic* argument was regarded as a milestone in a student’s progress, indicative of flexibility of thought, a wide knowledge base (from which to choose examples) and the ability to anticipate an opponent’s line of argument. The *chria* that provides the culmination of the *Ad Herennium* is worth quoting in extract in order to appreciate the structure of its argument, drilled into generations of pre-twentieth-century schoolboys across the West. In the context of discussion of *The Shortest Way*, it is also a *chria* that, intriguingly, canvasses the merits of sacrificing an individual—or group of individuals—for the good of the state.

The unidentified speaker of the *Ad Herennium* insists that he wishes to demonstrate how “a simple idea is developed in a multiple manner.” His “simple idea,” or chriaic statement of theme, is that “the wise man will, on the republic’s behalf, shun no peril… since it is from our country that we receive all our advantages, no disadvantage incurred on her behalf is to be regarded as severe” (*Ad Herennium* IV. xliv. 57). The reason that is first advanced in support of the theme is that those who flee from a difficult situation “act foolishly, for they cannot avoid the disadvantages, and are found guilty of ingratitude towards the state.” The third element of the *chria* occurs immediately in the restatement of the theme: “they who, with peril to themselves, confront the perils of the fatherland, are to be considered wise, since they render to their country the homage due her, and prefer to die for many of their fellow citizens instead of with them.” This restatement is followed by its own reasons (the fourth part of the *chria*): “for it is extremely unjust to give back to nature, when she compels, the life you have received from nature, and not to give to your country, when she calls for it, the life you have preserved thanks to your country.” This is succeeded by an argument from contrary (the fifth element of the *chria*) regarding “he who in a voyage prefers his own to his vessel’s security” and “he who in a crisis of

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the republic consults his own preference to the common safety”; hypothetical
individuals who are thought deserving of “contempt” since (according to the
sixth element of the chria, the argument from comparison), “from the wreck
of a ship many of those on board escape unharmed, but from the wreck of
the fatherland no one can swim to safety.” In the seventh part of the chria, an
argument from example is advanced, citing “Decius,” who “in order to save his
legions... plunged into the midst of the enemy.” (The story of Decius who, in
295 BCE. at Sentinum drew the fury of the Samnites away from the ultimately
victorious Romans was a perennial favourite Roman example of patriotism.)
Finally, in the eighth part of the chria, the speaker claims the authority of “reason”
and “illustration” to reiterate that as it is “fitting to confront danger in defence
of the republic, they are to be esteemed wise who do not shrink from any peril
when the security of the fatherland is at stake.”

In the context of the Ad Herennium (and doubtless of generations of school
lesson plans built around analysis of this culminating passage), it is clear that
the structure of the chria (statement of theme, reasons, restatement, reasons,
argument from contrary, argument from comparison, argument from example
and authority) lays a foundation upon which the particular structure of the
argument is built. Whether each element of the chria is allotted a sentence or
several pages, provided that all elements are given equal weight, the resulting
argument will be wide-ranging, nuanced, alert to opposing points of view and
able to counter them. As a student at Newington Green, Defoe was trained to
extemporise upon themes ancient and modern, elaborating a starting premise
into a fully developed chria. Like all of Morton’s pupils—indeed, like all good
students of rhetoric—an individual’s belief in the theme being advanced was
irrelevant: the demonstration of rhetorical skill was paramount.

It is in the nature of the rhetor’s art, however, that it will not always be
confined to mere exercises. The care that Charles Morton took in educating
his pupils recognised that they would one day exchange the classroom for an
infinitely more dangerous religious and political arena. Against such a rhetorical
background, Defoe’s authorship of The Shortest Way with the Dissenters (1702) is
intriguing, for if Defoe’s education had taught him to use language as a weapon
in the service of the Dissenters, it would be surprising if Defoe did not recognise
the power of his own polemic. Ventriloquizing sentiments that could have
come straight from the pen of High Church rabble-rousers such as Charles
Leslie or Henry Sacheverell, The Shortest Way, taken literally, is an incitement to

13 Daniel Defoe, The Shortest Way with the Dissenters: Or Proposals for the Establishment
of the Church (London, 1702). All page references are to this first edition and are given
parenthetically in the text.
sectarian violence sanctioned by the state. The enduring question about Defoe’s pamphlet is how anyone could take it seriously. Unable to account for Defoe’s apparent failure to judge the mood of his audience, critics have been known to turn Defoe’s commercial bravado into a risk-taking addiction. As Richetti points out, “Novak argues that given his risky behavior as a businessman Defoe must have realized (‘somewhere in the back of his mind’) the dangers in such ventriloquism, and he speculates that Defoe’s gambler’s instincts led him so that he ‘could not resist the perverse pleasure of approaching the edge of an abyss’.” It would seem that any argument for rhetorical manipulation of the reader in The Shortest Way with the Dissenters must explain its backfiring on the author either by showing that Defoe did not understand the nature of his own rhetoric, or by speculating that Defoe anticipated an outcry but was unable to resist the lure of notoriety. A third possibility is here suggested: that Defoe was a better student of classical rhetoric than the majority of his contemporaries who, had they paid more attention in the classroom, would have recognised that The Shortest Way represents an eighteenth-century re-working of the culminating chria of the Ad Herennium.

Immediately preceding the Ad Herennium’s demonstration of the structure of the chria, the author insists upon an orator’s ability to change the meaning of his words according to the manner of his delivery:

Our changes will reside in the delivery if now in the tone of conversation, now in an energetic tone, and now in variation after variation of voice and gesture, repeating the same ideas in different words, we also change the delivery quite strikingly. This cannot be described with complete effectiveness, and yet it is clear enough. Hence there is no need of illustration. (IV. xlii. 54)

At this stage in the Ad Herennium, the speaker assumes his audience will agree that delivery is all. The pitch of the voice, decisiveness of tone, and the nature of any accompanying gestures or facial expressions will finally determine how an audience understands a speaker’s words. In this instance, the ability to detect satire resides not in what is said but in visualising the way it might be said. And it is possible to imagine The Shortest Way being articulated in two different ways: one classical rhetorical chria sustaining two opposing readings. For purposes of clarity in the succeeding analysis, the rhetorical venom that Defoe seeks to satirise will be attributed to a High Church speaker (given Defoe’s insistence that he had written “a Banter upon the High-flying Church-Men”). A High

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Church reading of the pamphlet will be followed by an analysis predicated on the same text being delivered by a Dissenter.

*The Shortest Way* opens with a story from Aesop’s *Fables* about a cockerel that, for want of a perch, is forced onto a stable floor. Fearing that the lack of an elevated position will cause him to be trampled underfoot, he implores those around him, “Pray Gentlemens let us stand still, for fear we should tread upon one another” (1). But, in context, Defoe has framed the cockerel’s utterance—and hence our understanding of it—by referring us not to Aesop’s *Fables* but to Sir Roger L’Estrange’s *Fables*. A noted translator of Graeco-Roman classics who had indeed produced an edition of Aesop’s works in 1692, L’Estrange was also a notorious opponent of toleration and a controversial pamphleteer. The frame narrative should therefore alert us to the fact that words can be appropriated by speakers with a variety of intentions. When taken out of context and attributed to a wise and moralising Aesop, the cockerel’s words are an eminently reasonable plea for toleration. But when we are told that the words are to be attributed to L’Estrange, we are surely invited to hear those same words in a different way: we are invited to supply the context that imagines L’Estrange spitting out his barely disguised contempt for any plea for toleration. The words of the fable do not change: our understanding changes as we attribute those words to one speaker as opposed to another.

If there is a single sentence in *The Shortest Way* that could be said to encapsulate the High Church speaker’s theme (the first part of the *chria*), it is surely this:

No Gentlemen, the Time of Mercy is past, your Day of Grace is over; you shou’d have practised Peace, and Moderation, and Charity, if you expected any your selves (3).

Having insisted that the Dissenters should have practised toleration in order to obtain it from King and Parliament, the speaker lays out his (spurious) reason (the second part of the *chria*) for advancing such a position:

to execute the known Laws of a Nation upon those who transgress them, after having first been voluntarily consenting to the making those [sic] Laws, can never be call’d Persecution, but Justice (5).

The Dissenters are accused of failing to exercise power with justice when in a position to do so. The High Church speaker therefore insists that the Dissenters cannot expect that the law should, in turn, protect them. This theme is re-stated and re-proposed in yet more divisive language when James I’s toleration of Dissenters is held to be the fatal spark igniting Civil War under his son:
Had he given them strict Justice, he had clear’d the Nation of them, and the Consequences had been plain; his Son had never been murther’d by them… they have once requited us with a civil War, and once with an intolerable and unrighteous Persecution for our former Civility (6).

The Charles I represented here is the Christlike Charles of the *Eikon Basilike* (1649): the son murdered by lesser children of the father. In this restatement of the theme that the Dissenters should expect no mercy because showing none to King or country, the High Church speaker has grown increasingly vitriolic, seeking to manoeuvre his audience into an acceptance of the Dissenters’ treason, the punishment for which was death. Following a classic *chriaic* structure, the speaker now pauses to consider the contrary position. Charles II showed forgiveness to all “except the barbarous Regicides of the pretended Court of Justice” (7) and enjoyed a fruitful reign. Surely, the argument from contrary implies, the present age could follow this example? Yet this is immediately countered by a reminder of the Rye House plot (8) and the history of the Stuart line; inviting the audience to consider the instability of a throne resting on factious ground.

An argument from comparison is next advanced as the unsatisfactory nature of toleration under William III is reviewed. “How pitifully they Manag’d” (9) is put forward as a reason for not following William’s policies. Finally the speaker proposes an argument from example. The Scottish and English states are compared in their reaction to Dissenting opposition. This time the argument is rejected with even greater invective, claiming that toleration will lead to the persecution of Church of Scotland clergy and a resurgence of Scottish nationalism which will culminate in the Scots choosing “a King for themselves.” Dissenting ministers here join by implication with ghosts of the Auld Alliance to place an assortment of Dissenters and Pretenders to the throne at the doors of the English court. The final stage of *chriaic* argument, from authority, takes the form of a series of national, legal, religious, and Classical precedents, rehearsing the history of Huguenot persecution in France; religious persecution under the act *De Heretico Comburendo*; Cato’s insistence that Carthage be destroyed; and the massacre of Israelites fallen into idolatry under Moses (18). The image of Christ crucified, first introduced in describing Charles I, is recalled in the closing passage in which the Church of England is seen crucified between the “two Thieves” of “Popery” and “Schismaticks” (29). The rhetorical organisation of the speaker’s argument is flawless yet, intriguingly, any comprehensive reading of the text is flawed that does not recognise an alternative series of possibilities working throughout.

Returning to the pamphlet’s statement of theme, it is apparent that the High Church speaker has a selective memory for recent history:
No Gentlemen, the Time of Mercy is past, your Day of Grace is over; you shou'd have practised Peace, and Moderation, and Charity, if you expected any your selves (3).

It is true that the Declarations of Indulgence of 1672 and 1687 led to much heart searching among Dissenting groups, regarding the legitimacy of a royal prerogative extending toleration to Catholics as well as Dissenters, but “peace” was never threatened in the process. The High Church speaker is a poor student of recent history. Indeed, the whole thrust of the pamphlet could be interpreted as recommending a consideration of historical precedent and history is shown to be cyclical: the persecutors in time become the persecuted; the tolerant not tolerated on their own terms. In such a context the advice to practise “peace,” “moderation,” and “charity” is a timely one, alone capable of breaking such a vicious cycle. The reason supporting a plea for Christian toleration is to be found in a sentence capable of sustaining two diametrically opposed readings: “and now the Tables are turn'd upon you, you must not be Persecuted, 'tis not a Christian Spirit” (4). This can of course be read as a sarcastic snarl in the mouth of a High Church speaker (one of the variations of “voice and gesture” that the Ad Herennium thought so obvious that it required no elaboration), or it can be viewed as a genuine plea for religious toleration: the latter reading being the only one that acknowledges the full implications of a religious imperative to forgiveness. Confirmation that the latter interpretation is part of a pattern is found in the restatement and reason of the original theme that the quality of mercy is never strained:

now to execute the known Laws of a Nation upon those who transgress them, after having first been voluntarily consenting to the making those Laws, can never be call’d Persecution, but Justice. But Justice is always Violence to the Party offending, for every Man is innocent in his own Eyes (5).

The last sentence condemns all persecutors and behooves all representatives of the Law to consider the rights of those that they persecute under the law of common humanity. If one man’s justice is always another’s violence, the ideally just settlement does not exist and the assurance of justice upon which the first sentence comes to rest can only ever be a sham, perfectly capable of being called “persecution” by those who find themselves unable to comply with the law’s demands. Try as the High Church speaker might to use emotive imagery (the crucified Christ prefiguring the martyred Charles I), the language of the text sustains this more subtle plea for tolerance precisely because the only “crime” of which the majority of Dissenters are guilty is one of intellection: “what
Account can you give of the Multitudes you have forc’d to comply, against their Consciences, with your new sophistical Politicks, who like the new Converts in France, Sin because they can’t Starve” (4). The question, when taken seriously, traps the zealot at every turn.

Arguments from contrary, comparison, and example are then advanced. The argument from contrary shows the danger of embracing toleration in describing the Dissenters’ base treatement of Church of England clergy: “just such Measure as they have mete, shou’d be measur’d to them again” (7). Within the confines of the text (let alone outside it) such a view only imprisons one in the cycle of violence and retribution detailed through an examination of the reigns of the Stuart kings. The argument from comparison reminds the reader of stability under Charles II who “came in all Mercy and Love” (8). In such a reading the reference to the Rye House plot becomes an intricate rhetorical question. The response to the challenge “how did they requite [Charles II] with the villainous Contrivance to Depose and Murther him” (8), is that Dissenting groups were certainly not behind the supposed plot. The “Council of Six” subsequently arraigned for Charles II’s attempted murder (Essex, Hampton, Howard, Monmouth, Russell, and Sidney) were alleged to have wished to replace Charles with James II’s youngest daughter, the Princess Anne, revealed in the text to be opposed to the Dissenters’ cause. The argument from example is the same as that used by the High Church speaker: the experience of toleration in Scotland, but whereas the High Church speaker insists upon the failure of the Scots’ experiment, the counter reading again points to the value of mercy:

Pray how much Mercy and favour did the Members of the Episcopal Church find in Scotland, from the Scotch Presbyterian-Government; and I shall undertake for the Church of England, that the Dissenters shall still receive as much here, tho’ they deserve but little (10).

In this sentence, questions of desert and justice become complex value judgements. The final image invoked is, after all, Christ on the Cross: an image which both the Dissenters and their High Church opponents believe to be emblematic of wrongful persecution and death. The image which the High Churchman uses to fan the flames of mob insurrection is an image that is also capable of evoking the spirit of forgiveness. The final plea is for the “Friends of Truth” to root out “the Posterity of the Sons of Error” (29). Where the High Church speaker sees himself on the side of truth, those opposed to him see him as part of the problem in an assembly of fools and religious hypocrites. To imagine the rhetoric of The Shortest Way spewing from the mouth of a High Churchman is to take the text as an incitement to massacre the Dissenters: to envisage the
same rhetoric coming from a satiric Dissenter is to understand the pamphlet as a plea for mercy. And to understand that both arguments depend upon a classical *chria* for their fundamental structure is to be reminded of the *Ad Herennium’s* insistence that the argument underpinned by a *chria* may be manipulated by an orator’s delivery, if a speech is delivered “now in the tone of conversation, now in an energetic tone.” Even as the energy of the imagined High Church speaker mounts to hysteria, the rhetoric of the pamphlet sustains a reading in opposition to his sarcasm: a reading in which a Dissenter engages us in a conversational, rational tone and pleads for toleration.

That Charles Morton should have taught Defoe to organise arguments in such a fashion is consistent with all that is at present known about rhetoric and the art of preaching. Indeed, the history of sacred oratory is one of the loss and re-discovery of the methods of classical rhetoric: instruction in rhetoric becoming a basic requirement in the training of preachers after the Reformation, according to the express direction of Martin Luther himself. And so, when Novak suggests that “Defoe, who considered himself a connoisseur of sermon style, may have taken hints from [Samuel] Annesley,” the observation begs the question whether the arguments of Annesley’s *Casuistical Morning Exercises* (1690) do not themselves “take hints” from classical rhetorical manuals? (Comprising examples of sermons delivered at Annesley’s church of St Giles Cripplegate, the text presents its readers with a series of textbook demonstrations of classical rhetorical strategies, including the *chria*.) For generations of preachers, Luther’s recognition of the usefulness of the rhetor’s art was perhaps nowhere more welcome than in classical prescriptions regarding the ability to move a congregation to action. Indeed, classical rhetorical theory abounds in suggestions for how to manipulate the emotions of a crowd (the doctrine of *movere*). The means by which a disparate group of hearers may be brought to respond as one and to continue responding with increasing intensity is known in rhetorical theory as *amplificatio*. Cicero viewed the various techniques of *amplificatio* as existing on a continuum: the power of the speaker or writer only rarely in danger of causing a reaction that could not be managed, for “there is no limit to the power of an oration to exalt a subject or render it contemptible.” As Vickers insists, “the orator who is fully able to master his audience’s feelings can move them in any direction, arouse any emotion, achieve any goal he wishes. Of all the topics in the *laus eloquentiae* this was the one that most fascinated Cicero, and

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most affected the Renaissance, the promise of absolute power over the audience’s mind and feelings.”17 As the preceding analysis of The Shortest Way suggests, it should properly be imagined as the product of not one orator, but two. And as Cicero suggests before his demonstration of the usefulness of the *chria* in the *Ad Herennium*, we all understand how it is possible to “change the delivery quite strikingly” so that a single speech may be imagined in two different ways: the same text being articulated by both a rabid High Churchman and a sarcastic Dissenter, or by Sir Roger L’Estrange and Aesop. Throughout, the text remains unchanged: the audience’s response dependent upon their understanding of context.

The 2008 United States presidential campaign provides a useful coda to this argument, for on 21 July 2008, *The New Yorker* magazine found itself at the centre of an American media uproar when its cover art depicted Senator Barack Obama of Illinois (then still a challenger for the Democratic nomination), standing in the Oval Office in stereotypically conceived male Arab dress, fist-bumping his machine-gun-toting wife, Michelle. An American flag burned on the grate behind them. Despite editorial claims that the intention had been to satirize persistent yet erroneous rumours to the effect that Senator Obama was a Muslim, Howard Kurtz of *The Washington Post* called the satire “incendiary” and the political blogosphere abounded with stories of individuals who, not knowing anything about the *New Yorker*, took the illustration as confirmation of their most irrational fears about the candidate. In all the media discussion that followed, no commentator suggested that the editor of the magazine misunderstood the nature of satire, or that he was overwhelmed by a gambler’s reckless urge. The cover art was recognised to be dangerous by its subjects’ supporters precisely because it could so easily be taken out of context. Divorced from an accompanying *New Yorker* article by Ryan Lizza about Senator Obama, and removed from the magazine’s exploration of “The Politics of Fear,” Barry Blitt’s satiric illustration seemed to assume an independent life of its own. Just as the *Ad Herennium* insists upon the malleability of the message according to the mode of delivery, a classical rhetorical exercise proved dangerous for Defoe when divorced from the classroom context in which rhetorical mastery was demonstrated by arguing in support of self-evidently absurd propositions. The first readers of The Shortest Way proved all too ready to hear the voice of L’Estrange rather than Aesop; the venom of an imagined High Church speaker drowning out the milder voice of a Dissenter pleading for toleration. Yet from the point of view of classical rhetorical theory, The Shortest Way is not a failure but an unqualified success.

Chapter Two
Voices of Dissent: Rhetorical Strategies in Defoe’s Writing Before 1719
Penny Pritchard

Many investigations of Defoe’s canon acknowledge his London-based Presbyterian background and consider how his religious outlook informs his writing. The majority of these studies focus on later writing, in particular, the extended works of prose fiction and those compendious essays on trade and manufacture that appear after about 1715.1 In Defoe’s experience of Nonconformity may be discerned the early inspiration for social values including liberalism, toleration, and Protestant individualism, all of which in turn dovetail conveniently into the image of the “first English novelist.”2 However, such an image belies much of what Defoe himself writes in the first decades of his career about Nonconformity. This chapter will examine the relationship between Defoe’s Nonconformity and the genesis of diverse authorial “voices” adopted in his early writing. In addition to the well-known High Church extremist who speaks in The Shortest Way with the Dissenters (1702), a panoply of disparate voices emerge from Defoe’s early

1 Some of the more extensive studies that consider the relevance of Defoe’s Dissenting background in relation to his fiction are J. Paul Hunter, The Reluctant Pilgrim: Defoe’s Emblematic Method and Quest for Form in Robinson Crusoe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966); G. A. Starr, Defoe and Spiritual Autobiography (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); Leopold Damrosch, Jr, God’s Plot and Man’s Stories: Studies in the Fictional Imagination from Milton to Fielding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). The relationship between Crusoe’s failure to obey his father and Defoe’s failure to take up the ministerial role for which he was educated is also considered by Maximillian E. Novak in Economics and the Fiction of Daniel Defoe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 110–11.

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period, many of whom are associated with a specific religious identity. These range from those engaged in *A Dialogue between a Dissenter and the Observer* (1703) to the Muslim merchant, Kara Selym OgIan, whose correspondence is related in *The Conduct of Christians Made the Sport of Infidels* (1717). Beyond these specific examples are arrayed a further range of authorial personae, less easy to identify in terms of faith, but through which Defoe articulates views concerning contemporary dissent which are, at best, ambiguous and can be openly censorious. These views, and the rhetorical methods employed by Defoe in expressing them, are the subject of this investigation.3

Defoe's depiction of contemporary dissent needs to be perceived within the context of a divided Nonconformist “community,” forced together after the 1662 Act of Uniformity, and its ongoing internal tensions after 1688.4 Notwithstanding these tensions, Nonconformist writing during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century presents a form of cultural expression as equally rich, vibrant, and responsive to political and social change as its mainstream counterpart. Such a canon acknowledges the primary significance of religious identity in writers whose recent cultural memory is defined by the experience of

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