Divided we stand
Divided we stand: The French and Italian political parties and the rearmament of West Germany, 1949-1955

By

Linda Risso

Cambridge Scholars Publishing
For Thomas
# Table of Contents

Foreword by Piers Ludlow ................................................................. ix  
Acknowledgments ........................................................................... xii  
Abbreviations ................................................................................. xiii  
Introduction .................................................................................... 1  

## Part I: The Making of the EDC Treaty

Chapter 1 .............................................................................................. 21  
The early Cold War and the need for defence  
Chapter 2 .............................................................................................. 40  
From the Pleven Plan to the Paris Treaty  
Chapter 3 .............................................................................................. 66  
The Ad Hoc Assembly and Europe’s first constitution  

## Part II: The Actors of the EDC Debate

Chapter 4 .............................................................................................. 91  
The Christian Democratic parties and the EDC  
Chapter 5 .............................................................................................. 113  
The indecision of the French Socialists and Radicals  
Chapter 6 .............................................................................................. 134  
Right-wing opposition to the European army  
Chapter 7 .............................................................................................. 151  
The Military: A neglected player in the EDC debate  
Chapter 8 .............................................................................................. 166  
Communist opposition to the European army
PART III: THE REJECTION OF THE EDC TREATY AND ITS AFTERMATH

Chapter 9 .................................................................................................................. 185
1953: The beginning of the end

Chapter 10 .................................................................................................................. 202
The rejection of the EDC Treaty

Chapter 11 .................................................................................................................. 222
The diplomatic debate after the fall of the EDC

Chapter 12 .................................................................................................................. 240
The launch of the Western European Union

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 259

Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 271

Index ............................................................................................................................ 289
For a project that failed, the European Defence Community has attracted a great deal of historical attention. To some extent this reflects the fact that neither of its main two goals—the integration of Europe or the rearmament of Germany—actually perished in the seeming disaster of August 1954. Historians of both the integration process and the evolution of Western defence have thus gone on looking back at the EDC ‘story’ as a fascinating and significant, if ultimately deeply flawed, chapter in the longer narrative they have been attempting to establish. This is all the more so given the radical nature of the solutions discussed in the 1950 to 1954 period, both in terms of their extreme supranationality and their unorthodox approach to military cooperation. It is also an indication of how pivotal and compelling a moment the early 1950s are seen as being in the post-war recovery of Europe. Few other periods offer so rich a blend of cold war and colonial crises, fragile economic recovery, precarious internal political change, and intricate international diplomacy designed to put Europe’s slow revival from World War II on a more stable footing. It was a time when the very survival of a Western aligned and prosperous Western Europe seemed to be at stake. The deep personal involvement of a series of colourful and large-scale personalities, ranging from the three Christian Democratic leaders so associated with the launch of the integration idea, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi, aided and abetted by Jean Monnet, to the most famous early opponent of the integration process, Charles de Gaulle, via the ‘outsiders’ who sought to influence the EDC debate including Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and Joseph Stalin, only increases the historical appeal of the EDC affair. And finally the episode has continued to hold an appeal to French specialists because of its sheer divisiveness and the degree of domestic acrimony it provoked. The three year battle to assemble the necessary parliamentary support to ratify a European Defence Community born in response to a French governmental initiative are seen by many as epitomising the frailties of the Fourth Republic regime.

Despite this ongoing attention it is nevertheless important to ask what is original about each new arrival in the crowded field of EDC-related literature. The answer would appear to be threefold in the case of Linda Risso’s intensively researched and well-written study. The first innovatory
feature of this book is the way in which it addresses what might be termed ‘the long EDC affair’—in other words the whole period stretching from the 1947 Dunkirk Treaty and the start of the military organisation of Western Europe’s defence to May 1955 and the ratification of the treaty creating the Western European Union. This not only helps clarify the origins of German rearmament issue and of the intense party political opposition to any move in this direction. The incorporation of the birth of the WEU into the main EDC account also helps disentangle the two main strands of opposition which developed to the more ambitious EDC project. For by studying parliamentary voting patterns in 1955 when the question of rearming the Germans had been separated out from the question of far-reaching European unity, it becomes much easier to determine which of those who voted down the EDC were driven by anxiety about a re-emergence of the German threat and which were by contrast primarily concerned about the potential loss of sovereignty which the EDC involved. Rather than a mere epilogue, the account of how the WEU came to be accepted ought thus to be seen as a vital scientific ‘control’ to the much better-known EDC affair.

The second distinctive feature of Risso’s study is its systematic focus on non-state actors in general and political parties in particular. Over the last two decades, one of the primary characteristics of virtually all writing on the origins of the European integration process has been its fixation on the actions and inactions of national governments. The key debates have thus tended to revolve around the question of whether the calculations of national interest which determined when each individual West European nation state got itself involved in the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence Community or the European Economic Community were essentially economic or instead concerned mainly with geo-politics. Non-state actors, whether pressure groups, political parties, or professional milieux like the military, have been marginalised as a result. There have recently been welcome signs that this unduly exclusive focus on governments and governments alone is beginning to change. The central chapters of Linda Risso’s book with their detailed examination of how the main French and Italian political groupings and the military elite in the two countries responded to the question of German rearmament therefore represent a further, valuable, contribution to this new trend.

The third feature which helps set this book apart from most other studies of the EDC is its use of a comparative history methodology. This is genuinely new in the field of European integration history. A number of previous books and articles have concentrated on the bilateral relations
between two or more countries involved in the integration process. A few have even sought to reconstruct the multilateral interplay between all of the founding members of the first European Communities. But no one prior to Linda Risso has sought to use the techniques of systematic transnational historical comparison to the integration process. The results are illuminating. The comparison of the Italian and French debate succeeds in highlighting the profound differences between post-war Italy and Fourth Republic France. The superficial similarity of parliamentary systems beset by frequent changes of government and threatened by comparably sized Communist parties, thus masks the very significant contrast between an Italian system dominated by a single Christian Democrat party and a French one where the Christian Democrats were members of most governmental coalitions but unable to control any of them. This much weaker position of the MRP goes a long way to explaining French inability to ratify the EDC.

All told, therefore, Linda Risso’s book is a clear demonstration that the combination of detailed primary research and an innovative approach can still break new ground in a field as well tilled as the history of the European Defence Community. Indeed, the tactics of elongating the normal time-frame, looking away from national governments and towards non-state actors, and borrowing insights from comparative historians all might profitably be borrowed by other researchers working in the field of European integration history. I am therefore happy to recommend this book.

NPL, July 2007
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is based on archival research carried out in Britain, France and Italy over the past four years. At times, this research has been extremely demanding and it is only thanks to the loving support and continuous encouragement of Thomas, my husband, that I have been able to publish the results of my work. I am profoundly grateful to him and dedicate this book to him.

I would like to express my gratitude also to John Pollard, Claudio Costantini and Vittorio Foa for their friendship and guidance. I am thankful to Dr Piers Ludlow (LSE), who has always been very supportive and who has assisted me with his extremely valuable advice since the first time I met him in 2004. Dr Irene Di Jorio and Prof. Pieter Lagrou of the Université Libre de Bruxelles deserve to be thanked too. I was in Brussels during a critical phase of my work and thanks to their support I did not lose confidence. I am also in debt to Dr Mette Rasmussen (Cambridge), who introduced me to the ‘political scientist’s mindset’, and to Dr Geoffrey Edwards (Cambridge) and Prof. Percy Allum (Reading), who offered helpful feedback on my doctoral dissertation. As a visiting researcher at the European University Institute, I worked under the supervision of Prof. Stefano Bartolini, whose expertise and sense of humour were always tremendously encouraging. Similarly, I am most grateful for the precious advice of Prof. Arfon Rees and Prof. Pascaline Winand. Finally, particular thanks go to Mr Jean-Marie Palayret and his colleagues at the Historical Archives of the European Communities, Florence; to Prof. Michele Abate (Italian Foreign Ministry Archives, Rome), to Dr Concetta Argiolas (Istituto Luigi Sturzo Archives, Rome), and to Dr Giovanna Bosman (Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Rome). Financial assistance from Pembroke College (Cambridge), the Prince Consort and Thirwall Fund of the Faculty of History at Cambridge University and the Wiener-Anspach Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

Reading, August 2007
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANACR</td>
<td>Association Nationale des Anciens Combattants de la Résistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANPI</td>
<td>Associazione Nazionale Partigiani Italiani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>Action Républicaine et Sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP-CD</td>
<td>Atti Parlamentari della Camera dei Deputati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP-S</td>
<td>Atti Parlamentari del Senato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASILS</td>
<td>Archivio Storico dell’Istituto Luigi Sturzo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASMAE</td>
<td>Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTO</td>
<td>Brussels Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU-CSU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Democrazia Cristiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFM</td>
<td>European Federalist Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIG</td>
<td>Fondazione Istituto Gramsci</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNDIRP</td>
<td>Fédération Nationale des Déportés et Internés Résistants et Patriotes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAEC</td>
<td>Historical Archives of the European Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JO-AN</td>
<td>Journal Officiel la République Française, Assemblée Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JO-CR</td>
<td>Journal Officiel la République Française, Conseil de la République</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAE-CI</td>
<td>Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Sezione Commercio Internazionale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDSEUE</td>
<td>Mouvement Démocratique et Socialiste pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFE</td>
<td>Movimento Federalista Europeo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Mouvement Républicain Populaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>Movimento Sociale Italiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>NATO Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>Parti Communiste Français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Partito Comunista Italiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLI</td>
<td>Partito Liberale Italiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNM</td>
<td>Partito Nazionale Monarchico¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Partito Republican Italiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office (National Archives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDI</td>
<td>Partito Socialdemocratico Italiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Partito Socialista Italiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rassemblement du Peuple Français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFIO</td>
<td>Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOM</td>
<td>Territoires d’Outre-mer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLT</td>
<td>Territorio Libero di Trieste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UdFF</td>
<td>Union des Femmes Françaises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unione Donne Italiane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDSR</td>
<td>Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEF</td>
<td>Union Européenne des Fédéralistes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URAIS</td>
<td>Union des Républicains d’Action Sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPC</td>
<td>World Peace Congress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ From 1950 to 1955, the PNM and the MSI changed name several times. For consistency and in order to facilitate the reader’s understanding only their most well-known acronyms have been used throughout this book.
INTRODUCTION

History without political science has no fruit,
Political science without history has no root.
J.R. Seeley, Introduction to Political Science (1896)

One of the factors which initiated the European integration process was the so-called ‘German question’. The beginning of the Cold War and the call for an effective defence system in Western Europe put the rearmament of West Germany on the front burner. Similarly, the economic recovery of Western Europe could not be achieved without a stable and prosperous Germany. Because of its strategic position next to the Iron Curtain and at the heart of Europe and its pivotal role in the economy of Europe, West Germany clearly had a crucial role to play in recovery of the Continent. However, if policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic agreed on the need to have a stable and prosperous Germany, they disagreed on how this should be achieved and on the degree of recovery that West Germany should be allowed to enjoy, given the country’s the recent history. The question as to the extent of West Germany’s military contribution to the Atlantic defence system was particularly controversial and raised suspicion both among the political elites and the people of Western Europe.

This book investigates the first attempts to deal with the military aspect of the German question from the foundation of NATO in 1949 to the ratification of the Modified Brussels Treaty in 1955. Going beyond the traditional history of diplomatic relations, this book explores the role of political parties and pressure groups in the formulation of national preferences in the early stages of the European integration process.

Through the examination of new archival data and the comparative analysis of the French and Italian cases, this book demonstrates that the political parties’ views regarding the European army and the integration process itself are more complex than the unequivocal criticism of or support for European integration for which they are often known. The composite nature and the ever changing development of such resistance and support must be examined and comprehended in detail. This can be done by going beyond the diplomatic history of the European army, by taking into account the role of political parties and pressure groups, by
looking beyond the European Army project and by considering later developments, including the enlargement of the Western European Union and the entrance of West Germany into NATO.

**The European Defence and Political Communities**

The re-examination of the European Defence Community and the European Political Community (EDC and EPC) projects touches upon several crucial aspects of the history and organisation of Western Europe. First, both the EDC and the EPC challenged the very idea of the nation-state as a fully independent and sovereign political entity with wide-ranging powers and full decision-making capability. As one of the first—and, one might say, most ambitious—steps towards union, the EDC and the EPC projects acted as a magnifying glass for the obstacles that have stood in the way of integration since its inception. If the European Defence and Political Communities had become a reality, they would have radically curbed the policy-making capabilities of the member governments and imposed a new tier of bureaucracy at the highest political level. The ratification of the EDC Treaty would have prevented its members from joining international organisations and entering into bilateral defence agreements. Similarly, national governments would have been forced to harmonise their economic policies with those of the other members and been compelled to transfer part of their resources to the supranational level to finance the army and the new tier of bureaucracy. These are only a few examples of how the ratification of the EDC Treaty would have affected the functioning of the EDC members and how it challenged the sovereignty of the Western European nation-states.

A further interesting aspect of the integrated army project is linked to the importance of external inputs. The pressure exerted by the United States on Western Europe to achieve rearmament and to ‘stem the Communist tide’ both at the national level and in the international arena strongly shaped the economic and political reconstruction of Western Europe. Washington’s financial and military support of Western Europe stirred a bitter debate in several countries, where parties, and particularly the Communists, accused their government of ‘selling off’ national sovereignty to the US.

The death of Stalin and the destabilising battle for leadership in Moscow occurred during the delicate EDC ratification process, strongly influencing the debate in the Western capitals. The calling for a new Four Power Conference, for example, touched upon the sensibilities of those parties that did not believe in the need for—or the urgency of—West
German rearmament and consequently further jeopardised the prospects for the Treaty’s ratification. For these reasons, an accurate re-examination of the EDC project must weigh the reciprocal influences of both home and foreign affairs as well as the simultaneous development of East-West relations, the economic and political reconstruction of Western Europe and the ongoing debate among its members.

In the transition from the EDC to the Western European Union (WEU), the question of German rearmament was divorced from the European integration process. According to the text of the Modified Brussels Treaty (1954), the WEU was—a purely defensive alliance, formed to respond to military aggression. Although the WEU did not entail the creation of a supranational institution it did create a ‘psychological atmosphere of security in which continental integration efforts could successfully progress’.1

The history of the EDC and EPC is of interest both to historians working on the post-war period as well as to political scientists examining the origins of the European integration process or following the current debates regarding the Constitution of Europe and the creation of a Common Foreign and Defence Policy. In fact, the projects of the European Defence and Political Communities and the opposition then faced by European policy-makers reveal remarkable precursors to the current discussions regarding the Constitution and the Common Foreign and Defence Policy. Yet none of the people involved in the current debate about the European constitution or in the debate about EU security policies have made any reference to it; indeed, one might conclude from their silence that many of them hardly remember it. It is essential that we reconsider the EDC and EPC projects and that attention be drawn to the obvious similarities between them and the current debate on the European Constitution and the CFDP, despite the obvious historical differences. A better insight into the history—and particularly the failure—of the Defence and Political Communities will offer a helpful understanding of the obstacles that that obstruct the materialisation of the ‘ever closer Union’.

---

Introduction

State of historical research

The state of historical research on the EDC is relatively strong. Considerable detail regarding the diplomatic negotiations has been made available by Edward Fursdon and Daniela Preda, who have provided an examination of the EDC diplomatic debate and by Raymond Aron and Daniel Lerner, and Armand Clesse, who have focused predominantly on France’s role in the debate.²

Aron and Lerner published their study of the European army soon after its rejection. They focus exclusively on the French case, highlighting the shifting support of the continuously changing French governments and examining the role of the French Christian Democrats and Communists. In Aron’s assessment, it was the internal instability of the Fourth Republic that forced the French government to abandon its confident European policy and to favour the Gaullist demand for the protection of national sovereignty; a point further investigated by Clesse with the support of archival evidence and newly published sources.³

The work by Edward Fursdon still provides the best account of the EDC diplomatic debate. His work is based on interviews with policymakers who were directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations and on official documents. Besides providing a full account of the history of the EDC, Fursdon investigates the awkward British attempt to provide external support to the military integration of Western Europe without


³ Raymond Aron edited the issue and wrote the introduction and the conclusion; the other authors were Jacques Fauvet and Stanley Hoffmann, who wrote on the history of the EDC project; Alfred Grosser and Jacques Vernant on the French post-war foreign policy; Jean Stoetzel and Jean-José Marchand on public opinion; and Daniel Lerner on “La France et l’Europe dans l’arène mondiale”. The English translation was published one year later as Aron R. and Lerner D. (eds.), France defeats EDC, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1957. Clesse’s research provides an updated version of Aron’s work and is based on official documents published in L’Année politique and on documents of the French and German Foreign Ministries.
being directly involved, a point later re-examined with success by Kevin Ruane through the analysis of new archival sources.4

Daniela Preda has worked on the role of the Italian delegation to the EDC Conference and has investigated the changing support of Rome for the integration process between 1950 and 1954. Again, Preda focuses primarily on the diplomatic debate and her work is based on the archival material of the Italian Foreign Ministry as well as on the private papers of Ivan Matteo Lombardo, an active federalist and head of the Italian delegation after the summer of 1951.5

Finally, Rita Cardozo and Richard Griffiths have published two thoroughly researched accounts of the diplomatic history of the European Political Community. Griffiths’s work is complemented by the publication of Europe’s first constitution.6

These works have the merit of clarifying the official position of the six EDC members and of offering a better understanding of their shifting support both at the diplomatic conference and during the ratification process. They also demonstrate how the formation of a new governing coalition influenced the position of their delegation both at the EDC Conference and at the intergovernmental conference called to discuss the first European constitution.

These studies focus on the process and outcome of the EDC negotiations and often overlook the formulation of state preferences and the influence of political parties on the governments’ view of the integration process. But it seems hazardous to speak of an ‘unholy alliance of the Gaullists and the Communists to sink the EDC’7 if no explanation of such political and social phenomena follows. In order reach a more

---


5 It must be pointed out that when Preda worked on the EDC, the Ivan Matteo Lombardo collection was kept by the Fondazione Europea Luciano Bolis. In July 1999 the collection was transferred to the Historical Archives of the European Communities (henceforward HAEC) in Florence, where the collection was re-ordered. This explains why the archival references used in this book may differ from those available in Preda, *Storia di una speranza*; and Preda, *Sulla soglia dell’Unione*.


7 The first to use this expression was Aron in Aron and Lerner (eds.), “La querelle de la CED”. Both Fursdon and Preda have used similar phrases, which have then been quoted by several other historians.
advanced insight into the history of the EDC, it is essential to understand the positions held by the major parties and movements. If we are to attain such an insight, it is crucial to ascertain to what extent the still-fresh memories of the Nazi occupation impeded German rearmament; whether the demand for a more assertive foreign policy influenced the governments, and to know how much the increasing pressure of the United States for the ratification of the EDC Treaty affected the balance of power within each of the six parliaments.

Recent renewed interest in the history of the EDC and the EPC has partially remedied these shortcomings. Thanks to the work of historians such as Georges-Henri Soutou, Gérard Bossuat, Eric Vial, Fernando Guirao, Antonio Varsori, Sergio Pistone, and Wilfried Loth, various aspects of the way the EDC affected the functioning of the member countries and influenced their internal balance of power have now been accurately investigated. Although highly valuable, however such research has usually been limited to a single country and very often to a specific aspect of the EDC.

Why another study on the EDC?

The valuable information provided by the above studies notwithstanding, it is vital that we do not lose sight of the international context and of the EDC countries’ policies reciprocal influence, which proved essential in determining the ever changing position of each government. Additionally, it is crucial to look at the process of preference formation and to the role of individuals and political parties in shaping the governments’ position over time. The result of this gap in historical research has been a tendency to explain the changing positions of some of the EDC members, such as France or Italy, solely or primarily with reference to external foreign policy factors and to overlook the role of domestic political forces. Hence, this research study seeks to throw new light on the importance of individuals and pressure groups and on transnational collaborations and influences between the six countries themselves.

Additionally, this book challenges the consolidated historiography in several respects. Given the self-enclosing habits of national historiography and the growing specialisation of historical scholarship, there is need to
bring together the results of such a vast amount of work, to correlate these results with new archival material and to produce a valuable synthesis of the history of the beginning of the integration process that will be accessible to a larger audience. For the same reason, the scope of this book goes beyond the restricted history of the integrated army project and covers in fact a longer chronological period, from 1948 to 1955, thus including the origins of the German rearmament problem and its actual solution when West Germany entered NATO in 1955. The wider time span has allowed a more comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the German question and opened up the possibility of a more advanced insight into the changing position of national governments and pressure groups.

The originality of this research lies in the attention it pays to the roles of the major political groups and international organisations, such as the Peace Partisans and the European Federalists. In addition, this book goes beyond the examination of the political parties’ positions at the time of the parliamentary votes—as indeed have other historians—and traces the development of their opposition to or support for German rearmament assessing how various external and internal factors influenced them. Ronald E.M. Irving and Byron Criddle, for example, do consider the positions of the French Christian Democrats and socialists respectively, but they limit their analysis to their voting patterns in the National Assembly and fail to investigate the internal debate that took place in the parties’ newspapers and in party congress discussions, two vital sources of information, which offer an excellent insight into the shifting support for, and criticism of, the integrated army. Even recently, the collection of case studies edited by Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser perpetuates the erroneous idea of solid support for integration within the Western European Christian Democratic parties.10

By taking into account a longer period and a wider range of actors, it has been possible to establish the parliamentary and public concerns about the rearmament of West Germany and the integration process as such. The role of the parties is crucial in the examination of how the anti-integration front developed. Because of their position as mediator between the governments and the public, the parties acted as a filter between the public and government, influencing—and being influenced by—both at the same time. Thanks to its holistic approach, this research can assert that between 1950 and 1954, criticism of German rearmament shifted from outright

opposition to the re-formation of the Wehrmacht to the need to safeguard national sovereignty and to protect the nation-state from the fast developing integration process.

**The choice of the French and Italian cases**

The choice of a comparative approach was motivated by the need to understand the underlying trends of both the opposition—or, as it would be more appropriate to say, the oppositions—to and support for the integrated army. The comparative analysis has made it possible to assess to what degree the intrinsic instability of the French and Italian political systems was further aggravated by the discussion regarding the rearmament of West Germany and the creation of a supranational institution. Moreover, only through a comparative study of the French and Italian cases has it been possible to highlight the different ways in which the approach of certain political parties to European integration evolved after the rejection of the EDC: while the Mouvement Républicain Populaire rejected any alternative solution and voted against the WEU, the Democrazia Cristiana remained convinced of the need to support other forms of integration and therefore voted for the WEU and worked towards the Messina Conference. Also, the comparative analysis identified important similarities between the French and Italian cases, such as the similar strategy adopted by the French and Italian Communists after the Berlin Conference and the transnational cooperation of the Christian Democrats.

There are two sets of reasons behind the choice of the cases of France and Italy: the first is directly linked to the role of France and Italy in the failure of the EDC project while the second relates to the political, economic and social situation of the two countries in the post-war period.

By the end of 1953, the lower houses of the Parliaments of the Benelux countries and West Germany had ratified the EDC Treaty and for eight months European and American diplomacy tried to persuade Paris and Rome to complete the ratification. However, despite John Foster Dulles’ threat of an ‘agonising reappraisal’ and the continuous pressure of the other EDC members, France postponed the ratification debate for eight months and Italy never began it. The question is why the two most enthusiastic supporters of the integration process progressively became unable to ratify the EDC Treaty and thus accelerated the collapse of the most ambitious step yet towards the political union of Western Europe. In fact, by fully supporting the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the integrated army and the political union, France and Italy had emerged
as the initiators of the integration process, at least apparently. However, because of internal problems related to their political instability and the continuous changes of government as well as various external factors—such as the death of Stalin and increasing pressure from Washington—both France and Italy consistently shifted from their initial unconditional support for the integration process to a more moderate Europeanism.

The second reason behind the choice of the French and Italian cases is linked to the political, social and economic situations of both countries in the aftermath of WWII. Like the rest of Western Europe, France and Italy suffered immensely from the Nazi occupation. Peculiar to their cases was the problematic healing of the division between the supporters of the Nazis and those who had taken part in the Resistance. The Vichy and Salò regimes created a deep rift within French and Italian societies respectively. The effect of these rifts extended into the following years and precluded the return to normality and to the normal functioning of both republics in the immediate aftermath of the war. Because of the amnesties which were approved between 1946 and 1950, most of the civil servants who had supported the fascist regimes kept their posts. Moreover, the trials against war criminals that opened in the same period were extensively and closely followed by the press, reviving the painful memories of the Nazi occupation and of the flirtation of several civil servants and high officials of the Vichy and Salò republics with the occupying forces.11

A further peculiarity of the French and Italian cases was that France and Italy had the largest Communist parties in Western Europe. The Italian Communist Party had almost two million members between 1953 and 1954 and the French counterpart slightly less than one and a half million in the same period. Both parties based their political action on a hierarchical internal organisation, a widespread network of cells and party agencies and a solid relationship with Moscow. The parties’ activity was enhanced by the effective use of party newspapers and by groups such as the Peace Partisans. The exclusion of these massive and highly organised parties from the governmental coalitions and their criticism of the governments’ activity severely jeopardised the stability of the French and Italian Republics. The fact that in both cases fierce anti-Communism was often the only glue holding the governing coalitions together further disrupted the French and Italian governments’ ability to carry out confident and coherent foreign and domestic policies.

The comparative analysis of the internal composition and functioning of the two republics provides an excellent insight into the reasons behind their shifting policies and inconstant support for the European integration process in the period between 1950 and 1955. Finally, in both cases, under the leadership of the Christian Democrats the governing coalition saw in the economic integration of Western Europe the best way to achieve a permanent solution to the endemic economic and political problems of their countries. The huge numbers of unemployed Italians could benefit from international agreements and could emigrate to other Western European countries which needed cheap labour, while France hoped to find a peaceful and long-lasting solution to the Franco-German competition for the Ruhr and Saar resources.12

However, although there may be some obvious similarities between the French and Italian cases, some important differences played a major role in the countries’ approach to the EDC. Jasmine Aimaq and Kim Seung-Ryeol have correctly identified the French Union as an important factor in determining France’s European policy.13 While after WWII France still aspired to be a world power and its overseas territories were its main asset, the Italian peace treaty had wiped away the Italian colonies. Thus the two countries approached the integration issue from two opposite positions: Rome saw membership in Europe as a means of achieving political rehabilitation, whereas Paris was willing to take part in integration only if it protected French interests and ensured the leadership of Paris in Europe.

Comparative methodology and archive sources

This study’s comparative approach considers how the French and Italian parties and governments reacted to the challenge of political and military integration and how their political systems adjusted to the changes that took place in the national and international arena between 1950 and 1955. As Heinz-Gerhard Haupt has pointed out, the aim of comparative research is not simply to take into account specific historical phenomena,

---

but to situate them within broader analytical and theoretical frameworks and to determine their specificity. Thus, historical comparison adds analytical sharpness and synthesis to the traditional narrative approach.

The research study is grounded in historical research and therefore differs from the methodology used in the field of political science. In political science, comparative analysis is based on a solid theoretical approach and entails a complex system of rules and parameters that allows ‘scientific’ reliability to be achieved while historical comparative research still lacks a definitive theoretical foundation. The need to consolidate the traditional political history by including comparative analysis of European countries in order to achieve a better insight into the history of modern Europe was stressed as early as 1923 by Henri Pirenne and was strongly supported by Marc Bloch. Yet, historical comparative methodology is still developing and requires further discussion and practice.

Because of the complex nature of the European rearmament question, which brings together the theoretical definition of the nation-state, the reactions of political groups and governments to the challenge of the integration process and the influences of both internal and foreign affairs in the early stages of the Cold War, the transnational comparative approach recently proposed by David Thelen seems the most appropriate response to the challenge of this study. In contrast to the research

---

17 David Thelen’s work is the result of a series of meetings with historians that took place between 1991 and 1999 during which they discussed the theoretical
methods that distance themselves from the nation-state, such as transfer history and \textit{histoire croisée},\textsuperscript{18} transnational history focuses on the nation-state but aims to investigate how its relations to the outside world are determined by its particular physiognomy. Thus, transnational history looks at the nation-state as the background in which political subjects and social groups develop and interact with other similar subjects within and beyond the national borders. In this research, the transnational history method is used to investigate the evolution of the preference formation of the political parties regarding the integration and defence issues and how their approaches changed through continuous contact with other parties within both within their own countries and across the borders, as in the case of the Communists and of the Christian Democrats. The transnational approach is based on the combined use of different sources and on the analysis of the behaviour of various political parties, pressure groups and international organisations.\textsuperscript{19}

The core of this book is based on archival information from the Historical Archives of the European Communities (HAEC) at the European University Institute of Florence, where I worked between October 2003 and March 2004. These collections provide crucial definition of comparative methodology in historical research. Although Thelen focuses on American social history with particular reference to the ethnic composition of American society, Thelen offers an excellent contribution to the definition of comparative historical research and his suggestions can be adapted to the study of modern Europe and of European integration. Thelen D., "The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History", \textit{The Journal of American History}, 86/3 (1999), pp. 265-275.

\textsuperscript{18} The history of cross-cultural transfer focuses on the history of thought and of intellectual élites. It examines the formation of ideas and intellectual groups across borders and criticises traditional political history as limited by artificial national boundaries. \textit{Histoire croisée} is based on the study of entanglement between different subjects, or groups of subjects, beyond the limited definition of the political national entity. As Haupt has pointed out, the empirical realisation of \textit{histoire croisée} approach is not yet visible. Haupt, "European History as Comparative History".

\textsuperscript{19} This book is grounded in the historical discipline. Political scientists would perhaps have made a case-study similar to Allison's investigation into the Cuban Missile crisis through alternative theoretical lenses (Allison G.T., "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", \textit{The American Political Science Review} 63/3 (1969), pp. 689-718). Another political science approach would have entailed examining the shifting government positions on the EDC issue in terms of ‘nested games’ or ‘two-level games’; see for example Tsebelis G., \textit{Nested games: Rational choice in comparative politics}, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990 and various works by Andrew Moravcsik.
information regarding policy formulation and the parties’ responses to the integration process in the period 1949-55. The HAEC collections have the great advantage of including a variety of sources, from documents relating to the American approach to the integration process to the private papers of several Western European policy-makers.

The minutes of the specialised committees at the EDC and the EPC Conferences as well as official copies of the Treaties provide the essential bases of this study. The minutes offer a key insight into the position of the six delegations and provide the first hints of how the EDC would work once the Treaty had been ratified; simultaneously, they foreshadow the opposition which would impede ratification. Substantial information regarding the EDC Conference and in particular the position of the Italian delegation is also available in the papers of Ivan Matteo Lombardo. Lombardo was an active member of the European Federalist Movement, a close friend of Altiero Spinelli, and the head of the Italian delegation at the EDC Conference. His papers offer indispensable information regarding his formal and informal contacts with other policy makers involved in the negotiations, and the development of the European integration process in the period between 1950 and 1954. They thus provide a crucial insight into the shifting support of the Italian Foreign Ministry for the common army.

David Bruce’s unpublished diaries are another important set of documents. Between May 1949 and March 1952, Bruce was the American Ambassador to France where he became a personal friend of Jean Monnet and of several other French politicians, friendships which were to prove vitally important in the following years when Bruce was appointed ‘Observer to the Interim Committee of the EDC’ and ‘US Special Representative to the ECSC High Authority’. Bruce was able to follow the progress of integration from its very beginning and because of his position first as ambassador and later as observer and because he was a personal friend of the major French policy-makers, he had a privileged position from which to observe the development of European integration. Besides providing factual information regarding the position of the

\[\text{20 For the details regarding the HAEC collections, see the Bibliography (HAEC-PE2 and PU series).}\]
\[\text{21 For the purpose of this research I have mainly focused on HAEC-IML/15-20, 25, 30-32, and 51.}\]
\[\text{22 The HAEC retain a copy of the diaries of David Bruce in HAEC-JMAS/Bruce. The original copy is deposited at the Virginia Historical Society (Richmond, Virginia). The diary in its entirety consists of 72 volumes and the HAEC keep a copy of volumes 3-23.}\]
different parties and governments, Bruce’s diaries also offer an interesting insight into the often contradictory approach of the US authorities to European integration. Bruce describes the conflict between the State Department—which after the summer of 1951 endorsed the ‘European solution’ to the German rearmament problem—and the Pentagon, which persisted in its support of the Spofford Plan. Finally, the HAEC collections also offer vital information regarding the position and internal debate of several parties and pressure groups, the analysis of which forms the core of the second part of this book.

The Italian Foreign Ministry Archives (ASMAE) have provided further evidence to support the information offered by the HAEC documents. The Archivio Storico dell’Istituto Luigi Sturzo (ASILS) and the Fondazione Istituto Gramsci (FIG) in Rome have added details about the position of the Italian Christian Democratic and Communist parties. Also, documents from the National Archives in Kew and official documents (Foreign Relations of the United States, Documents Diplomatiques Français, Journal Officiel and Atti Parlamentari) offered more opportunities for comparison and contributed new information on a wide range of players directly and indirectly involved in the EDC project.

Finally, the parties’ newspapers, internal bulletins and congress reports published between 1950 and 1955 have contributed further data regarding the positions of the main French and Italian political groups and their internal debate regarding the integration process. The party newspapers in particular have been crucial to this research since they offer an insight not only into the positions of the political parties but also into the ways they tried to persuade their readers of the correctness of their positions.

A combined examination of these sources has revealed important information which challenges the official historiography of the EDC and has enabled me to offer a valuable contribution to existing scholarship. Numerous examples of these important contributions are available throughout this book but perhaps the most obvious is the re-examination of the Italian reaction to the rejection of the EDC Treaty in August 1954. Antonio Varsori has described the shock of the Italian Foreign Ministry at the news that the European army project had collapsed and their inability to think of an alternative solution and to adopt a confident foreign

---

23 Among the most valuable collections are: HAEC-OFME, which contains information regarding the French Federalists; HAEC-AS, regarding their Italian counterparts, and HAEC-JMDS/93, on the French Socialists.
policy. Thanks to the joint analysis of the official documents of the ASMAE and of the private papers of Ivan Matteo Lombardo (HAEC), it has been possible to demonstrate that the Italian government had in fact expected the rejection of the EDC since the beginning of 1954 and that it had been in contact with the French and British governments to work on an alternative solution. Moreover, as is demonstrated in Chapter Ten, the very fact that in 1954 the Italian government refused to initiate the EDC ratification debate demonstrates that government officials were not willing to expose the country to a fierce parliamentary battle with the Communists only then to have the EDC rejected by the National Assembly.

In other cases, although the archival information does not contradict existing studies, it provides more precise information about the role of individual policy-makers. The persuasive action in support of the ‘European solution’ for German rearmament promoted by Eisenhower, Bruce, and McCloy, for example, acquires new significance in the light of the information available in the diaries of David Bruce, in the Jean Monnet-Duchêne Sources (HAEC-JMDS) and in Jean Monnet-American Sources (HAEC-JMAS) collections. In fact, although the roles of Eisenhower, Bruce and McCloy have already been highlighted by Pascaline Winand and Thomas Schwartz, new archival information offers further evidence of their crucial role in persuading Congress to endorse the integrated army project and permits a re-examination of the sudden American support for the EDC in the summer of 1951.

Organisation of the book

The book consists of three parts. The first and the third parts follow the chronological development of the diplomatic debate regarding European rearmament between 1950 and 1955, while the second part is thematic and consists of five chapters that investigate the position of the major parties and pressure groups that took part in the EDC debate.

The first chapter of the book provides an historical introduction to the first post-war agreements and defines the security problem Western European policy-makers faced at the beginning of the Cold War. This chapter is based on published sources and analyses the clash between the

US pressure for rearmament and the resistance exerted by the European countries. It is designed to underscore the centrality of the German question in the period between 1948 and 1955. The second and third chapters investigate the origins of the European Defence and Political Communities Treaties and are based on the original minutes of the talks and on analyses of the official texts thus offering a picture of how the European Defence and Political Communities would have functioned if they had come into being.

The second part investigates the role of the different political parties and assesses their approach to rearmament and integration. I have considered the major opposition parties—such as the Communists and the Right—as well as the leading parties of the governing coalition, namely the Christian Democrats. With regard to the role of the moderate parties, I have decided to restrict my attention to those parties whose political weight or position within the parliamentary spectrum placed them in a crucial position and whose vote for or against the EDC Treaty or the Modified Brussels Treaty was bound to affect the outcome of the ratification debate. In other words, I have taken into account those political groups whose choice, had they voted solidly for or against the treaties, would have been decisive in the final outcome of the ratification debate. For this reason, the French Socialists and Radicals are treated in detail, whereas the Peasants and the Overseas are only briefly mentioned. Because of their tendency to follow the Christian Democrats with little or no deviation, the Italian parties of the governing coalition are mentioned only when some of their members took personal stands and disagreed with the line adopted by their own party. I am referring to the Italian Liberals, Social Democrats and Republicans who, between 1950 and 1955, were part of the governing coalition and accounted for around 13 percent of the seats in the Lower House. Where some of the members of the moderate parties were in substantial disagreement with the foreign policy of the governing coalition, as happened in case of the Parliamentary Agreement for Peace, their opposition is examined in detail.

The chapters of the second part of the book investigate the parties’ internal divisions and underline how their approach to German rearmament altered with time. Following the chronological development of the opposition or support within each party seemed the most appropriate way to explain the origins of their internal debate and the rifts which divided them. Occasionally, however, the need arose to abandon the chronological development and engage in a more analytical examination of the role of specific party members and the influence of external factors (such as the fact that the party had entered the governing coalition) on the