Conflict, Memory Transfers
and the Reshaping of Europe
Conflict, Memory Transfers and the Reshaping of Europe

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INTRODUCTION

After experiencing the end of European supremacy, the Cold War and an unprecedented atrocity that still persists as a deadlock to our understanding and claim on our moral imagination, the battles for memory, the politics of memory and the counter-memory are signs that the twenty-first century was born under the shadow of past events. If, indeed, the emergency in the global order and Europe as an enlarged Union, after the collapse of communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, seemed to herald a more prosperous and peaceful world equilibrium, they did not, however, reduce our interest in narrating and gazing over the past. No doubt because the consequences of the European division became all the more apparent with the political and social developments following the accelerated changes in the Warsaw Pact countries as from the late 1980s. The new tensions and perplexities generated by the end of the ideological bipolarization in addition to geopolitical changes demanded a reassessment of the internal politics of nations, their official historiographies and neighbourhood politics. As the endowment of past experience with cultural meaning turned out to be crucial, so did the interest in individual recollection, collective memory and all sorts of public forms of memory became a question of revision, reinterpretation and consciousness.

As a result, the reconnection of Europe did not obliterate the memory of the past; on the contrary, it stimulated it. The claims of an unsettled memory associated with specific historical events, which had been extremely chaotic, tragic and very often criminal, undergone across its territory and beyond, became focal. Likewise, trauma remained a prevalent preoccupation in recent theory, no doubt because the recurring and indiscernible nature of its symptomatic aftermath continues to pose acute problems for understanding and historical representation.

Furthermore, the growing memory culture also reflects a sense of individual and collective urgency in surpassing the generational constraint in order to gather the testimony of those more directly involved in twentieth century wars, genocide and other conflicts. Their testimonies were frequently discarded, suppressed or their relevance undercut by generational divides and a sense of useless belatedness. Now that they are beginning to disappear, the second and third generations, who unconsciously absorbed or came to acknowledge the tragedy lived by their
elders, are assailed by the desire and even moral imperative to deal with the distressing issue of this legacy. Seen from this perspective, genocide and war became crucial concerns, in some cases on a national scale, tied in with ethical and cultural issues, such as justice, legitimacy and identity. The debates on the Spanish Civil War and the ensuing policies are good examples of this development.

Adding to this, the (post-)colonial outlook is very often inscribed by local histories and loyalties used to define counter-identities to the Western liberal-democratic model. However, these representational strategies, deployed to engender a sense of belonging or shared identity, tell us that the confidence of a newly founded national consciousness very seldom matches the self-understanding of individuals attempting to combine their ethnicity with the colonial legacy. More prevalent seems to be the image of ambivalent and stressed attitudes and emotions that, in turn, weigh negatively on the ways Europeans envisage themselves.

The renewal of interest in memory is also connected with the strategic significance that national and local memories are acquiring in the context of the decline of national identities and the emergence of new identities of hybridity. The global post-modern characterized by the spread of cultural homogenization has been encouraging distinctive attention paid to national and local memory as resistance against the threat of disembodiment of identities, places, histories and traditions.

It is then the strong resonance of a largely unsettled memory, together with the need to come out from the shadow of its negativity, that continue to pressure the translation of lesser and more recent pasts into meaningful narratives, symbols, rituals and other practices. These are investing—and will go on so doing in the foreseeable future—the entangled European memory cartography with a positive quality, with its space and time discontinuities well beyond continental boundaries. If, on the one hand, the wounds and scars of endless conflicts are a blemish on the European political culture, on the other hand, the progressive internalisation of the principles of good governance, human rights, pacifism, ecological concerns and multiculturalism, combined with the logic of a globally systemic economy, are also felt to be adding to the limitation of violence and atrocity. The interaction of these factors with the persistent reinterpretation of past events seems to be reshaping the European historical identity while forging a more dialogic memory culture. Germany, for instance, so stigmatized by war and the Holocaust caesura, underwent significant transformation in recent decades. Reunification is allowing for the integration of its different memories and the recasting of a more rightful approach when dealing with external affairs, particularly
with its Eastern neighbours. In fact, since the mid-1990s, the concept of “normalisation” has no longer been exclusively associated with the more conservative politicians, intellectuals and revisionist historians attempting to oppose the so-called Historikerstreit of the mid-1980s. “Normalisation” tends to be increasingly understood as the outcome of the forty years of “successful” West Germany history between 1949 and 1989 and from which a united Germany is deriving its post-Wall identity. With the vision of a unified and multicultural Germany based on western and liberal values, and at the centre of the E.U., the term “normalisation” has become much less controversial, almost conventional.

Conflict, Memory Transfers and the Reshaping of Europe discusses processes of memory construction associated with the realities of war and genocide, totalitarianism, colonialism as well as trans-border dialogues in the overcoming of conflict memories. The book was elaborated on the premise that there are no available clear-cut or definite positions to approach the problematic issues of conflict, memory and history. Consequently, it examines and articulates across several different media discourses, problems, contexts and considerations of value. Its scope is thus deliberately interdisciplinary, drawing on the cross-fertilization of diverse research methods, from memory studies, cultural theory, cultural studies, historiography, literary criticism, sociology and psychology. Historical chapters are set alongside or juxtaposed with contributions focusing on politics, ideology, cultural theory, literature, public art, tourism, film and museum exhibits.

By conveying a broad-ranging critical perspective demanded by the trans-disciplinary nature of the subject matter under analysis, the editors hope this book will appeal to a wider audience of undergraduate and postgraduate students seeking to establish relevant connections between conflict, memory and history, particularly in the areas of European Studies, History, Communication, Cultural and Literary Studies.

The volume is organized in three sections under the titles: “Conflict, Trauma, (Post-)memory: The Dialectic of European Identities”, “European Authoritarianisms: Historical Contexts and Politics of Memory”, and “(Post-)Imperial Writing: Ambivalence and Memory”. They address a number of issues and raise questions that have been crucial to our modern thought and problematic or even inexplicable to any cultural theory that ethically approaches history. The three sections work through and evaluate ongoing representative processes, strategies and practices, alongside longstanding constraints, dilemmas and taboos regarding discussions of contentious matters. Additionally, the different perspectives from which the issues of conflict, identity and memory (“impossible memory”, politics
of memory, and “post-memory”) are examined, in authoritarian, new European and (post-)colonial contexts, provide examples of power and conflict memories intervening in discourse and areas of cultural practice, destabilizing fixed or encoded meaning. They shed light on how the response to conflict and memory is always framed by the contexts of production and reception. Therefore, the tensions between memory and oblivion, the clashes between values, the revival of conflict memories or the transition to a culture of peace always happen within specific frameworks of interpretation. These explain the shifts and adjustments in memory activity and policies along the time, as well as all sorts of representational strategies bent on constructing counter-memories and shared identities.

The different chapters also examine how the “making sense” of our memories—so vital for the qualification of culture and social practices—is about concepts and ideas, as well as emotions and attachments, i.e. meaning resulting from effective social exchange framed by specific contexts of interpretation. If history is never simply one’s own, but is basically the way we are implicated in each other’s endeavours and traumas, representation functions less like a model transmitting only one-way and more like a model of dialogue, or dialogic encounter. In a broad sense, culture is then inseparable from the relational way we produce meaning, configure relations, situations and things, enact the stories and the images we choose to remember from the past, charge them with emotions, conceptualizations and appraisal.

Finally, the editors hope the three sections can create an interface that provides further insight into some of the narrative strands and interconnections, as well as the symbolical mechanisms and ways conflict, trauma, distortion, ambiguity and impasse, as a lasting feature of Europe’s cultural legacy, bear on the present and the foreseeable future. The editors also see this book as a contribution to a memory culture that is pushing forward the clarification of conflicts, crystallizations of tension and all sorts of threads that bind us, very often invisibly, to the past. In seeking to respond to this underlying ambition, Conflict, Memory Transfers and the Reshaping of Europe brings together a selection of papers delivered at the international conference organized by the Research Centre for Studies in Culture and Communication, held in 2008 at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa in Lisbon.

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SECTION ONE

CONFLICT, TRAUMA, (POST)MEMORY:
THE DIALECTIC OF EUROPEAN IDENTITIES
The Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit dedicated his book *The Ethics of Memory* to his parents, whom he introduced to the reader on the second page of his preface. “From early childhood”, he writes, “I witnessed an ongoing discussion between my parents about memory”. Margalit then reconstructs this parental dialogue, which started after the Second World War when it became obvious that both of their huge families in Europe had been destroyed.

This is what the mother used to say:

The Jews were irretrievably destroyed. What is left is just a pitiful remnant of the great Jewish people (by which she meant European Jewry). The only honorable role for the Jews that remain is to form communities of memory—to serve as ‘soul candles’ like the candles that are ritually kindled in memory of the dead.

This is what the father used to say:

We, the remaining Jews, are people, not candles. It is a horrible prospect for anyone to live just for the sake of retaining the memory of the dead. That is what the Armenians opted to do. And they made a terrible mistake. We should avoid it at all costs. Better to create a community that thinks predominantly about the future and reacts to the present, not a community that is governed from mass graves (Margalit 2003, vii-ix).

After 1945, it was first the father’s position that prevailed—and not only in Israel. What mattered then in Israel was the collective project of founding a new state, of forging a new beginning for survivors and opening up the future for successive generations. Four decades later,
during the 1980s, the mother’s position became increasingly dominant. Survivors turned to the past that they had held at a distance for so long. After the foundation of the state had been politically accomplished and confirmed by two wars, Yad Vashem became the symbolic cultural centre of the nation and Israeli society increasingly transformed itself into a ritualistic community of memory.

Margalit has presented two paradigmatic solutions for the problem of dealing with a traumatic past: remembering or forgetting, either the preservation of the past or orientation towards the future. I want to argue that today we are no longer dealing with only these two mutually exclusive models but are experimenting with three or perhaps with four. I will refer to them as

I. dialogic forgetting
II. remembering in order to prevent forgetting
III. remembering in order to forget
IV. dialogic remembering

The fourth model represents more of a claim and project than a reality. All four are attempts at dealing with or overcoming a traumatic history of violence and I address them in this paper in the above sequence. Furthermore, they are all also attempts at overcoming the pernicious basic law that persists after a traumatic outbreak of violence: victors impose their version of history on the defeated victims whose experience is silenced. Such a memory conquest of the stronger over the weaker perpetuates and stabilizes oppressive power relations and hence cannot be conceived as a “model” for dealing with a traumatic past. The same is true for an imposed silence which exonerates the perpetrators and harms the victims. The following models therefore all deviate from these basic and widespread modes of preserving a repressive status quo in trying to limit and overcome traumatic violence by negotiating a new and mutual vision or memory of the past.

I. Dialogic Forgetting

It is an age-old experience that the memory of violence, injustice, suffering and unsettled accounts is prone to generate new violence, mobilizing aggression between neighbours which tears societies apart. This is why humans throughout history have looked for pragmatic solutions to bring to an end a lethal conflict by controlling and containing
the explosive force of memory.\textsuperscript{1} Forgetting was discovered time and again in history as a resource under such circumstances. The term must not be taken too literally in this context. It is but another expression for “silence”. While the silence that is imposed by victors on losers is the perennial strategy of repressive regimes to muffle the voices of resisters and victims, self-imposed dialogic silence is a model for peace designed and agreed upon by two parties that had engaged in violence in order to keep an explosive past at bay. Such a forgetting was introduced, for instance, in ancient Greece after civil wars in order to achieve closure after a period of internal violence and to mark a new era in which a divided society could grow together again.\textsuperscript{2} Of course, the state could not directly influence the memories of its citizens, but it could prohibit the public articulation of resentments liable to reactivate old hatreds and new violence. After the Peleponnesian War, an Athenian law ordered such a form of stipulated forgetting (Loraux 1997). The injunction to forget was legally enforced by restricting public communication through specific taboos. A new word was even coined to describe what was henceforth forbidden: “mnesikakein” which means literally: “to remember what is bad”. The same model was implemented after other civil wars, for instance the Thirty Years War. The 1648 peace treaty of Münster-Osnabrück contains the formula: “perpetua oblivio et amnestia.”\textsuperscript{3} This policy of forgetting often goes hand in hand with a blanket amnesty in order to end mutual hatred and achieve a new social integration of formerly opposed parties.

It is interesting to note that even after 1945 the model of dialogic forgetting was still widely used as a political resource. The international court of the Nuremberg trials had of course dispensed transitional justice by indicting major Nazi functionaries for the newly defined “crimes against humanity”. This, however, was an act of purging rather than remembering the past. In postwar Germany, the public sphere and that of official diplomacy remained largely shaped by what was called “a pact of

\textsuperscript{1} Machiavelli once warned victors that it is easy to conquer a people, but next to impossible to conquer their memories. Unless they are scattered and dispersed, the citizens of a conquered city will never forget their former freedom and their old memories. They will introduce them on the every occasion that presents itself (Machiavelli 1970, 19)
\textsuperscript{2} See Emrich and Smith 1996; Smith and Margalit 1997.
\textsuperscript{3} The peace treaty (Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis of 24th October 1648) contains the following article: “Both sides grant each other a perpetual forgetting and amnesty concerning every aggressive act committed in any place in any way by both parties here and there since the beginning of the war.” (Buschmann 1994, 17).
silence”. The term was used in 1983 for a retrospective description by Hermann Lübbe (“kollektives Beschweigen”) (Assmann and Frevert 1999, 76-78). He made the controversial point that maintaining silence was a necessary and pragmatic strategy adopted in post-war Germany (and supported by the allies) to facilitate the economic and political reconstruction of the state and the integration of society. These goals were swiftly achieved in West Germany at the price of putting the former National Socialist elites back into power. Dialogic forgetting or the pact of silence also became, as Tony Judt has shown, a strategy of European politics. It was widely adopted during the Cold War period in which much had to be forgotten in order to consolidate the new Western military alliance against that of the Communist Bloc (Judt 2005).

A complex example for the strategy of forgetting is the case of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). The victor of this war, General Franco, stayed in power until 1975. During his dictatorship, the victor’s narrative prevailed. It was entrenched in textbooks and public monuments, silencing the point of view and memory of defeated republicans. Thus, the victor’s memory was established and enforced as the official perspective on this past (including a prohibition against challenging it). After Franco’s death in 1975, an unwritten law came into practice, generally referred to as “the pact of forgetting”. The prescribed silence was introduced as a model to ensure an easy transition into a new democracy. The formula “amnesia and amnesty” once again prevailed. However, given the established state of an asymmetric memory, it had the further one-sided effect of offering a general amnesty to Franco’s henchmen. Only in October 2007, seventy years after the civil war, an important shift occurred that brought the one-sided pact of forgetting to an abrupt end: Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero passed a so-called “memory law” in parliament, which finally introduced the Republican version of the civil war into the public memory by explicitly condemning the Fascist dictatorship and acknowledging the memory and suffering of its victims. This change in memory policy is significant: at a belated stage, this covered-up chapter of history is now forcefully and literally reintroduced into the present in painful acts of uncovering mass graves and exhuming the bodies of killed family members. Despite its ongoing controversies, the Spanish example shows that between the 1970s and the 1990s the norms and standards of democratic states have undergone a decisive change. During the last two decades, we have witnessed a general re-orientation from policies of forgetting to new cultures of remembering.
II. Remembering in order to never forget

Especially after civil wars, forgetting was prescribed as a potent remedy against socially dangerous and explosive forms of remembering so as to foster a speedier integration. Dialogic silence was a remedy but it was clearly no general cure for disposing of a traumatic past in other situations. The pact of forgetting works only after mutual forms of violence between combatants or under the pressure of a new military alliance like NATO. It cannot work after situations of asymmetric relations in which all-powerful perpetrators attacked defenceless victims. The paradigmatic case of such an asymmetric situation of extreme violence is the Nazi genocide of European Jews.

The paradigmatic shift from the model of forgetting to an orientation towards remembering occurred with the return of Holocaust memory after a period of latency. This memory returned in various steps. In the 1960s, it re-emerged together with images of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem which were projected into a transnational public arena. The televised event transformed the silenced memories of Israeli and diasporic Jewish families into a new ethnic community of memory. After the broadcasting of the American television series “Holocaust” in 1978, the impact of this event spilled over to those who had no share in the historical experience but joined the memory community on the basis of empathy. In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of events happened in Germany that transformed the social consensus and made the nation of the former perpetrators ready to formally join the transnational Holocaust community of memory. After 2000, this memory community was further extended when it was officially taken up by other European states and the United Nations. This general turn from amnesia to anamnesis could be witnessed in Germany and the respective countries on all levels of personal and collective remembering; it was supported by books and films, public debates and exhibitions, museums, monuments and acts of commemoration on a social, national and transnational level. Holocaust memory today is supported by an extended community with a long term commitment. This memory is sealed with a special pledge for an indefinite future: “to remember in order to never forget”. Through widening in space as well as in time, it has acquired the quality of a civil religion.

In the case of the Holocaust, the model of dialogic forgetting as a strategy of sealing a traumatic past and opening up a new future was no longer considered a viable solution for the problem. On the contrary, this form of closure was exactly what had to be prevented by all means. Remembering was the only adequate response to such collectively
destructive and devastating experiences. It was rediscovered not only as a therapeutic remedy for the survivors but also as a spiritual and ethical obligation for the millions of dead victims. Thus, slowly but inevitably, the pact of forgetting was transformed into a “pact of remembering”. The aim of such a pact is to transform the asymmetric experience of violence into symmetric forms of remembering. To leave the memory of suffering to the affected victim group was now recognized as prolonging the original murderous constellation. The fatal polarity between perpetrator and victim can never be reconciled but it can be overcome by a shared memory based on an empathetic and ethical recognition of the victim’s memories. The establishing of such a “pact of remembering” between Germans, as successors of the perpetrators, and Jews, as successors of the victims, was a historically new and unique answer to the historically unprecedented crime of the Holocaust.  

III. Remembering in order to forget

The cumulative process of the returning Holocaust memory was a decisive event in the 1980s that also brought about a profound change in sensibility in other places of the world faced by historic traumas. Against this background of a new awareness of the suffering of victims, forgetting was no longer acceptable as a general policy in overcoming atrocities of the past. Remembering became a universal ethical and political claim when dealing with other historic traumas such as the dictatorships in South America, the South African apartheid regime, colonial history or the crime of slavery. In most of these discourses about other atrocities, references and metaphorical allusions were made to the newly established memory icon of

[^4]: A problematic side effect of this model is the perpetuation of a neat division of perpetrators and victims, which is programmed and transmitted as fixed and immutable across generations in the respective national memories and into an indefinite future. It may constrain the capacity of these nations for re-imagining themselves in the future. It also has an effect on the possibility of social and political coexistence within a state. The former victims and former perpetrators of the genocide are today separated in different nations: Israel and the United States on the one hand and Germany (together with Austria and other collaborating nations) on the other. Germany, however, is also becoming the site of growing Jewish communities which was possible only on the basis of a clear and responsible relationship of Germans with their past, an exemplary attitude that was ironically referred to as the German DIN-norm of remembering. The coexistence of Jews with Germans in the former country of the perpetrators is highly complicated; it requires them necessarily to reinforce their difference and to take a kind of extraterritorial position.
the Holocaust. I want to argue, however, that although the Holocaust became the prototype of traumatic memories and was and is regularly invoked in the rhetoric of memory activists all over the world, it was not chosen as a model. The transformation of traumatic suffering into a semi-religious transnational and perpetual memory is not what was and is aimed at in other contexts. When I described the shift from the second to the third model as one of “remembering in order to never forget” to “remembering in order to forget”, I am exaggerating the difference for the purpose of analytic clarity. I therefore hasten to add, that “forget” in the context of the third model must not be taken too literally as an act of erasure or wiping the slate clean. It stands rather for the urge to leave behind and go beyond—in this, the third model clearly deviates from a semi-religious fixation and from a normative past as a form of negative revelation.

Since the 1980s and 1990s, we have witnessed a new memory policy that is no longer in strict opposition to forgetting but in alliance with it. In this model, the aim is also forgetting but the way to achieve this aim paradoxically leads through remembering. In this case, remembering is not implemented to memorialize an event of the past into an indefinite future but is introduced as a therapeutic tool to cleanse, to purge, to heal, and to reconcile. It is not pursued as an end in itself but as a means to an end, which is the forging of a new beginning.

Cultures in history have produced ample evidence for such forms of transitory and transitional remembering. In the ritual framework of Christian confession, remembering is the introduction to forgetting: the sins have to be publicly articulated and listed before they can be blotted out through the absolution of the priest. A similar logic is at work in the artistic concept of “catharsis”: through the re-presentation of a painful event on stage a traumatic past can once more be collectively re-lived and overcome in the very process of doing so. According to the theory of Aristotle, the group that undergoes such a process is purged by this shared experience. Forgetting through remembering is at bottom also the goal of Freudian psychotherapy: a painful past has to be raised onto the level of language and consciousness in order to be able to move forward and leave it behind. “To remember in order to forget” also holds true for the witness in court whose sole function is to support with his testimony the legal procedure of finding the truth and reaching a verdict. As the goal of every trial is the verdict and conclusion of the procedure, its aim is closure and therewith the final erasure of the event from social memory (Henne 2007, 79-91). There is a world of a difference between the legal witness testifying to a crime within the institution of the court and the “moral witness” (Avishai Margalit) testifying to a crime against humanity publicly
outside the courtroom and before a moral community. While the former’s narrative is subordinated to the legal process, the testimony of the latter is part of a civic culture of remembrance. A merging of the legal and therapeutic function was aimed at in the staging of remembering in South Africa. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission as designed by Bishop Tutu and Alex Boraine created a new form of public ritual, which combined features of the tribunal, cathartic drama and the Christian confession. In these public rituals, a traumatic event had to be publicly narrated and shared; the victim had to tell of his or her experiences and they had to be witnessed and acknowledged by the accused before they could be erased from social memory.

The model of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was invented in South America when countries such as Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil transitioned from military dictatorships to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. By enforcing the moral human rights paradigm, new political and extremely influential concepts were coined such as “human rights violations” and “state terrorism”. This led to the establishment of investigative commissions, which became the antecedent of later TRCs. They emphasized the transformative value of truth and stressed the importance of acts of remembrance. “‘Remember, so as not to repeat’ began to emerge as a message and as a cultural imperative.” (Jelin 2007, 5) Within the human rights framework, a new and highly influential concept of victimhood was constructed. It replaced the older frameworks within which power struggles used to be debated in terms of class struggles, national revolutions or political antagonisms. By resorting to the universal value of bodily integrity and human rights, the new terminology depoliticized the conflict and led to the elaboration of memory policies (Jelin 2007, 6). Within the new framework of a human rights agenda and a new memory culture, other forms of state violence could also be addressed such as racial and gender discrimination, repression and the rights of indigenous people. When it is decades and sometimes centuries after a traumatic past, justice in the full sense is no longer possible, memory was discovered as an important symbolic resource to retrospectively acknowledge these crimes against humanity. What the transnational abolition movement was to the 19th century, the new transnational concept of victimhood was for the late 19th and early 20th century. The important change is, however, that now the victims speak for themselves and claim their memories in a globalized public arena. The dissemination of their voices and their public visibility and audibility has created a new “world

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5 See also Elizabeth Jelin, 2003.
ethos” that is not automatically enforced but makes it increasingly difficult for state authorities to continue a repressive policy of forgetting and silence.

A new response to the disenfranchised discourse of human rights and mutual global media observation is the memory policy of public apology. We are without doubt, writes Christopher Daase, “living in an age of political apologies: The Pope apologises for the inquisition, the United Nations apologise for their inactiveness during the genocide in Rwanda, the Queen apologises for the repression of the Maori in New Zealand, President Jacques Chirac for the Dreyfus affair and President Bill Clinton for the slave trade.” The list can go on and it does go on. Whatever we may think of these acts, they are evidence of new departures in the construction of nations as moral communities in the contemporary world of media observation. Democratic states and their societies distinguish themselves from others in taking the principles of care and public accountability seriously (Bornemann 2002, 281-304 and Bennett 2008). This involves a new memory policy and a culture of remembrance that addresses unresolved issues of the past and listens with empathy to the voices of victims.

The TRC in South Africa placed “truth” (rather than justice) in first position. It was inspired by the idea of reconciliation and hence by negotiation, compromise and an orientation towards integration and a new beginning. Today, there are almost thirty TRCs working all over the world and where the rules and proceedings have to be reinvented each time according to the specific circumstances. Their aim is first and foremost a pragmatic one: they are designed as instruments for “mastering the past”. The fact that the equivalent German term “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” has a negative ring is another indicator of the difference between the second and the third model that I am here proposing. “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” in the sense of mastering the past is the explicit aim of the third model while the perpetual preservation of a normative past is the aim of the second model. We have learned in the meantime that a new beginning cannot be forged on a tabula rasa, nor is there such a thing as zero hour. To begin anew requires not forgetting but remembering. The road from authoritarian to civil societies leads through the needle’s eye of facing, remembering and coming to terms with a burdened past. The transformation process of memory that starts with

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7 See Pierre Hazan in Überblick. The May 2007 edition is dedicated to the problem of re-establishing justice after armed conflicts.
TRCs on the political level has to be deepened on the social level, which takes much longer. But, however long it may take and however deep it may go, remembering is not the aim of the process but only its medium. The aim is to facilitate recognition, reconciliation and, eventually, “forgetting” in the sense of putting a traumatic past behind in order to be able to imagine a common future.

## IV. Dialogic Remembering

With the third model, we have looked at cases in which a state transitions from dictatorship to democracy or confronts a traumatic history in order to create a shared moral consensus within its nation and society. My fourth model applies to situations that transcend such internal reconstructions of nations and societies. It concerns the memory policy of two or more states that share a common legacy of traumatic violence. Two countries engage in a dialogic memory if they face a shared history of mutual violence by mutually acknowledging their own guilt and empathise with the suffering they have inflicted on others.

As a rule, national memories are not dialogic but monologic. They are constructed in such a way that they are identity-enhancing and self-celebrating; their main function is generally to “enhance and celebrate” a positive collective self image. National memories are self-serving and therein closely aligned to national myths, which Peter Sloterdijk has appropriately termed modes of “self-hypnosis”. With respect to traumatic events, these myths provide effective protection shields against events that a nation prefers to forget. When facing negative events in the past, there are only three dignified roles for the national collective to assume: that of the victor who has overcome evil, that of the resister who has heroically fought off evil and that of the victim who has passively suffered evil. Everything else lies outside the scope of these memory perspectives and is conveniently forgotten.

After the Second World War, for instance, with the Germans in the evident role of perpetrator, all other national memories chose one of these dignified positions: the narrative of the victor was that of the allies, the narrative of the resister was assumed by the GDR and by France, the narrative of the victim was chosen by Poland and Austria. After 1989 and the demise of Soviet Union, the opening of Eastern European archives brought to light a number of documents that challenged some of these clear-cut memory constructions. The Holocaust, that had been a peripheral site in the Second World War, gradually moved into its centre to become a defining event. In the light of this shift in historical perspective, new
evidence of active collaboration, passive support, and indifference to the crime of the Holocaust brought about a crisis in national memories. In Western Europe, the national constructions of memory have become more complex through the acknowledgement of collaboration. In many Eastern states, however, the memory of the Holocaust has to compete with the memory of one’s own victimhood and suffering under communist oppression which is a hot memory that emerged only after the end of the Cold War. Because there is a notorious shortage in memory capacity the atrocities that one has suffered claim more space than the atrocities that one has committed.

Another lack of dialogic memory has become manifest in the relations between Russia and Eastern European nations. While Russian memory is centred on the great patriotic war and Stalin celebrated today as the national hero, the nations that broke away from Soviet power maintain a strikingly different memory of Stalin that has to do with deportations, forced labour and mass-killings. The triumphalist memory of Russia and the traumatic memory of Eastern European nations clash at the internal borders of Europe and fuel continuous irritations and conflicts.

There are dark incidents that are well known to historians and emphatically commemorated by the traumatized country but totally forgotten by the nation that was immediately responsible for the suffering. While in the meantime they have learned a lot about the Holocaust, younger Germans today know next to nothing about the legacy of the Second World War and the atrocities committed by Germans against, for instance, their Polish and Russian neighbours. The Warsaw uprising, a seminal event commemorated in Poland, is unknown to Germans because it is fully eclipsed by the Warsaw ghetto uprising. Germans have rightly reclaimed the bombing of Dresden for their national memory, but they have totally forgotten a key event of Russian memory, namely the Leningrad Siege (1941-44) by the German Wehrmacht, in which 700,000 Russians were starved to death.\(^8\) This event has never entered the German national memory due to a lack of interest, empathy and external pressure.

There are promising beginnings between teachers and historians of neighboring countries working on shared textbooks and mutual

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\(^8\) To quote from a recent historical account: The siege of Leningrad was “an integral part of the unprecedented German war of extermination against the civilian population of the Soviet Union. [...] Considering the number of victims and continuance of the terror, it was the greatest catastrophe that hit a city during the Second World War. The city was cut off from the outside world for almost 900 days, from September 7th to 27th January 1944” (Ganzenmüller 2005, 20). See also Peter Jahn 2007.
perceptions. On the whole, however, dialogic memory is still more of a project than a reality and is best exemplified by its absence. It must be emphasized, however, that the European Union creates a challenge to the solipsistic constructions of national memory and provides an ideal framework for dialogic remembering. As we all know, the European Union is itself the consequence of a traumatic legacy of an entangled history of unprecedented violence. If it is to develop further from an economic and political network to a community of values, the sharing of traumatic memories will have to play an important part in this process. Janusz Reiter, a former Polish ambassador to Germany commented on this situation: “With respect to its memories, the European Union remains a split continent. After its extension, the line that separated the EU from other countries now runs right through it.” On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Buchenwald, the former concentration camp prisoner Jorge Semprún said that one of the most effective possibilities to forge a common future for the EU is “to share our past, our remembrance, our hitherto divided memories”. And he added that the Eastern extension of the EU can only work “once we will be able to share our memories, including those of the countries of the other Europe, the Europe that was caught up in Soviet totalitarianism” (Semprún 2005).

Already in the 1920s, the historian Marc Bloch criticized the monologic character of national memory constructions, describing their solipsistic nature as a “dialogue between the deaf”. 80 years after Bloch, the European Union is offering a framework which makes possible and demands the restructuring of monologic into dialogic memories. Dialogic remembering which is, of course, applicable in any region of the world has a special relevance for Europe; it could produce a new type of nation state that is not exclusively grounded in pride but also accepting its quantum of guilt, thus ending a destructive history of violence by including the victims of this violence into one’s own memory. Such an inclusive memory, which is based on the moral standard of accountability and human rights, can in turn help to back up the protection of human rights and support the values of civil society.

Dialogic remembering links two nations through their common knowledge of a shared legacy of traumatic pasts. This, however, does by no means entail a unified master narrative for Europe. Richard Sennett has once remarked that it needs a plurality of contesting memories in order to acknowledge uncomfortable facts. That is exactly the potential that the EU framework has to offer: the transforming of solipsistic into dialogic

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9 My translation.
memories, even though it may take another shift in sensibility before this potential is eventually embraced by its member states.

**Conclusion**

The Israeli writer Amos Oz once remarked: “If I had a say in the peace talks—no matter where, in Wye, Oslo or wherever—I would instruct the sound technicians to turn off the microphones as soon as one of the negotiating parties starts talking about the past. They are paid for finding solutions for the present and the future” (Oz 1998, 83). Unfortunately, issues concerning the confronting of the past and the solving of problems urgent to the future are not always so easy to sever. On the contrary, all over the world acts of remembering are today part and parcel of the project of establishing the foundations of a more just society and a better future.

It must be conceded, however, that memories are double edged and can promote integration as well as disintegration: they are both part of the problem (as Amos Oz suggests) and of its solution. Whether memories are part of the problem by prolonging inequality and violence or whether they are a means to overcome it depends on the way they are framed in a given political and social situation. In my paper, I have focused on four models that have been devised and applied to cope with a traumatic legacy of the past and to forge a new beginning.

The first model, dialogic forgetting, was pre-scribed to achieve the closure of a violent past in a symmetric situation of power. Forgetting or silence can only work to create the basis for a new future if the aggression was not one-sided but mutual. While *repressive* silence is the “natural state” that continues the violence by prolonging oppressive power relations, protecting the perpetrators and harming the victims, *dialogic* silence is built on mutual agreement.

The second model, remembering in order to never forget, has to be considered as the unique answer to the unique historic trauma of the Holocaust. The shift from forgetting to remembering, which is linked to the Jewish trauma and evolved over the last four decades, has irreversibly changed our moral sensibility on a global scale. While the memory of the Holocaust was conducive to the emergence of other memories, it did not, I would claim, become their prototype. The Holocaust is unique given the methods of its execution and the number of irredeemable and irreconcilable victims. The answer to it is a monumental memory that is semi-religious and an end in itself.

The third model is not unique at all but has been replicated in variations all over the world. It can be paraphrased as remembering in