Clusivity
Clusivity:  
A New Approach to Association 
and Dissociation in Political Discourse 

By 

Anna Ewa Wieczorek 

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To My Parents
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INTRODUCTION

The concept of clusivity refers to various aspects of inclusion and exclusion encoded linguistically in discourse. As a fairly new concept, clusivity has been the subject of a number of linguistic studies published in an influential volume edited by Filimonova (2005). These studies and other publications, of much lesser influence, were mainly concerned with clusivity markers investigated by such branches of linguistics as morphology (e.g. LaPolla 2005; Cysouw 2005a), syntax (e.g. Dobrushina and Goussev 2005), semantics (e.g. Lichtenberk 2005; Siewierska and Bakker 2005), as well as, though, only to some extent, pragmatics and cognitive linguistics (e.g. Simon 2005; Adetunji 2006; Wieczorek 2009a, b, 2010). The majority of traditional studies treat clusivity as a grammatical category, thus limiting its scope. The approach adopted in this book is, however, greatly extended to encompass and investigate occurrences of cognitively construed and linguistically engendered association and dissociation, which, naturally, requires an interdisciplinary approach drawing from diverse fields, such as pragmatics, cognitive studies, sociolinguistics, psychology and sociology, all of which contribute to a better understanding of the concept in question. The book is likely to be of interest to readers concerned with discourse analysis, cognitive analysts and pragmatics, as well as those interested in political and social sciences, social psychologists and language practitioners, such as speechwriters and journalists.

The present study proposes a pragmatic-cognitive model which underlies, enables analysis and explains discursive representation of belongingness and dissociation in terms of conceptual location assigned to various discourse entities in discourse space (cf. Chilton 2005). It is concerned with three strategies which, combined, form a fully-fledged apparatus for the analysis of legitimising power of clusivity in political discourse through positive self and negative other presentation tactics. The proposal of a methodology for investigating the manner in which representation of inclusion and exclusion adds to the construal of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, and thus to inclusion and exclusion, incorporates a theoretical framework built on a pragmatic-cognitive approach to the analysis of electoral rhetoric. The model proposed here involves a pragmatic-cognitive methodology to examine
widely discussed political phenomena, e.g. legitimisation and delegitimisation, persuasion, manipulation, etc., which have been taken into consideration in various frameworks for the analysis of political discourse, yet which are often not specific enough to provide unequivocal research results. The data analysed and used for illustrative purposes comes from a collection of 30 speeches delivered by Barack Obama between 10th February 2007 and 4th November 2008, as well as other non-electoral American and European political speeches. The project does not make a claim that the database is a fully representational one, however, it seems to suffice in order to exemplify certain tendencies and discursive features present in clusivity-oriented discourse aimed at legitimisation. The analysis of the excerpts used to exemplify the manner in which strategies in question operate ignores other aspects than the written text of the speeches as prepared for delivery in front of a public. Although Barack Obama’s pre-election speeches were written by a team of speechwriters, among others Jon. Feiphluo and Ben. Rhodes, rather than the candidate himself, no distinction is made here between the author(s) and the speaker: the study makes reference exclusively to the speaker as such, irrespective of the amount of contribution on the part of speechwriters and Obama himself. The present study is thus an essentially theoretical enterprise which, however, includes a comprehensive empirical part whose aim is to evaluate and confirm the theoretical assumptions made. The focus is essentially on the relationship between the speaker and the addressees, as well as the speaker’s attempt to maintain it discursively via the use of the pragmatic-cognitive model proposed.

The primary aim of the book is thus to account for the mechanisms behind the conceptual representation of clusivity in an attempt to combine pragmatic, cognitive, as well as social and psychological approaches to discourse analysis. In short, the book pertains to: (a) the investigation of selected clusivity markers and their application in electoral discourse as a legitimisation-driven means of positive self and negative other-presentation, based on the representation of inclusionary and exclusionary statuses, which are assigned to chosen political actors in discourse space, and (b) the examination of feasibility of the Perspective-Distanciation-Proximisation model (the PDP model) proposed in the study. Apart from the interdisciplinary perspective taken, the study concentrates on the role of the speaker, who may assign inclusive or exclusive statuses to discourse entities and thus construct actors’ identities in discursive representation of reality. This boils down to the crucial notion of perspective, according to which discourse entities are viewed. Typically, it is the speaker’s perspective that dominates over the discourse space and conceptualisation
of belonging and dissociation, which is pragmatically evident in an utterance. However, in an attempt to establish a bond with other in-group members, the original perspective may be occasionally shifted so that it becomes a common in-group point of view the speaker and those allied share. Moreover, conceptual distance and proximity are manipulated alike in the speaker’s representation and the addressees’ construal of reality, i.e. events reconstructed and the presentation of the actors involved.
CHAPTER ONE

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CLUSIVITY

Group identities and boundaries, relationships between members and non-members, belonging and dissociation, as well as distance and proximity are communicated whenever people interact, both verbally and non-verbally. They are, however, far more salient in discourses encoding inclusion and exclusion, in which self and other presentation plays a truly significant role. Political discourse is a notably rich source of such micro-strategies as legitimising self and delegitimising other and enhancing polar opposites of “us” and “them,” which, among others, contribute to the attainment of the ultimate macro-goal of political discourse: power. Thus, discursive projections of positive self-image and negative-other image are to be found on virtually all occasions when the struggle for power is at play, and in electoral discourse in particular. The event of presidential election is an occasion on which the speaker will typically aim at constructing a representation of self as a charismatic, resourceful, essentially good presidential candidate, sharing certain ideological and moral values with the addressees. Indeed, it is the relationship with the addressees, conceptually established in discourse, that determines whether voting will be favourable for the candidate or not. Therefore the creation of bipolar oppositions between “us-good people” and “them-bad people” is an inherent element of discourse in presidential campaigns, in which discursive representation of reality depends on positive self-image and negative other-image: evoking the aura of credibility, belonging and familiarity in relation to the group associated with the speaker, on the one hand, and on negative other-image, which evokes the aura of disreputableness, dissociation and isolation in relation to out-group members, on the other.

Legitimisation and delegitimisation

The first part of this chapter aims at introducing and defining the two crucial phenomena that prove to be indispensable in the discussion of clusivity-driven political discourse, namely legitimisation and delegitimisation.
Numerous studies define legitimisation as a process of attaining the state of legitimacy, i.e. the state of being commonly accepted on the grounds of abiding by the rules, norms and values shared within a given group, be it a society, a national minority group or a political party. This is to say that the process of legitimising makes a particular concept, idea, decision, etc. acceptable and justifiable since it provides an explanation so as to convince people that what has been done or decided to be done is essentially “good” and “right.” According to Kneuer, attaining the goal of legitimisation is equivalent to “securing stability and maintaining power of authoritarian rulers” (2011: 1). Moreover, he draws upon other accounts, such as Weber’s definition of legitimacy, which considers it to be “[a] key concept for the maintenance of power and stability of political systems, democratic or autocratic, [since] [a]ny power needs to justify itself by attempting ‘to establish and cultivate the belief in its legitimacy’” (Weber 1922, First Part, III. 1. §1) (quoted in Kneuer 2011: 2). He supports the aforementioned claim with Lipset’s approach: “political systems have to be able ‘to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate one for the society’” (1983: 64 quoted in Kneuer 2011: 2).

Also Scharpf’s (1998) understanding of the notion of legitimacy seems to be fairly relevant to the way it is treated here. He distinguishes three types of the concept in question: input legitimacy, output legitimacy and so called “we identity,” seen as collective identity of a particular group. By the same token, the three manners of winning legitimacy and thus the audience’s support refers to “Abraham Lincoln’s triad of ‘government of the people, by the people, and for the people’” (in Kneuer 2011: 3), which Kneuer explains in the following way:

The first element, government of the people, can be assumed as given in nation states as a sort of pre-political sense of belonging or collective identity. This “we-identity” is basic insofar as it justifies the obligation of solidarity that underlies community, on the one hand, as well as the trust that the majority will not utilize its strength against the minority, on the other. It is only this sense of community that justifies majoritarian decisions and sacrifices that are made by citizens including minorities. (2011: 3)

The “Government of the people” dimension, or output legitimacy, refers to the so called “we-identity” of particular groups and requires some amount of effort and sacrifice on the part of its members. Moreover, it constitutes a legitimacy prerequisite which strengthens the two remaining aspects and vice versa (Scharpf 1998: 89). “Government by the people,” or input
legitimacy, assigns political actions and decisions taken by political leaders to socially “negotiated” consent, i.e. “participation of the citizens, the pluralism of interest groups, political parties and civil society” (Kneuer 2011: 3). Thus, since societal needs and demands are expected to be fulfilled by the actions decided upon and undertaken by political agents, the authorities need to be perceptive enough to respond to them by virtue of their “electoral accountability” (2011: 3). Finally, “government for the people” assumes that political actions need to take into account and suit the needs of the society at large, thus providing solutions to its problems. The authorities, therefore, are, so to say, obliged to provide the means by which the society as a group will benefit and will be able to fulfil its needs and expectations. This is to say that in democratic realities

political objectives should be determined by the preferences of the governed, but only if the governed are “enlightened” and express interests shaped by common sense. The government should be able to pursue politically effective actions, but only if these serve the common good and abuse of power is ruled out. (Kneuer 2011: 3)

In Scharpf’s terms, then, legitimisation aims at attaining legitimacy that is based on common beliefs and thus “create[s] a sense of normative obligation that helps to ensure the voluntary compliance with undesired rules or decisions of governing authority” (2009: 173). Also Coicaud sees legitimacy as “the recognition of the right to govern” (2002: 10). Along the same lines, Brooker proposes two manners of seeking legitimacy and thus justifying and maintaining political speakers’ authority and power: via “coercion and repression on one side, and the quest for legitimacy on the other” (1999: 101). It seems, however, far more effective to employ these two manners simultaneously, i.e. exercise coercion discursively and support it with legitimisation strategies.

Van Leeuwen’s taxonomy of legitimation categories provides a more detailed account of how the notion may be employed in political discourse. The four categories he proposes, i.e. authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis, are used strategically by the speaker as either fully separate mechanisms or in combination with each other in order to legitimise the speaker’s stance and decisions, as well as delegitimise those his opponents. Authorisation, the first category, refers to legitimisation achieved via “reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested” (van Leeuwen 2007: 92). In other words, it is largely concerned with “because I say so,” “because experts say so” and “because that’s the way things have always been” argumentation. The second category, i.e.
moral evaluation, pertains to obtaining legitimiation via “reference to value systems” (2007: 92), which is primarily exercised by means of discursive representation of the set moral values and ideology held by a particular group of individuals and linguistically via lemmas referring to them.

Rationalisation, the next category, concern legitimising by means of “reference to the goals and uses of institutionalised social action, and to the knowledge society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity” (2007: 91). This is to say that this category serves to provide justification and rationale behind the decisions taken and occuring events “by reference to their goals, uses and effects” (2007: 91) and thus is often presented in terms of a cause-effect relationship. The final category, namely mythopoesis, refers to “legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes rewards legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions” (2007: 92) and whose potential is to provide comprehensible explanation, or an illustration of, often, very complex argumentation.

Similarly, Chilton approaches legitimisation as a considerably broader concept, which inherently involves coercive practices and provides the basis for legitimacy of particular actions and decisions. Coercion as such is inherent in both legitimisation of self and, by the same token, in delegitimisation of other:

Political actors [...] often act coercively through language in setting agendas, selecting topics in conversation, positioning the self and others in specific relationships, making assumptions about realities that hearers are obliged to at least temporarily accept in order to process the text or talk.

(2004: 45)

The variety of arguments that serve the purposes indicated above are communicated in discourse implicitly, as well as explicitly and pertain to the representation of “voters’ wants, general ideological principles, charismatic leadership [...], boasting about performance and positive-self presentation” (2004: 46), as well as criticism of the actions and performance of others and negative other-presentation. Delegitimisation and legitimisation may be understood in terms of two extremes on the same scale. According to Chilton, these extremes bear similarity to the concept of face, i.e. they “may coincide with positive face (being an insider and legitimate) and negative face (being not only an outsider and thus not a legitimate member but also under attack)” (2004:46). The concept of delegitimisation facilitates negative presentation of others, i.e. “foreigners, enemies within, institutional opposition, unofficial opposition” (2004: 46) and negative assessment of their actions and
decisions. Thus, delegitimisation techniques will typically promote
dissociation and boundary demarcation by means of

acts of blaming, scape-goating, marginalising, excluding, attacking the
moral character of some individual or group, attacking the communicative
cooporation of the other, attacking the rationality and sanity of the other.
(2004: 47)

Legitimisation, by contrast, concerns self and is evident in self-promoting
practices, such as:

positive self-presentation, manifesting itself in acts of self-praise, self-
apology, self-explanation, self-justification, self-identification as a source
of authority, reason, vision and sanity, where the self is either an individual
or the group with which an individual identifies or wishes to identify.
(Chilton 2004: 47)

Chilton distinguishes two major types of legitimisation: epistemic and
deontic. The former refers to the authoritative character of the speaker’s
claims, his fuller and better understanding of the world and the occurring
events, as well as to his unbiased judgement, “even more advanced in this
mode of thought than rivals or adversaries” (2004: 117). The latter, on the
other hand, is concerned with the speaker’s overt or covert claims that are
“not only ‘right’ in the cognitive sense, but ‘right’ in a moral sense”
(2004:117). This is to say that the speaker’s claims are considered to be
morally acceptable on the understanding that they converge with the
ideological assumptions held by the in-group. Moreover, such ideological
cues are likely to carry certain emotional weight:

There is an important overlap in this domain with feelings as well as
‘factual’ representations. The speaker will seek to ground his or her
position in moral feelings or intuitions that no one will challenge. The
analysis suggests that certain intuitive, emotionally linked mental schemas
are being evoked. Certain emotions that can be reasonably regarded as in
some way basic are evidently stimulated – most obviously fear, anger,
sense of security, protectiveness, loyalty. (Chilton 2004: 117)

In sum, legitimisation is a complex strategy, whose power resides in its
epistemic and deontic character. On the one hand, it pertains to the
dichotomy between “us” being right vs. “them” being wrong and “us”
being accepted on moral grounds vs. “them” hence being morally
dissociated, on the other.
Political discourse, and pre-election speeches in particular, primarily relies on the speaker’s voicing his stance in front of a public, which, in American circumstances, seems to be an efficacious way to convince the electorate to vote in favour of the speaker’s candidacy for the Presidency of the United States. Winning the voters’ support is determined by establishing and maintaining a bond and common ground with them so that they are inclined to conceptualise the speaker and themselves in terms of in-group members, in stark contrast to out-group members. Thus, electoral speeches are constructed so as to represent distinct and unequivocably separate in and out-groups and aim at creating the aura of unity, belonging and familiarity among inclusive members and, by the same token, of strangeness and dissociation of the in-group form non-members with exclusionary status. Positive presentation of self and negative presentation of other along with legitimisation of self and delegitimisation of other seem salient factors in electoral discourse not without a reason. Duranti (2006), for example, holds that, in an attempt to establish a bond with the addressees, presidential candidates tend to narrate their private selves as similar to other in-group members, e.g. in terms of certain shared experiences, feelings, beliefs, etc. Such narrative representations concentrate on discursive construal of political self as the president-to-be, as well as self as an individual in possession of particular qualities that match those considered desireable by the entire in-group. The former is typically a part of hypothetical or imagined representation, while the latter tends to be more factual, yet only to a certain extent, as it may also be partially constructed in a discursive representation of reality. Apart from narrating, there are also other linguistic means of construing the image of self as such and of self in relation to the in-group, as well as of other and of other in relation to the in-group.

**Social and psychological foundations**

Belonging to groups resides among fundamental human needs, such as self-esteem, freedom and control, as well as meaningful existence. Baumeister and Leary (1995) claim that “[a]fter primary needs such as food and shelter are satisfied, the need to belong is among the strongest of human motivations” (in Twenge and Baumeister 2005: 28). Thus, human social life relies to a great extent on a network of diverse relationships we form with others as a means of seeking and maintaining both belongingness and inclusion. However, apart from providing social inclusion these relationships also impose boundaries on people. The
boundaries, by their very nature, rely on inclusion of particular individuals and, by the same token, exclusion of others:

much of social life is about who we include, who we exclude, and how we all feel about it. The human passion for walls, fences, and ditches is no accident – it is a material manifestation of our need to manage inclusion and exclusion. (Abrams et al. 2005a: 2)

The need to belong is speculated to have been triggered by evolution itself: for our predecessors social exclusion frequently resulted in death caused by difficulties in hunting, gathering, and most of all maintaining self-defence against enemies. Social inclusion, thus, satisfies the need to belong providing individuals with a sense of security and safety (Twenge and Baumeister 2005: 28).

Normally, it is social and political leaders who are in power to assign in-group status to other individuals, as well as in a position to marginalise and exclude them. The Leader-Member Exchange Theory, as discussed by Hogg et al., captures the leaders’ tendency to make a distinction between their subordinates “favoring some over others by developing more rewarding interpersonal [relationships] with some than with others” (2005: 197). As a result, some in-group members take more peripheral while others more central positions in the group. Importantly enough, social inclusion and exclusion is not directly related to the assessment of an individual’s personal characteristics, but rather to their characteristics projected in situations of intergroup contact (Abrams et al. 2005b). On the other hand, the Social Identity Analysis of Leadership Theory distinguishes two major styles of leadership: personalised and depersonalised. The former, in which the leader clearly occupies the dominant position, may, under particular circumstances, be judged negatively by other group members and therefore be less efficient in comparison to a more depersonalised leadership style, in which equal in-group status is assigned to all members (see Hogg et al. 2005). Haslam et al. (2001) argue that what influences the way the addressees perceive the leader, as a powerful individual, is the leader’s affirmation of his own inclusionary status. In fact, the more affirmative of in-group belonging the leader’s behaviour (both verbal and non-verbal) is the more he is viewed as charismatic, potent and effective. Typically, it is the most prototypical representative of a particular group that will eventually evolve

1 It would be rather unusual to argue that there are leaders who are assigned exclusionary status in a group, however, Abrams et al. (2005b) mention such a possibility.
into a leader. In other words, the link between prototypicality and the emergence of leadership is enhanced when prototypes are internalized to the self-concept or, i.e. one’s social identity (see Hogg 2001). Hogg’s (2001) theory of social identity focuses on the leader’s prototypicality in a group. As the most prototypical in-group member, the leader is “the most [psychologically] included,” as well as the most wanted representative of the group (Abrams et al. 2005b: 179). Such individuals are highly regarded and most positively valued members, who thus will occupy the central position in a group:

These members are popular; they are consensually liked as group members. They are highly influential and, according to the social identity analysis of leadership, in high salience groups with which members identify strongly they tend to occupy leadership positions or be endorsed as effective leaders. (Hogg et al. 2005: 196)

Such an overly positive treatment of the leader naturally requires reciprocity on his part. The leader’s actions will thus naturally aim at projecting, enhancing and maintaining a positive image of the in-group as a whole and its members as its essential parts – a means of winning further support.

As has been already said, what constitutes the primary social motive for a vast majority of people’s actions is the need to develop and preserve enduring and meaningful relationships with others: “[p]eople strongly desire social attachments, exert considerable energy to develop and sustain them, and are adversely affected by their dissolution or absence” (Baumeister and Leary 1995 in Major and Eccleston 2005: 63). Therefore, in the face of social exclusion, they frequently internalise the feelings of rejection, exclusion and detachment, which results in self-dislike. According to Twenge and Baumeister, such a situation affects the level of self-esteem, defined as “a sociometer that measures a person’s prospects for belongingness” (2005: 28). Leary et al. (1995) support the approach and argue that self-esteem-oriented intricacies provide further insight into individual in-group statuses. Along with belongingness, self-esteem induces prosocial behaviours, motivated by their potential to augment possibilities of (re)inclusion. Moreover, Williams and Govan (2005) noticed that whenever the sense of belongingness or self-esteem is threatened, a surge in prosocial practices is likely to occur in order to regain the in-group status.

The in-group status essentially depends on the sense of similarity between group members and common ground as regards the underlying
existence of a bond between them. The bond itself engenders a set of commitments on their part, as well as benefits:

These ties often imply an obligation to the group (i.e. that as a member you are expected to work in ways to promote and help the group). But these ties also imply that as a group member one can rely on the other members of the group for support, security, and safety. (Pickett and Brewer 2005: 91)

Thus, the need to belong stems from an inherent need to be similar and to assimilate. Pickett and Brewer claim that a means to the end of forming greater in-group inclusion is to “perceive the in-group and out-group as distinct from each other, which can be achieved via enhanced perceptions of in-group and out-group homogeneity” (2005: 104). The perceived distinctions between particular social groups tend to be eliminated, which arises from the nature of humans as social animals whose existence is subject to their cooperation with others. The network of such interdependencies includes the capacity to dissociate oneself from others, as well as associate oneself with them. Decety and Sommerville present self as a cognitively multi-faceted concept dependent on “a distributed neural network” involving a common set of self-other representations, which may be pinpointed precisely in “prefrontal, posterior temporal and inferior parietal areas” (2003: 527) of the brain. Being social animals, people co-operate on the understanding that their mutual transactions may generate short-term, as well as long-term benefits indispensable for their survival. Dovidio et al. argue that inclusion constitutes one of basic aspects of such in-group collaboration:

Co-operation and other forms of assistance ultimately benefit the provider if others are willing to reciprocate. To the extent that opportunities for reciprocation are greater within than across groups, social categorization thus provides a basis for achieving the benefits of cooperative interdependence while minimising risk of excessive costs. (2005: 246)

Following Social Identity Theory, the social division of people into in and out-group members, of which the first specifically comprises members similar to self, while the latter those different from self, encourages positive-group-distinctiveness practices, which may include, among others: “enhancing the image, prestige, and resources available to one’s own group by derogating or discriminating against outgroups” (Esses et al. 2005: 317). The mechanism of group categorisation, then, would naturally
aim at minimising intragroup differences and maximising intergroup differences.

The socio-psychological fundamentals of belongingness are based on such features and views of individuals forming the group that are similar, common, mutual and/or shared. Chilton claims that sharing a viewpoint “in matters of justice and injustice [and] good and evil is what makes a ‘household’ and state” (2004: 199). His account presupposes a common system of in-group values is engendered in language. Similarly, Decety and Chaminade indicate a link between in-group belonging and what they refer to as “a shared representations network,” which “enables the self to represent the other, project thoughts and feelings to the other, feel sympathy for the other, and may also account for psychological identification with others” (2003: 578). Therefore, within a particular group, events, as well as individual objects may be viewed in a way that is tacitly agreed upon by its members:

one may advocate that within a given cultural group, the meaning of a given object, action, or social situation may be common to several individuals and thus should activate the same mental code. This code would be mediated by a similar neural network in their respective brains. (2003: 584)

However, such shared representations cannot be attributed to have a solely psychological and cognitive character. They are also encoded in language and “address semantic and affective representations,” which is manifested in our perception of other people as psychologically similar to us. Thus, it is claimed that we seem to have an inborn capacity to read intentions and mental states of others (see Gordon 1986). The approach corresponds with the Simulation Theory, elaborated on by philosophers of mind, which holds that “one represents the mental activities and processes of others by generating similar activities and processes in oneself” (Decety and Chaminade 2003: 584). Yet to say that shared representations assume identicalness of these mental operations in self and other would be too far-fetched a conclusion; if it were otherwise, “representations of self and others would completely overlap, and lead to confusion” (Decety and Sommerville 2003: 527).

On the level of social psychology and developmental science, the notion of representations shared by self and other is said to determine the image of self, which stems from the fact that conceptualisations of self and other are interdependent:
Further support for shared mental representations of self and other comes from work suggesting that individuals readily confuse their own traits and attitudes with those of intimate or in-group others, leading some investigators to conclude that close relationships include viewing other in the self. (Decety and Sommerville 2003: 528)

In fact, human ability to affiliate with other and differentiate self from other constitutes a salient aspect of a group’s existence and organisation. However, the concept of self is not inborn; quite the contrary, it is gained in the process of communication and cooperation with others, as well as through observation. On the basis of this claim, Berger and Luckmann distinguish two types of socialisation: primary and secondary. The former is concerned with “[the] socialisation an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society,” while the latter refers to “any subsequent process that inducts an already socialised individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society” (1967: 130). With regard to belongingness to in-groups and out-groups, primary socialisation is institutionalised and hardly ever undergoes any modification, while secondary socialisation may alter the individual’s views, moral stance, values and beliefs and, as a result, influence the level of shared membership in a particular group. Self, being both a social and one-of-a-kind entity, may overlap to a certain extent with other, yet, at the same time, be largely distinct. To put it another way, shared mental representations between self and other are strongly linked from the early developmental stages, which seems to explain the human ability to identify with others. According to the Social Comparison Theory, people have a tendency to search similarities and differences between themselves and others to assess their own capabilities, beliefs and values: “[c]omparing others to the self highlights differences between self and other, whereas comparing self to the other yields more similar self/other ratings” (Decety and Sommerville 2003: 529).

Social psychologists, as well as developmental scientists argue that the tendency to juxtapose self and other might, in fact, be “a default mode of the human mind as illustrated by the egocentric bias in social psychology” (Decety and Sommerville 2003: 529). Yet to interact efficiently and successfully in a society, humans need to possess the capacity to assimilate with the other, as well as to distinguish from the other. Therefore, at the level of group management, administering group membership is fundamental, on the one hand, however, on the other, differences between members constitute a salient factor for organisation of both inter and intragroup relations (Pickett and Brewer 2005: 96). Groups, clearly, do not exist on their own in utter separation from the rest of the
world. Moreover, the existence of an in-group naturally presupposes the existence of out-groups. Thus, the processes of inclusion and exclusion seem to be crucial to group membership management. Following Levine et al., “inclusion/exclusion occurs via role transitions that signal the movement of individuals through several phases of group membership” (2005: 155). The phases mentioned comprise inclusive role transitions of entry and acceptance, and exclusive role transitions of divergence and exit. In the first type, individuals may become new members or obtain full membership in a group, i.e. they “move toward the core of the group and gain status.” In the latter, they either become marginal members, yet in possession of in-group status, or ex-members with an out-group status, as they “move away from the core of the group and lose status” (Levine et al. 2005: 155). In fact, a group member will find a near-peripheral positioning, that is a position within in-group, yet close to the out-group location, threatening (Pickett and Brewer 2005: 93).

Such an assignment of inclusionary and exclusionary statuses, dependent on the process of individual assessment, serves the purpose of maintaining in-group norms. Relations between groups may occasionally undergo certain transformations, e.g. whenever out-group members are included due to “redefining intergroup boundaries, forming cross-group relationships, or by maintaining subordinate and superordinate group identities” (Abrams et al. 2005a: 10). If, however, individuals are excluded from the in-group, they naturally tend to increase their efforts to regain their inclusionary status: “[t]hese behaviours range from working harder in group settings, to conforming to group perceptions, to being more sensitive to information about others” (Williams and Govan 2005: 49). At the psychological level, it is their attempts to appear “prosocial and conciliatory” that increases their chances of becoming an in-group member again (2005: 49). It has been concluded on the basis of a number of studies, though, that groups are fully aware that their members may have diverse characteristics and beliefs. In such a case, they can regard in-group members as either atypical, yet still having the inclusionary status, or deviant members who may be criticised or stigmatised and eventually excluded from the group.

Exclusion

In the light of what has been said so far, both inclusion and exclusion are means of establishing, managing and maintaining inter and intragroup relations. Marginalisation and ostracism, which may lead to exclusion, are exercised to uphold the in-group norms through eradication of members
whose actions and beliefs are at odds with the group’s standards. Any manifestation of ostracism towards defiant members may result in altering their behaviours and, eventually, their re-admittance to the in-group. Williams and Govan argue that such practises would never be applied if the effect was otherwise:

If ostracism was not generally effective in bringing the undesirable behaviour of individuals back to acceptability, then it seems unlikely that ostracism would be practiced universally. (2005: 51)

Major and Eccleston find ostracism psychologically salient for a number of reasons, such as enhancing group self-esteem and positive image of its members. This is due to the fact that “excluding those who are stigmatised may help those who are not stigmatised to feel better about themselves and their group” (Major and Eccleston 2005: 67). Irrefutably, such occurrences of exclusion and bias may only be manifested on the understanding that they have been applied as a legitimate course of events. Among a variety of other types of exclusion, the one based on stigma rests on tacit social agreement concerning the object(s) of stigmatisation. The processes of stigma attribution and management are shared by group members and frequently rely upon “a social justification or supportive ideology for moral exclusion” (Abrams et al. 2005a: 5). The mechanism of social exclusion may be characterised with respect to source and target:

Social categories and groups are clearly one type of target of exclusion, particularly if they are minorities, are unfamiliar, or pose any kind of threat. Social categories, and more often groups, are also powerful agents of exclusion. (Abrams et al. 2005a: 17)

Individuals who do not fit within the group may readily undergo exclusion from the in-group or from interpersonal relationships due to their out-group status or a mismatch between them and other in-group members.

Exclusion takes various forms and thus has different bases: “from the ideological to the physical, communicative, and purely cognitive” (Abrams et al. 2005a: 3). Moreover, exclusion may be fundamentally dependent on dissimilarities regarding geographical location, religion, or ethnicity. Abrams et al. (2005a) distinguish different levels of exclusion: (a) societal exclusion, where chosen individuals or groups of individuals are consensually excluded from a society, (b) institutional exclusion, where institutions select particular groups to determine norms for both group association and dissociation practices, (c) intergroup exclusion, where groups establish clear demarcation lines to enhance their
distinctiveness from other groups, and (d) intragroup exclusion, where
groups establish sets of norms by means of which members can define
themselves as fully legitimate members. Intergroup exclusion, involving
rivalry or clash between groups, is far more frequent than the remaining
levels. By analogy to the last two levels mentioned, interpersonal
exclusion involves rejection from a relationship, while intrapersonal
exclusion “refers to a cognitive and emotional frame that enables or
prevents a person from considering opportunities for inclusion in the first
place” (2005a: 17-18).

The rationale for exclusion range from “the alleviation of discomfort,
system justification, and status preservation for the members of majority
groups” to evolutionary reasons like “avoiding poor partners for exchange,
those who are diseased and out-group members, or those who undermine
group living” (Abrams et al. 2005a: 5). Exclusion, partially based on the
rationale mentioned above, relies on dissociation relating to (a) “social
ideology, moral conventions and principles,” (b) “social (and cognitive)
representations”, as well as (c) categorisation “rang[ing] from relatively
abstract to relatively specific” types (2005a: 18-19). Strangely enough,
ideological framework is not a prerequisite for assigning simple qualities
to individuals, especially such that “dehumanize or infrahumanize” them
leading to ostracism of the entire group and does not facilitate exclusion
(2005a: 18). By contrast, Crandall (1994) concentrates on ideological
aspects of stigma-based exclusion in which stigma is defined as “a mark or
sign of disgrace or discredit” and distinguishes three separate facets of the
concept: consensual, shared, and justified. Consensual aspect of stigma-
based exclusion refers to one pertaining to race, religion, etc. and is shared
by members of the same group who typically resemble each other in some
respects. Shared exclusion relies on the concept of group identity based on
members “shar[ing] the same attribute[s] [and] belong[ing] to the same
category,” as well as on the lack of belongingness of those who do not
share these qualities (Major and Eccleston 2005: 64-66). Pickett and
Brewer, on the other hand, hold that exclusion may be a means of
reinforcing one’s feeling of in-group belongingness; in other words, “[t]o
be able to say that another person does not belong in the group is perhaps
the ultimate symbol of in-group belonging” (2005: 89). Abrams et al.
argue that it is also the asymmetry in power distribution that enables
exclusion of particular individuals in case others judge their behaviour to
be illicit (2005a: 20). Justified exclusion assumes the existence of a tacit
agreement between group members that exclusion of a particular member
is a legitimate and warranted:
Opotow [...] referred to this as “moral exclusion,” observing that groups are morally excluded when they are perceived as ‘outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply’ (1990: 173). (in Major and Eccleston 2005: 66)

Exclusion, as has been mentioned earlier, comprises twofold role transitions, i.e. divergence and exit. The former refers to the progression from the status of a full in-group member to marginal member, while the latter from a marginal member to ex-member, or, in other words, to out-group member. Levine et al. state that divergence is a typically exclusive role transition, as “the group is signalling its negative regard for members,” whose values differ from in-group values, by depriving them of their inclusionary status (2005: 152). Like divergence, exit exhibits exclusive role transition features. As stigmatised members are selected and separated by the group within its boundaries, they undergo the group’s evaluation. Once classified as deviant, stigmatised individuals are expelled from the in-group, a typical instance of what Hogg et al. have referred to as the “black sheep effect” (2005:195).

Inclusion

Ostracism, as already indicated, induces various attempts on the part of an excluded in-group member at re-inclusion, involving behaviours leading to adaptation to the group’s norms. However, apart from the natural capacity to exclude, social groups may similarly include individuals in order to maintain and regulate their existence as categories or groups. Williams and Govan (2005) suggest that it is the means by which an individual claims re-inclusion and fulfils the basic needs for belonging, self-esteem, control and meaningful existence that influences the choice between positive and negative response to ostracism. That is to say that in case belonging and self-esteem are threatened, attempts at winning inclusion are more than likely to occur. On the other hand, in case the sense of control and recognition are endangered, individuals facing ostracism will behave in a way that may enable them to “validate existence and regain control over others” (in Abrams et al. 2005:4). Thus, the major task of a marginal in-group member would be to demonstrate their similarity to other in-group members, which means they will need to act in such a way as to “clarify intergroup boundaries” (Pickett and Brewer 2005: 99-101). McLaughlin-Volpe et al. Argue that it is, in fact, prototypicality of that constitutes a salient source of identity for any group member, as well as common ground shared with other members which involves, among others, a shared point of view, system of values, norms,
etc. (2005: 114). On the other hand, in their attempt to become a more prototypical in-group member, individuals undergo gradual depersonalisation: self is altered according to the in-group’s perspective and system of values. According to Brewer (1991), the characteristics that a person has in common with other group members are “most salient features of the self-concept” in the process of group identification (in Pickett and Brewer 2005: 92).

Identification with groups contributes to the development of the sense of self, which naturally leads to positive self-evaluation and affects individuals’ perspective, values, feelings and actions, and thus relations with others. Hogg et al. suggest that the human need to be part of a group adds to the overall positive image of self and the in-groups, which “provide one with a sense of certainty about who one is, how one should behave, and how others will react” (2005: 199). The Social Identity Theory confirms the tendency of unification within groups. According to Abrams et al., intragroup and intergroup relations have a great influence on group perspectives and behaviours through categorisation: “[w]hen social identity is salient, category-based features will be attributed to all category members” decreasing discrepancies between individuals within a single group and increasing discrepancies between in-group and out-groups (2005b: 164). However, an individual may be included in more than one group, and thus have several identities at a time. It is inclusive role transitions of entry and acceptance, namely the point at which individuals are assigned the status of members or full members and become more prototypical, respectively, that provide more salient motives for the need to belong than exclusive role transitions mentioned above. The motives include the need to be a member of a group and take part in social relationships: “[p]eople can seek personalized belonging, based on their attractiveness as individuals, or depersonalized belonging, based on their attractiveness as group members” (Levine et al. 2005: 148). In both cases, inclusive role transitions, which enhance membership, will normally constitute more attractive goals than exclusive role transitions, which enhance dissociation. The want to manage one’s own social and physical circumstances, as well as create a positive self-image in a group are other motives behind favouring inclusive over exclusive role transitions in which case “[p]eople obtain positive social identity from belonging to valued groups” (Levine et al. 2005: 148).

Interestingly enough, virtually all instances of identification analysis include the notion of psychological inclusiveness, according to which an individual treats self as a component of a larger unit, such as a group. Identification is a process far more complex than just physical division and