


Building Civil Society and Democracy in New Europe

Building Civil Society and Democracy in New Europe

Edited by

Sven Eliaeson



Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Building Civil Society and Democracy in New Europe, Edited by Sven Eliaeson

This book first published 2008 by

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

15 Angerton Gardens, Newcastle, NE5 2JA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2008 by Sven Eliaeson and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-84718-465-0, ISBN (13): 9781847184658

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures.....	viii
List of Tables.....	ix
Acknowledgements	xii
Preface	xiii

Introduction	1
Sven Eliaeson	

PART I: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Political Sustainability of Monetary Union without Fiscal Union.....	24
Sverker Gustavsson	
Ethnic Conflicts and Monetary Integration in Austria-Hungary.....	45
Jürgen Nautz	
Educational Inequalities in Poland: 1982-2006.....	63
Henryk Domański	

PART II: DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNITY

Complexity and Citizen Disaffection in an Enlarged European Union....	88
Christopher G.A. Bryant	
Hybridization as a Condition of Civil Society's Portability.....	107
Jan Kubik	
Local Civil Societies in Poland at the Turn of XX and XXI Centuries: A Diagnosis	130
Joanna Kurczewska	

PART III: DEMOCRACY, TECHNOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY

Expertise and the Process of Policy-Making: The EU's New Model of Legitimacy.....	160
Stephen Turner	
The Powerlessness of Powerful Government.....	176
Stein Ringen	
Is Civil Society a Daughter of Knowledge? Worlds of Knowledge and Democracy.....	212
Nico Stehr	
The EU and the Risk of Global Disaster.....	228
Jan-Erik Lane	

PART IV: POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE: COMPARATIVE CASES

East Germany – The Middle Way between East and West? Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective, 1990 – 2000	248
Bernhard Wessels	
Upgrading Organizational Rationality: Paths and Patterns in Eastern Europe	274
Nikolai Genov	
The Early German Labour Movement as a Representative of Civil Society: Participation, Emancipation and Learning Democracy in 19 th Century Germany (ca. 1848-1880).....	293
Jürgen Schmidt	
Political Corruption Scandals and Public Attitudes towards Party Financing: Poland and Germany Compared	316
Leslie Holmes	

PART V: FROM THE PANEL

New countries, new problems?	340
Andrzej Rychard	
The Integration of Europe in the Long-Run Perspective.....	344
Włodzimierz Wesolowski	
Contributors.....	351
Index.....	357

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1.....	24
Possible outcomes of monetary union without fiscal union	
Figure 2.2.....	56
The exchange rate in Vienna, 1880-1900	
Figure 11.3.....	258
Size of Middle Classes in Society and Membership Density, 2000	
Figure 11.4.....	259
The Strength of Civil Society and Its Dimensions, 2000	
Figure 11.5.....	268
Liberalization, Inclusiveness, and Democratization (Dahl 1975)	

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1	46
The nationalities of Austria-Hungary, 1880 and 1910	
Table 2.2	47
Population shares after the nine major languages for the Austrian half of the empire 1900 (total population approx. 25.6 million)	
Table 3.3	71
Transition to secondary and tertiary levels	
Table 3.4	72
Logistic regression of primary school selection in Poland	
Table 3.5	73
Logistic regression of secondary school selection in Poland	
Table 3.6	75
Logistic coefficients of primary and secondary school selections. Poland. 1982 – 2006	
Table 3.7	78
Multinomial logistic regression of selection on the tertiary level in Poland in 1982	
Table 3.8	78
Multinomial logistic regression of selection on the tertiary level in Poland in 1995	
Table 3.9	79
Multinomial logistic regression of selection on the tertiary level in Poland in 2006	
Table 5.10	111
Legal transparent civil society ("classic" civil society) and imperfect civil societies	

Table 5.11	113
The flaws plaguing linkages among civil society and other polity domains	
Table 10.12	229
Regional mechanisms around 2000	
Table 11:13	255
Membership density in 12 post-communist societies 1990/91 and 2000	
Table 11.14	256
Correlations between social differentiation of societies and membership density in societies under transition, 1990/1991 and 2000/2001	
Table 11.15	261
Voter Volatility and Effective Number of Parties, 1990-2003	
Table 11.16	263
Attitudes towards Political Parties: Necessity and Participation, 1990 and 2000	
Table 11.17	265
Attitudes towards Political Parties: Trust and Responsiveness, 1990 and 2000	
Table 11.18	267
Attitudes toward the democratic rules of the game: inclusiveness and free competition combined	
Table 13.19	323
Attitudes towards <i>individuals</i> being permitted to donate to political parties (percentages, 2003-4)	
Table 13.20	324
Attitudes towards <i>domestic private companies</i> being permitted to donate to political parties (percentages, 2003-4)	
Table 13.21	325
Attitudes towards <i>foreign individuals</i> being permitted to donate to political parties (percentages, 2003-4)	

Table 13.22.....	325
Attitudes towards <i>foreign companies</i> being permitted to donate to political parties (percentages, 2003-4)	
Table 13.23.....	326
Attitudes towards <i>foreign political parties</i> being permitted to donate to political parties (percentages, 2003-4)	
Table 13.24.....	326
Attitudes towards <i>foreign states</i> being permitted to donate to political parties (percentages, 2003-4)	
Table 13.25.....	327
Attitudes towards <i>the state</i> financing political parties (percentages, 2003-4)	
Table 13.26.....	327
<i>How much</i> should the state contribute (percentages, 2003-4)?	
Table 13.27.....	328
Willingness to <i>contribute</i> to a political party, if the donation were tax deductible (percentages, 2003-4)	
Table 13.28.....	328
Willingness to use <i>democracy vouchers</i> (percentages, 2003-4)	
Table 13.29.....	328
Willingness to pay a <i>small annual sum</i> to ensure there is no private financing of political parties (percentages, 2003-4)	
Table 13.30.....	329
The corruption-effectiveness <i>trade-off</i> (percentages, 2003-4)	
Table 13.31.....	330
The corruption-effectiveness <i>trade-off</i> (percentages, 2003-4 – valid responses only)	

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung* (WZB) and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw with its Centre for Social Studies, have generously contributed to bringing about this publication and the symposium it builds on. Thanks and high appreciation are also due to Jakub Lengiewicz for taking care of the formatting.



**GRADUATE SCHOOL
FOR
SOCIAL RESEARCH**

PREFACE

This edited volume originates from an international conference on building civil society and democracy in the new, post-communist Europe. The events of 1989 in Poland and other communist countries in Europe led to such substantial changes as the collapse of the old political and economic systems and the emergence of new countries (to mention only the unification of Germany) and the dissolution of others (again, to mention only the disappearance of the Soviet Union). After the relatively short period in which the old regimes broke down we have learned that building new systems will require a much longer and sometimes even painful time.

We have also learned that it requires a truly comparative perspective to understand these processes fully, particularly the clash between the traditional Western-European meaning of civil society and democracy and its “Eastern” manifestations and peculiarities. This book analyses and reflects on these processes. It is worth adding here that study of the relationships between universal political processes and their local manifestations in communist and post-communist countries was a characteristic feature of the writings of Edmund Mokrzycki to whom the very idea and format of this conference (already the “Second Edmund Mokrzycki Symposium”) owes so much. Among the various factors and events which helped facilitate the building of the comparative perspective presented in this volume we would like to mention the Polish-German collaboration between the Centre for Social Studies/Graduate School for Social Research at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. On this occasion we would like to express our gratitude to all the research teams and colleagues involved in this cooperation which has resulted in, among other things, this book.

Andrzej Rychard
Graduate School for Social Research

Georg Thurn
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin

INTRODUCTION

SVEN ELIAESON

“The future started long ago”, is a very true statement. We have seen the return and strength of very old historical forces in Europe after *Die Wende* 1989, during the second phase of dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire. Nationalism seems virulent and eruptive where it has been “canned”. Among other observers Eric Hobsbawm and Manuel Castells have rung the knell for the nation state, as being outmoded. However, nations will prevail, for a long time yet, especially in cases where they have not managed to form nation states. Historically they are, moreover, a presupposition for civil society, together with the market.

There is a considerable time-lag between generation of consequential ideas and their gradual assimilation into public consciousness. What now happens in the European Union is one step along the path Immanuel Kant already pointed to, although Kant’s visions were more global, namely cosmopolitan European. But this is not untypical; European values tend to aspire to be universal values.

The destruction of old Europe began 1914 and the ensuing Bolshevist and National Socialist/Fascist revolutions by popular mass movements led to the prolonged European civil war that ended 1945, with a Europe occupied by the American and the Russian Empires, pretty much as Count Alexis de Tocqueville had feared.¹ It is often overlooked that the geographical and political divisions in Europe during the Cold war period were primarily determined by where the respective allied armed forces stood in May 1945, less so by the contents of the Yalta-agreement. However, a slow reconstruction of an independent Europe started soon after the war; initiatives to a large extent pioneered from Lothar’s part of the Charlemagne heritage, which incidentally had a geographical scope pretty similar to the EU, before the entrance of the UK.

We are back to 1918-20 and much of what happened after that date appears as anomalies in a longer perspective. Karl Popper once observed: “I am an optimist about everything - except the future”. What he meant was that at every moment we have a lot of alternative futures; history is open ended and there is no determinism involved, no *Weltgeist* or

Volksgeist we are urged to fulfil. There is no contradiction involved between these perspectives; we have to constantly check the rear mirror when moving forward. There might well be momentous historical switch-points, such as 395, 451, 732, 1054, 1648, 1683, 1806, 1919 and 1989. Probably the 1054 divide is the most momentous one.²

The Danish prime minister's (Anders Fogh Rasmussen) speech in Dec. 2002, on the occasion of the EU invitation to the ten new candidate countries to join EU already in May 2004, stressed the historical magnitude, not only that the cold war was over, but that the European order first established from 1648 onwards had finally reached the end of the road. The European project is, however, a slow process with reversals and standstills.

The basic European peace project initiated by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman – starting to fulfil visions of Kant - has now evidently become successful, which was already in evidence during the Balkan wars in the 1990s, where traditional great powers antagonisms were only partly re-enacted. The weakness is also evident. There is no European vision, no vigorous driving force and a notable disability to deal with some pan-European problems; not only concerning defence and foreign policy, agendas where some countries, like Sweden, continue to pursue traditional political goals. “A slow drilling of hard boards” is ahead of us before the new Europe takes shape, eventually as something more than a confederacy of independent nations. M Rainer Lepsius formulated the basics already in 1991. Of the bigger European nations only Germany has extensive experience of a federal system, which might appear as disturbing to some of the ten new member countries. After 1989 the traditional West European post war division of labour – that the French run politics and the Germans the economy – will gradually have to change. It is to quite some extent true that what is good for Germany is good for Europe, even if it may not be equally good for all its neighbours.

A federal Europe requires a common constitution, a public European sphere, a *demos*, a legal system, and trans-national popular movements and civil society organisations. But is all of this likely in an age of lower political participation rates? One way to overcome the democratic deficit would be to increase the role for national parliaments, since they provide the legitimacy for EU government. But this might be a poisonous cure from the point of view of integration.

If the new constitution drafted by Giscard d'Estaing and his colleagues from across Europe is dead or not remains an open question, despite French and Dutch referenda. It seems to be a relatively successful document, after all, considering how much the member states actually

agree upon. That “new kids on the block” make noise does not alter this impression. The Polish example shows that patriotism having a higher priority than being a “good European” is more characteristic for young and insecure nation states. This is especially true for old nations but young nation states, such as Norway and Poland. Finland as a good pupil in the European class is a special case, especially for the Swedes, the reluctant Europeans, to learn from. It used to be the case that whatever happened in Sweden, in terms of for instance currency depreciation, happened in Finland almost the following day. But today Finland is at the cutting edge.

The French and Dutch referenda are not easy to interpret, but it seems to be a common view that the voters said no without quite knowing what they said no to, or rather that they said no to something else than the referendum was about, in the French case a slap in the face of President Chirac. The No to the constitution is in itself difficult to interpret, if it is to be understood as merely another of these halts which the European integration process is full of, or if it is a long-term damage to bringing about a Europe as a homogeneous actor on the world scene. From the point of view of contingency the outcome might mean a delay of decades. On the other hand, there are also advantages in relation to Russia and the USA, if Europe speaks with many voices, for instance in the UN. Increased cooperation between sovereign nations to solve common problems is in any case a good start. If Europe remains an economic giant but a political dwarf, as we used to say about FRG – so what? Playing “big Switzerland” is not the worst part of the play.

A European public sphere does not really exist, neither in a pan-European sense (except for “Euronews” on TV and some soccer tournaments, etc), nor in the individual countries Participation in European affairs, such as elections, and thus legitimacy, is low. Genuine pan-European organizations, such as political parties and other popular movements are merely embryonic, and those existing tend to “negative politics”, populist protests, from both “Left” and “Right” (whatever these concepts are supposed to denote today). Massimo d’Azeglio once noted that when Italy was created, the next step would be to create Italians; and at the time for the French revolution 70 years earlier less than half of the French population at that time had French as their Mother’s tongue.³ To build and define a European “demos” should perhaps in principle not be more complicated than constructing a French or Italian one. On the other hand, this is still today unfulfilled projects. Italians typically identify with their hometown rather than country. Centuries are a more realistic time horizon than decades. Europe is unlikely to ever become a melting pot but remain a mosaic. However, India and the USA hardly have a *demos* either,

although the Americans tend to speak the same language. Historically language suppression is a tool for nation building. “A Europe without a demos?” is a rhetoric question. There will likely be some sort of growing community of values but EU does not aspire to a levelling out of cultural varieties, in the way that was evident part of the strategy in the old nation building, especially in then new nation states. Italy is a good example, especially since it was largely unsuccessful despite hard attempts.

It is a matter of dispute if a common currency would lead to a fiscal union or not. Politicians and economists do not agree upon this crucial problem of cognition. The fiscal union would result in unification and a Europe that could make us a junior partner to the USA on the world scene, no longer depending upon the Richard Holbrooke factor for military security. Unification in Europe cannot follow the pattern of French style state socialism. After all, both Napoleon I and Hitler for various reasons failed to unify (continental) Europe under a hegemonic order, although the Napoleonic legacy is quite strong in European liberal constitutionalism, while Hitler’s contribution appears as genuinely negative, not only for the German nation but also for its neighbours, generating new problems, in fact leading to half a century of occupation of European heartlands.⁴ Perhaps the European Monetary Union (EMU) is the “Trojan horse” unifying us into a federation, along the lines of the US prototype? Thus value priorities and identity matters, with potential far-reaching “Domino-effects”. If a European identity arises it perhaps merely adds to all other identities we have as individuals. Is there a European citizen and is there a European citizenship? Not yet really, except for in a formal sense, but we are rich in pan-European problems that can only be dealt with on a pan-European level, which should stimulate a development in such a direction.⁵

That we have a European judicial system under which national laws become subsumed is of course a vital step towards a European citizenship, that minority rights, etc, cannot be violated by any member state. But there are lacunas to fill. After creating EU we need to create Europeans with a European identity, a supplementary identity not contradicting the global, national or regional ones. To achieve a democratic Europe we need at least some sort of imagined *demos* (but which?), a constitution and trans-national popular movements. The trans-national perspective goes beyond the European horizon, both regarding demography, citizenship and “rights”. Considering the historical strength of nations one might assume that *Verfassungspatriotismus*, the notion of a European citizenship, might substitute for a genuine sense of belonging within one European community. There is no deterministic permanence in the nation states;

after all basically 19th century phenomena. We all know that the map of Europe could have looked very different, had it not been for...In addition we know that territories matters less than in feudal days and that identity giving memories are less relevant than in 19th century. It is hard to imagine today something like the public role of the German Grimm brothers or the Finnish *Kalevala*.

Today EU is more a constitutional order (*Rechtsstaat*) than a democratic order. This might sound conservative, but secured minority rights and individual rights are just as crucial for development and welfare as democracy, which perhaps is more a *result* of the Modernization process. It might also have some advantages, due to some “de Tocquevillian” or “Rousseauan” problems of democracy, authoritarian embryos that might pose a threat to the individual and his basic rights, such as *habeas corpus*, property rights, etc. The majority might suppress strong minorities in ethnically divided states. In Schleswig on both sides of the Danish-German border the principle of equal franchise is dropped in favour of guaranteed minority representation for the few remaining irredenta. In general *la volonteé general* is a dangerous temptation for communicative discourse ethics within the public sphere. The simple distinction between democracy and constitutional order is well worth repeating, since they have been parallel processes.

The national parliaments might be a substituting legitimating source for an embryonic pan-European democratic community, yet in the long run provide a rather weak source for the democratic legitimacy in EU, in a situation in which the old identifications and links between social class, party-identification and electoral behaviour no longer correspond the way they used to, and the political parties are becoming a crisis branch, depending on state subsidies for survival. If the political parties did not exist, they would nevertheless have to be reinvented or substituted, since we need electoral and campaign “machines” to create a representative order, and participation in elections is a highly symbolic act of legitimacy. Yet uncontrolled bureaucracy seems to gain the upper hand both in the nation states and in Brussels.

During the period of nation state formation a pressure to conformity violated individual rights, for instance in Mussolini’s Italy (South Tyrol) and the Finnish speaking parts of Northern Sweden (Tornedalen). There are risks associated with claiming non-conformist identity, for example with respect to language, cultural symbols and various “community of values”-assumptions, in places such as the Basque countries or Northern Ireland. And as M Rainer Lepsius remarks (1991): “Even opposition to the regime eventually leads to an acceptance of the regime’s cognitive self-

definition”, something which makes it difficult to condemn retrospectively “collaborators” and wide spread quietism, in a situation in which individual rights are vulnerable to “organized cohesiveness”, be it in the form of top-down state interventionism or a more civil society-oriented parochialism.

There are many groups and regions that now get their rights, as European citizens, instead of being subjects in nation states where they feel alien, only to mention Wales, Catalonia, The Basque provinces, South Tyrol, not to forget a number of minorities, such as Turks in Bulgaria. Assumedly the Russians in the Baltic states feel happy about joining the EU. And the Kurds in Turkey should be all for it. Roma minorities are probably better off within rather than outside EU.

There is lot of “recycling” in European debate.

The First Mokrzycki-symposium focused on Democracy and Civil Society East of the Elbe. The Second Mokrzycki-symposium focused on some obvious pan-European problems for liberal democracy and “civil society”, in common to countries East of and West of the Elbe, but becoming more let’s say “vitalized” by the enlargement. Some of these pan-European problems are trans-national. We need a trans-national perspective on European problems. One obvious example is to what extent European values are universal values. We have already mentioned Kant, who’s visions indeed were both European and global. Most Europeans would be inclined to say that to some extent that is true and the rapid spread of irreversible rationalisation and secularization, “Modernization” if we wish, seemingly provides supportive evidence. I am, however, not sure that colleagues in Kyrgyzstan and India agree.⁶ Problems of climate change are evidently global. So are increasingly problems of the relation between expertise, power and democracy.

Another example is that from the perspective of let’s say the Czech republic EU-entrance co-incides with both a globalization-process and a search for national independent identity, after fifty years in the Communist “freezer”. We have an identity “triad” of (1) national independence and newborn national awareness, (2) Europeanization and (3) increased economic globalization.

Europe rests on three historical: “pillars”, the Greek or rather Hellenistic legacy, with ratio and democracy, etc. Christianity, and Enlightenment/Renaissance (in my view the same but in two waves). We share this legacy with America. The USA are in many ways the first true European union; Ben. Franklin and Thomas Alva Edison are the ideal-typical Europeans. “Selbstbetrachtung aus der Ferne” is still today a good

way to learn basics about European identity, for us as for de Tocqueville and Weber. However, the strong reciprocity between the old world and the new side is a slowly deteriorating phenomenon. If Europe will become a balancing factor to the “New Rome”, or an equal player on the international scene depends on both Europe and the USA and is too early to predict. It will largely depend on “events”.

Any scrutiny today has a geopolitical aspect, in which national interest with regard to natural resources rather than territories is a crucial component.

Democracy, Peace and Welfare

What can we learn from history about EU as a peace project, focusing on such factors as currency and stability and “long lines” in history? Whatever EU is to the rest of it, most observers seem to agree that it is a successful peace project. Democratic states don’t start wars against each other. Democracy and peace correlate with welfare. What is the independent variable? That is a more complex question.

The European history between 1919 and 1939 could be described in terms of crises for faith in currency and the international monetary order, the Young-tranche, etc, etc. It is a popular method among governments to get rid of war debts, through devaluating the currency. The German *petite bourgeoisie* of a certain period lost everything twice. The international monetary stability is very vulnerable. In the 20s we had private initiatives in stabilizing direction, such as Ivar Kreuger’s transfer of money from the USA to small states in European border regions, predominantly East of the Elbe. Today the states are more involved, yet globalizing factors, such as stressed computers, make monetary stability a “card house”. The growing US budget deficit is frightening; if the petro-dollars were to be reclaimed we would have a severe situation. The Euro and the USD are now global competitors. The international stability rests upon the illusion that countries such as Mexico and Brazil will eventually pay back what they have borrowed. Realistically we might expect that they will continue to pay interest on their loans. If China suddenly decides to get rid of its USD reserves it would shake the whole world.

A collapse would be devastating and hurting to everybody, in contrast to high un-employment, which is probably merely resulting in low-level equilibrium and some “noise in the street”. Examples from recent history, such as Sweden and the USA in the 30s, indicate that even unemployment rates well above 30 percent remain absorbable. It remains a historical anomaly that there was so little Fascism in the USA in the 30s, despite

virulent charismatic plebiscitary demagogues on the political scene. There is no alternative to capitalism in sight. The problem for capitalism is that it is self-destructive by being too successful, and expanding excessively in various ways. It is like a dieseling motor. We can still learn from Joseph Schumpeter.

However, the human costs of rational market capitalism are high and the combination of unfulfilled infra-structural work (such as roads!) and high unemployment indicates though dysfunctional elements in modern capitalism. To speak with Guenther Roth, liberal capitalism has recovered well from its “near death”-experience and today predictions from the 70s, about the imminent collapse of “late capitalism”, appear as intellectual meltdowns.⁷

The euro seems to be a relative success and certainly small currencies are easy prey for speculation. Dr Soros has taught us that. Political scientists and politicians have a tendency to overestimate political decisions, while economic historians tend to underestimate them. Currency policy as part of international politics is no new field of inquiry but relatively neglected. The old question “do politics matter” needs a nuanced answer. The limits of national sovereignty are obvious, as are the limits of democracy.

It must, moreover, be noted that the European welfare states started as national projects. Now it is turning into a regional project. Obviously there are “identity giving others” involved, be it the Muslims, USA, or Russia. The Greeks identified themselves against the Persians and the Romans by comparing themselves to the Germanics and the Celtic people. Where does Europe end? And do ends meet if we claim preserved European welfare state and global international solidarity? Or is it “wishful thinking” involved in overlooking a goal-conflict? With the high correlation between democracy, peace and welfare in mind: what can we learn from which classic authors? Friedrich (Freddy) List (protectionism an element in early industrialization and modernization) and Gunnar Myrdal (institutionalism, soft state, virtuous and vicious circles) might be applicable not only on the national but also global level. From the perspective of small European states EU appears as a free trade project while it is really a protectionist project in the global perspective.

There is assumedly a contradiction between collective and individual rationality involved. Global capitalism and free trade should in principle increase wealth and rationality. We might recall that Adam Smith had some ideas about this, further refined by the so-called Stockholm school-economists Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. There are nevertheless few

examples in world history of economic take-offs without support from institutions and with elements of protectionism.⁸

Market, State and Civil Society

There are “free riders” among individuals and among states. From this perspective new Europe appears as an insurance system. Redistributive solidarity is a gain for Ireland (Eire), Portugal⁹ and Greece, less for Germany and Sweden, who have to pay. The limits for our solidarity is a matter of identity, depending upon our vision about where Europe ends. Evidently the Visegrad countries are more than welcome, at least from the perspective of the European elites and security policy analysis. The Czech republic is even the very heart of Europe in the pioneering conception of Friedrich Naumann (whose *Mitteuropa* [1915] is the birth of the concept “Central Europe”; including the idea of a custom union). We have learned to accept the famous „Polish plumber“ while millions of Anatolian peasants cannot realistically enjoy CAP-subsidies, in a situation with slow wheels in the European economy, e.g. in Germany, still digesting its re-unification.

This invites to theoretical considerations, about collective vs individual rationality, the role of trust (in just institutions) as well as *Begriffsgeschichte*, and the role of religion – or rather religious culture - for economic performance. It is a striking fact that all new acceding countries are located West of famous 1054-divide, between the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches. And it seems that Eire has been considerably more successful than Greece to take advantage of their European membership. Surveys might indicate attitudes of secularisation, yet there seems to be a double syndrome reproduced over centuries. Martin Luther is an extremely successful pedagogue (his “catechism” was mandatory reading for Swedish school pupils until relatively recently) but the main difference in political and entrepreneurial culture seems to be between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholics. East of the 1054 divide there are fewer cities and they don't have a big clock and a city hall in their centre. The very concept of citizen has something to do with cities, although we have examples of civil society among peasants, only to mention Switzerland, Sweden and Novgorod.

There is a debate in several countries about civil society, or a variety of debates. The concept is cognitively flawed but generates debates and insights nevertheless. The atomisation of individuals and the breaking up of solidaristic bounds in the smaller context with social control and

accountability is a theme since at least 1789; it is the classical reservation from the historical school to industrialization and its effects.

The modern rational state has become an enemy of Civil society, in a sense a necessary evil or a phenomenon with a Janus-face. Too much centralized state power is a toxic cure for modern welfare states, leading to family decline; in the long term declining population. This is a dilemma in social policy, since the original intentions among social engineers (e.g. the Myrdals in the 30s) was to *support* the family, not destroy it. The “Jacobinian” element in early social engineering by early public intellectuals is rather anti-liberal. It was in fact a Top-down endeavour overstating Enlightenment reason and rationalism; experts telling people how to lead their lives. Saint-Simon remains a “bouncy” classic author, albeit as a warning example. It is not by chance that Saint-Simon was a main target for Isaiah Berlin’s vehement criticism of authoritarian enemies of freedom.

If the state is an enemy of civil society, the same certainly goes for the market. “Less state, more civil society” is a slogan that needs to be supplemented by “less market, more civil society”. Historically the market, however, is also a presupposition for civil society and even originates it. de Tocqueville and the US-American experience are here telling. For Adam Ferguson a positive correlation between market and civil (polished, commercial) society was natural. In post-communist states independent NGOs were not allowed, and no market either, except for what you could sell in the street from what you had cultivated in your garden. Needless to say the empty space in the civil sphere will to quite some extent be filled with market activities.

Whatever one thinks about communitarianism: the omnipresence of its basic themes is high. The old “Titmussian triad” between state, market and “household” reappears in renewed conceptualisation, such as Gösta Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regimes: conservative, liberal and social democratic - or in a more traditional reformulation: “Patrie, Travail, Famille”, as we could read on the coins in Petain’s Vichy-France. Social thought is a battle of concept formation. Maybe Alan Wolfe’s *Whose Keeper?* (1989) provides an interesting synthesis, between Habermasian and communitarian strands. There are many ways to understand “civil society”, but a rough typology would perhaps, as a start, distinguish between a Scottish (market), Hegelian (state-idealist), Polish (insurrection and civil disobedience), Swedish (local initiatives seeking state support) and “Habermasian-conservative” (reactions against *Lebenswelt* being invaded by *Systemwelt*), emphasizing moral obligations in the smaller context, be it parish or local community or, or...

State, Civil Society and Expertise, or “Democracy’s Discontent”

The democratic deficit is a fact. Liberal democracy has been victorious to death. Uncontrolled rule by experts and the administration of things are replacing rule by citizens over citizens, to allude to a passage in Engels and a Humboldt speech by Thomas Hendrik Ilves, the former Estonian secretary for foreign affairs, and now president of the republic. Stephen P Turner’s *Liberal Democracy 3.0* (2003) provides an innovative renewal of an old Weber-Michels problematique, concerning the efficiency of democracy in an ever more knowledge-based society.

If we a century ago had suffrage and reformed tax system on the agenda, then gradually starting to improve housing, nutrition, education, employment policy, health care, etc. “from scratch”; we are now in a situation where other topics take more space in the public sphere, such as *pro et contra* nuclear energy, risk management of global warming, DNA-techniques and various forms of threats to personal integrity through new means of communication. It is hard to imagine that the electorate should be able to make any rational decisions on such topics. The elitist threat from Plato and others – perhaps including Leo Strauss and his many followers in the USA? - against the open society is a “creeping” one. Democracy has to be regained every day but the threats are today less visible than in the days of Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin, not to speak about Medieval days, with “the castle on the hill”.¹⁰ Despite issues becoming more complex and difficult to vote about, there are also so-called low-democratic agendas, in particular in security- and foreign policy, with its sudden contingencies and long lines of national strategies. When democracy overcomes crises it becomes stronger, yet remains vulnerable.

The extension of the old Weber-Michels-problematique, of democracy *vs* efficiency and routinization of popular movements, seems appropriate, in particular in a time when institutions are formed East of the Elbe that are increasingly irrelevant West of the Elbe. This calls for time-relativity, since they are not necessarily irrelevant in infant democracies East of the Elbe. Should today a new party system in for instance Armenia be structured along ideological left-right continuum? Why not? The important task is to break the pattern of clan society authoritarianism. The notions of time-relativism is helpful to deal with the frustration generated by new democrats taking party programs and Utopias seriously in a way that have been deteriorating in Western Europe, after discussions about “ministerial Socialism” in the 20s (e.g. Millerand’s presidency in France).

Perhaps we need more power investigations? The multi-level government system developing in the EU contributes to this trend. It poses a serious threat to democracy but also provides ways to deal with the democratic deficit. The problems of a growing democratic deficit might be increasingly the same East and West of the Elbe, but it is an impression that “cabbalist” hypothesis are more common in the ten new countries, maybe because they are more plausible in the political culture of “clan-societies” and/or party camarillas, with more particularistic patterns of value orientation, and less meritocracy. It is more frequent that people get jobs East of the Elbe due to contacts rather than competence. The relative lack of transparency and accountability is truly disturbing. Corruption and “cleptocracy” being a wide spread “cancer” in the bodies of many societies, not only in Africa (Thorvaldur Gylfason, 1998). Recent Poland occupied a position as number 61 in the corruption league, compared to Finland as no 1 (least corrupt), in the annual ranking by Transparency International. Since then Poland has fallen even further below in this league. There are estimates that a culture of corruption means a loss of BNP growth of several percents a year. One does not need to be a mathematician to realize the devastating long-term effects. The culture of corruption is a self-punishing crime, like voluntarily competing in a long distance run with a heavy back-pack.

However, if family ties matter more than competence it is a factor in a way modifying the Ilves/Turner-thesis. Power and accountability should “cover” each other, at least retrospectively, according to democratic doctrine. To bring this about is increasingly difficult as urgent problems are becoming more difficult to bring into the political marketplace of ideas, and increasing amount of problems in any case cannot be approached on merely a national level, only to mention environmental issues, irrigation, survival of species and international terrorism. That such topics notoriously attract “doomsday prophets” does not improve matters. Global warming might have saved us from a new Ice age, which reportedly is since long overdue. Or it might speed up its arrival?

If civil society has a value added from the point of view of democracy is a topic under debate. It might be argued that civil society activities merely gives an additional voice to middle class people already pretty strong in exercizing their influence. Surveys also show that there is a low correlation between the quality of democracy and the engagement in civic associations. Belarus, for instance, has a very high and Poland a very low score.¹¹ One has to keep in mind that the old nomenklatura has the upper hand, in terms of civic associational virtues, and that many civil society

organizations are “top-down” rather than popular movements. Mostly self-organization is stressed as a core element in the definition of civil society, so merely participation in non-governmental organizations doesn’t tell the whole truth.

A lack of transparency and a dysfunctional judiciary are major handicaps, allowing for an atmosphere of distrust and corruption.

In recent parliamentary elections (2005) Poland had a participation turnout of circa 40 percent, which is much better than let’s say Egypt’s 20 percent but lower than for instance Sweden, where a drop below 80 percent generates lamentations about severe system legitimacy crisis. Probably the whole enlargement came far too early, several decades premature, in terms of political and civic culture, which does not mean it was wrong. It is a matter of historical contingency. The low turnout probably reflects a lack of constructive citizen creed rather than a legitimacy crisis for the democratic system. Again time-relativism is of help to accomplish a balanced judgment. I recall that during the 1950s France was a weak democracy, since the two dominant social movements, Gaullism and Communism, both opposed the rather anarchic parliamentary system, which eventually was followed by de Gaulle’s “ruled democracy”. There are no significant enemies in Poland to the democratic system as such. The Polish apathy more reflects “democracy’s discontent” than its rejection.

In countries ruled from above and abroad a peculiar set of civic virtues develops, characterized more by “sand in the machinery” than “oil”. In the Polish case this is reflected in many instances of everyday life, such as a low propensity to obey traffic regulation, e.g. speed limits, and a tendency to cheat in the educational system; such frauds as signing attendance lists for absent friends is not regarded as an act of low solidarity but the reverse. It will take generations for Poland to overcome this predicament.

The USA pressed for NATO-membership; premature EU membership followed. However, history provides the opportunities where the capacity by politicians to “catch the opportunity by the tail” becomes decisive.

Building a democratic and non-corrupt political culture of accountability and transparency and a market culture “out of ashes” takes far more time than one wished to recognize in the euphoric moments of the implosion of the old “command economies” East of the Elbe.

Comparative cases

The return of history also means the return of old “Convergence theories”, so popular during the Cold war, as part of the “End of Ideology” (Shils,

Tingsten, and others). This calls for case studies, for instance surveys or participant observation inquiries that throw light upon secularization, and the role of religion for political and economic development, or the role of institutions in the same processes, or the role of trust and or associational engagements.

Poland is a crucial case since it has a considerable critical mass, alone being bigger than the other nine “new” countries together. Poland appears as a (sort of) stable democracy, although with a certain “overkill” in party formations, shifts in government, and party splits. There were 29 parties in the first *sejm* after the end of Communism. Every election seems to result in a change in government. The trust in institutions very low and the competence of the parliamentarians low as well.¹² However, there are no rigged elections. There are independent media. There is free opposition. In all, the skyline of Warsaw represents the democratic Utopian dream to countries East of the Bug/old Curzon line. There is little risk for a “reverse shift” in Poland. There are perhaps some risks for nostalgic populist patriotism of a kind that does not quite match the need for pan-European cooperation and Europeanization. However, the same could be said about Sweden. And in some respects Poland might speed up European policy formation, for instance when demanding EU support for the protection of the Polish irredenta in Belarus.

There is reportedly also a renaissance in Poland for geopolitics, a type of resource analysis with strong albeit lingering relevance. If it is in the interest of Russia to alienate Poland and its neighbour states, e.g. the Baltic ones, from each other, it is equally an interest of Poland to build bridges with Georgia and Azerbaijan, securing the energy supply. These countries in the Near East are historically far more European than Turkey, due to their Christian legacy.

Building bridges: New Countries, New Problems

All new members entering EU have experienced “harmonizing”-problems, regarding legal culture, etc. The ten “new” countries will be no exceptions; they will experience even more problems of “digestion” and adjustment. Except for very basic issues such as peace and security there are a number of pan-European problems that no longer realistically can be handled on only the national level in the increasingly globalized world. Problems of demography, migration and retirement schemes are merely examples, only to mention social dumping and “social tourism”, as well as exclusion/inclusion nexus, and the role of informal economic sector, the efficiency of the fiscal system, etc. Some of these problems are intensified

with ten new members to digest. Some problems of harmonization are new and some specific; some are trans-national and some national. There are differences in legal culture affecting also political culture, which was a problem for Sweden, with its lack of a tradition of law review and the heritage of Scandinavian legal realism providing a weaker protection for human and civil rights.¹³

Some sort of “community of values” or a common “belief system” is necessary for any cohesive society. Given the rich variety in the European market-place of ideas we have a problem of consensus-building and to anchor the “useful social fictions” that make society hang together and tick. One reason might be the rather negative rather than constructive reasons we have for the European project, to avoid wars in Europe and to be if not at the cutting edge so at least competitive in the peaceful wars of trade.

There is no answer – or perhaps too many answers – to what it means to be a European. It is obviously both a vague and controversial notion. There is no common European myth. We do have Leonardo, Copernicus and Erasmus, but no common Wilhelm Tell in live memory.

We owe much of our cultural heritage – e.g. Aristotle - to the Muslims. We have peripheries, such as Sweden, where Enlightenment was a rather bleak phenomenon. Enlightenment was relatively weak also in the German countries, despite the fact that Kant invented the concept. Enlightenment was even weaker in Russia – and Russia is part of Europe in many ways. We might contemplate how? – and to which extent? – but unthinking Russia is impossible.

Poland has reasons to feel insecure. The country has its security from NATO and its wealth (to be) from EU. On the other hand, Poland is a great power, which can make its voice heard. The combination of being welcome into Europe and courted by various members from what Donald Rumsfeld called Old Europe (somewhat erroneously; if somebody wishes to see how grandfather lived, the countryside East of the Elbe is the place), in addition having this “special relationship” to the USA, should be a diplomatic dream situation, with good cards on hand, a “new deal”. If these cards are skilfully played is an altogether different story. “Domestic foreign policy” might of course, as always, result in shots from the hip, resulting in shots in the toes.

Poland envisions itself as a victim in history, as a constitutive part of Polish identity. One only has to visit a cemetery on All Saints’ Day to realize this. This role of a victim may be very true. Many Germans don’t even know about the August 1944 uprising. Considering the reasons for the UK to declare war on Germany on 3 September 1939 the developments

after 1945 must have been a disappointment to most Polish patriots (understatement). And the rest of Europe owes Poland something not only for being a “buffer zone” but also for the crucial role of Polish troops in Vienna 1683, in defending Europe against the Ottoman Empire. The miracle at Vistula in August 1920 is far more momentous in European and World history than most of us are aware of.¹⁴ Polish expectations for a certain “Lastenausgleich” do not seem unreasonable. For natural reasons it is nevertheless a “sensitive spot” in Polish relations to in particular Germany. In this context it is a certain relief that what used to be called “The Oder-Neisse-problem” is no longer on the agenda – and that the many Germans in Silesia (e.g. Opole/Oppeln) now gradually get their rights, such as education in their own language and double language street signs, etc. There seems to be a – relatively and after all - “soft tone” between Germany and Poland in these lingering post-war problems, where they both are victims and evidently the European project makes the problem “altes Eisen”, although creating some new ones, about property restitution, etc, when European law applies.¹⁵

This is, however, evidently more of a problem between Germany and the Czech Republic, where young Czechs are still actually afraid of their big neighbour and crucial problems remain unresolved. After all Germany and Poland have common security problems, with borders difficult to defend and historically a feeling of being geopolitically encircled. Applying time-relativism one might say that Polish and German identity problems, as a *Sonderweg* between East and West, are rather similar in kind, although with a considerable time-lag. Germany saw itself as representing culture as a missionary East-bound endeavour (conducted by much varied means), in contrast to mere civilization, of British-French Enlightenment, with its total rationalism. One difference between Poland and the Czech case is that there was no Benes-decree in Poland. And of course that Poland is big and doesn't have to share the agony of small nations, such as the Czech republic and Sweden, as vulnerable and defenceless, having to “accommodate” in a Hobbesian world order.

Polish frustration seems to centre on symbol-questions, such as the existence of God and how appropriate certain historical monuments are, etc. Poland also has an unhappy love affair with both Marianne and Uncle Sam, in what appears as asymmetric relations. The French care more about the Mediterranean hemisphere.

There are good reasons to focus on problems of multi-level government, the creation of a pan-European public sphere, constitutional matters, corruption, and (in)-efficiency in the legal system, perhaps also select topics in social policy, such as generational conflicts in migrant