

# Being in Time to the Music



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By

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For Febra alone



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# ORISON

## Three Part Harmony to the Muse

### I

In thy beauty all wrongs become buried and reborn,  
Every wound suffered the site of new growth:  
Springing fountain of vibrant energy, your body  
Throws off the idle languor of misspent days;  
With thy touch eternity in hand presses onward.  
Heavy with light, ever-lasting joy comes out of passing grief.  
Thy face is the shining countenance  
Bathed in the mystery of silent creation,  
Veiled by the surface of rarely plumbed depths,  
Roiling with question and aroused by desire  
Incarnadine, your eyes are two vast whirlpools  
Into which time becomes measured  
Falling, things potential into imponderables  
As the rhythm flows inaudibly through  
The translucent membranes of things tintinnabulous,  
Chiming in the light:  
Sharp, clear notes descending  
As bells at a distance heard  
Announce the rising ground.  
Shimmering, upon which stamp the feet  
Of misty maidens, vaporous wraiths:  
Regaining substance:  
Unspeakably ancient, a crushed petal  
From which a mountain, Olympus, flowered.  
Paradoxes, scaled heights,  
Daunting and un-daunting:  
Ascending and descending  
Semi-tones and tones  
Knitting together sound,  
A tapestry of rhythm and rhyme,  
A-weaving the form of no-thing.

## II

O Three-Sistered Muse!  
 Thou weaves, measures, and cuts  
 The thread that runs through all things:  
 Which eyes purblind cannot see and  
 Which ears, damned with world dust, cannot hear:  
 The going forward, the inchoate surging of ripening, rippling tides  
 Momentous, without call  
 Unprovoked except by the mounting excitement of  
 Genesis; beginnings that crawl out of crushed dreams  
 Floating through volumes, gestation:  
 Emergent, the wetness of birth clinging, sticky shells  
 Of matter whose well-born fate is to suffer digestion.  
 Absorbing nutrients in-forming the textual tissues  
 From above incandescent crescents of waning moons  
 Perform hallowed rituals  
 Clearing the path for soft-spoken fate,  
 Thunderous in the still-ness of Being.  
 Yet, there, abiding, in the eventfulness of silent space  
 Expanding outward in firm, strong waves  
 Growth rings of crescent moons,  
 Gestures: the hope of incipient  
 Existence: rudimentary and awkward,  
 Wild, green: untried momentum.  
 Straining against forces compelling  
 Retreat, pushing the end out of itself  
 Never and ever there:  
 Eagle of Zeus, the King God  
 Whose wing span cannot be more than it itself is.

## III

Before the Gods at the foot of Mount Helicon the Muses danced.  
 Running, leaping, steps  
 Jumping, laughing,  
 Ankles winged:  
 Flight towards the Impossible  
 Before the majesty of Being  
 In all-round service  
 Duty bound by freedom alone

The Maidens mingle:  
Slender arms upward pointing  
Young trees, fixed in motion  
Gestures branching outward  
Rooted in ecstatic ground  
Rolling out its cadence:  
Nothing is there because everything is  
Divinity unearthed as the pulsation  
Enwombed within living matter,  
And whose creation is the cause of speculation.  
Nothing is there because the pulsation is not a thing  
Everything is there because the pulsation is.  
Upward is downward motion  
As wide-arched hands enfold and entwine  
Heaven and Earth, their unity danced out in difference.  
For, heavenly is the rhythm of the Earth;  
The clapping motion of one hand,  
With its beckoning waves, saying:  
Cosmic is the Sphere.  
Revolving: steps lost in passing time – out of time  
As the azure heavens crack,  
Becoming broken potshards of a Grecian Urn  
Odd, evenly spread out in luminous acquiescence.

## SETTING THE TONE

Being-in-time to the music from the ground up is a work in phenomenology, where this term is broadly defined, comprehending Plato, Heidegger, Hegel, and Marx. The most direct referent is Hegel together with the theoretical revolution that he initiated with *Phenomenology of Mind*. (I exclude Kierkegaard, Husserl and Pierce from the investigation because of the need to explicate the originating propositions of that tradition which they later elaborated). I will argue that the mind is the convergence of the phenomenon of truth and the reality of consciousness. The elaboration of this theme is the text, and I therefore cannot state what the argument is now. Here I can only point to the predisposition that makes such a project thinkable.

Phenomenology, to analyze its roots, derives from the Greek *phainein* to show. The possibility of phenomenology was based upon the possibility for reason. For *les philosophes* reason became the new god. This cult of reason or Deism reached its logical conclusion in the French Revolution where the bourgeoisie worshipped Reason in the form of a statue, thereby recreating the very thing they ostensibly opposed: religion. Phenomenology's basic outlines were fleshed in, so to speak, by German idealism, the two main figures being Kant and Hegel. The secularization of Christian metaphysics (onto-theology) to meet the demands of Reason was the thematic context of both their projects. Kant's well-known attempt to limit reason (the *Critique of Reason*, both pure and practical) wanted to preserve the space for the operation of reason, which could be called cognition in more contemporary terms, and also for the non-operation. Behind both Kant and Hegel was the fear, barely articulated, of the power of reason to dethrone the hitherto centre of the intelligible universe whose existence guaranteed universal coherence; for Kant, this remained God, while for Hegel, this became history (God history becoming Absolute Knowledge and philosophy the priest who would officiate at the rites). Kant, the more restrained of the two, spoke of consciousness in terms of a court of judgement; worked up in his version of morality and its strictures, it was based upon a non-calculative and non-instrumental mode of judgement (categorical imperative). *Les enfants terribles* of German idealism were Marx and Engels, some of whose less gifted followers created a new religion, namely, materialism.

To undo this last cult, I have found it necessary to return to the roots of phenomenological thinking. Phenomenal world reality was framed within the

operation of reason, detached from its connection with theism, which insisted upon the world being the creation of an entity completely removed from it. One could of course point Christianity back to its Platonistic roots, which Nietzsche did with his formulation of Christianity as Platonism for the people. Organized Christianity began where Platonism left off, Platonism being the shadow of Plato, which did not threaten to obscure his thinking, as it did his less illustrative successors.

To explain, I briefly refer to Plato's last works, notably, the *Sophist* and the *Parmenides*. In the *Sophist* Plato argued for *difference*, *this italicization pointing not to relations between things but between Being and Being*, so to speak. In particular Plato wanted to exorcise the ghost of Parmenides' apparent logical straitjacketing of change. In the *Sophist*, Plato argued for the existence of *difference*, *where this meant the logical possibility for non-Being*, this not entailing, however, the existence of *not-Being*. Not and non-, obviously distinctions in English but applicable to a reading/translation of a Greek text, I submit, refer to the validity and reality of language. Language (*Dasein*) is non-Being (*Sein*). The categories of rest, motion, sameness, difference and being offered by Plato in that dialogue are moments of that distinction.

Non-Being is real and not real. It is Being that has become other to itself by the action of the mind, the cognitive name for language body. Being is its most neutral form (neutral in relation to a host of versions which would insist upon it having definite characteristics) is no-thing. The 'no-', however, leaves open the possibility for not and non-. *Difference* refers to the movement that Being makes *in mind such that its reality becomes intelligible or intellectuated*. With this intellectuation, which has a history of its own, Being becomes a social object and thus no longer, strictly speaking, itself. Before descending into the distinctions proffered by Hegel – the in-itself, for other, and for itself it is useful to retrace this history. A significant moment was the transformation of thought from *phronesis*, from breast, rib to *noiesis*. The world is Homeric, the second, Platonic. In the course of which the former became reduced to practical reason. The mind (*nous*) identified with Platonic form, which Kant, under the influence of Christian metaphysics would call 'noumenal reality,' stood for a reality untouched by sensuality. Despite Plato's criticism of writing, his own forms could be conceived of in terms of his theorization of writing, particularly its power of abstraction: the dislocation of the appearance of reality fixed by relations between actual things. While it was true that individual memory suffered, collective memory gained, the increase, to use a contemporary term, being quantum. Writing became the storehouse of accumulated cultural values that were less subject to individual recollection, or at least in the personal reciting manner of the Homeric Bard.

Staying with the root of phenomenon, namely showing, world reality became increasingly mediated by a host of exchange relations, under the auspices of ‘writing’ or, more precisely, ‘the script.’ That script is synonymous with exchange, at varying interpretive levels, is no accident. World reality became defined by the exchange relations fostering and reproduced by the script which, apparently, could play the role of repository for all things conceivable such that nothing became lost to *memory*. Memory, moreover, is implicit in thought and, moreover, perception. To think that something is real is to perceive it having substance, an action that involves a host of interpretive mechanisms. To cite from one recent discussion in the literature:

Rather, it is by summarizing, constructing, interpreting, and condensing life experiences, often smoothing over the boundaries between different moments in our lives, that autobiographical memory produces any coherent narrative sense of a personal past (compare Glover 1988, chapter 14; Engel 1999, chapter 4).<sup>1</sup>

Here the substance is the ‘self,’ and the ‘identity’ that becomes constructed and reconstructed through time. The ‘self’ is not a full-blown entity existing throughout time but a work in progress, the recollection through which that entity becomes an *intelligible* self, meaning, the subject of a narrative. The broader term I shall use to summarize the workings of these mechanisms, which also remind me of Freud’s dream interpretive mechanisms and his mystic writing pad, suggesting that the ‘self’ is a dream image, a memory-trace. Indeed, Freud argued the repression of memory resulting in hysteria, which resulted in a definite type of ‘self’ or ‘personality’ being in the world. Memory-trace refers to the work of an entity inserting either itself or some other entity within a language system. To perceive something, for example, one’s own self, is to remember its place within a language system, an idea alluded to by Plato’s notion of *anamnesis*. Perception, in short, is not sensation, Plato’s point in the *Theaetetus*. That perception is, in essence, memory work, and thought, the actualization of this memory, organized by a vast system of belief structures, has consequences for phenomenology, namely, that there are good grounds for orienting to phenomenal reality. Perception is never performed in a vacuum but reproduces a system of beliefs, which makes perception, and whatever links this to thought, into a phenomenon. In classical language, reality is a phenomenon because it is the blend of perception with belief, organized by the memory reposing within a language body, a heightened awareness of which marked the movement from Homeric *phronesis* to Platonic *noiesis*.

In that unuttered and hence inarticulate sense, reality was an incipient phenomenon, but not an object of understanding; this last occurred when the

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<sup>1</sup> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/>

material conditions of production were sufficiently abstract in order to permit the isolation of thought; this last was determined by collective memory, further systemized as ‘written language.’ Here, I draw from one thinker, not usually called a phenomenologist: his writings, not directly examined in this text but present throughout it (a sort of benign presence), have implications for the thinking of phenomenal construction and the theoretical object. That thinker was Jacques Derrida. He argued in ways that at first scandalized (and possibly still do) fundamentalist philosophers or onto-theologians, for the primacy of writing, this reversing the normal manner of perceiving reality, which subordinated writing to oral culture. The notions of the trace, the text, the supplement, and *la différance* all promoted the idea of an *inscriptive* and *descriptive* character adhering to fields of human activity: this difference was not a difference: moreover, its exposition differed, delayed, (and even defaced in terms of logo-centric structures) the certainty of presence that control systems privileged by, for example, elevating oral over written form (and more generally one term of a conjugate pair over the other). The invention of writing is not writing as such but, echoing the Cabbalist story of the Infinite becoming reduced to the actual moment, which that tradition called *zimzum* reduction, but the reduction of writing to a particular script. It is this scriptural, if not scriptural interpretation of writing which lies at the basis of logo-centrism.

Phenomenal reality is rooted in mediation, what Marx would later call a value-form, which joins memory-thought-perception. The classical name for this is *logos*. Reality is a phenomenon of the *logos* or, more plainly expressed. *Legein*, the verb whose noun is *logos*, means firstly to pick out and secondly, to speak. The perception of reality is mediated by the phenomenon of logic, and it is this mediation which gives reality its character of being-real or realness. Reality’s realness is always a mediated proposition. And this does not result necessarily in the reduction of reality to its mediation, even if intelligibility is unthinkable, if not impossible outside of that mediation. The no-thingness of Being, in other words, is the *resonating* space between reality and its mediated realness. The reader will please note the italicized word *resonating*, this implying motion; a string has been plucked and set into motion, this being the basis of a musical play. It is hearing the music from the ground up which is the overarching theme of this work, the horizon-line of its Day, and over which the Day’s blazing Logos rises and falls.

Here, I return to the theme of writing. In the transition from oral to writing culture, one sense of ‘music,’ was displaced, music now being confined programmatically to ‘what actual instruments produce.’ That was the force of a definite inscription which defined writing according to the new phonetic alphabet. Those who previously ‘spoke,’ when speaking was synonymous with ‘singing,’ were the Bards, and it was the Bardic voice which became silenced by

the new phonetic script. The music was not heard, in that former *acoustic* sense, although the Greeks did speak of ‘the musical spheres.’ But with the adaptation of the phonetic alphabet the eye became privileged over the ear, for the sake of greater collective memory, and the emphasis was placed on the ‘script,’ for this is what writing became. The sort of writing which one hears, rather than reads (in this scripted way) is the music from the ground up. One can but *note* it, and in this notion choreograph how one’s own body moves to that *phenomenon*. This space resonates; it is in constant motion, this space which is the elusive Kantian ‘noumenal’ essence, which is no essence whatsoever in any way that is a thing, and it is the ‘observation’ of that space or the ‘hearing’ of that resonances, which is the basis of phenomenal reality and thus, possibly, the new basis for a phenomenology, that derives, however, from an ancient, if not *buried* conception passed over and ignored by the reductive writing of the phonetic script. Obviously, the meaning of ‘noumenal’ and ‘phenomenal’ would need to be re-inscribed within this re-conception of the Real.

The whole text elucidates these propositions. Consequently, I find myself in Hegel’s position where his preface was in fact an after thought. What to do? Let me share with the reader this one example. As part of re-thinking the phenomenological enterprise, I have found it necessary to integrate the latest discoveries of science within my *corpus* of work, notably, fractal logic. Briefly stated, the details being in the text, fractal logic presents us with the generation of a form based upon a reiteration of an algorithm ( $x_n = (x_{n-1})^2 + c$ ). The generation of the form is a vibrating space, the generation being the plucking of the algorithmic string. The point is that unity is being conceptualized (plucked) in terms of a fundamental frequency – the no-thingness of Being. Or, to show more pluck, its being is plucking, there *not* being any entity doing this. This raises interesting questions about the nature of phenomena and/or the phenomena of nature and for the more general theme of the phenomenological project.

Traditional phenomenology did not orient to the vibrating space of no-thingness. The space’s vibrating and resonating characteristics were, in effect, *dampened* by the identity of writing with the phonetic script, the challenging (if not deconstruction) of that identity being Derrida’s contribution to this debate. However, notions of ‘music of the spheres’ and much more recently, string theory’ have suggested, dampening was not elimination, but repression. In fact, the *Logos* was not simply the spoken word, but the *sung* word, and its meaning can only be comprehended by having an ear for its resonances. In a very ironic sense, Heraclites, he who advised us to ‘not listen to him, but to the Logos,’ reincarnated the Homeric Bard. Or, he became the pre-Socratic Bard. But then there was Parmenides, whose strictures against ‘the negation of Being’ has a profound, if not traumatic effect upon all subsequent thinking.

I have spoken already of Plato's recuperative efforts. As much as he provided the means for a cure, he also aided in the disease's progression. I refer to his lauding of sight in the *Republic* and elsewhere, the 'noblest' of senses. Intelligibility became synonymous with 'having insight.' That this occurred at the moment when seat of intelligence moved from breast (*phronesis*)<sup>2</sup> to mind (*nous*) was no accident. The dampening, if not muting of the resonances of vibrating space which was (and is) the context of the *sung* word was co-terminus with the *creation* of noietic intelligence. *Logos* lost its musical character, preserved, nevertheless, by Heraclites' 'listening.' Or the word became the mute witness of its once vibrant hearing. It is noietic intelligence which is implied by the phenomenological project, and a mind complicit with the reduction of writing to script.

I note the shibboleth whose utterance gains one entrance into the reductionist camp: *verba volant sed scripta manet*. This is a piece that belongs to the Christian middle ages, the age of scholastic philosophy dominated by Aristotelian logic, whose originating ground was repressed. The supposed authenticity of 'writing' and its superiority over the (unwritten) word lay in its ability to control exchange. The phonetic script became the organizing locus of a multitude of exchanges that defined, moreover, the range of 'knowing.' The above phrase suggests that truth 'remains'; it does not fly away, a sentiment voiced by Socrates in the *Meno*; there Socrates compared ill-grounded arguments to words that fly away and sound arguments to words that do not.

To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a runaway slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down, for his works are very beautiful. . What am I think of when I say this? True opinions. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man's mind, so

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<sup>2</sup>As my good friend, Andrew Fuyarchuk points out, *phronesis* means practical reason: 'I suppose the deeper question is how our relation to Being becomes stratified. I mean to say when we are not philosophers but parents, politicians...in these and similar cases we require not simply wisdom but *phronesis* practical wisdom. The latter then becomes the essential public or political virtue, or way of existing, wherein one's response to what is given is in measure and fitting. I think we are on common ground – however, while you are committed to a dance I am trying to make room, through *phronesis*, for walking, crawling, strolling as the case may require (personal correspondence.) I do not intend to privilege the dance form; the differences between my good friend and I are temperamental. Andrew tends to the Apollonian and sober style of exposition and I to the Dionysian and ecstatic. Let us say that Apollo and Dionysius, both artists of life, speak for different styles with their own steps, but on the common cultivated ground out of which is raised the Question of Being.'

that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge is different from correct opinion in being tied down (97e).<sup>3</sup>

The word here is memory, the core of Socrates' doctrine of recollection (*anamnesis*). My own argument, and the implications for re-generating the phenomenological project, after suitably destroying its present form, is of that type. I am suggesting that Western metaphysics has become deaf to the resonances of the Word, a deafness caused by the reduction of writing to the phonetic script and the hierarchical privileging of differences that Derrida has much analyzed in his work, and which I shall not, therefore, do so here. The point here, however, which does concern me is this: the notion of 'grounding.' This is problematic. It *could* refer to the 'fixing' of position that '*scripta manet*' recommends.

To remove this confusion, let us ask this question: what does it mean to remain? The Latin *manere* signifies to remain, stay behind, to be what is left. That thought is in motion is undeniably, but that thought is not necessarily thinking is the difference that emerges when trying to 'pin' thought down. According to the Socratic hierarchy in the above: knowledge is higher (and different) from correct opinion because the first is tied down and the second not. What is the status of this 'truth' in relation to 'one cannot cross the same river twice,' which implies that everything is in flux? Is this hierarchy a part of what Adorno remarked in *Negative Dialectics*, namely, the Western tendency to privilege unity over multiplicity? Didn't Hegel say that universality (surely, not diversity) is the element of philosophy in the *Phenomenology*? One can see (if not hear) even more clearly why Derrida's *différance*? – the differentiating of difference – would be scandalous.

This 'tying down,' of which Socrates speaks, is linked to memory-work, which is the task of recollection. If truth is one, which is a proposition that I entertain for the moment, being in welcoming mood, then recollection is the task of *overcoming* differences such that none remain. That belongs to logocentrism, to the form of phenomenological inquiry which identifies writing with the phonetic script and which must repress differences in order to state, if not re-find, the unity which would otherwise be lost. In *Writing and Difference* Derrida argued that Being is not the One; Plato brilliantly exposed this in the *Parmenides*. Socrates assumes in his telling of the *Logos*, some fixed properties to memory, which would guarantee the truth of the universal: 'process of

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/meno.htm>

teaching rests on the permanent, innate powers of the human mind.<sup>4</sup> How can this be? How can we reconcile (if needed, we need to) Plato's differences?

If one assumes that the one who wrote the *Meno* is the one who wrote the *Parmenides*, then we have, corresponding to what Plato described in the *Theaetetus*, a conversation within the same soul. This is a theme, moreover, which has broader phenomenological implications. The mind's permanent and innate power is, Socrates strongly implies, in the *Meno*, is recollection. However, memory is selective, the word selective, I note, deriving from the Greek *legein* to pick out. Memory, according to contemporary research, consists of neural pathways that change, moreover, in time. That phenomenon can be observed at the level of collective memory, where charges of 'revisionism' are often hurled at those who would re-write history. But that history is continually being re-written can be demonstrated by the recurrent battle over historical interpretation, which is also (and not extraneous to) the very process of historical reasoning (while avoiding historicism). The literary-historical battlefield reverberates with cries of revisionism

What is the relationship of memory to mind? Memory, the word, derives from the Latin *memoria*, from *memor* mindful; akin to Old English *gemimor* well-known, Greek *mermEra* care, Sanskrit *smarati* he remembers. To remember is to be reminded of something, memory being the second mind. Moreover, I recall mind to be a language body, which is different from the brain. Mind or culture or language body names the collective relations between brains-in-bodies modifying the expression of the electrical-somatic energy reverberating in each body. Memory/mind is a neuronal/ cultural pathway that shifts over time, the shift not being capricious because of the existing network form. Issues of network, information, and communication are discussed in detail in the text, the stating of this proposition illuminating a major structural thematic. Again, following what I did with the fractal example, I shall limit myself to broad points of exposition.

Pathways configure a system, specifically, the articulation defining its range of movement (one can think of the how the shoulder joints allowing for the articulating of the arm or language, allowing for the articulation of words). A system, moreover, exists in relation to an environment, a relation organized by the entropic/negentropic differential. In applying this to the question of mind and/or memory, one can argue that this phenomenon articulates 'what is' for the human being. Mind and/or memory is, in other words, a joint (the Latin *ars*) about which 'what is' becomes intelligible and thereby assumes effective reality or 'being.' Plato defines the term this way:

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<sup>4</sup> Ian Johnston of Malaspina University-College, Nanaimo, BC, for Liberal Studies 111 students in November 2000.

I am saying that it is whatever possesses a specific power either to naturally do anything whatsoever to another or to be affected in the smallest way by the slightest cause, even if only once - all this in its being exists. For I am establishing the boundary to define 'things which are', that it is nothing else but power.<sup>5</sup>

The boundary of being is the articulating defining the difference between that entity and its environment, and since both entities and environments will vary, both temporally and spatially, the difference cannot be fixed. The line implied is thus always in play, which is *other* than the entity and its character. This last statement takes us further into the text, I limiting myself to the broad exposition of this point.

The basic point is this: each kind of being possesses a character or characteristics that effectively distinguish it from other beings, both of its kind and not of its kind. Obviously, in relation to its kind, the distinguishing differences will be more subtle. In any case, we now have a more grounded notion of *difference* which bears no analytical relationship between two things. Or, two things only *become* different in relation to a dynamic and hence changing mechanism, based upon communications theory. The two things are an entity and its environment, but an environment could include other entities. *Difference* then emerges out of conversation, specifically, the sending and receiving of signals that denote the being in communication, communication being effective community. Both communication and community have the root *communicare* to share. Actual differences emerge out of conversation, meaning the relation between speakers. Difference, then, is not *something* which any speaker possesses outside of conversation but only through participation in social life.

The above deductions have implications for mind and/or memory and for a theory of reality, of which the phenomenal/noumenal distinction is one example. The mind and/or memory is a socio-linguistic difference, this deduction according with the argument's logic and finding support in one theorist, Marvin Minsky, the founder of AI (Artificial Intelligence):

What magical trick makes us intelligent? The trick is that there is no trick. The power of intelligence stems from our vast diversity, not from any single, perfect principle. Our species has evolved many effective although imperfect methods, and each of us individually develops more on our own. Eventually, very few of our actions and decisions come to depend on any single mechanism. Instead,

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<sup>5</sup> [http://www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/trans\\_pl\\_sophist2.html](http://www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/trans_pl_sophist2.html)

they emerge from conflicts and negotiations among societies of processes that constantly challenge one another.<sup>6</sup>

Differences of intelligence are differences stemming from patterns characterizing relations between entities and their environments (which includes other entities). Human intelligence has been honed by social relations, the complex demands of interacting with others of one's kind, that now far exceed the demands that any one human has with his or her' natural environment.' The *social* environment is 'other people,' whether hellish or not. From that there is no exit. Social environment has become the effective human environment.

What does this say about mind and/or memory? The character of being-human Aristotle defined in terms of '*zoon politikon*,' the political being, *polis* referring to the collective state of human habitation. Political economy, which a sub-theme of the present phenomenological disquisition, defines the complex of demands stemming from social interaction that permit that collective entity (society) to exist within the larger universal phase-space that the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and even the 20<sup>th</sup> called, up to a point, nature. Nature no longer has any place within social theoretical discourse, a point made by Jameson when he said: 'Postmodernism is what you have when the modernisation process is complete and nature is gone for good.'<sup>7</sup>

Classical phenomenology, from the present text takes its direction, confined, to be sure, to analysis of Father-Hegel, performs its analysis within the thought patterns of the cultural-natural divide. Naturally (pun intended), noumenal reality will correspond to the existence of an entity *apart from* phenomenal reality. To put matters more sharply, the phenomenon for Hegelian inspired phenomenology necessarily retains the other worldly character of its asocial referent: Absolute Knowledge is Nature assuming the form of a theoretical object (hypothesis). Relatively asocial phenomenology must be relatively indifferent to the social basis of its lucubrations. Nevertheless, to echo Marx, it would be wrong to treat Hegel as a 'dead dog.' His investigations retain seminal importance for consequent phenomenological investigations because of (at least) the following two considerations: 1) the emphasis on the system and 2) of the relations between system members that become elaborated through a series of theoretically infinite mediations, both subjective and objective, that successfully transform the basis of perception and belief, this having consequences at higher levels of system functioning for concepts of mind and world. Hegelian phenomenology, I will argue, was the pioneering spirit that brought together (or revealed) the mind to be the convergence of the phenomenon of truth and the reality of consciousness. My criticism of the short-

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<sup>6</sup> See <http://brainop.media.mit.edu/text-site/libretto/marvin.html>

<sup>7</sup> Jameson, 1997, p. ix.

comings of this phenomenological form is based on a profound debt owed to it. The writing of this text is my payment of that debt, a desire to ‘clear my accounts.’

This clearing of accounts is based upon the clarification of the subject matter of phenomenology. I have noted, in scaling the idea of showing, that while memory is the fundamental and innate property of the mind (there is no mind outside of being human), that memory has no innate content. Indeed, to draw from McLuhan, that prescient communications theorist, ‘the medium is the message.’ The contents of memory are subject to the means by which the process of memorization occurred. If the means by which memory is activated, namely, the reading of a text (the perception of an object), then memory, the ‘event,’ occurs in the context of a text. The text is the ‘eventful’ medium; it mediates the relationship between a given entity and its own intelligence. Or, intelligence is never directly employed, but employed only in relation to demands generated by being in an environment.<sup>8</sup> The internalization of those demands become re-formulated in terms of goals, objectives, and purposes, whether at the individual or group level.

However, and this is the salient contribution of phenomenology, beginning with but not limited to its Hegelian form, entities have their *own* dynamic for Being. Forms of phenomenology differ on the exact nature of that dynamic, where nature refers to the specific entropic/negentropic processes defining an entity’s relationship to its environment, this differential determining to what degree the entity remains at one with itself (and thus different from its environment, which is normally associated with being-alive) or becomes at one with its environment (and thus is indifferent to itself, which is normally associated with being-dead). The Hegelian form systemically set out for the first time relations between the entity’s own perception of itself and other, these relations forming the world (social reality). From its Classical German idealist inception, phenomenology has the purpose of showing the social reality of the world to the world. This was the movement from the onto-theology of Christian metaphysics which reached its apogee in the European Enlightenment, to the secularized form, the absurdity of absolute knowledge, which was present in this inarticulate way within Christian theology, coming to a head in the form of Hegelian dialectics.

It is fateful, moreover, I submit, that the phenomenological project and the cogency of dialectical thought find themselves entwined in Hegel. Phenomenology wants to show ‘the thing in itself,’ the noumenal essence,

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<sup>8</sup> Chimpanzees, for example, exhibit greater intelligence than their jungle environment demands from them, for example, their ability to learn symbols for purposes of communication once outside of that environment and within a human controlled one, such as a language laboratory.

which is a thing's being; dialectical thought, formally considered, is the systemic manner of disclosing the methodological principles of such an investigation. Phenomenology, in other words, is 'endful' while dialectical thought, strictly speaking, is 'endless.' Dialectical thought is the medium for which phenomenological investigation is the message. Phenomenology operates dialectically as it aims to unearth the exact constitution, to speak politically, of the nexus of being and language that produces (human) reality. This was not, of course, clearly stated by Hegel, but implied throughout by way of consciousness, which became methodologically reproduced in Husserl in the form of the 'bracketing operation.'

Here, in order to shed more light on a principal theme of the present text and my own relationship to phenomenological investigation more generally, I consider what consciousness is, limited by the introductory form. Why do I associate consciousness with bracketing? To answer it is necessary to state what consciousness is. Consciousness is a matter of language use, a point most recently elaborated by Julian Jaynes (1975) with his notion of metaphor, metaphier, metaphrand, paraphier, and paraphrand, the details not being relevant here. The same idea was implied by the ordinary language turn of 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy for which Wittgenstein was an outstanding example. Reality could be oriented to in the manner of a 'language game,' the game 'bracketing' reality and thereby producing actual reality, a moment of 'play.' To play the game, equivalent to doing philosophy, was to perform an act of consciousness, or to 'be' conscious. In other words, this being also what phenomenology owes to Hegel, consciousness-as-phenomenon presumes consciousness to be an action, a putting-in-play. It is not a state or if so, a stating and resting of what continually becomes lost, slips away, and becomes buried in the multifarious details of belief and perception.

By the same token, phenomenology, when taken to its discursive limit, a limit found only in language, unearths noumenal essence: the *remains* of the phenomenon's own deferred, delayed, and differentiated presence. Or, one could say, the noumenal essence is what remains when the phenomenological reality has disappeared, which turns (or reveals) the noumenal (strangely resonating, but, perhaps, not so strangely, with the *numinus*) to be the remains of the phenomenological. In that exact way, what is left of the geometric form is its logarithm, its noumenal essence. However, to strike a blow *against* dualism, the fractal geometric form is *not* reducible to its logarithm, because the form is generated through the *reiteration* of the logarithm. This reiteration is the shaking and the vibrating, the movement of the form through phase space which renders intelligible noumenal reality. This reiteration is the *movement* or *becoming* which Plato heroically recalled by way of his verbal heuristics, most notably in the *Sophist* and the *Parmenides*. Repetition of this 'basic form' or

‘fundamental frequency,’ in accordance with the text’s proposed musical conception of the Real, is non-being or, effective being. That this non-being is, which violated the fundamentalist tenor of Parmenides’ *Way of Truth*, is more fully discernible thanks to fractal geometry.

Phenomenal reality has for its noumenal essence the reiteration of a fundamental frequency. The equation, to speak mathematically, is not the noumenal essence itself, its existence the pre-condition for phenomenal reality which becomes realized only through repetition. Or, the essence of what is fundamental is repetition: to remember is to remind oneself of something. Memory is the fundamental frequency of mind, which becomes actually memorable through the wave-energy frequencies that carry energetic matter across the synaptic space – which I earlier named ‘the no-thingness of Being.’ To further character this musical conception, I note that synapses, these empty spaces are bridged by electrical impulses (brain waves). The phenomenon of thought, I further generalize, in preparing the reader for the main text, is the reiteration (repetition) of the energy that apparently no-thing becomes something under the auspices of some scale of measurement (world reality). To further qualify this conception, I recall the chief feature of fractal reality, namely, self-similarity.

Self-similarity, the basis of a new phenomenology, incorporates difference and sameness on the basis of a scale of measurement. I call fractal logic the time signature of reality because everything that is real, theoretically, exhibits this behaviour, which becomes obvious through measurement at every instance of phase-space. This phenomenon is analogous to the time signature of a musical piece, the time signature regulating the piece’s playing through the allocation of space given to the sounding of each note.<sup>9</sup> The relationship of difference and sameness – opposites – organized by a scale of measurement exhibits the dialectical interplay of opposites where dialectical thought is provoked by the simultaneous existence of opposites. A thing both is and is not because of the mediating space of its non-being (which is never not-being). In the phase spacing of its emergence from no-thing into some-thing, namely, its proper self, a thing recalls what it is, each moment of its actual existence self-similar to its actual, meaning *projected* reality, which exists *imaginally*.

These distinctions are developed in my text by comparing Hegelian and Heideggerian metaphysics. The phenomenal point that I want to make here, however, is this: there is no difference between phenomenal reality, a relic of onto-theological Christian metaphysics, and noumenal reality except this: the scale of measurement (world reality). It is only through employing a scale of

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<sup>9</sup> If the time signature is, for example,  $\frac{3}{4}$ , then there are three beats to the measure and each quarter note receives one full beat or count.

measurement that an observed value becomes produced, and in that observation *a space becomes opened up* which is at once the forgetting and remembering of 'what is' from 'what is,' which means both a reduction and an augmentation, a halving and a doubling. The (fractal) whole becomes other than itself because it becomes other to itself, and can only do so in relation to the self that becomes projected onto the scale of measure which divides that whole from itself. The whole departs from itself in becoming a part. That is measurement, the movement which compliments Plato's *anamnesis*. There the whole becomes re-associated with itself, its wholeness theoretically restored. The whole forgotten in the midst of its departure from itself, the departure called scale of measurement, and the whole re-becomes itself from out of the recollection provoked by the same scale. Or, more precisely, forgetfulness and recollection are separated by a relationship towards the scale of measurement in question, otherwise called the mind. Will the mind *take* mind of its own activities? Will it hear the resonating and quivering movement of itself shaking with its end? This pertains, neutrally expressed, to musical appreciation.

To musically appreciate means to be able to hear and hearing requires unblocking the ears. The blockage here, which became pronounced in the case of Parmenides, was the denial of the musicality of the *Logos*, its 'sung word' character. This prepared the word for the logo-centrism of later metaphysics (Platonism, Christianity, and historicism). Plato's later dialogues were the best the classical age could do against its own creeping degeneration, the systemic means of this spreading disease being the phonetic script.

Hegelian phenomenology hears the music from the heavens down (Absolute Knowledge), it displaying a tone deafness that verges on the absurd. I cite the most blatant example to my ears: 'To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science-that goal where it can **lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge**-that is what I have set before me.'<sup>10</sup> In the name of love, one hears the music of the spheres, a phenomenon resonating in the intimacy of 'making love' and 'making music.' Love making is music making: this denotes the concerted playing, this scaling of the Real through facing the not-thingness of Being in the form of one's own death. These existential propositions, developed in my text, which allows me to emphasize the phenomenological point: the hearing of the music from the ground up is the truer form of the transcendence implied by dialectical thought and realised phenomenally through the exploration of the difference between being and language. This becomes centred in the phenomenon of the being-there (*Dasein*) who is able to experience the hair breath distinction between forgetfulness and

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<sup>10</sup> [www.Marxists.org/reference/archive/phindix/.htm](http://www.Marxists.org/reference/archive/phindix/.htm)

recollection - my death is closer to me than my eyelid to my eye – the governing rhythm of his proper existence. By contrast, these isolated moments are named, according to tradition, ‘animal’ and ‘god.’ The animal can only forget (and never remember) what being is because it has no sense of self which would objectify that and the god can only remember (and never forget) what being is because its self is Being. However, neither moment is dialectically valid because each requires the exclusion of its opposite, dialectics, by contrast being the simultaneous holding of opposites, which thus is a moment experienced neither by animal nor god but by man alone.

Dialectical thought and phenomenological reality are intertwined. Dialectical thought preserves the space for the simultaneous existence of opposites, and phenomenological inquiry would clarify the relationship between opposites, the traditional metaphysical terms being ‘noumenal’ and ‘phenomenal.’ Indeed, a line can now be drawn that will summarize this discussion, ending the introduction and bringing the reader to the main text, from Plato to Hegel. In Plato thought became a systemically explored phenomenon in the person of Socrates. In him the Word became Flesh. However, it was a rear-guard action, in effect, against the assault upon non-Being unleashed by Parmenides ‘Way of Truth,’ which stripped non-being of the implied phenomenological status it held under the former truth regime of Bardic orality. Having become an object of science *at a distance* from the body that would examine – eye – it, the Word was sung no longer. That this was a response to and reflection of the revolution initiated by the phonetic alphabet could only be half-perceived by Plato was shown by his ambivalent reception of it expressed in the *Phaedrus*.

Philosophy was split into Socrates, the one who did not write, and Plato, the Socratic alter-ego, who remembered the master, but could *openly* hear the music from the ground up, this indirect hearing becoming the Platonic Form. Hegel, the product of the rationalized Platonism of the Middle Ages, it is true, eliminated the privileged position of sight in favour, however, of a script, not directly linked with the phonetic, that required the existence of a transcendental signifier upholding the coherence of the system against the chaos implied by Being’s no-thingness. Knowledge, in short, became absolute, the Platonic Form now transplanted upon the new grounds of the mind – convergence of reality of truth and phenomenon of consciousness. Hegel’s advance was to show through expanded dialectical form, the grounds of the mind, thereby re-laying those grounds for a new understanding, for which ordinary language philosophy, Heideggerian ‘destruction’ and Derridean ‘deconstruction’ would become the operative moments.

The reader may note that contrary to accepted chronological practice, I have conversed with Heidegger first, with Hegel in the background, and then

Hegel directly. I do so not to be deliberately perverse but because Heidegger's argumentation offers (to me) a richer corpus from which to develop and demarcate my own perspectives. In a sense, violating customary dating, Heidegger is earlier than Hegel because of the more primordial character of his inquiry. Hegel, by contrast, while appearing first (in standard time) actually appears after Heidegger in terms of the ontological primordial character of his concern for Being. One could even say that Hegel's own inquiry is a regional ontology for which Heidegger's is the nation-state. I thus (logically) begin with the whole (Heidegger) and then consider the part (Hegel).

This text carries out the program nascent at the very inception of dialectical thought, and it does so through the reinventing of phenomenological form. This remembering energizes the reinvention, and whose performance is a hearing of the music from the ground up, a hearing that is a passage way carved through the ground of fractal logic, the time signature of reality. The carving is a path-breaking, a hearing of no-thing that moves in the stillness of the proverbial one hand, clapping and shaking to the music. What is the sound of one hand clapping? Please, dear reader, read on, to hear the non-answer. For, we have come to the introduction's end.

# CHAPTER ONE

## MUSICAL FORMS

### 1.1. Mathematics and Sound

The argument's propounding requires the elaboration of terms taken from the musical literature. A glossary follows:

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1) *Mathematics is the logic of sound. [D]*

2) *For example, a harmonic oscillator is a system which, when displaced from its equilibrium position, experiences a restoring force  $F$  proportional to the displacement  $x$ :  $F = -kx$  where  $k$  is a positive constant. [Ra]*

3) *The lowest possible frequency of a harmonic oscillator is called its fundamental frequency. This frequency determines the musical pitch or note that is created by vibration over  $t$  [Me]<sup>11</sup>*

4) *In music, a note is either a unit of fixed pitch that has been given a name, or the graphic representation of that pitch in a notation system, and sometimes its duration, or a specific instance of either, so one can speak of 'the second note of Happy Birthday' for example. The general and specific meanings are freely mixed by musicians, although they can be initially confusing: "the first two notes of Happy Birthday are the same note", meaning, 'the first two sounds of Happy Birthday have the same pitch' A note is a discretization of musical or sound phenomena and thus facilitates musical analysis (Nattiez 1990, p.81n9). 12[Fa]*

5) *Pitch is a subjective quality and is something perceived by the human ear, as opposed to frequency, which is the physical measurement of vibration per*

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<sup>11</sup><http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Note>

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

*second.*<sup>13</sup> *If note is fixed pitch then note is the fixed subjective quality of the frequency which now depicts the music, that is, turns sound into image. Objective sound (without image) becomes subjective image (without sound). [So]*

6) *While music is mathematical, mathematics is not music. [La]*

7) *Music is the spirit of sound, what sound breathes with. Notes only are sounded, but the sound of the music remains unheard within the sounding. That is its sound. The construction of the music-mind remains what is yet to be heard and so rests still within (audibility) and without (hearing). [Te]*

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‘If music be the food of love, play on!’ exclaims the love-sick Duke Orsino at the commencement of Shakespeare’s *The Twelfth Night*. The text for which these words are themselves the beginning will initiate a different reading of Western metaphysics. It is a text predicated upon sorrow, from Plato’s discussion of the philosopher for whom the pondering of death and dying is life’s main pre-occupation to Heidegger’s *Sorgen*, care, which denotes also sorrow and pain.<sup>14</sup> Philosophy takes in the sorrow as the source of its joy. The sorrows of life can only enrich the tone of my singing voice. This is my full throated answer to the wondrous torture of existence. It is to sing even more profoundly, out of depths that are but the shallows to be recalled, my Ode to Being. I begin with the explication of terms, the lexicon of this new language. The first is self-similarity, a term touched upon in the introduction. Its provenance is mathematics, specifically, the geometry of nature. What could be its relationship to music, firstly, and to literary theory, secondly? To answer the first, I present this proposition: mathematics is the logic of sound while music is the spirit of it. The relating of mathematics to music and then to theory is useful to show regularities that define the structure of the text and which, in absence of such an analysis, would not become apparent.

To prove the first statement, I state the fact that a stretched string will, depending upon the tension it exhibits, have a definite frequency at which it vibrates. Dividing that string in half will raise that frequency by one octave, that is, eight tones. The mathematics of this transformation reveals the ratios involved and hence its numeric logic. Music, however, is inspired sound, this pertaining not to the frequency of the string’s vibration but to some idea the vibrating string, the instrument or medium of that idea, evokes. Nevertheless, no ideas can be conveyed in the absence of some semiotic or sign form,

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> See Plato’s *Phaedo* and Heidegger’s *Being and Time* for details.