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This collection of essays has been produced under the auspices of the Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism (CRONEM), a collaborative multidisciplinary organization which brings together researchers at the Universities of Surrey and Roehampton to explore issues lying at the nexus between nation, ethnicity, multiculturalism, citizenship and migration.

Multidisciplinarity lies at the heart of all the activities of CRONEM. This is because we strongly believe that there are many key issues today which can only be properly addressed by adopting a multidisciplinary perspective. The potency of nation and ethnicity in the modern world is evident through a wide range of different phenomena, including the resurgence of nationalism, the proliferation of ethnic conflicts, the emergence of multicultural societies, the social and political consequences of the prejudice, discrimination and disadvantage which are routinely experienced by minority individuals living within ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse societies, the political salience of refugees and asylum seekers, the move towards (and reactions against) the formation of an integrated supranational European state, the events of September 11th and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These events, phenomena and movements exhibit a level of complexity which cannot be adequately understood from the perspective of any single discipline, since it is created and sustained by the interweaving of historical, cultural, political, sociological, economic, psychological, linguistic, religious and educational factors and processes.

Some of the most salient and critical questions in the contemporary world are:

- What are the processes and factors which are responsible for the formation of national, ethnic, cultural and religious groups and communities?
- How are these processes and factors visible in the cultural practices of these groups?
How do these groups and communities construct, negotiate, communicate and express their identities, and what is the relationship between dominant and minority identities within different artistic, linguistic, political, historical, cultural and geographical settings?

What are the political, economic, cultural and psychological causes and consequences of migration, and how do individuals, communities, societies and nations respond to migration and cultural diversity?

How are conceptions and practices of citizenship being reshaped under the pressures of globalisation, migration and multiculturalism?

What are the competing visions of Europe and European identity, and how does European identity relate to cultural, linguistic, national and ethnic identities?

CRONEM's mission is to address these kinds of questions using multidisciplinary perspectives, drawing primarily on the disciplines of Anthropology, Economics, Education, European Studies, Linguistics, Policy Studies, Politics, Psychology and Sociology.

The activities of CRONEM began in October 2004 with a very successful launch at which Lord Bhikhu Parekh gave the inaugural address on ‘The Future of Multiculturalism’. During the short history of CRONEM which has occurred since that date, the research activities of the Centre have been supported by grants received from a number of different funding agencies, including the Economic and Social Research Council, the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the British Academy, the Leverhulme Trust, the US Social Science Research Council, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Heritage Lottery Fund. We would like to very gratefully acknowledge the financial support of all of these agencies here.

The projects which these agencies have funded have ranged across a wide range of topics and issues. For example,

In one study, funded by the Leverhulme Trust, we examined new ethnicities among British Bangladesh and mixed-heritage youth. The project involved both qualitative interviews and quantitative questionnaires with large samples of participants, and it was notable for its use of a multi-method and multidisciplinary approach, drawing especially on the disciplines of Psychology, Sociology and Anthropology. The results have already been presented at a number of conferences, including an eConference organised by the Commission
Advancing Multiculturalism, Post 7/7

for Racial Equality on ‘Mixedness and Mixing: New Perspectives on Mixed-Race Britons’ in early September 2007. The full findings are currently being written up for publication as a monograph.

- A second notable study, on Polish migrant workers in London, was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. This study examined ethnicity and class among Polish migrant workers in London, again through a multidisciplinary approach. A quantitative approach, which analysed large datasets such as the Labour Force Survey, Workers Registration Scheme and decennial Census, was combined with qualitative research based on interviews and participant observation in both London and Poland. The project was rated ‘Outstanding’ by the ESRC Council in February 2007.

- A third major project has been funded for a three year period by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. This interdisciplinary project offers the first cross-national study of televisual representations of Islam as security threat. Based on systematic monitoring of prime-time evening news programmes on the main public service broadcasting channels in Britain, France and Russia, the project is examining three countries which share similarities in their postcolonial relations with Islamic states, resident Muslim populations, and concern with the ‘war on terror’, but which also exhibit differences of media and political cultures, international alignments, and policy towards Muslim minorities.

- Another project has been funded by the US Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and involves the study of transnational religion in London, Johannesburg, Durban and Kuala Lumpur. CRONEM is undertaking qualitative research on the everyday religious life of Hindu, Muslim and Christian groups in London and works closely with the researchers in the other sites who also come from different academic backgrounds. A careful balance has to be maintained between exploring the similarities between these four urban centres and accounting for the particularities of place and time in each site.

- A British Academy-funded research project on representations of people and places between Britain and Bulgaria. Particular attention was paid to examining debates about immigration and multiculturalism involving both the media and local communities during the build-up and aftermath of Bulgaria’s entry into the
European Union in January 2007. Here CRONEM teamed up with colleagues from the Open University and the University of Plovdiv in Bulgaria and research meetings were held in Plovdiv and at the Bulgarian Embassy in London.

- A Foreign and Commonwealth Office-funded research project about Islamic transnational politics among the British Bangladeshi Diaspora in the UK, with ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in Tower Hamlets (London), Birmingham and Oldham.

We recognise that good interdisciplinary research is difficult and intellectually challenging. It requires a great deal of cross-disciplinary respect, trust in the contributions which can be made by the concepts, methods and research findings of other disciplines, and the recognition that the presuppositions of one’s own discipline are not always the optimal route to addressing a particular issue. In addition, specialist terminology and concepts need constant explanation in clear language, as do the distinctive research methods which may be used by different disciplines. There may also be problems associated with trying to reconcile theoretical explanations, which superficially appear to be operating at the same level but, in fact, are operating at very different levels because they are based on quite different ontological or epistemological assumptions. Because of all these challenges, interdisciplinary research is most effectively undertaken by teams of researchers with good interpersonal relationships so that any difficulties can be overcome in the wine bar and restaurant and with good cheer, rather than through hostile exchanges by email! We believe that CRONEM has achieved precisely the right kinds of interpersonal relationships to enable the best interdisciplinary research to flourish, and that our own use of a multidisciplinary approach to address complex issues is innovative, significant and sustainable.

Shortly after our launch in October 2004, we began to prepare for a conference, which was held at Roehampton University in June 2005, on the theme ‘The Future of Multicultural Britain: Meeting across Boundaries’. This was followed in June 2006 by our second conference which addressed the issue of ‘Multicultural Britain: From Anti-Racism to Identity Politics to ….?’ Many of the papers, which were presented at these two conferences, were of such a high standard that we decided to invite some of the contributors to these two conferences to write chapters reporting their work in greater detail so that they could be published in a more durable form. The present volume is the result. It contains
contributions from individuals, who have made a major impact on academic research and public debates concerning multicultural Britain, as well as those from less well-known, younger scholars.

In the preparation of this, our first co-edited, volume we would like to thank the University of Surrey, especially John Turner (Deputy Vice-Chancellor) and Barry Evans (Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Research and Enterprise), for agreeing to provide the initial pump-priming funding which enabled CRONEM to begin its operations, and Roehampton University, especially Yvonne Guerrier (Dean of the School of Business and Social Sciences), for releasing John Eade from other duties so that he could undertake the arduous and demanding role of Executive Director of CRONEM. We would also like to express our immense gratitude to CRONEM’s Administrator, Mirela Dumic, whose professionalism, administrative skills and enthusiasm are second to none and have been invaluable to the operations of the centre. However, the greatest debt of gratitude is owed to Dr Richard Race, who is based in the School of Education at Roehampton University. He has taken the lead in bringing together the contributors, editing the chapters and writing the Introduction, and deserves the credit for showing how the changing character of British society can be understood from different disciplinary perspectives.

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October 2007
**INTRODUCTION**

**ADVANCING MULTICULTURALISM, POST 7/7**

**RICHARD RACE**

Multiculturalism *still* matters and is even more important after 7/7 than it was before. The political discourse and rhetoric of integration sits uncomfortably alongside both multicultural realities e.g. the civil disturbances in Birmingham (October 2005), Paris (November 2005) and Sydney (December, 2005) and social scientific notions of where multiculturalism positions itself domestically and internationally (Blackstone *et al*, 1998; Parekh, 2000b; Kumar, 2003a; Parekh *et al*, 2003). If Doreen Lawrence, mother of Steven, is still attacking the government over its failure to implement the McPherson Reports recommendations (Home Office, 1999) all forums and discussions that include multiculturalism are crucial (Parekh, 2001; Kumar, 2003b; Modood *et al*, 2004; 2007). This book is intended to be a major contribution to studies of multiculturalism examining the historical background (Breuilly, 1992; 1993; 2002) and anthropological context, (Ballard, 1998; 2003) alongside more contemporary applied social policy perspectives (Kumar, 2000; Modood, 2005b). Parekh’s (2000a) report into the future of multi-ethnic Britain called for greater cultural diversity, as well as a more pluralistic outlook on society. The period from 9/11 to 7/7 witnessed global governments moving toward integrationist approaches concerning political and social policy. Trevor Phillips, (2005) the then Chairperson of the Commission for Racial Equality suggested that multiculturalism has brought us in a position of racial segregation, where ethnic groups within London and the UK live in separate entities with no interaction with each other. “In recent years,” he said, “We’ve focused far too much on the ‘multi’ and not enough on the common culture.” The evidence produced in this book attempts to address difficult issues e.g. how does the British government face up to the changing realities of multicultural Britain.
Recent work has begun to highlight a consideration of a revision on theoretical issues that concern integration and multicultural conceptual development. Joppke (2004) underlines both the retreat back to integration and the chronic lack of public support for multiculturalism. Hewitt (2005) drawing on evidence from South London disturbingly argues that there is a white backlash to multiculturalism in communities and makes a link between national and international debates over racism and multiculturalism. Olssen (2004) calls for a more sophisticated notion of multiculturalism in Britain. Citizenship, he argues, calls for a unified social structure and is therefore integrationist. Liberal approaches must recognise and acknowledge cultural differences. Cole (2004) argues that institutional racism has been a reality since 1945. Racialisation has categorised people into distinct ‘races’. Greater multiculturalism can only be achieved by pressing government to implement McPherson’s recommendations. Alred et al. (2006) have moved beyond the terminology of integration and multiculturalism and debate education for intercultural citizenship. Do we need to revisit racist and anti-racist conceptual debates (Gillroy, 1989; May, 1999; Baumann, 2006)?

In this volume, we argue that a multicultural perspective is as relevant and important, both socially and politically in a post 7/7 world. Was multiculturalist or integrationist policy partly or largely to blame for the events of the 7th July 2005? The London Bombings of July 7, 2005 killed 52 people and injured nearly 800. One of the most pertinent questions which the Official Account of the Bombings asked was why did the terrorist attackers do it? (Home Office, 2006a; House of Commons, 2006; Gore, 2006). Mohammad Sifique Khan, 30, the Edgware Road bomber, had a university education and had also been a teaching assistant and youth worker. Shehzad Tanweer, 22, the Aldgate bomber, had also received university education and was working for his father who was looking to set him up in business. Hasib Mir Hussain, 18, the Tavistock Square bomber, was not a high academic achiever but still achieved an Advanced Business Programme at College. Germaine Lindsay, 19, the Russell Square bomber, was bright, successful academically at school and good at sports. All of the bombers were British born Muslims.

Socially, Khan, Tanweer and Hussain would have met around the mosques, youth clubs, gyms and Islamic bookshop in Beeston, Yorkshire, in the north of England. Lindsay was the outsider of the group but had met
Khan through Islamic networks in the Huddersfield and Dewsbury areas of Yorkshire. The Official Report describes Khan as a leading figure and to many a mentor in his local area. Khan’s video statement, which was first broadcast on Al Jazeera on 1 September 2005, provides insights into his motivations. Khan suggests: “Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight”. The Official Report (House of Commons, 2006) highlights that Khan’s last will and testament focuses on the importance of martyrdom as supreme evidence of religious commitment. This links with similar attacks by suicide bombers i.e. the fierce opposition to perceived injustices by the West against Muslims, in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan and a resulting desire for martyrdom.

The Official Report (House of Commons, 2006) underlines that the explosive devices were home made with the ingredients readily available to purchase publicly. The British government highlighted the organisation of the group who avoided detection from internal security forces. The group were integrated into British society which meant detection was difficult. The planning was simple, the operation did not cost much and little expertise was needed to turn the materials into bombs. The suicide bombers, on the morning of the July 7 had driven separately down from Yorkshire and met in Luton, north of London, where they took a train south to Kings Cross and then gone on separate ways on the London Transport network.

Terrorist attacks are nothing new for Londoners. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) had attacked London on several occasions; one bomb explosion ripped apart the NatWest Tower in Central London in 1993. However, the IRA used to send coded telephone messages as a warning. The terrorists of July 7 attacked without any such warning. This fact alone increases tension in a society where terror seems, in the twenty-first century, to constantly reside just under the surface. It is significant to highlight through a consequent report (Home Office, 2006a) that the London attackers were all educated, the majority to college or university levels. Socially, they networked through the Muslim communities in West Yorkshire, specifically around Khan in Beeston.

**Advancing Multiculturalism, post 7/7**

Within a post 7/7 context, there are contributors within this edited collection who argue for both integrationist and multicultural approaches.
The volume acknowledges both concepts and encourages the reader to increase understandings of both arguments and position her/himself within the debates. Such a focus can be located within a macro-context. Social relationships within and between culturally diverse communities have to, at the very least, be accepted and developed (Cahoone, 2005; Modood et al., 2005). What are the micro and macro consequences of developing either an integrationist or multicultural approach? (Rex & Singh, 2004; Maiz & Requejo, 2005) Theorising around themes and issues of cultural diversity, institutional racism, integrationism and multiculturalism can also be located in micro-level examinations concerning the need to recognise ethnic differences and promote them in a positive rather than a negative way (Abu-Laden, 2003; Berkerman, 2003; Chick, 2003).

Phillips (2005) instigated a debate on multiculturalism and integration. He argued that the history of multiculturalism is too vague today and we require greater integration into common values and citizenship. Modood (2007) examines whether multiculturalism is in crisis and whether the concept is fit for the twenty-first century. Engaging in the ongoing debate that Phillips underlined, Modood (2007: 18-19) highlights the importance of placing the multicultural debate, ‘… in recent and ongoing policies, politics and other real-world developments.’ It is not just about 9/11 or 7/7, as the case that processes of integration in the past was assisted by people with Commonwealth countries, who had full voting rights as British citizenship has changed (Sen, 2006). Integration into Britain is global, with a large number of people entering the country from European Union states over the last 20 years. Modood (2007) highlights the complexity of the political debate within post-7/7 society. Giddens (2007: 155-156) describes multiculturalism as, ‘valuing diversity … recognition; …interaction between cultures … [and] acceptance of a common overall identity as members of a national community, as a ‘community of fate’ – that is, being bound by laws and collective decisions that affect everyone.’

Therefore, the objective of the book is to conceptually examine integrationist and multiculturalist approaches by using a variety of contributions to defend and question societal and theoretical developments in a post 7/7 world. John Breuilly begins the book with an analysis of the historical notion that pre-modern understandings of cultural difference were very different from modern understandings. Drawing on evidence from the Habsburg Empire, The Soviet Union and evidence beyond Europe after 1945, he argues that there is continued tensions between pressures for cultural homogenisation in the modern state and claims made
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John Rex aims to contrast his view of the problem of integrating ethnic minorities in a modern welfare state arguing that there is still considerable value in applying the Marshall/Jenkins ideal to contemporary problems of ethnic relations. However, this focus has to be set within a longer historical context in which other issues are raised including those of illegal immigration and East European immigration following the enlargement of the European Union to include twenty five countries. Michael Banton argues the distinctions between social policy problems and sociological problems, and between ordinary language concepts and analytical concepts, are not to be drawn sharply. Social science research into discrimination has contributed to new policies for improving the recognition and protection of human rights. Andrej Keba demonstrates that culture-centred multiculturalism has two objectionable features, one conceptual and the other having to do with its practical implications. The first one is failure to acknowledge the true rationale which ought to guide critics of liberal neutrality towards cultural matters. Maintaining cultural ties matters because it is important for persons to hold on to some inalienable aspects of their personality and their most basic attitudes and evaluations. But this also implies that there is no self-contained reason for valuing culture if what we really care about are individual identities.

Roger Ballard and Tahirah Parveen examine how people of colour still routinely find themselves subjected to systematic marginalisation by their white colleagues, no less in professional contexts than elsewhere. In seeking to make sense of such practices, this article eschews moralistic condemnation. Instead, both Ballard and Parveen set out to explore the conventional 'rules of engagement' which govern interactions across racial and ethnic boundaries in professional environments. Frank Echardt this paper will attempt to provide an overview of the main developments of multiculturalism in Germany. After focusing on some of the main aspects of the particularities of the German situation regarding ethnic diversity, Echardt concludes with an estimation of the recent developments following the reforms initiated by the Red-Green government, paying particular attention to the varying scenarios from the local policies dealing with ethnic diversity.

Krishan Kumar suggests that Multiculturalism is not just a fact but a value, an essential requirement for survival. Kumar asks the following questions: Why then should it be controversial? Why does it have to be formulated as a theory and advocated as public policy? Multiculturalism,
for Kumar is a complex concept becoming not just a doctrine but something more definite. Something more particular is implied over and above the evident fact of the implied multicultural nature of society. Tariq Modood examines the concepts of both integration and multiculturalism and the implications this has for society and post 7/7 British identities. It is interesting that Modood (2007) focuses on the anxieties about Muslims when highlighting that British Muslim men where involved in the 7/7 London Bombings which it is agued by commentators mentioned in Modood’s chapter, has led to a conclusion that multiculturalism has not only failed as a social concept but could be blamed for the bombings. Marc Verlot and Nick Johnson argue that multicultural politics, as they have developed since the 1960’s in Britain, had some unexpected and damaging results in terms of equality and solidarity. ‘Difference policies’, they argue, also produce barriers to interaction and the development of a common public space and identity by emphasizing what divides us over what unites us.

This might seem a very anti-multicultural way to end a book with the title, *Advancing Multiculturalism*, but this isn’t the intention. We recognise the importance of many concepts e.g. assimilation and integration which must be acknowledged and conceptually examined when examining multiculturalism in a post 7/7 context. The aim of this edited collection is to provide the reader with a greater understanding of the complexity of the continuing multiculturalism debate (Gereluk and Race, 2007; Race, 2007).
CHAPTER ONE

THE HISTORICAL CONDITIONS FOR MULTICULTURALISM

JOHN BREUILLY

The apparent timelessness of “multicultural” perceptions

It is probably the case that most human groups, in pre-history as well as recorded history, have known of the existence of other groups which they have regarded as different from themselves. Indeed, arguably people only acquire group identity by contrasting themselves with others. Others are strangers. Insofar as one encounters strangers as members of other groups, the us/Them distinction will be framed in terms of group attributes.

Central to the framing of group attributes are what we might call notions of culture. Insofar as these are used to depict members of other groups, such notions are not necessarily hostile or negative. Here is an extract from one of the classical ethnographic texts, *Germania* by Tacitus, written around AD 98.

Their [the Germans] marriage code.. is strict, and no feature of their morality deserves higher praise. They are almost unique amongst barbarians in being content with one wife apiece – all of them, that is, except a very few who take more than one wife not to satisfy their own desires but because their exalted rank brings them many pressing offers of matrimonial alliances. The dowry is brought by husband to wife, not by wife to husband. Parents and kinsmen attend and approve the gifts – not gifts chosen to please a woman’s fancy or gaily deck a young bride, but oxen, a horse with its bridle, or a shield, spear, and sword. In consideration of such gifts a man gets his wife, and she in turn brings a present of arms to her husband. This interchange of gifts typifies for them the most sacred bond of union, sanctified by mystic rites under the favour of the presiding deities of wedlock. The woman must not think that she is excluded from aspirations to manly virtues or exempt from the hazards of warfare. That is
why she is reminded, in the very ceremonies which bless her marriage at its outset, that she enters her husband’s home to be the partner of his toils and perils, that both in peace and in war she is to share his sufferings and adventures. That is the meaning of the team of oxen, the horse ready for its rider, and the gift of arms. On these terms she must live her life and bear her children. She is receiving something that she must hand over intact and undepreciated to her children, something for her sons’ wives to receive in their turn and pass on to her grandchildren. [Germania, Penguin 1948, pp.116-117.]

Superficially this passage resembles many written by early twentieth-century western anthropologists. An observer is paying close attention to the culture of another society, pointing to its distinctive qualities, and implicitly, if not explicitly, seeing positive value in that culture which is clearly very different from that of the writer. One finds similar accounts in Herodotus. Indeed it has been persuasively argued that Tacitus was writing within a tradition shaped by Herodotus. This tradition is continued in high medieval depictions by writers from “civilised” kingdoms or city-states of the barbarians they encounter in places such as Ireland, Wales, the Scottish Highlands, or eastern Europe. The same trope of civilisation versus primitive or barbarian can be found in Chinese writing. The European tradition can be traced further in writings on the inhabitants of the New World from the early sixteenth century onwards. In the early twentieth century one finds the missionary Bryant writing about the Zulus on the basis of a model derived from the way in which the Old Testament depicted the Israelites surrounded by pagan enemies, or Tacitus and later Romans characterised the barbarians found on the edges of their empire. This takes us into a time, the twentieth-century, when self-conscious practices of cultural anthropology sought to understand societies as systems of cultural practice, each one complete and equally worthy of respect (Gillingam, 2003; Pagden, 2000; Osterhammel, 2006).

One might think that the notion of multiculturalism rests on two principles: that there are distinctly cultural practices and values which bind people together into particular groups and that these are of equal value. Such assumptions, even if implicit rather than explicit, seem to inform ethnographic narratives that stretch back a long time. In this essay, I will argue that these are false assumptions and that the similarities between modern and pre-modern accounts are misleading. Pre-modern understandings of cultural difference were quite different from modern understandings. Consequently, multiculturalism was not conceivable under pre-modern conditions. This must remain largely an assertion but I hope to provide some arguments in support of it, arguments which in turn
highlight what it is about modernity which can enable multiculturalism as an idea and a practice to develop.

**The other as outsider**

Most pre-modern accounts of the “other” are of another society. Sometimes they are based on sending members of one’s own society to that other society such as ambassadors and merchants out into the world. Such people also provide the sources on which historians draw to describe such encounters and observations. Sometimes they are based on observing members of other societies who have come into one’s own society, again frequently ambassadors and merchants but also those who come involuntarily such as slaves and prisoners. There are, I hazard, rarely accounts by members of a dominant group of distinct but subordinate communities living in the same territory and under the same rule.

The accounts to which such contacts give rise are not systematic or based on long-term, intimate knowledge. More importantly, there is no distinction between “culture” and other features of the observed society. Tacitus, for example, describes systems of authority, methods of warfare, economic practices, social institutions and customs and rituals as so many aspects of a whole group.

Insofar as there is any positive valuation in these observations, it often turns out to be a way of criticising corruption and decay in one’s own society. Tacitus, in praising the faithful monogamy of Germans, is berating the growth of promiscuity, adultery and sexual licentiousness in Imperial Rome. Centuries later, when writers like Montesquieu or Voltaire praised the customs and values of the Persians or Chinese, it was with a Eurocentric critique in mind. Clearly where the other society was either powerful and/or possessed of an elaborate civilisation, there would be more serious engagement with it; it was not just a curious exotic. But in the encounter with a powerful other, the main concern was security, to be achieved either by conquest or strict separation and defence and study of the other was motivated primarily by those intentions. In the case of another society recognised as civilised but not seen as threatening, appreciation was frequently tempered by the sense that what one confronted, for example western European in late Imperial China, or the last period of the Mughal Empire, or eighteenth and nineteenth century British aristocrats on the Grand Tour in Italy, was but the decayed shadow of a once great civilisation. Such civilisation merited close and
sympathetic attention, but more to recover its historical greatness than to understand its present condition (Bayly, 2002; Jackson and Jaffer, 2004).

It was, therefore, impossible to come to a clear and distinct idea of people formed by cultural systems (rather than being members of independent groups) with their own complex and worthwhile characteristics. As this is almost always the way members of one society observed those of another, awareness of societies with different customs and manners could not take the form of multiculturalism. There was not enough knowledge of other societies and they were not understood in terms of a clear and distinct concept of culture.

The other in one’s midst

Arguably the situation changes in one or both of two typical pre-modern situations: conquest and the city. A couple of possibilities in these situations can take us closer to a multicultural perspective. However, these are usually cancelled out by opposing possibilities and restricted by a range of pre-modern conditions. Powerful empires can only co-exist for any length of time by being sufficiently distant from one another as to make series conflict difficult or impossible. Most per-modern empires were surrounded by a periphery of weaker, often tribute societies. Conquest took a bewildering variety of forms about which I must make wild generalisations. One form was that of class-domination whereby conquered groups were exploited for their labour and kept elaborately distinct from the ruling class. Slave societies or societies based on near-slave labour such as indentured workers on plantations provide the clearest example of such class-divided societies. There might be some recognition of a kind of subordinate class cum ethnic culture but there was no question of taking it seriously. Ancient Athenians tell us nothing about slaves and neither do the plantation owners of the American South, until providing an idealised account as part of a defence against criticism from other white Americans.

One form of conquest was co-option. In pre-modern conditions co-option led to assimilation. The Anglo-Welsh gentry which formed from the twelfth century onwards or the Frankish elites which helped run the Roman Empire in northern and central France assimilated into the culture, economy and polity of their imperial conquerors. Sometimes the cultural assimilation went the other way, as when a thin warrior class conquered a society of settled agriculture, cities, money, and institutionalised religion.
The Quing conquerors of China quickly sought to establish their credentials as civilised, for example with the emperors demonstrating their mastery of Mandarin calligraphy (Gillingham, 2003; Rawski & Rawson, 2005). Whether the pattern was of co-option and assimilation or conquest and class domination, the important cultural divisions were across classes, not between elites. The subordinate and exploited could not command cultural respect, being regarded at best as possessing crude, inferior culture, if they were accorded the notion of culture, or even humanity, at all. In other words, these accounts are not based on any notion of distinct peoples belonging to "whole" cultures which included elites and the great mass of manual workers and their dependents.

There were important exceptions to these patterns and in those exceptions some anticipation’s of multi-culturality (if not ism) can be seen. The first is where the imperial core practice of co-option included the deliberate preservation of communal identity. A good example of this is the Ottoman Empire as it penetrated into Christian Europe. On the one hand, Islam was itself too powerful and extensive a religion, formed in reaction to and then violent conflict with Christendom, to assimilate to Christianity. So the Ottoman conquerors of the Balkans did not go the way of the Manchu conquerors of China. At the same time, and especially where they found themselves closest to western Christendom and its political centres, the Ottomans could not simply repress or seek to destroy the Christian communities they had conquered. Both through weakness and political calculation, they sometimes exploited differences amongst Christians, for example institutionalising a system of religious tolerance in the semi-autonomous principalities of Transylvania. However, most of the Ottoman conquests were of Orthodox Christians who were too powerful and extended to be destroyed without imposing great costs on the Ottomans themselves. Co-option therefore took the form of recognising Orthodox populations as distinct communities which were charged with much of the everyday running of their affairs.

This gave rise to the millet system. In a recent book edited by Ephraim Nimni, concerning the idea of "national cultural autonomy" advocated by the Marxist politicians and theorists, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, in the late Habsburg Empire, Nimni suggests that the millet system can be regarded as an anticipation of a certain kind of multi-culturality, if not multiculturalism. If the millet was turned into a democratic and voluntary institution it would take on the character of what is practised or preached in the name of modern multiculturalism. (Nimni, 2005). Of course the
Ottoman Empire could never have made its millets into democratic and voluntary communities. The whole point of these communities was that they were hierarchical and compulsory (unless one converted to Islam), subordinate to imperial authority (even if that was weak) and not accorded equality with Muslims.

Another variation on this theme of living together, side by side, in communities of distinct cultures, is found in the pre-modern imperial city. However, once again one finds that the different communities, usually based on religious differences, are defined in terms of their political character and functions, not as distinct cultures. They are hierarchical and compulsory, frequently associated with legally separate districts within the city and distinct, often formally monopolised occupations. In both the empire and the imperial city the principle of identity was frequently provided not by culture but by religion and autonomy was not cultural but communal. Communities were forced into co-existence by imperial authority but remained ignorant of each other’s “culture”. Tolerance was, as Walzer has put it, a form of grudging fatalism practised at the collective level, not a positive value affirmed by individuals. Peaceful co-existence was punctuated by riot and killing which in a way stabilised the system of mutually patrolled communal boundaries (Walzer, 1999).

A provisional conclusion can be hazarded at this point. Small-scale societies, either in interaction with each other or with a more extensive, expanding polity, could not conceive of themselves as distinct cultures. Rather they represented distinct orders of authority and control. Imperial polities could not conceive of societies beyond themselves as distinct and worthy. Where imperial expansion did preserve group institutions and identities, it did so in ways which at best conceded that there were other societies with distinct ways of life but in a grudging, incurious and fatalistic manner. The idea of multiculturalism could only come about, I will argue, following upon an age of nationalism which undermined both small-scale and imperial polities but which also came to distinguish “culture” as a distinct and potentially self-standing characteristic of groups. However, that nationalism in the first instance was strongly, often violently, hostile to the other cultures it imagined it confronted.

A series of mini-empires expanded in Western Europe from territorial cores to control larger territories that came later to be given names such as Spain, Holland, Sweden, France and England/Britain. As these empires directly encountered one other they came to re-define the territories they
controlled as national. Their imperial face was then projected beyond Europe and soon came to destroy non-European imperial polities as well as bringing within their orbits many small-scale polities, as they had done earlier in marcher lands in Europe. This pattern of mini-empires - expansion - conflict - shift to national-state sets the stage for a modern ideology and politics which transformed the meaning of cultural identity in relationship to politics and society. This was the ideology and politics of nationalism.

**Culture in the age of nationalism**

**Debates about nationalism**

In the last couple of decades there have been some fundamental debates about how we can best understand nationalism. (Smith, 1988; Haliday & Ozkirimli, 2000; Ozkirimli, 2005). A central concern is with what one might call “modernist” views of nationalism. These views can be summarised as follows.

- Modernists consider nationalism and nation to be largely or completely modern, though just how modern is a matter of debate.
- They call into question the conventional nation - nationalism direction of causality. Nationalism is not some consequence or expression of the nation; indeed it may well be that it is the ideas and actions of nationalists which form nations.
- They are sceptical about the value, descriptive let alone explanatory, of grand narratives typical of national historiography (including accounts which are hostile to nationalism), in which nations are seen as some kind of group structure and/or group sentiment which develops over a long period of time and eventually, under certain modern conditions, give rise to nationalism.
- They identify certain features which we can call “modernity” as central to explaining the emergence, growth and diffusion of nationalism. This sets modernists off against what have been called “primordialist” accounts and also, though less sharply, against “perennialist” views.
- It also sets them off against “post-modernist” approaches which stress the significance of the discourse of nationalism (“narrating the nation”) but do not see this as only effective under certain non-
discursive conditions which might be called “modernity”, but as more contingent as well as fluid.

I cannot in a short essay consider the arguments for or against these different positions. I will simply assert that I take the modernist approach. (Breuilly, 2005a; 2005b). However, there are many variations within the broad modernist camp. There are those who draw attention to the political, or economic, or cultural conditions of modernity as crucial, along with various holistic or determinist ideas to relate these together. At each level special arguments about culture, identity and differentiation are developed.

- One economic form of modernism stresses the centrality of industrialism and how it tends towards the production an explicit and standard culture for a “whole society” embodied above all in a written vernacular language (Gellner, 2006).
- Another economic form of modernism – broadly the Marxist form – stresses the centrality of modern capitalism. Much of this work linked nationalism to specific class interests. However, various kinds of late Marxism, for example that associated with the Austro-Marxists and with the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, have sought to show how national culture and identity can have a significance apart from particular class interests (Cummins, 1980; Nimmi, 1991).
- The cultural-intellectual form of modernism stresses the invented character of nationalist ideas, often focusing on the work and impact of modern intellectuals (Kedourie, 1966; Suny & Kennedy, 1999).
- The cultural-imaginary form of modernism stresses that nations are imagined communities based on such modern conditions as secularisation and “print-capitalism” in which communities are no longer seen as communities of belief in some relationship to God and eternity but rather as cultural groups occupying specific territory and continuous over time (Anderson, 2006).
- The political-statist form of modernism stresses that nationalist ideas and politics are shaped by the rise of the territorial, sovereign, participatory state which sharply distinguishes itself from other states and derives its legitimacy from the people/nation it rules to which is then ascribed some unique cultural identity. Another variation on this approach draws attention to the way new kinds of political elites exploit notions of identity in the modern condition of mass politics (Tily, 1975; Brass, 1991; Breuilly, 1993; Mann, 1993).
There is not space to consider the debates between these variants on modernism. My own view, is that they are variously persuasive for different cases or aspects of nationalism. Furthermore, nationalism takes on many forms (unless one deliberately defines it in an arbitrarily narrow way) and is continuing to change in novel ways, such as with the very recent concern with multiculturalism reflected in this book. Consequently, I am sceptical about either the idea that one of these approaches is inherently superior to the others or that it might be possible to synthesis these variations into one general but precise modernist “theory of nationalism”. Nevertheless, I do think that generally the cluster of modernist positions work better than what is offered by competing primordialist, perennialist and post-modernist approaches.

The features of triumphant nationalism

One contention of the modernist approach is that nationalism makes claims about culture, identity and groups which are novel.

1. First, there is the claim to uniqueness. Herder (2004), one of the first to advance this claim, centred his conception of the nation on language but only as the most important aspect of a more broadly conceived notion of culture as communication and expression. Languages which were ways of thinking as well as communicating, were incommensurable and all forms of human action were, in some sense, languages. Logically the claim to uniqueness entails equality of respect, on the grounds that one cannot place nations on a hierarchical scale. Herder himself largely adopted this view. In practice nationalist ideology translates the claim to uniqueness into one of superiority, converting otherness into inferiority. Political ideologies are not logical systems of thought.

2. When nationalism is embodied as the official ideology of a nation state, this claim to superiority leads to policies of assimilation or expulsion or repression or subordination of cultures deemed to be different from that possessed by the dominant nation.

3. When a degree of pluralism was accepted in the classical era of nationalism in the nineteenth century, this was in terms of mutual regard between historic, high culture nations, and usually where there was no territorial dispute involved. The Italian exile nationalist Mazzini as well as the English liberal theorist John Stuart Mill expressed this position in different ways. Each high-culture or “civilised” nation had its own territory in which to form a public and national culture, both in Europe and
in areas brought under their control abroad. That culture also had a licence to assimilate other, low or less civilised cultures encountered within its territory.

4. The notion of assimilation worked in a different way but with a similar outcome in societies made up of streams of different kinds of European immigrants, above all in the USA. Those beyond the pale of assimilation were destroyed (Native Americans, Aborigines) or strictly subordinated (Afro-Americans). Here also successive waves of European immigrants were expected to assimilate into a public culture already formed by settlers from (largely Protestant) Britain.

5. However, as the prestige and power of the “national” culture declined in relation to the other cultures it encountered, partly due to the proliferation of nation-states after the two world wars, partly due to the formation of assertive counter-nationalisms, so processes of assimilation, expulsion and subordination became increasingly political and violent. This reached its terrible climax in Europe in the period c.1918-1950 (Mazower, 2000). Some students of the subject think it likely that this modern (and even modernising) process of “ethnic cleansing”, even if largely complete in the northern hemisphere, is still very likely to take place in the later modernising southern hemisphere (Mann, 2005).

So although the nationalist principle that humankind consists of a series of unique groups defined by nationality logically requires a multicultural inference, in fact in its initial emergence and consolidation it was destructive of multiculturality, and increasingly violent in that destructive process. We can see this first in the work of assimilation, subordination and exclusion (including physical destruction) in much of Europe and areas of European settlement overseas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The conversion of the French monarchy as a political structure that kept aloof from most local culture (except religious belief and practice) into a modern state which penetrated downwards into the life of local communities and pursued a policy of turning “peasants into Frenchmen” is a good example of the assimilationist drive (Weber, 1976). The policy of subordination is most clearly revealed in the slave condition of African-Americans in the USA. The policy of exclusion, including destruction, was pursued by white settlers against indigenous societies. There were, of course, always tendencies, both ideological and political, opposed to the policies of subordination and exclusion. However, they were not framed in terms of cultural pluralism. Rather they were presented as Christian and/or enlightened. These value positions, either separately or
combined, in turn drew upon the traditional tropes of the civilised and the barbaric.

The modern, often nationalist destruction of pre-modern multiculturality can be observed in the Balkans where the formation of national states based on various Christian denominations led to the expulsion of Muslims into the shrinking Ottoman Empire. This naturally intensified Muslim resentment of non-Muslims, often seen as a mortal danger to the very existence of the Empire and to policies of exclusion of Christians to their respective “national” states such as Greece or Bulgaria. This conversion of communal pluralism into nationalist conflict was also an essential condition for the mass murder of Armenians in 1916 (Mazower, 2004). That was the depressing start of an era of ethnic cleansings and killings which continued until the mass expulsions of Germans from various eastern European countries after 1945, an era which apparently exhausted and even undermined nationalist passions but at the same time helped realise the nationalist ideal of ethnically homogenous nation-states.

The emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in imperial polities in modern Europe

General points

My central argument is that pre-modern multiculturality had to be destroyed before the condition could be created which made modern multiculturalism possible. There is implicit in the idea of nationalism the premise that cultures are distinct and unique. This logically entails equal respect for such cultures. However, as political ideology does not operate logically and as the rise of political nationalism involved the imposition of one set of cultural values upon diverse groups in a given territory - a process which in turn generated counter-nationalisms - this implicit meaning was long submerged, even repressed.

The very idea that there can be distinct, bounded cultures is modern and a product of nationalism. Take, for example, the notion that people have just one, true language and that national culture and identity is based on this language. This proposition was argued forcefully and elaborately by Herder (2004) in the late eighteenth century and became a truism in nineteenth century nationalist ideology. Billig, (1995) has also pointed out what a peculiar and modern idea this is. The language/dialect distinction, for example, only makes sense in a world of written vernaculars which are
adopted as official languages of the modern state. After a while this assumption becomes naturalised; a national language is no longer a goal for which to strive but a social fact. Yet in a world of oral cultures, multi-linguistic competence and over-arching script languages, often with sacred functions (Greek, Persian, Arabic, Latin, Church Slavonic) the notion that groups of people essentially “have” one language, itself a bounded phenomenon that can be clearly distinguished from other languages that other groups of people “have”, such a notion could never take hold (Gellner, 2006).

**The Habsburg Empire**

It was around the acceptance of this “fact” of distinct languages which underpin unique cultures that multiculturalism was first anticipated, in the national cultural autonomy programme of the Austro-Marxists (Nimni, 2000; 2005). The late Habsburg Empire was in many ways a modern state and society, especially its more developed western half. The loss of its Italian territories and its leading position in Germany, along with its relative decline compared to the German Second Empire, have often disguised the extent of this modernity. That was compounded by the collapse of the empire at the end of the First World War. Yet if the comparison is made, not with Germany, Britain and the USA but rather with the Romanov and Ottoman empires, and arguably even with France, then a very different picture emerges (Okey, 2001; Cornwall, 2002). A series of revisionist economic historical studies have shown a healthy rate of growth, accompanied by significant urban and industrial growth. Rebuilding projects in Vienna from mid-century matched those of Paris in ambition and extent (Breuilly, 2002). Fin-de-siècle Vienna was one of the major centres of cultural modernism– even if its pre-eminence was perhaps more marked in the arts and social sciences than in the natural sciences. Bureaucratic government and mass electoral and parliamentary politics had displaced manoeuvres at court and informal aristocratic power, even if the personal power of the Habsburg dynasty, above all its aged emperor Franz Joseph, remained considerable.

In a range of western Habsburg towns and cities, most notably in the Austrian core and in Bohemia, one finds a well-developed civil society of associations. Commercial agriculture meant that such social organisation, as well as political mobilisation, was not confined to the urban centres. However, unlike its western European counterparts, there were much sharper divisions between older, established elites and newly rising ones