Domestic and Regional Uncertainties in the New Turkey
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## CONTENTS

Chapter One ................................................................................................. 1  
Women and the Patriarchal Paradox in Politics: A National Perspective from Turkey  
*Meltem Ince Yenilmez and Mehmet Hulusi Demir*

Chapter Two ...............................................................................................11  
LGBTQ Movements in Turkey: The People Living on the “Other Side”  
*Özgür Sari*

Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 23  
The Peace Process between Turkey and the PKK: Humanitarian or Political Struggle?  
*Rahman Dag*

Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 37  
The Kurdish Diaspora and Europe's Gatekeeping after Kobane  
*Vera Eccarius-Kelly*

Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 55  
The Trajectory of Political Islam in Turkey  
*Necati Anaz and Mustafa Cuneyt Ozsahin*

Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 67  
Anti-Capitalist Muslims in Turkey: The Gezi Resistance and Beyond  
*Gamze Evcimen*

Chapter Seven ............................................................................................ 85  
Manifestations of Islam in Turkey's Foreign Policy  
*Hüsrev Tabak*

Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 105  
Turkey’s Geopolitics of Zero-Problems and Strategic Depth Reconsidered  
*Emidio Diodato*
CHAPTER ONE

WOMEN AND THE PATRIARCHAL
PARADOX IN POLITICS:
A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM TURKEY

MELTEM INCE YENILMEZ
AND MEHMET HULUSI DEMIR

Introduction

Historically, political life has excluded women in many countries (Pateman 1988). Although, with social, cultural and political developments, democratic experiences of countries lead up, in time, to new experiences, these attempts have rarely contributed to women’s political roles (Simpson 1990). Although women’s contribution to representative democracy can be seen as greater than men’s due to their dual roles – in the economy in terms of production and in the family in terms of reproduction – their representation in every form of the political process is inadequate. According to UNDP (2014) the proportion of participants in political life who are female, worldwide, is only 18 percent. Although many countries’ commitments to gender equality are monitored at the highest level by the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), serious problems still exist in practice in developed and developing countries.

Arguably, in developing and developed countries, men still continue to exert power over women’s lives in many areas. Many ministers, religious leaders, provosts, and judges are male, and many positions of authority, such as in education, finance, health, infrastructure, communication and transportation, and state agencies, are held by men. In very recent adaptations of the women’s movement to local elections, it is important to consider representative institutions and political parties, as well as civic organizations, to understand the meaning of political life from the point of
view of gender. In feminist literature, formal political representation is corroborated by non-elected women’s participation. Therefore, political representation should be connected with communities by either by changing or encouraging the expansion of the constituencies able to participate in elections. However, implementing these proposals might not ensure women’s empowerment in the political arena. Herein, the implemented policies may not have a direct effect on women’s rights, requirements, and needs, and that may restrict women’s access to these things. On the other hand, this is only the beginning of the challenges that women face. Their husbands, fathers, brothers, and (in some cases) uncles have the right to make final decisions on women’s issues such as education, work life, family planning, childcare, housework, consumption, and expenditure of family resources. In nearly every aspect of women’s social, economic, and cultural progress, men have the power to have the final say. Thus, the empowerment of women in political life starts when they understand the reasons for powerlessness, and the oppressing factors and challenges in their living conditions.

This chapter investigates the reasons for women’s weak existence in formal local politics in Turkey in comparison with other countries. Establishing a historical analytical linkage between women’s participation in social and political mobility at national, state, and local levels of politics will provide meaningful insights into aspects of women’s movements in political life. The Turkish case emerges as particularly interesting upon evaluation the negative impact of patriarchal values on attempts to increase the political participation of women and consideration of how positive discrimination could provide a strong solution, especially in encouraging women at least in local elections.

**Political Movements of Women over Time**

Women’s political participation is one of the most important indicators in the assessment of gender inequality in all countries. In order to increase female political representation in localities, structural, social, and cultural burdens that create barriers to women’s empowerment should be considered. In the case of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s contribution should be remembered. Atatürk was the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923. In the light of the French Revolution and the European Enlightenment, he believed that absolute equality of men and women was the main necessity, and therefore human rights and citizenship rights were given to women within a short
period of time during nation-state building. Women gained the right to vote and to be elected in local elections in 1930, and in the Grand National Assembly parliamentary elections in 1934 (Yaraman 1999). At that time, there were only 27 countries, apart from Turkey, that had given women the right to vote for parliament. Canadian women gained the right to vote in 1918, French women in 1944, Italian women in 1945, and Belgian women in 1948. Turkey’s position was really very progressive in the world context, especially given that the country was fully occupied with building a new nation state. Eighteen women became members of parliament in 1935, soon after they had gained voting rights. Although the number of women interested in politics has recently started to increase, for a long time the proportion of female members of parliament was not as high as it was during Atatürk’s period. In comparison, in the 1999 parliamentary national election 22 out of 555 representatives were women (4 percent), the percentage of women in parliament reached 9.5 percent in 2007, and it returned to 4 percent in 2014 (TUIK 2014). The proportion of 9.5 percent in 2007 was the highest in the history of Turkey’s democracy, but has fallen through the floor since then. Consequently Turkey is now behind many developing countries in giving seats in parliament to women.

In any specific example, Turkey and the developed nations clearly lie at opposite ends of the spectrum. Nonetheless, it is difficult to measure the progress of a nation towards gender parity because of the multiple aspects in which it can be measured, such as political, economic, and social. Even within these different spheres of life, there is no objective way to measure gender equality. For example, in the United States, where women have had the right to vote since 1919, there has yet to be a female president and men continue to make up a disproportionately large percentage of seated politicians. In comparison, in other nations, such as Switzerland, which only gave women the right to vote much later (in 1971), there are women in important political positions, including vice president. Comparing these two developed nations, it is difficult to say which has progressed further. Women’s suffrage in the United States has inarguably played a key role in bringing controversial topics relating to women’s rights, such as abortion and contraception, to the forefront of American politics, and subsequently has led to the passing of landmark legislation. However, despite all this, the role of women in the political sphere still remains largely as advocates, trying to bring about change by persuading those in power, rather than assuming the positions of power themselves. Therefore it can be argued that on this measure of equal division of political power even the United States lags behind numerous other countries, and still has room for improvement, just as Turkey, the current research case, does.
In the literature of modernization theory, the socio-economic development of a country is largely connected with gender equality. Since female labor-force participation and opportunities for higher education and better living standards are correlated with gender equality, socio-economic changes are crucial for a society. To put these changes into practice and strengthen women’s position in society, women should be encouraged to become more active in political life to defend themselves and their fellows (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Therefore, the link between gender equality and socio-economic development is less apprehensible for most Muslim countries, and Turkey is no exception. It is true that many issues that once faced Turkish society, such as lack of access to resources and financial credit, unequal labor laws, and lack of educational rights, have been dealt with fully or partially, including by the introduction of various pieces of legislation. But gender inequality continues to be a prominent issue, because it has as much to do with the intangible as with the tangible. It is a perpetual cycle because women are not empowered as they should be, and they do not have the means or influence to create the long-lasting and meaningful change that would lead to their empowerment in social, economic, and political areas. Hence the root of the problem is the problem itself.

**Obstacles to Women’s Participation and Their Exclusion in Turkey**

Women’s local political participation is one of the most important indicators in the measurement of gender inequality in societies. Therefore two principle arguments come up in this context: intrinsic and extrinsic. The intrinsic hypothesis of Bari (2005) refers to human and citizenship rights with respect to democracy and the ratio of the female population to the total population. Since the female population is almost half of the total world population, this is a case that requires special attention. On the other hand, the extrinsic hypothesis generally analyzes the differences between men and women. The values, beliefs, arguments, and views of women on political life are different in different societies, and therefore each society has approached policy and implementation differently, and with different results. Of course, it should not be ignored that there has been extensive research in the literature regarding excluded and included women.

However, the presence of the women’s movement in the political arena does not neatly result in local and national political representation. Women are still not allowed to take leadership positions in many countries,
especially in power mechanisms. Therefore, women’s demands in any movement seem to be marginal in some states. Disenchantment among women, particularly in authoritarian and patriarchal states, leads to more women being informed, sophisticated, and activist. But not many women are successful in this progression.

According to Sirman (1989), the women’s movement is at a crossroads in Turkish political history, and is now at its third stage, called the feminist stage. The first stage of the movement started in the early 19th century, and the activities at that time were mainly restricted to charity work aimed at increasing the demand for women’s education. It then turned into a national movement (Çakır 1991). The second stage started with the building of the Turkish Nation State in 1923, and continued until the 1980s. This stage is important because it started a colonization process of women’s movements in the Turkish Nation State. The third stage started in the 1980s with the ensuring of new roadways and insights into establishing feminist movements. In contrast to the second stage, the third stage is the essential one, where women make an indelible impression by gaining their lost power in every aspect of life. But regrettably the second stage has adapted now to create a situation in which the status of men and women is regarded as “equal but different.”

However, attempts to address the issue are often restricted by the fact that gender inequality is accepted in society, either explicitly or implicitly, as a natural phenomenon that can only be mitigated, rather than eliminated. Even in the developed countries where there have been countless efforts to eliminate the traditional gender roles of the working father and the stay-at-home mother, the responsibility of childcare still falls predominantly on women. Thus women face many more obstacles to success in the workplace, which is likely to remain unaddressed so long as the supermajority of executives deciding on corporate policies, and legislators determining labor laws, are men. We again face the vicious circle of needing women in power in order to create policies more favorable towards women, while lack of such policies is the reason there are few women in power.

Unfortunately the gender gap in Turkish political institutions is worse than the world’s average. So analyzing any change, regardless of its size, is of importance. But more importantly, the reason for this dramatic gender gap overwhelmingly depends on the attitudes and decisions of Turkish political parties. Thus it is inevitable that these parties will have to find ways to play a more constructive role in narrowing this gap. Using gender
quotas, as is the case in many countries, would be the most effective means of increasing women’s representation. Along with the help of gender quotas, the presence of women from all social, cultural, and economic backgrounds in political institutions is important for improving the quality of democracy and the political legitimacy of those institutions.

Nevertheless, in many respects Turkey’s stance towards continuing progress to gender equality in the labor market in due course of law is leaps and bounds ahead of the policies of some other nations, although it needs to be revised in many realms. The major problem to consider is how traditional roles are defined in Turkish culture. In many nations with a state-sanctioned religion, in particular in Turkey, gender roles are heavily defined by religious texts. Thus the debate in the country is still centered on whether women should be allowed to be a part of society – an issue that has never arisen in many other developed nations. Such strict adherence to religious texts means that there is little acceptance of women who stray outside these restrictive boundaries, and little to no tolerance for any advocates of more progressive policies. It is fair to say that if momentous change does not occur, the status of gender parity will forever be immobilized and never reach a level equal to that of the developed nations.

Similarly, although numerous statistics have been produced about women in the workforce, a look at economic parity should involve much more than just numbers. Despite the fact that the number of working women has increased every year, many women continue to work at wage levels that are comparably lower than those of their male counterparts. Although countless pieces of legislation have been passed mandating that men and women receive the same wages for the same work, this continues to be the cause of controversy. Needless to say, in other countries where the employment of women is pretty common, women at least have the power to fight for their rights; in Turkey, without a woman in power to advocate on their behalf the idea of equal wages for women is unattainable at present. While looking purely at statistics regarding employment, it is important to keep in mind that they fail to accurately convey important distinctions, such as whether women have made headway into traditionally male fields such as science and engineering, whether they are contract workers or employed indefinitely, and whether they work as menial laborers or in higher management-level jobs. These factors are all as significant as the empirical measure of the percentage of women in the workforce. Many women have a much harder time accessing financial resources, such as loans, which are usually necessary for the development of businesses and other economic endeavors. While it is impossible for
banks to provide loans to every person who needs them, it is equally unrealistic to expect nongovernmental organizations to fill in the remaining gap. But on this point it is important to note that microloans and the concept of person-to-person funding through private organizations can be a tool in order to make capital much more accessible to women.

However, the source of the greatest disparity is the social realm. While many issues can be placed under this label, the one of the greatest interest is the way in which ambition (and likewise success) is viewed differently for men and women, because this reflects and explains a lot of the underlying perceptions and double standards inherent in the expectations of men and women and thus the gender inequality that arises. Ambition, generally seen as a positive trait when talking of men, can assume a negative connotation in relation to women. Women who are described as ambitious are often seen as unrightfully so, as if they are ruthless or conniving or have some other undesirable trait that is the source of their success. This unfavorable portrayal is damaging not only personally to these women, but also to other women in the workplace and even to younger women, who are discouraged from pursuing similar roles. Thus any comprehensive plan towards achieving gender equality in all scopes of life must address both the prominent issues facing women in our society today and the question of how to prevent this inequality from replicating itself in future generations of women. Education plays a large role in this. Undoubtedly the opportunity to receive education at any level should be a right and not a privilege for girls, as it will provide the basis of any long-lasting and significant change. It places a significant burden on the next generation of women to expect them to be the next wave of change, to break down the boundaries that continue to create inequality, but education is the main tool through which a country can empower not only women but also men – that is, all of us.

Aside from education, there has been a conscious decision and effort to foster political skills in women. There is inherently nothing unequal about the capabilities of men and women, and this conscious decision and effort will foster a generation that will overcome gender inequality because they will not know what it is. This is not to say that ignorance is the answer. Teaching and spreading awareness to avoid inequalities in every aspect of women’s lives can be designed to bring about improvement.

It is true that the majority of people in Turkey are Muslim and maintain their lives with traditional patriarchal family values. But it should be stated that secularism is one of the unchangeable principles of the Turkish
Constitution. According to the Unification of Education law that Turkey follows, women have equal educational and working rights with men. But traditional values exclude them from receiving those rights. It should also be considered that currently only one fourth of the total female population is in higher education in Turkey (TUIK 2013). This inequality affects women’s employment opportunities, and their representation in the political arena. However, the history of Turkey shows that traditional values or Islamic movements are not the only factors that affect society’s treatment of women. Many other aspects of cultural behavior have an impact on women’s roles in the society as well.

Concluding Reflections

To counteract the negative impact of patriarchal values and increase women’s political participation, positive discrimination could be a strong solution, especially in encouraging women in local elections, at least. Political parties and nongovernmental organizations should ensure gender-sensitive activities and policies by cooperating with civil societies and female candidates. Since women are not independent from their parents and/or spouses even in political standing, NGOs and activists should use as many social media channels as possible to increase public awareness of the needs for women’s political participation. On the other hand, the most important thing here is that women themselves need to be the proponents of change, especially in Turkey, where their voices are not as easily expressed and not as readily heard. The entire population, not just half of it, needs to realize that the society we live in today does not provide equal opportunities to men and women. There are countless important female figures in Turkish history who got a lucky break, and thus were able to make their mark on history. The most important change that could be made in this century would be to eliminate that need for luck, and to make success an attainable goal for all women.

The information provided in this chapter indicates that there are no surprises in terms of what has been achieved or about the current situation. The female politicians already placed in parliament, regrettably, still assume that their primary responsibility is being housewives. The traditional roles and cultural attitudes in society represent a major barrier for women in every politicization process. The foremost gender difference in terms of political representation is indeed very simple. Men are politicized as individuals as a result of their own participation in any political event or movement, while women can only be involved in
political life by virtue of their husbands, fathers, or other male family members. They still do not have the power of self-advocacy, which means that women still do not recognize being a politician as a career that is open to them, nor understand the advantages of how that career brings privileges and power to them, enabling them also to change the law for their fellows. Hence they give their male counterparts/deputies authorization to make decisions on every rule and regulation, even on issues that specifically affect women. Bearing all these consequences in mind, it seems that one key group of addressees for increasing women’s political demands should be party leaders. If leaders are convinced, they will create opportunities. To convince them, female cadres of existing parties, including leaders of women’s organizations, feminist NGOs, and female activists, should play the role of interlocutors. It must be clearly elucidated that women’s advancement towards equal representation in politics is vital for the success of parties. This would be another route to calling male attention to the vital importance of achieving gender equality. All in all, it is impossible to ensure sustainable development without understanding women’s requirements, giving priority to their economic and political participation, and empowering their position in civil society. If reforms are not pursued and regulations are not improved, women’s empowerment will not be strengthened in a sustainable manner. Although reforms have been modified and laws redesigned as part of the process of negotiations with the EU, important changes have not yet been implemented even regarding women’s position in economic, social, and political life. As stated, freedom of expression is still not available to all women, so we should commend those who endeavor to advocate publicly for such changes.

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CHAPTER TWO

LGBTTQ MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY: THE PEOPLE LIVING ON THE “OTHER SIDE”

ÖZGÜR SARI

Introduction

In Turkey, as well as all around the world, non-heterosexual LGBTTQ-oriented (lesbian, bisexual, gay, transsexual, transgender, queer) movements and identities are today much more visible in the public sphere. In support of LGBTTQ people – to be more visible in the public sphere, to influence policies and public opinion, to give voice to their freedom and rights – NGOs and initiatives based on sexual orientation out of hegemonic sexual identity have been improving rapidly around the world. In parallel to this global rise, in Turkey LGBTTQ movements and NGOs are more and more active today as a new social movement. Within the parameters behind the development of LGBTTQ movements, a total of eight LGBTTQ NGOs are active in the Turkish cities of Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Eskişehir, and Diyarbakır. To transform the heterosexist, patriarchal, and militarist public sphere in Turkey, the LGBTTQ NGOs have organized a number of activities and demonstrations, the most famous one being Istanbul Pride.

In this study, their propaganda techniques, media tools, projects aimed at affecting public opinion, and relation to other NGOs and initiatives are seen as typical of new social movements. Behind the rise of sexual-oriented social movements, the decline of national identities, the dissolution of citizenship and class identities, and the decline of identities based on production relations play crucial roles. The transformation of capitalism and the rise of consumption-based societies and lifestyle-based identities differentiates LGBTTQ movements from the classical mass movements. LGBTTQ movements in Turkey have individualistic and atomistic characters, demanding lifestyle-based rights rather than class-
based mass movements like labor unions. However, the LGBTTQ
movement in Turkey differs within itself between Istanbul and Diyarbakır;
and in how it articulates with other movements such as the Kurdish
Uprising in East Turkey, and the Gezi Movement in Istanbul.

The rise of the LGBTTQ movement in Turkey was organically a part of
the rising feminist movement in the 1980s. The elimination of LGBTTQ
people in the public sphere and the pushing of them to the ghettos of cities
and public life provoked the LGBTTQ movement in Turkey. Organic and
collaborative relations between European and Turkish LGBTTQ
movements gave power to the development of the movement. The
violence that LGBTTQ people experience every day is very visible in
media and the political arena. The identity of LGBTTQ people in Turkey
is much more visible in public arguments as a result of the movement.

The 1968 uprisings and student movements are generally taken as the
starting point for the new social movements. Many social scientists,
according to some parameters, believe that “new” social movements differ
from the “old” ones. The differentiation between the “new” and “old”
social movements was clarified by two scholars: Alain Touraine (2004)
and Alberto Melucci (1980). In the 19th and 20th centuries, collective and
class-based movements led by the working class were dominant in regard
to production relations and the redistribution of wealth and surplus value.
The working-class movements were a reaction to the exploitation of
workers by the bourgeoisie in Europe which came to be an issue following
industrialization. Industrial capitalism brought social injustice, poverty,
lower living standards, and the exploitation of workers. The politics of the
19th and 20th centuries were shaped around production relations and
class-based movements. The state became the negotiator between
capitalists and workers. The rise of the welfare state and the subsequent
rise of the neoliberal state are the result of that negotiator role of state
between bourgeoisie and proletariat.

From the second half of the 20th century until today, new social
movements have reshaped the social and political structures and
parameters of any society. New social movements started using new
means of communication such as the Internet and social media, new types
of organization structures such as non-hierarchical atomistic organizations,
and new values and opinions based on lifestyles and individual freedoms.
The greatest aims of the new social movements, instead of instigating
revolution, changing the system, or collapsing political power, were
building public opinion, increasing awareness, showing identities in the
public sphere, and gaining cultural rights. New social movements are being organized more flexibly, along the horizontal level and articulated with other movements such as environmentalism, feminism, antiwar/anti-militarist movements, and animal rights.

The 1980s is the midpoint in the rise of new social movements. Global capitalism and neoliberal policies became hegemonic and the representative democracies underwent major crises. As a result, nation states are not the main actors anymore in global capitalism, and the public sphere and citizenship have been redefined. The enlargement of the service sector, the spread of post-Fordist flexible working conditions, the transformation of production structures, the spread of urban areas, and the rise of micro-identities are the new parameters of the global age. Identities based on consumption and lifestyles rather than production relations started to rise, including different sexual-oriented identities. The marginalization of non-hegemonic identities and their struggle to re-enter the system and the public sphere will be writing world history in the near future.

The LGBTTQ Movement in Turkey

The first Pride demonstration in Istanbul took place in 2003, and there were only 30 people who joined in on that last Sunday of June. Istanbul Pride has gotten bigger annually; in 2010, 5,000 people, and in 2011, 10,000 people (see Figure 2.1) joined the Pride event. Istanbul Pride 2013 was attended by more than one hundred thousand people, as a result of the participation of the Gezi Movement. At the time of writing, the 23rd Istanbul Pride was planned to be held in June 2015 (BBC Turkish 2014).

The LGBTTQ movement in Turkey started to organize around a number of associations after 1980. In the 1980s, the concepts of gay, homosexual, and lesbian, did not exist. Men who acted in what was regarded as a feminine manner were called zenne (the name for a male belly dancer in oriental cultures). Gay people were known in nightclubs as singers or prostitutes. Gay or trans singers were acceptable in society, and Zeki Müren and Bülent Ersoy (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3) were the most popular singers in Turkey, but in other contexts the marginalization of gay and trans people prevented them from being visible in the public sphere. They were confined to marginal areas, such as nightclubs, and ghetto neighborhoods in Istanbul such as Tarlabası. The obstacles for them in accessing education and occupational opportunities often pushed them towards the entertainment sector. The juridical structure did not define non-heterosexual identities; therefore, those who identified as gay, trans,
or lesbian tended to have medical operations in order to change their biological sex. Society forced LGBTTQ people to define themselves as either male or female (Gürsu and Elitemiz 2012).

Figure 2.1: A Scene from Istanbul Pride 2011

Figure 2.2: Bülent Ersoy
In social life and professional life, gay and lesbian people were impressed upon to hide their identities. However, in the 1990s, identity and difference policies gained importance following political and ideological changes in wider world. A new type of capitalist economy reflected itself in all aspects of life, and neoliberal policies affected social movements deeply (Adam 2002: 18). New social movements reconsidered culturally grounded identities and minorities within the context of modernity. Movements based on class, race, and national identities explored minority identities and daily life issues through the classical understanding of modernity. The new context of modernity and social movements was reflected in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the close ties between American and European societies within Turkey. In Turkey, gay and lesbian people created their own enclaves in the ghettos of metropolitan cities and articulated themselves through other organizations in order to have a public voice. Feminist movements and organizations were a shelter for LGBTQ people until the establishment of unique LGBTQ organizations (Toktaş and Altunok 2003: 40). Although homosexuality was defined as a sickness in the West in the 20th century, in Turkey, positive or negative, there has not been any accepted definition with respect to LGBTQ people. Today there is no definition and there are no rights regarding LGBTQ individuals in law, including discrimination law, in Turkey. Discrimination against LGBTQ people is indirectly governed by civil law codes and professional life. In other words, they are invisible at both the public and the juridical level. Transgender individuals can only get a new identity after a medical operation.
The movement aimed to bypass discriminatory public attitudes on sexual orientation and instead focus on gaining people legal rights to their own identity. The general idea about homosexuality in Turkey is that it is a psychological disease or perversion. Transvestites and transsexuals are the most visible individuals outside of heteronormative identities, and therefore come face to face with more extreme discrimination in the public sphere and in police stations. There is no job for them, most of them work as sex workers, and physical violence is part of their daily life (Öner 2015).

**LGBTQI Organizations in Turkey**

The 1990s is the turning point for LGBTQI movements in Turkey, since KAOS GL was established in September 1994. Until the establishment of that organization, gay activists were working at the Human Rights Association in a subdivision which was working on gay rights. On September 20, 1994, the first magazine for gay people was published, also named *KAOS GL*. In 2000, the KAOS Culture Center was opened to organize activities, panels, film shows, and festivals. Later, the first LGBTQI library was established at this foundation especially for recording violence against gay people.¹

KAOS GL was legally constituted on 15 September 2005; however, the Ankara Governorship later applied to the Ankara Attorney Generalship to close the foundation, on the basis that it was illegal according to the Turkish Civil Code, being against communal morality. The Attorney Generalship of Ankara took a decision against the Governorship and KAOS GL was confirmed as the first legal LGBTQI foundation in Turkey (Radikal 2013). The foundation has strong collaboration with feminist and antiwar movements both in Turkey and throughout Europe. Political support from the EU to the foundation maintains its existence and its budget.

Lambda Istanbul, the first organization, was established in Istanbul in 1993, one year before KAOS GL. Lambda Istanbul began with a focus on psychological advice for gay people and their families, health advice, and cultural activities to raise awareness. They opened the first gay radio program, which was broadcast on Open Radio on Sundays between midnight and 1 am, beginning on May 5, 1996. Lambda Istanbul is the main actor in organizing Istanbul Gay Pride, and it has close relations with

¹ The official website of the foundation is at www.kaosgldernegi.org (accessed February 16, 2015).
women’s organizations, antiwar and anti-militarist initiatives, and HIV-AIDS organizations. Some members of Lambda Istanbul established another foundation in 2011 called Spod. Spod focuses on social policies regarding gender discrimination. Its main aim is to expand the struggle against discrimination into a wider arena, including social policies, rather than concentrating on identity politics.

After the establishment of LGBTTTQ foundations in Istanbul and Ankara, the movement spread to other big cities around Turkey. The Siyah Pembe Üçgen Foundation was founded, in 2001, in İzmir, the third largest city of Turkey. Subsequently, the Morel Foundation was founded in Eskişehir in 2007. Both Siyah Pembe Üçgen and Morel are active in cultural festivals, seminars, gay literature review collections, and demonstrations. Like the foundations in Ankara and Istanbul, members are generally LGBTTTQ individuals of younger ages, including both employed people and university students. In April 2010, like KAOS GL, the Siyah Pembe Üçgen Foundation was also seen as a movement against communal morality and so was threatened with closure.

The LGBTTTQ movement spread to the eastern part of Turkey, where Kurdish people live, but the movement in the Kurdish population followed a different direction. Hebun, the LGBTTTQ organisation for Kurdish gay people, was founded in 2011 in Diyarbakır. As a result of the Kurdish movement for ethno-cultural rights, the people are aware of the role of activism. However, the traditional Kurdish geography in Turkey is one of heteronormative tribal relations and one in which the “honor killing” of women is sometimes tolerated. But this community where traditions are still strongly respected by people is now host to an LGBTTTQ movement. The members of Hebun (the meaning of hebun is “being”) define themselves as being “other of other”. Not only a Kurdish identity, but also an LGBTTTQ identity, make them subject to double discrimination. Most of the members are, at the same time, active in the Kurdish nationalist movement and parties, although they claim the Kurdish nationalist movement is still heterosexist (t24 2012). While the LGBTTTQ movements and foundations in the western part of Turkey articulate themselves through the feminist movements and struggle for cultural rights, the Hebun

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2 www.lambdaistanbul.org (accessed February 16, 2015) is the official website of the organisation.
3 The official website of Spod is at www.spod.org.tr (accessed February 16, 2015).
4 Siyah Pembe Üçgen and Morel’s websites can be found at www.siyahpembe.org and moreleskisehir.blogspot.com.tr respectively (both accessed February 16, 2015).
movement of Kurdish gay people articulates itself through the Kurdish nationalist movement and focuses on antiwar and anti-militarist aims. For Kurdish gay people, heterosexist systems of society and the militarist policies of the state coincide with each other. Any militarist policy of the government discriminates against them for both their Kurdish and their LGBTTQ identities.

**Analyzing LGBTTQ Movements in Turkey: New Social Movements Perspective**

Some characteristics of the new social movements underlined by social scientists are found in the LGBTTQ foundations in Turkey. First, all LGBTTQ foundations in Turkey use social media effectively. To give LGBTTQ people a voice, to affect public opinion, to share their ideas, and to organize their activities, social media is the first and most effective way of communicating among members and with the public. The classical media communication channels, such as TV, newspapers, and radio, are dominated by big companies and the government. Social media is far from state control and market domination in comparison to these classical institutions of the media.

Second, different from classical social movements, there is not a rigid hierarchy among the members. In demonstrations and preparatory processes for activities, all members are involved in the decision-making process. Decisions are generally taken after group meetings in the foundations.

Third, unlike labor unions and revolutionist movements, LGBTTQ movements in Turkey aim to influence government policies and juridical structures for cultural and equal rights, instead of changing the political system or effecting ideological transformations of political structure.

Fourth, the LGBTTQ movements in Turkey articulate themselves through other movements. From environmentalists to feminists, from antiwar movements to human rights associations, LGBTTQ movements have multiple collaborations and relations with other movements. Unlike classical movements, the LGBTTQ movements do not have enough members to affect state policies alone; therefore, they must collaborate with other movements.

Lastly, the individuals in the LGBTTQ movements in Turkey are as not homogenous as they are in labor movements. They also have various other
identities besides being LGBTQ individuals. Individuals vary widely and are segmented according to educational level, ethnic origin, profession, age, socio-economic strata, cultural background, and many other demographic, socio-economic, and cultural indicators.

### On the Intersection of Class and Sexuality

The articulation of the LGBTQ movement to the other movements was not easy as those in the movement thought it would be. Aligül, a trans man, is a social activist in a famous feminist movement in Turkey known as Amargi. Through his personal experiences, an intersection of two movements can be seen more openly. He has said that, like any other feminist movement, Amargi has also built up its arguments on the basis of two sexual binary oppositional identities – man and woman (Arıkan 2013: 273). Therefore, being a trans man, it was not easy to be accepted as a member in a feminist movement. But just as the LGBTQ movement gets support from some other movements, like feminism, environmentalism or anti-militarism, those other movements also gain the views and perspectives of those of different sexual and gender identity. Aligül had to introduce himself as a lesbian during his first encounter with Amargi, since they had no understanding of what a trans man looked like. As time goes on in Turkey, non-heterosexual identities diverge from gay–lesbian to trans and queer identities. This diversity in LGBTQ identities has brought another level of segmentation and differentiation within the LGBTT community. Aligül claims that among LGBTQ people, there is a hegemony of gay and lesbian people over trans people in social life.

In Öner’s (2015) study, there are in-depth interviews with white-collar gay people. From the interviews, it can be understood that gay people are difficult to homogenize. What is needed in order to live with a different and a “freak” sexual identity and to handle the difficulties and discrimination attendant on being LGBTQ differs from one person to another. If a gay or lesbian person has a prestigious job in society, s/he can more easily handle these difficulties (Öner 2015: 208–210). But any non-heterosexual person with lower living conditions, with a lower education level or salary, or from a rural area, for example, cannot handle the discrimination and difficulties. White-collar gay people are better able to “hide” themselves in society, and even when their sexual identity is known, the discrimination they come face to face with is more likely to be indirect, rather than direct discrimination or physical violence. Similarly, any gay or lesbian people who committed suicide were found to be from a lower
class background. Some gay people who can “hide” themselves successfully may, consciously or unconsciously, discriminate against “passive sexual role” gay people or more visible gay people in the public sphere (2015).

Defining the process of non-heterosexual identities is a fluid process that produces new definitions. The gay and lesbian movement is broadening to incorporate new identities of bisexual, trans, and queer people. The LGBT Oral History Project of Siyah Pembe Üçgen in İzmir reveals that in the 1980s in Turkey, being gay or trans meant only dönme (meaning a return to female identity from male identity) or zenne (male belly dancer), and non-heterosexual persons were visible only in the entertainment or prostitution sectors. Now, in Turkey, non-heterosexual identities have diversified, and there are people who identify as gay or lesbian working in many other professional sectors. However, for transgender persons, professional sectors other than entertainment and prostitution are still strongly closed. From the oral histories of trans people, it can be seen that even being trans is also an economic process: to be a trans person, one needs money to pay for medicines or operations. Most trans people contributing to the Oral History Project said that they got money from prostitution to achieve the identities with which they would be happy (Siyah Pembe Üçgen 2012). When class and sexual identity cross, different experiences and diverse discrimination become an issue among LGBTTQ people.

In the new social movements, class identities are weakening and lifestyle-or consumption-based identities come first. However, this does not mean that class is not a significant parameter anymore. How many communities live and experience their “otherness” is basically tied to class-based conditions. Class identities and sexual identities overlap, and LGBTTQ identities in Turkey are still mobile and dynamic as they are in the rest of the world; so the LGBTTQ movements are actively in motion to attach themselves to other movements, to affect other political views, and to accommodate diversity within themselves. Although it is hard to define them rigidly and analyze them clearly, LGBTTQ people and movements are today more visible and determined to shape a new Turkey.
References


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Touraine, Alain. 2004. Modernliğin Eleştirisi, translated (into Turkish) by Hülya Tufan. İstanbul: YKY.
In the early stages of the 19th century, the religiously oriented concept of humanitarianism emerged. This arguably originated in the humanitarian aspects of Jesus’ teachings, but separating the concept from its religious origin saw it become integrated into the secular roots of Western development. Apparently, a total shift from religious orientation to political means has been practiced, starting after the mass killings in the World Wars. Therefore, the concepts of humanism, humanitarianism, and human rights have been prevalent since the First World War, in order to stand against the killing of humans together with doing “good” for people, ranging from single aid activities to humanitarian interventions of one state or states in others. Immediately after the Second World War, this humanitarianism gained vital significance, as the extent of destruction and death was shocking. In this context, these concepts are, one way or another, integrated into developmental ideas, whether from socialist or liberal ideologies. As a result, when the international system was being reshaped during the ideologically driven Cold War, human rights and humanitarianism took their place as part of the characteristics of Western democracy which could be disseminated into relatively non-democratic agencies. The moment humanitarianism reached its peak in terms of global cooperation in helping people in need was at the end of the Cold War, which saw a dramatic increase in humanitarian aid, for instance, from

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US$2 billion in 1990 to $6 billion in 2000. This reality resulted from the nature of international humanitarian organizations, which were able to function despite the assertion that “the major powers pursued the realpolitik of the Cold War.”

Since then, these internationally prevailing concepts have been adjusted to the context of nation states while transforming legal, political, social, and economic issues. Didier Fassin’s first sentence in his book *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* states that “Moral sentiments have become an essential force in contemporary politics: they nourish its discourses and practices are focused on the disadvantaged and the dominated, whether at home (the poor, the immigrants, the homeless) or farther away (the victims of famine, epidemics, or war).” At the core of these concepts are human beings, but in political terms they are now being used both as a justification for a range of political projects and, in a broader sense, to promote humanitarianism over national and international interests. This sort of contemporary politics is not only followed by established state structures, but also deployed by opposition groups against embedded political systems of a nation state. Therefore, almost every distinctive alternate socio-political group at the national and international level has been using these concepts, especially human rights, in order to justify their struggle against established national or international structures. The contradiction here is that states which are implicitly or explicitly responsible for disasters and unjustified killings of people have also become involved in the humanitarian field. In this sense, it might be argued that core principles of humanitarianism such as impartiality, neutrality, and independence have been violated. The picture which surfaces from this sort of contradiction is that a state, or a legal or illegal organization, might be causing poverty, disasters, and even deaths, while

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