

Solidarity, Memory and Identity

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Edited by

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Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing



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This book first published 2015

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

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ISBN (10): 1-4438-7063-3

ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7063-4

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INTRODUCTION

THE MIRACLE OF SOLIDARITY

WOJCIECH OWCZARSKI

Solidarity is like a miracle: it appears unexpectedly and vanishes without any reason. Solidarity is unpredictable, mysterious and capricious. Nobody knows the rules by which it is led. Nobody can foresee the time and place of its birth. And nobody is able to understand why it suddenly dies. Solidarity may show up in a hopeless situation, but it may also not show up in circumstances when everyone is sure it will. So maybe I expressed it in the wrong way. Solidarity is not *like* a miracle. Solidarity *is* a miracle.

This miracle occurs rarely, in our times even more rarely than previously. Lately its tracks could be seen in Kiev's Maidan Nezalezhnosti ("Independence Square"). Some years ago it visited the Arab countries. In 1980 it was present in Poland. As a child, I was happy to experience the enthusiastic atmosphere of new born solidarity in Gdańsk. I can remember the strong feeling of unbelievable energy and friendliness shared by all. I can remember the smiling, happy faces and the altruistic attitude to each other in my parents' generation. It was the miracle of solidarity. But then solidarity in Poland was killed. And it has never been reborn. Now, thirty-four years after formation of the "Solidarity" movement and twenty-five years after the collapse of the communist regime, solidarity in Poland is an absolutely abstract and dead idea.

In the present world of a never-ending rat-race, solidarity is not in fashion. We are persistently taught to be competitive, successful and self-made individuals. But it still happens that somebody feels responsible for somebody else. It still happens that members of this or that nation, society or group support one another in a difficult situation. From time to time we can still hear about heroes who sacrifice their lives for common wellbeing, and about ordinary people who unthinkingly help their friends, neighbours or strangers. This is the miracle of solidarity.

Our book, however, does not concern miracles. Its subject is very concrete and real. In the age of rapid socio-political changes, with deepening ethnic and religious conflicts on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a diminishing feeling of identification with the community, there exists a strong necessity for reflection on the idea of solidarity. The book aims to answer the following questions: “What is the idea of solidarity today?”, “How can it be defined?”, “How has it evolved over the last decades?”, “How does it manifest itself in social life?”, “How is it reflected in the arts?”, and, above all, “How does it relate to collective memory and identity?”

With this outline of topic areas in mind, we have collected essays which refer to a number of its various aspects: philosophical, social, political, cultural, historical, psychological and artistic. We wanted the book to have an interdisciplinary character, which would illustrate the complexity of perspectives and contexts in which the phenomenon of solidarity can be described today in social sciences and the humanities. Thus, the monograph contains chapters devoted to the history of ideas, international relations and political conflicts in the modern world, national minorities, racism and anti-Semitism, twentieth-century crimes against humanity, but also psychological case studies, experimental research on mechanisms of social behaviour and analyses of works of art (literature, film and performing arts).

Our authors represent academic centres from all around the world (Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe). They are deeply concerned with fighting against any forms of discrimination, and try to make their works contribute to the improvement of the fate of societies and individuals in different corners of the globe. Therefore, we believe that our book will have not only a cognitive dimension but also an ethical one, inspiring its readers to undertake efforts to help victims of social exclusion, persecution and crime.

Obviously, many studies have been published on the process of collective identity constitution, or various forms of social rebellion. Yet among them there is not to be found a book which, like this one, would place solidarity at the centre of attention, distinguishing it as a phenomenon and at the same time admitting that it escapes clear-cut definitions, and offering a multifaceted approach, an interdisciplinary perspective—knowing that this phenomenon is crucial to the understanding of the dynamics of political, social and cultural change in the last several decades.

PART I

PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER ONE

LIKE A PHOENIX: THE EMERGENCE AND DEFORMATION OF SOLIDARITY

MOHINEET KAUR BOPARAI

Deconstruction awakens us to a world without a centre and a structure that is unfathomable and forever undergoing rearrangement. Logocentrism becomes futile because centring notions like God and self have been challenged. Meaning becomes ambiguous and any theoretical framework that tries to locate meaning, pretentious. Deconstruction opposes the idea of centre and hence the hierarchy in binary oppositions. Deconstruction takes us back to innocence, to where we began, with its awakening to lack. Various life structures become a way of layering this lack and finding a centre that ironically exists at the circumference of our consciousness.

In a poststructuralist sense, solidarity is an attempt at the filling of gaps in our limited perception and conscious experience. It is a human cohesion for certainty in the face of overt uncertainty. Uncertainty leads to a dependency between people who share this uncertainty. From our limitations emerges a life with not the view but with a certain view and solidarity becomes the stick we walk with in our collective blindness to “the truth”.

Solidarity is like a cultural object. We are born into culture and we are born into lack. Culture creates desire that can only be fulfilled superficially and temporarily. Solidarity being one such desire offers certainty in the face of an otherwise uncertain world. We associate with people because we feel that they can fill in the gaps in unfathomable existence. According to Žižek, association with other people is idiosyncratic. It arises from a personal need and hence society is a myth. Thus true and permanent solidarity is only possible when we push back our own needs and de-therize the other.

The way our bodies are made, there is always something beyond our perception and there is always something in someone else’s perception

that is hidden from us. This is the very reason why there have been slavery, despotism and cultural misunderstandings. Racism and slavery are precisely this inability to see from the other's perspective and arises out of a perceptive closure. Paradoxically, closures are also the reason for our solidarity with those who are in the same situation. Solidarity is only possible in this way because living demands choice and choosing automatically involves exclusion. Solidarity, if it is to attempt filling up the lack and find meaning must emerge from a conjoining of visions.

In solidarity, there is an element of "we" and a corresponding element of "they". In rather simplistic terms, the "we" and "they" are oppositions. But for the poststructuralists, a signifier never exists alone. It exists only in a chain of other signifiers or in comparison to them, as Derrida stresses in his *Of Grammatology*, "The thing is itself a collection of things or a chain of differences 'in space'".¹

Thus, the "we" always exists because of "they" and is not opposed to it. Without a "they" there would not be a "we". Centring of the self necessarily separates it from the other, but the other is required in order to create a self that at the most basic level arises out of differentiation.

Solidarity, in one sense, is a psychological need for humans and can roughly be equated with what Abraham Maslow calls the needs of love and belonging. Maslow uses the term with regard to the hierarchy of human motivations. Thus, we can say that solidarity is not only a means to an end but is also an end in itself. Once the needs for love and belongingness have been fulfilled, humans seek to fulfil the needs of self esteem, self-actualization and self-transcendence.

Withholding of some kind of solidarity is symptomatic of madness. What kind of solidarity develops in a group depends on their psychological conditioning. In societies where people have control over how they bond and who they bond with, psychological distress is lesser as compared to societies where people have only partial control over their interpersonal bonding and relations. In African-American slave societies, for example, the basic solidarity between family members was disrupted. The institution of family became subservient to the economics and politics of slavery. In the face of such disruptions, love and emotional bonding became a liability; solidarity nevertheless stayed alive and became a trope for agency. Thus solidarity is not simply an emotional need; it is a practical requirement. However, to be authentic, it must encourage emotional bonds. In the above sense, solidarity becomes a need in the formation of subjectivity.

¹ Derrida 1997: 90.

An individual's subjectivity is never holistic and cannot be described with certainty and in totality. This is, in one sense, a fall-out the lack we are born into that shows starkly in the gaps in memory. An individual does not know for certain and in total, at any single time, what makes her. Also, subjectivity is continuity because it is always in the process of shaping up, during life as well as after death.

There are always gaps in memory because something is always driven to the unconscious or lingers in the subconscious. Memory, in Freudian terms, is a system. It is not only the conscious but is a complete whole encompassing the conscious, subconscious and unconscious:

There are other mental processes or mental material which have no such easy access to consciousness, but which must be inferred, discovered, and translated into conscious form in the manner that has been described. It is for such material that we reserve the name of the unconscious proper. Thus we have attributed three qualities to mental processes: they are either conscious, preconscious, or unconscious. The division between the three classes of material which have these qualities is neither absolute nor permanent. What is preconscious becomes conscious, as we have seen, without any activity on our part; what is unconscious can, as a result of our efforts, be made conscious, though in the process we may have an impression that we are overcoming what are often very strong resistances.²

Memory, also, is a domain of uncertainty because an individual can never certainly know what she has forgotten or what remains in the unconscious. Thus memory is also the domain of lack. Memory being in the domain of lack necessitates the acceptance of other individuals and hence is the harbinger of solidarity. Some theorists would suggest that oblivion too is necessary for solidarity, in that we have to forget our differences to unite; though the words acceptance and recognition are more apt in this context. It is not as if we become oblivious of our memories; rather, we accept our memories and overlook them into the domain of the other by shifting the focus from personal memory to shared memory like national memory or class memory.

Solidarity always emerges out of a shared culture whose carrier is language. We are born into language like we are born into a culture. When we say that solidarity is cultural, we are also implying that it is discursive. Solidarity always presupposes a truth and an opposing falsity. This truth is not the universal truth, but a Foucauldian "will to truth". The truth being a will to truth is ambivalent and has gaps that can completely change its face. Thus, the will to truth has no fixed referent to which it can be

² Freud 1969: 34–35.

compared. It is free-floating. Solidarity too is not as solid as its signifier makes it appear. Groups are always in a state of flux, just as subjectivity is always in a state of flux. Solidarity is not frozen, but keeps changing, just as truths keep changing. Taking a detour to Lacan's concept of "wall of language" we can assume that though language enables us to communicate, there is always something that evades representation and hence communication because something is always below the surface or unconscious. Lacan believed:

No matter how often we try to put our pain and suffering into language, to symbolize it, there is always something left over. In other words, there is always a residue that cannot be transformed through language.³

Differences arise because communication is never complete. A cohesive group that shows solidarity always tends to have a structure that can be changed by rearranging its parts. Since structures are not permanent, solidarity is not permanent.

As can already be comprehended from the above discussion, memory and language play an important role in the formation of subjectivity. Language is how we come to terms with our memories and together they carve out a mould into which we fit. This shape gives our shapeless being concreteness, the comprehension of existence that survival requires. By differentiating ourselves from the landscape we at once recognize its perils. We remember these perils and construct a memory register of survival. Survival, then, is the opposite of merging with the landscape. We are not born separate from the landscape, but become separate.

Lacan contends that the child considers himself a part of the landscape. The separation from our surroundings, then, is an instinct that surfaces at the Lacanian symbolic stage:

What Lacan calls separation is this encounter with the lack in the Other and the "want to be", more than merely lack. Separation involves the coincidence, or overlapping, of two lacks: the lack in the subject and the Other. The interaction between these two lacks will determine the constitution of the subject.⁴

On another note, we separate ourselves from our surroundings because we cannot encompass the whole landscape into our limited sensory field. Identity, then, arises out of this limitation.

³ Homer 2005: 84.

⁴ Homer 2005: 73.

Some form of cohesion is essential for life. Our disjunctions with the exteriority arise out of our limited perceptions. These perceptions are harbingers of borders. Solidarity begins when we open up these borders and allow someone else's perceptions to enter our domain. It is transcendence over the mirror image of the self. It is as if the non-self comes to stand in the mirror with the self. Even in solidarity, there are always gaps that dismantle it. Since two selves are not fluid but are solid, separate entities, solidarity becomes a brittle proposition. Language is the link between people and language exists in the realm of the symbolic. True solidarity is possible only in the real that lies beyond language. But because we can never grasp the real, solidarity also becomes transitory and a feeling of continuity with the other is never achieved in permanence.

Nevertheless, in cohesive groups, the other moves closer to the self, however temporarily, in that any infliction of injustice on any member of the group becomes an infliction on the self. Many Marxists believe that the working class members must set aside their individuality and participate in a group as a totality. The individual ambitions must become subservient to the needs of the group. Thus, group needs must be accepted as primary, while individuality becomes secondary. Marx himself in one of his letters to his comrade Sigfrid Meyer emphasized that if the English workers wanted to be free, they must ensure the same for their Irish counterparts. The battle for rights is a collective battle:

“for them, the national emancipation of Ireland . . . is the first condition of their own social emancipation.” This is a particularly powerful quote from Marx's letter. I think this actually is saying quite a bit about what solidarity meant to Marx. Here, he's stating that solidarity comes not from an idealistic conception of justice, selflessness or humanitarianism. It's not about just “being a better person” than others. He's saying that solidarity comes from the recognition that you have a real stake in the outcome of this struggle, too—so you'd better get out there and fight in it.⁵

This view lies beyond the spectrum of modern western lifestyles where individuality is prominent. Such thinking is a fall-out of late, consolidated capitalism. The very mechanisms of late capitalism tend to make individuals self-sufficient. As it advances, capitalism becomes increasingly shock absorbing. The stronger capitalism becomes, the greater the number and variety of substances it produces and at the same time the necessity to use and purchase them. Substances replace interpersonal relationships and solidarity takes a step back. The subject becomes autonomous and self-

⁵ Petkov 2012: 2.

sufficient in a world where all needs are fulfilled by an invisible capitalist force. Capitalism pushes the “other” to the background with its focus on the “I”.

In most societies, the other is accepted but always remains the other, nevertheless. The differentiation between the self and the other is constructed and not always already there. These very differences are temporarily negated within the in-group and at the same time the out-group becomes a totality, its members becoming all the same.

Solidarity paradoxically emerges out of idiosyncratic needs. This is the very reason why solidarity is never permanent. However, even in individualized capitalist societies the need for cohesion is always there. Solidarity in capitalism becomes a safety valve to let out the pressure that being alone creates. Solidarity comes to exist superficially in clubs and unions. On the other hand, solidarity being a raw need is a gap in the capitalist agenda. Capitalist society is highly artificial and its culture is literally and metaphorically a plastic culture. It subverts authentic and raw needs with inflated needs. Capitalism and solidarity are two paths to the same goal of concreteness and meaningfulness.

Solidarity has changed the face of the world and then subsided only to emerge again like a phoenix. It dies only to emerge again and hence never dies. Some form of solidarity always exists everywhere and at every time. We do not create solidarity, but are born into it. Hence the lack we encounter comes with both the struggle to try countering it and the gear we need in this struggle. The struggle with lack is however endless but we do not succumb to it and solidarity keeps running on the treadmill of lack.

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CHAPTER TWO

GLOBAL SOLIDARITY MISSION IMPOSSIBLE IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

MARCIN LISAK

The idea of solidarity apparently has been transferred into social sciences as a mere rhetorical term. Even though within the discipline of sociology it was introduced by Émile Durkheim in 1893¹—with his classical convention of two concepts of solidarity, mechanical and organic—since then only sporadic attention has been paid to solidarity.² Later on, terms such as “cohesion”, “integrity”, “belonging”, “identity”, “participation”, “social mobility” or “social capital” have been placed in the centre of analyses and theories. Moreover, within the discipline of political science there has been no interest in the concept of solidarity. As Lawrence Wilde persuasively puts it, in politics the notion of solidarity has been overlooked for decades while different terms like democracy, nationalism, community, multiculturalism, human rights, social participation are used.³ However, in recent years two attention-grabbing studies have been published: one on the history of the idea of solidarity in Europe,⁴ the other on the conditions of global solidarity.⁵ Consequently, the concept of solidarity seems to respond to at least two demands: the increasing trend of democratization and the challenges of globalization for global citizenship, governance, democratic control, collective responsibility and participation and accountability.

Nonetheless, serious critical arguments are convincing although solidarity is often just an evocative phrase or a kind of subjective appeal to “the feeling of reciprocal sympathy and responsibility among members of

¹ Durkheim 1947.

² Gould 2007: 150.

³ Wilde 2007: 171–172.

⁴ Stjernø 2009.

⁵ Brunkhorst 2005.

a group which promotes mutual support”.⁶ In consequence, solidarity is reduced to meaning “love”, “friendship”, “sympathy” and similar subjective terms which should be left to individual interpretation and application.⁷ As such, solidarity can however be a subject of anthropology, philosophy, the sociology of culture and politics and so-called Catholic Social Thought (understood as a multidisciplinary approach in religious and social studies).

In that context we examine whether the concept of solidarity is useful in the field of social sciences. Apparently two somewhat different modes of meaning can be grasped. On the one side, solidarity refers to collectiveness, unification and integrity of both formal and informal groups. Solidarity demands social stability, cohesion, participation and cooperation. However, these connotations show that the analysed term can be replaced by other concepts like social ties, binds or cohesion. Solidarity itself remains then a soft term with limited descriptive function or is an elusive expression.⁸ In a radically softer way the notion is referred to by Richard Rorty as a flexible feeling of sympathy for each other, and solidarity feeling with any human beings exposed to suffering and humiliation.⁹

On the other hand, solidarity is understood as commitment to the objectives of society, a sense of co-responsibility for a community, group and other individuals. Such an understanding is linked to the concept of the common good. Each member of society is obliged (morally) to serve the common good of his/her society and to partake in community life while fulfilling the objectives of society. Thus Steinar Stjernø defines solidarity as “the preparedness to share resources with others by personal contribution to those in struggle or in need and through taxation and redistribution organized by the state” that “implies a readiness for collective actions and a will to institutionalize that collective action through the establishment of rights and citizenship”.¹⁰ Furthermore, Hauke Brunkhorst claims (following Ulrich Preuß) that the concept of solidarity, dialectical *in se*, is, as Durkheim puts it, “rooted not in *community*”, but it is an “inherent element of *society*” that bureaucracy and law recognize as compatible with a state-controlled model of the political community.¹¹

⁶ Wilde 2007: 171.

⁷ Baker et al.: 28.

⁸ Ferrera 2009: 178.

⁹ Rorty 1992: 192–196.

¹⁰ Stjernø 2009: 2.

¹¹ Brunkhorst 2005: 4–5.

Additionally, solidarity has its own ambivalence. In deviant social groups (e.g. criminals) and in destructive social systems (e.g. Communism, Nazism, Maoism) it is either ethically wrong or dysfunctional and socially destructive. Hence, solidarity is “good only to the extent that its inclusiveness, goal, and implications for the individual are morally acceptable”.¹² A strong pressure of group solidarity (lobbies) can rather disrupt cooperation and mutual trust, weaken wider social ties and tear society apart. Such a risk becomes more relevant in the global age.

The Context of Globalization

Globalization as a specific theoretical and empirical subject is relatively recent. One theoretical approach to globalization refers to the world-system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein. In the seventies of the last century he dealt with the origins and growth of the modern capitalist world-system, which has been in existence since the fifteenth century in Europe. Subsequently, while it has spread to encompass the whole globe, a world-economy created its own socio-geographical divisions: core, periphery, and semiperiphery. The relation between the core (exploiter) and the periphery (being overused) is characterized by either exploitation or dependency, whereas the semiperiphery simultaneously is exploiter and dependent.¹³ For Wallerstein, the basic economic and global actors of the time were nation states, in contrast to the current global players that are transnational corporations and international organizations. Accommodating the Wallerstein approach to the most recent phase of globalization—digital instant communication and frontier-free capital flows—we can sum up by saying that the inequalities between the rich people of the Global North (the core of globalization) and the poor of the Global South (peripheries) are greater than ever.

In spite of that, globalization should not be comprehended as a one-way process of domination or exploitation only. The global trends are neither merely economic (neoliberalism) nor linked only to international relations. Hence globalization leads through cultural and ethical shifts. As Anthony Giddens convincingly argues:

Globalization is not only, or even primarily, an economic phenomenon; and it should not be equated with the emergence of a “world system” . . . Globalization does not only concern the creation of large-scale systems, but also the transformation of local, and even personal, contexts of social

¹² Stjernø 2009: 3.

¹³ Wallerstein 1979: 37–48, 95–118.

experience. Our day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the world. Conversely, lifestyle habits have become globally consequential.¹⁴

Globalization builds up a broad and deeper awareness of worldwide trends and local cultures and lifestyles, producing a mixture of interdependencies. Giddens underlines the dialectical character of these processes:

Globalization is not a single process but a complex mixture of processes, which often act in contradictory ways, producing conflicts, disjunctures and new forms of stratification. Thus, for instance, the revival of local nationalisms, and an accentuating of local identities, are directly bound up with globalizing influences, to which they stand in opposition.¹⁵

Corresponding to that line, Roland Robertson affirms the ambiguity of globalization, considering two directions: convergence and divergence occurring simultaneously.¹⁶ We observe thereby the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local events are affected by experiences occurring in remote corners of the world and vice versa. The variety of directions and dynamics entails the multilevel changes. Many of them tend to deepen social stratification.

In the classic debate, a wide range of scholars distinguished pre-modern from modern society in terms of a transformation from communal *Gemeinschaft* to associative and structured *Gesellschaft*. Consequently, the process of modernization progressively separates individuals from primordial engagement in communal locality (*Gemeinschaft*) while advancing greater differentiation across the individual itself and society (*Gesellschaft*). For Robertson, it leads to polarization with further implications at the global level.¹⁷ The first perspective depicts the world order as an agglomeration of closed communities holding their own inherent and non-transferable identity—the closest to an anti-global approach as seen in political-religious fundamentalism. Those are separated *Gemeinschaften* thrown into one global context. On the platform of solidarity that tendency corresponds to local, group solidarities which are isolationist. The second perspective opts in favour of constructing a global community: a family or brotherhood of *Gemeinschaften*. In that context, as Peter Beyer describes it, a global order is

¹⁴ Giddens 1994: 4–5.

¹⁵ Giddens 1994: 5.

¹⁶ Robertson 1992: 12–13.

¹⁷ Robertson 1992: 76–82.

possible only to the degree that a single global community is established, a sort of “global village” or Durkheimian collective consciousness. Such a conception puts the emphasis on harmonization of differences whether through absorption or toleration. Examples are the views espoused by the Roman Catholic church, the contemporary peace movement, and various theologies of liberation.¹⁸

At the solidarity level social cooperation is built “bottom-up” and has its spiritual dimension. On the other hand, Robertson proposes two *Gesellschaft* approaches. The first one regards world order as a free association of open but interrelated societies. In that view interrelationship helps the societies in their growth. The second approach relativizes the integrity of national states and claims that deliberate and systematic world organizations are needed to manage global order. In that sense a form of world government is required and solidarity is to be introduced top-down, for example in a form of solidarism polity: founding the social system upon solidarity of interests which are to be found in the natural interdependence of society members.

In the second decade of the twenty-first century globalization is more and more characterized as the set of fostering processes of interdependence among countries and their citizens. Growing interdependence is built upon the breaking down of borders and limits that correspond to Willem Buiter’s view of globalization as:

a process of diminishing importance of distance, geography and national boundaries in shaping all kinds of human activities. It therefore refers to trade liberalisation, trade integration; it refers to increased capital mobility. It refers in certain regions to increased labour mobility; and it also refers to the enhanced mobility of just about everything and anything that is permitted by the combination of technological change, lower transportation costs and communication costs that have been going on for a long time.¹⁹

Consequently, globalization is understood as networks of interdependence on a worldwide scale. Nonetheless, since we recognized the social and financial networks widespread across the world can we say that humankind is yet integrated in a harmonized way if at all? An answer to that question leads to testing the idea of global solidarity.

¹⁸ Beyer 1994: 29.

¹⁹ O’Sullivan 2006: 15.

Efficacy of a Solidarity Approach to Globalization

Solidarity relationships between individuals and groups separated by physical, social and cultural distances have been present at least since the middle of the nineteenth century and its Marxian philosophy and working class movements. Today solidarity activities are beginning to take place on a much wider front and the embryonic international community is becoming progressively more vital as an audience for political and solidarity activists. What is at play is an intensified globalization of social and cultural relations, a continuation of the democratization process, coming especially with its third way.²⁰ In theory, if not often in practice, democracy builds on a high degree of global consciousness and the idea of a shared humanity with inalienable individual rights. A global consciousness entails the ability and aspiration to see the world as a single place, to recognize the oneness and wholeness of the world. Such a conviction becomes a motive for examination of the solidarity approach.

We can recognize and examine, then, some traits of solidarity across the globe. Following the analyses of Thomas Olesen, the scholar from the field of political studies, it is worth dealing first with his threefold typology, mainly political, human rights and material solidarity. Furthermore, we evaluate briefly a solidaristic face of world economy and spiritual and ethical forms of solidarity.

1. Politics

Political solidarity has its roots in the traditions of Marxism and socialism. Left-wing internationalism was prevalent especially in the first decades of the twentieth century. In its early form it presented a kind of cosmopolitan alternative to rough capitalism, expressed in slogans such as “workers of the world unite”, building on a degree of international assumption that the working class all over the world struggles with similar difficulties and oppression. Such a general movement was not conceived of as the voluntary actions of individuals and civil organizations, but was structured from above through political parties and states with socialist or communist regimes. This old fashioned internationalism consequently had an explicitly national and class dimension. Since the end of the Cold War this form of class solidarity has practically disappeared in vast parts of the world.

²⁰ See Huntington 1996.

After the twentieth-century worldwide wars, peacekeeping processes and international cooperation initiatives have emerged accordingly. The founding of the United Nations Organization stood as the culmination of such development. The promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 gave ideological legitimacy to the notion of human solidarity.

In the second half of the century the solidarity with the Third World is another type of political solidarity. Activists of the time were mainly located in the global North, well-off regions of the world, especially Western Europe and the USA. Such a kind of solidarity grew up, *inter alia*, on the basis of the student movement in the late 1960s and was concerned with the results of structural inequalities between the rich and the poor countries and regions. As Olesen notes:

Although Third World solidarity activists worked within a framework that divided the world into first, second and third worlds, it still reflected a growing global consciousness in which the world was analysed as one structure. In the 1970s Third World solidarity activism was highly politicised and it typically considered the gross inequalities in poor countries to be fertile soil for the development of revolutionary movements. When solidarity work consisted in aiding these movements it also often reflected the bipolar conflict between East and West.²¹

On the political platform we should point out many international (or even global) institutions which hold the reins. Their steering role is, nonetheless, ambivalent. So far global institutions (such as the United Nations Organization with its many agendas) have been inefficient in regulation and control. In many cases (currently the Syrian civil war) international forces are paralysed and powerless. In the economy the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are accused of imposing a narrow-minded neoliberal vision of social life. Moreover, high level political institutions contribute to increasing inequality between the global North and South, in other words, between the cores of globalization and its peripheries.

2. Human Rights

Another type of solidarity is based on the concept of human rights. Rights solidarity is, thus, a form of common reaction concerned with

²¹ Olesen 2004: 255.

human rights abuses and other forms of antihuman oppression or, particularly in the Western world, a call to democratization and strong opposition to authoritarian forms of government. Such a kind of solidarity aims at putting pressure on human rights abusers both individual and institutional. As Olesen argues:

rights solidarity work is most common in relation to cases where the violation of rights is the result of intentional acts on the part of specific individuals or states, and consequently less common in cases where violations have more structural causes. Rights solidarity is therefore often less politicised than political solidarity.²²

To some extent rights solidarity correlates with the activity of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Helsinki Committees for Human Rights and others. The main difference between historical and contemporary transnational rights solidarity lies in the institutional references available to rights solidarity activists in present times, as well as in the increasing interdependence of states. This interdependence, which is often a result of trade and economic agreements, makes it difficult to commit human rights violations without being subjected to criticism from other states and civil society organisations. The transnational solidarity networks can be understood as supporting to implement and protect human rights across the world.²³

3. Material Aid

Another type of solidarity is directed mainly towards victims of disasters and to different forms of underdevelopment. These problems may have natural as well as human causes. Material solidarity reflects a global consciousness in that it constructs a world in which the fate of distant people can no longer be ignored. Historically, this form of solidarity goes back at least to the foundation of the International Committee of the Red Cross following the Battle of Solferino in 1859. The period following the end of World War II in particular witnessed the birth of a large number of organizations whose objective was to deliver aid to populations suffering from the consequences of conflict. Like rights solidarity, material solidarity is often carried out by organizations that take a neutral position in specific conflicts. Nevertheless, material solidarity, how has been observed, refers rather to charity than to solidarity. We can express that

²² Olesen 2004: 256–257.

²³ Gould 2008: 101.

notion in words of Eduardo Galeano: “Unlike solidarity, which is horizontal and takes place between equals, charity is top-down, humiliating those who receive it and never challenging the implicit power relations”.²⁴ Thus, material solidarity as global charity is rather hierarchical and superior to the aid receivers without any partnership dimension which is required by solidarity itself. Material needs and emergency news become popular in global public opinion, but a one-way solidarity is related to compassion, fundraising and charity providing.

4. Economy

Some socio-economic measures are ambivalent about economic growth and the improvement of living conditions globally. Regarding inequality amongst the world’s nations, the Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality, from 0 to 1, the higher the more unequal) shows the globe becoming slowly more unequal. The Gini for the world grew in the two last centuries from 0.5 in 1820 to 0.61 in 1910, and then more slowly to 0.64 in 1950, and only to 0.657 in 1992. The coefficient suggests that inequality increased globally, mainly because of the division between the First and the Third World mainly.²⁵ Nowadays, we observe the gap between developed and globalized countries and those developing but globalizing poorly is widening.

Nonetheless, at the same time the percentage of the globe’s population that lives on 2 US dollars per day (inflation and purchasing power parity adjusted) dropped from 94% in 1820 to 76% in 1910, and to 51% at the end of the twentieth century. This is a view of the rising tide which lifts all boats up. Despite such an apparent improvement, the poorest population has increased, in absolute numbers, to about 2.8 billion. It is worth adding that spectacular development has been observed particularly in China and India, while gloomy regression spreads in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, life expectancy has risen sharply from 1960 to 1999 by 20 years in India, doubled in China to 70 years and has risen by 7 years in the USA to 77 years. Likewise, newborn mortality in globalizing countries has dropped dramatically, though it remains high in regions detached from the mainstream of globalization, such as sub-Saharan Africa.²⁶

In general, however, it is difficult to weigh up whether globalization has helped the developing world effectively. Specifically regarding the

²⁴ Galeano 2000: 312.

²⁵ O’Sullivan 2006: 26–28.

²⁶ O’Sullivan 2006: 28–29.

developing countries, the meagre economic level of some countries might be an effect of their sufficient openness to the world economy and its turbulence or exploitation, or whether they have been deficient in the institutions and capacities that would have enabled them to benefit from globalization in a sense of interdependence. Nevertheless, we say that there is a lack of or deficit in cooperation. There is no evidence of any firm implementation of economic solidarity amongst the nations of the world. The correlations between modern globalizing capitalism and the solidarity of humankind are even more ambivalent than those articulated by Brunkhorst.²⁷

5. Spirituality

Some kind of conceptualization to spiritual solidarity arrives from the field of religion and Catholic Social Teaching in particular. Despite the fact that a call for cohesion is a consequence of the development of the common good theory, which is fundamental in a classical Thomistic model of social ethics (venerated by the official Catholic institutions at least since the late nineteenth century), the term “solidarity” was not introduced into social teaching until the time of John Paul II. The pope recommended solidarity as the moral virtue and the fitting approach for the current age of interdependence. Solidarity becomes then a function of justice and peace:

When interdependence becomes recognized in this way, the correlative response as a moral and social attitude, as a “virtue”, is solidarity. This then is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say, to the good of all and of each individual because we are really responsible for all.²⁸

Spiritual solidarity is based on the unity of human beings. It is clear also in some Protestant traditions, as in Martin Luther King’s words: “All life is interrelated. All men are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny”.²⁹ In the context of brotherhood then, solidarity, as Joseph Thompson recapitulates, is:

²⁷ Brunkhorst 2007: 93–94.

²⁸ John Paul II 1987: #38.

²⁹ Thompson 2010: 59.

rooted in the oneness of the human family with God as our common parent. We now know that all humanity is genetically related and that we are all composed of stardust. We are theologically and physically brothers and sisters. Moreover, we are dependent on one another and affected by each other's choices and action.³⁰

Solidarity can be interpreted as demanding responsible care for all people who are members of the global, united human family. Although the principle of solidarity has become one of the salient social rules it is defensible to claim that this "virtue" has to a certain extent limited implications within social sciences while being a kind of a moral appeal as critiqued above. Within Catholic tradition solidarity, interpreted as a moral virtue, is in close proximity to other merits like "social love", "commitment to a neighbour and to the common good of a society", "loving instead of exploiting the others".³¹ It recognizes and affirms the ties which unite groups and individuals. Methodologically, solidarity-as-function-of-social-nature gives rather an evocative function of language than an analytical character. Solidarity, confirmed as one of the basic principles of the entire Catholic social teaching, is analogous to "friendship", "social charity", "civilization of love",³² making it a soft term: evocative rather than descriptive. However, the call to solidarity brings into the social field practical needs and consequences: bridging the gap between the poor and the rich, international cooperation, collaboration on global tasks like protecting the natural environment and human rights. A couple of years later, yet in the context of a globalized world, the next pope also underlines the need for friendship and social charity while saying: "As society becomes ever more globalized, it makes us neighbours but does not make us brothers".³³ Solidarity denotes the "brotherhood of men" as an evocative term linked to Christian spirituality and its sense of universality (catholicity) and cooperation.

On the other hand, within the field of religion, group solidarity provides a means of antiglobalism, as Robert Schreiter credibly emphasizes: "Antiglobalism is manifest in theology in two forms: fundamentalism and revanchism".³⁴ The first term is used to cover a wide range of incompatible conservative responses to modernity or globalization. It is an act of resistance to late modernity, an act based on

³⁰ Thompson 2010: 60.

³¹ Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 2004: #193.

³² John Paul II 1991: #10.

³³ Benedict XVI 2009: #19.

³⁴ Schreiter 2000: 21.

conservative religious traditions. The latter refers to “an attempt to regain territory that has been lost”.³⁵ Revanchism tries to recentralize the religious world and culture through hierarchy, capturing control and centralization of leadership. In consequence, processes of globalization are supposed to be reoriented towards a strong group identity that is not universal but particular, and loyalty to a hierarchical centre of orthodoxy. In general, religious (or spiritual) solidarity tends to build up limits and barriers that can protect orthodox exclusive identity against globalizing patterns of a multipolar and fast-modernizing world.

6. Ethics

Another type of solidarity is based on nondenominational ethics. Global solidarity, if it is achievable at all, presupposes human fellowship. Many scholars have argued that a unity of humankind can be established on the basis of some essential values³⁶ like mutual respect. Accordingly, the world’s religions ought to work out an integrative platform for the peaceful coexistence of people. Hans Küng and the Council of the Parliament of the World’s Religions (since 1993) propose the following two rules for the core of a global ethic: 1) every human being must be treated humanely, 2) What you wish done to yourself, do to others or rather: Do good to *others* as *you would like* good to be *done* to you.³⁷ Both ethical principles are founded upon golden rules of humanity within various religions. These are some of their formulations:

- Confucius (551–489 BC): what you yourself do not want, do not do to another person.
- Rabbi Hillel (60 BC–AD 10): do not do to others what you would not want them to do to you.
- Jesus of Nazareth: whatever you want people to do to you, do also to them.
- Islam: none of you is a believer as long as he does not wish his brother what he wishes himself.
- Jainism: human beings should be indifferent to worldly things and treat all creatures in the world as they would want to be treated themselves.

³⁵ Schreiter 2000: 22.

³⁶ Korab-Karpowicz 2010: 308–309.

³⁷ Küng 1997: 110.

- Buddhism: a state which is not pleasant or enjoyable for me will also not be so for him; and how can I impose on another a state which is not pleasant or enjoyable for me?
- Hinduism: one should not behave towards others in a way which is unpleasant for oneself: that is the essence of morality.

Ethics based on religious presumptions can be ambiguous, but it is reasonable to take note of the positive role of religions in the formation of ethics because their institutional forms still command the loyalty or sympathy of hundreds of millions of people.³⁸ Thus, the *Weltethos* proposal is a response to the challenge of fundamentalism, terrorism and clash of civilizations.³⁹ Küng underlines that there will be no peace between the civilizations without a peace between the religions. And there will be no peace between the religions without a dialogue between the religions.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the initiatives of building up solidarity on the basis of an ethical consensus and interreligious dialogue are still at a primordial stage. Moreover, the idea of common global ethics has not materialized in the shape of any social movement. Without such a form of support at the back a shared ethics stays as a rather vague illusion or dream.

Conclusions: Limits of Global Solidarity

The forms of solidarity described so far display elements of inequality or are just evocative. Some forms denote a one-way relationship between those who offer aid and those who benefit from it. As a consequence the benefactor of solidarity is supposed to be stronger than the recipient. This factor is evident in most instances of rights and material solidarity and in solidarity relationships between people and groups in the rich cores of globalization and the poor peripheries of globalization. For Olesen:

This type of solidarity usually involves the transfer of different forms of resources. It is the result of initiatives by activists in the rich world, but may also be inspired by calls from aggrieved groups and populations in the poor parts of the world. In general, rights and material solidarity are rather non-political and do not fundamentally challenge the underlying causes of the grievances that inspire the solidarity effort.⁴¹

³⁸ Küng 1997: 108.

³⁹ See Huntington 1996.

⁴⁰ Küng 1997: 92.

⁴¹ Olesen 2004: 258.