

Binaries in Battle

Binaries in Battle:
Representations of Division and Conflict

Edited by

Marja Vuorinen, Noora Kotilainen
and Aki-Mauri Huhtinen

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P U B L I S H I N G

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INTRODUCTION

NOORA KOTILAINEN AND MARJA VUORINEN

Binary representations of reality are at the core of all human thinking. We tend to divide things into two opposing, often differently valued extremes, such as true against false, us against them, and good versus evil. We also logically define by opposition: e.g. alien as not familiar and deviant as not normal.

Particularly in the Western political thought there is a long tradition of dividing the world into two contrary poles – the *Us* and the *Other*, the latter being something fundamentally different from the former. For Aristotle, the Other was a ‘barbarian’, namely someone unable to speak properly or understand the Greek language. An alien easily becomes the hunted, or the slave – he is unlike us, and thus without rights. To modern scholars like Michel Foucault, the Other has often appeared as a violator of norms: as defective, diseased, delinquent or mad.¹ The prevailing Western model of binarity as an essential division into good and bad is balanced by the yin/yang model of the East, emphasising the complementary aspect of the opposites.

Divisions are essential for all encounters, from negotiating differences to a conflict of interests, political confrontation, paramilitary engagement and war. The inclusion of some is necessarily based on the exclusion of others. Binary representations of self and other are therefore vital for the formation of identity, and for the sense of uniqueness of the self. The seemingly negative division thus serves an important and positive social function. Yet otherness is also a prerequisite for a bloated in-group identity. We cannot indulge in feelings of distinction, superiority or self-righteousness unless there is a lesser counterpart against whom to compare ourselves. Similarly, to maintain social order we need to be able to tell the difference between those who violate the (our) rules and those who abide by the law.²

This book covers several interrelated aspects of conflict, rejection, and exclusion. In the main title, *binaries* refer to the primary mental division

¹ Harle, *The Enemy with a Thousand Faces*, 10-2.

² Ibid.

into two opposites prevalent in discourses relating to political, societal, ethnic and religious identity and enmity, while *battle* refers to actual confrontations and juxtapositions – the themes around which the individual articles revolve. Battle also points to the military settings and the rationale for war, which many of the writers touch upon.

Divisions are enforced in times of conflict. In war, certain others become totally excluded from us, to the point of being perceived as less human, subhuman or even non-human – in each case, a legitimate kill. In its ultimate form, the division creates the category of *evil enemy*. At an archetypal level the enemy represents the Devil itself, while the self assumes the position of God. As Vilho Harle argues, the enemy is a special case of the Other. Functioning as a reflector of the Self, the image of the Other retains some common human qualities. As for the de-humanized image of an evil enemy, it is totally different from us, and can be used as a scapegoat in times of conflict. It seems legitimate to destroy the bad, in order to allow the good to prevail.³

Portraying the opponent as the ultimate evil is apparent in propagandist representations of the Other in times of war. The propagandist image of an enemy is always strongly stereotyped, to the point of making it so visually distinct as to be easily recognizable by one and all. The visual form of the evil enemy is distinguishable at first glance, immediately revealing its essential difference in its physical appearance.

It is easy for us now to recognize the historical images and narratives of enmity – e.g., the countless depictions of the Nazis, Jews, Bolsheviks, Hitlers and Stalins of WWII – as conflict-related, politically motivated and culturally constructed representations, and not as accurate descriptions of the actual figures.⁴ Similar representations produced today are more challenging to spot. The popular, visual contemporary representations of the ‘evil enemies’ of the West, characteristic of the post-9/11 era, can be found in the characters of Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. Even the contemporary ‘bad men’ are portrayed in the mass media as terrorists, tyrants and dictators unheeding of human rights, oppressing their people and posing an ultimate threat to Western democracies.⁵ In the Western narratives these leader figures have served as antagonists that must be captured, destroyed and killed in order for democracy, humanity and freedom to prevail. One by one they have been captured and photographed – portrayed as powerless, dishevelled and

³ Ibid., 12-5.

⁴ Burke, *Eyewitnessing*, 123-8.

⁵ Kotilainen, “Muammar Gaddafin, Saddam Husseinin ja Osama Bin Ladenin vihollispektaakkelit”.

defeated, to be subsequently killed by Western “humanitarians”.⁶ Our time will be remembered through such images, reflecting the worldviews of their presenters, and revealing uncomfortable truths about the political system that created them.⁷

According to Carl Schmitt, a political movement is born when it finds an enemy – a real or imaginary outside force that appears to threaten its core values and/or thwart its fundamental goals. Opposing the chosen antagonist then becomes the movement’s mission. This kind of *constitutive enemy* serves as the negation of what the group cherishes, whom it seeks to protect or what it promotes; paradoxically, the rhetoric of hate is the rhetoric of love inversed. Carefully tailored, such enemies serve well as so-called ‘good enemies’, legitimising the movement’s actions and providing a means of maintaining a positive self-image by presenting a negative counterpart.⁸

Many of the individual writers of this book take as their starting point the notion that group stereotypes invariably contain the seeds of harmful corollary effects, necessarily speeding the creation of self-satisfied in-groups vis-à-vis inferior out-groups. Indeed, stereotyping as described by Edward Said and Stuart Hall – as a process based on crude distortion, largely separate from any actual reality⁹ – is indeed more suited to othering, exclusion and oppression than to a growing understanding and unity.

Stereotyping is easily detectable when ‘we’ get defined by outsiders. Yet, our own perceptions of the others, whoever they may be, often appear as rather neutral and functional. Identity-building from the inside also makes good use of stereotypes when setting binding ideals for the would-be members. Self-stereotyping occurs when group members either conform to the ideal, or even assume that by belonging to a group they *a priori* embody its high ideals.

As tools for coming to terms with each other in the initial stages of contact, stereotypes are nevertheless indispensable. Identifying individuals by sorting them into pre-set categories, understandably presenting less variation than occurs between actual individuals, helps us to make workable sense of the multitude of strangers we meet.¹⁰ Regardless of

⁶ Kotilainen and Jantunen, “Huipulta häviöön, vallasta verilammikkoon”.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 26-39, 46-7, 54, 64-8, 74, 79. See also Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*.

⁹ Said, *Orientalism*; Hall, “The spectacle of the Other”.

¹⁰ For further discussion, see Oakes-Haslam-Turner, *Stereotyping and Social Reality*.

what malevolent-stereotype theorists insist, most people are, more often than not, perfectly capable of separating the two levels, using group stereotypes only as an often unreliable initial tool inappropriate for any final classification of individuals. The evil potential of stereotypes becomes fully evolved only in particularly unfortunate circumstances, typically enhanced by an antecedent power struggle or a competition for material resources.

Intense loyalty towards one's in-group often manifests as an active reluctance to call into question its values and beliefs. The social codes of a group may openly favour cohesion and harmony at the expense of open debate. The *groupthink* phenomenon, as described by social psychologist Irving Janis¹¹, focuses on the subliminal tactics to avoid risking a group consensus about what is right and true, leading the members to ignore contradicting information e.g. about the risks involved in the chosen line of action. Janis originally developed his model to explain how and why the initial faulty thinking involved in certain military and political failures went unchecked long enough to produce disastrous outcomes. Among his original cases are Nazi Germany's decision to invade Russia, the U.S. failure to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbour, and the Watergate scandal. Janis' model has implications for many fields of research touched upon in the chapters of this book, including communication studies, political science, military and business management, and organisational theory.

According to Janis, group-imposed (false) conformity typically leads to an inadequate evaluation of alternatives and deliberate ignorance of unpalatable facts, eventually resulting in uninformed decision-making. Attempts to minimise *intra-group conflict* produce Manichean worldviews and case-group isolation, thereby increasing polarisation and eventually increasing the risk of *inter-group conflict*. In the end, replacing independent critical thinking with ultra-cohesive groupthink is likely to result in irrational and dehumanising actions towards out-groups. On the other hand, groupthink may also jeopardise the well-being of the in-group by allowing it to practise wishful thinking about its situation, give in to illusions of invulnerability and infallibility, and turn a blind eye to potential threats.

To illustrate his point, Janis listed the symptoms of groupthink. They include overestimating the power of the group, compounded by a firm belief in its superior morality, which entitles the members to discard self-doubt and considerations of guilt. Issues that call into question the group's assumptions typically get explained away with shallow rationalisations,

¹¹ Janis, *Victims of Groupthink*.

while opponents are labelled as weak, evil, ignorant, biased and/or stupid. Illusions of unanimity are maintained by voluntarily discarding ideas that differ from the (imagined) consensus, and by considering silence as a sign of acceptance. Those who openly criticise the group are brought back into line by calling their loyalty into question. The truest believers shield the others from potentially dissenting information.

The list of respective cures boils down to a few down-to-earth rules. To resist self-enhancing groupthink, we should deliberately expose our ideological notions to criticism, promote independent thinking, invite outsiders with 'outside' ideas, consider things from several viewpoints and explore as many alternatives as possible. Janis' last piece of advice applies particularly well to the academic seekers of truth: always make sure that there is, among your crew, a *Devil's advocate*, to remind the rest about the importance of taking into fair consideration even the most bizarre of the opposing views.

This book offers multi-layered insights into the realms of representing divisions in wartime and peacetime conflicts. The methodological contexts range from linguistics to visual analysis, from semiotics to ethnography, and from the phenomenology of the body to organisational analysis. The academic fields of research include media studies, social science history, leadership and organisational studies, military science and tourism research. Some chapters discuss burning real-time issues, such as the fast-developing cyber warfare or the positive and negative corollaries of mass immigration, while others focus on more timeless topics.

Although most of the writers concentrate on the events of the 20th and early 21st centuries, taken as a whole the eleven chapters cover a time perspective ranging from representations of Antiquity to expectations about the future. The soldier's identity and the changing modern soldiery are looked at from the point of view of the military personnel themselves, while the everyday reality and immediate consequences of modern warfare are often seen through the eyes of civilian society. The soldiery themes relate mostly to adult males, but the themes of irregular migration and civilians trapped in the theatre of war also concern women, children, youth and the elderly.

The first part of this book deals with practices and representations of war. Armed confrontation serves as the prime example of a situation where the division into "us" and "them" manifests itself in a tangible form. At the social level, the division appears to be ideological, political and economic; yet it also has effects at a very personal level, either in the form of

psychological and corporeal experiences or as material and even cultural losses. Wars are not only about staging battles and moving borders, or juxtaposing different ideals of a good life or an orderly society. They are fuelled by violence, inflicting immense pain, and killing people. Wars, both past and present, are constantly with us: experienced, mediated and reminisced about. The construct of war influences all spheres and levels of human life even when the phenomenon itself is absent, and the impact of a war extends far beyond its actual temporal duration.

Focussing on the social and humanitarian cost of modern warfare, the chapters of Part I offer relevant new information through unconventional perspectives – tourism, military burial practices and politically motivated journalistic representations of war. In the opening chapter, Anu Valtonen gives us a guided tour through the realm of *dark tourism*. At first glance, war and tourism might seem to be at odds with one another: war is about hostility and death, while tourism is about entertainment and hospitality. Yet we often come into contact with suffering and witness the pain of others while travelling.

Visiting sites where atrocities have been committed is also commonplace in tourism. While travelling in Poland we visit Auschwitz, in Cambodia the Killing Fields; on a summer trip driving across our homeland, or strolling around in a foreign city, we stop to contemplate a burial ground or war memorial, or visit a military museum. War tourism has been estimated to constitute one of the largest tourist attractions in the world. There is something particularly poignant about facing the pain of others through visiting sites of war and atrocity.¹²

The centrality of the experience is highlighted further when we think of the phenomena in broader terms: every day we encounter war and pain mediated from the sites of ongoing wars and past wars by browsing through the daily paper, watching the TV news and surfing the Internet. By encountering the horrors of war and atrocity, past and present, we place ourselves in the world in relation to not only war and violence, but to humanity. Through the act of encountering pain, sites of atrocity serve as sites of witnessing, empathising, and thus understanding. Encountering and witnessing the pain of others arouses our emotions and sentiments. These sentiments may be multifarious and take various directions.¹³

When encountering human suffering, we may feel pity, empathy or grief, and may experience an urge to act for the betterment of the status of the sufferers, or even of all humanity.¹⁴ Such witnessing calls for

¹² Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, 85-8.

¹³ Sliwinski, *Human Rights in Camera*; Sontag, *ibid.*, 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

judgement: what is it we see, how do we relate to it, what actually happened, and how can we prevent it from happening again? On a positive note, emotional responses aroused by witnessing suffering allow people to hope and plan for a better world, which may be interpreted as a sign of humanity's ongoing progress.¹⁵ On the other hand, witnessing the pain and death of those with whom we identify may cause us to feel anger, hate and resentment instead, increasing the black-and-white division between "us" and "them" and eventually resulting in a wish to retaliate, even to wage war.¹⁶

Seeking experiences related to war and anguish creates a market for thrill-seeking dark tourism. In her article, Valtonen takes a critical look at today's tourism industry, presenting a case where a past incident of military violence is used to produce an entertaining experience. Valtonen shows how a historical atrocity story activates an emotional map of victims vs. enemies. Encountering past atrocities in touristic settings can indeed generate, or revive, feelings of hate towards a onetime enemy.

In a time of war, the conflict between us and them culminates in the respectful handling of the bodies of dead soldiers – both theirs and ours – and in the notions about practices related to war death. In the second chapter, Ilona Pajari traces the representations of identity and enmity through the dissimilar burial practices for the Finnish and Soviet fallen of WWII.

The dead body of a soldier, felled in war, bears with it more than just the significance of any human remains. The body of a dead soldier can be seen as sacred, representing the ultimate sacrifice, honour, and devotion to one's country. As an introduction to her topic, Ilona Pajari discusses the various European traditions concerning the treatment of fallen soldiers, before moving on to describe the handling of the dead in Finland, first during the Civil War of 1918, then during the wars of 1939-45.

The Finnish practice of bringing the fallen back from the field and burying them in the soil of their home country was motivated by a spirit of "bringing all the boys home". As the fighting took place close to the Finnish borders, this was more achievable than in some other theatres of war. Special burial grounds were established next to the churchyards of the home parishes of the fallen. The Soviets observed a different practice, burying their dead close to where they had fallen, usually in trenches. Collective war memorials known as the *graves of the Unknown Soldier* were set up at home, to serve both as places of memory for the individual soldiers and as patriotic monuments to their heroic combat. The difference

¹⁵ Kant, "An old Question raised again", 144.

¹⁶ Sontag, *ibid.*, 13.

between the Finnish and Soviet conventions of honouring the fallen, most probably caused by practical considerations, notably the vast size of the Soviet Union, gave rise to speculation among Finns about how the official hostility towards religion and an alleged lack of respect for individuals in the socialist ideology was reflected in the war practices.

Pajari discusses how the Finnish wartime propaganda made use of the Soviet burial practices – alongside other material, including atrocity stories and comic descriptions of the stupidity of the Ruskiies – to create a contemptible image of the enemy. The supposedly opposing worldviews of the two nations – one Christian of a mostly Lutheran, partly also Greek Orthodox denomination, the other officially atheist – would also be evident in the way the Soviet soldiers, as opposed to their Finnish counterparts, approached matters of death and burial. This juxtaposition is not entirely false, but it can be regarded as unfair in many respects. The article shows that the differences in the ways of burying and honouring the fallen arose not only from the different attitudes towards religion, but also from different ideas about individuality and differing military traditions. Moreover, the fallen in different wars were commemorated in different ways.

The third chapter of Part I resumes the theme of war-as-entertainment, tracing the Italian newspaper coverage of the Iraq war as gruesome entertainment. Marja Härmänmaa analyses the rhetoric embedded in the representations of topical warfare through methods of critical linguistics. She deals with the representation of the Iraq crisis and war from autumn 2002 until spring 2003 in three of Italy's most important journals: *Il Corriere della Sera*, *La Repubblica* and *L'Espresso*, analysing their vocabulary and the naming practices of the different elements related to the crisis, including the choice of agents and affected participants and types of predicates they are related to.

Härmänmaa reads the Italian press representations of the Iraq war in the context of the maintenance of the national identity. According to her finding, the Italian media represented the country's involvement in the war as a humanitarian mission, embarked on mainly for the sake of Iraqi civilians and their cultural heritage. She concludes that although the Italian press, as well as the Italian people, seemed very much against the war, the media nevertheless presented the war from a decidedly Western point of view and for a Western audience. The press revelled in news about the deeds of the invincible – and innocent – allies, peppered with reports of Iraqi casualties, turning their suffering into a serial for Westerners to follow and bemoan, while sitting in their armchairs as distant spectators of the unfolding events. Positing that the Italian press somehow managed to

present the war in Iraq as a humanitarian mission, Härmänmaa concludes her treatise by asking whether war is actually peace, and peace war.

Even though war is a persistent feature of human societies, it is inclined to change along with the changes in its surroundings, military technology and political context. Part II builds heavily on the themes of the previous one, taking into consideration the changing nature of contemporary war, the related humanitarian issues, and the implications of the military novelties for the concept, experience and imagery of war.

Once upon a time most wars happened between states and were fought by regular armies. The emergence of irregular warfare, such as the post-9/11 Western war on terror, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations and international humanitarian military interventions, aided by technical novelties such as unmanned remote-controlled drones, has not only transformed war itself, but also the ways in which it is perceived and experienced. The fundamental changes of the past few decades also concern the corporeal operators of war. The personal experience and motivation of a soldier, as well as his private identity, public image and the related expectations have changed enormously, along with the surroundings, practices and overall implementation of war. The chapters of Part II discuss these recent changes, drawing on the teachings and conceptions of the past.

An essential alteration in the discourse of war is related to the introduction of the concept and ethos of *humanitarianism*, associated ever more intimately with international power politics. War and humanitarianism are seemingly at odds with each other. Yet, paradoxically, modern war is inseparable from humanitarianism, as the principles of human rights have their origin in the immense suffering caused by war.¹⁷ The current global system of regulating the global machinery of help and relief extends far beyond neutral help by non-governmental relief workers. The promotion of human rights can be seen as an ideological apparatus, which extends all the way to the highest levels of politics and warfare.¹⁸ Humanitarianism has in recent decades become the central frame through which actors evaluate each other's legitimacy and determine their roles in international politics. The "humanitarian paradigm" has become a byword

¹⁷ On the war-related origin and current operations of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations, see Ignatieff, *Warrior's honor*, 109-63.

¹⁸ Douzinas, "The Many Faces of Humanitarianism".

of the international community and the current world order.¹⁹ Recent Western interventionist wars, from Kosovo to Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, have all been justified by a humanitarian ethos and motives.²⁰

As Marja Härmänmaa points out in Part I, the war of today is all too often camouflaged by humanitarianism. The rhetoric of helping, of alleviating suffering and promoting human rights, has merged with military slang and operations. Its tireless repetition in the Western discourse has transformed the image of war, conditioning the public to expect wars to be relatively humane and bloodless, with a minimum of casualties and pain. The practices of legitimization have changed not only the discourses and imagery, but also the practices of military conduct and operational culture, down to the performance of the primary operators: the soldiers. The current Western discourse of a clean, hi-tech, humanitarian war without casualties has an impact not only on the expectations and requirements, but also on the identity and self-reflections of 21st century soldiership.

In the chapter titled *Drones, missiles and teddy bears* Saara Jantunen and Noora Kotilainen address the practices of representing the Western warriors of today. In order to track the changes, the authors look into topical Western media representations, official documents and military communication presentations, focusing on the various conflicting expectations about the role of the soldier. The authors discuss the Enlightenment ideology and the end of the Cold War as the culmination points in the development of modern perceptions of soldiership and military intervention. They move on to analyse the official visual and textual presentations of the Afghan war (2001-) in order to illustrate the formation and development of the current ideal of the *global Western soldier*, serving in today's multinational military operations in the global warzones. Finally, they discuss the motivations of today's soldiers participating in international military operations. This is achieved by analysing the image of the soldier, constructed in recruitment material, and the way it is reflected in the potential recruits – how they are seen and how they are expected to experience their role as soldiers.

The core of Jantunen and Kotilainen's argument is that the present state of modern soldiership is the result of a development that started during the Enlightenment. It is based on the ideas of reason, virtue and instrumentalism, the original building blocks of the American ideoscape. Yet in the contexts of modern warfare, the practices of military violence and the humanitarian role of the warrior constitute a paradox. This

¹⁹ Aaltola, *Western Spectacle of Governance*.

²⁰ Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond*.

becomes manifest in the attempts to merge the Enlightenment values, once vital to the Western identity, with the demands of effective warfare.

The theme continues in Virpi Lehtinen's article on the kinaesthetic-sensational body of the Western male soldier. Drawing on the concepts of the *phenomenology of the body*, she concentrates on the bodily aspects of the formation of the identity of the Western male soldier in contemporary wars and other conflict settings. The author argues that the proliferation of irregular wars, between parties with vast differences in tactics, resources and/or degrees of militarisation, pose a challenge for the Western male soldier's identity formation. When fighting against a militarily inferior adversary, they find it difficult to experience the battles as honourable, as the concept of military honour traditionally relates to combat between men who are relatively equal in force – or even to fighting an incomparably superior enemy, as depicted in Greek and Old Testament mythologies. Due to information-technological advances, the contemporary soldier may attack the enemy from a location that allows him to maintain a position of total invulnerability.

Lehtinen focuses on the corollaries of the diminished dependence on manpower and bodily strength, also by biochemical means. Does it mean that the soldier's body – its needs, desires and intentions – play only a minor role in contemporary and future battles? Or has the dependency on embodiment just changed into a different type of dependence? What are the potential effects of the two alternative options on the formation of soldier identity?

Bias in academic writing is often considered to be bad form, more suited to light journalism than serious scholarly endeavour. Ideally, a researcher should aspire to objectivity, even though the goal will remain unattainable. Sometimes bias is applied unconsciously, under the influence of cultural convention or intellectual fashion. Promoting ideological content using selective evidence or unbalanced argumentation is sometimes pejoratively called 'partisan research', particularly by those with different biases.

On the other hand, openly siding with the underdog is a viable option within disciplines with interventionist or emancipatory ambitions, such as feminist research, social policy, sociology, ethnography and gender studies. Generations of progressive political historians and political scientists have also been known to promote their chosen ideologies by dismantling the arguments of their predecessors and/or tackling their

opponents under academic banners. Perusing texts with opposed biases is a serviceable way to build an all-round picture of a subject.

The chapters of Part III openly take sides, discussing the potential controversies between immigrants and indigenous populations from different angles. The focus is on conflicting ideological constructs, such as multiculturalism vs. xenophobia and Islamophobia, mobility vs. border control, and neo-nationalist vs. Islamist militancy. Initial contacts across cultural lines create fertile ground for friction, and present-day encounters evoke memories of historical conflicts. Both positive and negative past experiences reappear as a significant factor in arguments about the future, either in a utopian or a dystopian guise.

The big issues at stake include the nature and limits of human rights, the multiple understandings of the basis of the concept of rights in general, and the many different guises of (self-)righteousness; the varying definitions of victimhood and the potential legitimacy of mutually exclusive claims of victim status; and the broad spectrum of the implications for the freedom of movement, its inherent risks and intended benefits.

When defining in-group identities, representing the Other as different, inferior or downright evil is always a convenient standby. In Chapter Six, Pia Mikander analyses the construction of the Western Us and the respective Other through readings of history, culture, war and conflict, using Finnish history textbooks as her source. School textbooks offer the critical reader glimpses into the hidden agendas of an educational regime, related to acculturative projects such as identity-building. Analysing the descriptions of two historic events, namely the battle of Thermopylae between the Greeks and the Persians, in 480 BC, and the 9/11 attacks in New York along with the ensuing Afghanistan and Iraq wars, Mikander shows that the strategies of presenting the opponent as Other vary very little – regardless of which historical opponent they refer to.

Through such descriptions, the students are instructed to position themselves as Westerners. Even though history writers are supposed to at least attempt to present events and situations objectively, the division into Us and Them is readily applied in the books. The Western identity is enhanced by hiding some of its aspects, such as the violence committed by the Westerners. It also reveals how Islamophobic statements are embedded in the descriptions of today's world, turning Muslims into the essential Other.

The remaining chapters of Part III present two European discourses on immigration that appear to be founded on diametrically opposed sets of ethics – for want of better words termed liberal and conservative, as

described by the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. According to him, the *liberal ethic* concentrates on providing care and preventing harm, motivated by an overall ideal of fairness understood as full equality. The *conservative ethic* recognises – and respects – the care/harm principle, but instead defines fairness as proportionality, namely rewarding each person according to their input. In addition, the conservative ethical code includes such traditional ideals as loyalty, respect for authority when based on accomplishment and experience, culturally defined notions of sanctity, and personal liberty, which the liberals typically treat as outmoded or even downright harmful.²¹

Anitta Kynsilehto analyses the attempts to control human mobility, notably the access to Europe across the Mediterranean, and takes a look at the persons who seek to challenge these attempts. *Irregularity as a securitised phenomenon in the hubs of transit migration* draws on the author's ongoing ethnographic research, which focuses on the irregular forms of human mobility in Europe and the Mediterranean area. It deploys the theory of *securitisation* to address the increasingly repressive measures undertaken by border control that aims to halt irregular migration.

The article is written from the perspective of persons who are themselves in an 'irregular' situation, or who work among such people in order to protect and enhance their basic rights. It takes as its focal points three sites where the practices of securitising irregular migration can be observed, namely Calais, France; the Greek-Turkish border; and the island of Lampedusa, Italy. The sites have been chosen because of their role as highly mediatised and thus illustrative points of *entry into* (the Greek-Turkish border, Lampedusa) or *transit within* (Calais) the European Union. The sites have been explored using the multi-sited ethnographic approach. The chapter shows that despite the increasingly technologised attempts to govern and control human mobility, there are also persons who seek to challenge these attempts. Therefore, increasing control will not put a stop to human mobility.

Marja Vuorinen traces the development of the modern anti-Islamist/anti-multiculturalist ideology. *Case Breivik – a solitary madman's crusade or a reality check for Western democracies?* focuses on the interplay between enmity and self in the political programme of European neo-nationalists. Vuorinen analyses the anti-Islamist political thinking of Anders Behring Breivik, the then 32-year-old Norwegian whose terror attacks on Oslo and Utøya, on July 22nd 2011, took the lives of 77 of his fellow countrymen and women. The analysis is based on Breivik's 1516-page *Manifesto*, published online before the attacks and still available. The

²¹ Haidt, *Righteous Mind*, 128-86.

first half of the Manifesto is a compilation of texts by several critics of multiculturalism and/or Islam. Its second half is more personal, describing Breivik's own political development and the preparation process leading to the attacks.

Vuorinen's analysis focuses on the interplay between the images of Self and Other in Breivikian thinking. The in-group, defined as traditionalist, neo-nationalist, secular/Christian Western men and women, is contrasted with a series of interrelated enemy images, including the multiculturalist liberal Left, Western feminism and emancipated womanhood, the appeasement-minded EU and aggressive Islamism. Drawing on the *typology of enemies* developed by Vilho Harle,²² Vuorinen suggests new conceptual subcategories to describe the continually developing scene of enmities.

In Breivik's case, the anti-multiculturalist political programme motivated violent actions on a mass scale. However, similar ideas are also promoted by individuals who wish to achieve their goals through peaceful means. Vuorinen discusses the ideal of freedom of speech as a condition for democracy vis-à-vis attempts to prevent violence by banning hate speech. Her article practises, and strongly recommends, an ideological disarmament based on communication, instead of promoting a further escalation of differences.

The final part in the book looks at different manifestations of strategy, planning, organisation and leadership through the lens of communication. The first chapter of Part IV presents a civilian case, while the latter two discuss army and warfare from the point of view of the professional military.

The possibilities and limitations of communication are determined by culture. In the Western world we take it for granted that there is a systematic, predictable and stable cultural context; yet at the same time we belong to many local sub-cultures based on building individual relationships. The components of rapport consist of understanding, respect, and trust.

In all wars, the decisive factor is the human factor. People are the centre of gravity, regardless of whatever technological enchantment may prevail in the battlespace. Every politician and war-maker knows this, but when violence is enacted, the educated high-level actors of war suddenly seem to forget it. Yet we know from the military and battle history that

²² Harle, *ibid.*, 9-21, 35 and *passim*.

only by providing human beings with the security they need, by earning their trust and by promoting confidence can the military organisation prevail.

Pace of communication differs depending on the medium. While communicating slowly in real human relationships, we simultaneously operate within speedy information systems. In conflict situations, contradictions arise due to differences in the pace and time of communication. During combat, the speed of live communication is slower than cyber communication. Action is delayed not only because of the human reaction speed but also by the need to thoroughly understand the message and sometimes even weigh up the command. Compared with human speed, commands related through cyber systems are carried out instantaneously, as well as precisely. The downside is that high-speed cyber events, once set in motion, are difficult to intercept. In the postmodern world, it eventually becomes impossible to communicate to the fight from the outside.

In war, the perceptible enemy is not the only threat. People affected by the war are also threatened by inadequate governance, corruption, and abuse of power. In a postmodern war the military target is a whole network, not just individuals or some 'bad' groups. The binarity of modern war can be formulated in several ways, such as "if you kill civilians or damage their property in the course of military operations, you will create more enemies than your operations eliminate". The second binary point is that before one starts to clear or secure some area of the war, one must develop a comprehensive approach plan to hold and to build this area. Last but not least, one has to understand that the people within the theatre of war see things through their eyes.

Part IV opens with a civilian application of strategy. In her article *Strategists in trouble?* Virpi Sorsa looks at an everyday adaptation of strategy to solve a management-related disagreement. She analyses the linguistic techniques and skills of the participants, as well as the tensions and power relations embedded in the disagreement. The situation is that of socially constituted tension between senior managers. 'Being a strategist' appears to be a fluctuating role even within a top management team. Drawing on the literature on strategists' relational communicative competencies, Sorsa examines how language influences the constitution of 'the voice' of leaders and those involved in strategising.

The context of the study is provided by the strategy formulation meetings of a top management team (TMT), updating a strategic plan for a city organisation. During the strategy formulation, the key participants of the meeting disagreed about exactly how the actions of each of the city's

departments should be included in the strategy. Through a deep analysis of the subtext of this tension, the article explains how the linguistic skill of one of the managers became instrumental for their sensitivity and ability to manage tensions, linked to the participants' professional roles and power relations. This insight extends the prior research by highlighting the importance of a better comprehension of the practices through which strategists' tensions are managed.

The book closes with two articles by men of military calling. Their focus is on current practices and the immediate future of warfare. The recent change of military-technological regime, with the introduction of cyber warfare and other novelties of war, create new challenges and conflicting expectations for military planning and leadership.

Juha Mälkki focuses on the so-called *linchpin leaders* and their impact on the effectiveness of the military organisation. His aim is to trace the true human and organisational potential of military effectiveness, as well as the disintegrating forces that might imperil it. The basic argument is that the battle performance of any military does not consist of an iron discipline or a superior command of the art of war – but instead of the ability of the leaders to understand the internal tensions of the organisations.

The concept of *linking pin leadership*, coined by Rensis Likert²³, is developed further in the article. Mälkki draws on conflict theories to paint a more comprehensive picture of the older linchpin idea of what is needed in organisations going through power struggles and social stratification, especially in the heat of battle, when coercive forces undermine the effectiveness of the military organisation.

Aki-Mauri Huhtinen views the myths, ideologies and other content present in the virtual world as a continuum that allows the armed forces to attain their politically legitimised tasks. The challenge is that the armed forces of today operate in global networks, and globalisation does not support the idea of self-regulation in the rule formation of the social network. The continuum is seen through the concepts of *parallax* and *narrative gap*.

When the Internet expanded from a network of researchers and armed forces into a citizens' highway and commercial network, it crossed the boundaries of self-regulating communality. Today, the ideal of self-regulation has reappeared in the form of volunteers who moderate the social media discussion forums. How does this idea of a collective need for internal control fit into the activities of a military organisation?

²³ Likert, *New Patterns of Management*.

This chapter tests the applicability of the central concepts of a new Western military planning model of the operational level called the *Comprehensive Approach*. The basic principle of the model is a Wikileaks-type open-door policy: everyone operating in the same real space can participate in the actions of the virtual planning space, to complete the comprehensive picture of the parallax and narrative gap. The aim of the article is to examine the usability of the central concepts in a new atmosphere of military organisation, and to highlight the challenges that open planning poses for the military organisation traditionally operating as an isolated culture.

The main conclusion is that the organisational development of the military follows the development patterns of the military-industrial complex. Economic steering surpasses the political – Clausewitzian – steering, and the ‘de-territorialising’ effect of the new model centralises the capabilities of the traditional branches of service, army, navy and air force, into a (virtual) whole.

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PART I

WAR

CHAPTER ONE

THE THRILL OF DARK TOURISM

ANU VALTONEN

While the relationship between war and tourism may at first appear to be anomalous or even contradictory, closer examination reveals its long-standing and intimate nature. Briefly put, where there is, or has been war, there are tourists. This is evidenced by literature¹ and by statistics: today, war tourism has been estimated to constitute one of the largest tourist attractions globally.²

War tourism is a subcategory of a type of tourism commonly labelled ‘dark tourism’. It is an illustrative example of today’s society and economy, in which the production and consumption of emotions, sentiments, affect and extraordinary experiences have become more or less a normalized, if not expected, practice.³

This article first discusses dark tourism as a phenomenon, and as an area of research that has gained prominence in recent years in tourism studies, as well as in other disciplines. The article goes on to describe one empirical case of war tourism. The case concerns the production and consumption of a local tragedy – five civilians killed during the Second World War in Salla, a small municipality in Finnish Lapland. The analysis illuminates how this tragedy is narrated by the guide at the War and Reconstruction Museum, and how it is received by the visitor.

¹ E.g. Smith, “War and Tourism”; Stone, “A dark tourism spectrum”; Weaver, “Tourism and the Military”.

² Henderson, “Is There Hope for Anger”; Smith, *ibid.*, 205; Weaver, *ibid.*

³ Ahmed, “Affective Economies”; Arnould and Price, “River Magic”; Keinan and Kivetz, “Productivity Orientation and the Consumption of Collectable Experiences”.

Dark tourism as a phenomenon and as an area of research

Death and tourism

Tourism and death have cohered for centuries.⁴ The Roman gladiatorial games provide one early example of death-related tourism, while in England, the very first guided tour was a train trip to witness the public hanging of two murderers. In Finland, it was the Crimean War (1854-56) – fought also in the Baltic Sea, along the coasts of Finland – that attracted the tourists of the time to travel to Helsinki to see the spectacular sea battle from the water's edge of the city.

Also today, real and/or commoditized sites associated with death, suffering, violence or disaster attract large numbers of visitors. Auschwitz and other concentration camps or Holocaust museums are perhaps the epitome of this type of tourism.⁵ In addition to these, many other sites are also popular: prisons such as Alcatraz⁶, battlefields such as those in Vietnam⁷, or the American Civil War (1863) memorial in Gettysburg⁸; slave castles in Ghana⁹; or Ground Zero, the memorial to the 9/11 attacks in New York, which provides a more recent example of people's desire to visit a site of death and disaster. In a similar fashion, trips to sites where individual celebrities – such as Princess Diana – or a large number of people have met sudden death keep attracting visitors. In addition to memorials, there are also more active ways of witnessing death and identifying dying: during the Bosnia war (1992-95), it was possible for tourists to buy package trips that allowed them to see the real battlefields, or to follow the shootings in Sarajevo.

The popularity of these sites thus reminds us of the human fascination with death. In this sense, they are part of the thanatoptic tradition, one of contemplation or meditation upon death, which has long been a part of Western religious and philosophical thought.¹⁰ In particular, it is the sudden, un-quiet, violent, traumatic and difficult-to-comprehend death that

⁴ Stone and Sharpley, "Consuming Dark Tourism"; Sharpley and Stone, *The Darker Side of Travel*; Seaton, "Guided by the Dark"; Seaton, "War and Thanatourism"; Weaver, *ibid.*

⁵ Beech, "The Enigma of Holocaust Sites"; Cohen, "Educational Dark Tourism".

⁶ Strange and Kempa, "Shades of Dark Tourism".

⁷ Henderson, "War as a Tourist Attraction".

⁸ Chronis, Arnould and Hampton, "Gettysburg Re-Imagined".

⁹ Mowatt and Chancellor, "Visiting Death and Life".

¹⁰ Seaton, *ibid.*

provides the basis for the type of tourism that is commonly referred to as 'dark tourism'.

Within the academic study of tourism, research on dark tourism is rapidly proliferating. While several terms, such as 'tragic tourism'¹¹, 'thanatourism'¹², or 'grief tourism'¹³ have been proposed for this type of tourism, the term 'dark tourism'¹⁴ is widely employed today both in academic and popular discourse. It is commonly used as a catch-all term for tourism to sites linked to death, grief and disaster. These sites, it is further suggested, can be categorized by the degree of their 'darkness' depending on the nature of the tragedy associated with them.¹⁵ It is worth noting, however, that the threat of death exists, to some extent, in virtually every popular tourist destination. Think of the possibility of accidents, natural catastrophes, or terrorist attacks – tourists and terrorists rely on the same methods of communication and transportation, and infrastructure. Furthermore, scenic national tourist destinations, such as the Grand Canyon, can attract some who wish to commit suicide in a spectacular manner.

The existing body of empirical and conceptual research on dark tourism reveals that these sites are visited for a wide variety of reasons. For some, the sites provide entertainment: they are legitimate places to celebrate crime or deviance, and to express basic bloodlust. For others, they are sites that enable the construction and manifestation of a personal, familial, national or ethnic identity as the sites allow visitors to memorialize lost ancestors, and to contemplate what has happened to 'our' nation or to 'our' ethnicity.¹⁶ Visiting these sites might thus be a way of triggering emotions and affect, and in this sense they might be consumed for dramatic purposes, much like affective movies or melodramas, but they may also be a way of relating to and witnessing the past and its victims. Furthermore, some visitors may search for novelty or nostalgia, or for the educative historical heritage and 'eye-witnessing' possibility these sites offer. Or, as is often the case, such sites are visited just because they happen to be promoted with other mainstream tourist attractions and as a part of package trips.

In the prior research, dark tourism has been addressed from various theoretical perspectives, drawing on, for instance, sociology, history, or

¹¹ Lippard, *On the Beaten Track*.

¹² Seaton, *ibid*.

¹³ Trotta, "Grief Tourism".

¹⁴ Foley and Lennon, "JFK and Dark Tourism"; Lennon and Foley, *Dark Tourism*.

¹⁵ Stone, *ibid*.

¹⁶ Chronis, Arnould and Hampton, *ibid*.

management. This article follows sociological accounts of death – and more precisely, of the relationship between tourism and mortality – as discussed by Stone and Sharpley¹⁷, and Stone.¹⁸ In this sense, dark tourism is conceived of as an institutionalized means of confronting death and mortality in modern societies, through practices such as memorialization and education.¹⁹ It thus provides a socially sanctioned space to encounter, and cope with, an otherwise tabooed, yet inevitable feature of the human condition, death. To quote, dark tourism “allows individuals to (uncomfortably) indulge their curiosity and fascination with thanatological concerns in a socially acceptable and, indeed, often sanctioned environment, thus providing them with an opportunity to construct their own contemplations of mortality”.²⁰

War tourism

War-related attractions are a subset of the totality of tourist sites associated with death and disaster.²¹ This subset is diverse: it includes battlegrounds, war memorials, war museums and war zones, to mention a few. Moreover, as Weaver²² aptly notes, the interplay between tourism and the military sphere has a widespread and ubiquitous presence in today’s economy. Military-themed entertainment is present within a range of tourism-oriented environments: slot machines, simulated flights in a combat aircraft, or simulated battleground situations can be found in museums, amusement centres and theme parks. The present-day, global ‘militainment’ industry thus provides countless opportunities to play out warfare fantasies. In this way, killing is turned into an entertainment commodity. Weaver also notes that many of the people developing such entertainment commodities have a background in producing similar types of devices for the defence industry.²³

The following quote exemplifies how contemporary battlefields, or areas of catastrophe, may turn into playgrounds for tourists. Journalist and communications director of the Finnish Red Cross, Hannu-Pekka Laiho, describes in a Finnish newspaper article entitled *Grief attracts tourists* his

¹⁷ Stone and Sharpley, *ibid.*

¹⁸ Stone, “Dark Tourism and Significant Other Death”.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Stone and Sharpley, *ibid.*, 587.

²¹ Stone, *ibid.*, 1568.

²² Weaver, *ibid.*

²³ Weaver, *ibid.*

long work experience in different sites of catastrophe around the world.²⁴ He claims to have encountered grief tourists as early as the 1970s in Kampuchean refugee camps, where there were “freelancers” who pretended to be journalists, but who just hung around the camps with the aim of looking at the grief. Even today, Laiho remarks, “some of the war tourists take on the identity of a journalist, photographer, or humanitarian aid worker”, and their actions in war zones might be problematic in many ways.

Besides merely visiting and watching the historical or ongoing war-related activities, tourists may also seek more active ways to engage in the thrill that war provides. Often, war tourism is not only a means to confront death, but to confront, or dice with, killing. In this form of tourism, the visitors seek the thrill or shock from the experience of killing – to kill or to be killed – and actually seek to heighten that experience by way of getting close to the act of killing and/or being killed – be it thought of as macabre, enjoyable, or shocking. What is it like? An ethnographic study of Gettysburg provides us with an example of the battlefield tours during which the guides engage the tourists in re-enacting war incidents.²⁵ A fieldwork note from this study states:

“We got off on the first stop and the guide asked for volunteers, of which I was one, and he lined five of us and showed how the soldiers lined up to prepare for battle and how they did their maneuvering and the lines actually fired...with the noise and the smoke and the soldiers actually becoming deaf from the firing. And for me, that was very interesting.”²⁶

A further example of the thrill of killing is provided by the online marketing materials of Somali Cruises – whether it is a real product or a fake is irrelevant for the purpose of this article.²⁷ This company promotes their tourist safari using the slogan “Most cruises offer a mini-bar. We offer a mounted Mini-Gun”. The product they offer is described in the following way: “We sail up and down the coast of Somalia waiting to get hijacked by pirates. We encourage you to bring your ‘High powered weapons’ along on the cruise. If you don’t have weapons of your own, you can rent them on the boat”. The point of the safari is, thus, to ‘kill’ the pirates by shooting them. On the same page, customers who have participated in the safari tell of their experiences:

²⁴ *Grief attracts tourists.*

²⁵ Chronis, Arnould and Hampton, *ibid.*, 1807.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Somali Cruises.*