Southeast Asia between China and Japan
Southeast Asia between China and Japan

Edited by

Lam Peng Er and Victor Teo
CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ vii

Chapter One......................................................................................................................... 1
Southeast Asia between China and Japan: A Historical Survey
VICTOR E. TEO

Chapter Two ....................................................................................................................... 48
Japan and China in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia:
Competition and Cooperation
LAM PENG ER

Chapter Three ..................................................................................................................... 64
China’s Rise and Japan’s Changing Approach toward Southeast Asia:
Constraints and Possibilities
TOMOTAKA SHOJI

Chapter Four ....................................................................................................................... 82
ASEAN’s Perception of Sino-Japanese Relations:
With Focus on Singapore
LI WEN

Chapter Five ....................................................................................................................... 98
Two Giants are Better than One?: Indonesia’s Relations with China and Japan
CHRISTINE SUSANNA TJHIN

Chapter Six ......................................................................................................................... 123
China-Vietnam-Japan: A Strategic Triangle?
KHONG THI BINH

Chapter Seven ..................................................................................................................... 143
Two Powers – Which way? Lao’s Relations with China and Japan
SULATHIN THILADEJ
Chapter Eight ........................................................... 161
Cambodia: Between China and Japan
VANNARITH CHHEANG

Chapter Nine ........................................................... 179
Myanmar’s Economic Relations with China and Japan:
Opportunities and Challenges
TOSHIHIRO KUDO

Chapter Ten ........................................................... 195
The Quest for Soft Power Supremacy: Chinese and Japanese Cultural
Currency in the Thai Popular Music Scene
JAMES MITCHELL

Chapter Eleven ......................................................... 217
The Spratly Dispute, Southeast Asia and Sino-Japanese Relations:
Interests, Constraints and Policies
YANG JIAN

Chapter Twelve ......................................................... 239
The ASEAN States and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in the 21st
Century: The Challenge of Balancing between the Dragon
and the Rising Sun
RENATO CRUZ DE CASTRO

Chapter Thirteen ......................................................... 265
The Engagement of China and Japan by ASEAN: Prospects and Pitfalls
for Regionalism
VICTOR E. TEO

Chapter Fourteen ....................................................... 294
The Road to Recovery: The Spill-Over Effects of Multilateralism
in Cambodia on Sino-Japanese Relations
MIWA HIRONO

Chapter Fifteen ......................................................... 313
Constructing East Asia: Has the ASEAN+3 Lost its Role?
BENNY TEH CHENG GUAN

Bibliography ........................................................... 337

Contributors ........................................................... 371
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors thankfully acknowledge the assistance of the colleagues who have made this book possible. A great debt is owned to the School of Modern Languages and Cultures, University of Hong Kong for making the logistical and financial resources for this project available. We are grateful to Dr Kendall Johnson and Dr Dixon Wong, present and former head of the School respectively, and Professor Kam Louie, Dean Faculty of Arts who have been so supportive of the project. The editors are also tremendously grateful to Miss Lolo Yu, Miss Belle Ho, Mr Richard Edele, Dr Andrew MacNaughton, Mr Samuel Wong and most of all Mr Watson Lam for all their assistance in the organization of the conference at the University in 2009 and the subsequent production of this book. We would also like to express our sincere thanks to the learned scholars who have taken the time to come to Hong Kong to attend our conference, in undertaking the many revisions required as well as their forbearance in waiting for this book to materialize. Finally, we would also like to convey our sincere thanks to the editors and staff at Cambridge Scholars Publishing for their confidence in us and for making this book possible.
“... you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the ‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly ... after all, [Asia] has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses ... the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following ... multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking about millions and millions and millions of people ... it turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the Philippines ... It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place in the world to go - that is, toward the Communist areas in order to live. So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world ...”

—Former US President Eisenhower

In 1954, Southeast Asia leapfrogged to the top of the United States foreign policy agenda after President Eisenhower postulated his domino effect theory to the world. Implicit in his speech and subsequently in many of the discussions that followed, strategic brittleness and diplomatic fragility became characteristics associated with the region. Almost six decades later, it would appear that these characterizations have yet to disappear. The Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, in response to a perceived joint diplomatic maneuver by the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) states and the United States, reacted angrily to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s inclusion of the South China Sea as one of United States “core interests”. Amongst other things, Yang argued
before the group of Southeast Asian politicians and officials, that China’s interest in the South China Sea is as legitimate as anyone else’s and that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact". Along with Eisenhower’s speech, this terse diplomatic exchange between China and the ASEAN diplomats reaffirms a central theme that has existed in the international relations of Southeast Asia, especially with the region’s great power neighbours in Northeast Asia. One scholar has gone so far to characterize this as a “hierarchical order” – with the United States at the apex of the hierarchy, then followed by the People’s Republic of China, and with Japan and India occupying the third tier in this hierarchical order. Implicit in this analysis is that Southeast Asia forms the “base” of this hierarchical order, actively engaging the United States and other regional great powers as a part of a concerted regional security strategy.

Subsumed within this thinking are three very common but arguably misplaced assumptions about the nature of Southeast Asia in international politics. First, Southeast Asia is often regarded as a political “backwater” compared to East Asia because the Southeast Asian countries are seen to be geographically and demographically smaller with less vibrant economies. Collectively and geopolitically as a region, they barely have the strategic weight to balance against China, Japan or the Koreas. Second, Southeast Asia as a region is seen as relatively “passive”, always subjected to the influence of great powers and external lobbying, and the efficacy of its collective role as an actor in International Relations is inconsequential. Third, as a result of the aforementioned lack of geopolitical clout, Southeast Asia stands in danger of being “re-absorbed” into a Sino-centric orbit – as if the theoretical and supposed centrality of China in the ancient world order in the region could be easily replicated today. The papers contained therein this volume will attest to the fallacy of these presuppositions. This volume would also show that Southeast Asia today is very different from the Southeast Asia in pre-modern or colonial times. The region as we know is one that is far more economically vibrant, politically astute and diplomatically united than any other period in its history. Southeast Asia today is able to engage any external powers as effectively and independently as modern statecraft allows. Its experiences of dealing with the colonial powers and external intervention of Japan, USSR and the United States has left the region invaluable geopolitical lessons. In face of the ascending China and a Japan keen on “normalizing”

---

itself in the Post Cold War era, Southeast Asia does not merely reacts to the circumstances but rather is apt at exercising diplomatic initiatives. This focus of this volume is on how Southeast Asia as a region, engages the political and economic giants - China and Japan in the tempestuous twenty first century international politics.

It would not be possible to contextualize Southeast Asia’s experience with China and Japan in a volume as such without briefly historicizing the region’s engagement with these two political and economic giants. Even though this volume is primarily a political science study, historicizing the development of the region can allow us to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of how the region has developed and can enable us to appreciate the nuances of modern-day politics and international relations of and within the region. Today, there are contentions between ASEAN states themselves. Some involves powers external to the region (e.g. the Spratly island disputes which involves Taiwan, China and now increasingly the United States). Others are localized and involved only ASEAN states (e.g. over historical sites such as the Preah Vihear Shiva on the Thai-Cambodian border. These issues are not just differences of interpretation over history but have real strategic-political consequences. The Preah Vihear Shiva temple issue directly undermines the viability of ASEAN as a political organization as the rest of ASEAN looks on helplessly while limited armed conflict broke out between Thailand and Cambodia. The Spratly issue could potentially paralyze intra-region communication should a conflict break out and might bring serious geopolitical ramifications if the United States is brought into the picture as some ASEAN states look to external support to validate their claims. Looking back in the past would allow us to understand the political dynamics of these issues and allow us to separate the political-diplomatic rhetoric from the real issues amidst the contending versions of the past presented to us.

At the same time, if we can further appreciate the trends and developments of the interactions of the political entities over time, we can therefore appreciate how current day dynamics and interactions affect our understanding of the region’s past with both China and Japan.

Pre-colonial Southeast Asia was home to many political units of different constituencies and natures over the centuries – for example Ayutthaya in Siam, Srivijaya, Majapahit, Melaka Sultanates, and the Khmer Empire – all which bore very little geopolitical semblance to the eleven Southeast Asian states we see today. The idea of Southeast Asia is

---

new, as the distinction between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia did not exist until the early 18th century. In itself, Southeast Asia is not a coherent unit in the religious, historical, geographical or ethnic senses, and the region was never united wholly under one political jurisdiction, with five non-Asian powers ruling parts of the region until various points in the twentieth century. There were also Asian powers such as the Majapahit and the Siamese Kingdom that ruled over large tracts of present-day Southeast Asia. Interestingly, neither has Japan nor China ruled over large tracts of Southeast Asia, apart from the Mongolian attempt to invade Java at the height of Yuan China’s power and the Japanese incursion into the region militarily during the Second World War. For China and Japan, Southeast Asia has traditionally never been a major priority on their foreign policy agenda. In fact, prior to the 1850s, China and Japan appear to have remained distinctly segregated from Southeast Asia, despite the existence of intra-regional commercial ties between China, Japan and Southeast Asia.

By and large, China’s impressions of Southeast Asia were relatively limited in the early imperial period. The epistemological foundation of early knowledge of Nanyang (Southern Seas) in China was largely drawn from foreign tributary missions and traders who arrived from Southeast Asia from the 5th century onwards. These impressions were documented and passed down through successive generations of Chinese political leadership until Chinese merchants during the early Sung period brought back first-hand knowledge of the region. Regardless of the accuracy of these accounts, the accumulated record of these experiences cannot be underestimated in its impact upon the successive Chinese emperors. Southeast Asia then was to the Chinese a far flung land separated and cut off from continental China by a massive body of water, and that as early as the 5th century an emporium had existed at various times in Western Indonesia, where well-stocked ships sailed to China.

---

6 Wolters, pp 38-39
7 Wolters, p 36
8 For a good discussion of the East Asian “Mediterranean” trade, see Angela Schottenhammer (eds) The Emporium of the World: Maritime Quanzhou 1000-1400, (Netherlands, Koninklijke Brill, 2001)
6th century onwards, the historical interactions of China and Southeast Asia were thus predominantly made up of merchants, traders, court emissaries and missionaries traversing the region. Srivajaya for one had served as a major Buddhist centre for Chinese monks traveling there to obtain scriptures that originated from India. At the same time, trade between Indian Ocean merchants, the European trading companies with China and Japan was the reason for the expansion of trans-Asian trade for kingdoms like Srivajaya and Malacca and their prosperity.

Over the course of the next few centuries, trade was therefore the dominant conduit by which the kingdoms of Southeast Asia established relations with China. Historians such as John King Fairbank, who has written on the “Chinese World Order” posited a “Sino-centric hierarchical world order” in which China had a superior-inferior, overlord vassal relationship with her neighbors. This idea of the “Chinese World Order” has somewhat been immortalized in narratives of Asian history, and in brief, this system characterizes the model for the conduct of Chinese foreign and trading relations. The vassal states will pay tribute to the Chinese Emperor confirming the superiority of the Chinese civilization and the overlord status of the Chinese court, and in return the Chinese Emperor will confer titles, ranks and riches (many times the tribute given by the vassal state). Today, the idea that Japan, Korea or Southeast Asia states were at some point in history “vassal” states to China in the said tributary system is a contentious (and possibly an offensive) one, not just to ardent nationalists but also to the average citizens in countries concerned. At the onset, this chapter acknowledges the validity of the evidence that supports both sides of the debate as to the nature and the efficacy of the “tributary system” thesis. There is however no question as to whether the political units in question did in fact paid tribute to China (however intermittently). What is questionable is whether the act of paying tributes renders them “vassal” states of China, and this is something the chapter will attempt to address later on.

Drawing from diverse sources, Antony Reid was able to tabulate the frequency of the tribute missions to China by the Kingdoms located in Java, Pasai, Siam, Champa (Southern Vietnam), Cambodia, Pahang, [Shaffer, L. N. 1996, “Maritime Southeast Asia to 1500,” Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 42]

[Wolters, p 19]

Melaka, Brunei, and the Philippines from 1400 to 1510. Twenty one tributary missions were sent from Cambodia to the Ming Court between 1371 an 1432, and more throughout the Angkorean period.\textsuperscript{12} There were also tributary and trading missions from the Ryukyu Kingdom (present day Okinawa) throughout this period.\textsuperscript{13} This period in Asian history is marked in particular by Zheng He’s extraordinary voyages, indicative of China’s eminence as a nautical power in the world. The nature of Zheng He’s voyages is still being debated vigorously – but regardless if the missions were just peaceful diplomacy aimed at re-establishing trade links or exhibiting Ming grandeur or imperialistic attempts to colonize Southeast Asia and beyond – the fact of the matter is that Zheng He’s nautical adventures was short-lived and not indicative of extended and sustained Chinese naval ambitions or diplomacy in Southeast Asia and beyond.

However, the picture garnered from a closer reading of Southeast Asian history offers a very complicated and nuanced picture. China has in fact not maintained a consistent and rigid tributary relationship with all or most of the Southeast Asian Kingdoms since time immemorial. Throughout the course of the last millennium, various Southeast Asian Kingdoms such as Siam, Majaphahit, Palembang, Malacca, Annam all had active but intermittent relations with China. In other words, China’s political relations with Southeast Asia appeared more sporadic and less sustained than her economic and cultural relations with the region. Even at the height of Chinese power – as exemplified by the naval voyages undertaken by Zheng He, it was still debatable whether the Chinese had a consistent

\textsuperscript{12} David Chandler, A History of Cambodia, Westview Press 2008, p 92
### Tribute Missions to China During the 13th and 14th Centuries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Java</th>
<th>Pasai</th>
<th>Siam</th>
<th>Champa</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Pahang</th>
<th>Melaka</th>
<th>Brunei</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1400-09</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3(^a)</td>
<td>3(^a)</td>
<td>2(^a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410-19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8(^a)</td>
<td>4(^a)</td>
<td>2(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1420-29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5(^a)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5(^a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430-39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1440-49</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1450-59</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1460-69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1470-79</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1480-89</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1490-99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: a Ruler led one mission in the decade. Sources: Ming Shi Lu; also Wade 1970: 74; and Wade 1991.
and resilient diplomatic connection with the region.\textsuperscript{14,15} The fact that there were also periods of maritime trade bans in the Ming and Qing dynasties accompanied by drastic reductions in China-Southeast Asian trade means that the tributary system needs to be examined more closely.

To understand the periods where there were bans, it would be crucial to examine what the Ming and Qing emperors hoped to accomplish by controlling the maritime trade. The first Ming Emperor Hongwu believed he was restoring traditional Chinese values by suppressing overseas trade and restructuring the tribute system, while Yongle (the third Ming Emperor) through Zheng He’s voyages countered coastal disorder, extended Chinese hegemony and asserted state power over seaborne traffic.\textsuperscript{16} Yongle’s successor canceled Zheng He’s expeditions (thus eliminating Yongle’s initiatives) but left Hongwu’s ban on private trade in place. This meant that there was a glut in seafaring manpower and expertise along the coast, reverting to the state of affairs before Yongle came into power, i.e. an increase in piracy and smuggling in these areas, undoing Yongle’s efforts in the first instance. The “wokou” (Japanese pirates) were in fact Chinese mariners, acting in concert with some Japanese as well as foreigners (i.e. Westerners such as the Portuguese) who were not allowed to partake in the tributary system. It was not until 1567 when the ban was partially lifted and tributary trade was in effect eliminated. During the Qing Dynasty, these bans were again put in place.

\textsuperscript{14} There is considerable literature on this subject. Part of the debate have focused on Zheng He’s (and hence Ming China’s intent) in the undertaking of these voyages (1405-1433). While some scholars have argued that Zheng He’s voyages attests to the Ming Court’s naval prowess and diplomatic strategy; others have argued that it is very possible that the voyages were imperialistic in nature. For example see Geoff Wade’s paper on The Zheng He Voyages: A Reassessment, ARI Working paper no 31, October 2004 at http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps04_031.pdf ; also see Tan Ta Sen “Did Zheng He Set Out to Colonise Southeast Asia?” in Leo Suryadinata (eds) Zheng He and Southeast Asia, (2005) ISEAS Press,

\textsuperscript{15} It is also important to note that for much of China’s history, the Chinese Emperors have focused on the “barbarian threats” coming from the North, and Southeast Asia whilst considered to be on the periphery of the Chinese civilization posed very little threat to the existence of most Chinese regimes. Zheng He’s voyages were therefore considered an expensive political exploits and the maritime force was subsequently disbanded and documents destroyed by the Imperials officials (the eunuchs” main rivals in court) after the voyages were stopped.

especially in the areas near Taiwan, as the Qing regime sought to ensure that the Ming Loyalists based in Taiwan could not threaten the regime.

Furthermore, it was also clear that at the height of Qing power and influence (i.e. the reigns of Emperors Kangxi 1661-1722; Yongzheng 1722-1735; Qianlong 1722-1735), Chinese settlers had already moved to various Southeast Asian territories to make a living. Mostly from the Southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, some of these settlements had grown to a substantial size. Yet the Qing government did not show any interest in engaging these settlements as either an extension of the empire nor as vassal states. Of late, one of the most curious cases is the Lanfang “Republic”, ostensibly a mining kongsi\(^\text{17}\) based in North Borneo from the 1770s onwards. Drawing from documents recorded by the Dutch East India Company, several scholars\(^\text{18}\) have written on the founding of these Chinese Kongsis. Ironically even as these Kongsis grew in size and stature, the overtures made by the leaders of these Kongsis to become vassal states of China, with similar status as Annam (Vietnam) and Chosun (Korea) were turned down. Luo, the founder of Lanfang Kongsii had in fact great ambition to turn the Lanfang settlement under his leadership into an “outer country” (外藩) and aspired to pay tribute to the Qing emperor every year, but this did not materialize because the Qing regime had imposed a ban on Chinese who had migrated from returning to China.\(^\text{19}\) This discriminatory treatment of the Chinese overseas was indicative of how the Ming-Qing Chinese authorities viewed the world: they were worried that overseas Chinese (especially the merchants) would not be controllable, and would partake in activities (such as smuggling or collaboration with foreigners) that might undermine the security of the

\(^{17}\) A Kongsi (公司) is literally a partnership (pronounced in Fujian dialect). This term refers to the charitable or benevolent organizations overseas founded by Chinese Diaspora communities to assist migrants from the same clan or surname.


\(^{19}\) Yuan Bingling, p 55
regime.\textsuperscript{20} Thus the policy of not protecting overseas Chinese was the norm rather than the exception. One of Zheng He’s missions to Southeast Asia was actually to persuade those overseas Chinese to return to China in support of Emperor Chengzu’s ultimatum for overseas Chinese to return home.\textsuperscript{21} In 1717, Emperor Kangxi again issued an ultimatum for overseas Chinese to return to China by 1720 or otherwise they would never be allowed to return home again. In 1742, the Dutch Colonial government apologized to the Qing Court for the massacre in 1740-41 of the 100,000 Chinese in Batavia, but Emperor Qianlong was reported saying that “those who leave their ancestor tombs to make profits overseas are outcasts of China, and no longer have anything to do with the court no matter what happens to them”\textsuperscript{22}.

What does all these facts mean for our understanding of China’s influence in Southeast Asia then? First, we must realize that until the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the tone and texture of international politics did not quite conform to the Westphalian system of nation-state interactions we are so familiar with today. Pre-modern East Asia then did not understand the notion of sovereignty nor accepted the fact that all states are equal (in legal status at least) and have a right to self-determination in the Westphalian sense. China, Japan and other political units in Southeast Asia existed in a world-order where the “equality” of states (i.e. legal status) was not a natural given condition, and the international system exhibited values and norms of feudalism, the dominant way in which societies and nations were organized during that era. Vassalage\textsuperscript{23} in international relations was the norm not exception. Today we all speak of the “soft power” influence of the United States in Asia, and how both friends and foes admire (albeit

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Deng Gang, Maritime Sector, Institutions and Sea Power of Pre-modern China, Greenwood Press, London, 1999
\item \textsuperscript{21} Deng, p 134
\item \textsuperscript{22} This is quoted by Deng, p 134 and originally appeared in Xia JiaJun, Qingchao Shihua (A History of the Qing Dynasty) Beijing, Beijing Press 1985, p173 and also in Sun Guangqi, Zhongguong Gudai Hanghai Shi, Beijing, Maritime Press, 1989, p 553
\item \textsuperscript{23} At the centre of an overlord-vassal relationship were two central concepts – homage and feality. The vassal states are obliged to demonstrate their respect or dedication to the superior state by declaration or partake in some symbolic expression (e.g. conduct ceremony, present a gift or some other artistic expressions) to express their adoration (real or otherwise). At the same time, through these acts of homage, the vassal states pledge their allegiance (hence feality) to the patron-state. The patron in turn too has obligations to ensure the well-being of the vassal state, and one of the most significant acts would be to protect the vassal state’s independence and interests.
\end{itemize}
grudgingly) the United States and at the same time are influenced by the culture, norms and values that the United States espouses. China’s position at the apex of the social order then in pre-modern East Asia was perhaps somewhat comparable. Her influence emanated out of her civilizational attainment, cultural sophistication and social progress more than anything else. Most countries surrounding China were influenced by Sinic culture. Even though they try their best to retain their independence, they admittedly were influenced by the Sinic attitude towards political and social life as well as international relations. The tributary system was therefore a formal way of conducting foreign relations between China and the “barbarian” countries as well as for the Chinese to dispense aid, conduct trade and manage foreign relations by balancing “barbarian” tribes against each other. Both Japan and larger Southeast Asian entities (such as Siam or Sri Vajaya) validated these norms and values by trying to inculcate vassal states of their own, even as they too paid tribute to China.

Second, prior to the colonial expansion in Asia, many polities were organized along ethno-cultural lines or in the form of trading communities. Even though many colonial states that came into being subsequently were pluralistic in nature, most were ethnically divided. To be sure, there were fiefdoms, sultanates, kingdoms, and trading port outposts of European empires scattered all over Asia in somewhat fixed geographical localities, their existence was never secured and the extent of their territories waxed and waned with their political fortunes. The existence of warfare and rivalry between (or even within) the different political entities in Southeast Asia meant that the nature of their relationship with China (or even Japan) was tenuous and lasted as long as the regime (or more accurately the ruler) which established the relationship stayed in power.

The situation was somewhat similar in China. Few dynasties in China had total control over a unified China and could claim that they faced an absence of political threats and military confrontation where the Emperor enjoyed his reign without internal rebellions or external military threat. For example, while the Zhou Dynasty was the longest lasting dynasty in China’s imperial history, it encompassed the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, which witnessed the rapid rise and decline of several different Chinese kingdoms all vying for supremacy. This implies a few things for China. Without a clear discernable “unified” state,

---

24 In particular, we are reminded of the Southeast Asian historian JS Furnivall’s notion of “plural society” consist of a medley of peoples where ethnic groups mix and interact but do not combine, as they main their own identity, religion and cultural practices. They do meet and interact as individuals in the market place and co-exist side by side in the political unit.
(even though, admittedly, the warring parties themselves had aspirations of “unifying” China), it was (and still is) very difficult to discern which Emperor was the “legitimate” authority receiving tributes or who was actually giving tribute to whom. Moreover, prior to the establishment of the Yuan Dynasty, China saw an increasing incursion of non-Chinese tribes into Northern China. From the 10th century onwards, until the Mongol’s termination of the Kara Khitai (1218), of Xi Xia (1227), of the Jin (1234) and of Southern Song (1275-1279), the Chinese states have adapted pragmatically to less than ideal international circumstances, striving to be “China amongst equals”. It was not until after the establishment of the Ming Dynasty that the Chinese reconstructed and reimposed and reformed the earlier tribute system and the Sino-centric world order. The Hongwu Emperor, the first Emperor of Ming sent emissaries overseas to China’s neighboring states inviting tributes. In turn, all of China’s neighbors were relatively relieved that the civil war that plagued China since the end of Mongol rule was over. Yongle sent naval expeditions to establish these linkages. It was only after the Ming era, China’s tributary relations with Ryukyu, Korea, Annam, Champa (Vietnam), Cambodia, Siam and Tibet remained formal and relatively unchanged until the 19th century. Thus, the tribute system has not been in place since time immemorial but was in fact an institution actively cultivated and reinvented assiduously by the Ming and Qing emperors after the Yuan dynasty.

There are thus a few reasons for the intermittent nature of China’s engagement with Southeast Asia. First, the localized strategic rivalry and warfare in Southeast Asia and continental China made the sustenance of long-term relationships between Southeast Asian political units and China exceedingly difficult. Compounding the difficulty was the fact that unlike present day state-to-state relations, there was considerable ambiguity as to whether Chinese Emperors or the rulers of Southeast Asia’s political units were obliged to uphold the agreements made by their predecessors. The relationships between states struck up by the monarchs were personal just

26 It is not unknown for Chinese emperors to have a female member of the Royal Household marry the ruler of a neighbouring state in a act of preventive diplomacy, and the relationship founded on such a basis might resemble a tributary one in form but not in substance.
27 Mote, p 377
as they were official. However, the continuity of tribute missions to China certainly meant that for most part even if the political units survived – the new Monarch/ruler ascending the throne in China or Southeast Asian side would want to reaffirm the relationship. As such, within the Ming and Qing periods themselves, there is a significant disparity in opinion with regards to the actual meaning and symbolism of the tribute, and the evidence suggests that the relationship was just as symbiotic as it was hierarchical.

What was also true is that the number of tributary states recorded changed according to the political-economic conditions within the countries as well as the routes leading from them to China. In truth, tribute trade was also about the exchange of resources, and even though Chinese Court have traditionally favored the symbolic submissiveness of the visiting dignitaries bearing tributes – in reality the reciprocal act to bestow gifts that far exceeded the value of the tribute received meant that during periods of economic austerity, the act of receiving tributes was a difficult one for the Chinese. Even during the Ming and Qing era, the Imperial courts felt the same sort of difficulty to the extent that the Imperial court had ordered distant countries, such as those in Southeast Asia needed to send tributes infrequently.

The third and most common factor concerns the intent behind the establishment of the relationships between China and Southeast Asia. There were pragmatic reasons as to why the Chinese were willing to enter into such a relationship with the vassal states, beyond the obvious and often cited question of imperialistic ego and illusions of grandeur. As early as 7th century, the Chinese were aware of the geopolitical problems of maintaining overseas relations without naval power, derived from experiences during the Tang and early Sung dynasties. The Tang and early Sung emperors saw the endowment of the Maharajas in Southeast Asia with a strategic role in protecting Chinese interests. But this view was not new. The earlier Han Emperors saw tributary trade as a way to rein in the Northern Xiongnu, but also was a diplomatic strategy implemented in the multilateral context in order to pacify the different tribal “barbarians” from the north. Beyond imperial gifts, a common strategy was to demand the presentation to the Chinese court an important member of the “barbarian” royal family to marry into the Imperial family or to live as

29 Kerr, p 67
30 Wolters, p 56
31 See Wolters, chapter 3 especially pp 20-21
32 Yu Ying-Shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China, University of California Berkeley Press, 1967, p 59
guest (i.e. hostage) of the Chinese court. This pattern of using tributary trade as a foreign policy tool continued in subsequent dynasties. Kublai Khan saw Japan’s (and Java’s) non-compliance to his demands to submit tributes as insulting and insolent, and that it directly challenged Yuan dynasty’s legitimacy. As such, it justified the successive and costly punitive missions against Japan and Java. The Ming Emperors (Kangxi and Yongle) saw the tributary system as a way to nationalize trade, starve the coastal areas of seafaring manpower and expertise in order to reduce piracy activities and as a way to get the maritime barbarians to resubmit to the Chinese courts. In a nutshell, it must be note that China’s relations with Southeast Asia were also crucial for the Chinese Emperors themselves, as the vassals too provided a source of legitimacy for the ruling regime and a way for China to handle its foreign relations.

For most Southeast Asian states (if not all) upholding tributary relations with China meant that the regimes could enjoy the commercial benefits of tribute trade, both in terms of gaining prestigious and/or rare gifts from the Chinese court, as well as prospering from private trade with the Chinese businessmen. In short, one of the prime motivation behind these states engaged in this “tributary” system was to gain a license to trade with the largest economy that existed in the world at that time. There were other political considerations as well. Smaller Southeast Asian states paid tribute to China for protection (from the larger Southeast Asian entities) or to forestall a Chinese invasion.\textsuperscript{33} Yunnan province, today regarded as China’s gateway to Southeast Asia, was only subsumed under Mongol rule in 1214. The kingdom of Dali then (present day Yunnan) was an independent Southeast Asia kingdom that was once regarded as Southeast Asia’s gateway to China. By and large, the Mongolians invaded Dali while they were trying to outflank the fledging Song China’s troops through the invasion of Southwestern China. The Mongolians were not targeting Southeast Asian Kingdoms per se, but Yunnan’s incorporation exposed Burma, Cambodia (Khmer) and Vietnam (Champa and Annam) to future Mongol invasions.\textsuperscript{34} The Mongol-led Chinese army did not succeed because of the humid weather conditions and the mountainous terrains, but these attempts brought mainland Southeast Asia under her

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[33] Between 1280 to 1294, after waging successive wars with the Mongols, the Kingdom of Champa and Annam finally capitulated and declared themselves vassals of Mongols to prevent their countries from being ravaged by war again and again. See Grousset, Rene, Empire of the Steppes, Rutgers University Press, 1970 pp 289-290
\item[34] Martin Stuart Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence, Australia, Allen and Unwin, 2003, pp5 2-69
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
suzerainty as the Kingdoms of Champa and Annam finally declared themselves vassal states so as to secure their own security and to prevent their country from coming under perpetual siege.\textsuperscript{35} Others entered into the tributary relations with China to seek protection from regional regimes, as the Kingdom of Malacca did in 1405. There were repeated Malacca missions to China conducted by the Sultan himself to China (on at least three occasions) as he sought to legitimize his rule as well as to engage the Chinese in an attempt to ward off Siam’s influence.\textsuperscript{36} Zheng He visited Malacca a few times, and with Chinese protection, Malacca was able to grow and prosper, eventually conquering both sides of the Malacca Straits in the 15\textsuperscript{th} century. There is also evidence that Malacca attempted to rope in the Portuguese to form an alliance in order to ward of attacks from the Chinese, who were also attacking the vital sea routes to Goa and Nagasaki.\textsuperscript{37} Yet, Zheng He’s voyages were the exception rather than the norm, for Chinese naval exploration did not continue in a significant way after the Zheng He era due to imperial politics.

Ironically, even the larger Southeast Asian kingdoms too engaged China for their endorsement of their status in the region. For example, Majaphahit Kingdom (Java) intercepted and murdered Chinese envoys traveling to Sumatra with return gifts and tokens of recognition from the Chinese court, so as to prevent the bestowment of investiture by the Chinese upon the Malayu-Jambi Kingdom (the Srivijaya in Sumatra) around 1377 – which the Javanese considered a vassal state.\textsuperscript{38} It was obvious that the political advantages of such diplomacy did not go unnoticed, especially if recognition by the Chinese Emperor lent credence to their struggle for political legitimacy and diplomatic status back home. As Wolters put it so eloquently, “the Malay vassals were willing to engage in the tributary trading relations and allow the Chinese to regard them as vassals for a similar practical reason: The China trade was their source of power, and if the Chinese emperors thought they were manipulating the vassals via techniques of indirect control; the vassals were manipulating the China trade, the reality was that behind the tributary trade, to amass wealth as a means of asserting their authority in the fragmented and restless Malay society” \textsuperscript{39}.

China’s vassal states in Southeast Asia also aspired to build overlord-vassal relations with other lesser states in the region. Southeast Asian

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35} See Grosseut, pp 288-296
\item \textsuperscript{36} Ricklef, p 22
\item \textsuperscript{37} Wang (1964) Malaysia, see chapter on The Historical Background, 1500-1815
\item \textsuperscript{38} Wolters, pp 62-66
\item \textsuperscript{39} Wolters, pp 37-38
\end{itemize}
kingdoms such as the 17th century (Ayutthaya) Kingdom too maintained their own tributary system with the Malay kingdoms in the Indo-Malayan region, even though they simultaneously engaged in tributary relations with China. In Southeast Asia Malayan kingdoms then, there were two distinct geo-political spheres – each with a different set of rules. One was that of the Siamese Kingdom, where obligations were upheld in return for protection and the other was the Malay world itself, where different kingdoms conducted affairs as independent states vying for greater prestige. For the vassals, the powerful Siamese belonged to another realm [like China] and like a powerful spirit had to be appeased so that the immediate world could function with greater harmony.\(^\text{40}\) The two distinct geopolitical sphere has implications for the way we conceived of Sino-Southeast Asian relations at that time and the centrality of China to the region.

This implies that the suggestion that just because there was not a meeting of the minds between the smaller states and China, therefore Southeast Asian states were not vassal states in the China’s tributary system could be problematic. Admittedly, some of these rulers might have partaken in a “farce” that would have enabled them to trade with China but because of political considerations such as gaining international legitimacy or forestalling an onslaught of Chinese, it does not absolve the fact that they had undergone the act of paying a tribute. In imperial China, the process of paying tributes was an elaborate and formal one, replete with ambassadors and envoys dressing up, and moving the tributes in the form of a procession from the port of entry to the Imperial court where the tributes are given to the Sons of Heaven as a sign of acknowledging the superior status of China.\(^\text{41}\) It would not have been quite possible for the monarchs to send tributes without understanding the symbolic meaning in this ritual. The very fact that the tributes were given intentionally (albeit not in a sustained manner) by the different Southeast Asian entities as well as by certain rulers in precursor states to modern Japan and Korea presupposed a tacit acknowledgement of China’s cultural and material superiority at the very least. Even if the intent was to enhance trade or benefit from the tributary exchange, these entities knowingly partook in China’s elaborate tributary ceremonies by sending missions. While there is no evidence there existed any binding legal antecedents, these tributary

\(^{40}\) Babara Watson and Anndaya Leonard, Y Andaya, A Brief History of Malaysia, pp 65-67

\(^{41}\) For a discussion on the importance of rituals, please see James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (United States, Duke University Press, 2005).
cere monies were elaborate and part of a wider cultural social protocol established by the Confucian literati. The very idea of a tributary system was also validated by the Southeast Asian political units themselves as they tried to establish the same sort of patrol-vassal relations in their own spheres of influence. In a nutshell when we consider as to whether these Southeast Asian states who had given tributes to China are to be considered a “vassal” state, there is not an easy answer. However, if giving tribute necessarily meant establishing a vassal relationship (as it did in the eyes of the Chinese), then we have to agree that indeed the tributary system existed between China and the Southeast Asian states even though the Southeast Asian states perceived it differently then.

Just as Siam engaged in an overlord-vassal relations with China and at the same time attempted to cultivate her own vassal states in the region, so did Japan – who was all the more reluctant in acknowledging the superior status of China. Historically, Japan’s relations with continental China was probably the most unique and independent of China compared to the rest of the countries in East Asia. Like China, Japan’s domestic political landscape has been a complicated one, with the competing centers of powers vying for supremacy.

If we take a macro view of Sino-Japanese history, the Chinese have never been too overtly concerned with the Japanese, at least not until the latter half of the 19th century. The Japanese on the other hand, have always been preoccupied and concerned with developments in and around China.

Having said this, the author is of the view that acknowledging this should not have any direct bearing on the current international relations between the People’s Republic of China and the successor states to the Southeast Asian political entities as the modern states have very different political and legal identities from their precursor states. However, the author is aware that “labeling” of any state as a “vassal” to China historically is political sensitive and does not convey the fluid picture of the changing nature between the different political entities over time.

Wood, p 79


The influence of the Chinese on Japan can been distilled from the way Japan has constructed her own institutions. For example, Kyoto is modeled after the capital of Tang China (Changan); pre-Meiji Japanese society is split into four classes
– at least until the Meiji Restoration when all things Western became the national obsession. Japan has always been careful to ensure that she distanced herself from Chinese claims of superior status. It was not entirely clear if Japan sought to be “better” than China in her quest to distance herself from China, but what we can be clear of is that Japan at least sought to have equal relations. Yet, regardless of whether Japan acknowledged if China was superior politically, there appears to be somewhat of a consensus that Chinese ideas, notably cultural norms and influences became somewhat of basis of “civilization” in East Asia. It was these ideas that enabled the Chinese to have an influence on surrounding countries as opposed to interventionist or transformative attempts. Thus the Japanese have always tried to emphasize their uniqueness vis-à-vis China to maintain her independence and national consciousness. Even though Japan had embarked on tributary relations with China during the Sui period during the sixth century, she had as early as the 12th century consistently sought to distance itself from China’s Sino-centric world order and the establishment of tributary relations with China.

The question of Japan’s ambivalent stance towards China was probably most affected by the domestic politics within Japan. Japan’s traditional attitude was to confront China as an equal or superior and this was exhibited in Japan’s diplomacy towards Koryo, a vassal state of China.

Given Japan’s cultural and economic relations with Southern Sung, (Samurai, Peasants, Artisans, Merchants), where three out of the four classes were similar to that of the Chinese society (Confucian scholar class, Peasants, Artisans, Merchants) and origins of the Japanese language script borrowed heavily from the Chinese character system. However, Japan is the country widely acknowledged to have modified and improved upon Chinese ideas to adapt to her local circumstances, at least more so than Korea and Vietnam.

47 David Kang, East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010
48 Kang, p33
49 See Louis Frederic (translated by Kathe Roth), Japan Encyclopedia, (US, Harvard Universities Press, 2002), entry on Ono no Imoko (p755) and entry on Kentoshi (p 511); Some Japanese people might see these missions as less tribute missions but more of a “cultural exchange” missions where Japanese delegations are sent to visit China in order to learn various dimensions of Chinese society. See this blog: http://heritageofjapan.wordpress.com/6-nara-period-sees-the-nurturing-of-chinese-culture/in-the-shadow-of-the-chinese-empire/monks-on-a-mission/imperial-envoys-made-perilous-passages-on-kentoshi-sen-ships-to-tang-china/
51 Kawazoe Shoji, p 417
there was no question that her relations with Northern China (the Jin and the Mongols) remained strained. The subsequent two Mongolian invasions were rebuffed, but on both occasions the Japanese prevailed in no small part due to the storms (“divine winds”) that wrought havoc on the Mongolian fleet. The invasions also meant that Japan’s relations with Yuan China were limited, apart from successive Mongol missions requesting Japan to pay tribute. This meant that for the most part, Japan had only submitted tributes during Sui, Tang and Sung China but has for over two centuries had almost no political relationship with Yuan China until Ming dynasty was founded. As Elisonas notes,

The international order that ideally spanned East Asia when Japan was in the later Middle Ages of its history (1392–1573) may be described as a tributary system, one in which outlying states were bound with real or fictional ties of allegiance to the “Central Country,” China … … as far as the Chinese of the Ming period (1368–1644) were concerned, Japan had entered such a tributary relationship with China long ago, during the time of the Han dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 220). Their scholars could catalog a long list of Japanese “tribute-bearing missions” stretching back at least to A.D. 57. To be sure, in more recent times that relationship had been disturbed by war and piracy, but it was confirmed and regulated once again at the beginning of the fifteenth century, on the initiative of the Japanese ruler Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358–1408), the third shogun of the Muromachi bakufu, who retained his control over Japan's foreign affairs even after formally retiring from the shogunate in 1395.

In 1368, Emperor Hongwu (first Emperor of Ming) sent envoys to request the Japanese to submit and pay tribute, but the envoys were blocked at Hakata where earlier Mongol attempts to invade Japan were fended off. It was not until the early Ming years, specifically in 1371 when

Prince Kaneyoshi (son of Emperor Go-Daigo) declared himself a subject of Ming China and personally lead a tribute mission to Ming, returning with Japanese captured by the Ming troops and reversing decades of non-acceptance of the Chinese order. Yet, the Court of Shogun Yoshimitsu only responded in kind thirty years later and this was then in the hope of establishing a profitable luxury trade more than anything else. Subsequently, it was reported that there were repeated clashes between the Japanese and the Chinese who came to trade because the Japanese were not all that interested in the Chinese rituals of paying tribute. This however was shortlived, as two centuries later in 1591, Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s Japanese forces had crossed into Chosun in her attempt to conquer continental China – but Japan’s efforts was repeatedly rebuffed by joint Korean-Chinese task force. Hideyoshi’s unsuccessful attempt to incorporate Chosun (Korea), then a Chinese vassal, is certainly indicative of Japan’s respect (or lack thereof) of the Chinese worldview. This ambivalence extended well into the Tokugawa era. The Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan had effectively encouraged others in the world to see East Asian international relations through the prism of Japanese diplomacy, and at the same time deny the centrality of China. As Toby so eloquently puts it:

“… the place the bakufu built for itself in East Asia was not, however, one prefabricated by the traditional sino-centric world order of Ming. To be sure, many of the norms of the protocol, and even the language of diplomatic correspondence, were of Chinese derivation. But by asserting the shogun’s identity as Nihon-koku taikun, an unprecedented title, by asserting the primacy of Japanese era names, by bring foreign embassies to Edo or Kyoto, and by carefully constructing protocol so that in no diplomatic exchange did the bakufu recognized a superior – in all these ways the bakufu was able to create the illusion of an East Asian world order that was Japanese in design and Japanese in focus. The discovery in the 1640s that Japan was a magnet for Ming loyalists armies seeking military aid…… only heightened the illusion”.57

55 Yuan China had tried to unsuccessfully conquer Japan, after two invasions, Kublai Khan couldn’t have mounted a third due to the factionalism warfare within the Chinese court. Nonetheless, China-Japan relations remained estranged until founding the early Ming dynasty when Muromachi Bakafu were attacking the Southern Court based in Kyushu. See Kawazoe Shoji, chapter 9 in particular pp 396 - 428
56 Kerr, p 70
57 Toby, Ronald, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, Princeton University Press, 1984 p 234
The narrative above indicates that Japan too maintained the semblance of partaking patrol-client relations with China, regardless whether the pledges of allegiance were fact or fictional in reality. However, what is important is also to realize that Japan had at the same time maintained independent and sovereign relations with the Southeast Asia political entities. Japan’s diplomacy with Southeast Asia and the West allowed Japan to construct an alter vision of the international system to suit her own political vision and outlook, and allowed her to conduct relations with China with pragmatic ambiguity. This ambiguity is very often established by skillful if not downright unethical diplomats who were less than honest in the interpretation of the messages from their respective political masters. These acts of deceit and maneuvers were attempts to prevent any mishap that could befall on them (the diplomats) if they reveal the true message they were carrying with them to the sovereign on the other side.

Insofar where Southeast Asians are concerned, Japanese looked towards Southeast Asia as a primitive region that was beyond the realms of civilization. The notion of kiteki chitsujokan that informed Japan thinking in pre-modern history divided the world into the Chinese sphere - Ryukyu, Korea, Cochin China (Vietnam) and the barbarians elsewhere, i.e. Southeast Asia (apart from Vietnam). There is evidence that early accounts of Southeast Asia were brought back first-hand by shipwrecked sailors who were rescued from Java and Sumatra and returned to Japan via Chinese or European ships. Even though Japan carried the same sort of condescending attitude towards the natives in Southeast Asia, these countries’ viability as trading partners with Japan were not at question. Most Southeast Asian states were regarded as suitable partners for trade and commerce if not for diplomacy. As such, for greater part of Japan’s pre-modern history, various Daimyos and Japanese communities were engaged in commerce (and sometimes politics) in various parts of Southeast Asia. In 1292, the Mongolian ruler also dispatched an expedition to punish and invade Java after King Kertanagara of Singharasi disfigured

58 See Toby, 1984
59 Swope, pp 757-782
60 See Kenichi Goto, Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Post Colonial World, Ohio University Press, pp 1-15, especially on the attitudes of the Japanese towards the Javanese and other Southeast Asian people.
his envoy but this was equally unsuccessful. Japan hence stood in solidarity with the Java based Majaphahit Kingdom (1293-1500) as both of them strove to fight off the Chinese (actually Mongols of the Yuan Dynasty) in the 13th century. From the early 15th century onwards, there was an active Japanese community in Luzon and Manila, predating the arrival of the Spaniards. The Japanese ships purchased cotton and forest products and conducted pearl fishing along the Ilocos coast in the Philippines. They were involved in the trade and export of “Luzonware” which were essentially Yuan/Sung ceramic burial items back to Japan used for tea ceremonies. The Japanese were also actively engaged in trading copper with the Portuguese subsequently. There was also a Japanese presence in Siam in the 15th century, as the King of Siam had maintained a large number of Japanese Samurai as bodyguards. The leader of the guards, Yamada Nagamasa took a prominent part in the history of the Kingdom, and was instrumental in establishing the relations between the King of Siam and the Shogun of Japan Tokugawa Iyesu at that time. King Songtam promoted friendly relations with the Tokugawa Shogunate and named envoys to Japan, and traded Thai guns and ammunition for Japanese horses, deerskin and obtained tin, teak, sandalwood, sugar, coconut oil from Siam. Vietnam (then Annam), which until the Nguyen Dynasty was regarded by the Chinese as vassal

---

62 Grousset, p. 288
63 See Garcia, M. 1979, “Readings in Philippine Prehistory,” Manila : Filipiniana Book Guild, pp. 16: Khubai Khan had dispatched his great expedition consisted of a thousand ships with a provisions for a year, for the purpose of subduing Kartanagara, who had refused to pay tribute and mistreated the Emperors envoy. Upon arriving in Java the expedition found that Kartanagara was dead and that his throne was in the hands of a usurper; so the Chinese generals contented themselves by joining forces with Raden Widjaya- who had sent them presents and friendly messages- to oust the usurper and lay waste his kingdom of Kediri. ; also see Grousset, pp 288-293
65 Flory, p 123
66 Glamann, pp 167-182
67 Wood (1933), pp 159-161
68 Rong Syamananda (1973), pp66 ; also see SarasinViraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853 (US, Harvard University Asia Cente, 1977)
69 A watershed period will be 1884 when Vietnam after the Treaty of Hue came under French colonial rule completely.